1
G.R. No. 212565 February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
BENJAMIN CASAS y VINTULAN, Accused-Appellant.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan (Casas) assailing the
Decision2 dated November 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 which affirmed the
Decision3 dated November 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and
136843, finding Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide under Articles 248
and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively.
The Facts
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC
charging Casas of the Murder of Joel Tabile y Gulla 4 (Joel) and
the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz y Ricardo6 (Eligio), the
pertinent portions of which respectively read:
Crim. Case No. 136842
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of
San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, in conspiracy with another person,
whose true identity and present whereabouts are unknown, with
the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill
and by means of the qualifying circumstance treachery (sic),
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Joel Tabile y Gulla, thereby inflicting upon the latter
several stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Crim. Case No. 136843
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of
San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, in conspiracy with another person,
whose true identity and present whereabouts are unknown, with
intent to kill and by means of the qualifying circumstance
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
which qualifies the crime to frustrated murder, with the use of a
bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Elegio
Ruiz y Ricardo, thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which ordinarily would
have caused his death, thus, performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but
which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely
medical assistance rendered unto said Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo,
which prevented his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.8
During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After
which, joint trial on the merits ensued.9
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows:
On December 24, 2007, between 1 to 2 o’ clock in the afternoon,
Casas, accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ron" (Ron-Ron), went
to a certain taho factory located at 313 F. Roman Street, San
Juan City, looking for a certain Jesus. Failing to find the person
he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a
pail used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of
the tahofactory, confronted Casas, saying to the latter,
"Benjie[(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi
mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas
replied "Gusto mo ito? (referring to his knife)." Eligio told Casas
to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio
and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas
took the knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while the
latter was fleeing. Casas, during his continued pursuit of Eligio,
then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio with the
use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on
the floor, and was prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him
twice, the first blow entering his back and exiting at the front of
his torso, and the second blow hitting the left side of his
abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed him
again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio
grabbed a plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing
the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R.
Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he was riding his
motorcycle on the date of the incident when he met PO3
Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance as the
latter saw a bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded
towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas, and asked him
what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed
someone. After confirming that there was indeed a stabbing
incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested
Casas.10
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to
Evidence11 on the basis of the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which the RTC denied
in an Order12 dated December 30, 2010.13 With the demurrer’s
denial, the defense changed its theory as Casas admitted that
he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense to
justify his actions.14 In particular, Casas claimed that he was a
former employee of the taho factory and that on December 24,
2007, the date of the incident, his former employer asked him to
get the remainder of his salary. While at the factory, Joel
challenged him to a fight. Casas averred that he refused to
accept Joel’s challenge, but the latter took a knife and attacked
him. During the alleged attack, Casas posited that he suffered
minor injuries when he disarmed and stabbed Joel. Eligio and
one Rolando Jaronel witnessed the fight, and when they saw
that Casas stabbed Joel they began to attack him also. In order
to protect himself, Casas repeatedly stabbed Eligio. He
maintained that he did not intend to kill Joel.15
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision16 dated November 4, 2011, the RTC convicted
Casas of the following:
(a) in Crim. Case No. 136842, Murder (of Joel), thereby
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
all the concomitant accessory penalties, and ordering him to pay
the amounts of ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity, ₱12,500.00 in
actual damages, ₱37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity,
₱30,000.00 in moral damages, ₱30,000.00 in exemplary
damages, and costs; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 136843,Attempted Homicide (of Eligio),
thereby sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and ordering him to pay the amount of ₱14,000.00
as temperate damages, and costs.17
It declared that the evidence on record did not support Casas’s
theory of self-defense, observing that the victims showed no
unlawful aggression towards Casas. On the other hand, the
prosecution’s witnesses invariably testified that it was Casas
who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as
he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing,
establishing that Casas was the aggressor. Further, it was
pointed out that Casas suffered only nine (9) injuries, consisting
of three (3) abrasions, one (1) contusion, and five (5) incised
wounds, which did not, collectively or individually, threaten his
life at any time.18 Conversely, Joel was killed because of the
stab wounds that Casas inflicted, while Eligio was stabbed
multiple times. As such, the second requirement under Article
11 (1) of the RPC, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the unlawful aggression, was non-existent.19
Meanwhile, the RTC found that Casas stabbed Joel twice when
the latter slipped, fell, and lay prostrate, and in that position Joel
could not defend himself. Accordingly, it ruled that Casas
employed treachery in killing Joel, and thus should be convicted
for Murder.20

As for Eligio, the RTC opined that though Casas’s intent to kill
the former was present (as shown by the weapon he used, the
number of wounds he inflicted, his resolution to chase and harm
Eligio after the latter fled, and the parts of Eligio’s body that
Casas injured), the circumstances that would qualify the case to
Murder were not attendant; therefore, Casas should be
convicted only of Homicide in such respect. The RTC also ruled
that the said crime was only in its attempted stage given that the
prosecution was not able to prove that he performed all the acts
of execution which would consummate the Homicide, 21 nor
show the nature of Eligio’s wounds.22
Dissatisfied, Casas appealed23 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated November 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the
RTC’s conviction of Casas but modified the amounts awarded
to ₱75,000.00 in civil indemnity, ₱12,500.00 in actual damages,
₱37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity, ₱30,000.00 in moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages for the
Murder of Joel. As for the Attempted Homicide of Eligio, it
awarded ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages, and ₱10,000.00 in
moral damages, in order to conform with recent jurisprudence.
Aggrieved, Casas filed the instant appeal.25
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Casas’s
conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide
should be upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability.
Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from the denial
of his demurrer, banks on the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in order to overturn his conviction for the crimes of
Murder and Attempted Homicide. The statutory basis therefor is
Article 11 (1) of the RPC which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.— The following do not incur
any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced that the
above-mentioned requirements were not present in this case. It
is significant to point out that upon invoking the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the burden of
proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing
evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing
required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on
the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it
were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission. 26
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on
the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non
for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case
law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted
to self-defense.27 As shown by the records, it was Casas who
was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a
knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay
prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. 28 Being the
party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was
2
unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude,29 as against the one claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and
Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed
by the former against the latter considering that Eligio had
already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It
is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away – if
and so such was the case with respect to Eligio – unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and
when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise,
retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not
the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still
existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused. 30
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was
not proven, Casas’s claim of self-defense falters and his criminal
liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas
should be convicted of the crime of Murder with respect to the
incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842, i.e., the death of Joel,
considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of
treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the
prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b)
that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article
248 is treachery.1âwphi1 Under Article 14 of the RPC, "[t]here
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make." In other words, to appreciate
treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution
employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted;31 indeed, treachery cannot be presumed,
it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 32
In People v. Se,33 the Court explained that the essence of
treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on
the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter’s part.
The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at
the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the
victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of
fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.34
In People v. Discalsota,35 the Court held that treachery cannot
be appreciated in instances when the victim had the opportunity
to flee or defend himself.36
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between
Eligio and Casas.37 Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio,
wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and
fell.38 As he was lying prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the
blows that ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, it is the
Court’s observation that Joel was fully aware of the danger
posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a
knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to
intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole.
Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the
danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and
there being no showing that no appreciable interval of time had
elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the
assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally appear that
Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel
had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably,
 3

Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped is increased to ₱20,000.00. In addition, all awards for damages,
on the floor when the former caught up with him (Joel). in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, shall bear legal interest
Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality
as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts of judgment until fully paid.
this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the The rest of the CA Decision stands.
Court downgrades the conviction to the crime of Homicide. In
SO ORDERED.
consequence, Casas is instead meted with the penalty of
imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the Associate Justice
concomitant accessory penalties, for the Homicide of Joel.

The downgrading of Casas’s conviction in Crim. Case No.

136842 results in the deletion of the award of ₱30,000.00 in
exemplary damages.39 Further, keeping with recent
jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the award of
moral damages from ₱30,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, 40 as well as
delete the award of ₱12,500.00 in actual damages and, in lieu
thereof, award temperate damages in the higher amount of
₱25,000.00.41 The Court also perceives error in the award of
₱37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity since the established
formula thereof was incorrectly applied.

The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as

follows:42

Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income

- Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life
expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).

Thus, operating under the established facts as found by the RTC

that Joel was 22 when he was killed by Casas, and that he had
monthly salary of 1,000.00 to 1,500.00 as a utility man, 43 the
loss of earning capacity is computed as such:

Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500 x 12) - ((1,500 x 12)

x 50%)]

= [2/3(58)] x [₱18,000.00 - ₱9,000.00]

= ₱348,000.00

Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is increased

from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00 as above-computed.
Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of ₱75,000.00 stands.44

In similar light, the Court modifies the award of moral damages

in Crim. Case No. 136843from ₱10,000.00 to ₱20,000.00 to
conform with recent jurisprudence.45

Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall
be imposed on all damages awarded, in both Crim. Case Nos.
136842 and 136843, from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.46

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in the Decision dated November 20, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 with
MODIFICATION in that, in Crim. Case No. 136842, considering
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven,
accused-appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of Homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant accessory
penalties.

Further, in order to conform with existing jurisprudence, the

following monetary awards are MODIFIED: in Crim. Case No.
136842, (a) the award of ₱12,500.00 in actual damages is
deleted and, in lieu thereof, ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages
is awarded; (b) the award of loss of earning capacity is increased
from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00; (c) the award of ₱30,000.00
in moral damages is increased to ₱75,000.00; and (d) the award
of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages is deleted; and in Crim.
Case No. 136843, the award of ₱10,000.00 in moral damages

G.R. No. L-23386 May 26, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PAMFILO ARTUZ, defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is a sad fate that every once in a while a person, peace-loving
and law-abiding, contrary to his wishes but unable to control
events or to anticipate what pugnacious and bellicose
troublemakers may have in mind, is compelled to resort to force
in self-defense, in the course of which the aggressor may suffer
physical injuries or even death. So it did happen in this case,
resulting in a prosecution for murder of the accused Pamfilo
Artuz, now appellant. The lower court, mindful of the
circumstances to be hereafter narrated, did find that there was
indeed an unlawful aggression and that there was no
provocation on his part. In view of its belief, however, that there
was lack of reasonable necessity for the means employed, it
held that there was incomplete self-defense. Accordingly,
appellant was sentenced to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum. Nonetheless, fully cognizant as it
was that the fatal incident could not be ascribed to a criminal
intent on the part of appellant, it did allow his provisional release
on liberty while his appeal was being prosecuted. A vigorous
case for the reversal of the decision for acquittal was filed by his
counsel, Attorney Estanislao A. Fernandez, later appointed to
this Court, but now retired. 1 The brief for the People of the
Philippines submitted by the then Solicitor General, now Justice,
Felix V. Makasiar, joined the plea for his acquittal. After a careful
examination of the evidence of record, we are Persuaded that
self-defense had indeed been shown as there was more than
reasonable necessity for the means employed. The conviction
is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted.
The facts of record were presented and appraised in the able
brief for appellant in their most favorable light from his
standpoint, as was to be expected. The cause of objectivity and
impartiality may be better served by setting forth the facts
according to the brief of appellee, the People of the Philippines.
Thus: "Since appellant raises only a legal issue, he is deemed
to have accepted the finding of facts made by the trial court. The
facts of the case and the conclusions of the Court therefrom are
as follows: `These facts are proven: Leoncio Panganiban was
the object of an assault perpetrated by Dominador Rallonza and
companions; Panganiban informed Artuz about the incident and
the latter immediately went down the house to report the matter
to the authorities. Panganiban and Rallonza met Pat. Amorosa
and while the three were walking they met Rallonza's group. A
fight again ensued between Panganiban and Dominador
Rallonza. Artuz separated Rallonza from Panganiban after
which Rallonza rushed at Artuz with a weapon in his hand.
Rallonza and Artuz grappled for the weapon until Artuz
succeeded in grabbing it. After Artuz was in possession of the
weapon * * * and when Rallonza continued to rush at him, Artuz
stabbed Rallonza first in the lower chest and later twice at the
back. Under the above facts, it cannot be said that there was
reasonable means employed by accused Artuz in repelling the
aggression of Rallonza. After Artuz had taken possession of the
weapon and Rallonza had nothing more in his hand, the menace
or danger to the life of the accused ceased or was greatly
minimized. * * * Although the claim of self-defense is not
established by clear and convincing evidence, the facts show
that accused is at least entitled to an incomplete self-defense
which minimizes to a certain extent his criminal responsibility.
The Court does not give much weight and credit to the testimony
of the prosecuting witnesses tending to show that the stabbing
of Rallonza was done with treachery. As found by the Court it
was the deceased who commenced the unlawful aggression
first against Leoncio Panganiban and then to the herein accused
and that accused did not give any provocation for such
aggression for undoubtedly it was Rallonza, who at that time
was under the influence of liquor, who gave the provocation for
the incident. These circumstances disprove the charge of
murder; instead they show that Artuz fought back to defend
himself against Rallonza, but the means employed by him were
4
not reasonable and commensurate to the danger in which he
was placed at the time he became master of the situation. * * *
.2
There was a manifestation of fealty to the creed that should
animate the prosecuting arm of the government when the then
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, now a member of this Court
as previously noted, after appraising the above facts concluded
that appellant had demonstrated that he was entitled to the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. His acquittal is therefore
in order. As set forth at the outset, this Court is of the same mind.
1. Appellee's brief analyzed both the contention of counsel for
appellant and the reasoning followed by the lower court in
rejecting the claim of self-defense. Thus: "It is the contention of
appellant's counsel that after appellant had wrested the weapon
(tres cantos) from the deceased, the struggle had not ceased,
for the danger to the appellant still existed because it was not
impossible that the deceased could recover the weapon and
thereafter used it against appellant. It is argued that even after
the appellant had wrested the weapon from the deceased, the
latter continued to advance toward him despite the fact that he
was swinging the weapon from left to right and warning the
deceased not to approach him. The deceased must have been
unreasonably emboldened by the alcohol he had taken that,
unheeding of the warnings given by the appellant, he rushed at
the latter, in the course of which he was hit by the weapon on
the chest. In the continuing struggle, the deceased was also hit
twice at the back. With such as a background, the trial court
concluded that, even assuming that the first wound on the chest
was inflicted in self- defense, the wounds subsequently inflicted
at the back of the deceased was not reasonably demanded by
the circumstances 'since the menace or danger to the life of the
accused ceased or was greatly minimized." 3 Appellee's brief
then referred to what it characterized as revealing incidents: "1.
That the deceased and his gang mauled up Leoncio
Panganiban for no reason at all than the apparent thrill they get
from such unwarranted assaults (p. 3, t.s.n., Dec. 12, 1962); 2.
That the deceased and his gang were notorious for these
sadistic activities in that vicinity (p. 2, t.s.n., Aug. 26, 1963); 3.
That the deceased and his gang defied police authority, in the
person of policeman Urbano Amorosa, who tried to stop them
from assaulting Leoncio Panganiban when they, instead, rushed
at the latter evidently because they were irked when Leoncio
Panganiban pointed them to the policeman as his assailants
(pp. 6-7, t.s.n.. Feb. 5, 1963; p. 21. t.s.n., Feb. 28, 1962); 4. That
in the ensuing free-for-all, the deceased first wounded the
appellant on the knee with the death weapon and when the latter
wrested possession thereof, the deceased still pressed the
attack until he was stabbed on the chest (p. 7, t.s.n., Feb. 5,
1963; p. 10, t.s.n., Sept. 2, 1963); 5. That the struggle continued
on without let-up for about a minute longer when the deceased
still [persisting in his efforts to] recover the death weapon, was
stabbed on the back and thereafter he fell down to the ground
(p. 16, t.s.n., Feb. 28, 1962) * * *." 4 Its conclusion, with which
we are in agreement, is that "appellant is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. 5
2. The brief for the appellee relied on People v. Pancho. 6 It was
shown in that case that a controversy having arisen between the
accused and the deceased who was at fault, the latter seized
his bolo and attacked the former. There was a struggle, with the
accused having succeeded in getting the weapon away from his
assailant who, however, tried to recover the weapon.
Thereupon, the accused retreated a little, freed his right hand
from the grasp of his opponent, and inflicted the wounds, from
the effects of which the deceased died four days later. This
Court, speaking through Justice Street, holding that the means
employed was reasonable, pointed out: "Under these
circumstances it is but natural that the appellant should have
used the same weapon to defend himself, and more properly so
because his antagonist was larger and stronger than himself. In
dealing with situations of this kind some allowance must be
made for the excitement naturally incident to the physical
contest; and it cannot fairly be said that in using the bolo as he
did, the appellant passed beyond what was reasonably
necessary for his own defense. It might very well have happened

that the deceased would have recovered the bolo, and, enraged
as he then was, the most probable thing is that he himself would
have struck the appellant with the weapon, inflicting perhaps a
fatal injury, or injuries, upon him. In the light of these
considerations, we are of the opinion that the appellant should
be acquitted." 7 The brief for the appellant relied on the first
Philippine case in point, United States v. Patala, 8 decided in
1901, and thereafter United States v. Molina, 9decided in 1911.
The opinions in both cases came from Justice Mapa. In United
States v. Patala, it was shown that the accused, who was a
member of the crew in an inter-island vessel, was performing his
task cleaning the fish to be served the passengers when all of a
sudden the cook, believing that some fish were missing, slapped
and kicked him. The accused ran away; he was pursued and
attacked with a knife. Then, as stated by Justice Mapa, "taking
advantage of some favorable chance during the struggle, [he]
succeeded in wresting the knife from the deceased and inflicted
upon him a wound in the left side, from the result of which he
died a few hours later." 10 It was then set forth: "The aggression
on the part of the deceased was in every respect unjustified, and
the defendant had a perfect right to repel the attack in the most
adequate form within his power under the critical circumstances
of a sudden assault." 11 In United States v. Molina 12 the
evidence disclosed that the accused went to the house of the
deceased hoping to settle amicably a dispute that arose when
his son, who was living with the latter's daughter as his common-
law wife, left her. His mission was unsuccessful, for upon
reaching that place, the accused was insulted and then
assaulted with a bolo. While he had no weapon with him, he
fought with the aggressor and was able to get hold of the bolo.
With it, he inflicted the wounds which proved fatal. In holding that
the means was reasonable and that the plea of self-defense was
entitled to acceptance, Justice Mapa emphasized: "Considering
the decidedly aggressive attitude of the deceased from the
commencement of this struggle until its termination, it can not
be said that there was a cessation of the danger for the accused,
even for a single instant. If, through the various incidents of the
struggle, or any favorable accident whatever, the deceased had
succeeded in recovering the bolo or in possessing himself of the
hatchet, as he attempted to do to the last, the result of the
combat would probably have been very different; perhaps the
accused, instead of being the slayer, would himself have been
killed. The accused certainly was not duty-bound to expose
himself to such a contingency, and while the Struggle continued,
and, consequently, the danger to his person or to his life
subsisted, he had a perfect and indisputable right to repel such
danger by wounding his adversary, if necessary, as from the
circumstances of the case it was, and even to disable him
completely so that he could not continue the assault. In our
opinion, the means employed by the accused were rationally
necessary to repel the assault, and as the latter was in all
respects unlawful and was not preceded by any provocation of
any kind on the part of the accused himself, we declare the said
accused to be exempt from criminal liability, in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code." 13
3. It may not be amiss to point out that in addition to justice
Mapa, the other two in the illustrious group of Filipino jurists who
were first appointed to this Court, Chief Justice Arellano himself
and Justice Torres, viewed the matter similarly. In United States
v. Gesmundo, 14 a 1907 decision, the accused used a pen-knife
against the deceased, who held him by the neck. As succinctly
put by Chief Justice Arellano: "Death resulted from the wounds
inflicted. The characteristic elements of self-defense are here
well defined, and anyone acting under such circumstances is
relieved from criminal responsibility." 15 In United States v.
Paras, 16 promulgated that same year, the accused used a
revolver after having been assaulted and knocked down by the
deceased. With his nose bleeding and while still being kicked by
the aggressor, he fired several shots at his assailant. Again, this
Court held that that was a proper case of self-defense, the
means employed being reasonable, the essential point being
"that without any known cause or reason, Florencio Paras, in the
darkness of night, was assaulted in a brutal manner by James
Reed, who knocked him down, and the assaulted party in self-
defense fired at his assailant several shots with the revolver he
5
carried in his hand." 17It was further stated by Justice Torres: "It
is reasonable to believe that the accused, when he defended
himself by shooting his assailant, did not exceed his rights in his
defense or employ unnecessary means to repel an attack
already commenced in a cruel and violent manner or to prevent
its continuation, because from the suddenness of the attack, the
end thereof, without risk to his person, could not be assured. It
would not be proper or reasonable to claim that he should have
fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the
emergency in which, without any reason whatever, He was
placed, and being attacked by a person larger and stronger than
himself, there was nothing more natural than to have made use
of the weapon he held, in order to defend himself; anyone, upon
being assaulted in a similar manner, would have acted likewise.
In the natural order of things, following the instinct of self-
preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense;
an impossibility can not be demanded of the injured person
when it can not be affirmed that he could have done less than
he did in defending himself by shooting at his assailant who had
maltreated him and knocked him down." 18
4. It would thus appear that the lower court was unduly strict in
its appreciation of the situation that confronted appellant. It was
not for him a matter that he could, with calmness and sobriety,
objectively weigh. He was attacked by an assailant intent on
mayhem and possibly worse. He had already been wounded;
his life was in danger. The aggressor in addition was further
emboldened by his gang, rowdy elements unmindful of, if not
taking pride in, the injury they could inflict on peaceful citizens.
It was the assailant likewise who had the weapon. Appellant had
the good fortune of being able to take it away from him. That
ought to have given pause to the former. It did not. The peril then
to appellant's life, actual and imminent, continued. He had in his
hand the only means of self-defense. He did brandish it to warn
the deceased. The response was negative. What else was there
left then for appellant except to act exactly as he did? It would
be to disregard the counsel of realism and to rely on the
conjectural if on the above facts he would be denied exculpation.
The test of rationality is not what a man should do under normal
circumstances and with time for cool reflection present. It is
rather how an individual in such dire situation, with the grim
prospect of the loss of life, would react. The law wisely takes into
consideration the well-nigh irresistible force of the instinct of self-
preservation. This Court, from the previously cited case of
United States v. Patala 19 promulgated in 1901, to People v.
Boholts-Caballero 20 a 1974 decision, has been steadfast and
unwavering, in its adherence to such a test of
rationality. 21 There is no justification for a departure from such
a norm. The appellant is entitled to acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of February 26,
1964 finding the accused guilty of homicide with the attendant
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete
self-defense is reversed and the accused is acquitted. His bond
for provisional liberty is ordered cancelled. With costs de oficio.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer
for acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome"
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the
proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete
exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-
husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on
appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that
broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9
and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of
her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her
in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame
her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances
arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from
custody on parole, because she has already served the
minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25,
1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic
Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered,
the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec.
5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay
Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
[causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
6
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity.
Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes
out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone
of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous
rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest,
trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty
during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. 6 In due course, she
was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on
November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with
the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time,
Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too.
Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben
and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a
cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2)
bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of
Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a
store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for
the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant
arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas'
rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to
which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was
the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since
then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was
always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her
close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her
house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for
a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell
her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida
was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant
going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the
waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her
children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation
as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told
him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented
by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause
of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since
he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the
gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get
inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a
window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside
the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming
from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on

the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with
injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of
the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of
Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo
Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte,
received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented
house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr.
Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben
lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at
the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin
found in one corner at the side of an aparadora metal pipe about
two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The
metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with
a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end
without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom
was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because
of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house
before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer
at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo
found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body
was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr.
Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of
Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home
after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her
husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since
it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to
look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but
did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return
at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's
request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the
light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television
antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According
to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around.
She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left.
At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the
bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her
'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the
drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-
inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed'
the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and
his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the
pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She
thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer
where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on
November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
7
working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to
the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3)
children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary
school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates;
and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were
against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to
stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed
as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's
parents, together with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In
the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and
their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could
not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when
Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come
home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in
one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after
Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with
blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another
incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father
apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's
forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic
reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's
forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too,
saying that Ben and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or
less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went
along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were
'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic
stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was
also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband
went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the
couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she
saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic
for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on
November 15, 1995 'After we collected our salary, we went to
the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3)
hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer –
allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not
there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went
across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the
masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners
so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were
quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is
used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on
the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied
'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were
joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road
from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben
were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He
claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with
a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that
Ben would always take her back after she would leave him 'so
many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it
was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben

'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben
became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often
run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her
out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She
said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help
from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors
would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their
reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her
every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to
Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at
the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of
the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard
a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for
help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses
'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please
note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of
Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic
shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through
the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house
and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Ben
Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the
accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was
able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children.
After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that
evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please
note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas
while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located
about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he
knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the
couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben
would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble.
One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben
was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.'
He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and
when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will
say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me,
'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr.
Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would
see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the
witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife
was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben
had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that
morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of
Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995,
Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben.
They searched in the market place, several taverns and some
other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic
home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got
to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano
said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss
Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking
and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and
she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked
her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time
her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did
8
sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when
Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and
I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic
ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't
get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through
the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted
for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that
when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple
were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic
were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was
his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment from
other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until
November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in
his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and
considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and
hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart
of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of
physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a
psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were directly
related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist
who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the
patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where
the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before
Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She
sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who
were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in
the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed
'that they might have settled with each other or they might have
forgiven with each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the provocation.
Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical
Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always
follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x
Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a
gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels
could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas
lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day,
November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila,
rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher
under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that
she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery
of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw
the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe
she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on
her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards
the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'

"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995
after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from
the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the
prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the
trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal
Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and
among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and
the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and
passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some
police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back
to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the
injury involving the skeletal area of the head' which she
described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination,
Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against
Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE
committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use
of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21
July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997,
15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August
1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day
of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of
parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon
automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's
trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary
measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by
her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a
letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the
same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court
of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her
'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4
February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and
stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000,
undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow
the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of
the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists.
9
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of
Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in
the country, who opined that the description of the death wound
(as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more
akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the
Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days
from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and
relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared
and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch
35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a
quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan
informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist
for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected
presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before
this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at
the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and
was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense
College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology
from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past
president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and
is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from
about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology
Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling]
Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence
and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing
research about Military Psychology. She has written a book
entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan
Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she
has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first
case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the
socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved
in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500
cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there
are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from
domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of
incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional
abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-
defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually
think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would
happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were
the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse
to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.'
Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman,
'also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have
superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant,
very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic)
a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are

involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they
become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them
feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their
parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-
blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself
which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her
obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of
the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the
violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another
room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence
on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,'
abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic,
are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital
relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting
and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even
death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological
tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the
profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of
self-confidence which we can see at times there are really
feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees
herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same
time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and
did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite
of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then
thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who
has since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a
Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the
practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in
private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and
neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical
Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from
government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General.
He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo
Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of
Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown
in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978'
which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines 2000', which was likewise published internationally
and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use
Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published
the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional
disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the
brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand,
10
is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to
finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical
Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound,
and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In
those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman
Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such
as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a
woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is
sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo
said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode
of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina
and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger,
'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-
traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated
under the 'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is
produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is
not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but
the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become
neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and
restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She
has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to
an individual's illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous
care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is
aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong
façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act
without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the
presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the
battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic)
because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in
her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress
disorder try to defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives.
Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the
immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that
abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and
there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in
an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17)
minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case
studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo
said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental
condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said
'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-
experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her
mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more
subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either
the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the
Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially
re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC
gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had
killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the
trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed
him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had
killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts'
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for
the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting
in part appellant's Motion, remanding the case to the trial court
for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring
the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings
taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs.
Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts
on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by
the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to
form part of the records of the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court
for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to
self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and
Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore
liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be
by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding
evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that
Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa
was a battered husband.
11
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from
the children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight
to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt,
instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an
aggravating circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the
traditional elements in determining the existence of self-defense
and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously
convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and
condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death." 13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1)
whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her
fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in
nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues.
As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused
his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of
discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts
that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the
case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged
errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page
Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence
on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-
defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court,
may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in
an "obviously hasty" manner. The Information had been filed
with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial
began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took
the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to
promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and
resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all,
the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded.
In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with
his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben
Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the
non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender
with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the
brother of appellant's deceased spouse -- attested in court that
Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no
objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission
is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there
is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.19 Other
than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage
contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made
by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the
deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct
cause of Ben's death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with
a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in
its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the
acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at
the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victim's death." Determining which of these
admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating
evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-
beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant
had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman
syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant.
Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the
trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of
self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear
inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of
the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring
testimony from appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by
the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies
the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are
necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither
the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from
presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of
whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent
apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error
as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal
liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child.
When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon
her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal
cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine
jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete
self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey
their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a
12
person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman." 25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low
self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and
the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant
male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's
actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27 which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it
could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of
hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer
through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself
to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All
she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited
by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his
belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss
of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from
the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws
emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive
and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence
"spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering incident. 29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered
woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put
an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the
time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with
him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack
and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember
every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence
may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful
experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents
are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for
it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her
again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle
and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor
of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation

and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she
remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he
seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in
this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer
are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his
nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each
partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated.
Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.31
History of Abuse in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the
defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her
heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent
year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your
husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this
abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and
sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat
me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we
separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving
home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was
convinced and after that I go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty
and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a
doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
13
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of
injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that
time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or
in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will
just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the
Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing
testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which
are found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the
dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma
(R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr.
Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area,
pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma.
Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you
were the attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who
attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle
left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with
something rough substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an
inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
 14

xxx xxx xxx A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to
our treatment. She does not response when the medication was
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress
related and emotional in nature.
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is
Q What did she tell you?
emotional in nature?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of
of these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her
the patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of
husband.
what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to
Q You mean, Ben Genosa? the patient all comes from the domestic problem.

A Yes, sir. Q You mean problem in her household?

xxx xxx xxx A Probably.

ATTY. TABUCANON: Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause
accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not
incident happened? response to the medication.

A As per record, yes. Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take
the blood pressure of the accused?
Q What was the date?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was
A It was on November 6, 1995. 180/120.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, severe.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this
Court, was the patient pregnant? is dangerous level of blood pressure?
A Yes, sir. A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor
pregnancy was she? of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the
couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy? were inflicted upon her by Ben.35

A Yes, sir. Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had
been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her.
examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings? On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic
complicates her pregnancy. came running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed
up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked
A Yes, sir.
her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They
Q For how many days? returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already
drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
A One day. sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel
hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she
Q Where?
decided to leave.
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa,
xxx xxx xxx at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
said that you were able to examine her personally on November process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
What is this all about?
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary 15, 1995 in the evening?
to hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same
period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty- A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office
three (23) times. working then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and
went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked
Q For what? my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he
was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I
A Tension headache. was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him,
my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that
children.
the patient had hypertension?

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for
him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this
time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at
Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested
to sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was
again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I
requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because
she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with
you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would
not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual
behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly
behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at
you? What else did he do if any?
15
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to
quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you
know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking
for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would
beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to
you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him
because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me
again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him
of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him,
'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.'
At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing
their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his
challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because
they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as
Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me
and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the
bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was
going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their
reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry
with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of
the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and
then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed
so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open
the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the
key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3
inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
16
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to
testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the
psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa
for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their
talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a
quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife?
Could you in layman's term describe to this Court what her life
was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten
years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a
lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse
and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income,
she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the
family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight
and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of
physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting
from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at
the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening
day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely
elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional
supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999,
where you talked to her about three hours, what was the most
relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened.
The most important information were escalating abuses that she
had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that
you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have
substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether
I can consider them as substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of
her husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of
her husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who
are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she
stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and
battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered
in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about
being battered, it really happened.

Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on
saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this
in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there
had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because
of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that
is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had
experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as
follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective
personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying
prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth,
or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective
personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she
is a person that I can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from
her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo
Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,42 which was based
on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report
said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and
happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was
also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At
the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he
showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report
continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as
time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed
that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time
he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate
whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking
[spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and
practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were
in vain. Further quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the
advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in
spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt
in the Court's mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a
severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In
determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating
17
the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian
court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental
state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average
member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with
this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such
a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point
of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she
not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint
should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable
person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been
subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent
with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been
through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to
clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about
battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her
research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in
the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with
the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that
the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered
woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her
own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with
no means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker
found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation
and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the
battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She
has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
[W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner --
poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that
she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep
the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that
she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also
helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent
family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty
thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As
such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma"
could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and
severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they are
essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x
x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating
the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to
try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim
ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a
predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the
University of Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has
control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will
be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses
rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive

aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important.
He referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness."
"[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the
situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering
situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their
terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow
responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also
believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a
shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and
hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for
specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the
repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long
period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that
would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to
find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the
essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle
of violence" supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben
and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quohow the fatal incident that
led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage.
However, that single incident does not prove the existence of
the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build
up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to
Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to
try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more
violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the
third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would
usually run away to her mother's or father's house; 58 that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their
common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents
between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the
only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support
of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped
in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable
to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her
factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert
witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain
fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each
other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous
studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that
appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
18
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a
modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence
that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman
syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons
further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of
the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly
believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one
who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual,
not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides
the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur
any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected
attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of
a person.64 In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there
was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and
inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized
person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents
of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack
before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her
to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on
the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to
the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence
of danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence
of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous,
does not warrant self-defense.67 In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of
Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise
any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty,
we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor

circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook
doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for
review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by
the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to
Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report
dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The
repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband
constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down
her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very
clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of
violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He
explained that the effect of "repetitious pain taking, repetitious
battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity
and the prolonged administration of the battering is
posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering.
Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged
administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the
victim and another one is the public and social support available
to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that
disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the
qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress
disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of
the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is
heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant,
she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect
herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how
do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or
[a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called
delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering
and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional
instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and
probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened
to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months.
The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one
is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal
and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from
neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress
disorder." 72
19
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the
expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman
syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence
inflicted upon appellant resulted in "cumulative provocation
which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in
concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the
exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or
intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her
favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been
held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed
as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by
prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason.77 To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there
is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the
unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck
towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be
recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The
attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His
abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at
the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though
she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and
mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood
pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear
that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation,
she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then
she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that
there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic
could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr.
Pajarillo's testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a
psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She
cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious
and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the
suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person
under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic
experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her
from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical
nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a

period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the
violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That
the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with
their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception
naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.81 In order to qualify an act
as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence.82Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial
court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred
this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the
lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open,
depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As
to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however,
the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following
testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his
death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and
then he kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed
so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open
the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the
key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3
inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
20
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe
and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what
happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was
frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed
him, the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck
or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through
with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also
because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun
and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of
treachery. There is no showing of the victim's position relative to
appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from
the assailant.85
 21

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and however, not all of these elements were duly established.
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing
the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for
up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer- temporal as maximum.
spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
resolves the doubt in her favor.87
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
Proper Penalty unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de
oficio.
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating SO ORDERED.
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and
found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
Tinga, JJ., concur.
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez,
64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion
JJ., join Justice Santiago in her dissent.
temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying
circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of
the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is
next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall
be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem

it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14
years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant
has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for
and be released from detention on parole.91

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman

syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize
vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court
agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It
took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions
are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence
applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper
resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at
studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the
intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the
chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned
much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's
counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons,

we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and
given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we
amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom,
may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-

defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now
sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of
 22

G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for
Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995,
promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decisionaffirmed with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of
seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 (B.P.
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for
violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila.
The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-
130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of
the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as
follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital
to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No.
Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila
Doctors Hospital in the amount of ₱30,000.00, said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account
Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount
of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.3
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the
number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are
hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case
No.
Check No. Postdated Amount
bills in the amount of ₱418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the
two patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty
THE executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of
the obligation in installments.9 To assure payment of the
obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each
covering the amount of ₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their
due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and
returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with
the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant
hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the
demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven
(7) Informations subject of the instant case.10
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because
of "an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that
she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and
would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She
alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as
the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject
to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line,
late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to change the
latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s
suspending medical treatment of her mother. The "debasing
treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother’s mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated
suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing
the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the
hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an
account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her
mother’s immediate discharge.11
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the
prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the checks
subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother
and rejected the theory of the defense.12Thus, on 21 April 1997,
the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7)
counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison
term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of
issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, which
turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found
guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two
(42) months.

93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 ₱30,000.00 SO ORDERED.13

Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court.

93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 ₱30,000.00
Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she
issued the checks "under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 ₱30,000.00 of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury." She
also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 ₱30,000.00 evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration
for the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 ₱30,000.00
trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without
due regard to the principles of justice and equity.14
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 ₱30,000.00
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 ₱30,000.004 the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine
of sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00) equivalent to double the
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her
amount of the check, in each case."15
arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.5
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua
defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and
Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital
the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of
(hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the
funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a
patient’s daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of
worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being
Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated
a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
30 October 1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor
Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.16
₱657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the
hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital

Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no
valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as they
were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother. 17
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the
appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals18 wherein this Court declared that in determining the
penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the
social order.19
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same
issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she
ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following
grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE
OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF
AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR
IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY
SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE
CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN
THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE
APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE
REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
citing jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an
evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for
payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it
falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented
for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same,
regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation
or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is
the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum.21
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain
Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked
certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect
the disposition of the case.22Jurisdiction of this Court over cases
elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose
factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to
reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of
this case. She, however, claims that the issuance of the checks
was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also
23
have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration
in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear
of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the
grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined
by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had
in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered
judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments
unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already
passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law
appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised--whether the defense of
uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from
criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative. For this
exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear
is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would
have succumbed to it.25 It should be based on a real, imminent
or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb.26 A mere threat of a
future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful,
or remote.27 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will
as well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity
to the accused for escape.29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not
real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue
the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged--for fear that her
mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane
treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness
was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the
hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce
a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not
the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might
commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not
impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to
make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no
choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the
many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By
her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security
the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may
be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.30 And if indeed
she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue
the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to
avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance
of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She
even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current
account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I will
not have funds it will be a big problem." 31 Besides, apart from
petitioner’s bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence
to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or
coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance

of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal
Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph:
(1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the
injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that
there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it.32
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable.33 Ty could have taken advantage of
an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,
the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by
the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor.34 In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was
brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital
bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It
would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove
that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her
full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear
that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or
injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial
court in the Civil Case35 for damages filed by Ty’s mother
against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing
the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a
claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported
by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily
engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance
of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
the same was issued for valuable consideration. 36 Section
2437 of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption
that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a
consideration38 or for value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the
onus to prove that the checks were issued without
consideration. She must present convincing evidence to
overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to
discharge her burden of proof. "Valuable consideration may in
general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest,
profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract,
or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to
act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an
obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who
makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser." 40
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services and
the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had
a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her
relationship with them and by force of her signature on her
mother’s Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for
payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of
the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was
not her personal obligation because she was not the patient, and
therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case
of Bridges v. Vann, et al.41 tells us that "it is no defense to an
action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was
no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is
sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a
third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the
24
instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes
some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release
and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann,
Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid,
subsisting obligation for the note executed by the appellants.
This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes."
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any
distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are
issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.43 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation. 44 As this
Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,45 "what is
primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of
their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22."
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the
checks for insufficiency of funds.46 If not rebutted, it suffices to
sustain a conviction.47
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact
that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and
such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds
of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not
an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence,
malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.48
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of
Appeals49 wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of
transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally
acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the
circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention
and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the
law.
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material
operative facts therein obtaining are different from those
established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced
checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease
contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the
deposit. It was a modus operandiwhereby the supplier was able
to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in
desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of
the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement
under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did
not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used
as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt
of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt
of an actual "account or for value." Substantial evidence, as
found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established
that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of
Ty’s mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the
penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was
not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith.

Administrative Circular 12-2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca
v. Court of Appeals51 and Lim v. People,52 authorizes the non-
imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases
subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to
modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-
200153 which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated
therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg.
22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to
say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should
the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be
deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-
2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the
exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of
justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused
unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.54
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001,
finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to
double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the
seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila
Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*,
JJ., concur.
25
G.R. No. 116511 February 12, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
COLOMA TABAG, SARENAS TABAG, MARCELINO TABAG,
FERNANDO MAGLINTE, JR., ARTEMIO AWOD, LAURENO
AWOD, ROMEO AGUIPO, LEOPOLDO LEONCIO and
ERNESTO MAWANG, accused.
COLOMA TABAG * and SARENAS TABAG, accused-
appellants.
DIVIDE, JR., J.:
At about 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 in Sitio Candiis, Barangay
Cabidianan, New Corella, Davao, the spouses Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., and Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, together with
their children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, were massacred in their
home allegedly by members of the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Force (ICHDF).
On 14 March 1984, Aniceto Magdasal and Marciana Magdasal,
parents of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., reported the incident to the
Municipal Mayor of Asuncion, Davao, and to the police
authorities of New Corella. They executed a joint affidavit on that
date "to request the authorities concerned to follow up said
incident and to conduct proper investigation to the end in view
that justice will prevail."1 Later, they, together with one Lucrecio
Dagohoy, executed sworn statements before the police
authorities of New Corella.2 Yet, the identities of the killers
remained unknown.
The first light on the case was shed on 27 February 1985 when
Sergio Doctolero, barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao,
executed a sworn statements3 declaring that a member of the
ICHDF, Romeo Guipo, had confessed to him that it was the
team led by Sarenas Tabag that massacred the Magdasals. The
real break came three days before the first anniversary of the
massacre when Ernesto Mawang, a member of that team, gave
his sworn statement4 naming those involved in the massacre.
Not long after, another member thereof, one Pablo Oca, likewise
gave a sworn statements5 corroborating Mawang's statements.
On 15 July 1985, an information for murder against accused
Coloma Tabag, Sarenas Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando
Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio,
and Ernesto Mawang was filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of New Corella, Davao.6 Accompanying the information
were the abovementioned joint affidavit, sworn statements, and
death certificates of the victims. The information was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 897.7
After examining, through searching questions, witnesses Pablo
Oca and Sergio Doctolero, Judge Napy Agayan issued a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. No bond was
recommended for their temporary liberty, since they were
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was
strong.8
On 21 August 1985, accused Sarenas Tabag surrendered to
Judge
Agayan.9 The others could not be arrested; hence, an alias
warrant for their arrest was issued. 10
Sarenas Tabag waived submission of his counter-affidavit and
preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause against him,
the MTC ordered on 28 August 1985 the transmittal of the record
of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and the
commitment of Sarenas at the Provincial Jail. 11
After appropriate proceedings, an information 12 was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao, charging the
abovenamed accused with the crime of multiple murder. The
accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1984, in the Municipality of New
Corella, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, all members of the ICHDF, conspiring, confederating

and mutually helping with Coloma Tabag, Marcelino Tabag,
Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Laureno Awod, Romeo
Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio and Ernesto Mawang, who are all still
at large, with treachery and evident premeditation and with
intent to kill, armed with garand, armalite and carbine, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino
Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, thereby inflicting upon them
injuries which caused their death and further causing actual,
moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victims.
The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength, nighttime and in
band committed with the aid of armed men.
Contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6364 and raffled
to Branch 2 of the said court.
Since the other accused had remained at large, the court
proceeded with the case against Sarenas Tabag only. At his
arraignment on 11 December 1985, he entered a plea of not
guilty. 13
On 3 March 1987, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the
case as against Ernesto Mawang because it found after a
thorough re-assessment of the prosecution's evidence that he
"does not only appear to be less guilty, but he appears not
responsible in any way in the commission of the crime charged.
. . . [He] has not participated in the killing of the victims, he has
not fired any shot nor has lunged any bolo to the victims, and his
presence in the crime scene was not voluntary on his
part." 14 The court granted the motion and ordered the
immediate release of Mawang from detention. 15
In the meantime, accused Coloma Tabag, Artemio Awod,
Laureno Awod, and Romeo Aguipo were arrested. 16 All of them
entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment. 17
On 19 October 1989, accused Laureno Awod and Artemio
Awod, together with three others, escaped from the Provincial
Jail. Upon being informed of this incident, 18 the trial court
continued the proceedings as against Sarenas Tabag, Coloma
Tabag, and Romeo Aguipo only. 19
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Pablo Oca,
Sergio Doctolero, Aniceto Magdasal, Pablo Babagonyo (a
member of the Philippine National Police [PNP]), Marciana
Magdasal, and Enrique Bermejo (Administrative Officer of the
PNP of New Corella, Davao), with Doctolero recalled as rebuttal
witness. On its part, the defense presented Sarenas Tabag,
Romeo Aguipo, Coloma Tabag, and Alfredo Galocino, with
Sarenas Tabag and one Ricardo Agrade called as sur-rebuttal
witnesses.
On 7 January 1992, the trial court promulgated its
decision 20 dated 19 December 1991,the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Sarenas Tabag, Coloma
Tabag and Romeo Aguipo or Guipo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of four (4) counts of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino
Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, each of them is sentenced
to suffer four (4) indivisible prison terms of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by
law and to pay the costs.
They are further condemned to jointly and severally indemnify
the heirs of their victims in the total sum of FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P400,000.00) PESOS as moral damages; SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000.00) as attorney's fees to Marciana
Magdasal, mother of the late Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and FOUR
THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS as actual and compensatory
damages. 21
26
The material operative facts established by the evidence for the
prosecution was summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On March 11, 1984, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Pablo
Oca was in the CHDF detachment in Barangay Buan, Asuncion,
Davao. (p. 5, TSN, September 10, 1986) Also present were
Marcelino Tabag, appellant Sarenas Tabag, appellant Coloma
Tabag, Artemio Awod, Laureno Awod, Ernesto Mawang, Romeo
Guipo and Fernando Maglinte, all members of the CHDF. (p. 6,
Ibid.) While there, appellant Sarenas talked to his son, Marcelino
Tabag, and his brother, appellant Coloma Tabag (Ibid.)
Thereafter, Sarenas told the group to go on patrol. (pp. 7 and
14, Ibid.) Pablo asked Marcelino where they were going but the
latter kicked him in the buttocks, and told him to "just keep quiet
and follow." (p. 15, Ibid.)
Marcelino led the group to Barangay Cadi-is, Asuncion, Davao.
(p. 7, Ibid.) The group reached Cadi-is at 11:00 o'clock in the
evening (p. 17, Ibid.). Upon reaching the house of Welbino
Magdasal, the group stood to observe for a while. (p. 12, TSN,
January 13, 1988) Pablo Oca was posted as lookout five meters
away from the house. (p. 17, Ibid. and p. 18, TSN, September
10, 1986)
After some time, Fernando Maglinte went up the house and
knocked at the door. (p. 17, Ibid.) The door was opened and
Welbino Magdasal went out of the house. (p. 17, TSN, January
19, 1988) Marcelino ordered his companions to open fire at
Welbino. (p. 24, TSN, September 10, 1986) The children who
were inside the house started shouting. (p. 10, Ibid.) Three men
from Marcelino's group went up the house and stabbed to death
Welbino's wife, Wendelyn, and their two children, Welbino, Jr.,
and Melisa. (Ibid.)
After the massacre, Marcelino's group went back to their
detachment at Barangay Buan. (Ibid.) Upon arrival, appellant
Sarenas asked Marcelino, "Is it finished" to which the latter
answered, "Yes, it is finished." (p. 11 Ibid.) Sarenas inquired
further, "Did you gather the CHDF?" (Ibid.) Sarenas warned
each member of Marcelino's group to keep quiet about the
incident and threatened: to shoot whoever will squeal. (p. 11,
and 16, Ibid.)
As a result of the massacre, the entire family of Welbino died.
Welbino's mouth was shattered and his intestines protruded out.
(p. 9, TSN, April 12, 1989) Wendelyn's left leg and left arm were
twisted. (Ibid.) Welbino, Jr. sustained wounds on his face and
stab wounds in his chest. (Ibid.) Melisa was likewise wounded
and died in the hospital. (Ibid.) A total of thirty-two empty shells
of M16 spent bullets were recovered from the scene of the
massacre. (p. 4, TSN, January 5, 1990)
This summary is faithfully borne out by the transcripts of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; hence, we adopt it as
our own.
It was further established through the testimony of Pablo Oca
that after talking to his son Marcelino and brother Coloma,
Sarenas called for the other members of the ICHDF and
instructed them to go on patrol. While on the way to New
Visayas, Marcelino separated from the others. The latter
nevertheless, followed him to Sitio Candiis and then to the house
of the) victims. 22
Alibi and denial were the defenses interposed by accused
Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Romeo Aguipo.
Sarenas Tabag was the head of the ICHDF team in question.
He was enlisted into it when he was the barangay captain of
Buan, Asuncion, Davao. The team was to serve only in the
municipality of Asuncion; its specific "area of operation" were the
barangays of Buan, New Visayas, and Sunlon, all in Asuncion.
All the members of the team took orders from him. 23 On 11
March up to 12 March 1984, he was with Cpl. Gafod on a military
operation of the 37th Infantry Battalion in New Visayas and
Sunlon, Asuncion, Davao. Aside from Cpl. Gafod, he was with
Laureno Awod, Artemio Awod, Marcelino Tabag, Ernesto

Mawang, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Pepito Tabag, and Cortez
Tabag. Sarenas asserted that he could not have conducted a
briefing, as some of his men, particularly Coloma Tabag and
Pablo Oca, were in Mawab. 24 Sarenas likewise denied having
asked Marcelino after the killing, "Human na?" and having
threatened those who patrolled on that fateful night that anybody
who squeals would be shot with a clip of bullets. Sarenas also
testified that Pablo Oca could not have been at the detachment
on the night of 11 March 1984, as he was relieved of his post as
a member of the ICHDF as early as 24 December 1983 for
having discharged seven clips from his garand rifle while
drunk. 25 This then provided Oca's motive to testify against him
(Sarenas). 26Sarenas further declared that members of his
family were massacred by suspected members of the NPA. 27
Coloma Tabag declared that on 11 March 1984, he was in
Mawab, Davao del Norte, panning for gold. He went there on 4
March 1984 with his two children. Mawab is more than twenty
kilometers away from Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao del
Norte. 28
Romeo Aguipo testified that at 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984, he
was at the copra drier in Barangay Buan "watching the copra."
He said he was there from 9 March to 12 March 1984. The copra
drier was only two kilometers away from the ICHDF
detachment. 29
The trial court gave full faith to the version of the prosecution
and disregarded that of the defense. As to the motive of accused
Sarenas Tabag, the trial court stated:
Fourth: Sarenas Tabag also declared that this family, sometime
before March 11, 1984, was massacred and his suspects were
the members of the New Peoples' Army.
The Magdasals, who first resided in Buan, Asuncion, transferred
to Sunlon, Asuncion, which was infested with members of the
New Peoples' Army, according to Sarenas Tabag.
Sunlon being infested with members of the New Peoples' Army,
Welbino Magdasal, Sr. and/or his family could easily be
suspected or he and his family must be members of the New
Peoples' Army.
Since the family of Sarenas Tabag was a victim of a massacre
by the New Peoples' Army, the killing of Welbino Magdasal, Sr.
and the members of his family must be the retaliation of Sarenas
Tabag perpetrated through his men who were CHDF
members. 30
In support of its conclusion that four counts of murder were
committed, the trial court rationalized that
the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal,
Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal resulted not [from]
a single act punishable as complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code but [from] a series of acts . . . with the
qualifying aggravating circumstances of either treachery,
evident premeditation, or superior strength having been taken
advantage of. 31
It opted to consider evident premeditation to qualify the killing to
"multiple murder" and considered treachery, nighttime, and
band as generic aggravating circumstances 32
From the judgment of conviction, only accused Sarenas Tabag
and Coloma Tabag filed their notice of appeal. 33
34
On 8 August 1995, after filing his Appellant's Brief, accused
Coloma Tabag died at the Davao Prison and Penal
Farm. 35 Accordingly, in the resolution of 21 February 1996, we
ordered the dismissal of the case against him.
Only the appeal of accused Sarenas Tabag is left for our
determination.
In his Appellant's Brief, accused Sarenas Tabag contends that
the trial court erred in
27
1. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS
TABAG NOT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE: BUT BECAUSE OF THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE'S EVIDENCE;
2. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS
TABAG AS CONSPIRATOR OR CONFEDERATE, THE
ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY NOT HAVING BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
3. NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS
TABAG ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS EXEMPTED FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 11, (5) & (6), OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
The first assigned error is without basis. The trial court convicted
him primarily on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If
at all the trial court considered the weakness of the evidence of
the defense, it was merely to show that the massive proof of guilt
was not shakened by the "brazen and unmitigated lies of the
accused and their witnesses." 36
Regarding Tabag's second assigned error, we have held time
and again that conspiracy need not be established by direct
proof. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of intent. 37 It must,
however, be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
offense itself. 38
Indeed, Sarenas was not at the scene of the massacre at the
time it was committed. His alibi was firmly established not only
through his evidence but also by the testimony of prosecution
witness Pablo Oca. That fact, notwithstanding, we are
convinced that Sarenas was not just a co- conspirator; he was
the mastermind of the massacre or the principal by inducement.
His role was established with moral certainty by weighty
circumstantial evidence.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e.,
the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty. 39
In the instant case, the following circumstances were duly
proven:
1. Sarenas was the leader of the ICHDF team in Barangay Buan,
Asuncion, Davao.
2. Before the massacre in question, members of Sarenas' family
were massacred by persons whom he believed were members
of the NPA. Sarenas suspected the Magdasals to be members
of the NPA. 40
3. Prosecution witness Pablo Oca and the other accused were
members of Sarenas' team; as such, they took orders from
Sarenas. On his cross-examination, Sarenas proudly admitted
of his authority to give orders. 41
4. At about 9:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 Sarenas' team met at
the ICHDF Detachment in Barangay Buan where Sarenas gave
a briefing to his son Marcelino and brother Coloma.
5. After the briefing, Sarenas instructed the team to go on patrol
in New Visayas and "some distance away." Marcelino and
Coloma led the team.

6. The area of operation of Sarenas' team is comprised of the
barangays of Buan, New Visayas, and Sunlon, all of Asuncion,
Davao.
7. Somewhere along the way, instead of patrolling their area of
operation, Marcelino proceeded toward Sitio Candiis, Barangay
Cabidianan, Asuncion, Davao.
8. Pablo asked Marcelino where they were going, but the latter
kicked the former on his buttocks just to keep quiet and to follow.
9. Upon reaching Sitio Candiis, the team proceeded to the house
of the victims. Marcelino Tabag ordered Pablo Oca to serve as
"look-out," while Marcelino, Coloma Tabag, Fernando Maglinte,
Laureno Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo Aguipo fired their
garands toward the victims' house. Then Marcelino, Coloma,
Laureno, and Artemio went up the house and started stabbing
Welbino's wife and children. 42
10. After the massacre, the team returned to its detachment in
Barangay Buan. Upon arrival thereat, Sarenas asked his son
Marcelino whether it was finished, and the latter answered in the
affirmative. 43
11. After Marcelino made the report to his father that "it [was]
finished," the members of the team were gathered. Sarenas
forthwith warned them against squealing, otherwise the
squealer would be shot. 44
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sarenas had the motive to
eliminate Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and his family. The briefing
was on a matter which he could neither openly discuss nor
entrust to others who were not of his confidence. He thus chose
for the purpose no less than his son Marcelino and brother
Coloma. Then, as the subsequent developments showed, the
briefing turned to none other than an instruction to get rid of the
Magdasal family or "to finish" them off. If it were otherwise
Marcelino would not have led the team to a place outside of its
area of operation, or to Sitio Candiis of Barangay Cabidianan, in
another municipality, where the house of the victims was
located. Sarenas knew exactly where Marcelino should lead the
team and what it was expected to do. He even waited at the
detachment in Barangay Buan for the team's return, and upon
its return he asked Marcelino whether "it's finished." When
Marcelino assured him that it was, Sarenas warned the other
members of the team not to talk about or reveal the massacre,
otherwise the squealer would be killed. None did, not until nearly
a year later.
All told, the concordant combination and cumulative effect 45 of
the foregoing circumstances more than satisfy the requirements
of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
In his third assigned error, accused Sarenas Tabag invokes
paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provide for justifying circumstances. 46 He contends that being a
member of the ICHDF involved in the battle against insurgency,
he was in the performance of an official duty or function duly
authorized by law 47 and that he is, therefore, exempt from
criminal liability.
This assigned error is not predicated on a hypothesis that even
granting arguendo that he was a co-conspirator with the other
accused in the massacre of the Magdasals he would still be
"exempt" from any criminal liability because he was in the
performance of an official duty or function duly authorized by
law. Not being so, he thus admits that he was a co-conspirator.
The slip may be showing much, or that the conscience has
unwittingly told the truth. Yet, we shall not put Sarenas on a bind
or be too harsh to him for the imprecise formulation of this
assigned error.
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5
and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre
of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no evidence that
Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children
28
were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of
the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful
night of 11 March 1984, they were peacefully resting in their
humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day.
Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked
attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre was
nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.
As to the crime committed, we agree with the trial court that in
killing Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their
children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, the accused committed four
separate crimes of murder, which are charged in the information.
There was no challenge thereon on the ground that the
information charges more than one offense. 48 Accordingly, the
accused could be properly convicted of four counts of murder.
As to the circumstance which qualified the killings to murders,
we differ with the view of the trial court. It should be
treachery, 49 not evident premeditation, 50 as ruled by the latter.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to satisfy two of the three
requisites of evident premeditation, viz., (a) the time when
Sarenas determined to commit the crime, (b) a sufficient lapse
of time between such determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 51 On the other
hand, treachery was established beyond cavil. Accused
Marcelino Tabag, Coloma Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureno
Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo Aguipo suddenly fired their
high-powered firearms toward Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and
thereafter, they went upstairs and stabbed his wife Wendelyn
and his children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa. The victims, all
unarmed, were caught by surprise and were in no position to
offer any defense. There can be no doubt in any one's mind that
the accused employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the killings which tended directly and specially to
ensure their execution, without risk to themselves arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. 52
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating nighttime and band
as generic aggravating circumstances. Under the facts of this
case, nighttime or nocturnity was absorbed in treachery, since it
was evidently an integral part of the peculiar treacherous means
and manner adopted to ensure the execution of the crimes, or
that it facilitated the treacherous character of the attack. 53 Band
or cuadrilla was likewise absorbed in treachery. 54
Aside from disregarding nighttime and band as aggravating
circumstances, we also give accused Sarenas Tabag the benefit
of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For, as
evidenced by a certification issued by Judge Napy Agayan,
Sarenas Tabag voluntarily surrendered himself before the
warrant for his arrest was served on him.
The penalty for murder at the time the accused committed the
four separate crimes of murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. There being one mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it,
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable in each case isprison mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as minimum,
to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
As to the civil liabilities, the award of P400,000.00 "as moral
damages" is not correct. Current case law fixes the indemnity
for death at P50,000.00. Moral damages may also be recovered
in criminal cases under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Marciana
Magdasal, mother of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., left to the
discretion of the trial court the quantification of her sufferings
caused by the death of her son, daughter-in-law, and two
grandchildren. Since Marciana's husband did not testify as to his
moral suffering, any award for moral damages must be in favor
of Marciana only, and an award of P10,000.00 in each of the
four counts of murder is adequate. Hence, the total indemnity to
be awarded to the heirs of the victims shall be P200,000.00, and
the aggregate moral damages to be awarded to Marciana
Magdasal shall be P40,000.00,
Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case
against Laureno Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful

escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They
had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last
sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution, 55 trial against them should continue and upon its
termination, judgment should be rendered against them
notwithstanding their absence unless, of course both accused
have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established.
Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, 56 their
escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to
be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify
them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from
continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have
received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure
to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed
themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This
being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, 57 the trial
against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have
been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court
had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment
accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives' re-appearance or
re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testified against them.
It is obvious that the trial court forgot our rulings
in Salas and Nazareno. We thus take this opportunity to
admonish trial judges to abandon any cavalier stance against
accused who escaped after arraignment, thereby allowing the
latter to make a mockery of our laws and the judicial process.
Judges must always keep in mind Salas and Nazareno and
apply without hesitation the principles therein laid down,
otherwise they would court disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao, in Criminal Case No.
6364 is AFFIRMED, with the modification (1) sentencing
accused-appellant SARENAS TABAG in each of the four crimes
to an indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and (2) deleting the award of
P400,000.00 as moral damages and awarding, in lieu thereof,
(a) P200,000.00 as indemnity for the deaths of Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, Welbino
Magdasal, Jr., and Melisa Magdasal, payable to the heirs of the
victims; and (b) P40,000.00 as moral damages, payable to
Marciana Magdasal.
The Resolution of 21 February 1996 dismissing the case as
against accused Coloma Tabag because of his death is hereby
reiterated.
The trial court is ordered to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 6364 as against accused Laureno Awod and
Artemio Awod if they are still alive, in accordance with the
principles laid down in People v. Salas and Gimenez
v. Nazareno.
Costs against accused-appellant Sarenas Tabag.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
29
G.R. No. 113691 February 6, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law presumes that an offender possesses full control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the exempting circumstance of insanity
or imbecility under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
must be established by clear and competent evidence showing
that the accused completely lost his reason, or was demented
immediately prior to or at the very moment the crime was
committed.
The Case
This is the legal precept relied upon by this Court in denying this
appeal from the Decision1 dated November 17, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7, in Criminal
Case No. 5787 convicting Alberto Medina y Catud of murder.
In an Information dated June 10, 1992, Second Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Benito E. Lat charged appellant with
murder allegedly committed as follows:2
That on or about the 20th day of May, 1992, at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, in Barangay Kaingin, Municipality of San
Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a balisong knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said balisong knife one Andres M. Dalisay,
suddenly and without warning, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Jose Contreras,
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.3 After trial in due course, the
court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion
of which reads:4
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, ALBERTO MEDINA
y CATUD, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal [Code] and there being no mitigating circumstance to
offset the qualifying circumstance of treachery generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the deceased Andres M. Dalisay the sum of
P50,000.00. Costs against the deceased.
Hence, this appeal.5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as recounted by the
solicitor general in the appellee's brief, is as follows: 6
At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party was held in the house
of Sebastian and Delia Aguila in Barangay Caingin, Balite,
Batangas, to celebrate the awarding of a championship trophy
to the basketball team of Larry Andal. Among those present
during the celebration were Andres Dalisay, Edgardo Silang,
Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano
Aguila and appellant Alberto Medina (pp. 3-5, tsn, September 9,
1992, testimony of Larry Andal). During the celebration,
appellant and Dalisay danced the "cha-cha" in the shade
(sulambi) near the terrace of the house of Delia and Sebastian
Aguila. While the two were dancing, the group watched and
clapped their hands. When the dance was finished, appellant left
the house of the Aguilas. After a while, Dalisay invited Andal to

go home (pp. 8-11, tsn, September 11, 1992). The two left the
house of the Aguilas, with Dalisay walking ahead of Andal. While
they were walking, Andal saw appellant, who was waiting along
the way, stab Dalisay with a "balisong" in the abdominal region.
Dalisay held the hand of appellant. While they were grappling,
Dalisay was able to extricate himself and started to run away.
Appellant chased him. When appellant caught up with Dalisay,
appellant stabbed Dalisay once more at the back. Dalisay fell to
the ground. He tried to get up and run, but he again fell down.
Appellant stabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then
[a]ppellant fled from the scene.
Andal, who was about one meter away, was so stunned and
shocked by what he saw that he did not do anything to help
Dalisay. Andal and his relatives brought Dalisay to the Batangas
Hospital, but Dalisay was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 2-6,
tsn, Sept. 11, 1992).
At that time of the incident, prosecution witness Edgardo Silang
was urinating twenty paces away. He heard Delia Aguila, the
sister of appellant, shouting, "Husay ka Alberto pihadong
makukulong ka, sinaksak mo si Andres." When he turned to
where the shout came from, he saw Dalisay running towards
him, pursued by appellant. He saw blood in front of the body of
Dalisay. He held the arm of Dalisay and tried to hug him but
Dalisay fell to the ground. At that point, he saw appellant flee
(pp. 5-18, tsn, Sept. 9, 1992, testimony of Edgardo Silang).
Dr. Benjamin M. Aguado, the Municipal Health Officer of San
Pascual Rural Health Unit, conducted post-mortem examination
of the body of the deceased. He issued a Post-Examination
Report (Exhibit "C") containing the Mortem following findings:
1. Stab Wound between the 3rd & 4th interspace at the
lateral side of the body of the sternum measuring 1/2 inch in
length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
2. Stab Wound at the left Hypochondriac region
measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] exposing the
omentum.
3. Stab Wound thigh left just below the Inguinal Hernia
measuring 1 inch in length 3 cm in wid[th] x 4cm in depth.
4. Stab Wound of the thigh left mid portion anterior
surface measuring 1 inch in length x 3 cm in wid[th] x 4 cm depth.
5. Stab Wound at the scapular region mid portion
measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
6. Stab Wound at the back left between the 7th and 8th
interspace measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm
in depth.
7. Stab Wound at lower portion of the scapular region left
measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
8. Stab Wound at the back right at the level of the kidney
measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 4 cm in depth.
(Exhibit "C").
Version of the Defense
In his brief, appellant sets up insanity as his defense. His version
of the facts is as follows:7
1. Accused-appellant Alberto Medina testified that on the
evening of May 20, 1992, he went to the house of his sister,
Delia Aguila, purposely to watch t.v. (TSN, September 9, 1993,
p. 5). Upon his arrival, he saw the group of the deceased Andres
Dalisay, Larry Andal and Edgardo Silang who were then
engaged in a drinking spree at the balcony of the Aguila
residence (Ibid, p. 6).
2. Accused-appellant refused the group's invitation to join
them in their drinking; however, he accepted their invitation to
dance with Andres Dalisay (Ibid.). In fact, accused-appellant
danced with him for about six (6) or seven (7) times (Ibid, p. 7).
30
3. As the dance and the party ended, the guests started
to leave. Accused-appellant left his sister's house to head for his
home at Barangay Balete, which was more or less 200 meters
away. Among the persons left behind was Andres Dalisay.
4. While walking along the path, accused-appellant heard
Andres Dalisay say, "Bert, sandali lang", (TSN, September 9,
1993, p. 10) prompting the former to stop.
5. Thereupon, Andres Dalisay, who appeared to be
drunk, approached accused-appellant and uttered: "Bakit mo
ako hiniya?" and hit him (accused-appellant) on the chest (Ibid).
Enraged, accused-appellant prepared to fight back when
Andres Dalisay threatened to kill him (Ibid., p. 11). At this point,
accused-appellant further testified, it looked as if Andres Dalisay
was taking something out [of] his pocket.
6. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant beat him to the
draw, took out his "balisong" and stabbed Andres Dalisay, who
then looked like a devil with "horns" (Ibid., p. 11 and 19). It was
only when Andres Dalisay uttered "May tama ako" did accused-
appellant stop . . . stabbing his victim (Ibid., p. 16).
7. Upon realizing that he has stabbed a person, accused-
appellant surrendered himself and the weapon on the same
evening to the authorities (TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 20).
8. On several occasions before, specifically during the
latter part of 1981, accused-appellant had exhibited unusual
behaviors. His sister Lorna Medina testified that on June 22,
1982, she brought her brother to the National Mental Hospital
after the latter had shown unusual conduct, such as looking
blankly at a distance, hitting his wife or banging her head on the
wall for no reason and having sleepless nights (TSN, August 11,
1993, pp. 13-15).
9. From June to October of 1982, accused-appellant was
confined at the National Mental Hospital. Ms. Lourdes Palapal,
the Records Officer of the National Center for Mental Health
(formerly, the National Mental Hospital) testified on the
documents issued by their office relative to the confinement of
accused-appellant for "schizophreniform disorder" during that
period (Exhibits 3 to 11).
10. After his release from the hospital, accused-appellant
lived with his mother and his two children at Brgy. Balete, San
Pascual, Batangas. His condition did not seem to improve,
though. Lorna Medina further testified that in January of 1992,
accused-appellant again exhibited the same unusual behavior
which she had observed from him in 1982 (TSN, August 11,
1993, p. 17).
11. This prompted Lorna to refer her brother's case to Dr.
Teresita Adigue, a psychologist-friend who conducted a
psychological examination on accused-appellant (TSN, August
11, 1993, p. 17).
12. Dr. Teresita Adigue, a Doctor of Psychology and a
holder of a Master's Degree in Clinical and Industrial Psychology
and another Master's Degree in Guidance and Counselling, and
an accredited psychologist of the Philippine National Police
testified that on January 20, 1992, she administered a
psychological evaluation on accused-appellant (TSN, May 24,
1993, p. 5).
13. Dr. Adigue testified that based on the evaluation of
accused-appellant, the latter has been shown to be suffering
from depression and was exhibiting homicidal tendencies, and
that he did not know the difference between right and wrong
(TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 10 and TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 16). On
cross-examination, the witness affirmed that a person suffering
from depression may be insane (TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 10).
14. Dr. Adigue stated that the psychological evaluation
made on accused-appellant was based on the behavioral history
of the latter furnished to her by Lorna Medina and Leticia
Regalado, (TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 11) a case study based on

the family background of accused-appellant (Ibid., p. 12), and
on a series of psychological tests ("draw a person" test, the
"card" test wherein the emotions of the subject are represented
by the cards, and the thematic perception test) (TSN, May 24,
1993, p. 7).
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rejected the appellant's defense of insanity. It
ruled that Dr. Adigue was not properly qualified as an expert
witness because: (1) she did not have the appellant's complete
behavioral history; (2) she failed to demonstrate satisfactorily
how she arrived at her conclusions; (3) her method of testing
was incomplete and inconclusive; (4) her examination lasted for
only a few hours without any follow-up evaluation; (5) the
university from where she allegedly obtained her doctoral
degree is not known to specialize in psychology or psychiatry;
(6) she is not known as a psychiatrist; and (7) she reported that
'the mental activity [of the accused was] functioning on the
normal level' at the time of the evaluation, that he
comprehended instructions fast, and that he was suffering only
from mild depression.
The testimony of appellant's sister that she had observed
unusual behavior on the part of appellant did not constitute
sufficient proof of his insanity, "because not every aberration of
the mind or mental deficiency constitute[s] insanity." That the
accused was released from confinement at the National Center
for Mental Health on October 4, 1982 and was not readmitted
for any mental disorder for about ten years militated against his
alleged lunacy. Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during
the hearings, appellant was attentive, well-behaved and
responsive to the questions propounded to him in English even
without translation.
On the other hand, appellant's mental agility was shown when
he admitted seeing the deceased take something our of his
pocket, for which reason he decided to beat him to the draw
("Inunahan ko na"). With his balisong, he repeatedly stabbed the
deceased. The trial court appreciated treachery based on
Andal's narration of the stabbing incident.
Assignment of Errors
The defense assigns the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court in convicting appellant:
A the accused had previously lost his reason or was demented
The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-appellant
or mitigating his criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
B district health officer who examined him. In Bonoan,13 the Court
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable
for the death of Andres Dalisay, the trial court nevertheless erred
in convicting him of the crime of murder by appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation despite doubt tending to show the existence of
such circumstances.
C vol. I, p. 617." There, the accused was treated at the psychiatric
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable,
the trial court likewise erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.
In short, appellant puts in issue (1) his insanity and (2) the
presence and the effect of the following circumstances: (a)
treachery, (b) evident premeditation, and (c) voluntary
surrender. We shall deal with each of these issues.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We reject appellant's plea for
acquittal but accept his claim of voluntary surrender.
First Issue: Appellant's Insanity Not Proven
Appellant insists that the trial court gravely erred in refusing to
consider Dr. Adigue as an expert witness. He argues that Dr.
31
Adigue, being an accredited psychologist of the Philippine
National Police since 1979 and a holder of a doctorate in
psychology from the University of Calcutta, India, and a master's
degree in clinical and industrial psychology, deserves credence.
Appellant misses the point. More than her academic
qualifications as a psychologist, what really matters is the failure
of Dr. Adigue's testimony to establish legal insanity on the part
of the appellant. After examining the appellant on January 20,
1992, or four months prior to the incident, and after conducting
the "Draw-a-Person" Test, the Thematic Apperception Test and
the Hand Test, she reported the results of her examination as
follows:
VII. TEST RESULTS/EVALUATIONS
Psychological test results revealed that subject's mental activity
is functioning on the normal level at the time of evaluation. He
can comprehend instructions fast and [was] never hesitant to
take the said examinations.
With regards to some dominant personality factors, test results
revealed also the fact that subject is suffering only from mild
depression because of problems he had encountered in life and
in things around him. He had also developed negative reactions
and outlook in life, therefore he undersigned concluded that he
has some emotional disturbances.
Verily, such results do not prove the alleged insanity of the
appellant. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that
the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no
consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be
complete absence of the power to discern.8 More relevantly,
said report does not support the claim that appellant could not
distinguish right from wrong.
Thus, the trial court properly rejected appellant's defense of
insanity. The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code,
always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.9
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,10
for there is a presumption that acts penalized by law are
voluntarily.11 Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the
courts will always presume that he was in a normal state of mind.
In Bascos,12 the accused was exempted from criminal liability
because he was a violent maniac as confirmed by the acting
reversed the conviction of the accused, holding that a person
afflicted with dementia praecox and manic depressive psychosis
has "no control whatever of his acts. . . . There is in this disorder
a pathologic lessening [of] normal inhibitions and the case [in]
which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and
the use of normal checks to motor impulses (Peterson, Haines
and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxicology [2d, ed., 1926],
department of San Lazaro Hospital and was released long
before the commission of the crime, but the reports of the
alienists14 who examined the accused after the crime confirmed
his mental disorders. The Court held that the evidence that the
accused appeared lucid when he stabbed the victim did not
necessarily prove his sanity, because it was "clear from what Dr.
Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine,
University of Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medicine,
(3d. ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia praecox,
'the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and
planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are common,
because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually
or that their property is being taken.'"15
However, care must be taken to distinguish between lack of
reason (insanity) and failure to use reason or good judgment due
to extreme anger (passion). ". . . [I]t is now well settled that mere

mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not
from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the
moral system, where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its
influence."16
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an
exempting circumstance, Philippine case law shows a common
reliance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete
deprivation of intelligence — not only of the will — in committing
the criminal act.17 In the cited case of Rafanan, the fact that
appellant threatened the victim with death in case she reported
her ravishment indicated that he was aware of the reprehensible
moral depravity of that assault and that he was not deprived of
intelligence. In Dungo, that the accused knew the nature of what
he had done negated his claim that he was insane when he
fatally stabbed his victim.18 In Aquino19, appellant, who took
120 cc of cough syrup and consumed three sticks of marijuana
before raping his victim and hitting her head with a stone, had
some form of mental illness which did not totally deprive him of
intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, enabling
him to exercise sound judgment and to satisfactorily articulate
the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounted any intimation of
insanity when he committed the felony. It has been held that
mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not exclude
criminal culpability.
In the present case, Dr. Adigue's testimony did not establish
complete deprivation of appellant's reason. Consequently,
appellant cannot claim exemption from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Alternatively, appellant argues that his condition should merit, at
the very least, the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13, par. 9 of the Code.20 In Formigones, the Court
found the feeblemindedness of the accused to be a mitigating
circumstance, noting that his faculties were not fully developed.
After stabbing his wife, the accused in said case took her dead
body up their house, put her on the floor and lay beside her for
hours, showing remorse at having killed her. The accused was
"suffering [from] some physical defect which thus restrict[ed] his
means of action, defense or communication with his fellow
beings,' or such illness 'as would diminish the exercise of his will
power.'"21 In Rafanan, schizophrenic reaction, although not
exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender
of the consciousness of his acts, was considered a mitigating
circumstance which diminished the exercise of the offender's will
power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of
his acts.22
In the instant case, however, the defense miserably failed to
establish the deprivation of the appellant's will when he stabbed
his victim. Appellant testified that he thought the victim was
going to pull out a weapon, thus he beat him to the draw and
stabbed him with his balisong.23 This statement shows that he
did not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment. While
the victim appeared to him as a "devil with horns," such
perceptual distortion occurred only after he had dealt the fatal
blows on the victim. The Court cannot, therefore, appreciate this
mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Second Issue: Proof of Treachery
The treacherous nature of appellant's attack on the victim was
established by Andal who witnessed the incident. Testified the
witness:24
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q What about you, where [were] you on that occasion?
A I was with Andres in going home sir..
Q Can you tell the court [if you were] walking together at
that time?
A Yes sir.
Q Who was ahead?
32
A Andres was ahead of me, sir.
Q And you [were] following?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While walking together, can you tell the court what
actually happened?
A Alberto waited for us on the way that were going pass,
sir.
Q Why do you say that Alberto [was] waiting for you and
Andres during that time?
A Perhaps he has a bad intentioned, (sic) sir.
Q While walking on that path Andres was ahead of you
what did you see if you had see[n] anything?
A Alberto stabbed Andres Dalisay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after Alberto had [stabbed] Andres
Dalisay?
A They chased one another, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after that?
A When the first stubbed (sic) hit Dalisay, Dalisay tried to
hold the hand of Alberto and when they were struggling Andres
was able to push Alberto and they both fell down and with
Alberto on top of Andres, Andres was able to push Alberto and
he was able to get up and Andres ran away and Alberto chased
him sir.
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q Did Alberto [catch] up with Andres . . .?
A Yes sir, Andres Dalisay toppled down and Alberto
stabbed him at the back, sir.
Q What happen[ed] next?
A After the stabbing of Andres at the back by Alberto,
Andres was able to get up and ran and while running he fell for
the second time and Alberto stabbed [him] again on the chest,
sir.
Treachery can be gleaned from the fact that appellant waited
behind a chico tree and then, all of a sudden, jumped on the
victim. Appellant's attack was not only sudden and unexpected;
it was also vicious and relentless. After delivering the first stab,
appellant chased his victim and stabbed him seven more times.
These seven additional stabs were inflicted when the victim was
helpless, as he fell down several times during the pursuit.
Counterattack and escape proved futile because of the injuries
that the victim sustained. The medico-legal officer reported that
of the eight stab wounds on the victim, six were fatal.25 Clearly,
in killing his victim, appellant employed means which ensured its
execution without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the victim might make.26 Treachery which qualified the killing as
murder was properly appreciated by the trial court.
Third Issue: Absence of Evident Premeditation
The Court concurs with appellant and the solicitor general that
the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation. The
solicitor general explains that "only a few minutes had passed"
from the time appellant left his sister's house to the time he
stabbed his victim. Thus, no sufficient lapse of time is
appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its
execution to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences

of his act.27 Under such circumstances, evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have
been credited in favor of the appellant.28 The solicitor general
concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier given
himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on
May 20, 1992, or about an hour after the stabbing incident, to
Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City
Police Station.29 Hence, the evidence sufficiently established
the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender
has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3)
his surrender was voluntary.30
The Proper Penalty
Voluntary surrender diminishes appellant's penalty. Since the
crime committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 7659, the
imposable penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. The proscription of the death penalty
by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalty
under said article.31 Thus, Art. 64, which provides the rules for
the application of penalties containing three periods, governs
the determination of the proper penalty in this particular case.32
Contrary to the contention of the solicitor general, Art. 63 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply.33
Following Art. 64 (2) of the Code, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender entitles appellant to the imposition of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended),
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
prison mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, and reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant is IMPOSED an indeterminate
sentence of ten years and one day of prison mayor maximum,
as minimum, and seventeen years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
33
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner)
for the review on certiorari1 of the Decision2 and Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his
conviction for the crime of qualified rape rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its
decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her
friend BBB in the second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw,
Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and
BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then
undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had
sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers.
The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her
teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate),
who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was
later subjected to physical examination that revealed a
laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual
abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings,
the petitioner was charged with rape under the following
Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15
years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister,
AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Contrary to law.6
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the
defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling
cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that
AAA only invented her story because she bore him a grudge for
the beatings he gave her. The parties’ mother (CCC) supported
the petitioner’s story; she also stated that AAA was a
troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the petitioner was
fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident happened.7
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner
raped her; she confirmed the petitioner’s claim that AAA bore
her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified
rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in
relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the said
juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of
₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and
₱25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking
AAA’s credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)9 to exempt
him from criminal liability considering that he was only 15 years
old at the time the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with
modification as to penalty as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting
Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The
award of damages are likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.10
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability,
the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was not
clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was
15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the crime.
It was incumbent for the defense to present Robert’s birth
certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Neither is the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the
Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on
May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of
sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already
18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No.
603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
not been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other
disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence,
juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable
penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from
having their sentences suspended.11
The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on
his guilt of the crime charged; what he now assails is the failure
of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 612 of R.A. No. 9344
under the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of
R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioner’s exemption from criminal
liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent
for the defense to present the petitioner’s birth certificate to
invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving
his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A.
No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in
Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton13 thereby denying the petitioner the
benefit of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
34
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who
bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption
from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the
time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the
prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if no
evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-
year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.14 He additionally claims that
Sections 3,15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also provide a presumption
of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that any
doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and
evidence on record – specifically: the allegation of the
Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the
prosecution never objected to, and the findings of the RTC –
established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime.
The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), counters that the burden belongs to the
petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or
other documentary evidence proving that his age was 15 years
or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is
presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence
suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton. 18
THE COURT’S RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the
findings of the lower courts on the petitioner’s guilt, since the
petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before
us are predicated on the petitioner’s guilt of the crime charged.
A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of
R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal,
not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA
decision and the records of the case, to deviate from the lower
courts’ findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution
established all the elements of the crime charged through the
credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating evidence;
sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information
charged.19 As against AAA’s testimony, the petitioner could only
raise the defenses of denial and alibi – defenses that, in a long
line of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed
to present this required evidentiary support.20 We have held,
too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail
over the credible and positive testimony of the
complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue of
credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity
of their conclusions in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground – i.e.,
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 – that
implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way
swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is
entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even
inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s claim of
exemption from liability was made for the first time in its appeal
to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of
theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of
fairness, 22 no essential change is really involved as the claim
for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence
submitted below and with the lower courts’ conclusion that the
petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil
liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in
other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be
held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted
by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not
unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one
made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on

questions that the parties did not raise.23 By mandate of the
Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every
circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the
accused.24 It is with these considerations in mind and in
obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No.
9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law should
be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the
applicable law on exemption from liability compelling because of
the patent errors the CA committed in these regards.
Specifically, the CA’s findings of fact on the issues of age and
minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.25
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset
that the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim
are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical
for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is
material in characterizing the crime committed and in
considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does
not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took
effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the
rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by
providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt with
in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision
orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and
vocational training programs and other alternatives to
institutional care.26 More importantly in the context of this case,
this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs
2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, previously provided – i.e., from "under nine years of
age" and "above nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted
without discernment) – to "fifteen years old or under" and "above
fifteen but below 18" (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law – as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article
12 of the RPC did – presumes that the minor offenders
completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong,
so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they
cannot be held accountable.27 The current law also drew its
changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses;
it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives
minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through
diversion and intervention measures.28
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from
criminal liability because he was not more than 15 years old at
the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for
the petitioner’s failure to present his birth certificate as required
by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344.29 The CA also found him
disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the
imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to
death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on
Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense.
In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of
the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to
prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution
completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it
believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove
what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by
evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not
commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
35
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its
evidence and had done everything that the law requires it to do.
The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which
now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if
guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his
age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not
the prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the
petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed the rape
charged.30
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that
minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the
prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances.
To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make
minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly
they are not. 31 If the prosecution has a burden related to age,
this burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a
circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape.32
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accused’s Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence
showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he
committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly
states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be
determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
9344 provides the implementing details of this provision by
enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law
enforcement officer to ascertain the child’s age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such
as
(a) Child’s birth certificate;
(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the
child’s school records, dental records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending
receipt of such documents, the law enforcement officer shall
exhaust other measures to determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate
age (e.g. date of birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that
indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers,
classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the
child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having
been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the
jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may be
admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused’s minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted
testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the
accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory
evidence showing the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v.

Roxas34 where the defendant’s statement about his age was
considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to
establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he
committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v.
Tismo,35 the Court appreciated the minority and age of the
accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the
prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia, 36 we found the
testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old
sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in
the cases of People v. Morial37 and David v. Court of
Appeals,38 and ruled that the allegations of minority and age by
the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s
failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial
evidence on the accused’s minority and age upon the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of any
other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the
date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from
accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused
at the time of the complained incident without any objection on
the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence
showing that the accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are
untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner
and CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when the
rape was committed.39 Second, the records before us show that
these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by
the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any
contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15
years old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No.
9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be
resolved in his favor.40 Hence, any doubt in this case regarding
the petitioner’s age at the time he committed the rape should be
resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the
petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be
read to mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is
the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing
rules, and established jurisprudence in accord with the latest
statutory developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error
in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the
petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the former’s age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344
took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20
years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying
the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
grants.41 As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68 of
R.A. No. 934442 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:43
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission
of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall
be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL,
is not the CICL’s age at the time of the promulgation of judgment
but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of the offense.
In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified
under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides that
penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing
in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a
habitual criminal.
36
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
the accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his
exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly
liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal liability. The
extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would have
been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal
liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of
the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified
rape because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil
degree of consanguinity and the latter’s minority. 44 Both courts
accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding to qualified
rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings,
does not appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC,
declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her
children. The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in
the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We find,
however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in the Information,
had not been sufficiently proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid down
these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by
the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is
an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA.
They do not likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and
clearly admitted AAA’s age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to
Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAA’s testimony be
taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would
upgrade the crime to qualified rape – i.e., relationship within the
third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim – does
not exist. The crime for which the petitioner should have been
found criminally liable should therefore only be simple rape
 37

pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape.

The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows
the characterization of the crime and the attendant
circumstances.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of

₱50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary damages
₱30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 47 Moral
damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without the
necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered
moral injuries entitling her to this award.48Article 2230 of the Civil
Code justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship
between AAA and petitioner and dwelling.49 As discussed
above, the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We
appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on
AAA’s testimony that the rape was committed in their
house.50 While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was
not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence holds
that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award
of exemplary damages.51lavvphi1

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 to

₱50,000.00, the latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for
simple rape52 on the finding that rape had been committed.53

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no

need to discuss the petition’s third assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008 and
Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No.

120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert
Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the
victim, AAA, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued

detention, we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under
the above terms.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the

Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile

Justice and Welfare Council.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice