Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec.
9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 1 of 8
Article III Section 9 Case Digests and Bar Questions
1. SMI Development Corporation vs. Republic, 323 SCRA 862
Facts: On September 20, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Department of Health thru the National Children’s Hospital filed a complaint for
Eminent Domain against SMI Development Corporation for the purpose of
expropriating three (3) parcels of land with a total area of 1,158 sq. m. (the properties)
belonging to said corporation which are adjacent to the premises of the hospital. In
November 1996, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the
plaintiff’s Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Order and Writ of Possession. The
defendant alleged that the complaint lacked or had insufficient cause of action; that
the taking of the property would not serve the purpose for which it was intended;
that the plaintiff failed to negotiate with it for the purchase of the property which
‘reflects against the urgency and necessity’ of the plaintiff’s need of the property and
implies lack of intention to pay its true and fair market value; and that the necessity
to expropriate the property is negated by the fact that less than a kilometer from the
plaintiff’s premises was the Quezon Institute which is ‘presently not put to its
optimum use’ and is a better place for putting up the ‘frontline services for which the
property is needed with less costs and less prejudice to private rights.’
Issue: Is prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition sine qua non for eminent domain?
Ruling: No. Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain is found in Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provides: “SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain – The President shall determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in
behalf of the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he
deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper
court.” The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a
condition precedent for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v.
Court of Appeals, the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional
requirement instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was
imposed.
2. NC vs. Ileto, G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, September 2012
Facts: On September 23, 1998, the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC filed with the
RTC a jointly executed compromise agreement where they agreed that NPC would
acquire 13,855 square meters of the 95,445 square meter property owned by the Heirs
of Sofia Mangahas. In turn, the NPC would pay the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas the total
amount of P3,463,750.00 as just compensation for the property, with an assessed
value of P250.00 per square meter. The RTC found the compromise agreement to be
proper, and rendered a partial decision approving it on September 28, 1998
Issue: Does the NPC have the power and authority of eminent domain?
Ruling: Republic Act No. 6395, entitled “An Act Revising the Charter of the National
Power Corporation,” grants the NPC the power to acquire “property incident to, or
necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which [it] was created,”
namely: the construction of generation and transmission facilities to provide
electricity for the entire country. Section 3 (a) In acquiring private property or private
property rights through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof
will be traversed by the transmission lines, only a right-of-way easement thereon
shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which such land is actually devoted
will not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof will be needed for
the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as necessary shall be acquired. (b)
With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion thereof,
not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor whichever is lower.
3. Manapat vs. CA, G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007
Facts: Sometime in the 1960’s Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila allowed a
number of individuals to occupy the the Grace Park property on condition that they
would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct
a school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants
offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they could not afford
RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive members
of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for
the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of
the subdivided lots to them at a low price.
Issue: Is the issue of genuine necessity a justiciable question?
Ruling: Yes. In Lagcao v. Judge Labra, we declared that the foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the
exercise is a justiciable question. However, when the power is exercised by the
Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question.
4. Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007
Facts: Julita P. Tan (petitioner) owner of a parcel of land located at the southern bank
of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City acquired the property
from the San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) on April 6, 2001. The Public
Estates Authority (PEA) a GOCC (respondent) on 1985 wrote SADC requesting
permission to enter the latter’s property for the purpose of construction of the Zapote
Bridge. PEA also proposed to SADC to start their negotiation for its acquisition of the
latter’s property. However did not reach any agreement until October 2, 2000 wherein
SADC asked PEA to pay compensation equivalent to the current zonal value plus
interest of ten percent (10%) per annum and a monthly rental of P10,000.00, also with
the same interest. Petitioner as rightful owner of the parcel of land requested juswt
compensation for the use of the land but PEA continuously refused to pay any
compensation despite having toll gates operations benefiting from the said parcel.
Petitioner then wrote PEA expressing her willingness to be compensated through a
land swapping arrangement which on August 6, 2002, PEA Board approved and to

execute a Deed of Exchange. However, On September 22, 2003, respondent alleged
with the RTC that zonal value of the land should of be the taking in 1985. The Order
of December 16, 2003 however directed PEA to pay petitioner just compensation in
the sum of P94,380,000.00 on the zonal value of 20,000.00 per square meter as
indicated by the BIR on October 2001. PEA filed for a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. The Court reiterated that just compensation should be based on the time
of the taking of the land. On July 6, 2005, the court ruled that the petition for certiorari
and prohibition GRANTED while that of mandamus DENIED reversing and setting
aside the December 16, 2003 and April 14, 2004 orders. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in a CA Resolution dated December 12, 2005 was the same denied.
Issue: What is the nature of entry to be considered “taking”?
Ruling: The court ruled that there was no taking of the property in 1985 and that the
CA erred in not dismissing PEA’s petition for certiorari, prohibition ad mandamus
and in the ruling that PEA’s taking of the property occurred in 1985 and that BIR
zonal valuation be based on that year. The Nature of entry can only be considered
taking, only if (1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. (2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners as cited by the court in Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation). Of the
same Rules it also provides that, if upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. In citing Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi the court reiterated the rule that just
compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, whichever comes first.
5. Hda. Luisita vs. Republic, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
Facts: In 1957, the Japenese owners of Tabacabua, offered to sell hacienda Luisita. The
TADECO then owned by Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group was willing to buy. To facilitate
the sale, the Central Bank assisted the buyer to obtain dollar cash from the US Bank.
Also, the GSIS extended a loan in favour of TADECO. As of March 31, 1958,
TADECO had fully paid the purchase price. On May 7, 1980, the martial law
administration filed a suit against TADECO for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita
to the ministry of Agrarian Reform to that land can be distributed to the farmers at
cast. The Manila RTC rendered judgement ordering TADECO to surrender the
Hacienda Luisita to MAR. TADECO (organized) appealed to the CA but the
government won against the TADECO. The dismissal was however made subject to
the obtention by TADECO of the PAPC’s approval of a stark distribution (SOP).
Issue: For purposes of determining just compensation, should the date of the
“taking” be November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? Or should it be
January 2, 2006, the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR? Or
should it be reckoned from finality of the Decision of this Court?
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 2 of 8
Ruling: His shares should be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural
land that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the farmers- beneficiaries
(PLOB). We find that the date of the “taking” is November 21, 1989 when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP for PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.
Ruling (November 22, 2011) : The Supreme Court maintains that the date of “taking”
is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP, in view of the fact
that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of
the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the FWBs.
6. Land Bank vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 168533, February 4, 2008
Facts: Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of a parcel of land with a
total area of 300.4023 hectares in Guimba, Nueva Ecija tilled by tenant farmers.
Pursuant to PD 27 issued on 21 October 1972 and EO 228, the tenant tillers are
deemed full owners of the land they till. The average gross production (AGP) is 91.42
cavans of palay per hectare and the land is capable of 2 ½ harvests in two years.
However, as reflected in the records of this case, the AGP of 91.42 cavans is for TCT
No. 97155 which is not among the titles covered in this subject land. On the contrary,
LBP alleged that the subject land was producing at most only 41.42 cavans of palay
per hectare as of 1972. Emancipation patents were made on the TCT with the
guidelines for just compensation embodied in PD 27 and implemented in EO 228, the
DAR fixed the value of the subject land consisting of 262.2346 hectares at
P2,086,735.09. The GSP for one cavan of 50 kilos palay in 21 October 1972 was P35.
Domingo filed a Petition for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation in the
trial court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija praying that the just compensation for the subject
land be determined in accordance with the formula in Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657 (RA 6657) which would amount to P39,335,190.00 computed at P150,000 per
hectare. In its Answer, LBP maintained that Domingo’s unirrigated land is covered by
PD 27 and EO 228 being primarily devoted to rice and tenanted as of 21 October 1972.
LBP stated that the valuation formula found in PD 27 and EO 228 is the applicable
formula for computing just compensation. On 12 April 2004, the trial court, after
hearing the case, ruled that the subject land’s date of taking is not 21 October 1972
when PD 27 took effect. Instead, the issuance dates of the emancipation patents
should determine the date of taking because these are when the ownership of a
determinate portion of the subject land was transferred to the farmer-beneficiaries.
The trial court further stated that LBP’s contention to compute just compensation
based on the formula prescribed in PD 27 and EO 228 cannot be sustained. These
laws are only suppletory to RA 6657 which is the latest law on agrarian reform. The
trial court deemed it necessary to apply suppletorily the formula in PD 27 and EO
228. Dissatisfied with the decision, LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but then
was denied by the trial Court.
Issue: When is compensation considered just?

Ruling: Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. As a concept in the
Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined as the fair or market value of the property
as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell. Section 4, Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution mandates that the redistribution of agricultural lands shall be
“subject to the payment of just compensation.” The deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not
do violence to the Bill of Rights but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle
to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the landowners’ right to just compensation
should be balanced with agrarian reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we
declared that it is the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged,
but this duty should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. In Land Bank v.
Natividad, the Court held that the determination of just compensation “in accordance
with RA 6657, and not PD 27 and EO 228, is especially imperative considering that
just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.” In
this same case, this Court also had the occasion to discuss the just compensation for
PD 27 lands, thus: Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant states that: Sec.
17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation. The trial court and the appellate court
ruled that the provisions of RA 6657 apply to the present case and that the date of
taking of Domingo’s riceland for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of emancipation patents.
7. NHA vs. Guivelondo, G.R. No. 166518, June 16, 2009
Facts: This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 154411,in which we resolved once and for
all the validity of the order of expropriation issued by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
11, condemning the properties of respondents at P11,200.00 per square meter and the
propriety of the garnishment against petitioner’s funds and personal properties for
the payment of just compensation to respondents. On November 12, 2003,
respondents filed a motion for payment of interest anchored on the premise that
petitioner made piecemeal payments of the judgment amount, causing a 32-month
delay in the full satisfaction thereof which entitled respondents to the payment of a
legal interest of 12% per annum. The motion was granted. Aggrieved, petitioner filed
a petition for review on certiorari with the CA which was denied for lack of merit in a
decision dated December 16, 2004. Hence, this present review.
Issue: Must just compensation include interests? How much?
Ruling: The ruling in Untula vs. Republic is not applicable to the instant case because
respondents do not ask for interest as part of the judgment in an expropriation case,
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 3 of 8
but for the interest which is imposed due to the delay on the payment of a money
judgment. The interest in this case is computed from the time the judgment becomes
final and executor and the award of this interest need not be stated in the judgment.
This is considered legal interest which is to be computed at 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction because the interim period is deemed to be the equivalent
to a forbearance of credit.
8. NPC vs. Makabangkit, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011
Facts: In their complaint filed before the RTC in 1997, the heirs of Macabingkit said
that they discovered the presence of the tunnel underneath their land when several
firms refused to buy their property because of the tunnel, and that even a bank had
rejected the use of their land as collateral. They told the trial court that the presence of
the tunnel that was constructed without their knowledge and consent. After trial and
an inspection that established the presence of the tunnel, the RTC ordered the NPC to
pay Macabangkit as just compensation for the property. The Napocor’s appeal before
the CA was denied, prompting the power firm to elevate the issue before the SC.
Issue: Was the construction of a tunnel underneath the land of the heirs of
Macabangkit a compensable taking?
Ruling: Yes. There was a full taking on the part of NPC, even when the owners were
not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private
property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is
neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any
respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire
land.
9. Republic vs. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448, November 16, 2011
Facts: Nov. 10, 2000 the Philippines represented by the TRB filed a complaint before
the RTC Angeles for expropriation of parcels of lands to become part of the Luzon
Expressway Project. April 18, 2002 a writ of possession was issued petitioner in
possession of the properties. Consequently, a committee was created and after
deliberations, the members of the committee recommended specific amounts to be
the just compensation to be paid by petitioners. Petitioners against that the moment
recommended by the committee and not constitute fair and just equivalent of the
properties.
Issue: Can tax declarations and the BIR zonal valuation be the bases for
determination just compensation? Should just compensation be at 200.00/sq.m or 4,
800 sq.m?
Ruling: No. The petitioners tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation and the deeds of
sale presented are not the only proof of the fair value of properties. Zonal valuation is

just one of the index of the fair market value of the real estate. By itself, this index
cannot be the sole basis of just compensation in the expropriation cases. Various
teachers came into play in the valuation of the specific properties singled out for the
expropriation. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation 4, 800 sq.m as determined by the court appointed commissioners
and corroborated by the BIR admin officer Cleofe. BIR testified and certified that the
prevailing fir market values of land located at Pulung, Manaquil, Angeles City s at 4,
800 sq.m.
10. NPC vs. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012
Facts: Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission lines
to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project. These
transmission lines traversed a 12,060-square meter portion of a parcel of agricultural
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15343 and owned by
Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.
NAPOCOR then commenced expropriation proceedings. These proceedings
culminated in a final Decision ordering it to pay the amount of P 300,000 as just
compensation for the affected property. Respondents filed the instant Complaint
against NAPOCOR and demanded the payment of just compensation. They alleged
that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting high-tension transmission
lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for the intrusion. Petitioner
averred that it already paid just compensation for the establishment of the
transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision in
National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just
compensation and damages may only be filed within five years from the date of
installation of the transmission lines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6395.
Issue: Can NPC only pay an easement fee for its aerial transmission lines?
Ruling: No. Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon the
Supreme Court. SC have ruled that “when petitioner takes private property to
construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper
determination by the courts.” SC therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay
respondents the full market value of the affected property as determined by the court
a quo. In a similar case of National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, the SC ruled that
while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCOR’s
transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not
exceed three meters, danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents’ farm
workers, such that the property is no longer suitable for agricultural production.
Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary
use of their land.
11. NC vs. Ileto, G.R. Nos. 169957 &171558, September, 2012
Facts: On April 6, 2006, Danilo Brillo, et al., filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 171558, assailing the CA’s instruction to the
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 4 of 8
RTC to apply the schedule of fair market values attached to NPC Board Resolution
No. 97-246, to determine just compensation for their lands. In turn, the OSG,
representing the NPC, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court on April
7, 2006, docketed as G.R. No. 169957, to question the validity of the compromise
agreement between the NPC and the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas. The OSG also claimed
that the RTC erred when it decided to pay the landowners just compensation for the
acquisition of the subject properties instead of paying the rate fixed for an aerial
easement of right of way. Lastly, the Sps. Ileto filed a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 171583. However, the Court denied this petition for lack of
merit in its April 17, 2006 Resolution. On October 3, 2007, the Court issued a
Resolution, ordering the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 169957 and 171558. The National
Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint, which was subsequently amended,
seeking to expropriate certain parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line project. On October 22, 1997, the NPC
deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amount of P204,566.60,
representing the initial provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated.
Consequently, the NPC received actual possession of these properties on December
16, 1997. To determine the issue of just compensation, the RTC constituted a team of
commissioners.
Issue: Upon whom is the determination of just compensation addressed to? How can
“justness” of compensation can be attained and under what criterion?
Ruling: The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function
addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government.30 We already established in Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay31 that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the
statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the courts' own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. We said: The determination of
"just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations[,] but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation. The "just"-ness of just compensation can only be attained by using
reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property.
12. Lagcao vs. Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts: In this appeal, petitioner argued that Ordinance no. 1843, which authorizes the
mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of the lot
1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners to be used for the benefit of the
homeless, is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the “public use”
contemplated in the Constitution. They alleged that it will benefit only a handful of
people and that it was passed for politicking.

Issue: Is Cebu City Ordinance no. 1843 a valid exercise of inferior domain?
Ruling: No. Local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise
their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to housing problems. In this case,
there was no showing why petitioner’s property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice. Ordinance no.
1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioner’s property as the site of a socialized
housing project. Moreover, prior to its passage, there was no evidence of a valid and
definite offer to buy petitioner’s property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. The
ordinance is constitutionally infirmed for being violative of petitioner’s right to due
process. For an ordinance to be valid, it must (1) not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) not be unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
13. Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 678
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Parañaque filed on Sept. 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. The
complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project. Incidentally, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to
enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter
did not accept. The RTC of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10,
1994, giving it due course. Acting on petitioner’s motion, said court issued an Order
dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of
its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. On February 21, 1994,
private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim, alleging in the main that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by
RA 7160; and the cause of action, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On
private respondent’s motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. On
March 24, 1994, petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the trial court’s Order
dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the
principle of res judicata was not applicable.
Issue: Is res Judicata applicable in expropriation proceedings?
Ruling: The Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent
power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is
plenary and, like police power, can reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use. All separate interests of individuals in property are held of
the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding
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the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires it. Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot
be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
14. NPC vs. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012
Facts: Petition questions the RTC and CA ruling that entitled respondents to
₱4,920,750 as just compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by
petitioner NPC. In the 1970’s, NPC constructed high-tension transmission lines. Such
lines traversed the agricultural land owned by the Pereyras. In 1981, NPC
commenced expropriation proceedings and in a final judgment, the RTC mandated
NPC to pay the Pereyras P300,000. Respondents, however, claim that they were not
paid just compensation for NPC’s intrusion. Petitioner claimed that they already paid
just compensation by virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision in
NPC v. Pereyras. NPC further claimed that the claim for just compensation and
damages may only be filed within five years from the date of installation of the
transmission lines pursuant to the provisions of RA 6395.
Issue: Can prescription defeat a claim for just compensation?
Ruling: No. The Court held that prescription cannot defeat a claim for just
compensation. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our
Bill of Rights, which states in clear and categorical language that “private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” This constitutional
mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. Thus, the prescriptive period
under RA 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. Note that
when the State wishes to occupy private property, it should institute first eminent
domain proceedings and deposit with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. It is not the duty of the
private citizen to demand just compensation.
15. LBP-versus- Bona, G.R. 180804, Nov. 12, 2012
Facts: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) alleging error on the part of the appellate court in reversing the
finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court, that the land subject of this case was under the coverage of
R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1987 and not under P.D.
No. 27. Rokaya Narrazid Bona (Rokaya) is the owner by succession of a parcel of land
located at Bataraza, Palawan. She inherited this property from her mother who also
inherited the same from her husband who traces his roots back to Sultan Narrazid, a
former Sultan of Palawan. LBP is the financial intermediary for the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). From 4 December 1989 until 5 November 1990,
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 6 of 8

several emancipation patents were issued to different farmer-beneficiaries under the

Operation Land Transfer (OLT) that covered the land of Rokaya. Meanwhile, on 12
December 1989, then Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago of the DAR sent a Notice of
Acquisition addressed to Bautan Narrazid, the mother of Rokaya, placing the
property under CARP. On 16 January 1990, Rokaya, through a letter to the Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution, DAR, objected to the offered price for being too
low. In October 1993, Rokaya filed a complaint before the RTC of Puerto Princessa
City, Palawan but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. Following the dismissal,
Rokaya sent a letter to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Homer P. Tobias
requesting for a re-evaluation based on the Average Annual Production per hectare
of the land.

Issue: If the acquisition of the property' is under Operation Land Transfer [OLT]
under P.D. No. 27, does it necessarily follow that the determination of just
compensation therefore be under the same decree?

Ruling: No. The Court, in Paris vs Alfeche, ruled that the passage of RA 6657 before
the completion of agrarian reform process over the lands acquired before PD 27
should, for compensation purposes be completed under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO
228 having suppletory affect pursuant to Sec. 75 of RA 6657. If such is the case, the
formula to be followed is that expressed in Sec. 17 of RA 6657.

BAR QUESTIONS
2004 Bar
The City of San Rafael passed an ordinance authorizing the City Mayor, assisted by
the police, to remove all advertising signs displayed or exposed to public view in the
main city street, for being offensive to sight or otherwise a nuisance. AM, whose
advertising agency owns and rents out many of the billboards ordered removed by
the City Mayor, claims that the City should pay for the destroyed billboards at their
current market value since the City has approached them for the public purpose of
city beautification. The Mayor refuses to pay, so AM is suing the City and the Mayor
for damages arising from the taking of his property without due process nor just
compensation. Will AM’s suit prosper? Reason briefly.
First Alternative Answer:
The suit of AM will not prosper. The removal of the billboards is not an exercise of
the power of eminent domain but of police power (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580
[1915]). The abatement of a nuisance in the exercise of police power does not
constitute taking of property and does not entitle the owner of the property involved
to compensation (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]).
Second Alternative Answer:
The removal of the billboards for the purpose of beautification permanently deprived
AM of the right to use his property and amounts to its taking. Consequently, he
should be paid just compensation (People v. Fajardo, 104, Phil. 443 [1958]).
2008 Bar
Congress passed a law authorizing the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
expropriate or acquire private property for the redevelopment of slum areas, as well
as to lease or resell the property to private developers to carry out the redevelopment
plan. Pursuant to the law, the NHA acquired all properties within a targeted badly
blighted area in San Nicolas, Manila except a well-maintained drug and convenience
store that poses no blight or health problem itself. Thereafter, NHA sold all the
properties it has thus far acquired to a private realty company for redevelopment.
Thus, the NHA initiated expropriation proceedings against the store owner who
protested that his property could not be taken because it is not residential or slum
housing. He also contended that his property is being condemned for a private
purpose, not a public one, noting the NHA`s sale of the entire area except his
property to a private party. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case?
Suggested Answer:
The power of the NHA is a delegated power of eminent domain, strictly construed
against its holder and limited to the public purpose of redevelopment of slum areas.
The expropriation of a property already previously excluded for not posing a blight
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 7 of 8
or health problem lacks public purpose and exceeds the delegated power of the
NHA.
Alternative Answer:
The power of expropriation cannot be used to benefit private parties (Pascual v.
Secretary, No. L-10405, 29 December, 1960). In this case, the main beneficiary would
be the private realty company. The taking of private property and then transferring it
to private persons under the guise of public use is not within the power of eminent
domain (Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Airport, G.R. No. 156273, 09 August, 2005).
2009 Bar
The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234, authorizing the
expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of a freedom
park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality has an
existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the purpose,
and to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the people's money. Is
the disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
The disapproval of the ordinance is not correct. Under Section 56(c) (Local
Government Code), the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte can declare the
ordinance invalid only if it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Bulalakaw. In the instant case, the ordinance is well within the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan. The disapproval of the ordinance by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Leyte was outside its authority having been done on a matter
pertaining to the wisdom of the ordinance which pertains to the Sangguniang Bayan
(Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 [1997]).
2009 Bar
Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a local manufacturer of computers and
computer parts, owns a sprawling plant in a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To
remedy the city's acute housing shortage, compounded by a burgeoning population,
the Sangguniang Panglungsod authorized the City Mayor to negotiate for the
purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to subdivide the property into small
residential lots to be distributed at cost to qualified city residents. But FCC refused to
sell the lot. Hard pressed to find a suitable property to house its homeless residents,
the City filed a complaint for eminent domain against FCC.
a. If FCC hires you as lawyer, what defense or defenses would you set up in order
to resist the expropriation of the property? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 9, Case Digest Compilation|Page 8 of 8

I will raise the defense that the selection of the lot to be expropriated violates due d. Between one who desires to purchase on terms and one who desires to sell after
process, because it is arbitrary. Since it is devoted to commercial use, the a period of time.
beneficiaries of the expropriation will not settle there and will instead merely
lease out or resell the lot for a profit (Manotok vs. National Housing Authority,
150 SCRA 89 [1987]).

b. If the Court grants the City's prayer for expropriation, but the City delays
payment of the amount determined by the court as just compensation, can FCC
recover the property from Pasig City? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

The mere delay in the payment of the just compensation will not entitle the
Filipinas Computer Corporation to recover the property.
Instead, legal interest on the just compensation should be paid (National Power
Corporation v. Henson, 300 SCRA 751 [1998]). However, if the payment was not
made within five years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation case,
Filipinas Computer Corporation can recover the property. To be just, the
compensation must be paid within a reasonable time (Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA
265 [2005]).

c. Suppose the expropriation succeeds, but the City decides to abandon its plan to
subdivide the property for residential purposes having found a much bigger lot,
can FCC legally demand that it be allowed to repurchase the property from the
City of Pasig? Why or why not?

Suggested Answer:
If the lot was expropriated with the condition it can be used only for low-cost
housing, it should be returned to Filipinas Computer Corporation upon
abandonment of the purpose (Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority, 413 SCRA 502 [2003]).

2012 Bar

Which one of the following circumstances is NOT an element of taking under

eminent domain?
a. Entering upon public property for a momentary period;
b. Under color of legal authority;
c. Devoting it to public use;
d. As substantially to oust the owner of all beneficial ownership.

2012 Bar

Market value for purposes of determining just compensation in eminent domain has
been described as the fair value of property:
a. Between one who desires to purchase and one who does not desire to sell;
b. Between one who desires to purchase and one who wants to delay selling;
c. Between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell;