Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a
home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not
cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but
also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and
raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with
him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding
probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate
criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case
No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the
accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force
upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force
upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the
accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated
August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of
the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru
a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime
are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-
affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a
joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which,
together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got
married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put
up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision
with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by
occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the
daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but
KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that
objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their
sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to
Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact,
both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and,
sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for
her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend
to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to
stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his
wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept
together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the
three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
1
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine.
The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and
the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-
appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the
house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with
the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted
him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to]
our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and
threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her
panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her
legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them.
She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out
his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not
feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43
KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44
MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously
knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-
appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because
this is a family trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his
father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant
opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family
trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached
her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is
it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to
the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their
breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway
by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the
trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way
out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed:
"[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls
then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17,
1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him,
he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls'
bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were
already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep
with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could
be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After
that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her
from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go
to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point,
MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you,
I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to
leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas
of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants
and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced
himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went
out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a]
flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door
locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its
lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled.
The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and
animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father.
He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October
18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint
hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses
that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra,
or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he
was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles
Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's
graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and
MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy
some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims.
According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading
area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant
were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The
accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former
attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a
helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in
October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the
towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them
then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-
appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took
over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January
1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and
business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996
but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to
immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had
sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He
tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had
also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened
the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went
out.68
2
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters
purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong,
Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government
employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his
wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time,
OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to
tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit
the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and
KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK
was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman
unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to
the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case
No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining
a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving
greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.
The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our
culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of
extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi
for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness,
Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2)
separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay
complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in
each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the
accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the
amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements
of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and
intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of
the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual
obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of
the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of
external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the
victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the
truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped
her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only
found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for
grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes,
considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if
they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated
September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt
its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief,
arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of
force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom
on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the
absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man
conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married
her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the
act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's
chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife,
he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three
ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she
marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the
owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her
political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within
the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman
becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or
write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied
consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It
gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed
against a woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration
of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated
in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to
3
show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's
theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute
immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He
had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being
violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases
where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects
requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York
declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent
theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various
rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about
the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited
most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent,
however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a
degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting
physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the
context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse
on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried
woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was
the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed,
"[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human
being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband
from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally
unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however,
that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent
theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of
rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty
of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights,
the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The
Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means,
the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender
equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted
principles of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353
eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime
against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case,
and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality
of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his
victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress
on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime
as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But
under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose
that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the
legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't
have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this
bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't
provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go
against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so
4
because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second
paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is
marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the
cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our
provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct
to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the
legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1
and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House
version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under
this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor,
is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who
forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual
assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in
the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another
definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you
cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains
she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in
the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to
it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have
sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not
alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal
knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't
know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not
meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already
in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of
evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect
of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we
should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear.
x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal
husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me
up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I
hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but
instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is
not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is
where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape
if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The
fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under
one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not
actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can
indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one
another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape.
It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow
beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of
rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally
married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which
regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife
within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are
the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in
seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%)
experienced sexual violence.115
5
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his
appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal
charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally
married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape
cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the
ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already
been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for
human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State
Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to
take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of
such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because
a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W.
The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination
against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of
female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as
rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse
with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to
engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that
have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection
and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and
coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically
utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation,
the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies.
Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in
sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an
essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied
the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally
known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The
single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over
unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress
equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those
raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he
cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and
violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that
human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different
definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge
the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the
Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape
any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that
support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and
evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be
imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict
mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a
rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-
bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the
testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their
deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial
proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its
findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the
witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between
6
uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous
cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations xx xx
of the defense.
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October
16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have
sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed Q So after that what else did he do?
into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down.
The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed
stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, because he is stronger than me.
mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he
never desisted.133 COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom.
While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two
refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the hands?
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged
him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to
force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do Q How did you say that to your husband?
that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself,
he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
fond of sex."135
xxxx
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the
absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136 A I shouted when I uttered that words.

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, xxxx
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary
consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
years of age or is demented.
xxxx
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and
intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
testimony of KKK, viz:
(Cross-Examination)
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
ATTY. AMARGA;
(Direct Examination)
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?
ATTY. LARGO:
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him. if he have sex with you?

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you? A Yes, Sir.

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand. Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand? A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him
at that time.
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means
that he wanted to have sex." Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?

Q So, what did you do after that? A Yes, Sir.

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing) Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you? A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom. xxxx

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]? Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong. A No, Sir.

7
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex
with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her
legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-
consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to
the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his
wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual
craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to
sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK
into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998
cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-
appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent
can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse
was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally
required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant
point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting
sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture
KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she
was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the
victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that
she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing
her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring
about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim
to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a
medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that
determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary
to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is
-sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of
which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was
inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who
stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude
that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here,
however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not
witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the
circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and
crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and
the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the
accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM
kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard
all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the
floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to
the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me
to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the
children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant
ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children
because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their
mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use
of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were
clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant
opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room,
and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the
sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape
incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims
in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for
grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital
exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal
professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common
8
factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her
husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or
trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that
could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been
sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible,
candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the
affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or
statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are
inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes
generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit
in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J,
which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount
the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being
aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their house.
These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the
money deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife
KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The
accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the
alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could
corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to
confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's
erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out
of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold
no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In
sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is
harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has
essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This
admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is
easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time
of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or
within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the
place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but
more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or
was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him.
The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon
can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which
was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at
the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the
victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive
on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and
intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of
MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and
conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant
for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to
rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered
moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1âwphi1
Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its
commission, the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as
a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and
it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the
family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does
not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to
an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to
marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot
resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can
determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves
the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only
mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may
use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal
justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who
institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts
of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
9
each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. THIRD DIVISION

SO ORDERED. January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos.
01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11 of Davao City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different charges of rape.

THE FACTS

The two (2) Informations in this case read:

Criminal Case No. 64,964-09

That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing her legs.3

Criminal Case No. 64,965-09

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after grappling her.4

These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although separate,
were consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015.5

The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:

Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On February
10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with her aunt at
Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a basketball court where a
make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative
near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court were several trees. She
was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already waiting for her along the way. Amarela
suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was no match to the strength of
Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered
her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh
and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push
and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So she fled
and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around, she proceeded on her
way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the Racho residence because
Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed behind So Neneng Racho asked her son
[Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

xxxx

[AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie down.
When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him but he succeeded
in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his
penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So [AAA] went home alone.

10
When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried. The following
morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until eventually, [AAA] told her
mother about what happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who got very angry.
They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested.6
For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with AAA:
Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the fiesta
celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private complainant, [AAA], at
the cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked him if he knew a person by the
name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a while, Eric Dumandan passed by and so he
told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then he left.
Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy and fell down
from the bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in Tawan-tawan. He did not
know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in the morning.7
On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:
Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio District,
Calinan, Davao City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10, 2009. At around 10:00
o'clock in the evening, [AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking for help while crying because she
was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.
His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But [AAA]
wanted to go home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by [his] mother to
accompany [AAA] in going to her aunt's house.
When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she knows the
latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura. Since Ventura was
far, Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.
When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because his hand is
impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a hacking incident on
September 21, 2008. He offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi Andrew Sabal of the Davao
Medical Center which indicates that Racho was confined in the said hospital from September 21, 2008 up to
October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left forearm. He said that his left arm was placed in a plaster cast but
that he removed the cast after three (3) months. He said that even after he removed the cast, his arm was still
painful and he could not move it around.
Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited him to the
police station because there was a complaint for rape against him.
Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her husband and
sons Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was allegedly raped by three (3)
men. [AAA] appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath and not to go home anymore since it
was late. [AAA] insisted on going home, so she asked her son [Racho] to accompany her. [Racho] at first
refused pointing to his elder brother Bobby to accompany her. He eventually brought [AAA] home. He came
back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and then he went to sleep.
The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho] denied
raping [AAA].8
Ruling of the Trial Court
In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be
clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as these
could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were convicted as
follows:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding [Amarela]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and
the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and
the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.9
The Assailed CA Decision
Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only material
testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances casting doubt on AAA'
s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to common knowledge and to ordinary
human experience.
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the trial court's
factual findings. It held:
[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast in her
cross-examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho] abused her five hours
later. The first rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled by Amarela while she was on her
way to the comfort room located at the back of the x x x cooperative building. Private complainant, full of mud
and wet, with dress tom, took refuge at the house of her boyfriend and sought for help. Her boyfriend's father
took her to the house of the in-laws of her cousin. [AAA], who was still wet and muddy, begged the mother-in-
law of her cousin that she be taken to the house of her aunt. While the in-laws of her cousin helped her by
having escorted her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that [Racho] her escort had another plan in
mind. [Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength to fight him.
The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the appellants' denials
miserably fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-appellants as the person who sexually
abused her. There is no doubt in our mind that both appellants had carnal knowledge of [AAA]. Her credibility is
cemented by her lack of motive to testify against the two appellants, Amarela and [Ra.cho]. There is no
evidence to suggest that she could have been actuated by such motive. The People has ably demonstrated the
existence of the elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, which states:
xxxx
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of witnesses, the
assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so
traumatic that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a rape victim has decided to seek justice,
that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the animalistic act committed on her person.
[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because, according to him,
being raped by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours apart, is contrary to the
normal course of things.
We are not convinced.
The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to overpower
and control a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or circumstance in committing
rape or sexual abuse for the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had
ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place. Thus, we cannot agree with [Racho]'s argument that just
because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier, the possibility that she might get raped again is nil.
Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical findings as the
medical certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use of force by the appellants.
We do not agree.
The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not militate
against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth, honesty, and candor.
It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on the victim depends on the degree
of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge
with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as
could not be resisted. It is only that the force used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his
purpose.
Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very dark at the
place where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was allegedly raped.
[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because she saw
Amarela's fact while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare center.
11
Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over denial, a
negative defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's] unwavering assertions
positively establishing the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find the guilt of each of the accused-
appellants to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. 10
OUR RULING
More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are
solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged
on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually
abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 11 However, this
misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates
a travesty of justice.
The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana,
12 the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person named
Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:
It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that
abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that
the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.13
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have been
appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply
cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away
from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the
years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.14 Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for
rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to the
credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely on the
observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly, examination.15 It has since become
imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by this Court;
for it can be expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is
acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.16 Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the
trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court,17 this rule is not absolute and admits
exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended, and misinterpreted.
We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering
its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the
trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no significant
facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.18
After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt lingers as we
are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances, particularly, would cast
doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint
differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the
crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how
she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical
injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the beauty contest
and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:
Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10, 2009. After
that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do?
A: I was on my way to the CR.
Q: And where is the CR located?
A: Near the coop.
Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?
A: Cooperative.
Q: Can you recall the exact name?
A: Maligatong Cooperative.
Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where the beauty
contest was held?
A: It's near.
xxxx
Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two buildings?
A: Durian trees and cacao.
Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to relieve yourself.
And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?
A: Nomore.
Q: Why not?
A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.
Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?
A: At the back of the cooperative.
Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?
A: He pulled me.
Q: Going to what place?
A: Going towards the day care center.19
Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty contest stage
to the day care center:
6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children went back to
Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at the multicab at the
parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the stage. While at there, the person
of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to me. I resisted to get his hand on my hands
because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought me to the back portion of the building. I asked for help but
nobody heard me maybe because of the high volume of the sound system.
7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told him, "Ran
(Eric's palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."
8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio Maligatong,
Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the [cooperative] building. I shouted
for help but still nobody heard me.20
It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness,
the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually incomplete and
inadequate.21 We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do not impair the
credibility of the rape victim.22 In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely
12
different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity
of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed. By this Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would you confirm
alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela that?
to abduct AAA against her will.
A: Yes, sir.
If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of the stage,
people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her will. Thus, AAA's Q: What about his body?
version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from the crowd watching the
beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being taken away against her will. If A: No, sir.
indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement
reflect another story that differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been Q: Why, Ms. Witness?
concocted to just make her story believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced
himself and pulled her away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail A: It was dark.
because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was abducted against her will
before she was raped. xxxx

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA's credibility Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that [Amarela]
in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone testimony of the was the one who raped you?
victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human experience. We
must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop.
mentally capable.
Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him?
Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident
allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not illuminated and that she did A: Yes, sir.25
not see Amarela's face:
From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting conditions in the
Direct Examination crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela while she was being pulled
to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as to how she was able to do so when,
Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the daycare center? according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this
material detail unexplained, we again draw reservations from AAA's testimony.
A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.
Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The identity of
Q: ·what else? the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty
of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission
A: Several trees. of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.26
Q: How about grass?
Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then raped seems
A: Yes, sir. unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said:

Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place? Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you?

A: It was dark. A: Under.

Q: Why is it that it was dark? Q: Under what?

A: Because there was no lighting.23 A: Under the makeshift stage.

Cross-Examination Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?

Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct? A: Yes.

A: Yes, ma'am. Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not?

Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong Cooperative building, it A: Not yet finished.
was also dark on your way?
Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage?
A: Yes, ma'am.
A: Yes.
xxxx
Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage?
Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark?
A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?
Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark, correct?
A: I was scared.
A: Yes, ma' am.24
Q: And what did you do?
Re-Direct Examination

13
A: I did not know what to do then. Discharge None
Internal and Speculum exam Not done
xxxx Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING
Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness? Forensic Evidence and Laboratory Results Pending laboratory results (Spermatocyte determination gram
staining).
A: He pushed me under. IMPRESSONS
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.29
Q: What happened after that? Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-legal report
is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature.30 In convicting
A: He [punched] me in my abdomen. rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a medico-legal report is by no means
controlling.31 Thus, since it is merely corroborative in character, a medico-legal report could even be dispensed
Q: What else did he do to you? with.32

A: I felt weak. A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only infer
possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual incident, cannot testify
Q: After that what happened? on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on personal knowledge or derived from his own
perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what
A: He undressed me. most likely happened.

Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness? In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape
victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical examination on AAA, she
A: I was just lying down. diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or penetrating trauma.

xxxx In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva,33 the most common sites for lacerations were determined, "in
rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as followed at dorsal
Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances? recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of cases; (2) two lacerations at 5
and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of
A: He boxed my upper left thigh. cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 25% of cases."

Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh? These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting from sexual
abuse.34
A: I felt numbness.
However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the authors
xxxx discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the same.35 Their findings
suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual intercourse.36
Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself. What, then, [did
he] do to you? From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from non-
consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of lacerations and whether
A: He placed himself on top of me. they are located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was consensual or not. If the
frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that
Q: What did he do after that? there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate
forced rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse.
A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ.27
In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen.
From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and place himself on Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability that AAA voluntarily
top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for two human beings to move had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she said she was punched there
freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist sexual advances. Moreover, AAA twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had consensual intercourse.
failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift stage without any sign of struggle or
resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female.37 It
away. is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be
without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the
Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-legal officer. age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.39 The female must not at any time
The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no pertinent physical findings/or consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with
physical injuries:28 mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of
initial coercion.40
FINDINGS
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in mind that the
Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
General Survey Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory distress Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is fundamental that the
Mental Status Conscious, coherent, respond well to questions when asked and maintained eye to eye prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.41
contact
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Injuries Normal Findings As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases.1âwphi1 This means that both
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the testimony of the private
External Genitalia Normal findings complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For
Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the
Perihymenal Area and Fossa Narvicularis (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous perihymenal area. victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she
Hymen (+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock and 3 o’clock positions with minimal bloody secretion on the was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light.
lacerated area.
Perineum Normal findings

14
In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but instead forced
her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly boxed AAA's abdomen,
undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho
got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.42
We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's house to seek
help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho what happened. Again,
instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be brought to her aunt's house nearby. This
is way beyond human experience. If AAA had already told other people what happened, there was no reason for
her not to report the incident to the proper authorities.
Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's version that
they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho did not even want to
bring AAA to her aunt's house nearby.43 If he had the intention to have sex with AAA, Racho would not have
declined her mother's instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by herself because he did not want to bring
AAA to her house since this was in another town from her aunt's house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go
home alone is supported by the fact that he was able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA.
Unlike AAA's testimony, the version offered by Racho is corroborated by the testimony of his mother.
Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we have
dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not, uncorroborated. To
recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he said he left her when AAA
insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated this part of the story. To our mind, if the
denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever
came to the house. His mother could have likewise covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that
Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was
alibi which he thought he did not have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself
to go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.
In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.45 Absolute guarantee of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on
each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the offender.46 Thus, the
prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.47
The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether AAA's ill-fated
story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its part to convince the court
that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the government to present a logical and
realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to
get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should
have been the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or
Racho.
Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts
which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict
an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the
prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of
Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February 2016 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on the ground
of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held for
other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 218942
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO BISORA y LAGONOY, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Bisora y Lagonoy challenges in this appeal the October 10, 2014 Decision 1
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06282, which affirmed the judgment 2 of
conviction for Rape rendered against him on June 28, 2013 by Branch 172 of the Valenzuela City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 552-V-12.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:
That on or about May 23, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of one
AAA, 16 years old, DOB: August 17, 1995 (complainant), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with the said minor complainant against her will and without her consent, thereby
subjecting the said minor complainant to sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned her intrinsic
worth and dignity as a human being. 3
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
AAA, 4 the complainant, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant twice: on September 9, 2011 and
May 23, 2012. AAA declared that accused-appellant started courting her in September 2011, and they became
sweethearts one month thereafter. AAA and accused-appellant's relationship remained a secret as AAA was
afraid of her parents.
On September 9, 2011, AAA narrated that she was requested by her grandmother to call her uncle at the billiard
hall. Accused-appellant, who was also at the same place, asked AAA if they could talk. Accused-appellant then
brought AAA to the restroom where he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Fearing that her parents
would know what happened between her and accused-appellant, AAA went away and stayed with her aunt in
Cavite. Nevertheless, AAA's parents learned about the incident. AAA alleged that she wanted to file a complaint
then but she did not know accused-appellant's surname.
Meanwhile, AAA was again raped on May 23, 2012, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon. AAA was then at her
house when accused-appellant invited her to talk. Accused-appellant brought AAA to the neighbor's comfort
room. While inside, accused-appellant told AAA to remove her shorts. Fearing accused-appellant, AAA complied.
Accused-appellant then inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina, while in a standing position. AAA pushed
accused-appellant, but to no avail.
Through their neighbors, AAA's parents had learned what happened. AAA's parents then brought her to the
police station where she executed a written statement regarding the incident. AAA declared in open court that
she was a minor when she was raped by accused-appellant.
Aside from AAA, the prosecution also presented Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Jocelyn P. Cruz, the medico-legal
officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory who examined. AAA. She testified that AAA's hymen
showed clear signs of blunt penetration trauma, which could have been caused by an erect penis or finger.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied that he raped AAA. He stated that he was merely introduced to
AAA by a common friend, after which they became sweethearts. He admitted to being in the billiard hall and
seeing AAA therein on May 23, 2012, when AAA was allegedly raped, but denied that he had a sexual encounter
with her.
On June 28, 2013, the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused- · appellant guilty of Rape under paragraph l(a)
of Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the complainant moral damages of PhP50,000, civil indemnity of PhP50,000, and exemplary
damages of PhP25,000.
Seeing merit on the RTC ruling, the CA,· in its October 10, 2014 Decision, affirmed the RTC decision in its
entirety. Accused-appellant then comes before this. Court, maintaining that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the appeal.
For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of
15
force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.5 In this case, We find no merit in accused-appellant's argument
that the prosecution failed to establish force or intimidation.
AAA's failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused-appellant should not be taken against her since such
negative assertion would not ipso facto make ·voluntary her submission to accused-appellant's criminal act. In
rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way.
Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to
yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape · victim has no burden to prove that she
did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or
intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. 6
In this case, We find that accused-appellant employed force upon AAA when he forcibly held AAA by the hand as
·he led her to the comfort room. We also find that intimidation facilitated the commission of the offense,
considering accused-appellant's persistent threats to AAA in saying "subukan mong magsumbong sa magulang
mo ". We are cognizant of the fact that the victim, AAA, was then a 16-year old girl who heavily feared her
parents, while accused-appellant was a 42-year old man. Evidently, it is not unreasonable to discern that AAA
was cowed to surrendering to. Accused-appellant's bestial desires. We note that in AAA's direct testimony, she
narrated that she felt afraid when accused-appellant uttered the said statement. 7
Neither do We find meritorious accused-appellant's claim questioning AAA's failure to immediately report the
incident. Suffice it to state that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of fabrication and does
not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. This is because the victim may choose to keep
quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is
unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. 8
As to accused-appellant's claim that he and AAA were sweethearts, such fact does not necessarily negate AAA's
lack of consent to the sexual encounter with accused-appellant. As has been consistently ruled, "a love affair
does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will. Love is not a license for lust.
"9
Finally, the level of healing of AAA's hymen does not cast any doubt to the conclusion that she was raped. The
essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not one of
its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of
the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.10
In sum, the prosecution was able to establish accused-appellant's guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, prescribes reclusion perpetua as the
penalty for the crime of simple rape.1âwphi1 The trial court, concurred by the appellate court, thus correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court also resolves to increase the amount of civil. indemnity of
PhP50,000 to PhP75,000; moral damages of PhP50,000 to PhP75,000; and exemplary damages of PhP25,000 to
PhP75,000 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 11 The amount of damages awarded should earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid. 12
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 06282 dated
October 10, 2014 which found accused-appellant Rolando Bisora y Lagonoy GUILTY of rape in Criminal Case No.
552-V-12 is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages are each increased to PhP75,000; and, (2) all damages awarded shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Considering that the accused-appellant is a detention prisoner, he is hereby credited with the full length of time
he has been under detention.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO LAYUG, NOEL BUAN AND REYNALDO
LANGIT, Accused,
WILFREDO LAYUG AND NOEL BUAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA**, J.:
For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the Decision 1 dated April 23, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03500 affirming with modification the Decision2 dated December 20, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan in Criminal Case No. DH-1204-01, finding appellants Wilfredo
Layug and Noel Buan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The facts follow.
According to Analiza L. Paule (Analiza), a state witness, around 7 o'clock in the evening of June 1, 2001, she
was at the plaza in Barangay Luacan, Dinalupihan, Bataan talking with Ramil Ambrosio alias Janice (Ramil) and
they were talking about her supposed "date" with the victim Victorino Paule (Victorino). Thereafter, she went to
the house of appellant Wilfredo Layug (Wilfredo), located in the same barangaywhere they had a shabu session
together with appellant Noel Buan (Noel). Afterwards, they went to the house of accused Reynaldo Langit
(Reynaldo) where they continued their shabu session. During the said shabu session, Analiza overheard accused
Reynaldo giving instructions to appellants Wilfredo and Noel about a "hold-up," but did not hear the name of the
person intended to be held-up. After the shabusession, Analiza asked permission to go back to the public plaza
of Dinalupihan as per her agreement with Ramil that she will meet her customer there. Upon arriving at the
plaza, Ramil was already with the victim Victorino. Analiza was introduced to Victorino and they agreed that the
latter will bring her to Benzi Lodge to have sex with her for P500.00. After reaching an agreement, Analiza and
Victorino left Ramil at the plaza and went in front of the Dinalupihan Parish Church to look for a ride. They
boarded a tricycle driven by Analiza's brother-in-law Jesus Ronquillo (Jesus). Thereafter, Analiza and Victorino
checked-in at Benzi Lodge, while Jesus waited outside. After three hours, Analiza and Victorino went back to the
plaza riding the same tricycle driven by Jesus. Victorino then talked to Ramil in the plaza and, thereafter, gave
Analiza her P500.00 service fee. Since Victorino still wanted to have a good time with her, Analiza brought
Victorinc to the house of appellant Wilfredo. Analiza joined appellants Wilfredo and Noel, and accused Reynaldo
in their shabu session, while Victorino waited inside the tricycle with Jesus. After fifteen to thirty minutes,
appellants Wilfredo and Noel, and accused Reynaldo, asked Analiza to go with them to their hideout. Victorino
went with them because the former knew them as fellow residents of Barangay Luacan. They all boarded the
tricycle driven by Jesus and upon reaching Sitio Bucia, Pangalanggang, Dinalupihan, Bataan, appellant Noel
asked Jesus to stop the tricycle. Analiza asked appellant Noel where they are going and the latter replied that
they have to walk because the tricycle cannot enter the place. Appellant Noel alighted first and, thereafter,
asked Victorino to also alight from the tricycle. Appellant Wilfredo and accused Reynaldo also alighted from the
tricycle. After more or less three steps from the tricycle, appellant Noel held the shoulder of Victorino and
stabbed him twice in front of his body which led the latter to lean forward. Appellant Wilfredo and accused
Reynaldo surrounded Victorino and helped appellant Noel in stabbing Victorino. Victorino shouted "Tulungan
ninyo ako," as accused Reynaldo took his wallet, wristwatch and necklace. Because of fear, Analiza and Jesus
remained in the tricycle, while Victorino was being stabbed and robbed. Thereafter, the three boarded the
tricycle, and warned Analiza and Jesus not to report the incident to anybody or else they will also get killed.
Analiza then alighted at the public plaza of Dinalupihan and proceeded to the house of her live-in partner for five
days. Thereafter, she went to the Municipal Station of Dinalupihan because her sister told her that Jesus was
incarcerated at the Municipal Station of Dinalupihan, Bataan. She then executed a sworn statement regarding
the incident.
Thus, the following information was filed against the appellants Wilfredo and Noel, and accused Reynaldo:
That on or about June 1, 2001 in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength, that is by stabbing Victorino L. Paule with bladed weapons on the different parts of his body, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away a necklace, wristwatch and wallet
containing cash money [sic] amounting to P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to Victorino Paule, and as a result
or on occasion of the said robbery, the said victim sustained mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Victorino Paule.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Aside from Analiza, testimonies of Dr. Roberto Castafleda, a Municipal Health Officer of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
who conducted the medico-legal examination on the body of the victim, and Ramil Ambrosio were also
presented during the trial on the merits. Based on the findings of Dr. Castaneda, the victim sustained a total of
nineteen (19) stab wounds on the different parts of his body and that the cause of death was a massive
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds at the front and back part of the victim's body. Ramil corroborated
some parts of the testimony of Analiza.
Appellants and accused Reynaldo denied that they had any participation in the incident. Noel Buan claimed that
around 7:00 p.m. of June 1, 2001, he was in the house of Councilor Boy Timog (Boy) where Noel was working
16
as a houseboy. According to him, on that night, he was with Boy and his live-in partner, Emelita Lubag
(Emelita). He then saw the victim, Victorino and Emelita seated together and that they were holding hands.
When Boy woke up, he saw Victorino and Emelita holding hands. Boy, thereafter, asked Noel to invite Victorino
for a drink which the latter accepted. They then had a drink, together with a certain Boy Nacu and when they
were already a little bit drunk, Boy raised the issue of Victorino and Emelita holding hands. They continued
drinking, when suddenly, Victorino and Boy had a heated confrontation. During the commotion, Boy picked up a
knife and stabbed Victorino twice. Victorino ran away, but Boy was able to catch him. Victorino once again tried
to run away, but Boy was able to intercept and the latter stabbed him, too. After the incident, Boy Nacu brought
Noel to the house of Emelita. It was there that Boy Timog talked to Noel and told the latter to implicate Wilfredo
and Reynaldo as the ones responsible for the killing of Victorino because Reynaldo and Emelita had a
misunderstanding. Noel did not follow Boy Timog's instruction and the former got arrested after Analiza
implicated him for the death of Victorino. Wilfredo, on the other hand, testified that he was at his home in
Luacan, Dinalupihan, Bataan, at the time of the incident and denied that he knew Analiza.
The RTC found appellants and accused Reynaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Wilfredo Layug @ Aswang, Noel Buan @
Dadoy/Kuluping/Voltron, and Reynaldo Langit @ Rebong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, aggravated by treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In addition, the said accused are hereby ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Victorino
Paule, the amount of P75,000 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000 by way of temperate damages and the cost of
litigation.
SO ORDERED. 4
According to the RTC, all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are present. It also held that the
prosecution was able to prove the existence of treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, thus, the penalty imposed should be death, however, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed.
A notice of appeal was filed and the RTC gave such due course. Accused Reynaldo filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal which was granted by the RTC.
The CA dismissed the appeal of the appellants and affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated December.20, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in Criminal Case No. DH-1204-01 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as against accused-appellant Wilfredo Layug @ Aswang and Noel Buan @
Daboy/Kuluping/Voltron.
Accordingly, accused-appellants Wilfredo Layug and Noel Buan are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation, and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are further ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Victorino L. Paule the amounts of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity,
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
temperate damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until fully paid.
In accordance with Our Resolution dated June 1, 2012 which granted Reynaldo Langit's request to withdraw his
appeal, the Decision dated December 20, 2007 stands and shall not be disturbed as against Reynaldo Langit.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
also held that treachery and evident premeditation may be appreciated, but abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by treachery. It further ruled that the award of moral damages is proper even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering.
Hence, the present appeal with both the appellants and the Office of the Solicitor General manifesting to this
Court that they are adopting their respective Briefs instead of filing Supplemental Briefs.
Appellants raise the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
II.
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT TREACHERY, EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND ABUSE OF SUPREIOR STRENGTH ATTENDED ITS
COMMISSION.6
The appeal must fail.
In arguing that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the appellants pointed out
the questionable credibility of the witnesses who testified against them. Time and again, this Court has deferred
to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the
CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. 7 This is because the trial
court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their
conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess
the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor. 8 As aptly ruled by the CA:
We agree with the RTC in giving full credence to the accounts of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution,
particularly Analiza and Ambrosio's testimonies, as no evidence was adduced to refute them or to show why said
witnesses would testify falsely against appellants. In the face of the positive identification by Analiza and
Ambrosio, accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi must fail. The said rule is that denials, as negative and
self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much weight in law as positive and affirmative testimonies. Time and
again, case law has held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 9
What is important is that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. The
crime of robbery with homicide has been thoroughly discussed in People v. Ebet,10 thus:
In People v. De Jesus, this Court had the occasion to meticulously expound on the nature of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, thus:
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation
or arson.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the
following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking
of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property.
When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is
justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution
is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the
robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent
the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of
17
robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as
principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it
has materialized.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit
of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime
may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.11
In this case, all the elements were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As correctly ruled by
the CA:
In this case before Us, all the essential ingredients of robbery with homicide have been established by the
prosecution with proof beyond reasonable doubt through the convincing testimony of Analiza. Through her
testimony, it was established that personal properties and cash belonging to Victorino were taken by the
appellants by means of force, and with an obvious intent to gain. Moreover, during the heist, Victorino was
mercilessly and repeatedly stabbed by the appellants which resulted to his immediate death. 12
Also, treachery was adequately proven by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA.
In People v. Baron,13 this Court reiterated that treachery is not considered as a qualifying circumstance in the
crime of robbery with homicide but as a generic aggravating circumstance, the presence of which merits the G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
imposition of the higher penalty, thus:
As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr., treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but "a generic NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property Petitioner,
and a single and indivisible crime". Corollarily, "Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that vs.
in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or
which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into DECISION
account for the purpose of increasing the penalty". In the case at bar, "treachery is not an element of robbery
with homicide". Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide". As such, treachery may be PERALTA, J.:
properly considered in increasing the penalty for crime.14
Again, robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. 15 Thus, the aggravating set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime of robbery with homicide only as to the killing but not as of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
to the robbery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the
victim.16 The CA, therefore, is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery in imposing the The following facts are culled from the records:
higher penalty as it was shown that the killing of the victim was done treacherously, thus:
The RTC was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Treachery was established Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
through Analiza's testimony that upon reaching the secluded place, Victorino was asked to alight from the Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
tricycle and without any provocation on his part, was repeatedly stabbed and kicked by the accused-appellants. Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Here, Victorino was caught by surprise when he was immediately stabbed by Buan a few steps after they
alighted from the tricycle. It shows that the victim was caught completely off-guard, which supports the Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
existence of the first element of treachery, i.e., a sudden attack giving the victim no opportunity to appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner
defend himself or retaliate. The second element is likewise present as the accused-appellants consciously and her son came home to the Philippines.6
and deliberately stabbed the victim as evidenced by the fact that all of them had knives in their possession
when the stabbing incident happened.17 According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Evident premeditation, on the other hand, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the
robbery with homicide because the elements of which are already inherent in the crime. Evident premeditation arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
is inherent in crimes against property.18
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
As to the penalty imposed, the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of Death have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering,
considering that the latter penalty has been suspended by Republic Act No. 9346. located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their
son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
As to the award of damages, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 per People v. Jugueta.19 in addition to the award of damages ordered by the RTC and the CA. Being On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded not only due to the presence of an However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender.20 Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 23, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03500 affirming refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to
with modification the Decision dated December 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Bataan, in Criminal Case No. DH-1204-01 convicting appellants Wilfredo Layug and Noel Buan of the crime of Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is AFFIRMED.
The same appellants are also ORDERED to PAY, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim, the amount of The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages per People v. Jugueta,21 including all the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals, with legal interest on all the said damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province
date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid. of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
SO ORDERED.

18
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse
to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support
their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless
of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of
the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his
child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is
the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure
to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on
appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves
in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of
error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the
liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time,
effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the
administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses
the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws
of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal
law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195
of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however,
mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
19
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status
of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under
the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46
which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to
wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al.
vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife,
in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
(Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force
or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines
as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis
for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the
ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53
which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has
clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
20

G.R. No. 212448
AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004,
committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the
country?
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the issuance of a writ of certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions
granted the motion to quash the Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262, committed as follows:
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then
legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with
a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and
the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA],
in violation of the aforecited law.
Contrary to law.
We briefly recount the antecedents.
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children:
CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.6
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in
September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents
reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their
children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.7
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only
sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income
as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son
CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a
Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a
head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit
with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of
abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.9
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a
Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived.10
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive
Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB.
Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial
court reasoned:
Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that
[BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts
complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
xxxx
The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and
emotional anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that
the acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it
noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a
new law, the act itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred
within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use
of the emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into
existence of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought
about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the
Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of
the basic characteristics of our criminal laws - territoriality.
In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there must be an
act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which
partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain
Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to have been committed in Singapore.
Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information must still
be ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At
best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12
(Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought
direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is
in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's
ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without
fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and
emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her
wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig
City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.
In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:
Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court
in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime
or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:
Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.
In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an
acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that
this petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that
the petition was belatedly filed.
We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.
21

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was belatedly
filed. The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed - June 2,
2014 - refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said motion was
lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had
under the Rules of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi
in a Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26,
2014 to file a petition for review.
In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response to her
Letter16 dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for
assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the
extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the
petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et
al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private
offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of
substantial justice so requires.18
Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show
that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or
that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The
only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal,
is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the
court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the
merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could
not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.20 (Citation
omitted and emphasis in the original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may
only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the
accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21
Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23
Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No.
9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:
[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the
law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)
We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh
the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for
resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e.,
whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological
abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took
place outside the Philippines.
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no
jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28,
2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on
jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of
Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as
well as the Committee on Justice and Human Rights.28
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a great number of
Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number of
overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were
comprised of overseas contract workers or those with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas
without contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of
territorial jurisdiction over a case of psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly
caused by marital infidelity carried on abroad.
Ruling of the Court
There is merit in the petition.
"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be committed against women and
their children:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness
the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right
to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
xxxx
As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,
threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v.
People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime
are derived as follows:
(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
22
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar· such acts or
omissions.
xxxx
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.
xxxx
Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but
the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only
one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be
causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an
essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus,
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA,
Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional
anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the
indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the
vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in
Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The
estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon
City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction
where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
case will exclude the others x x x[.]35
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of
the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine
territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent
husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction
over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity
must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same
beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over
the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed
abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine
courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212193
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC y MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be one of acquittal of the
accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation for rape.
Factual Antecedents
Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez (appellant) appeals the September 26, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 which affirmed with modification the February 15, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453. The RTC found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against "AAA"3 under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The designation of the crime in the Information against appellant is
rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. However, the accusatory portion of the
Information charges appellant with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph l(b), Article 266-A, to wit:
That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person of "AAA" by then and there making her drink
liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise unconsciousness, bringing her to a
room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Elvis James Meneses (Meneses) was involved in the commission
of the crime but could not be prosecuted due to his minority. He was only 14 years old at the time of the
incident.
Version of the Prosecution
"AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a drinking session with
appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around
11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her
vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now
lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping her. While still
feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When
she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her
body. "AAA" then left appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in
partner.
23
The following day, "AAA" reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a medical examination and the
results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a drinking session with his
cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA" arrived and joined in their drinking session. Meneses
and
"AAA" then went inside his bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of the house to buy food. When
he returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and "AAA" having sex. They asked him to leave, so he
went to the kitchen. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed by "AAA" who was holding a bottle of
"rugby," which she brought home with her. Appellant contended that nothing more happened that night.
Meneses corroborated his version of the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision5 dated February 15, 2012, the R TC clarified that appellant is charged with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based on the allegations in the Information and not
with rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same provision of law, as the designation in the
Information suggests. The RTC stressed that this is consistent with the legal precept that it is the allegations or
recital in the Information that determine the nature of the crime committed. Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual intercourse against "AAA." It held that the
prosecution successfully established the crime through the testimony of "AAA," which was credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the private complainant
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.6
Appellant appealed the RTC's Decision arguing that discrepancies in the sworn statement of "AAA" and her
testimony diminished her credibility. Appellant contended that "AAA" alleged in her sworn statement that: (1)
appellant held her hands while Meneses was on top of her; and (2) she slept after Meneses raped her and
awakened only when he was on top of her. However, "AAA" did not mention these allegations during her direct
examination. Appellant maintained that "AAA" failed to refute his assertions that her aunt and uncle fabricated
the charges against him for having previous affairs with two of her cousins.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision7 dated September 26, 2013, the CA ruled that discrepancies between the affidavit and testimony
of "AAA" did not impair her credibility since the former is taken ex parte and is often incomplete or inaccurate
for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. The inconsistencies even preclude the
possibility that the testimony given was rehearsed. Moreover, the CA held that a rape victim like "AAA" is not
expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might even try to
obliterate it from her memory. The CA gave scant consideration to the appellant's claim of ill motive of the aunt
and uncle of "AAA," as well as his denial of raping her which cannot overcome her positive, candid and
categorical testimony that he was the rapist. The CA therefore affirmed the Decision of the R TC with
modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid. The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 15 February 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, in Crim. Case No. 08-264453 finding accused-
appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape under paragraph
1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of
private complainant AAA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.8
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.
Assignment of Error
Appellant adopts the same assignment of error he raised before the CA, viz.:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.9
Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able to establish the
required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
The Facts Recited In The Information
Determine the Crime Charged
It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the Information (rape by sexual
assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and the recital in the Information (rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of the same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not violate
appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As ruled correctly by the
RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph
1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital in the Information determine the nature of the crime
committed. "[T]he character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information."10
The Use Of Force, Threat or
Intimidation Causes Fear on the Part of
the Rape Victim.
Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by presenting
evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of
the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was
accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force,
threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the
part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually
employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause."11
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind.
On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with
death if she reports the incident.12 "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the
girl with a knife or pistol."13
It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had sexual intercourse with
"AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence to prove that
appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that appellant
and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At around 7:00 p.m. of
September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and chatted with him and Meneses while drinking
liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when she took a nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses
forced, threatened or intimidated her.
As to how appellant and Meneses had sexual intercourse with her, "AAA" merely testified as follows:
Q - Madam Witness, you said that it was Elvis James who raped you first. And then after he left this Juan
Richard Tionloc [accused] approached you and asked if you can do it?
A - Yes, Ma' am; he asked me but I did not answer because I was still shivering.
Q - And then what else happened after that?
A - That is it; he was the one who did it.14
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed force, threat or intimidation
against her. No claim was ever made that appellant physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a
weapon against, or uttered threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the
table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of her own imagination.
There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even
ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an effective tool to intimidate a person because it was
neither presented nor described in court. These findings are clear from the following testimony of "AAA:"
Q- While Elvis James was inserting his penis to [sic] your vagina, what are [sic] you doing?
24
A- I was crying, Ma'am.
Q - You did not shout for help?
A - I did not because I was afraid, Ma'am.
Q - Why were you afraid, madam witness?
A - Because there was a knife inside the room which we used in cutting the hotdog and then [I] did not shout
anymore because I was afraid that they might stab me, Ma'am.15
Even asswning in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in "AAA's" mind, it should be
noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA" for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of
the feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant casually asked his friend, "AAA,"
if she "can do it" one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the negative.
Resistance Should be Made Before the
Rape is Consummated.
Later on, appellant went on top of "AAA" without saying anything or uttering threatening words. For her part,
"AAA" neither intimated any form of resistance nor expressed any word of rejection to appellant's advances. It
was only when she felt something painful minutes during their sexual intercourse that "AAA" tried to move.
Thus:
A - During the intercourse that was about few minutes and when I felt the pain that was the time when I tried
to move.
Q - When you tried to move, what else happened?
A - When I tried to move he released himself
Q - And then what happened?
A - He went out of the room.16
Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, appellant never employed the slightest force,
threat or intimidation against her; second, "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked
her to have sex with him; and, third, appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt
the slightest pain and tried to move during their sexual congress.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign
of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress when "AAA" tried
to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of
appellant's sexual advances.
In People v. Amogis,17 this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious.1âwphi1 A mere
attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and
chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil
design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a
woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing
him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.
The Age Gap Between the Victim and
Appellant Negates Force, Threat or
Intimidation.
"AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or intimidation. She insinuates that
she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual intercourse with her. However, their age gap negates force,
threat or intimidation; he was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they were friends. In
addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter threatening words or perform
any act of intimidation against her.
Drunkeness Should Have Deprived the
Victim of Her Will Power to Give her
Consent.
The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant. There is authority to
the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of drugs or liquor, which incites her passion but
does not deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of rape."18
Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her friends. Thus, as usual,
she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them while drinking liquor for about
four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that she was
completely deprived of her will power.
"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be. "AAA" is used to
consuming liquor.19 And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering" at that time rendered her immobile such
that she could not move her head to signal her rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper to him
her refusal, then she would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home immediately after the alleged
rape.
It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State.
Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an
acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 05452 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, in
Criminal Case No. 08-264453 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez
is ACQUITTED due to insufficiency of evidence. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED,
unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this
Court the action he has taken within five days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELEN MEJARES Y VALENCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Court affirms with modification the conviction of accused appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia (Mejares) for
the crime of qualified theft. While this Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty initially imposed upon her. In light of the
recently enacted Republic Act No. 10951,1 which adjusted the amounts of property and damage on which
penalties are based, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the prosecution's failure to
establish the precise values of the stolen items, accused-appellant must be ordered released on time served.
In an Information dated May 24, 2012,2 Mejares was charged with qualified theft of cash and jewelry amounting
to P1,556,308.00. This Information read:
That on or about the 22nd day of May 2012 in the City of San Juan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a domestic servant of complainant Jacqueline Suzanne
Gavino y Aquino, as such, enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed upon her with intent to gain, without the
consent of the owner thereof and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following items, to wit:
Rolex wrist watch (antique) -
Php 400,000.00
Assorted jewelries gold and -
1,000,000.00
Cash money -
25
50,000.00
Cash money ($2,000.00) - someone called her and instructed her to destroy her employer's drawer, take the cash and valuables there, and
86,308.00
Cash assorted foreign money - dugo gang, she answered that she was. PO3 Hipolito was likewise informed that condominium security initially
20,000.00
with a total amount of Php 1,556,308.00, belonging to said complainant to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses. The first witness, Raquel Torres (Torres), was a household helper
for Mark Vincent and Jacqueline Suzanne Gavino (the Spouses Gavino) from August 2011 to July 2012.4
According to Torres, she was cleaning the dining area of the condominium unit of the Spouses Gavino at around
1:00 p.m. on May 22, 2012, when she noticed that Mejares' cellphone kept ringing. Mejares answered it,
hurrying to the computer room and away from Torres. When Mejares returned, she was "pale, perspiring and
panicky."5 When Torres asked about the identity of the caller, Mejares did not answer. She told her instead that
Jacqueline Suzanne Gavino (Jackie) met an accident and instructed her to get something from a drawer in the
masters' bedroom. Since it was locked, Mejares was supposedly told to destroy it.6
Torres added that when Mejares emerged from the bedroom, she was holding a plastic hamper that contained a
black wallet and envelopes and was talking with someone on her cellphone. After a few minutes, Mejares
informed her that Jackie did not want other household members to know what happened and that Mejares was
instructed to also take a watch and jewelry, since the cash in the drawer was not enough to pay the other driver
in the accident who was threatening to sue. Torres narrated that after preparing everything, Mejares left with a
green bag.7
When Mejares returned at about 3:00p.m., she asked Torres if there had been an incoming landline call while
she was gone. Torres answered in the negative and Mejares stated that she had purposely hung it. At 4:00
p.m., Torres started to receive calls from Jackie, who sounded "loud, normal and animated,''8 making Torres
wonder if Jackie had really encountered an accident. Torres then asked Mejares once again if it was Jackie she
had spoken with earlier. According to Torres, Mejares "grew ashen and perspired" before answering that she
was certain.9
The prosecution's second witness was private complainant, Jackie.
She recalled that when she interviewed Mejares back in May 2011, Mejares then indicated that she was familiar
with the operation of the dugo-dugo gang. She further narrated that in the early afternoon of May 22, 2012, she
was at work. She tried calling but could not access her household landline past 5:00p.m., so she decided to call
Torres' cellular phone to have her instruct the driver to pick her up from the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board's Office. After the phone call was cut, she then received a call from Mejares, informing her
about what happened.10
According to Jackie, Mejares told her about receiving a call from a certain Nancy, who stated that Jackie wanted
to avoid the publicity that may arise from her supposed accident. Jackie continued that Mejares thereafter
claimed that she was instructed to break the drawer in the masters' bedroom and to take all its contents.
However, Jackie clarified in her account that she had neither a personal secretary nor an aide named Nancy.
She also affirmed that she did not figure in any accident.11
The third prosecution witness was Bonifacio Baluyot (Baluyot), the stay-in driver of the Spouses Gavino who had
been working for Jackie since 1976.12
Baluyot claimed that on May 22, 2012, Mejares told him to bring her to Greenhills Shopping Mall, allegedly on
Jackie's orders. He complied. He narrated that he saw her carry a green bag. After dropping Mejares at the mall
entrance, he returned to the condominium. He added that when the incident was subsequently being
investigated, he heard the guards say that they tried to stop Mejares from leaving, although she had told him
that it was only Torres who was stopped by the guards for not having a gate pass.13
The prosecution's fourth witness was Pedro Garcia (Garcia), the condominium security guard who was on duty
at the lobby on May 22, 2012.14
Garcia narrated that at around 1:30 p.m., he saw Mejares about to leave the premises carrying a green bag.
However, he did not allow her to leave in the absence of a gate pass signed by her employer. Despite his
insistence that Mejares call her employer, she did not. After a few moments, her cellphone rang. Instead of
answering Garcia's query on the caller's identity, Mejares rushed to the elevator. Afterwards, Garcia saw
Mejares leave using her employer's car driven by Baluyot. According to him, he still attempted to stop them by
warning them that they could be victims of dugo-dugo gang, to no avail.15
The prosecution's last witness was investigating officer PO3 Clifford Hipolito (PO3 Hipolito).
He testified that during the investigation, he questioned Mejares about what happened. She stated that
bring everything to Baclaran because Jackie had met an accident. When asked if she was aware of the dugo-
prevented Mejares from leaving but she went back to the unit, refusing to call her employer.16
The defense presented Mejares as its lone witness. She denied the charge and claimed that she was a victim of
the dugo-dugo gang.
According to her, she received a phone call from the condominium unit's landline at 1:00 p.m. on May 22, 2012
from a certain Nancy, who introduced herself as Jackie's assistant and informed her that Jackie had met an
accident. Afterwards, she claimed that Jackie herself talked to her and instructed her to get something from a
drawer in the master's bedroom and to use a screwdriver to destroy its lock because the other driver in the
accident had a 50-50 chance of survival. She further narrated that when the lobby guard did not allow her to
leave after she had gathered and packed the contents of the drawer, Jackie called her and told her to return to
the unit and to ask the driver to take her to Virra Mall. From there, she took a cab going to Baclaran Church,
where she met an unknown woman. Before handing the bag to the unidentified lady, she claimed that she was
able to talk again over the phone to Jackie, who told her to give the bag to the woman and return to the unit.
She only had second thoughts about what had happened when after arriving at the condominium, Torres stated
that she might have been tricked. She also contended that she had never heard of the dugo-dugo gang.17
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft of assets amounting to P1,056,308.00. The dispositive portion of its February 6, 2014 Decision18
read:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment finding accused BELEN MEJARES y VALENCIA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of qualified theft of articles worth P1,056,308.00, thereby sentencing her to
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 310 vis à vis Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is ordered to
pay to Jacqueline Aquino Gavino the sum mentioned in actual damages. Cost against accused.
SO ORDERED.19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision in toto in its July 30, 2015
Decision.20
Accused-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal.21
In its January 23, 2017 Resolution,22 this Court noted the parties' manifestations in lieu of supplemental briefs.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether or not accused-appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
I
Theft is consummated when three (3) elements concur: (1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of
the owner's consent.23 Moreover, for qualified theft to be committed, the following elements must concur:
Taking of personal property;
That the said property belongs to another;
That the said taking be done with intent to gain
That it be done without the owner's consent;
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.24
Accused-appellant hopes to convince this Court that her actions only reflected the will of her employer,
emphasizing that there could be no theft on her part because there was no intent to gain.25 She insists that she
only took instructions from the secretary of private complainant and later on, from private complainant
herself.26 Additionally, she claims that she is as much a victim of the dugo-dugo gang as was her employer.27
Her contentions are untenable.
This Court has been consistent in holding that "intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. [Thus,] [a]ctual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain."28 In this case, it is clear from the established
facts that it was accused-appellant who opened the drawer in the masters' bedroom and took away the cash and
26
valuables it contained. Therefore, the burden is on the defense to prove that intent to gain was absent despite
accused-appellant's actual taking of her employer's valuables. It is precisely this burden that the defense failed
to discharge.
The Court of Appeals is correct in pointing out that the actions of accused-appellant before, during, and after the
crime all belie her claim that she did not willfully commit the crime. It correctly underscored the following
observations of the Regional Trial Court:
Why would accused hang the landline phone if not to insure that she was not discovered in the nick of time to
have her loot recovered?
While accused portrays herself as the victim, prosecution evidence has established that she is the victimizer.
This conclusion has the following bases: first, the surreptitious way accused handled the incoming calls; second,
her failure to heed the warnings of persons around her, i.e. Raquel and security guard Garcia; third, her inability
to make use of the myriad opportunities available to verify the alleged vehicular accident where her mistress
figured in.29
Normal human experience, as well as the consistency in and confluence of the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses lead to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant, taking advantage of her being a domestic
helper of private complainant for approximately a year, committed the crime of qualified theft. If she honestly
believed that her employer had met an accident and was genuinely worried for her, she could have easily
sought the help of any of her co-workers in the household. When warned about the dugo-dugo gang, accused-
appellant could have paused to re-assess the situation. She failed to do all these security measures with no
convincing justification. Indeed, accused-appellant's persistence to leave the condominium with the valuables
and her refusal to let the security guard talk to her employer further belie her position.
To make matters worse, accused-appellant was a domestic helper who had been working for the Spouses
Gavino for at least one (1) year when she committed the crime. By this fact alone, the offense committed is
qualified and warrants graver penalties, pursuant to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
Article 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has explained that while grave abuse of trust and confidence per se does not produce the felony as
an effect, it is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the commission of the crime of theft";30 hence,
the imposition of a higher penalty is necessary. It is not difficult to understand why the character of accused-
appellant's work as a domestic helper qualifies the offense she committed. As explained in Corpuz v. People of
the Philippines:31
[T]he rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by
her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer's loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal
of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of
such wrongful acts.32
The established facts point to the soundness of the Regional Trial Court's and the Court of Appeals' conclusion:
that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. Thus, her conviction must be upheld.
II
However, this Court modifies the penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant pursuant to Republic Act No.
10951, in view of the other details of the case, as established during trial.
On August 29, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. 10951 that sought, among
others, to help indigent prisoners and individuals accused of committing petty crimes. It also increased the fines
for treason and the publication of false news; and likewise increased the baseline amounts and values of
property and damage to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses committed in
relation to them.
Basic wisdom underlies the adjustments made by Republic Act No. 10951. Imperative to maintaining an
effective and progressive penal system is the consideration of exigencies borne by the passage of time. This
includes the basic economic fact that property values are not constant. To insist on basing penalties on values
identified in the 1930s is not only anachronistic and archaic; it is unjust and legally absurd to a moral fault.
In his dissenting opinion in Corpuz v. People,33 Justice Roberto Abad illustrated in the context of qualified theft
the cruelty foisted by insistence on the values set by the Revised Penal Code when it was originally adopted:
The harshness of this antiquated 1930 scheme for punishing criminal offenders is doubly magnified in qualified
theft where the offender is a domestic helper or a trusted employee. Qualified theft is a grievous offense since
its penalty is automatically raised two degrees higher than that usually imposed on simple theft. Thus,
unadjusted for inflation, the domestic helper who steals from his employer would be meted out a maximum of:
a)
6 years in prison for a toothbrush worth P5;
b)
12 years in prison for a lipstick worth P39;
c)
14 years and 8 months in prison for a pair of female slippers worth P150;
d)
20 years in prison for a wristwatch worth P19,000; or
e)
30 years in prison for a branded lady's handbag worth P125,000.
Unless checked, courts will impose 12 years maximum on the housemaid who steals a P39 lipstick from her
employer. They will also impose on her 30 years maximum for stealing a pricy lady's handbag. This of course is
grossly obscene and unjust, even if the handbag is worth P125,000.00 since 30 years in prison is already the
penalty for treason, for raping and killing an 8-year-old girl, for kidnapping a grade school student, for robbing a
house and killing the entire family, and for a P50-million plunder.
It is not only the incremental penalty that violates the accused's right against cruel, unusual, and degrading
punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and
inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in.34 (Citations omitted.)
Given its possibly fairer and more just consequences, Republic Act No. 10951 is a welcome development in our
legal system.
Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case.35 It likewise specifically
stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect.36 Section 100 adds that this retroactivity applies not
only to persons accused of crimes but have yet to be meted their final sentence, but also to those already
"serving sentence by final judgment."37 This retroactivity is in keeping with the principle already contained in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony."38 Given these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to adjust the penalty to be
imposed on accused-appellant.
Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal properties,39 it is critical to
ensure that the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information or
uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution. Here, a perusal of the records leads to the conclusion
that while the Regional Trial Court reduced the value of the stolen jewelry from P1,000,000.0040 to
P500,000.00 on the basis of the complainant's social standing,41 such determination is devoid of evidentiary
basis.
Citing People v. Paraiso42 and People v. Marcos43 in Francisco v. People,44 this Court explained that "an
ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry"45 and that courts cannot take judicial notice of the value
of properties when "[it] is not a matter of public knowledge [or] unquestionable demonstration"; thus:
The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and
in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by the
prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Regional Trial Court did not only err in setting the amount of the stolen jewelry on the basis of nothing but
the complainant's social standing, but also in sustaining the values of the other stolen items as they appeared in
the Information and asserted by the complainant. These items were valued as follows: the antique Rolex
wristwatch at P400,000.00, the foreign currencies at P86,308.00, and cash at P50,000.00. They were valued
this way since no other competent evidence such as in the form of watch make, model description, receipts, or
exchange rates was presented to satisfactorily prove their value.
Thus, in the absence of factual and legal bases, the amount of P1,056,308.00 could not be the basis to
determine the proper penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant. On the same ground, the complainant is
likewise not entitled to reparation.47 Instead, the rule articulated in Candelaria v. People48 applies:
In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances
of the case.49 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
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Given that the value of the stolen personal properties in this case was not determined by reliable evidence
independent of the prosecution's uncorroborated testimonies, this Court is constrained to apply the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 81 of Republic Act No. 10951,
which is arresto mayor.

However, in view of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code concerning qualified theft,50 accused-appellant must
be meted a penalty two (2) degrees higher, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a
range of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, where there are no modifying circumstances and the minimum
of the indeterminate penalty is computed from the full range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is reckoned from the medium
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, accused-appellant must only suffer a minimum
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to a maximum of three (3) years,
six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional.

In view of these considerations, this Court finds that accused-appellant is now entitled to immediate release for
having fully served her sentence. In a Letter from Elsa Aquino-Albado, Officer-in-Charge of the Correctional
Institution for Women, dated October 15, 2016,51 she affirmed that accused-appellant has been confined since
February 10, 2014 until today. Evidently, she has been deprived of her liberty for a period well beyond what the
law has required, having already served her time for almost 4 years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals July 30, 2015
Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06778 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

While this Court affirms that accused-appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia is GUILTY of the offense of qualified
theft, the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving the total value of the stolen articles through
reliable and independent evidence. Thus, pursuant to Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10951, and upon application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer only the minimum penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to the
maximum penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional.
Complainant Jacqueline Gavino is likewise no longer entitled to reparation.

However, given that accused-appellant has been confined for almost four (4) years already since February 10,
2014, she is now considered to have fully served her sentence and MUST BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED, unless
she is being detained for a separate charge.

SO ORDERED.

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