CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I | TORRES DIGEST

REPUBLIC v.s FELCIANO

Nature of the case: Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177
hectares in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff said that
he bought the property from Victor Gardiola through a Contract of Sale at followed by a Deed of
Absolute Sale

On, November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.90 under the
administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA),
reserving for settlement purposes, a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and
Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority,
started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; The plaintiff contended that the
property, though reserved under Proclamation No. 90, was of private property of plaintiff and
should be excluded. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the
property . The trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No.
1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff. While the rest of
the property claimed by plaintiff, be reverted to the public domain.

On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto,
maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State.

ISSUE:

IS THE DOCTRINE OF NON SUABILITY OF THE STATE APPLICABLE/

RULING:

YES. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is enforceable.

A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam and the
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.

A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be
sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.

NTC v.s. OROVILLE Development Corp.

Nature of the case: Eminent Domain

FACTS:

In 1983, National Transmission Corporation constructed a power transmission line on the properties which
originally belonged to Alfredo Reyes (Reyes) and Grace Calingasan (Calingasan), in Puerto, Cagayan de Oro
City, which is known as the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line.

Reyes sold his land to Antonio Navarette, who later sold the same property to respondent Oroville
Development Corporation (Oroville), which is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
85121. Likewise, Calingasan sold her land to Oroville, now registered under TCT No. T- 104365. Thus, in
1995, Oroville became the registered owner of these properties with a total area of 13,904 square meters
traversed by the existing Tagoloan- Pulangi 138 kV transmission line.

On November 17, 2006, TransCo offered to buy these properties from Oroville to be used for the construction
of the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line in Mindanao. Oroville, through its representative Antonio Tiu
(Tiu), requested to reroute the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line because the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV
transmission line is already traversing its properties and as well as that TransCo has not been paid Oroville just
compensation for the construction of the Tagoloan- Pulangi 138 kV transmission line in its property. Request
was refused. Thus Oroville filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against TransCo, seeking to enjoin the construction of the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV
transmission line.

ISSUE:

1. Is the power of eminent domain used by TransCo over the properties of Oroville applicable/enforceable?
2. Whether the computation of just compensation for the expropriated property should be based on its value
at the time of the taking of property
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RULING:

YES. The power of eminent domain is applicable.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property for uses to promote public welfare. However,
there are conditions to this power, (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property
owner.

On the requisites of eminent domain. First, The expropriator must enter a private property; Second, the
entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; Third, the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority; Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and Fifth, the utilization of the property for public
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The first and fourth requisites are present in this case. Transco took possession of Oroville's property in order
to construct transmission lines to be used in generating electricity for the benefit of the public.
The second requisite is likewise present as there can be no question that the construction of transmission lines
meant an indefinite stay in the property of Oroville. Further, Trans Co's exercise of eminent domain is pursuant
to its authority granted under Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001. 17.
(Ito yung pangalawang issue) However on the final requisite, Oroville has been deprived of the beneficial
enjoyment of its property. this Court has already declared that "since the high-tension electric current passing
through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the nonnal use of their land, it is
only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property. Thus,
The valuation of the subject property shall be 78.65 per sq. meter, with interest at 12c/o per annum from the
Jan. 1983 until Jan. 21, 2011. Petoner, TansCo is also ordered to pay Orville examplary damages in the amount
of 1,000,000 and ttorney's fees of 200,000.

JIMENEZ vs CABANGBANG
Nature of the case: LIBEL

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez. Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
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libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang, who is a member of the HOR and chairman of its
committee of the National Defense. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of
the Philippines, The letter contained operational plans by ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategist, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The said letter is to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Latter, moved to dismiss the complaint stating
that the letter in question is not libelous, but rather is a letter of privileged communication.

ISSUE:

Is the letter a privileged communication rather than libelous?

RULING:

No. The letter is not of privileged communication.

We must take into consideration Art 6. Sec 15 of the constitution. The determination of the privilege
communication depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or
debate in Congress”. It refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same
is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication in this case does not belong to any this category. It was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or
as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Eastern Shipping Lines v.s. POEA

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA.

The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.

The validity of the memorandum circular was questioned on the grounds that POEA has no jurisdiction and is
violating the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA
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to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in
favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses.

ISSUE:
Is the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is in violation with the principle of non-delegation of legislative
powers.

RULING:

No, The court held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was
given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

However we must take into consideration the exception of legislative discretion as to the substantive contents
of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. The reasons given above
for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
Wherein, Memorandum Circular no. 2 is an administrative regulation which has the force and effect of law.
The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegated in the exercise of the said authority. It is discoverable in the executive order itself which
in creating the POEA mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable
employment practices.
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Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct
the errors, if any, of its subordinates.
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