G.R. No. L-34974 July 25, 1974
Goodrich
P. A. ALMIRA, P. M. AMURAO, J. R. ANGELES,
R. N. BADIOLA, LILIA R. BAUTISTA, G. B. LAIZ,
N. A. CANLAS, C. S. DE CASTRO, C. V. CELIS,
JR., A. M. DIONISIO, V. S. ESPIRITU, E. S.
GUERRERO, J. R. GUTIERREZ, E. HERMIDA, M.
O. LORENZO, R. S. MARQUEZ, C. G. PAISO, C.
DELA PAZ, O. RABULAN, A. C. SALCEDO, C. P.
SAN JUAN, D. T. SULIT, I. F. UY, FELIX BAYANI
LOPEZ, GERRY DOMINGO, Z. DACLISON, A.
PANGINDIAN, T. F. PESTANO, P. FULGAR,
BEATRIZ M. LACSON, EROL A. SUGUITAN,
ROSALIE O. ROMERO, AMADOR S. JALOSJOS,
R. G. ARTEFICIO, M. R. BARTOLOME, MANUEL
BASILIA, SYLVIA CAGUIOA, REBECCA DELA
CRUZ, ROGELIO I. CRUZ, LIGAYA A. DURAN,
ENRIQUE GALIERO, ANNA T. GAMBOA, FELIPE
LLAVORE ARSENIO A. MENDOZA, JUSTO
MUEDEN, STALINITA QUIJANO, PATRICIA
RODRIGUEZ, ALLINAS P. ALBINDA, RUBEN A.
ANTONIO, HERMINIA CANDO, NICOLAS CRUZ,
TEREZA A. CRUZ, ANGELES Q. DELA CRUZ,
DANIEL F. BAGUIO, MARCIAL DE LA LUPO, C.
DE CASTRO, AMELIA R. CEDRO ISLA, ANDRES
LACSAMANA, JOSE S. SIENA, ROLANDO S.
JOSE, GERFE P. LOHO, BERNARDO MARTINEZ,
GONZALO MORALES, DIONISIO T. ONG,
AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, MANUEL V. TIBAY,
MANUEL ALMENDRALA, E. V. FRANCIA,
CARMELO CAPARROS, ROQUE DUMAGUING,
F. P. ESPIRITU, G. I. MANANSALA, CARLOS
SANTOS, FELITO E. CABANGON, ANGEL
TICSAY, ROBERTO FORMELOZA, ROMEO
GONZALES, and FLORENCIO
MARQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
B. F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HONORABLE
JOAQUIN SALVADOR, respondents.
Domingo E. de Lara & Associates for petitioners.
Manuel O. Chan for private respondent. Jose K
Manguiat, Jr. for respondent Court.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is readily apparent in this appeal from a
decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations,
declaring a strike illegal because of the means
employed, and dismissing petitioners, was the high
pitch of bitterness that marked the relationship
between labor and management in the
establishment of private respondent, B. F.
Philippines, Inc. Even a cursory reading of the
records will make evident that on both sides, there
was the feeling that the other party was guilty of
conduct the most reprehensible resulting in the
flagrant disregard of its rights. With such a
background, there was a greater need for objectivity
in the application of the authoritative legal norms to
the facts as found. It cannot be said that respondent
Court, more precisely respondent Joaquin Salvador,
then the Judge whose order is now on appeal, was
fully cognizant that such should be the case.1 It is
hard not to lend credence to the contention of
petitioners that there was undue receptivity to the
claim of private respondent, no doubt induced by the
skill, competence, and resourcefulness of its
counsel, Atty. Manuel Chan. It was unfortunate that
in some of the crucial stages of the controversy,
petitioners did not have the same
advantage.2 Nonetheless, as will be shown, the
strike could have been viewed with a little less
disapproval and even if declared illegal, need not
have been attended with such a drastic
consequence as termination of employment
relationship. This last point is even more compelling
considering the security of tenure which is one of the
notable features in the present Constitution.3
The facts according to the appealed order follow: "As
to the conduct of the strike and the picketing, this
Court's Order of July 1, 1971 has fully described the
same. In the course of the mass picketing, illegal and
unlawful acts were committed by the respondents
such as physically blocking and preventing the entry
of complainant's customers, supplies and other
employees who were not on strike, both in
complainant's premises in Makati and Marikina,
Rizal. Injuries likewise were inflicted on certain
employees of complainant. Such acts of violence
and intimidation appear to be of such a widespread
nature so as to create an impression that there is a
common pattern of action set into motion by the
respondents. The actuations of respondents are
likewise illegal. In the premises of complainant at
Makati, Rizal, the respondents who picketed the
same on April 20, 1971 were identified ... . Similarly,
some of the respondents who picketed the Marikina
premises of complainants were identified
....4 Further: 'The complainant caused the
publication of notices in both the Manila Times and
Daily Mirror, newspapers of general and wide
circulation ... for all employees not participating in
the illegal strike to report for work on or before April
23, 1971, otherwise such failure will be considered
as participation therein. Such notices were
accompanied by instructions to personnel at all
levels on how reporting for work will be
accomplished, considering the precarious situation
in relation to the safety of employees brought about
by the strike of respondents. With respect to this
particular aspect, certain of the respondents who
were not seen in the picket line on or before April 23,
1971 were identified as having failed to report for
work ... . It would appear, however, that these listed
respondents who failed to report for work likewise
were seen picketing the premises of complainant
after April 26, 1971, ... ."5 Then came this portion: "It
would seem that the picketing by respondents has
continued up [to] the present under the same pattern
of coercive activities narrated in our Order Of July 1,
1971. Physical injuries where inflicted on
complainants personnel manager. Mass picketing
with the employment of intimidatory statements have
again started on January 3, 1972. The roof of the
complainants Makati Recap Plant was set on fire on
January 13, 1972 ..."6
Based on the above facts, it was in the appealed
order of Judge Salvador; "On the basis, therefore, of
the motivation as well as the conduct of the strike,
the respondent are declared to have committed an
illegal strike, which is likewise an unfair labor
practice"7 As consequence, in the dispositive
portion, petitioner where "declared to have lost their
status of employees of the complainant corporation
as of April 19, 1971"8 The appealed order was
handed down on February 4, 1972. Had greater
awareness been displayed to the approach followed
by this court in a 1968 decision, Cebu Portland
Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union,9 as well as
to Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Co. of the
Philippines, Ltd. 10 there would have been less
certitude displayed in the opinion of Judge Salvador
as to the correctness of its decision. Moreover, as
stated at the outset, if there be deference to what of
late has been so evident, even on the assumption of
the illegality of the strike, there need not be the
automatic termination of the employment
relationship, especially so in view of the command of
the present Constitution as to the security of tenure.
1. It is understandable why respondent Judge
Salvador was unsympathetic to a strike in which
petitioners participated, considering the pendency of
a certification election, just because management
would not consider their union as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative. At the very
least, it was premature. Nonetheless, there was this
commendable admission in the appealed order of
Judge Salvador; "Lest we be miscontrued, the
ilegality of the strike for recognition as general
proposition is not absolute. We declare such strike
illegal on the basis of the attendant circumstances in
this case." 11 It mentioned the attendant
circumstances, but as was apparent in an earlier
portion of such order, what respondent Judge
apparently could not resist was the compelling force
of what by now should be an outmoded view of a
strike being "by its very nature ... coercive ... ." 12 To
display such a predisposition is to ignore the leading
case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement
Workers Union. 13 For, as was therein pointed out,
the ruling in National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine
Match Factory 14 to the effect that a strike "is an
economic weapon at war with the policy of the
Constitution and the law," resort to which "is not, in
plain terms, outlawed," 15although certainly
discouraged, is obsolete, for as was so clearly
pointed out by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers
Union: 16 "For a time, decisions on the issue under
consideration were characterized by strict
adherence to the ruling in the Philippine Match
Factory Case." 17 Further, it was stated by him: "The
actual break-away from the doctrine laid down in the
Philippine Match Factory case came in Dinglasan v.
National Labor Union, when the discretionary power
of the Court of Industrial Relations to grant
affirmative relief was recognized. ... Thereafter, the
doctrine enunciated in Interwood Employees
Association ... that good faith of the strikers in the
staging of the strike is immaterial in the
determination of the legality or illegality of the strike,
was abandoned. In the case of Ferrer v. CIR, et al.
the belief of the strikers that the management was
committing unfair labor practice was properly
considered in declaring an otherwise premature
strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the
Labor Court for the reinstatement without back
wages of said employees." 18 This 1968 decision of
this Court, if present in the consciousness of
respondent Judge Salvador, certainly could have
caused, at the very least, a hesitancy on his part to
declare the strike illegal. This is not to deny that the
labor union ought not to have declared a strike under
such circumstances, but at least, while premature, it
could have been plausibly viewed as inspired by
good faith, although perhaps not guided by sound
legal advice.
2. What was set forth in the facts as found by
respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it
was during the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that
the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be
ignored, however, that there were injuries on both
sides because management did not,
understandably, play a passive role confronted as it
was with the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is
not, by any means, to condone activities of such
character, irrespective of the parties responsible. It
is merely to explain what cannot be justified.
Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an
automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order
issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious
of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers'
Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines,
Ltd. 19 There it was clearly held: "A strike otherwise
valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond
the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially
where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid
stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by
such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition
of the right to strike, responsibility in such case
should be individual and not collective. A different
conclusion would be called for, of course, if the
existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive
and widespread, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be
reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to
ends, it becomes illegal because of the means
employed. 20 It must be pointed out likewise that the
facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater
degree of violence. Thus: "Respondent Court must
have been unduly impressed by the evidence
submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that
the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation
and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in
the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila.
Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on
the following day, with police officials stationed at the
strike-bound area, molotov bombs did explode and
the streets were obstructed with wooden planks
containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the
branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well
as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries
appeared to have been inflicted on management
personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed
decision did penalize with loss of employment the
ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to
be lost sight of that before the certification on June
27, 1967, one month had elapsed during which the
Union was on strike. Except on those few days
specified then, the Shell Company could not allege
that the strike was conducted in a manner other than
peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be
going too far to consider that it thereby became
illegal." 21 Then, mention was made of a decision
"in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees'
Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
[where] there is the recognition by this Court,
speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as
such being 'inherently explosive.' It is thus clear that
not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of
employment by the guilty party." 22
There was in that case a concurring opinion by
Justice Barredo which elicited the approval of the
present Chief Justice. Thus: "All these, however, do
not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike
should necessarily be held to be illegal. It is always
a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give
but secondary importance to strict technicalities,
whether of substantive or remedial law, and to
constantly bear in mind the human values involved
which are beyond pecuniary estimation. 23
It would seem, therefore, to reiterate a point, that on
the date of the appealed order of February 4, 1972,
a less condemnatory attitude to the appearance of
violence as such was part of the law of the land. It is
to be admitted that this is one of those close cases.
What is merely emphasized is that the imputation of
illegality on the ground of the means employed is not
automatically called for.
3. This is not to say that the appealed order is totally
bereft of support in law. It is merely to point out that
the facts as found did not point automatically and
unerringly to so severe a result, namely the
dismissal of petitioners. From a perspective more
attuned to the trend indicated in current decisions of
this Court, the three cited cases being
representative, the conclusion reached could have
been cast in a different mold. In labor law, as in
constitutional law, it is no doubt true that the issues
submitted, in the language of Justice Malcolm, may
be "determined by the court's approach to
them." 24 It is submitted that the direction indicated in
the express language of both the 1935 and the
present Constitution, is that which leads to
protection to labor. 25
As previously noted, both petitioners and private
respondent were guilty of practices far from peaceful
in character. The original blame must of course be
assumed by petitioners, for they ought to have
known that the picketing that comes within the
protection of the free speech guarantee is one that
is peaceful. It involves people marching to and fro
with placards to acquaint the public with the facts of
a labor dispute. So it has been ruled from Mortera v.
Court of Industrial Relations 26 a 1947 decision,
to Chan Bros., Inc. v. Federacion Obrera de la
Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas 27 decided in January of this year. When
they obstructed entrance into the premises of private
respondent, they ought to have known that they
were inviting reprisal. It has been observed of course
that in labor controversies the unstructured
incoherencies of vehement protest for grievances,
sincerely even if erroneously felt, may easily flare up
into rowdy conduct. So it did come about. The
appealed order took note of the resulting melee.
From the standpoint of settling a dispute, it would not
suffice just to visit recriminations on either or both
parties. The more crucial question is what to do next.
We start with the circumstances that ought to be
considered. To repeat, the breach of the peace,
though started by petitioners, was not solely their
responsibility as it turned out. For criminal charges
and counter charges were filed by one group against
the other. The reply brief of private respondent,
submitted on March 8, 1973, included a
memorandum from a certain Attorney Rolando A.
Velasco, speaking of the status of the criminal cases
filed by the group of petitioners against management
men, 28 , and of thirteen criminal cases as well as
complaints against at least thirty individuals
identified with private respondent. 29 In some of
them the complainants did not press charges, and
the cases were dismissed. With the submission of
such data, its objection to the admission of
information similar in character as to the status of the
criminal cases against petitioners loses weight.
What is more, it does not appear as of this date as
to who of the petitioners were found guilty of what
was referred to it in the Shell opinion as committing
serious acts of violence. As a matter of fact, the
appealed order merely referred to the instances of
picketing conducted illegally without specifically pin-
pointing the culprits to whom such kind of conduct
could be ascribed. It would seem therefore, that the
wholesale dismissal of petitioners is far from
warranted. It is to be admitted though that on a
showing of having engaged in non-peaceful
activities of a serious character, the right to re-
admission is defeated.
This conclusion is further fortified by the stress on
the security of tenure that is a notable feature of the
present Constitution. As pointed out in a decision
rendered only last month, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association: 30 "The
futility of this appeal becomes even more apparent
considering the express provision in the Constitution
already noted, requiring the State to assure workers
'security of tenure.' It was not that specific in the
1935 Charter. The mandate was limited to the State
affording protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, ....
... That is to conform to the ideal of
the New Society, the establishment
of which was to felicitously referred to
by the First Lady as the
Compassionate Society. 31 To the
possible objection that in this
Philippine Air Lines case, there was
an order of reinstatement, it suffices
by way of an answer that while the
facts could be distinguished, the
basic principle in accordance with a
constitutional mandate, in the
language of Justice Cardozo, speaks
with a reverberating clang that
drowns all weaker sounds.
It would imply at the very least that where a penalty
less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may
be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe. It is not only because of the
law's concern for the workingman. There is, in
addition, his family to consider. Unemployment
brings untold hardships and sorrows on those
dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain
attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided
if there be acceptance of the view that under all the
circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be
deprived of their means of livelihood. Nor is this to
condone what had been done by them. For all this
while, since private respondent considered them
separated from the service, they had not been paid.
From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too
strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly
work, Discretionary Justice, 32 that where a decision
may be made to rest an informed judgment rather
than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be
accorded their due weight. Finally, labor law
determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be
not only secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.
4. This is all that needs to be said except to remind
petitioners that the basic doctrine underlying the
provisions of the Constitution so solicitous of labor
as well as the applicable statutory norms is that both
the working force and management are necessary
components of the economy. The rights of labor
have been expanded. Concern is evident for its
welfare. The advantages thus conferred, however,
call for attendant responsibilities. The ways of the
law are not to be ignored. Those who seek comfort
from the Shelter that it affords should be the last to
engage in activities which negate the very concept
of a legal order as antithetical to force and coercion.
What is equally important is that in the steps to be
taken by it in the pursuit of what it believes to be its
rights, the advice of those conversant with the
requirements of legal norms should be sought and
should not be ignored. It is even more important that
reason and not violence should be its milieu.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of February 4,
1972 as affirmed in a resolution of March 14, 1972
is reversed and set aside. Petitioners against whom
no criminal charges filed in relation to their acts
referred to in this decision are still pending are
ordered reinstated to their employment, with the
right to backpay corresponding to eighteen (18)
months, at the respective rates of compensation
they were being paid on February 4, 1972, without
any deduction corresponding to any possible income
earned elsewhere since their dismissal to the
present. Those petitioners against whom criminal
complaints have been filed shall be reinstated, with
the right to backpay as herein indicated, only upon
the final dismissal of said cases or their acquittal
therein. Respondent Court is hereby ordered to
implement this decision as expeditiously as
possible. No costs.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D.
WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo for respondents Williams,
Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if
at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the
law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application
of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should
be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of
public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY;
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. —
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which
the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31
Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life
is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and, personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen
and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this
court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.,
from a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on
July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the
Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic
to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August
10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved
the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles, between the points and during the
hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth
Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control
of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets
is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The
rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early
Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v.
Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments or subordinate
officials thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to
the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated
as national roads by acts of the National Assembly
or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules
and regulations, with the approval of the President,
may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads.
Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any
or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely
the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that
the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To
assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob
the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to
a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know." The proper
distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature
cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this
would be to stop the wheels of government. There
are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to
the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a
subject of inquiry and determination outside of the
halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña,
G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The
Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion
to observe that the principle of separation of powers
has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to
a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of
certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and
regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.
In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire
to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life
is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as
civilization advances. As was said in the case of
Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L.
ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a
continuing one, and a business lawful today may in
the future, because of the changed situation, the
growth of population or other causes, become a
menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People
v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday.
The development of civilization, the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of the masses
and of the government to look after and care for the
interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power many questions for
regulation which formerly were not so
considered."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and
regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people. The promotion of social
justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments
on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed
for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30543 July 15, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO CAWILI, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,
Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and
Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan T. Aquino (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-
appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The difficulty that faces appellant Rodrigo Cawili,
prosecuted and convicted for the crime of rape in the
lower court, arises from the coherent and straight-
forward story narrated by the offended party, a
thirteen-year old girl, who, while asleep in her house
was taken by surprise by the accused and thus fell
victim to his carnal desires. Nonetheless, there is in
the brief submitted by counsel a sustained effort to
seek a reversal predicated on the ground that an
appraisal of the testimony offered by the prosecution
would reveal that the constitutional presumption of
innocence had not been overcome.1 A careful study
of the records, however, discloses that the lower
court did consider carefully and meticulously the
evidence of both the complainant and the accused.
It was his conclusion that there was enough proof to
satisfy the requirement that guilt be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. We are not justified in viewing the
matter differently. We affirm.
The victim of rape in this case is Elizabeth de Jesus,
who, at the time of the commission of the offense,
was thirteen years of age. She was in the sixth
grade. She began by stating that she was asleep in
her house at Barrio Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, at
about 10:00 in the evening of February 11, 1968.
Then she continued: "I was awakened by a certain
weight upon my body and when I was awakened,
accused Rodrigo Cawili was on top of me and [I] felt
pain in my private parts."2 She then pushed and
kicked him and shouted at the top of her voice
"Inang" (Mother).3 Asked why she had felt such pain,
she answered that his genital organ was inserted in
hers.4 Obviously alarmed by her shout, Rodrigo
Cawili released her and ran downstairs; her mother,
awakened by the shout, went to the kitchen and
came back with a bolo to chase Cawili but she did
not catch up with
him.5 On cross-examination, Elizabeth de Jesus
admitted that when she went to bed she had her
panties on, but that when she woke up, she noticed
that not only was appellant on top of her but also that
she was divested of such garment.6 The trial court
itself did not merely accept her story. It pursued the
matter further.7 She explained that the previous
night, a Saturday, she had attended a party in Barrio
Pulo, Hermosa, Bataan, one that lasted until almost
morning. All day the next day, she pressed clothes.
Thus it was that on the night of February 11, 1968,
she went to bed tired and drowsy. She slept soundly.
It was not unexpected then for appellant to be able
to remove such garment and for him to place himself
on top of her, without her immediately noticing
it.8 When the incident happened, on February 11,
1968, the young girl's father was not at home. When
he came back from work from Subic, Zambales, on
February 17, 1968, his daughter was so ashamed of
what had happened to her that she did not even tell
him specifically that appellant had succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. It was only after she
was brought to a doctor on February 19, 1968, and
it was discovered that she had a swollen vulva, a
swollen urethral orifice and a ruptured hymen with
two healed lacerations, 9 that she admitted to her
father that appellant succeeded in his designs.
Rodrigo Cawili, a neighbor and a "compadre" of the
young victim's mother, was readily recognized by
Elizabeth de Jesus because "the house was bright
inside, it being lighted by a lamp, second, there was
a light on the post just opposite our house, and third,
it was a moonlit night." 10 The facts narrated above
gave rise to the charge of rape against Rodrigo
Cawili.
After trial duly had, he was convicted and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party and to recognize and
support the offspring, if any. The case is before us
now on appeal. As noted at the outset, the principal
ground relied upon as the basis for reversal is that
the constitutional presumption of innocence had not
been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
While there is a recognition that the appraisal of the
lower court of the evidence offered is accorded
deference and respect, it is submitted that such
finding cannot prevail in the absence of a showing
that suffices to overturn what is so clearly expressed
in the fundamental law that guilt is not to be
presumed. 11 As a statement of juridical norm, that is
correct. This Court has repeatedly stressed that
accusation cannot be considered as synonymous
with culpability, and the evidence offered by the
prosecution must meet the required standard. Only
then is a conviction warranted. 12 It is on that basis
that in several recent decisions, a person accused of
and sentenced for rape succeeded in obtaining a
reversal. 13 This is not, however, as already
mentioned, one such case.
1. In appellant's brief, the principal authority cited in
support of the plea that the constitutional
presumption of innocence had not been overcome is
an excerpt from Justice Laurel's opinion in People v.
Manoji. 14 What was conveniently left out was the
opening phrase of the citation which certainly casts
a different light on the matter. Accuracy demands
that this particular sentence relied upon he quoted in
full: "In the light of the facts and circumstances of
record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man on
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be
guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest
of his natural life a person who may be innocent.
..." 15 As a matter of fact, the opening sentence of
that particular paragraph starts with this phrase:
"Upon the other hand, there are certain facts which
if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of
the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant-appellant, ..." 16 In this case, on the
contrary, the testimony of the offended party, so firm
and so categorical, does not give rise to any such
misgivings. When put on the stand by her counsel,
she was able to narrate clearly and concisely the
untoward event that befell her in the evening on
question. Afterwards, she was cross-examined
intensively and exhaustively for two
days. 17 Questions searching in character but
unavoidable considering the nature of the offense,
quite embarassing for a young girl of tender years,
came not only from the defense but also from the
judge, desirous of ascertaining the truth and
conscious of the dire penalty that goes with
conviction for this heinous crime. At one stage, her
counsel had to ask the court for a recess of five
minutes as she was evidently under strain and she
was feeling dizzy. 18 The court granted a suspension
of the session not for five minutes sought but for ten
minutes. Moreover, right afterwards, it was
adjourned. 19 The grueling ordeal to which she was
subjected continued all throughout the next day
when the hearing was resumed. Her version of what
transpired came under the most rigorous scrutiny,
again from both the defense and the court itself. No
contradiction was elicited although it was quite
obvious that she would rather not remember the
details of that unfortunate incident. Twice the
session had to be suspended because she was in
tears. 20 The second time, the court itself was moved
to declare: "The witness is still crying. Let us have a
recess." 21
2. This notwithstanding, counsel for appellant would
have the temerity to assert that the testimony of
complainant was "evasive." 22 He would seek to
impress on us that there was not enough evidence
to warrant conviction for the offense of rape and
would imply that perhaps only trespass to dwelling
was committed. Such a contention is devoid of merit.
As was stressed in People v. Baylon: 23 "The other
point raised in the brief for appellant that the crime
of rape was not shown to have been committed
defies rationality, let alone commonsense. Time and
time again, this Court had correctly observed that no
woman, especially one of tender age, would willingly
expose herself to the embarrassment of a public trial
wherein she would have not only to admit but also to
narrate the violation of her person, if such indeed
were not the case. Far better it is in not a few cases
to spare herself the humiliation if there be some
other way of bringing the offender to justice. Here,
there was such a testimony coming from the
offended party, firm, categorical, straightforward. ...
It is quite a strain on one's credulity to believe that
under such circumstances, the young girl's honor
remained unsullied, the nefarious design unfulfilled.
To repeat, appellant had not made out a case for a
reversal." 24 The succeeding paragraph in the
opinion therein rendered likewise deserves mention:
"Nor is this all. As was noted in a recent
case, People vs. Molina, it is manifest in the
decisions of this Court that where the offended
parties are young and immature girls like the victim
in this case, there is a marked receptivity on its part
to lend credence to their version of what transpired.
It is not to be wondered at. The state, asparens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk
of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those
of tender years deserve its utmost protection.
Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted
on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it
causes her family must also be taken into account.
It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced
concern in the fundamental law for such institution.
There is all the more reason then for the rigorous
application of the penal law with its severe penalty
for this offense, whenever warranted." 25
3. There is one other matter equally deserving of
attention. Counsel for appellant did not even
mention the defense offered by his client. It is
understandable why. In the statement of the
accused taken before Corporal Cipriano
Vistan 26 and subscribed before the Municipal Judge
Bernabe T. Peñaflor of Hermosa, Bataan, he
admitted having entered the house of complainant
with the explanation that he made a mistake due to
his being in a state of intoxication, but denied having
done anything reprehensible. At the trial, he had
another version. He would rely on alibi. This is how
the lower court disposed of the matter: "The defense
interposed by the accused is alibi. His testimony is
to the effect that starting from 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 11, 1968, he was in his house
at Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, asleep with his wife
and child. He asserts that the filing of the instant
criminal charge against him was ill-motivated,
because his wife and the spouses Dominador de
Jesus and Rufina Santos had a misunderstanding;
that the spouses used to buy goods on credit from
their store and failed to pay their account; that prior
to February 11, 1968, the spouses tried to get some
more goods on credit which he refused, because the
old debt was not paid; that because of the incident,
the spouses went to the extent of approaching
Nicanor Sioson, the owner of the lot where his store
is erected for the purpose of having him ejected from
Sioson's lot. The accused further testified that he
was forced to give his statement, Exhibit C, and had
to sign it because he was mauled. He showed a scar
on the upper left eyebrow; and [said] that he signed
his statement not before the subscribing officer,
Municipal Judge Peñaflor, but in jail. The defense
deserves no serious consideration. The accused
could not produce any one of the persons he
mentioned ... to corroborate his testimony. His claim
that his sworn statement, Exhibit C, was forcibly
taken out of him as evidenced by his swollen left
eyebrow, was belied both by Pat. Conrado Alvaro of
the Hermosa Police Force, who fetched the accused
from his house to the Municipal Building for
investigation, and by P.C. Sgt. Cipriano Vistan. Pat.
Alvaro testified that when he made a preliminary
inquiry, the accused admitted to him having entered
the house of Dominador de Jesus on the night in
question because he was drunk. Pat. Alvaro denied
having mauled the accused. Likewise Sgt. Vistan
declared that in the course of his investigation, the
accused revealed to him that he (accused) was
boxed by Dominador de Jesus, father of the
complainant, [thus explaining] the swollen face and
cut on the upper left eyebrow." 27 What had been
stated earlier as to the ordeal undergone by the
offended party when she was placed on the stand to
give her credible and competent testimony with a
clear identification of the accused would serve to
bolster further the characterization of his defense as
undeserving of serious consideration. Moreover,
there is this excerpt from the recent decision of
People v. Cudalina: 28 "It suffices to state that this
Court when confronted with the defense of alibi in
rape cases has invariably found it unconvincing and
unsatisfactory." 29
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of March 31,
1969 by the then Judge Tito V. Tizon of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan is affirmed. Costs against
appellant.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164733 September 21, 2007
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to
give. (Final preambular clause of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July
30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision3 of
Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in
Criminal Case No. 00-0691 which found petitioner
Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of paragraph
3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information
which read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610,
AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of
November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael
John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse
for several times with him as in fact said accused had
carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610,
AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of
November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael
John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and
induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption
College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for
several times with him as in fact said accused has
carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.6
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence,
the trial court entered for him a plea of "not guilty." After
the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA
was 17 years old.7 She was a college student at the
Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati
City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her
Philosophy II class in the first semester of the school
year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her
friends when petitioner joined their group. He told them
to address him simply as "Mike." He handed them his
organizer and asked them to list down their names and
contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were
discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner butted in
and bragged that it was nothing compared to his
collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock of AAA’s
group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he
had already experienced. He then invited the group to
view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation
to AAA and her friends to watch his collection of
pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA
and two of her friends went with him. They rode in his
car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a
"calesa room." Petitioner was disappointed when he
found out there was neither a video cassette player (on
which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated
show on the closed-circuit television. He suggested
that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends
ignored him but he pulled each of them towards him to
lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted
petitioner’s invitation. For fear of embarrassment in
case their classmates got wind of what happened, they
agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner
apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous
attention. He called her on the phone and paged8 her
romantic messages at least thrice a day. When
semestral break came, his calls and messages
became more frequent. Their conversation always
started innocently but he had a way of veering the
subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken
family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioner’s
persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He was the
first person to court her. Soon, they had a "mutual
understanding" and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at
the start of the second semester, petitioner told her that
he gave her a final grade of "3." She protested, stating
that her mid-term grade was "1.2." He gave her a grade
of "1.5" when she promised not to disclose his intimate
messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not
to tell anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize
his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA
agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the
premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well
at that time, he asked her to lie down in the backseat
of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to
Queensland Lodge9 on Harrison St. in Pasay City.
Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back
and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand
inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he
was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got
angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come
with him so that they could talk in private. He again
brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they
were inside the room, he took off his shirt, lay down in
bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap."
She refused but he dragged her towards the bed,
kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her
brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he
overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her
pants and touched her private part. He tried to
penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and
she sat up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying, "Sige
na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you." She
refused and said, "Mike, ayoko." He angrily stood up
saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Don’t come to
the faculty room anymore. You know I need this and if
you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this." She
replied, "Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who
said it will be after my debut" on December 3, 1997. He
insisted that there was no difference between having
sex then and after her debut. He told her, "kung hindi
ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon."
Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their
relationship, she hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing
this, he quickly undressed while commenting "ibibigay
mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They
had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with
petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately
involved with or was sexually harassing his students in
Assumption College and in other colleges where he
taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La
Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations
with a student and sexually harassing three other
students. His employment was also terminated by
Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his
students. It was then that AAA realized that she was
actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and
distressed, she confided all that happened between
her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands
of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in
Assumption College against him. She also lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay
City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-
0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He
claimed that the alleged incidents on October 3, 1997
and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent
October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito
and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and
computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last time
he saw AAA during the first semester was when she
submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00
p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class schedules for the
second semester at the Assumption College. On
November 26, 1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s
College (where he was also teaching) preparing a
faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch
time, he attended the birthday treat of a colleague,
Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th
birthday party. That was the last time he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart
when she was already 19 years old and after he was
dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27
and 28, 1998, they spent time together, shared their
worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other.
On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland
Lodge where they had sexual intercourse for the first
time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from January
1999 until they broke up in July 1999, some of which
were done at either his or her house when no one was
around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. On March 7,
2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty.10 The dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section
5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended and
hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its
medium period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php
75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php
50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the
CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004,12 the appellate
court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his
acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It
further observed that the trial court failed to fix the
minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on
him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding
₱75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper
only in a conviction for rape committed under the
circumstances under which the death penalty was
authorized by law.13 Hence, the CA modified the
decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that (1)
appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight
(8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum;
and (2) the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
is DELETED.14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his
conviction although it found that he did not rape AAA.
For him, he should have been acquitted since there
was no rape. He also claims that he and AAA were
sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was
consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was Wrongly
Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or
information against him should be sufficient in form and
substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense and the place where the
offense was committed.16
The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.17 If there
is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.18 The acts or omissions constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.19
The designation of the offense in the information
against petitioner was changed from "violation of
Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of
Section 5(a), Article III" thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
- Children, whether male or female, who, for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate
or induce child prostitution which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a
child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar
means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as a
prostitute;
4. Threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration,
goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx x x x(emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes,
facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the
following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
 b. inducing a person to be a client of a
child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar
means;
c. taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as a
prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute or
e. giving monetary consideration,
goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be
exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. the act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to
or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates
sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In
other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused
primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected
to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which
a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege
anything pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for
profit. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal
knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or
seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge
in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA
was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a
charge for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a),
of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by
Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the
Designation
The designation in the information of the specific
statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute,21 or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act,22 or an erroneous
specification of the law violated23 does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not
the title of the information or the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the
information.25 In other words, it is the recital of facts of
the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged
in the information.26
The facts stated in the amended information against
petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial
and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of
the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense
on the basis of the facts recited in the information and
duly proven during trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610, as amended
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused.
The second element refers to the state or condition of
the offended party. The third element corresponds to
the minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner
committed lascivious conduct against and had sexual
intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on
November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back
and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand
inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November
26, 1997, when, with lewd designs, he dragged her
towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly kissed
her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he
exerted moral influence on her and pressured her until
she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997.
His acts were covered by the definitions of sexual
abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and
(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to
implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on
child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the
intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or public area of a
person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The
following pronouncement in People v. Larin27 is
significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under thecoercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of
petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was
repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date AAA
also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a
result of the latter’s influence and moral ascendancy.
Thus, she was deemed to be a "child subjected to other
sexual abuse" as the concept is defined in the opening
paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and
in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied.
Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen
(18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
(emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA
was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She was
therefore within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and
Rape are Separate and Distinct Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The
offense for which he was convicted is punished by a
special law while rape is a felony under the Revised
Penal Code.28 They have different elements.29 The two
are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can
be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal
Cases Involving Violation of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and
touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with
him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and
affection. But may the "sweetheart theory" be invoked
in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse
prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness
and rape, felonies committed against or without the
consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the
sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an
evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws.31 This is on the rationale that she can easily be
the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully.32 Those of tender years deserve its
protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to
her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences34 of her
attempts at adult sexual behavior.35 For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented
to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the
act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game
and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.36 1âw phi 1
This must be so if we are to be true to the
constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being of the youth.37 This is consistent with the
declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development; provide sanctions for their
commissionand carry out a program for prevention
and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations
of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination.38 (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents,
guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of
the child fails or is unable to protect the child against
abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such
acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care
and custody of the same.39(emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration
of the child’s best interests in all actions concerning him
or her.
The best interest of children shall be the
paramount consideration in all actions concerning
them, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities
for a useful and happy life.40 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the
medium of the penalty prescribed by the
law.41Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.42 Since the penalty provided in RA
7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.43 Thus,
he is entitled to a maximum term which should be
within the range of the proper imposable penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging
from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a
minimum term to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision
mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months).
The Award of Damages Should Be Modified
The trial court awarded AAA ₱75,000 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
The CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It
correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in a
conviction for rape committed under the circumstances
under which the death penalty is authorized by law.
Consistent, however, with the objective of RA 7610 to
afford children special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination and with the principle
that every person who contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify
the latter for the same,44 civil indemnity to the child is
proper in a case involving violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is
civilly liable.45 The rule is that, in crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of.46Thus, ₱50,000 civil
indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.47
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of
₱50,000 as "moral and exemplary damages." The rule their applications for telephone
is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the installation. 1 Investigated and heard, she was found
award of each item of damages and make a finding guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the
thereon in the body of the decision.48 Thus, moral service.2 She went to the Ministry of Labor and
damages and exemplary damages should be separate Employment claiming she had been illegally removed.
items of award. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of
the parties, the company was sustained and the
AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
and "lost touch of her inner self" as a result of what Nevertheless, the dispositive portion of labor arbiter's
petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and decision declared:
wounded feelings caused by petitioner to her, she had
several sessions with the dean for student affairs49 and WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is
the guidance counselor of Assumption College as well dismissed for lack of merit.
as with a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her
mother and the dean of student affairs of Assumption Considering that Dr. Helen Bangayan
College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of and Mrs. Consolacion Martinez are not
₱50,000. However, in the absence of an aggravating totally blameless in the light of the fact
circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is that the deal happened outhide the
unwarranted.50 premises of respondent company and
that their act of giving P3,800.00
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner without any receipt is tantamount to
Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of violating corruption of public officers,
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for complainant must be given one month
which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months pay for every year of service as
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years financial assistance. 3
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and Both the petitioner and the private respondent
₱50,000 for moral damages. appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, which
upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the
Costs against petitioner. appeals. 4 The private respondent took no further
action, thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her
SO ORDERED. dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to
question the affirmance of the above- quoted award as
having been made with grave abuse of discretion.
EN BANC
In its challenged resolution of September 22, 1987, the
G.R. No. 80609 August 23, 1988
NLRC said:
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
... Anent the award of separation pay
COMPANY, petitioner,
as financial assistance in
vs.
complainant's favor, We find the same
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
to be equitable, taking into
and MARILYN ABUCAY, respondents.
consideration her long years of service
to the company whereby she had
Nicanor G. Nuevas for petitioner. undoubtedly contributed to the success
of respondent. While we do not in any
way approve of complainants (private
respondent) mal feasance, for which
CRUZ, J.: she is to suffer the penalty of dismissal,
it is for reasons of equity and
The only issue presented in the case at bar is the legality of the award of compassion that we resolve to uphold
financial assistance to an employee who had been dismissed for cause as
found by the public respondent.
the award of financial assistance in her
favor. 5
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, was accused by The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is
two complainants of having demanded and received conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is
from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required
by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed for
cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor
backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because
his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of
the private respondent, she has been awarded
financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay
corresponding to her 10 year service in the company
despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in
effect rewarded rather than punished for her
dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or
justification. The award is made on the ground of equity
and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law.
Moreover, such award puts a premium on dishonesty
and encourages instead of deterring corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the
employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal.
The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a
reward for her offense but merely to help her for the
loss of her employment after working faithfully with the
company for ten years. In support of this position, the
Solicitor General cites the cases of Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa 6 and
Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 7 where the
employees were dismissed for cause but were
nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of
social and compassionate justice. As the Court put it in
the Firestone case:
In view of the foregoing, We rule that
Firestone had valid grounds to
dispense with the services of Lariosa
and that the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering his
reinstatement. However, considering
that Lariosa had worked with the
company for eleven years with no
known previous bad record, the ends of
social and compassionate justice
would be served if he is paid full
separation pay but not reinstatement
without backwages by the NLRC.
In the said case, the employee was validly dismissed
for theft but the NLRC nevertheless awarded him full
separation pay for his 11 years of service with the
company. In Soco, the employee was also legally
separated for unauthorized use of a company vehicle
and refusal to attend the grievance proceedings but he
was just the same granted one-half month separation
pay for every year of his 18-year service.
Similar action was taken in Filipro, Inc. v.
NLRC, 8 where the employee was validly dismissed for
preferring certain dealers in violation of company policy
but was allowed separation pay for his 2 years of
service. In Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC, 9 the
employee was validly removed for loss of confidence
because of her failure to account for certain funds but
she was awarded separation pay equivalent to one-half
month's salary for every year of her service of 15 years.
In Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 10 the
dismissal of the employee was justified because he
had instigated labor unrest among the workers and had
serious differences with them, among other grounds,
but he was still granted three months separation pay
corresponding to his 3-year service. In New Frontier
Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, 11 the employee's 3- year service
was held validly terminated for lack of confidence and
abandonment of work but he was nonetheless granted
three months separation pay. And in San Miguel
Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and
Employment, et al ., 12 full separation pay for 6, 10, and
16 years service, respectively, was also allowed three
employees who had been dismissed after they were
found guilty of misappropriating company funds.
The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person
dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to
separation pay. 13 The cases above cited constitute the
exception, based upon considerations of equity. Equity
has been defined as justice outside law, 14 being ethical
rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals
than of law. 15 It is grounded on the precepts of
conscience and not on any sanction of positive
law. 16 Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed
provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of
employees for cause and without any provision for
separation pay.
Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that
there is no express justification for the grant of
separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other
than the abstract consideration of equity. The reason is
that our Constitution is replete with positive commands
for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the
protection of the rights of the workers. The
enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary
concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of
confining itself to the general commitment to the cause
of labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of
State Policies, the new Constitution contains a
separate article devoted to the promotion of social
justice and human rights with a separate sub- topic for
labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of
labor, hand in hand with management, in the
advancement of the national economy and the welfare
of the people in general. The categorical mandates in
the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the
workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the
award of separation pay in proper cases even if the
dismissal be for cause.
The Court notes, however, that where the exception
has been applied, the decisions have not been
consistent as to the justification for the grant of
separation pay and the amount or rate of such award.
Thus, the employees dismissed for theft in the
Firestone case and for animosities with fellow workers
in the Engineering Equipment case were both awarded
separation pay notnvithstanding that the first cause
was certainly more serious than the second. No less
curiously, the employee in the Soco case was allowed
only one-half month pay for every year of his 18 years
of service, but in Filipro the award was two months
separation pay for 2 years service. In Firestone, the
emplovee was allowed full separation pay
corresponding to his 11 years of service, but in Metro,
the employee was granted only one-half month
separation pay for every year of her 15year service. It
would seem then that length of service is not
necessarily a criterion for the grant of separation pay
and neither apparently is the reason for the dismissal.
The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note
that heretofore the separation pay, when it was
considered warranted, was required regardless of the
nature or degree of the ground proved, be it mere
inefficiency or something graver like immorality or
dishonesty. The benediction of compassion was made
to cover a multitude of sins, as it were, and to justify the
helping hand to the validly dismissed employee
whatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy
should be re-examined. It is time we rationalized the
exception, to make it fair to both labor and
management, especially to labor.
There should be no question that where it comes to
such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply
with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the
dismissed employee may be both just and
compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some
time with the company. For example, a subordinate
who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences
with his employer may be validly dismissed for
demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable
ground. A working mother who has to be frequently
absent because she has also to take care of her child
may also be removed because of her poor attendance,
this being another authorized ground. It is not the
employee's fault if he does not have the necessary
aptitude for his work but on the other hand the
company cannot be required to maintain him just the
same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations.
He too may be validly replaced. Under these and
similar circumstances, however, the award to the
employee of separation pay would be sustainable
under the social justice policy even if the separation is
for cause.
But where the cause of the separation is more serious
than mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must
be more discerning. There is no doubt it is
compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if
he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely
he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is
misappropriation of the receipts of his sales. This is no
longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. A
security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless
subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay
since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if
he was in fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a
prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company
premises, the situation is changed completely. This is
not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of
separation pay would be entirely unjustified.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication
or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may
not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly
argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than
punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we
do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only
and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if
the employee who steals from the company is granted
separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not
unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next
employment because he thinks he can expect a like
leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced
compassion is not going to do labor in general any
good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by
those who do not deserve the protection and concern
of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the
offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of
every humane society but only when the recipient is not
a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels
any more than can equity be an impediment to the
punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social
justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their
motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution
is not meant for the protection of those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who
have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of
their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the
grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified.
The private respondent has been dismissed for
dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed
by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted.
The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more
than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be
taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of
loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of
betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the
company. If regarded as a justification for moderating
the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize
for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice
and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks
of all undesirables.
The Court also rules that the separation pay, if found
due under the circumstances of each case, should be
computed at the rate of one month salary for every year
of service, assuming the length of such service is
deemed material. This is without prejudice to the
application of special agreements between the
employer and the employee stipulating a higher rate of
computation and providing for more benefits to the
discharged employee. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged resolution of September 22,1987, is
AFFIRMED in toto except for the grant of separation
pay in the form of financial assistance, which is hereby
DISALLOWED. The temporary restraining order dated
March 23, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199890 August 19, 2013
JEROME M. DAABAY, PETITIONER,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,
INC., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves petitioner Jerome M. Daabay’s
(Daabay) Verified Petition for Review1 , which
assails the Decision2dated June 24, 2011 and
Resolution3 dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN.
The case stems from a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, unfair labor practice
and monetary claims filed by Daabay against
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (Coca-
Cola) and three officers of the company.4The
records indicate that the employment of Daabay with
Coca-Cola as Sales Logistics Checker was
terminated by the company in June 2005,5 following
receipt of information from one Cesar Sorin (Sorin)
that Daabay was part of a conspiracy that allowed
the pilferage of company property.6
The allegations of Sorin were embodied in an
affidavit which he executed on April 16, 2005.7 The
losses to the company were also confirmed by an
inventory and audit conducted by Coca-Cola’s
Territory Finance Head, Silvia Ang. Such losses
comprised of cases of assorted softdrinks, empty
bottles, missing shells and missing pallets valued at
₱20,860,913.00.8
Coca-Cola then served upon Daabay a Notice to
Explain with Preventive Suspension, which required
him to explain in writing his participation in the
scheme that was reported to involve logistics
checkers and gate guards. In compliance therewith,
Daabay submitted an Explanation dated April 19,
2005 wherein he denied any participation in the
reported pilferage.9
A formal investigation on the matter ensued.
Eventually, Coca-Cola served upon Daabay a
Notice of Termination that cited pilferage, serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence as
grounds. At the time of his dismissal, Daabay had
been a regular employee of Coca-Cola for eight
years, and was receiving a monthly pay of
₱20,861.00, exclusive of other benefits.10
Daabay then filed the subject labor complaint
against Coca-Cola and Roberto Huang (Huang),
Raymund Salvador (Salvador) and Alvin Garcia
(Garcia), who were the President and Plant Logistics
Managers, respectively, of Coca-Cola at the time of
the dispute.11 On April 18, 2008, Executive Labor
Arbiter Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (ELA Magbanua)
rendered his Decision12 in favor of Daabay. He ruled
that Daabay was illegally dismissed because his
participation in the alleged conspiracy was not
proved by substantial evidence. In lieu of
reinstatement and considering the already strained
relations between the parties, ELA Magbanua
ordered the payment to Daabay of backwages and
separation pay or retirement benefits, as may be
applicable. The dispositive portion of ELA
Magbanua’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of
complainant Jerome Daabay as illegal, and ordering
respondents to pay complainant his backwages in
the amount of [P]750,996.00.
Additionally, respondents are hereby ordered to pay
complainant his separation pay at one (1) month for
every year of service, or his retirement benefits
based on the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement
prior to his suspension/termination.
Other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for
failure to substantiate.
SO ORDERED.13
Dissatisfied, Coca-Cola, Huang, Salvador and
Garcia, appealed from ELA Magbanua’s Decision to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Daabay filed a separate appeal to ask for his
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, the
payment of backwages instead of separation pay or
retirement benefits, and an award of litigation
expenses, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
The NLRC reversed the finding of illegal dismissal.
In a Resolution14 dated August 27, 2009, the NLRC
held that there was "reasonable and well-founded
basis to dismiss [Daabay], not only for serious
misconduct, but also for breach of trust or loss of
confidence arising from such company
losses." Daabay’s participation in the conspiracy
15
was sufficiently established. Several documents
such as checkers receipts and sales invoices that
made the fraudulent scheme possible were signed
by Daabay.16 The NLRC also found fault in Daabay
for his failure to detect the pilferage, considering that
the "timely recording and monitoring as security
control for the outgoing [sic] of company products
are necessarily connected with the functions, duties
and responsibilities reposed in him as Sales
Logistics Checker."17 Notwithstanding its ruling on
the legality of the dismissal, the NLRC awarded
retirement benefits in favor of Daabay. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of
complainant is DENIED for lack of merit, while that
of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed 18 April 2008 Decision of
the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered
DISMISSING the present complaint for want of
evidence.
Let, however, this case be REMANDED to the
Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration
Branch of origin for the computation of complainant’s
retirement benefits in accordance with the latest
Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his
termination.
SO ORDERED.18
Coca-Cola’s partial motion for reconsideration to
assail the award of retirement benefits was denied
by the NLRC in a Resolution19 dated October 30,
2009. The NLRC explained that there was a need "to
humanize the severe effects of dismissal"20 and "tilt
the scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure
of equity and compassionate social
justice."21 Daabay also moved to reconsider, but his
motion remained unresolved by the
22
NLRC. Undaunted, Coca-Cola appealed to the
CA.
The CA agreed with Coca-Cola that the award of
retirement benefits lacked basis considering that
Daabay was dismissed for just cause. It explained:
We are not oblivious of the instances where the
Court awarded financial assistance to dismissed
employees, even though they were terminated for
just causes. Equity and social justice was the vague
justification. Quickly realizing the unjustness of
these [s]o-called equitable awards, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to curb and rationalize the
grant of financial assistance to legally dismissed
employees. Thus, in Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court recognized the
harsh realities faced by employees that forced them,
despite their good intentions, to violate company
policies, for which the employer can rightfully
terminate their employment. For these instances,
the award of financial assistance was allowed. But,
in clear and unmistakable language, the Supreme
Court also held that the award of financial assistance
should not be given to validly terminated employees,
whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some
depravity in their moral character. x x x.23 (Citation
omitted)
Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated
June 24, 2011 reads:
FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is
GRANTED; the portion of the Resolution
promulgated on 27 August 2009 remanding of the
case to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Arbitration Branch of origin for computation of
retirement benefits is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.24
Daabay’s motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Resolution25 dated December 9, 2011; hence, this
petition.
It bears stressing that although the assailed CA
decision and resolution are confined to the issue of
Daabay’s entitlement to retirement benefits, Daabay
attempts to revive through the present petition the
issue of whether or not his dismissal had factual and
legal bases. Thus, instead of confining itself to the
issue of whether or not Daabay should be entitled to
the retirement benefits that were awarded by the
NLRC, the petition includes a plea upon the Court to
affirm ELA Magbanua’s Decision, with the
modification to include: (a) his allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent in the
computation of his backwages; (b) his actual
reinstatement; and (c) damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
We deny the petition.
We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was
brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was
limited to the issue of whether or not the award of
retirement benefits in favor of Daabay was proper.
Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was
concerned, the correctness of the NLRC’s
pronouncement on the legality of Daabay’s
dismissal was no longer an issue, even beyond the
appellate court’s authority to modify. In Andaya v.
NLRC,26 the Court emphasized that a party who has
not appealed from a decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than
what he had obtained from the lower court, if any,
whose decision is brought up on appeal.27 Further,
we explained in Yano v. Sanchez,28 that the
entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that
a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors
as are designed to have the judgment modified. All
that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of
errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the
purpose of sustaining the judgment in his
favor.29 Due process prevents the grant of additional
awards to parties who did not appeal.30 Considering
that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRC’s
Resolution to the CA, his plea for the modification of
the NLRC’s findings was then misplaced. For the
Court to review all matters that are raised in the
petition would be tolerant of what Daabay was
barred to do before the appellate court.
Before the CA and this Court, Daabay attempts to
justify his plea for relief by stressing that he had filed
his own motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s
Resolution dated August 27, 2009 but the same
remained unacted upon by the NLRC. Such bare
allegation, however, is insufficient to allow the issue
to be disturbed through this petition. We take note of
Daabay’s failure to attach to his petition a copy of the
motion which he allegedly filed with the NLRC. It is
also quite baffling why Daabay does not appear to
have undertaken steps to seek the NLRC’s
resolution on the motion, even after it remained
unresolved for more than two years from its
supposed filing.
Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed
with the NLRC, the labor tribunal shall first be given
the opportunity to review its findings and rulings on
the issue of the legality of Daabay’s dismissal, and
then correct them should it find that it erred in its
disposition. The Court cannot, by this petition, pre-
empt the action which the NLRC, and the CA in case
of an appeal, may take on the matter.
Even as we limit our present review to the lone issue
that was involved in the assailed CA decision and
resolution, the Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse the ruling of the CA.
Daabay was declared by the NLRC to have been
lawfully dismissed by Coca-Cola on the grounds of
serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of
confidence. Our pronouncement in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC31 on the issue of whether an
employee who is dismissed for just cause may still
claim retirement benefits equally applies to this
case. We held:
At the risk of stating the obvious, private respondent
was not separated from petitioner’s employ due to
mandatory or optional retirement but, rather, by
termination of employment for a just cause. Thus,
any retirement pay provided by PAL’s "Special
Retirement & Separation Program" dated February
15, 1988 or, in the absence or legal inadequacy
thereof, by Article 287 of the Labor Code does not
operate nor can be made to operate for the benefit
of private respondent. Even private respondent’s
assertion that, at the time of her lawful dismissal, she
was already qualified for retirement does not aid her
case because the fact remains that private
respondent was already terminated for cause
thereby rendering nugatory any entitlement to
mandatory or optional retirement pay that she might
have previously possessed.32 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)
In ruling against the grant of the retirement benefits,
we also take note of the NLRC’s lone justification for
the award, to wit:
Where from the facts obtaining, as in this case, there
is a need to humanize the severe effects of dismissal
and where complainant’s entitlement to retirement
benefits are even admitted in [Coca-Cola’s] motion
to reduce bond, [w]e can do no less but tilt the scales
of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and
compassionate social justice, taking into
consideration the circumstances obtaining in this
case.33 (Emphasis ours)
Being intended as a mere measure of equity and
social justice, the NLRC’s award was then akin to a
financial assistance or separation pay that is granted
to a dismissed employee notwithstanding the legality
of his dismissal. Jurisprudence on such financial
assistance and separation pay then equally apply to
this case. The Court has ruled, time and again, that
financial assistance, or whatever name it is called,
as a measure of social justice is allowed only in
instances where the employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character.34 We explained in
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
NLRC35:
[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal
is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense
involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly
argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than
punishing the erring employee for his offense. And
we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal
only and that the separation pay has nothing to do
with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has.
Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is
validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit
a similar offense in his next employment because he
thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again
found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not
going to do labor in general any good as it will
encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who
do not deserve the protection and concern of the
Constitution.36 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, considering that Daabay was dismissed on
the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust
and loss of confidence, the award based on equity
was unwarranted.1âwphi1
Even the NLRC’s reliance on the alleged admission
by Coca-Cola in its motion to reduce bond that
Daabay is entitled to retirement benefits is
misplaced. Apparently, the supposed admission by
Coca-Cola was based on the following:
In support of its motion to reduce bond, Coca-cola
seeks leniency for its failure to include in the posting
of the bond the monetary award for [Daabay’s]
retirement benefits which, as directed by the
Executive Labor Arbiter, should be computed in
accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining
Agreement prior to his termination. Coca-Cola
explains that the amount of the retirement benefits
has not been determined and there is a need to
compute the same on appeal. x x x.37
It is patent that the statements made by Coca-Cola
were in light of ELA Magbanua’s ruling that Daabay
was illegally dismissed. Furthermore, any admission
was only for the purpose of explaining the non-
inclusion of the amount of retirement benefits in the
computation of the appeal bond posted with the
NLRC. Coca-Cola’s statements should be taken in
such context, and could not be deemed to bind the
company even after the NLRC had reversed the
finding of illegal dismissal. And although retirement
benefits, where not mandated by law, may still be
granted by agreement of the employees and their
employer or as a voluntary act of the
employer,38 there is no proof that any of these
incidents attends the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution dated
December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165951 March 30, 2010
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION;
RODOLFO N. BOMBITA, DANILO J. MEDRANO,
DONALD F. MAGLEO, RONALD M. PASIMIO,
JOSE R. PACHECO, ALFREDO TAN, JUSTICE Z.
DEMERRE, SOFIA G. YAP, NICHOLAS DEL
ROSARIO, RAMON R. ABASTA, LUIS S.
MASTRILL, REYNALDO E. ALLADO, DANILO
NERY, GRACIANO M. DEL ROSARIO, GEALDINO
M. PARAM, LUCINA D. DE CASTRO, GLORIA
MARAYAG, ROLANDO A. ARIÑO, BEDELL F.
FERRANCULO, MA. BELLA A. PERALTA,
DIONILO M. MARFIL, TERESITA E. ANGELES,
ZENAIDA Q. CAÑETE, CHERRY KRISTIN C.
BAUTISTA, CECILIA S. ABELLA, MARIE
ABIGAIL TONGSON, MADEMIOSETTE
PRINSIPE, RICARDO APOLINAR, BENJAMIN O.
CASTAÑEDA, JR., LUIS DEL MORAL, JR., JOSE
G. RICAFORTE, JR., PATRICIA LEE, ENRIQUE T.
CASTELLVI, RENATO P. MALLARI, ESTRELLA
LOPEZ, MOISES ANGELES, ROLANDO
CUNDANGAN, CONRADO GALANG, CLARO I.
NEPOMUCENO, FLORESITA GOCE, ALBERTO
CABALLERO, LEONARDO SANGA, WINIFREDO
MARTINEZ, MA. VICTORIA LABORTE,
ROBERTO F. MADRID, EVELYN S. SERVIETO,
MILAGROS MUJER, GIL CABAÑAS, LILIA CUAN,
NORMA V. GO, IRMA M. MANAOIS, WILFREDO
B. REYES, TESSIE MATEO, RESURECCION
SANTOS, BIENVENIDO M. SILANGIL,
GODOFREDO F. DE LEON, NORMAN R. REYES,
ALFONSO S. MORALES, JR., MERCEDITA I.
MAGSUMBOL, ROSARIO G. UMALI, VICENTA
LOPEZ, PRISCILLA F. CRUZ, MA. CARMEN A.
YAZON, MARIE EMILLE C. DELA CRUZ,
DOROTEA YAP, RUCIA T. PO, ROMEO C.
ROSARIO, RUBEN A. FELEBRICO, RUBY ROSA
M. CARZA, ROBERTO S. DE GUZMAN,
LEONORA T. COMIA, RAMON L. YU, ERLINDA T.
CALUMAG, JANE CUA, FILINO G. MARQUEZ,
JAIME C. CHAM, FELOMINO V. LEGARDA,
JUANITO B. ARCEO, MANUEL B. MANZANO,
ROBERTO T. TUALE, SAMUEL Z. ARCILLA,
CLEMENTE N. AGCAMARAN, BENJAMINA D.
MONCADA, ILDEFENSO F. TAGAYON,
CARMELO INAMAC, MARICEL D. SALIRE,
RICARDO M. BONDOC, ROLANDO M. HALLIG,
ROMEO C. BONDOC, HENRY F. LEE LEONG,
FRANCISCA S. ZABALA, RENE G. ALBANA,
EDUARDO T. JUAN, MERLIN L. VILLASIS,
EDWIN O. CACHO, NICOLAS S. DIAZ, EDUARDO
M. LIMBAGA, JESUS P. TREYES, MAXIMO S.
MUÑOZ, JR., MAYNARDO B. DYTUCO, AIDA J.
PALAFOX, EVANGELINE S. YANZON, DARIO V.
ABOGA, MODESTO V. BALTAZAR, ROBERTO L.
MAPA, ISAURO A. ARELLANO, MAXIMO D.
SUNER, NOMER A. VIDAL, EDUARDO V.
ILAGAN, ROMEO D. MENDOZA, FLORO A.
BUSTO, FREDDIE L. UYACO, JOE M. LICAYU,
YODEL C. MORALES, ALEXANDER V.
CABALLERO, HERMIN A. DOLORITO, EDWARD
C. YOUNG, MA. TERESA R. LEGASPI, ELMER F.
CIERVA, ROMEO MERCADO, HUMBERTO S.
RANCO, CONCEPCION S. YADAO, CARLO C.
DELA RIARTE, EDWIN R. ERMITA, RAYMUND
NIETES, JENNIFER T. ABESAMIS, ARNULFO
ALVARES, LUISITO J. ESTEBAN, CONCHITINA
C. MESINA, PING CHAN C. YAO, LARIZA V.
LLANES, LEONARDO S. AVELINO, JR., JAIME T.
ESMERALDA, EDUARDO S. BUENVENTURA,
JOSEFINA M. NIEVES, ERMENILDA P. IGNACIO,
MA. VICTORIA G. CAPULONG, TERESA C.
ANDRES, EVELYN C. DEL ROSARIO, and
CONSOLACION AUREA M.
SAURA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the May 28, 2004 Decision2 and
October 28, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 76879. The CA
awarded financial assistance to respondents
Rodolfo Bombita et al. out of "compassionate
justice" despite the fact that petitioner Solidbank
Corporation had already paid the respondents their
separation pay in accordance with Article 283 of the
Labor Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in May 2000, petitioner decided to cease
its commercial banking operations and forthwith
surrendered to the Bangko Central ng Pilipinas its
expanded banking license. As a result of petitioner’s
decision to cease its operations, 1,867 of its
employees would be terminated.
On July 25, 2000, petitioner sent individual letters to
its employees, including respondents, advising them
of its decision to cease operations and informing
them that their employment would be terminated.
The pertinent portions of said letter are hereunder
reproduced, to wit:
With the cessation of the banking operations of
Solidbank Corporation and the surrender of its
banking license to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), the employment of all Solidbankers will have
to be terminated.
We regret that your services as an employee of
Solidbank are hereby terminated, effective the close
of business hours on 31 August 2000. Your
separation package will be in accordance with the
implementing guidelines issued to all officers and
staff in President/CEO D.N. Vistan’s Memorandum
of 14 July 2000. You will receive your separation pay
only upon release of your clearance, but not later
than the effectivity date of your termination from the
Bank.
We wish you success in your future endeavors.4
On July 31, 2000, petitioner sent to the Department
of Labor and Employment a letter5 dated July 28,
2000, informing said office of the termination of its
employees, the pertinent portions of which read:
In compliance with the provisions of Article 283 of
the Labor Code, we would like to inform the
Department of Labor and Employment that
Solidbank Corporation will cease operations and
surrender its banking license to the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas effective 31 August 2000.
Due to the cessation of the Bank’s operations, the
employment of all officers and staff of Solidbank will
be terminated effective the close of business hours
on 31 August 2000. As a result, the Bank will
implement a separation program in accordance with
the attached guidelines. The separation package
offered to Solidbankers is more than what is required
by law.6
Petitioner granted to its employees separation pay
equivalent to 150% of gross monthly pay per year of
service, and cash equivalent of earned and accrued
vacation and sick leaves as a result of their
dismissal. Upon receipt of their separation pay, the
employees of petitioner, including respondents,
individually signed a "Release, Waiver, and
Quitclaim."7
On September 27, 2000, respondents filed with the
Labor Arbiter (LA) complaints for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of separation pay, plus damages and
attorney’s fees, and these were docketed as NLRC
NCR Case Nos. 30-09-03843-00, 30-1004350-00,
30-10-03928-00, 30-10-04200-00, and 30-10-
04036-00.
On July 22, 2002, the LA rendered a Decision8 ruling
that respondents were validly terminated from
employment as a result of petitioner’s decision to
cease its banking operations. The LA, however,
inspired by compassionate justice, awarded
financial assistance of one month’s salary to
respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Complaints for illegal dismissal
filed by the complainants under the above-stated
case numbers are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
However, inspired by compassionate justice, this
Office hereby orders the respondent Solidbank
Corporation to provide each complainant a financial
assistance of one month’s salary.
Metrobank’s motion to dismiss the claim against it
for want of jurisdiction is DENIED for lack of merit.
Complainants’ motion to admit annexes dated
March 12, 2001, together with their motions to
amend affidavits/complaints dated January 22, 2001
are hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
Solidbank’s counterclaim is dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Both parties appealed the LA’s Decision to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On October 29, 2002, the NLRC rendered a
Decision10 affirming the findings of the LA that
respondents were validly terminated. The NLRC
ruled that the closure of a business is an authorized
cause sanctioned under Article 283 of the Labor
Code and one that is ultimately a management
prerogative. The NLRC, however, modified the LA’s
Decision by increasing the amount of financial
assistance to two month’s salary out of
compassionate justice. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
appealed from is affirmed with modification as to the
award of the financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved by the NLRC Decision, petitioner then
appealed to the CA, specifically questioning the
grant of financial assistance to respondents.
On May 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision
reversing the Decision of the NLRC. The CA shared
the view of the LA that respondents should only be
awarded one month’s salary as financial assistance
and not two month’s salary as previously decreed by
the NLRC. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Decision is hereby REVERSED, and the 22 July
2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated October 28, 2004.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS’ AWARD OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
EQUIVALENT TO ONE-MONTH’S SALARY TO
THE RESPONDENTS AFTER ITS FINDING THAT
SOLIDBANK HAS MORE THAN COMPLIED WITH
THE MANDATE OF THE LAW ON PAYMENT OF
SEPARATION PAY.13
THE AWARD OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF
"COMPASSIONATE JUSTICE" AND AS A FORM
OF "EQUITABLE RELIEF."14
TO SUSTAIN THE COURT OF APPEALS’ AWARD
OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE 140
VALIDLY-DISMISSED RESPONDENTS WOULD
RESULT IN A HIGHLY ANOMALOUS SITUATION
WHERE THE SAID RESPONDENTS WOULD BE
ACCORDED BETTER BENEFITS THAN OTHER
FORMER SOLIDBANK EMPLOYEES WHO WERE
SIMILARLY SITUATED.15
The petition is meritorious. The errors being
interrelated, this Court shall discuss the same
seriatim.
Before anything else, this Court shall first address
the allegations raised by respondents in their
Comment,16 which deal with the issue of the validity
of their termination. Respondents, in the main, claim
that their termination was unlawful as petitioner did
not really cease its operations.17 Thus,
notwithstanding their admission that the LA, the
NLRC, and the CA all ruled in unison that their
termination was in accordance with law,
respondents seek this Court’s discretion to reverse
such findings.
On this note, it is well settled that this Court is not a
trier of facts. To begin with, the question of whether
respondents were dismissed for authorized cause is
a question of fact which is beyond the province of a
petition for review on certiorari. It is fundamental that
the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only
to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of
fact; more so, in labor cases where the doctrine
applies with greater force.18
The LA and the NLRC have already determined the
factual issues, and these were affirmed by the CA.
Thus, they are accorded not only great respect but
also finality, and are deemed binding upon this Court
so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. A heavy burden rests upon respondents
to convince the Court that it should take exception
from such a settled rule.19
Moreover, what is damning to the cause of the
respondents is the fact that the issue of the validity
of their dismissal is now already final. As correctly
manifested by petitioner, respondents had earlier
filed with this Court a petition for review20 dated
December 28, 2004, docketed as G.R. No. 165985,
entitled Rodolfo Bombita, et al. v. Solidbank
Corporation, et al., which questioned the validity of
their termination. A perusal of said petition shows
that the issues raised therein are the very same
issues respondents now raise in their Comment. On
February 21, 2005, this Court’s Second Division
issued a Resolution21 denying respondents’ petition
for review. On September 20, 2005, an Entry of
Judgment22 was rendered. Based on the foregoing,
the validity of the termination of respondents is an
issue that this Court must no longer look into as a
necessary consequence of the denial of their petition
for review before this Court.
Now, going to the issues raised by petitioner, this
Court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:
ARTICLE 283. Closure of establishment and
reduction of personnel. - The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving
a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof. In case of termination due
to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his
one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases
of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year. 23
Based on Article 283, in case of cessation of
operations, the employer is only required to pay his
employees a separation pay of one month pay or at
least one-half month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. That is all that the law requires.
In the case at bar, petitioner paid respondents the
following: (a) separation pay computed at 150% of
their gross monthly pay per year of service; and (b)
cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and
sick leaves. Clearly, petitioner had gone over and
above the requirements of the law. Despite this,
however, petitioner has been ordered to pay
respondents an additional amount, equivalent to one
month’s salary, as a form of financial assistance.
The LA awarded the financial assistance out of
"compassionate justice." The CA affirmed such
grant also out of "compassionate justice" and as a
form of "equitable relief" for the employees who were
suddenly dismissed due to exigencies of business.24
After a thorough consideration of the circumstances
at bar, this Court finds that the award of financial
assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to
penalize petitioner who has complied with the
requirements of the law.
It behooves this Court as to why the CA affirmed the
grant of financial assistance notwithstanding its
pronouncement that it would be inequitable to allow
respondents to receive benefits than those
prescribed by law and jurisprudence, to wit:
In the instant case, both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC upheld the validity of the dismissal of the
employees and of the quitclaim agreements
between the affected employees and employer
Solidbank. However, it was a strange occurrence
when the NLRC granted an additional award of
separation pay in an amount equivalent to two
months salary to each employee. This means that
Solidbank now has the obligation to pay the
employees not only their wages, benefits and other
privileges under the law, and separation pay in an
amount equivalent to 150% of their one month’s pay,
but also financial assistance equivalent to two
months pay to each employee. Such a situation
cannot be upheld by this Court. As discussed above,
all that the law requires in cases of dismissal due to
an authorized cause is that the employer must pay
financial assistance or separation pay in an amount
equivalent to "one month’s pay or one-half month’s
for every year of service, whichever is
higher." Solidbank has complied with the mandate of
the law. Hence, it would be unjust and inequitable to
allow the employees to receive higher benefits than
those prescribed by the Labor Code and
jurisprudence.25
Moreover, a review of jurisprudence relating to the
application of "compassionate and social justice" in
granting financial assistance in labor cases shows
that the same has been generally used in instances
when an employee has been dismissed for a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code and not
when an employee has been dismissed for an
authorized cause under Article 283.
As a general rule, an employee who has been
dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated
under Article 28226of the Labor Code is not entitled
to separation pay.27 Although by way of exception,
the grant of separation pay or some other financial
assistance may be allowed to an employee
dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity.28
The reason that the law does not statutorily grant
separation pay or financial assistance in instances
of termination due to a just cause is precisely
because the cause for termination is due to the acts
of the employee. In such instances, however, this
Court, inspired by compassionate and social justice,
has in the past awarded financial assistance to
dismissed employees when circumstances
warranted such an award.1avvphi1
In Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v.
Diasnes,29 this Court discussed the parameters of
awarding separation pay to dismissed employees as
a measure of financial assistance, viz:
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory
officials and the CA must demur the award of
separation pay based on social justice when an
employee’s dismissal is based on serious
misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and
habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of
trust; or commission of a crime against the person of
the employer or his immediate family - grounds
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction
dismissals of employees. They must be most
judicious and circumspect in awarding separation
pay or financial assistance as the constitutional
policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant
to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The
commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should
not embarrass us from sustaining the employers
when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be
more cautious in awarding financial assistance to
the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the
liberality of the law.30
Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Abad,31 this Court, having considered the
circumstances present therein and as a measure of
social justice, awarded separation pay to a
dismissed employee for a just cause under Article
282. The same concession was given by this Court
in Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission32 and Tanala v. National Labor
Relations Commission.33
Looking now at Article 283, this Court holds that the
same was drafted by the legislature, taking the best
interest of laborers in mind. It is clear that the causes
of the termination of an employee under Article 283
are due to circumstances beyond their control, such
as when management decides to reduce personnel
based on valid grounds, or when the employer
decides to cease operations. Thus, the bias towards
labor is very apparent, as the employer is statutorily
required to pay separation pay, the amount of which
is also statutorily prescribed.
While the CA should not be faulted for sympathizing
with the plight of respondents as they suddenly lost
their means of livelihood, this Court holds that it is
precisely because of the sudden loss of employment
− one that is beyond the control of labor − that the
law statutorily grants separation pay and dictates
how the same should be computed. Thus, any
business establishment that decides to cease its
operations has the burden of complying with the law.
This Court should refrain from adding more than
what the law requires, as the same is within the
realm of the legislature.
It bears to stress, however, that petitioner may, as it
has done, grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis,
any amount more than what is required by the law,
but to insist that more financial assistance be given
is certainly something that this Court cannot
countenance, as the same serves to penalize
petitioner, which has already given more than what
the law requires. Moreover, any award of additional
financial assistance to respondents would put them
at an advantage and in a better position than the rest
of their co-employees who similarly lost their
employment because of petitioner’s decision to
cease its operations.
Withal, the law, in protecting the rights of the
laborers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. While the Constitution
is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. The
management also has its own rights, as such, are
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less
privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined
more often than not toward the worker and upheld
his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such
favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the
rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to
be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
applicable law and doctrine.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The May 28, 2004 Decision and
October 28, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R SP No. 76879, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196201 June 19, 2012
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as
Chairman of the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORENTINO VELOSO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the petition filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court by petitioner Francisco T. Duque III,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), assailing the decision1 and the
resolution2 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA)3 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 01682-MIN. The CA modified CSC
Resolution No. 061714,4 finding Florentino Veloso
(respondent) guilty of dishonesty, by reducing the
penalty imposed by the CSC from dismissal from the
service to suspension from office for one year
without pay.
The Facts
The records show that the respondent, then District
Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee
Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City,
was administratively charged with three (3) counts of
dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized
withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino
(complainant), a client of Quedancor. The
complainant applied for a restructuring of his loan
with Quedancor and deposited the amount of
₱50,000.00 to Quedancor’s cashier for his Manila
account. In three (3) separate occasions, the
respondent, without notice and authority from the
complainant and with the assistance of Quedancor’s
cashier, managed to withdraw the ₱50,000.00
deposit. Upon the discovery of the withdrawals, the
complainant demanded the return of the money and
called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in
Cagayan de Oro City, who issued to the respondent
a memorandum requiring him to explain the
withdrawals and to return the money.
In compliance with the memorandum, the
respondent returned the money. The respondent
admitted having received the ₱50,000.00 from
Quedancor’s cashier knowing that it was intended
for the complainant’s loan repayment.
From the established facts, the respondent was
charged by Quedancor with dishonesty, and was
subsequently found guilty of the charges and
dismissed from the service. The CSC affirmed the
findings and conclusions of Quedancor on appeal.
Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor
and the CSC, the respondent elevated his case to
the CA which adjudged him guilty of dishonesty, but
modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year
suspension from office without pay. The CA cited the
case of Miel v. Malindog5 as supporting basis and
relied on Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases (Uniform Rules) which
allows the appreciation of mitigating circumstances
in the determination of the proper imposable penalty.
The CA took into account the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) the respondent’s length of
service of 18 years; (2) the prompt admission of
culpability; (3) the return of the money; and (4) the
respondent’s status as a first time offender.
The Present Petition
The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the
applicable law and jurisprudence which penalize the
offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the
service. The CSC also argues that there are no
mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction of
the penalty, for the following reasons:
(1) The respondent’s length of service
aggravated his dishonesty since the
respondent took advantage of his authority
over a subordinate and disregarded his oath
that a public office is a public trust. The
respondent’s length of service cannot also
be considered mitigating given the number of
times the dishonest acts were committed and
the supervisory position held by the
respondent.
(2) The admission of guilt and the restitution
by the respondent were made in 2003, while
the misappropriation took place in 2001. The
respondent admitted his culpability and
effected payment not because of his desire
to right a wrong but because he feared
possible administrative liabilities.
(3) The respondent was charged with, and
admitted having committed, dishonesty in
three separate occasions.
(4) Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules imposes dismissal from the service for
dishonesty, even for the first offense.
In compliance with our Minute Resolution dated May
31, 2011, the respondent filed his comment to the
petition. The respondent begs the Court to apply
jurisprudence where the Court, for humanitarian
reasons, refrained from meting out the actual
penalties imposed by law, in the presence of
mitigating circumstances. In this case, the
respondent calls attention to the following
circumstances: (1) that he is the sole breadwinner of
his family; (2) his length of service with Quedancor;
and (3) other than this case, no other administrative
case had been filed against him for his past 21 years
of government service.6
The Issue
The issue in this case is the determination of the
proper administrative penalty to be imposed on the
respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty
imposed by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a
first offense. The aforesaid rule underscores the
constitutional principle that public office is a public
trust and only those who can live up to such exacting
standard deserve the honor of continuing in public
service.7 It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules provides the application of mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances in the
imposition of administrative penalties. Section 53,
Rule IV applies only when clear proof is shown,
using the specific standards set by law and
jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case justify
the mitigation of the prescribed penalty.
In appreciating the presence of mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances to a given
case, two constitutional principles come into play
which the Court is tasked to balance. The first is
public accountability which requires the Court to
consider the improvement of public service, and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in
the government by ensuring that only individuals
who possess good moral character, integrity and
competence are employed in the government
service.8 The second relates to social justice which
gives the Court the discretionary leeway to lessen
the harsh effects of the wrongdoing committed by an
offender for equitable and humanitarian
considerations.
A significant aspect which the CA failed to consider
under the circumstances is the inapplicability to the
present case of the Court’s ruling in Vicente A. Miel
v. Jesus A. Malindog,9 which in turn cited Apuyan, Jr.
v. Sta. Isabel10 and Civil Service Commission v.
Belagan.11 The rulings in these three (3) cases were
rendered under different factual circumstances
involving dishonest acts, i.e., submission of false
entries in the Personal Data Sheet, the solicitation of
money, or the non-compliance with the prescribed
court procedure, among others. In terms of
seriousness and gravity, these dishonest acts differ
from the dishonest acts committed by the
respondent who used public funds under his
responsibility for his own personal benefit. Unlike the
cases cited by the CA, we also take into account the
nature of Quedancor’s business – it is a credit and
guarantee institution where the public perception of
the official’s credibility and reputation is material.
In the clearest of terms, the CA upheld that factual
findings of the CSC. Thus, it is on the basis of these
findings that we must now make our own
independent appreciation of the circumstances cited
by the respondent and appreciated by the CA as
mitigating circumstances. After a careful review of
the records and jurisprudence, we disagree with the
CA’s conclusion that mitigating circumstances
warrant the mitigation of the prescribed penalty
imposed against the respondent.
First, we have repeatedly held that length of service
can either be a mitigating or an aggravating
circumstance depending on the facts of each
case.12 While in most cases, length of service is
considered in favor of the respondent, it is not
considered where the offense committed is found to
be serious or grave;13 or when the length of service
helped the offender commit the infraction.14 The
factors against mitigation are present in this case.
Under the circumstances, the administrative offense
of dishonesty committed by the respondent was
serious on account of the supervisory position he
held at Quedancor and the nature of Quedancor’s
business. Quedancor deals with the administration,
management and disposition of public funds which
the respondent was entrusted to handle.
The respondent’s dishonest acts carried grave
consequences because Quedancor is a credit and
guarantee institution, and the public’s perception of
its credibility is critical. In this case, the sanction of
dismissal imposed on the respondent as a dishonest
employee assures the public that: first, public funds
belonging to Quedancor are used for their intended
purpose; second, public funds are released to their
proper recipients only after strict compliance with the
standard operating procedure of Quedancor is
followed; and lastly, only employees who are
competent, honest and trustworthy may manage,
administer and handle public funds in Quedancor.
Like a bank, Quedancor as a credit and guarantee
institution is expected to observe the highest degree
of competence and diligence as it is a business
imbued with public interest.15 To promote trust and
confidence, employees in Quedancor are expected
to possess the highest standards of integrity and
moral uprightness. The respondent’s dismissal from
the service is a measure of self-protection and self-
preservation by Quedancor of its reputation before
its clients and the public.
We additionally note that length of service should
also be taken against the respondent; the infraction
he committed and the number of times he committed
the violations demonstrate the highest degree of
ingratitude and ungratefulness to an institution that
has been the source of his livelihood for 18 years.
His actions constitute no less than disloyalty and
betrayal of the trust and confidence the institution
reposed in him. They constitute ingratitude for the
opportunities given to him over the years for career
advancement. Had it not been for the respondent’s
length of service, he could not have taken the
subject funds for his own use as he could not have
held a supervisory position. In addition, the
respondent’s length of service allowed him to take
advantage of his familiarity with Quedancor
operations and employees – a factor that made the
misappropriation possible.
Second, the circumstance that this is the
respondent’s first administrative offense should not
benefit him. By the express terms of Section 52,
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the commission of an
administrative offense classified as a serious
offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal
from the service even for the first time. In other
words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV
does not consider a first-time offender as a
mitigating circumstance. Likewise, under statutory
construction principles, a special provision prevails
over a general provision.16 Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the
appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of
Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules which
expressly provides for the penalty of dismissal even
for the first commission of the offense.
While we are not unmindful of the existing
jurisprudence17 cited by the respondent where the
penalty of dismissal from the service was not
imposed despite the clear language of Section 52,
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the respondent failed
to clearly show exceptional and compelling reasons
to justify a deviation from the general rule.
Finally, we reject as mitigating circumstances the
respondent’s admission of his culpability and the
restitution of the amount.1âwphi1 As pointed out by
the CSC, the respondent made use of the
complainant’s money in 2001 while the restitution
was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the
administrative case against him.18 Under the
circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and
was certainly neither purely voluntary nor made
because of the exercise of good conscience; it was
triggered, more than anything else, by his fear of
possible administrative penalties.19 The admission of
guilt and the restitution effected were clearly mere
afterthoughts made two (2) years after the
commission of the offense and after the
administrative complaint against him was filed. With
these circumstances in mind, we do not find it
justified to relieve the respondent of the full
consequences of his dishonest actions.
All told, in reversing the CA’s decision, we
emphasize that the principle of social justice cannot
be properly applied in the respondent’s case to
shield him from the full consequences of his
dishonesty. The Court, in Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. NLRC,20 clearly recognized the
limitations in invoking social justice:
The policy of social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone
the offense. Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society but only when
the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be
[the] refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may
do so only if their hands are clean and their
motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection of those
who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the
workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character.21 [Emphases
supplied.]
Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful
disbursement of public funds or loss of public
property.22Greater damage comes with the public’s
perception of corruption and incompetence in the
government.23
Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is
a public trust and public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.24 These constitutionally-enshrined principles,
oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical
flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be
taken as working standards by all in the public
service.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT
the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision dated August 20, 2010 and the resolution
dated March 8, 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 01682-MIN. The resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission, affirming the decision
dated August 11, 2004 of the Quedan and Rural
Credit Guarantee Corporation, imposing upon
respondent Florentino Veloso the penalty of
dismissal from the service, with the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, for
dishonesty, are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182606 December 4, 2011
CESAR S. DUMDUMA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 assailing the January 31, 2008
Decision,2 as well as the April 10, 2008
Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 98207, which affirmed the order of the
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC)
dismissing petitioner Cesar S. Dumduma
(Dumduma) from government service.
Factual Antecedents
Dumduma entered public service in 1979 as a
patrolman in the then Integrated National Police.4 He
steadfastly rose through the ranks until he was
promoted in 1991 as Senior Police Officer 4 (SPO4)
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). He was then
designated as officer-in-charge of San Miguel Police
Station in San Miguel, Leyte.5 On December 15,
1998, he took the Career Service Professional
Examination in Quezon City.6
On March 7, 1999, Dumduma filled out a Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) pursuant to his promotional
appointment as Police Inspector. On Item No. 18 of
the PDS, Dumduma stated that he passed the
Career Service Professional Examination
Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City on
December 15, 1998 with a rating of 81%.7 His
appointment was then forwarded to the PNP-CSC
Field Office on April 16, 1999 for verification and
approval.8 It was then discovered that Dumduma did
not have the proper civil service eligibility, contrary
to what he disclosed in his PDS. His name was not
included in the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-
NCR) Regional Register of Eligibles for the Career
Service Professional Examination conducted on
December 15, 1998; instead, his name appeared in
the Regional List of Passing/Failing Examinees with
a rating of 25.82%. Accordingly, the director of the
CSC-NCR, Adoracion F. Arenas disapproved
Dumduma’s appointment on the ground of spurious
eligibility.9 On June 6, 2002, the CSC-NCR formally
charged Dumduma with Dishonesty.10
Dumduma denied the charge.11 His version of the
circumstances surrounding his alleged eligibility is
as follows: Prior to the date of the examination,
Dumduma met a certain Salome Dilodilo (Dilodilo),
who was allegedly a retired CSC director. Dilodilo
promised Dumduma her "total support in
[Dumduma’s] x x x examination [but] (i)n return, she
asked [Dumduma] to convince [his] close friend x x
x to sell x x x a property x x x [to her]."12 On the day
before the examination,13 Dumduma and Dilodilo
went to the CSC Office located at Kaliraya Street,
Quezon City in order to facilitate an early
examination schedule14 for Dumduma. The following
day, December 15, 1998, Dumduma took the Career
Service Professional Examination.15 A week later,
he received his Certificate of Eligibility16 from an
unnamed person, who claimed to be Dilodilo’s
emissary.17 The Certificate of Eligibility stated that
Dumduma passed the examination with a rating of
81%.18 Dumduma then wrote the said information in
his PDS, allegedly in good faith that the Certificate
of Eligibility was authentic.
Dumduma waived the formal investigation and
submitted the case for resolution based on the
available documents.19
Decision of Civil Service Commission-National
Capital Region20
The CSC-NCR held that the Certificate of Eligibility
relied upon by Dumduma in making his PDS entry
was spurious because it was contrary to the CSC’s
Regional List of Eligibles. The Regional List prevails
over the Certificate of Eligibility because the former
is the primary official record of eligibles hence is
presumed genuine and accurate, unless proven
otherwise. Since Dumduma failed to satisfactorily
explain the discrepancy posed by his Certificate of
Eligibility, the presumption is that the same was
falsified for his benefit.21 Based on CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1991,
Dumduma’s procurement and use of a spurious
Certificate of Eligibility constituted the offense of
Dishonesty,22 which merited dismissal from
government service with all the accessory
penalties.23
Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
Dumduma appealed the adverse CSC-NCR
Decision to the CSC. Dumduma maintained his
good faith in relying on the Certificate of Eligibility
that was delivered to his residence. Any defect in his
Certificate of Eligibility must be blamed on some
unnamed and unknown CSC personnel, who most
probably authored the falsification. Without any
proof that he colluded with these CSC personnel,
Dumduma contended that he cannot be found guilty
of dishonesty.24
In its Resolution No. 06009825 dated January 23,
2006, the CSC found Dumduma’s version of how he
obtained his certificate of eligibility implausible. The
CSC noted that the standard operating procedure for
the Career Service Professional Examination
Computer-Assisted Test is to hand-over the
certificates of eligibility of the passers immediately
after the examination. Since Dumduma did not get
his certificate in the standard manner, he had the
burden of explaining what merited the unorthodox
procedure. This he failed to do.26
The CSC further held that Dumduma failed to rebut
the presumption that he, as possessor of a falsified
document, was the author thereof. His bare
assertion of good faith could not stand against the
presumption.27 The CSC thus affirmed the CSC-
NCR’s Decision. The dispositive portion of the
CSC’s January 23, 2006
Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Cesar S. Dumduma is
hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March
19, 2004 of the CSC-NCR, finding him guilty of
Dishonesty and imposing on him the penalty of
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service is hereby
AFFIRMED. Further, since this involves
disbursements of funds for the salaries and benefits
of Dumduma after his appointment was
disapproved, let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Commission on Audit for its appropriate action.
The CSC-NCR is hereby ordered to monitor the
implementation of this Resolution.
Quezon City, January 23, 2006.28
Dumduma filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was denied in CSC Resolution No.
07030629 dated February 19, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dumduma reiterated his defense of good faith in his
appeal to the CA,30 but the appellate court was
unconvinced. The CA found substantial evidence
supporting the conclusion that Dumduma’s
Certificate of Eligibility was spurious. It was contrary
to the entries in the Regional List of Passing/Failing
Examinees and those in the Regional Register of
Eligibles. Moreover, it was delivered to Dumduma
contrary to the standard operating procedures of
CSC.31
The CA held that Dumduma’s possession and use
of the falsified certificate for his own benefit created
the presumption that he was the author of such
falsification. It was incumbent upon Dumduma to
overcome the said presumption with controverting
evidence. His bare assertion of good faith did not
suffice as a rebuttal.32
The CA disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The assailed CSC
Resolutions STAND.
SO ORDERED.33
Dumduma moved for a reconsideration but the CA
denied the same in its Resolution dated April 10,
2008.34
Our Ruling
Petitioner Dumduma is now before us questioning
the sufficiency of the evidence against him. He is of
the impression that he was found guilty of dishonesty
on a mere presumption – that the holder of a forged
document is the forger – despite the presence of
contrary evidence.35 His alleged contrary evidence
consist of the apparent authenticity of his Certificate
of Eligibility (which did not alert him to any irregularity
therein)36 and the absence of evidence that he
colluded with CSC personnel to falsify the
certificate.37
The question raised by Dumduma regarding the
CA’s appreciation of the evidence against him is
ineluctably one of fact, which is beyond the ambit of
this Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on
certiorari. It is not this Court’s task to go over the
proofs presented below to ascertain if they were
appreciated and weighed correctly, most especially
when the CA and the CSC speak as one in their
findings and conclusions.38 While it is widely held
that this rule of limited jurisdiction admits of
exceptions, none exists, or is even alleged as
existing, in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the
undisputed facts, as revealed by the evidence, make
out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma.
When Dumduma’s claim of eligibility was
contradicted by the CSC Register of Eligibles and
the List of Passing/Failing Examinees, it became
incumbent upon Dumduma to explain why he made
the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS entry,
the CSC records are presumed correct and made in
the regular course of official business.39 In
explaining his action, however, Dumduma dug a
deeper hole from which he could not extricate
himself.
He admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that Dilodilo, a
retired CSC official, promised to help him with his
CSC examination in exchange for a personal favor.
They then proceeded to the CSC Office together and
Dilodilo was welcomed by her former colleagues.
After Dumduma took the exam, he went home
without knowing the result thereof (a procedure that
is contrary to CSC practice). Several days later,
Dumduma professed that he received his Certificate
of Eligibility from a man sent by Dilodilo, who is a
retiree hence without official ties with the CSC.
Instead of exculpating him, Dumduma’s explanation
completed the evidence against him. He not only
failed to explain the discrepancy, he even explained
how he obtained a spurious Certificate of Eligibility.
Dumduma asserts that, despite the questionable
circumstances, he is in good faith and that the blame
is with the CSC personnel who gave him a
Certificate of Eligibility. Their actions should not be
attributable to him, unless there is evidence that he
colluded with them.
Dumduma’s contention is in stark contrast to his
admissions and does not merit belief. The concept
of good faith in administrative cases such as this one
is explained in a recent case in this wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of
mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put
the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage
of another, even through technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render [a] transaction
unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a
question of intention. Although this is something
internal, we can ascertain a person’s intention not
from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-
serving, but from evidence of his conduct and
outward acts.40
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances
surrounding Dumduma’s acquisition of the
Certificate of Eligibility cast serious doubts on his
good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official
and accepted the Certificate of Eligibility from her
representative. These circumstances reveal
Dumduma’s knowledge that Dilodilo could have
pulled strings in order to obtain his Certificate of
Eligibility and have it delivered to his residence. How
else would a retired employee obtain the said
certificate? Dumduma cannot feign innocence given
his unquestioning cooperation with Dilodilo.
Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be
held administratively liable for falsifying Dumduma’s
Certificate of Eligibility is beside the point. The fact
that someone else falsified the certificate will not
excuse Dumduma for knowingly using the same for
his career advancement.
Dumduma maintains that it is entirely possible that
his Certificate of Eligibility is correct and that the
CSC’s Register of Eligibles and the List of
Passing/Failing Examinees are the ones with
incorrect entries. In light of the circumstances, the
Court cannot accept this theory. As Dumduma
himself admitted, he did not obtain the Certificate of
Eligibility from the CSC but from a representative of
his facilitator, Dilodilo. The official records kept by
the CSC deserve credence compared to a certificate
that admittedly originated from a dubious
source.1avvphi1
This is not the first time that a government employee
had been dismissed from service for falsification of
his eligibility for appointment purposes.
Maniebo v. Court of Appeals41 is analogous to the
instant case. Maniebo denied any participation in the
preparation of her spurious Certificate of Eligibility.
She maintained that she only received the same
through the mails and was in good faith in submitting
the same for her appointment. The Court held that
the presumption of good faith does not apply when
the employee’s Certificate of Eligibility conflicts with
the CSC’s Masterlist of Eligibles. Moreover, the
Court did not accept Maniebo’s long and satisfactory
government service in order to mitigate the penalty
of dismissal. The Court noted that Maniebo was
undeserving of the mitigation given her refusal to
own up to, and her lack of remorse for, her
dishonesty.
In Bacsasar v. Civil Service
Commission,42 Bacsasar obtained her Certificate of
Eligibility from a private individual and not from the
CSC. The CSC verified the spurious nature of her
eligibility because Bacsasar was not included in the
CSC Masterlist of Passing/Failing Examinees. The
Court rejected Bacsasar’s defense of good faith
given that she did not even take the civil service
exam.
In Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit,43 Cayobit
received her Certificate of Eligibility through mail and
maintained that she believed the same to be
genuine. The Court found her guilty of dishonesty
given that she failed to explain the discrepancy in her
passing grade in the certificate and the failing grade
reflected in the CSC masterlist.
Like Dumduma, the dismissed employee in Re:
Tessie G. Quires44 also maintained that she was
merely a victim of fixers operating within the CSC
Office. The Court did not accede to her pleas and
meted the prescribed penalty for dishonesty.
Disapproved Appointment of Limgas45 also involved
an employee who maintained that she acted in
complete reliance that the Certificate of Eligibility
she received after taking the CSC examination was
authentic. Limgas claimed that "she was a victim of
an injustice perpetrated by fixers, insiders and
syndicates operating in the Regional Offices of the
CSC."46 In rejecting her plea, the Court expressed its
disbelief that a fixer would act for Limgas’ benefit,
without the latter having any knowledge of the
anomalous transaction.1avvphi1
Guided by the foregoing cited authorities, the Court
holds that the CA did not err in affirming the penalty
of dismissal and all its accessory penalties imposed
by the CSC. Only those who can live up to the
constitutional exhortation that public office is a public
trust deserve the honor of continuing in public
service.
Dumduma makes a final plea for leniency but the law
and the prevailing jurisprudence binds the hands of
this Court. We cannot change the imposable
penalties for a clear case of dishonesty without at
the same time, visiting injustice against all the other
government employees that were similarly placed
but received the full force of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that petitioner
was once an outstanding member of the police force.
He risked life and limb serving the citizenry of Region
8 with total dedication and hard work. His service
record shows that, since his original appointment in
1979, he patiently rose through the ranks until he
was promoted to SPO4 in 1991. While justice
exhorts that petitioner suffer the full penalties
imposed by law, temperance cries out that he be
recognized for whatever good he has done prior to
his mistake. Thus, the Court deems proper, on a pro
hac vice basis, to extend financial assistance of
₱50,000.00 to petitioner, which amount shall be
taken from his forfeited retirement benefits. This
award in no sense mitigates his offense but is made
solely out of equity and humanitarian considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
January 31, 2008 Decision and April 10, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 98207 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is extended a FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
of ₱50,000.00, to be taken from his forfeited
retirement benefits on a pro hac vice basis.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987
CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF
LABOR and RAMON PILONES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent was removed by the
petitioner and complained to the Ministry of Labor.
His complaint was dismissed by the regional
director, who was, however, reversed by the public
respondent. Required to reinstate the separated
employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner
has come to us, faulting the Deputy Minister with
grave abuse of discretion. We have issued in the
meantime a temporary restraining order. 1
The public respondent held that Ramon Pilones, the
private respondent, was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was
entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for
his removal, to wit, "pulmonary tuberculosis
minimal," was not certified as incurable within six
months as to justify his separation. 2 Additionally, the
private respondent insists that the petitioner should
have first obtained a clearance, as required by the
regulations then in force, for the termination of his
employment.
The petitioner for its part claims that the private
respondent was still on probation at the time of his
dismissal and so had no security of tenure. His
dismissal was not only in conformity with company
policy but also necessary for the protection of the
public health, as he was handling ingredients in the
processing of soft drinks which were being sold to
the public. It is also argued that the findings of the
regional director, who had direct access to the facts,
should not have been disturbed on appeal. For these
same reasons, it contends, the employee's
reinstatement as ordered by the public respondent
should not be allowed.
The original findings were contained in a one-page
order 3 reciting simply that "complainant was
employed on a probationary period of employment
for six (6) months. After said period, he underwent
medical examination for qualification as regular
employee but the results showed that he is suffering
from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed
of the termination of his employment by respondent."
The order then concluded that the termination was
"justified." That was all.
As there is no mention of the basis of the above
order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll
authority 4submitted by the petitioner showing that
the private respondent was employed on probation
on February 16, 1978. Even supposing that it is not
self- serving, we find nevertheless that it is self-
defeating. The six-month period of probation started
from the said date of appointment and so ended on
August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private
respondent's employment also ended then; on the
contrary, he continued working as usual. Under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, "an employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee." Hence, Pilones
was already on permanent status when he was
dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he
ceased to be a probationer.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the
private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978,
and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the
petitioner had all of six months during which to
conduct such examination, it chose to wait until
exactly the last day of the probation period. In the
light of such delay, its protestations now that
reinstatement of Pilones would prejudice public
health cannot but sound hollow and hypocritical. By
its own implied admission, the petitioner had
exposed its customers to the employee's disease
because of its failure to examine him before
entrusting him with the functions of a "syrup man."
Its belated concern for the consuming public is
hardly persuasive, if not clearly insincere and self-
righteous.
There is proof in fact that the private respondent was
first hired not on February 16, 1978, but earlier in
1977. This is the 1977 withholding tax
statement 5 issued for him by the petitioner itself
which it does not and cannot deny. The petitioner
stresses that this is the only evidence of the private
respondent's earlier service and notes that he has
not presented any co-worker to substantiate his
claim. This is perfectly understandable. Given the
natural reluctance of many workers to antagonize
their employers, we need not wonder why none of
them testified against the petitioner.
We are satisfied that whether his employment began
on February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he claims,
the private respondent was already a regular
employee when he was dismissed on August 21,
1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of
tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the
Labor Code.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal
invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code reading as follows:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for
dismissal. — Where the employee
suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited
 by law or prejudicial to his health or to
the health of his co-employees, the
employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a
certification by a competent public
health authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six
(6) months even with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment
can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the
employee but shall ask the employee
to take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the
restoration of his normal health.
The record does not contain the certification
required by the above rule. The medical certificate
offered by the petitioner came from its own
physician, who was not a "competent public health
authority," and merely stated the employee's
disease, without more. We may surmise that if the
required certification was not presented, it was
because the disease was not of such a nature or
seriousness that it could not be cured within a period
of six months even with proper medical treatment. If
so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and
unlawful sanction.
We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for
the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his
employers, must look up to the law for his protection.
Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and
even favor and always with faith and hope in his
capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It is
error to take him for granted. He deserves our
abiding respect. How society treats him will
determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a
caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry
weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is
obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should,
we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries"
of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but
does not bow his head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order of November 18, 1981,
is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated
July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the
modification that the backwages shall be limited to
three years only and the private respondent shall be
reinstated only upon certification by a competent
public health authority that he is fit to return to work.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

It is also worth noting that the petitioner's application

for clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent was filed with the Ministry of
Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after
his dismissal. 6 As the NLRC has repeatedly and
correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in
force at that time) was not a "trivial technicality." It
required "not just the mere filing of a petition or the
mere attempt to procure a clearance" but that "the
said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act
of termination. 7

We agree that there was here an attempt to

circumvent the law by separating the employee after
five months' service to prevent him from becoming a
regular employee, and then rehiring him on
probation, again without security of tenure. We
cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to
the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other
hand, we have also the health of the public and of
the dismissed employee himself to consider. Hence,
although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement,
this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his
work, as certified by competent authority.