SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015 ]

AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Amelia Carmela
Constantino Zoleta assailing the November 5, 2008 decision[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326.

The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian,
and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for
participating in the scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using
provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a
special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit
Team was a P20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative
whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani
Province.

The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted
a preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charged the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria
Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by falsification of public
documents defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Sandiganbayan in an Information which
reads:
That on January 24, 2002 or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public
officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta,
Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of
Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violita
Bahilidad, private individual, the public officers, while committing the offense in relation to
office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for which they are
accountable, by falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher
No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance
had been sought by Women In Progress, Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President,
Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no
financial assistance had been requested by the said group and her association, nor did Amelia
Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating
the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00) through encashment by the accused at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of the Violeta Bahilidad, which
amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and despite demand,
the said accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government
and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] (Emphasis in the original.)

On arraignment, the petitioner, Vice-Governor Constantino and Bahilidad pleaded "not guilty."
Diaz and Camanay, on the other hand, remained at large.

On March 22, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-trial Order.[4] The People of the Philippines,
though the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed its Comment and Ex Parte Motion to Include
Testimonial Evidence and Issue to Pre-trial Order[5] essentially claiming that the Pre-trial Order
did not reflect certain testimonial evidence "as stated during the Pre-Trial."[6]

In its Order[7] dated April 5, 2006, the Sandiganbayan amended certain portions of the Pre-trial
Order.

On April 25, 2006, Vice-Governor Constantino died in a vehicular accident, resulting in the
dismissal of the case against him.

In its decision dated November 5, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner and Bahilidad
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. It
also imposed on them the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any
public office. The Sandiganbayan likewise directed them to pay back the Province of Sarangani
P20,000.00 plus interest, computed from January 2002 until fully paid.[8]

The Sandiganbayan held that Vice-Governor Constantino had control and custody of the funds
by reason of his office, and that his signature was needed before a grant, donation, or assistance
could be released to a requesting party. According to the Sandiganbayan, Vice-Governor
Constantino approved the P20,000.00 disbursement despite the lack of the required
documentation.

The Sandiganbayan further ruled that Vice-Governor Constantino conspired with the other
accused in using a dummy organization - WIP - to facilitate the malversation. It explained that
the petitioner, who was Vice-Governor Constantino's own daughter and who held the position of
Executive Assistant III in his office, committed the following acts: (a) ordered Mary Ann
Gadian, a computer operator at the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani, to
make a letter-request for financial assistance using a nonexistent cooperative; (b) directed Jane
Tangan, the Local Legislative Staff Officer of the Office of the Vice-Governor, to falsify the
signature of WIP's secretary, Melanie Remulta, on the request-letter; and (c) certified and
approved the disbursement voucher; and then presented it to Diaz, Camanay, and Vice-Governor
Constantino for their respective signatures.
The Sandiganbayan likewise ruled that falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime
of malversation.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

In the present petition, the petitioner argued that: (a) the Sandiganbayan's November 5, 2008
decision in Criminal Case No. 28326 was void because one of its signatories, Justice Gregory
Ong, was not a natural-born Filipino citizen per Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec.
Ermita,[9] and hence not qualified to be a Sandiganbayan justice; (b) the totality of evidence
presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the petitioner's presumption of
innocence; and (c) the Sandiganbayan denied her due process when it issued its Order dated
April 5, 2006, amending certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing.

In its Comment,[10] the People countered that Kilosbayan merely required Justice Ong to
complete "all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship." It
added that Kilosbayan did not categorically rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born Filipino
who was disqualified from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of this
Court. The People further pointed out that the Court in Topacio v. Ong[11] already acknowledged
Justice Ong's actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.

The People likewise argued that the issue of sufficiency of the prosecution evidence is a question
of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. It nonetheless
maintained that the Sandiganbayan's findings were supported by the evidence on record.

On the third issue, the People maintained that a person charged with willful malversation can
validly be convicted of malversation through negligence.

OUR RULING

We DENY the petition.

I. The Sandiganbayan's November 5, 2008 decision is valid

The petitioner's reliance in Kilosbayan to challenge the validity of the Sandiganbayan's decision
is misplaced.

We point out that Kilosbayan arose from a petition for certiorari filed by both Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan - both nongovernmental organizations engaged in public and
civic causes - assailing then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's appointment of Justice Ong as
an Associate Justice of the Court on the ground that the latter was not a natural-born citizen.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, Kilosbayan did not rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-
born Filipino (and hence unqualified to assume the position of a Sandiganbayan Justice). The
Court merely stated that Justice Ong cannot accept an appointment to the position of Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court or assume the position of that office, "until he shall have
successfully completed all the necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings
in court to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and
citizenship."[12]

At any rate, the Court has long settled the issue of Justice Ong's citizenship. After the Court
promulgated Kilosbayan, Justice Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 264, Pasig City, a petition for the amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation
of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth, docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ. In its decision of
October 24, 2007, the RTC[13] granted Justice Ong's petition to be recognized as a natural-born
Filipino. Consequently, the RTC directed the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila to
annotate in the Certificate of Birth of Justice Ong its (RTC's) decision.

The RTC denied the motions moving for a reconsideration of its decision.

In its six-page resolution in 2013, the Court En Bane also held that Justice Ong was a natural-
born citizen, thus:
The pronouncements of the Court in both GR No. 179895 and GR No. 180543, and the finality
of the decision rendered by the RTC on October 24, 2007, in S.P. No. 11767-SJ recognizing
Justice Ong as a natural born citizen of the Philippines and directing the correction of the
existing records of his birth and citizenship have already definitively settled the subject of the
query posed by SP Villa-Ignacio.[14]
Even without this ruling, we hold that Justice Ong was a de facto officer during the period of his
incumbency as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. A de facto officer is one who is in possession
of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election,
even though such appointment or election may be irregular.[15] It is likewise defined as one who
is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent be not a mere volunteer.[16] Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are as valid
for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.[17]

In the light of these considerations, we find no basis to invalidate the November 5, 2008 decision
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28326.

II. Only questions of law should be raised in a Rule 45 petition

It is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of
the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law; it does not review the factual findings of
the Sandiganbayan which, as a general rule, are conclusive upon the Court.

A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts. On the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or controversy arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The resolution of a question of fact necessarily involves
a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of
surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations.[18]

In the present petition, the petitioner alleges that the presented evidence were insufficient to
support a conviction. She thus seeks a re-evaluation of the Sandiganbayan's appreciation of the
evidence presented, including the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of their
testimonies. The petitioner likewise wants the Court to take a closer look into her claim that the
charges against them were politically motivated.

To our mind, the Sandiganbayan's findings that: the testimonies of Gadian and Tangan were
credible and worthy of belief; WPI was an unregistered cooperative; the signatures of the
petitioner and her co-accused on the disbursement voucher were authentic; Remulta's signature
had been forged; and the charges against the accused were not politically motivated, are
questions of fact, as these matters were resolved after a calibration of the pieces of evidence
presented during trial. The Court will not anymore weigh these pieces of evidence in the absence
of a clear showing that these findings had been arrived at arbitrarily or are devoid of support in
the records.

At any rate, we hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex
crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.

Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or

misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting
any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.[19]

The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them. All these elements have been established by the prosecution.

First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public
officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official,
of any rank or class. Constantino was the Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province, while the
petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz were occupying the positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office
of the Vice-Governor), Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board Member, respectively.

Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to the
Province of Sarangani.

Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public officers. Under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public officer
who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government
Code expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section 340 of the LGC
reads:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. — Any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government
funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this title. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their
duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government
funds through their participation in the use or application thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature
of their functions; or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public
funds.[20]

As a required standard procedure, the signatures of, among others, the Vice-Governor and the
Provincial Accountant are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. No
checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and
release of public funds require their approval. Thus, Constantino and Camanay, in their
capacities as Vice-Governor and Provincial Accountant, had control and responsibility over the
subject funds.

Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated, took, misappropriated or

consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take the public
funds when they signed Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822. The term voucher, when
used in connection with disbursement of money, implies some instrument that shows on what
account or by what authority a particular payment has been made, or that services have been
performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. Corollarily, when an
authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the entries
therein, among others: that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting
documents are complete, and the availability of cash therefor. He also attests that the person who
performed the services or delivered the supplies, materials, or equipment is entitled to
payment.[21]

Notably, the signatures of Camanay and Vice-Governor Constantino also appeared on the
Allotment and Obligation Slip (ALOBS) and in Land Bank Check No. 0000036481,
respectively. Their respective signatures in these documents allowed Bahilidad to encash
P20,000.00. We also point out that although the purported request was made by the WIP, the
check was made payable to a private person, that is, Bahilidad. According to Helen Calling, the
leader of the COA Special Audit Team, there were no supporting documents attached to this
disbursement voucher proving that Bahilidad was indeed the treasurer of WIP.

We also agree with the Sandiganbayan's ruling that falsification was a necessary means to
commit the crime of malversation. Article 171, paragraphs (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal
Code, provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The
penalty of prision mayorand a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate;

xxxx
In the present case, the records showed that the petitioner ordered Tangan to sign above the name
of Remulta in the letter-request to make it appear that the latter, as WIP Secretary, consented to
the request for financial assistance. We note, too, that this letter-request was made on January 24,
2002, but Gadian antedated it to January 7, 2002, so that the transaction would not look
suspicious (considering that both the disbursement voucher and check were also dated January
24, 2002).

The Presence of Conspiracy

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by direct evidence
and may be inferred from the conduct — before, during, and after the commission of the crime
— indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design
of another, as shown by an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission of the crime.[22]

In the present case, the records established with moral certainty that the petitioner and her co-
accused acted in concert to achieve a common objective. The presence of conspiracy between the
petitioner and her co-accused was explained by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
xxxx

Moreover, the testimony of Gadian and Tangan indubitably established that accused Constantino
and Zoleta took advantage of their official positions. Zoleta ordered Gadian to make a request
using a nonexistent cooperative. She ordered Tangan to falsify the signature of Remulta in the
request letter. Both followed the directive of Zoleta, being their superior, the Executive Assistant
and the daughter of the Vice-Governor who places her initials before the Vice-Governor affixes
his own signature. Despite the irregularity, accused Constantino approved the disbursement.

The facts taken together would prove the existence of conspiracy. Zoleta, as president of an
inexistent association and a co-terminous employee at the office of her father, initiated the
request for obligation of allotments and certified and approved the disbursement voucher. There
is no doubt that Constantino facilitated the illegal release of the fund by signing the questioned
voucher. Without the signatures of accused Constantino, Zoleta, and Bahilidad, the amount could
not have been disbursed on that particular day. When the voucher with its supporting documents
was presented to accused Constantino, Diaz, and Camanay for approval and signature, they
readily signed them without further ado, despite the lack of proper documentation and
noncompliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the check, Bahilidad, and
received the amount. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signature of
Remulta, all lead to the conclusion that the accused conspired to defraud the government.
The concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action between the accused is indubitable. A
careful scrutiny of the records revealed that indeed: (a) the petitioner signed the letter-request for
financial assistance, and this was approved by Diaz and Vice-Governor Constantino; (b) the
ALOBS was signed by Camanay; (c) Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 was signed
by Vice-Governor Constantino, Diaz and Camanay; and (d) Land Bank Check No. 0000036481
was signed by Vice-Governor Constantino.

The connivance between the accused is made more glaring by the fact that the entire transaction
— from the letter-request, to the approval of the disbursement voucher, until the processing and
release of the check — was completed in only one day. We note, too, that the disbursement had
been approved even without the required supporting documents such as the Articles of
Cooperation and Certificate from the Cooperative Development Authority. There was also
noncompliance with the COA-prescribed auditing and accounting guidelines on the release of
fund assistance to NGOs, such as the required monitoring and inspection report either by the
Office of the Provincial Agriculturist or the Provincial Engineering Office. As earlier stated, the
purported request was made by WIP, but the check was made payable to Bahilidad (despite the
COA's findings that there were no supporting documents proving that she was WIP's treasurer).

We are aware that Bahilidad was acquitted by this Court in G.R. No. 185195[23] - a case where
she questioned her conviction by the Sandiganbayan. This does not preclude us, however, from
ruling that the other accused, i.e., Vice-Governor Constantino, Diaz, Camanay, and the
petitioner, conspired with each other to attain a common objective. We point out that Bahilidad's
acquittal was anchored on the fact that she had no hand in the preparation, processing or
disbursing of the check issued in her name. It cannot be denied in the present case that the
petitioner, Vice-Governor Constantino, Diaz, and Camanay, all participated in the preparation
and processing of Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822[24] as evidenced by their
respective signatures affixed there. Sanggunian Panlalawigan Bookbinder[25] Gadian, in fact,
witnessed Vice-Governor Constantino, Camanay, and Diaz sign these documents.

In Barriga v. Sandiganbayan,[26] we ruled that:

It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue
of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use
of public funds or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an
accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.
III. No denial of due process

The petitioner claims that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution's motion to amend certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing. In
essence, the petitioner argues that she could not be convicted of malversation through consent,
abandonment, or negligence because this allegation was not contained in the Information.

The petitioner's argument lacks merit.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal
misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain
satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.[27]

In People v. Consigna, et al.,[28] the Court first ruled that an accused charged with wilful
malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through negligence where the evidence
sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

Similarly, in People v. Ochoa,[29] the Court stated that [e]ven when the Information charges
wilful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the
evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.

In Tubola, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[30] we affirmed the accused's conviction of malversation of

public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and reasoned out as follows:
Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be
in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved
and conviction thereof is proper. A possible exception would be when the mode of
commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate
categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused
into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was
occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of
this case. (Underscoring and emphasis in the original.)
The Proper Penalty

We modify the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the Sandiganbayan,
from sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months, and twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal, in accordance with Articles 48 and 217
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[31]

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in
Criminal Case No. 28326 with the MODIFICATION that the maximum term of the penalty
imposed on the petitioner be increased from sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11)
days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015 ]
CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Clarita Estrellado-
Mainar assailing the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 28, 2007,[2] and
July 29, 2008,[3] respectively, in CA-G.R.CR No. 00429.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land
located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told
Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed
Naval that the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother
title."[4]

On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Self[5] where the petitioner
agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of the petitioner's share in the estate of her
deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado.[6] Naval paid a down payment totaling P100,000.00,[7] and
then asked permission from the petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought.
After the petitioner issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the
subject land.

On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished
Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the
subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the
petitioner the return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house
demolished, but the latter refused to heed these demands.

The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City[8] in an Information that provides:
That sometime in February 2005, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with deceit and intent to defraud,
pretending to be the lawful owner of a two hundred (200) square meters lot portion of a lot
covered by TCT-19932 located at Cogon, Matina Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent to
gain, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in selling the same to one Eric C. Naval for
which the said Eric C. Naval paid to the accused the total amount of P123,000.00, as partial
payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact and despite her knowledge that the entire
property covered by TCT No. 19931 [sic] had been sold and was already owned by JS Francisco
and Sons, Inc., thereby defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount of
P123,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
In its decision[10] dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.

The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner "represented to the complainant that the property
is free from lien and encumbrance."[11] It added that Naval relied on the first page of the title that
had been shown to him, and that the petitioner deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she
(petitioner) no longer owned the area sold.

Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the following amounts to the offended
party: (a) P123,000.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; (b) P123,000.00
civil indemnity; (c) P65,755.45 as actual expenses incurred and proven; (d) P10,000.00
attorney's fees; and (e) P10,000.00 moral damages.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Davao City, affirmed the MTCC
decision in toto.[12] The RTC essentially adopted the factual findings and the conclusions of the
MTCC.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied her motion in its Order of
May 29, 2007.

The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA via a petition for review, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In its resolution[13] dated August 16, 2007, the CA directed the
petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the
date of receipt of the assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial
of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to
"05" referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."

In her Compliance and Manifestation,[14] the petitioner specified the date when her counsel's
messenger received the assailed RTC decision and order. She, however, manifested that her
petition for review bore no Exhibits '"03" to "05" on pages 8-9.

In its resolution of November 28, 2007,[15] the CA dismissed the petition for the petitioner's
failure to attach the exhibits that would support the allegations of her petition in violation of
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution
dated July 29, 2008.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

In the present petition,[16] the petitioner claimed that the CA erred in dismissing her petition for
review on mere technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo erred in convicting her of
violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code because the Information charged
her with violation of paragraph 1 of the same article. The petitioner also maintained that she did
not misrepresent the subject land to be free from any lien or encumbrance.

OUR RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.

Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but merely a statutory
privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. As the appealing party, the petitioner
must comply with the requirements of the relevant rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right
to appeal. We emphasize that the procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of
Court must be followed because strict compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice.[17]

Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the
original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state
the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was
filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court,
and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis ours)
Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that, "[t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements regarding, among others, the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

We note that the CA exercised liberality in .its treatment of the petitioner's petition for review
when - instead of dismissing it outright - it still directed her to show cause why her petition
should not be dismissed for failing to strictly comply with Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for
failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date
of receipt of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits "03" to
"05" referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition.[18]

Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the petitioner stated that the petition had
no exhibits "03" and "05" on pages 8-9. An examination of the records revealed that, indeed,
exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The CA itself admitted that it inadvertently
stated in its directive that exhibits "03" to "05" were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner ought to have complied with the latter's
third directive, considering that there could have been no other exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
other than those mentioned on pages 4 and 5 of the petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh.
"03"); Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").

Without doubt, these documents would have supported the material allegations in the petitioner's
petition for review. The petitioner should have been more prudent and vigilant in pursuing her
petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's misquotation of the pages. The CA already gave the
petitioner the opportunity to rectify the procedural infirmities in her petition, but the latter did not
take advantage of this liberality by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's directives.

The records likewise showed that the petitioner did attach Exhibits "03" to "05" in her motion for
reconsideration before the CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded these annexes due to the
petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she did not attach these documents to her
petition. While the CA could have stretched the limits of its liberality a bit more, we could not
fault it for ruling the way it did at that point since the petitioner did not even bother to offer any
explanation why she did not attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the CA held:
Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify the procedural infirmities in the motion for
reconsideration by attaching therein the exhibits, yet, petitioner did not even proffer any
explanation why she failed in the first instance to attach the same in the petition.

xxxx

Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal application of the rules of procedure is her
obligation to exert her utmost to comply therewith. Sadly, petitioner is wanting of the traits that
could qualify her to invoke liberality in the application of the Rules.[19]
What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will merit a reconsideration of the dismissal of
the petition is a discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not interfere with the exercise of
this prerogative unless there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Following the clear provisions
of Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of Rule 42, we hold that the CA did not act in a
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The petitioner's improper conviction under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC

Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42, we resolve the
substantive issue raised by the petitioner in the interest of justice. This Court has, on occasion,
suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that
tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[20]

Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that
the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the
caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
comprised must be alleged in the Information.[21]

To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes "[a]ny person
who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage
the same."

The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes
the act of any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance is not recorded.

The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew
that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that
there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from
encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another.[22]

The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its caption that it is
charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged that
the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-
square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her knowledge that the entire
property had already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged
that the petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any
encumbrance.

In Nay a v. Abing,[23] the Court set aside the petitioner's conviction for estafa under Article
316(2) of the Revised Penal Code since there had been no allegation in the Information that he
(petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the subject property to William Po that the said
property was free from any encumbrance. We explained that the gravamen of the crime is the
disposition of legally encumbered real property by the offender under the express representation
that there is no encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an express representation
in the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance for
one to be criminally liable. The Court explained that:
xxx there is no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly represented in the sale of
the subject property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance.
Irrefragably, then, petitioner was not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court committed a reversible error in finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision and that the Court of Appeals
likewise erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on appeal.[24]
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an
express representation that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was
crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1),
and the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be
the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may
be committed even by the owner of the property.

Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not
contain any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any
encumbrance.

It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following annotations:
xxxx

Entry No. 1131326 - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - filed by J.S. Francisco and Sons,
Inc. represented by Joselito Franscisco affecting the property covered by this Certificate of Title
which is the subject of Deed of Sale executed between the said corporation and the registered
owner. This instrument was executed before Notary Public of Davao City Francis Arnold de
Vera, as Doc No. x x x

Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;

Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8:10 a.m.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered property; the
vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property was free from
encumbrance.[25] What brings about criminal liability is the deceit in selling the property.
Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the
offense.[26] The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the presence of an adverse claim (she
assumed that Naval became aware of this inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-
19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to constitute fraud within the meaning of the
law. The fraud and/or deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must be the result of
overt acts; they cannot be implied or presumed.

In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously convicted the
petitioner of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other than that charged in the Information
would be a violation of her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her.

Violation of Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code not proven

The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a conviction for the crime for which the
petitioner had been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following essential elements of this crime must be established: (1) that
the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building; (2) that the offender who is not
the owner of said property should represent that he is the owner thereof; (3) that the offender
should have executed an act of ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the
property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.[27]

The presence of the first and third elements are beyond question, as the parties admitted that the
petitioner sold to Naval a 200-square meter parcel of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City.
The fourth element is likewise settled, as the petitioner did not deny that Naval paid her a total of
P123,000.00. The fact of destruction of Naval's house by the representatives of JS Francisco is
also not disputed.

With regard to the second element, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in
the Information that the petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was one of the nine (9) children of Nicolas and Nareisa, who
was the registered owner of TCT No. T-19932 entered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City on
October 31, 1967. The Register of Deeds of Davao City eventually cancelled TCT No. T-19932
and issued a new title (TCT No. T-364319) in the name of "Nicolas Estrellado, married to
Nareisa Trono, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Davao City, Philippines."[28]

Naval's court testimony showed that he was aware that the title to the land being sold to him
was still under the name of Nicolas, thus:
ATTY. PERCY JANE ABIAN-FUÑE:

Q: Mr. Naraval (sic), how long have you known the accused Clarita Mainar?

ERIC NAVAL:

A: We knew each other in 1999 for three years.

Q: And you personally know that she is the daughter of the late Mr. Nicolas Estrellado?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And that you approached sometime in February, you said you approached her and made
known your intent to buy the property?

A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And that you knew that the property that you are buying will still be segregated from
the mother title?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And at that time the accused had shown you copy of the owner's duplicate of title?

A: Correct.

Q: Under the name of the late Nicolas Estrellado?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And at that time you knew you were buying a titled property, right?

A: Correct.

Q: And at that time you did not verify with the Register of Deeds?

A: Yes, I did not.

Q: Because you have already seen the duplicate copy of the title, right?

A: I just seen [sic] the front page of the title.

Q: And knowing that you have only seen the front title, you did not check with the Register of
Deeds?

A: I did not.
Q: And did you find any other burden on the property other than what is stated in the title?

A: None.[29]

xxxx
In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the petitioner informed him during the
negotiations for the sale "that the area that I will buy would still be segregated from the mother
title."[30] In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also stated that he caused the property to be
surveyed in order to determine the boundaries of the area he bought, and to separate it from the
mother title. These statements were corroborated by Naval's wife, Josephine, who stated in her
own affidavit that the petitioner told her and Naval that the subject property was still part of the
mother title. In addition, stipulation no. 3 of the Agreement to Buy and Sell provides that "xxx
the SELLER shall cause the subdivision of the title and take out two hundred (200) square meters
portion of the BUYER from the SELLER's nine hundred thirty six (936) square meters share."

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the
property sold. From the very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that the subject property
was still under the name of her (petitioner's) father; and that the area subject of the sale would
still be segregated from the mother title. Naval also admitted that he saw the front page of the
land's title showing Nicolas to be its registered owner. The element of deceit - central to
prosecutions for swindling - is therefore wanting. We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs
(Narcisa and his nine legitimate children) eventually executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale[31] where they agreed,
among others, to give a portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land covered by TCT No.
T-364319 to the petitioner.

In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code absent a finding that she
employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses with regard to her ownership of the real
property sold.

We are aware that a decision[32] (attached to the records) had been issued by the MTCC, Branch
3, Davao City, on April 26, 1999, in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, where the trial court ruled in
favor of JS Francisco (plaintiff) against Nicolas Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-Estrellado
(Estrellado spouses). In this case, the MTCC ordered the Estrellado spouses, their successors-in-
interest, and other persons acting on their behalf, to immediately vacate Lot 377-A-1-B-4-B
(LRC) Psd-78004 (covered by TCT No. T-19932) and to restore its peaceful possession to the
plaintiff.

This MTCC decision, however, bears no relevance on the issue whether the petitioner
misrepresented to be the owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-19932. We point out that
this case arose from an action for forcible entry filed by J.S. Francisco against the petitioner's
parents, the Estrellado spouses. The issue in an ejectment case is the right to physical possession
of the premises or possession de facto, and the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter.
Corollarily, a party who can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even
from the owner himself, since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership.

In its April 26, 1999 decision in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, the MTCC merely resolved the
issue of prior physical possession or possession de facto, and did not resolve the issue of
ownership of the disputed property. The MTCC, in fact, recognized that the title (TCT No. T-
19932) to the disputed property was registered under the name of Nicolas.

We also point out that the petitioner sought the assistance of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao to require the Register of Deeds of Davao City to produce the deed of absolute sale
between Nicolas and JS Francisco referred to in the affidavit of adverse claim. While the
Register of Deeds could not yet certify with finality as to the nonexistence of this deed,[33] the
petitioner's act of seeking the aid of the Ombudsman shows her honest and earnest desire to
protect her family's interest over the subject property (she claims that the deed of sale between
her father and JS Francisco was spurious), and that she had no intention to deceive Naval. Naval
and Josephine, in fact, lived on the subject property for two years, more or less, before their
house was destroyed by the representatives of JS Francisco. Josephine even intimated that she
had been hoping that the petitioner's family would be able to settle the dispute with JS Francisco
over the subject property while she (Josephine) and Naval were living there.

On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who determines the charges to be filed and
how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information.
Fairness demands that the petitioner should not be convicted of a crime which she has not been
charged with or which is not necessarily included therein.

WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition, and SET
ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007, and July 29, 2008,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly, we ACQUIT petitioner Clarita
Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 206970, July 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO EDAÑO AND
NESTOR EDAÑO, ACCUSED, ANTONIO EDAÑO ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00846
dated 28 August 2012 which affirmed the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 2881 finding accused-appellant Antonio Edaño
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Nestor Edaño (Nestor) was charged with murder in
an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 1999 in the [M]unicipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one LEONARDO DABALOS with the use of knife (pisao) which the
accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following wounds to wit:
1. Incised wound, right side of lower face just beside [the] nose, measuring 1 inch long x ¼ inch
wide x skin deep.
2. Incised wound anterior neck, measuring 8 inches long x 4 inches wide x 2 inches deep
damaging the esophagus and the big blood vessels on both lateral side of neck.
3. Incised wound upper anterior abdomen across the epigastrum measuring 4 inches long x 1
inch wide x 2 inches deep with liver damaged and large intestine.
4. Incised wound perpendicular to wound number 3, anterior abdomen, from epigastric region
downward to the right iliac region, measuring 8 inches long x 4 inches wide x 2 inches deep,
damaging the intestines.
5. Incised wound over hypogastrium, measuring 3 inches long x 1 inch wide x 2 inches deep
damaging the urinary bladder.
6. Stab wound, multiple at lower back 1/3 inch long x skin-deep.
7. Stab wounds, left lower back just below the left scapula measuring 1/3 inch long x skin-deep.
which wounds caused the death of said Leonardo Dabalos.[3]

Nestor was arrested on 28 June 1999. Trial proceeded against him. He was eventually convicted
by the RTC on 29 November 2001. Accused-appellant remained at large and was only arrested
on 31 August 2005.

During accused-appellant’s scheduled arraignment on 28 September 2005, he entered a “not

guilty” plea to the offense charged. The trial proceeded. The prosecution presented four
witnesses and adopted the testimonies and exhibits presented in the case against Nestor in lieu of
the death of witnesses Fernando Layson (Fernando) and Monico Dabalos (Monico).

The facts, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, follow.

In the evening of 21 March 1999 at around 6:00 p.m., Fernando was about to cross a riverbank
on his way home when he heard a person moaning. He quietly followed the sound and saw
Leonardo Dabalos (Leonardo) being stabbed by accused-appellant while Nestor held him on both
arms. He saw accused-appellant stab Leonardo at least three times with a bolo measuring
approximately eight inches long. Fernando witnessed the incident while hiding behind some
plants. Terrified by the incident, Fernando did not go home and instead went to the house of his
brother in Leyte. He told his brother the stabbing incident that he witnessed. On the following
day, Fernando reported the matter to the police and to Leonardo’s family. Fernando
accompanied Monico, Leonardo’s son, and the police officers to the scene of the crime. Thereat,
they found Leonardo sprawled on the ground. Leonardo sustained seven stab wounds on
different parts of his body.

Florante Paa (Florante) testified that there was an altercation between the accused and the victim
one week before the stabbing incident.[4] Police Officer 2 (P02) Ruben Astilla received a report
from Florante about the killing of Leonardo.[5] Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Roque Baronda
identified the entry in the police blotter of the incident.[6]PO3 Margarito Delantar (PO3 Delantar)
led the criminal investigation on the death of Leonardo. Based on the testimonies of Fernando
and Monico, his office formally filed a complaint against the accused.[7]

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed denial and alibi. Accused-appellant
claimed that he was already residing in Babatngon, Leyte when the incident happened. Accused-
appellant admitted that Nestor is his cousin. He mentioned that Nestor and Leonardo had a fight
during the wedding of his cousin. In said fight, accused-appellant stated that he even sided with
Leonardo. Accused-appellant claimed that he had a misunderstanding with Fernando when he
was still living in Leyte, Leyte prompting him to leave for Babatngon, Leyte. Accused-appellant
explained that he did not surrender despite knowledge of a case filed against him because he was
innocent. [8]

On 24 January 2008, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [c]ourt found accused ANTONIO EDAÑO, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, charged in the information pursuant to Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and further amended by R.A. No. 7659 (Death
Penalty Law), and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and exemplary
damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (25,000.00) Pesos to the heirs of Leonardo
Dabalos; and

Pay the Cost.[9]

Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 29 January 2008.[10]

On 28 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment affirming in toto the
trial court’s decision.

Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal. In a Resolution[11] dated 22 July 2013, accused-
appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their
briefs filed before the appellate court.[12]

In his Brief, accused-appellant targets the credibility of Fernando as an eyewitness to the alleged
stabbing incident. Accused-appellant argues that Fernando’s testimony was fraught with
improbabilities. First, accused-appellant insists that Fernando’s failure to intervene and seek
help cast doubt on the credibility of his testimony. Second, accused-appellant maintains that it
was impossible for Fernando to identify the perpetrators when he admitted to have been hiding in
darkness. Third, accused-appellant asserts that Fernando had the ill motive to testify against him
because the latter held a grudge against him when their former landlord entrusted to accused-
appellant the land and carabao used in farming. Fourth, accused-appellant notes that Fernando
testified that he saw him stab Leonardo thrice but the total stab wounds found on Leonardo’s
body is seven. Finally, accused-appellant avers that the prosecution’s evidence contained no
proof of treachery to qualify the crime to murder.

The OSG defends the actuations of Fernando in not intervening in the stabbing incident. The
OSG posits that Fernando may have been too shocked when he witnessed the stabbing incident
or that for fear of being wounded, he chose to keep quiet.

There is no merit in this appeal.

At the outset, we give imprimatur to the utilization of the testimonies of Fernando and Monico
presented in the trial of Nestor. Both of these witnesses were already deceased during accused-
appellant’s trial. Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. In this case,
the prosecution properly offered the testimonies of Fernando and Monico in the case against
Nestor.

The testimony of the lone eyewitness Fernando is sufficient to prove accused-appellant's

complicity.
During the direct examination, Fernando gave a straightforward narration of the stabbing
incident and positively identified accused-appellant and his co-accused as the assailants. His
testimony is consistent with the contents of his sworn statement taken on 23 March 1999 by PO3
Delantar in the office of the Investigation Section of Leyte Police Station, thus:

Q- - - 7. Will you narrate to the investigator the nature of the incident?

A--- That on or about 6:30 o’clock in the afternoon of March 21, 1999 while I was on my
way home at Brgy. Elizabeth, Leyte, Leyte and while I was about to reach the river to
which I am going to cross, I notice and heard a strange sound/voice asking for help. I
immediately hide myself at the bushes and slowly move to the place where the voice
came from. There I saw ANTONIO EDAÑO stabbing LEONARDO DABALOS while
NESTOR EDAÑO is holding the hands of Leonardo Dabalos at his back.

Q- - - 8. After that what transpired next?

A--- I slowly went back on my way to poblacion because I am afraid that I might be seen by
them and kill me also.

Q- - - 9. How many times did the perpetrator stabbed the victim?

A- - - Many times sir.

Q- - - 10. How far were you from the crime scene?

A- - - More or less Ten (10) meters sir.

Q- - -11. Since it was night time, how could you able to identify the suspect?

A--- Because the moon was bright sir and aside from that I know them very well for we are
living in the same place and they were my neighbors.

Q- - - 12. What kind of weapon use by the suspect?

A- - - Short bladed weapon (pisaw) sir.

Q- - - 13. Aside from you, were there other person who can testify the veracity of the incident?

A--- I don’t know sir.

Q- - - 14. Did this incident reported to the authorities?

A- - - Yes sir, to the Brgy. Chairman of Brgy. Elizabeth and to the police station.

Q- - - 15. What do [you] think the motive of the incident?

A- - - I don’t know sir.

Q- - - 16. When and where this incident happened?

A- - - Last March 21, 1999 at about 6:30 o’clock in the afternoon more or less at Brgy.
Elizabeth, Leyte, Leyte.

Q- - - 17. What else can you say in this investigation?

A- - - No more sir.

Q- - - 18. Are you willing to sign this statement?

A- - - Yes, sir.[13]

As to accused-appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Fernando to identify him as the
assailant since it was dark, Fernando himself confirmed that it was a moonlit night and that at
6:30 p.m. it was still clear. In People v. Lopez,[14] we held that illumination from the moon and
even from the stars is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes.

Fernando’s failure to come to Leonardo’s aid and to immediately report the incident do not affect
the credibility of Fernando.

No standard form of behavioral response can be expected from anyone when confronted with a
startling or frightful occurrence.[15] As observed by the Court of Appeals:

Thus, witness [Fernando] cannot be faulted for reacting the way he did during the
incident. Human experience dictates that when a person is confronted with a threatening
environment, the natural reaction is to secure his safety. Indeed, this is what [Fernando] did in
staying home with his brother for the night. It is to be noted that upon the break of first light the
following day, Fernando reported what he witnessed to the authorities as early as 5:00 a.m. He
went on to break the news to the victim’s family an hour after. These actions are conformable
with his sworn statement and are logical responses considering his recent traumatic
experience.[16]

While Fernando stated in court that he saw accused-appellant stab Leonardo three times, the fact
that Leonardo sustained seven stab wounds does not demolish Fernando’s narration. Note that
when Fernando heard Leonardo’s cry for help, the incident was ongoing. Leonardo was
continuously being attacked by the accused even after Fernando left the crime scene. It is thus
safe to speculate that Leonardo was stabbed a few more times either before Fernando stumbled
upon the incident or immediately after he left.
Accused-appellant tried to attribute improper motive to Fernando to falsely testify against
him. Accused-appellant however failed to substantiate his claim. He could not even state the
family name of the landlord whom he claimed to be the reason why Fernando had grudge against
him. Furthermore, accused-appellant’s flight to elude arrest until his apprehension six years later
is not consistent with his claim of innocence.

Accused-appellant committed murder qualified by treachery.

Even though the lower courts found that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime, it was not appreciated as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance because it cannot
serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed by the
latter.[17]

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The requisites of treachery are:

(1) The employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of
the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being
given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and

(2) Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.[18]

Treachery, in this case, is evident from the fact that the method employed by the accused
rendered Leonardo helpless. Both of Leonardo’s arms were held by Nestor while accused-
appellant was stabbing him. Clearly, this manner of execution left the victim with no
opportunity to defend himself or even to retaliate.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, accused-appellant must suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua, the lower
of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant, however, is not eligible for parole pursuant to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.[19]

Anent the award of damages, the amount of civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00,
and exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[20] The award of
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00[21] is also proper in view of the recognized fact that
death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family.[22] Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not award actual damages, we
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[23] In addition, all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.[24]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 28 August 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00846 finding accused-appellant Antonio Edaño guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro,* (Acting Chairperson), Peralta,** Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe,

JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212929, July 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ENRIQUE GALVEZ,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated January 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03210 convicting accused-appellant Enrique Galvez of four counts of qualified
rape.

Informations[2] for four counts of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, and four counts of sexual abuse under Section 5
(b), Article III, R.A. No. 7610 were filed against the accused-appellant. Except for the dates of
the commission of the crimes, all the Informations for the rape charges were worded similarly as
in the Information for Criminal Case No. 228-95[3]:

That on or about the 14th day of May, 1995 at Sitio [XXX], Brgy. [YYY], in the municipality of
Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being the uncle of minor [AAA[4]], by means of force, intimidation and threats,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], a
girl of 13 years old, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Court restates the facts as summarized by the CA.[5]

At the time of the incidents complained of, private complainant AAA, the niece of accused-
appellant Galvez, was thirteen (13) years old.

On several occasions during the summer vacation of 1995, complainant AAA stayed at the house
of her father’s brother, accused-appellant Galvez, at Sitio [XXX], Barangay [YYY], Subic,
Zambales, to keep company accused-appellant’s wife.

On several days, such as on May 14, 15, 16 and 18, 1995, when accused-appellant’s wife was not
in the house, accused-appellant Galvez removed AAA’s clothes and underwear, went on top of
AAA, forced himself on AAA, and had sexual intercourse with her. Private complainant could
not do anything.

Afterwards, AAA was able to leave accused-appellant’s house and go to her house. There, AAA
told her father what had happened to her. AAA’s father brought her to the Subic Police Station,
where she gave a Sworn Statement [about the alleged incidents of rape]. Afterwards, AAA’s
father brought her to the San Marcelino District Hospital, where AAA was examined by Dra.
Echaluse.

The Medico-legal Certificate issued by Dra. Echaluse revealed the following:

“DIAGNOSIS/ FINDINGS:

- Old Hymenal tears on the 3:00, 6:00, 9:00 o’clock position.

- (-) Negative smear for spermatozoa.
- Cervix- Pink, firm with whitish discharge.
- No hematoma, echymosis, abrasion.
- No menarche.” (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of accused-appellant Galvez, in
order to establish the following:

Upon his brother’s request, accused-appellant Galvez allowed his thirteen (13) year old niece,
private complainant AAA, to stay in his house. According to accused-appellant, no unusual
incidents occurred from May 14 to 16 and May 18, 1995 while AAA was at his house. Accused-
appellant Galvez denied AAA’s accusation that he had sexual intercourse with her. According to
accused-appellant, it was his brother, the father of AAA, who molested AAA. Accused-appellant
Galvez added that, on May 18, 1995, he went to his brother’s house. There, accused-appellant
Galvez saw AAA’s mother, who was mute, standing at the door of her house. Private
complainant AAA’s mother, using her two (2) index fingers, demonstrated the acts of embracing
and kissing. Accused-appellant Galvez then confronted his brother about the gestures made by
AAA’s mother. However, accused-appellant’s brother ran away. Accused-appellant Galvez ran
after his brother and told him, “Baboy[,] pati anak mo inaasawa mo”.

Afterwards, when accused-appellant Galvez was unable to catch his brother, accused-appellant
went back and told the incident to accused-appellant’s mother-in-law.

Accused-appellant Galvez only came to know of the charges of Rape and violation of Sec. 5 (b),
Art. III, R.A. 7610 against him when he was arrested by the barangay officials.

Subsequently, four (4) sets of Information for the crime of Rape under the Revised Penal Code,
and another four (4) sets of Information for violation of Sec. 5 (b), Art. III, R.A. No. 7610,
otherwise known as “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act” were filed against accused-appellant Galvez.

Accused-appellant pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to all charges.

On May 2, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City, rendered its
Decision[6] and convicted accused-appellant of four counts of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610
and four counts of rape under the Revised Penal Code:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused is hereby found GUILTY for four (4)
counts of sexual abuse under RA 7610 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
medium to reclusion perpetua for each act; and four (4) counts of rape under the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuafor each act.

SO DECIDED.[7]

The RTC, relying on the testimony of AAA and the Medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Joan
Marie C. Echaluse, found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged.[8] The RTC gave
weight to AAA’s testimony which it found to be straightforward, honest, and consistent on all
material points. The RTC added that based on AAA’s testimony alone the prosecution
succeeded in proving all the elements of the crimes.[9]

The CA affirmed with modifications the Decision of the RTC. The CA convicted accused-
appellant of the crimes of rape only on the ground that the accused may not be subjected to
criminal liability twice, for both sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III, R.A. No. 7610 and
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same act.[10] The dispositive portion of
the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the

following MODIFICATIONS:

a.) Accused-appellant is CONVICTED of four (4) counts of Qualified Rape under the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case Nos. 228-95, 229-95, 230-95, and 231-95;

b.) Accused-appellant is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, for each count of Qualified
Rape;
c.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php 75,000.00 as Moral
Damages, for each count of Qualified Rape;

d.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php 30,000.00 as
Exemplary Damages, for each count of Qualified Rape; and,

e.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php 75,000.00 as Civil
Indemnity, for each count of Qualified Rape.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The CA noted that the testimony of AAA was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Echaluse, who
conducted the physical examination of AAA.[12] The CA added that accused-appellant was
positively identified by AAA as the one who had sexually forced himself on her on four
occasions.[13] The CA rejected the argument of accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA was
unbelievable and rehearsed. The CA noted the RTC’s observation that the testimony of AAA
was straightforward, honest, and consistent on all material points.[14] The CA also stated that it
saw no ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses and that the uncorroborated and weak
defense of denial asserted by accused-appellant was negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[15]

Hence, this appeal.

The issues for our consideration are:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of four counts of qualified rape.

2. Whether or not the award of civil indemnity and damages to AAA is proper.

This Court affirms the conviction of accused-appellant with modifications.

The accused is not guilty of qualified

rape but is guilty of simple rape.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape and enumerates its elements, to
wit:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

x x x x[16]

We now examine whether the elements of simple or qualified rape were proved beyond
reasonable doubt in this case.

Carnal knowledge

Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the
female organ; the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape.[17]

In this case, the RTC and the CA both found that the element of carnal knowledge was
sufficiently established by AAA’s narration that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with
her, to wit:

[TSN, December 13, 1995]

xxxx

FISCAL:
Q And you stayed [at the accused’s house] on May 14, 1995 and while you were there do
you know of any unusual incident that happened between you and [the accused]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court [w]hat was that unusual incident that
happened between you and [the accused] on May 14, 1995 while you stayed with him?
A He removed my clothes and then my under wear then he went on top of me.
xxxx
A He had sexual intercourse with me, sir.[18]
xxxx
Q The following day on May 15, 1995[,] were you in the house of Idring or the accused
Enrique Galvez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was there any unusual incident that happened between you [and the accused] on May
 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell us what was that unusual incident that happened between you and the
accused on May 15, 1995[?]
A He did the same thing to me sir, he again undressed me, I was naked.
COURT:
Q And after you were undressed?
A He again went on top of me ma’am.
Q And?
A None, your Honor. He again had a sexual intercourse with me.
xxxx
FISCAL:
Q How about on May 16, 1995 were you still in the house of [the accused]?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you recall of any unusual incident that took place between you [and the
accused] on the same date?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident that happened between you and [the accused on May
16, 1995]?
A The same thing, sir.[19]

[TSN, April 27, 1998]

FISCAL:
Q While in the house of the accused on May 18, 1995, do you recall of any unusual
incident that happened to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident that happened to you inside the house of the accused on
May 18, 1995 at around 12:00 noon?
A [The accused] undressed me and thereafter he had sexual intercourse with me.
xxxx
Q And after he removed your clothes, what did the accused do if any?
A He went on top of me.
Q And when he was already on top of you, what did the accused do?
A He had sexual relation with me.[20]
This Court agrees with the lower courts that carnal knowledge was proved. We disagree with
accused-appellant that the prosecution failed to prove rape because the testimony of AAA was
not detailed.[21] In People v. Salvador,[22] we held that the credible testimony of the victim
narrating that she was defiled, such as the testimony of AAA in this case, is sufficient for a
conviction of rape, to wit:

x x x [W]hen a victim of rape says that she was defiled, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her, and so long as her testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This is a basic rule,
founded on reason and experience and becomes even more apparent when the victim is a
minor. In fact, more compelling is the application of this doctrine when the culprit is her close
relative.[23] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

In People v. Gecomo,[24] we also held that what is merely required in establishing rape through
testimonial evidence is that the victim be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank[25] in her statements about the incident of rape. In this case, we agree with the RTC that the
testimony of AAA was straightforward, honest, and consistent on all material points[26] and it is
sufficient to establish carnal knowledge as an element of rape.

Further, while AAA may not have described the incidents of rape in detail during the trial, she
identified[27] her sworn statement[28] containing a detailed account of the incidents of rape and
admitted placing her thumb mark on said statement.[29] The testimony of AAA, while not as
detailed, is consistent with what is stated in the sworn statement and accurately reflects points
such as the approximate time when the rape incidents on May 14,[30] 16[31] and 18,[32]1995
occurred and the fact that the incidents occurred while accused-appellant’s wife was away.[33]

Furthermore, we note that AAA’s testimony is corroborated by the findings stated in the Medico-
Legal Certificate[34]issued by Dr. Echaluse after her examination of AAA. In People v.
Mercado,[35] we ruled that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.

Based on the foregoing, this Court agrees with the lower courts that the element of carnal
knowledge has been sufficiently established.

Moral ascendancy in substitution

of violence and intimidation

With respect to the element of violence or intimidation, it is settled in jurisprudence that said
element may be substituted by moral ascendancy.[36] The Court reiterated this rule in numerous
cases where the offender and the victim were the uncle and niece respectively.[37]

In this case, the CA recognized the existence of moral ascendancy because accused-appellant is
AAA’s uncle and AAA lived with him and his wife during the time the acts of rape
occurred.[38] We agree with the CA that accused-appellant had moral ascendancy over AAA who
was a young girl living in accused-appellant’s house where the only adults to provide for and
discipline AAA were the accused and his wife.[39] In People v. Gonzales,[40] the Court also found
moral ascendancy because the victim lived in a house with an uncle who raped her while her
parents were not living in the same house.

Qualifying circumstance of the

victim being below 18 years of
age coupled with the fact that
the offender is a relative within
the third degree of said victim

With respect to the element that makes the offense qualified rape, that is, the minority of the
victim coupled with the fact that the accused is related to her within the third civil degree,[41] it
bears stressing that both minority and the third degree relationship must be established.

As to the age of the victim as a component of the qualifying circumstance, the case of People v.
Flores[42] laid down the following guidelines on how to prove the age of the offended party:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.

In this case, no birth certificate was offered in evidence to prove AAA’s age.[43] Neither was
there any other authentic document offered to prove AAA’s age. It must also be pointed out that
there is doubt as to AAA’s real age based on the records of this case as, for instance, she testified
to being 12 years old, on December 13, 1995 (6 months after the incident of rape).[44] The
Medico-Legal Certificate dated May 24, 1995 stated that AAA was 14 years old.[45] Ms.
Angustia R. Clavecilla[46] also testified that AAA was 12 years old at the time the felony was
committed.[47] AAA herself said that she does not know when she was born.[48] Contrary to this,
the Informations alleged that she was 13 years old at the time the felony was committed.

In People v. Ortega,[49] we explained how to resolve this doubt in the victim’s age:

x x x Given the doubt as to AAA’s exact age, the RTC properly convicted Ortega only of simple
rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.

In People v. Alvarado,[50] we did not apply the death penalty because the victim’s age was not
satisfactorily established, thus:
“We agree, however, that accused-appellant should not have been meted the death penalty on the
ground that the age of complainant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The information
alleged that, on July 26, 1997, the date of the rape, Arlene was 14 years old. In her testimony,
Arlene stated that she was 14 years old at the time of the incident. Accused-appellant confirmed
this during the presentation of the defense evidence, but Lonelisa Alvarado, complainant’s
mother, testified that Arlene was born on November 23, 1983, which would mean she was only
13 years old on the date of the commission of the crime. No other evidence was ever presented,
such as her certificate of live birth or any other document, to prove Arlene’s exact age at the time
of the crime. As minority is a qualifying circumstance, it must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. There must be independent evidence proving the
age of the victim, other than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence of
denial by accused-appellant. Since there is doubt as to Arlene’s exact age, accused-
appellant must be held guilty of simple rape only and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.”

xxxx
We further stressed in People v. Villarama[51] that:
“Court decisions on the rape of minors invariably state that, in order to justify the imposition of
the death penalty, there must be independent evidence showing the age of the victim.
Testimonies on the victim’s age given by the prosecution witnesses or the lack of denial of the
accused or even his admission thereof on the witness stand [are] not sufficient. This Court has
held that, to justify the imposition of the death penalty for rape committed against a child below
7, the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime
itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age with factual certainty and beyond
reasonable doubt is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.”
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It must likewise be remembered that the minority of the victim must concur with the second
component which is the third degree relationship between the victim and the offender. As to such
second component of the qualifying circumstance, People v. Libo-on[52] teaches:

It is well-settled that this attendant circumstance, as well as the other circumstances introduced
by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and 8493 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. These
attendant circumstances are not ordinary aggravating circumstances which merely increase the
period of the penalty. Rather, these are special qualifying circumstances which must be
specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information; otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed.

In this regard, we have previously held that if the offender is merely a relation – not a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the victim – it must
be alleged in the information that he is “a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may
be) within the third civil degree.” Thus, in the instant case, the allegation that accused-
appellant is the uncle of private complainant is not specific enough to satisfy the special
qualifying circumstance of relationship. The relationship by consanguinity or affinity between
appellant and complainant was not alleged in the information in this case. Even if it were so
alleged, it was still necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the
third civil degree. (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since the Informations contained only a statement that the accused-appellant was the uncle of
AAA without stating that they were relatives within the third civil degree, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship cannot likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

In sum, since the prosecution was able to prove the elements of carnal knowledge and the moral
ascendancy of accused-appellant over AAA but failed to clearly prove the age of AAA and
allege the third degree relationship between accused-appellant and AAA, accused-appellant
should be convicted of the crimes of simple rape only.

Because the crime committed was

simple rape, the award of civil
indemnity and damages should be
reduced.

The CA awarded civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000 and exemplary damages of
P30,000. The award of the CA is premised on the fact that the accused was convicted of
qualified rape. Since the crime committed is simple rape, the amounts awarded must be
modified.

In a simple rape case, the victim is entitled to P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.[53] Interest at the rate of 6%
per annum on all damages awarded in this case is likewise proper.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision
dated January 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03210. Accused-
appellant Enrique Galvez is hereby convicted of four counts of simple rape under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of simple rape. He is ordered to pay AAA civil
indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 and exemplary damages of P30,000 for
each count of simple rape. Interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded in
this case reckoned from the finality of this Decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid by
accused-appellant.

With costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015 ]
SPO2 ROLANDO JAMACA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 26, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated June 19, 2008
in CA G.R. CR No. 23887. The CA affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), finding petitioner SPO2 Rolando Jamaca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Grave Threats in Criminal Case No. 97-1598.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private complainant Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave Threats against petitioner
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-97-
0754. He likewise filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
de Oro City.

In a Resolution[3] dated January 26, 1998, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the accusation against petitioner was unfounded,
based solely on the statement of one Rustom Roxas that there were no threatening words uttered
by petitioner. A petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to assail said ruling of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated
July 29, 1998, which read, thus:

The petition [or] for certiorari is dismissed for utter lack of merit, having failed to comply with
well nigh all the relevant requisites laid down by law, prescinding from the obvious proposition
that the Supreme Court does not review findings and conclusions of investigators conducting a
preliminary inquiry or investigation into charges of a crime.[4]

On the other hand, private complainant's complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor
prospered and led to the filing of an Information against petitioner. He was charged with grave
threats defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
allegedly committed as follows:

That on [or] about July 22 1997 in the evening, at Kalambaguhan/Burgos Streets, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and moved by personal resentment which he entertained against Atty.
Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten the latter
with the infliction upon him of a wrong amounting to a crime subject to a condition, by
threatening to kill the offended party thus uttering or shouting words in the presence of, and
within the hearing distance of Jay Jay R. Bangot (son of offended party) as follows, to wit:

KUNG MATANGTANG AKO SA TRABAHO, BUAKON KO ANG ULO NI ATTY.

BANGOT ...

which means in English: "If I will loss my work I will break the head of Atty. Bangot ...",or
words of similar import, directed to the said offended party, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., without
however attaining accused's purpose, thereby casting fear upon offended party's person and
endangering his life.

Contrary to and in violation of Art. 282, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.[5]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial then ensued. The prosecution presented
three witnesses, including the son of private complainant, who all testified that while petitioner
was at the house of Rustom Roxas, they all heard petitioner utter words threatening to cause
private complainant Atty. Bangot grave bodily harm. On the other hand, petitioner insisted that
he went to the house of Rustom Roxas, a relative by affinity of Atty. Bangot, to ask Rustom
Roxas to mediate and reconcile him (petitioner) with Atty. Bangot. Petitioner denied that he ever
mentioned any threatening words against Atty. B mgot. Elisea Jamaca, petitioner's wife,
corroborated petitioner's testimony. The prosecution then presented Phoebe Roxas, the wife of
Rustom Roxas, as rebuttal witness. She testified that she was in the very same room and clearly
heard petitioner utter words to the effect that if he (petitioner) loses his job, he will break the
head of Atty. Bangot. She also said that Jay Bangot, the son of private complainant, was also
there in their house, sitting only about two and a half meters away from petitioner, when
petitioner made the threats against Atty. Bangot.

The trial court, ascribing greater credibility to the testimony of each of the prosecution witnesses,
ruled that the evidence clearly established the guilt of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused SPO2

Rolando Jamaca guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of GRAVE
THREATS defined and punishable under paragraph 2 of Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code
without attendance of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Consequently, pursuant to
said law, he is hereby sentenced with the accessories of the law as provided by Art. 44 of the
Revised Penal Code, to an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to be served at the
City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City and to pay a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (500.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency computed at the rate of one (1) day for each eight
pesos but in no case will it exceed one-third of the term of the sentence.

No pronouncement as to the credit of preventive imprisonment since accused immediately put up

a bond for his temporary liberty without waiting for his arrest.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The trial court's Decision was appealed to the CA and, on May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated a
Decision affirming in toto petitioner's conviction for the crime of Grave Threats. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA per Resolution dated June 19, 2008.

Petitioner then filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Supplemental Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court. The only issue presented in the original petition is whether
the CA should have dismissed the petition outright and ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because private complainant was guilty of forum shopping, having
filed similar complaints before both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Office of the
City Prosecutor. Subsequently, in his Supplemental Petition, petitioner raised additional issues,
to wit:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AS THE CONVICTION OF THE
ACCUSED PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF GRAVE THREATS BY THE TRIAL
COURT HAD LONG BEEN DISMISSED BY THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY IN
ITS RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 26, 1998 FOR EXACTLY THE SAME CRIME, WHICH
WAS UPHELD BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 134664 WHEN IT
DISMISSED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF SUCH DISMISSAL AND THAT ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT HAD BEEN MADE ON DECEMBER 1, 1998, HENCE, IF THIS
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION IS NOT REVERSED IN THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW THE
SAME WOULD [BE] TANTAMOUNT TO VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RlGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INFORMATION

FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CAGAYAN DE ORO IS NULL
AND VOID FROM THE VERY BEGINNING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AS THE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY HAD ALREADY
DISMISSED THE CASE AFTER IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE SAME, THE
PETITIONER BEING A POLICE OFFICER.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO GRAVE
THREATS BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT ARE MERELY
HEARSAY.[7]

The petition is bereft of merit.

It should be borne in mind that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, petitioner has to prove
that a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second. As stated in Braza v.
Sandiganbayan,[8] "[t]he first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c ) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent."[9] In this case, the complaint before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military was dismissed as early as the preliminary investigation stage, thus, there was as
yet, no indictment to speak of. No complaint or Information has been brought before a competent
court. Hence, none of the aforementioned events has transpired for the first jeopardy to have
attached.

In Vincoy v. Court of Appeals,[10] which is closely analogous to the present case, the private
complainant therein initially filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay
City, but said office dismissed the complaint. Private complainant then re-filed the complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City
found probable cause and filed the Information against the accused therein. In said case, the
Court categorically held that:

The dismissal of a similar complaint x x x filed by [private complainant] before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar
petitioner's prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary
investigation does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of
the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence but
only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
accused is probably guilty thereof. For this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a
judicial pronouncement of acquittal.[11]

The foregoing ruling was reiterated in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman,[12] where the Court
has categorically ruled that since the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial, the
dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of
double jeopardy in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. An investigating
body is not bound by the findings or resolution of another such office, tribunal or agency which
may have had before it a different or incomplete set of evidence than what had been presented
during the previous investigation.[13] Therefore, petitioner's indictment pursuant to the findings of
the Office of the City Prosecutor, and his eventual conviction for the crime of grave threats, has
not placed him in double jeopardy.

As to petitioner's argument that the information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction as the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military had
already dismissed the case, the same is likewise tenuous. In Flores v. Montemayor,[14] the Court
clarified that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to investigate public officers and employees as
defined under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive, and explained, thus:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and
officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of
the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the
Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective
officials.[15]

Petitioner's argument that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright because private
complainant committed forum shopping by filing similar complaints with the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor, should not be given
consideration. The Court stated in De Guzman v. Ochoa,[16] that failure to comply with the
requirements on the rule against forum shopping is not a ground for the motu propriodismissal of
the complaint because the rules are clear that said issue shall cause the dismissal of the case only
upon motion and after hearing.[17] More importantly, as the Court held in S.C. Megaworld
Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada,[18] to wit:

It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first
time on appeal is barred by estoppel.

xxxx

In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be
raised in the CA and in the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the
earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading. The high court even warned
that [i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may result in the dismissal of
the action x x x.[19]

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court has time
and again abided by the principle that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based
on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not
recalibrate and reexamine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA. Moreover, the supposed inconsistencies of witnesses in recounting the
wordings of the threats uttered by petitioner, are much too trivial and inconsequential to put a
dent on said witnesses' credibility. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,[20] "[m]inor inconsistencies
and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as
their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime."[21] Both the trial
court and the CA found the prosecution witnesses' candid and straight forward testimony to be
worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle
reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People[22] that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,
their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
candor.[23]

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or
exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no
cogent reason to overturn the courts' ruling that the prosecution evidence, is worthy of belief.
Thus, prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed
guilty of grave threats.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
26, 2004 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23887 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188698, July 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. SONIA BERNEL NUARIN,
APPELLANT.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by appellant Sonia Bernel Nuarin (appellant) from the April 28, 2009
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02886.

The appealed decision affirmed the May 25, 2007 joint decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 80, Quezon City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Background Facts

The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Sections 5[3] and 11,[4] respectively, of
R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-114918 and Q-03-114919.

The appellant was duly arraigned; she pleaded not guilty to the charges laid. The prosecution
presented Police Officer 1 (PO1) Roberto Manalo at the trial on the merits that followed, while
the parties stipulated[5] on the testimony of Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr.
Insp.) Bernardino Banac. The appellant took the witness stand for the defense.

PO1 Manalo testified that on February 2, 2003, members of the District Drug Enforcement
Group of the Central Police District, composed of himself, PO1 Filnar Mutia, PO3 Cleto
Montenegro, PO3 Eduardo Datul, and PO3 Rommel Bautista went to Barangay Old Balara,
Quezon City, to conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant.[6] When they arrived there at
around 12:30 p.m., the informant introduced PO1 Manalo to the appellant. PO1 Manalo told the
appellant that he wanted to buy PI00.00 worth of shabu. The appellant handed a sachet
containing white crystalline substances to PO1 Manalo who, in turn, gave him the marked
money. Immediately after, PO1 Manalo made the prearranged signal to his companions.[7] The
other members of the entrapment team rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as
policemen; PO1 Mutia searched the appellant and found two other plastic sachets inside the
appellant's coin purse. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant and the seized items to the
police station.[8]

The defense presented a different picture of the events. The appellant's testimony was aptly
summarized by the CA as follows:

On February 2, 2003, at about 12:30 in the afternoon, accused-appellant was at home with her
son John Bernel and friends Jan Ticson and Rebecca Agana. They had just finished eating lunch
and accused appellant was, then, washing the dishes when she heard a knock on the door. At the
door were PO3 Cleto Montenegro, PO1 Filnar Mutia and two others. They were looking for a
certain Bogart. When accused-appellant said that she did not know where Bogart was, the police
officers entered the house and searched the premises for about an hour. When the search did not
yield anything incriminatory, the police brought accused-appellant and the other occupants of the
house to Camp Karingal In Quezon City. There, the police extorted P40,000.00 in exchange of
accused-appellant's release. When the money was not produced, accused-appellant was charged
by the police officers.[9]

In its joint decision[10] of May 25, 2007, the RTC found the appellant guilty of the illegal sale of
0.03 gram of shabupenalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC held that the
prosecution was able to prove, through testimonial and documentary evidence, that an illegal sale
of drugs took place between the appellant and the poseur-buyer, PO1 Manalo. It added that the
police were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties in the absence of any
evidence to rebut this presumption. The RTC likewise found no merit in the appellant's defenses
of denial and extortion as she failed to substantiate these. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the
appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and ordered her to pay a P500,000.00 fine.

The RTC, however, acquitted the appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal
Case No. Q-03-114919 for insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA held that the prosecution
successfully proved all the elements of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. It further ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu had
been preserved. The CA also disregarded the appellant's denial in the light of the positive
identification made by PO1 Manalo.

In her brief on appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in convicting her
of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to establish that a buy-bust operation took
place. She also maintained that the chain of custody over the seized shabu had been broken.

For the State, the office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the prosecution was able to
establish that the sale of shabu between the appellant and the poseur-buyer was consummated. It
also maintained that the nonpresentation in court of the original marked money, the forensic
chemist, the informant, and the original marked money was not fatal in the prosecution for illegal
drugs.

Our Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution's failure to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the perfunctory
presentation of evidence establishing each element of the crime: the identities of the buyer and
seller, the transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and the existence of the corpus delicti.

In securing or sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these pieces of
evidence, especially the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to
have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

Thus, to remove any doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered
from the accused-appellant.[11] It is in this respect that the prosecution failed.

The 'Marking' Requirement vis-a-vis the Chain of Custody Rule

Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165,
defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."

A crucial step in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.[12]
In the present case, the prosecution's lone witness, PO1 Manalo, gave conflicting statements as
to who marked the seized sachets. In his direct testimony, he claimed that it was the desk
officer who marked the sachets, thus:

PROSECUTOR JOSEPHUS ASIS:

Q: After you were able to arrest the accused and while going travelling (sic) to your office[,]
who was holding the drug that you were able to buy from the accused?

PO1 MANALO:

A: I, Sir.

Q: After the recovered money by PO1 Mutia and after you arrived at the station[,] what did you
do?

A: We turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer put the initial RM.

Q: After the marking[,] what happened next?

A: The investigator prepared a request to the crime laboratory and brought the drug to the
crime lab.

Q: Who brought it if you know?

A: I can no longer remember.[13]

In the latter part of his direct examination, however, PO1 Manalo claimed that he was the one
who marked the sachets. To directly quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR JOSEPHUS ASIS:

Q: Now you mentioned that you were able to purchase drug from the accused. If the drug will
be shown to you[,] would you be able to identify it?

PO1 MANALO:

A: I have my marking there[,] sir.

Q: Will you please go over the same and tell me what is the relation of the said sachet with the
substance with the one you were able to buy (sic)?

Q: This is the same stuff that I bought, this is my marking.

PROS ASIS:

Witness identified the sachet previously marked Exhibit "F-3." May we request that
the marking placed by the witness in the sachet be marked as Exhibit "F-3-B."

xxxx

Q: How sure are you that the sachet that you have just identified is also the sachet that you
recovered during the operation?

A: Nobody held it except me.

Q: How did you identify the sachet?

A: The marking that I made.[14] [emphasis supplied]

In his cross-examination, PO1 Manalo again stated that he was the one who marked the
confiscated plastic sachets with "RM."

We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the initial markings as reference.
If at the first instance or opportunity, there are already doubts on who really placed the markings
on the seized sachets (or if the markings were made in accordance with the required procedure),
serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution
introduced into evidence.

In addition, the records do not show that the sachets were marked in the presence of the
appellant. In People v. Sanchez,[15] we explained that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation.[16] We explained therein that [t]his step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations
of robbery or theft.

Significantly, PO1 Manalo and PO1 Mutia did not even mention that they marked the seized
plastic sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.

In People of the Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna,[17] the Court acquitted the accused
for the prosecution's failure to clearly establish the identity of the person who marked the seized
drugs; the place where the marking was made; and whether the marking had been made in the
accused's presence.

As to the subsequent links in the chain of custody, PO1 Manalo stated that he handed the seized
plastic sachets to the desk officer at the police station. Curiously, the identity of this desk officer
was never revealed during trial. This is particularly significant since no reference was ever made
as to the person who submitted the seized specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. PO1 Manalo, in fact, testified that he could not remember the person who brought
the seized plastic sachets to the crime laboratory. Notably, the specimen was forwarded to the
crime laboratory only at 10:35 p.m. It was not clear, therefore, who had temporary custody of the
seized items when they left the hands of PO1 Manalo until they were brought to the crime
laboratory for qualitative analysis.

The stipulation on the testimony of the forensic chemist does nothing to help fill the gap as
regards the custody and possession of the sachets from the police station to the crime laboratory.
To recall, the parties merely stipulated that P/Sr. Insp. Banac received a request for laboratory
examination, together with the specimen to be examined; that he recorded the receipt of the
sachets in the logbook and conducted a physical, chemical, and confirmatory test on the
submitted specimen; that he found them positive for the presence of shabu; and that he put his
markings on the sachet and placed it in an improvised envelope before forwarding it to the
evidence custodian. Notably, the RTC held that P/Sr. Insp. Banac "has no personal knowledge
from whom the subject specimen presented before this court was taken (sic)."[18] Simply put, the
stipulated testimony of the forensic chemical officer has no bearing on the question of whether
the specimen submitted for chemical analysis and subsequently presented in court were
the same as that seized from the appellant.

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof, [emphasis ours]

This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165, which reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items; [emphasis ours]

This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-
bust team, as PO1 Manalo himself admitted that the police did not make an inventory and
photograph the seized items either at the place of seizure or at the police station. In addition, the
police did not offer any acceptable reason why they failed to do a basic requirement like a
physical inventory of the seized drugs, considering that there were only three (3) sachets taken
from the appellant.

In the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Rosalinda Casabuena,[19] we acquitted the
accused for failure of the police to make an inventory and to photograph the seized shabu. We
explained that strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal
drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

No Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

The courts a quo erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in performance that a
police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would
induce him to falsify his testimony. The regularity of the performance of the police officers'
duties leaves much to be desired in this case given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly
confiscated shabu. The totality of all the procedural lapses we previously discussed effectively
produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face
of allegations of frame-up and extortion. We have previously held that these lapses negate the
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint
of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.[20]

We also entertain serious doubts on PO1 Manalo's claim that they coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) before the buy-bust operation, as he admitted that
there was no pre-operation report or coordination sheet prepared by the police. Significantly,
PO1 Manalo likewise admitted that the police did not coordinate with the barangay officials of
the subject area. To our mind, these circumstances vis-a-vis the lapses made in the handling and
safekeeping of the alleged sachets of shabu puts in doubt the claim of the police that they had
conducted a legitimate buy-bust operation.

In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the instant case does not support the appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. We reiterate that the prosecution's
failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody
requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, which is the corpus
delicti of the crime charged against appellant. Following the constitutional mandate, when the
guilt of the appellant has not been proven with moral certainty, as in this case, the presumption
of innocence prevails and his exoneration should be granted as a matter of right.[21]

A final note.
We are mindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that
destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies
concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma.
Regardless of our desire to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly on the presumption of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all
the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant
deserves no less than an acquittal.[22]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the April 28, 2009
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02886. Sonia Bernel Nuarin is
hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for
another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5)
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARTIN NERIO, JR.,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Brought before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 30, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00853-MIN. The CA
affirmed in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
Branch 21, dated July 22, 2010 in Criminal Case No. XXI-1016(03), finding accused-appellant
Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

In an Information dated September 22, 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur charged
Nerio with the crime of Rape, allegedly committed against AAA[3] as follows:
That on or about the 26th of February 2003 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon thereof and/or
subsequent thereto, at Barangay Blocon, Municipality of Magsaysay, Province of Davao del Sur
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused after bringing the
offended party thirteen (13) year old and mentally retarded AAA from Chapter 5, Barangay
Aplaya, Digos City to his residence at Barangay Blocon, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, by force or
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
aforesaid offended party against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Nerio, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.[5]

During trial, the prosecution presented the following version of the facts:

AAA, a child with special needs, was born on April 15, 1990 and was adopted by Kathlene[6] and
Rick. In the afternoon of February 26, 2003, Kathlene was working in the school canteen of the
Aplaya Elementary School when she noticed that AAA, who was also enrolled at the same
school, was missing. Thinking that AAA just went to her cousin’s house near the school,
Kathlene did not worry until after school hours when AAA was still nowhere to be found. She
then went to look for her child, and when she was unsuccessful, she went to the police to have
the incident placed in the blotter.

Rick likewise looked for AAA, and he was told that his daughter was seen boarding a minibus
with a group of people who just had picnic at the beach. Together with their neighbor,
Rosaliah,[7] Rick and Kathlene proceeded to Matanao, Davao del Sur, after learning that the
minibus was Matanao-bound. With the assistance of the police, they were able to find the owner
of the minibus who told them that he indeed saw AAA inside his bus. The charterer of the
minibus, Arthur Lucero, informed them that AAA went to the house of the Nerios in Blocon,
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. It was already 1:00 a.m. of February 27, 2003 when they arrived at
said house. When Lucero knocked, it was the mother of the accused-appellant, Violeta, who
opened the door. When Kathlene asked about her daughter, Violeta told her that AAA was
sleeping upstairs. But when Kathlene started climbing the stairs, Violeta immediately corrected
herself and said that AAA was, in fact, sleeping on the ground floor. Still, Kathlene proceeded
and upon seeing a room with the door left ajar, she went inside. To her dismay, she saw her
daughter scantily clad sleeping beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on the latter’s
shoulder.

When Rosaliah asked Violeta why she allowed her son to sleep with AAA, she received no
answer. So they took AAA and proceeded to the Matanao Police Station to report the incident
before finally returning home to Digos.
On February 28, 2003, Dr. Arthur Navidad examined AAA. He found a hymenal laceration at
eleven (11) o’clock position, which appeared fresh and could not have occurred more than three
(3) days from the date he examined AAA. Dr. Navidad also testified that AAA acted like a small
child so they even had to bribe her in order to examine her genital area.

The prosecution likewise presented a Psychological Assessment Report[8] on AAA by the

psychologist at the Psychiatry Department of Davao Medical Center, which reads:

MENTAL ABILITY:

Subject gained a raw score of 11 and its equivalent percentile rating is 55%. Results suggest
Mild [to] Moderate Mental Retardation. Subject attains intellectual levels similar to those of
average four – seven year-old children. She can hardly understand simple instructions.

xxxx

In defense of her son, Violeta testified that AAA, who was a complete stranger to them, joined
them during their picnic on February 26, 2003 at the Aplaya Beach in Digos. When they were
about to go home, AAA also boarded the minibus. When asked to leave, AAA simply held on to
her seat. Since they could not seem to do anything that would make AAA leave, they decided to
take her home with them and just bring her to the barangay officials the following day. At home,
Nerio would ask his mother to take AAA downstairs because she kept following him to his
room. Later, when it was time to sleep, Violeta asked Nerio and AAA to come down and they all
slept on the ground floor, with Violeta in between the two (2). Nerio, for his part, testified that all
along, he and his family knew that AAA is a special child. He was also surprised that the police
came to their house late at night but he did not mind because he thought they only came to take
AAA home. Thus, he was shocked when he learned that he was being accused of raping AAA.
He asserted that he could not have abused AAA because he slept downstairs while AAA slept
upstairs with his mother and sisters.

On July 22, 2010, the RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur found Nerio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. The decretal portion of the Decision declares:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty of
rape beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered
to pay private complainant P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Nerio thus sought relief from the CA. On September 30, 2011, the appellate court rendered a
Decision affirming the trial court’s ruling in its entirety. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The court a quo’s Decision dated July 22, 2010 in
Criminal Case No. XXI-1016 (03) is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Nerio now comes before the Court seeking the reversal of the CA Decision. He raises the lone
issue of whether there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape
where the victim, who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to substantiate
the accusation in the criminal information.[11]

The Court finds the petition to be devoid of merit.

Mental retardation has been defined as a chronic condition that exists at birth or early childhood
and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests.
Intellectual or mental disability is a term synonymous with and is now preferred over the older
term, mental retardation.[12]

Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape can be committed in the following
manner:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

x x x x[13]

It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in the
same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The term "deprived of
reason" has been construed to encompass those who are suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency or retardation.[14] Carnal knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but
with the mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape
because a mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent consent to such act.[15] If sexual
intercourse with a child below twelve (12) years of age is rape, then it must follow that sexual
intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl whose mental capacity is that of a four or seven-year-old
child will likewise constitute rape.[16]The essence of the offense is whether the alleged victim has
the ability to render an intelligent consent, and therefore, could not have been deprived of the
required reason at the time of the sexual congress. Contrary to the assertion of the defense, the
prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child. In fact, Nerio himself said
in his direct testimony that he and his family had known from the start that AAA is a special
child.[17] At the time of the incident, AAA was already in her sixth year as a Grade 1 pupil.
According to Kathlene, she first noticed that her adopted child is mentally challenged when the
latter was merely six (6) years old. Dr. Navidad observed that when he was about to conduct the
physical examination, AAA, a thirteen-year-old, acted more like a small child. She started crying
and refused to be examined. The prosecution also submitted the Psychological Assessment
Report showing that AAA has Mild to Moderate Mental Retardation. Lastly, the lower court
observed that while in court and seated next to Kathlene, AAA would bury her head on the lap of
her mother and would make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds. This would prompt Kathlene
to bring her out of the court from time to time.[18]

Nerio doubts the trial court’s conclusion that AAA is mentally retarded based merely on its
observation of her demeanor in court. He strongly presses that AAA was never presented in court
as a witness. AAA even refused to give her name when asked to be identified. The lower court,
therefore, could not have possibly been sure that the child seated beside Kathlene was indeed
AAA.

This argument is ludicrously misplaced.

It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the victim is
a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as
to the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial
evidence becomes inevitable. Circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence, indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder
draws from the evidence established.[19] It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct
evidence.[20] Resort to it is imperative when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting
an outlaw free. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the
only basis on which a court may draw its finding of guilt.[21] In fact, circumstantial evidence,
when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may even be the sole basis of a criminal
conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis.[22] Established facts that
form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction. Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section
5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The following are the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all
these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
the one who committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[23]

Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge
the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist who examined her found that her answers
reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of capacity to deal with matters rationally.
She could hardly even understand simple instructions.[24]The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who were not shown to have any malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively
identified Nerio as the person seen alone with AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003.
AAA, who was only in a sando and panties, had her head on the shoulder of Nerio, who was
naked and only had a blanket covering the lower portion of his body. Although Nerio denied this
because he allegedly slept downstairs, while AAA slept with his mother and sisters upstairs, his
testimony is inconsistent with that of his mother, who testified that AAA and Nerio actually slept
in one (1) room, but she lay between the two. Further, Dr. Navidad found a fresh hymenal
laceration on AAA’s genitals. He explained that it could not have been inflicted more than three
(3) days from the date he examined AAA. There was, likewise, no showing that AAA met with
another man during that three-day-period. Hence, the courts below did not err when they held
that these pertinent circumstances proven during the trial form an unbroken chain of events
leading to the conclusion that Nerio had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent.[25]

More importantly, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence, as in this case. Since it had the full opportunity to
observe directly the deportment and the manner of testifying of the witnesses before it, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
Unlike the trial courts, the appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during
trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. The defense failed to show
any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the trial court’s findings of fact; these
findings must, therefore, be given due deference and great weight.[26]

As regards the penalty, the courts below were correct in imposing reclusion perpetua under
Article 266-B of the RPC. However, with respect to the civil liability, Nerio must likewise pay
AAA exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 by way of example in order to deter
others from committing the same bestial act especially against mentally challenged persons. This
will be in addition to the P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages granted by the courts below.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision dated
September 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision dated July 22, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. XXI-
1016(03), finding accused-appellant Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of his civil
liability. He is ORDERED to PAY an additional amount of P30,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., and Perez,** JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212336, July 15, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARSENIO D. MISA III,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal[1] from the September 30, 2013 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00781 finding appellant Arsenio D. Misa III guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape. Appellant was originally found guilty of statutory rape by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cebu City in its September 18, 2007 Decision[3] in
Crim. Case No. CBU-72202.

On January 14, 2005, the City Prosecutor filed the following Information[4] for rape in relation to
Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 against appellant Arsenio D. Misa III:

That on or about the 18th day of October 2004 at about 12:00 p.m. more or less, in the City of
Talisay, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with deliberate intent, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there have carnal
knowledge with one [AAA],[5] a minor, 8 years of age, without the consent and against the will
of the latter, thus committing other acts of child abuse or other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The Information was later on amended changing AAA's age to eleven years old.[7]

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[8] After pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented AAA, her sister BBB,[9] Dr. Naomi Poca and RRR.[10]

AAA testified that on October 18, 2004 as she and BBB, her younger sister, were walking back
to school after taking their lunch at home, appellant called out to the sisters. Appellant told them
that he would tell AAA's fortune by reading her palm. He then grabbed AAA's hand and
examined her palm. He told AAA that any person who would court her will die. When AAA
asked why that was so, appellant ignored the question and told her to shut up. Appellant then
handed AAA twenty pesos and BBB five pesos. After handing BBB the money, the appellant
then told her to go to class and threatened to hit her forcefully on the head if she disobeyed. Out
of fear, BBB obeyed.[11]

Appellant then grabbed AAA's hand and dragged her to the back portion of the school
compound. There being a lot of children, the appellant hailed a trisikad[12] and forced AAA to
board with him. AAA sat beside appellant and felt something sharp pricking her back.[13]

They disembarked near a farm lot. Appellant dragged AAA to an area where several banana trees
grew. Appellant thereafter ordered AAA to lie down on the ground. He undressed her and
proceeded to take liberties on her person. He took off her underwear and licked her vagina.
Appellant then removed his pants and had carnal knowledge with AAA making her bleed.
Throughout the ordeal appellant held a sharp pointed object to coerce her into submission.[14]

After appellant was done, he left AAA in the middle of the banana farm. AAA then went to the
house of the barangay tanod, a friend of her father, to seek help. The barangay tanod assisted and
escorted AAA to the police station and informed AAA's parents of what had just transpired.
They reported the incident then proceeded to the hospital for examination.[15]

BBB corroborated AAA's testimony up to the point where she was ordered by the appellant to
enter her classroom.

Dr. Poca, the representative of the hospital where AAA was examined, verified the contents of
the Medical Certificate[16] issued by the Women and Children Friendly Center of the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center where it was found that AAA was "DEFINITE FOR SEXUAL
ABUSE" due to the victim's swollen genital area, abrasions and semen found thereat. In addition,
the medical report noted that AAA sustained a 10-cm. abrasion at her back.[17] She explained that
based on the findings the linear abrasion at the back was caused by a sharp instrument. There
was also definite blunt trauma to the hymen and external genitalia.[18] The vaginal swab taken
during the examination came out positive for the presence of spermatozoa.[19]

RRR, AAA's mother, testified that while she and her husband were tending to the shells that they
had gathered, a barangay tanod came to their house and informed them that their daughter had
been raped. RRR immediately went to the police station, where she filed an affidavit, and
brought her daughter to the hospital to be examined.[20]

While the defense presented appellant, Rocel dela Cruz and Benedicta dela Victoria as its
witnesses, only the testimony of appellant had substance.

Appellant denied knowing AAA and raping her. He alleged that he could not have been the
perpetrator because on the day of the supposed incident he was working as a conductor plying
the Tabunok-Carcar route and that he did not match the cartographic sketch of the alleged
rapist.[21]

In its September 18, 2007 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape. It noted that AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the incident and that
carnal knowledge was proven. It thus ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, JUDGMENT is rendered finding

accused, ARSENIO D. MISA III, of Rape in relation to Violation of R.A. 7610 as is
sentencefd] to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Accused is also ordered to pay
[AAA], private complainant the following amounts:

1) P50,000.00, for and as moral damages;

2) P25,000.00, for and as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[22]

On appeal,[23] the CA in its September 30, 2013 Decision affirmed the RTC's findings. The CA
noticed that while the prosecution presented AAA's birth certificate as Exhibit 'H' in its formal
offer of exhibits, no such document was surrendered by the prosecution to the trial court. In its
May 13, 2013 Resolution, the CA required the Clerk of Court of the RTC to submit Exhibit 'H'.
In her June 7, 2013 affidavit, the Court Interpreter alluded that the said exhibit was never
attached to the prosecution's formal offer.[24] It however stated that while it agreed with the RTC
that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, he could only be found guilty of simple rape
because AAA's minority was not proven in evidence in accord with this Court's ruling in People
v. Lupac[25] reiterating People v. Pruna.[26] The CA thus held:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS and [MODIFIES] the
assailed Judgment dated September 18, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City
in Criminal Case [No.] CBU-72202. Accused-Appellant ARSENIO D. MISA, III is found
GUILTY of the crime of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-Appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) as moral damages; and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) from the date of the finality of this decision until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[27]

Hence, this appeal.[28]

In its December 10, 2014 Resolution, this Court informed the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs.[29] Both parties decided to forego the filing of the pleadings and
adopted the briefs they submitted before the CA.[30]

Appellant assailed AAA's credibility as a witness and pointed out her inconsistent statements
during testimony. He questioned the scant consideration given to his defense of denial and alibi.

We affirm the CA's decision in toto.

A person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable
of giving consent to a sexual act.[31] The crime of rape is defined and punished under Article 266-
A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC). It provides:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx
After careful review of the records, appellant does not present any compelling reason for this
Court to overturn the decision of the courts a quo.

We have consistently said that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best
left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts - and when his findings
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon
this Court."[32]

Here, AAA's testimony was found by the lower courts to be credible. Absent any compelling
reason brought forth by appellant, this Court does not see any need for it to deviate from their
finding. In any event, it is evident from the transcript that AAA narrated what had happened to
her in a clear and straight forward manner. The sequence of events from the appellant reading
her palm-fortune, to the trisikad ride, to appellant's dragging her to a secluded area so that he
may accomplish the dastardly deed. When we take all of the prosecution's evidence, i.e., the
injuries AAA sustained, the corroborating testimony of AAA's mother and sister and AAA's
categorical identification of appellant as her violator, and stack it up against the appellant's weak
defense of denial and alibi, we find no compelling reason to overturn the finding of rape and the
identification of the culprit. Verily, we have already ruled that mere inconsistencies in testimony
are not fatal to the witness' credibility.[33] Nor can an alibi prevail over the positive identification
of the accused by a credible witness.[34]

For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which must be
proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2) carnal
knowledge by the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be found
guilty of statutory rape.

This Court has held that for minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also
be established with moral certainty.[35]Under Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is inferred
that the victim's birth certificate is the best evidence of her age. We are guided by the guidelines
set in People v. Pruna[36] in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an aggravating or
qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.[37] (Citations omitted)

Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the
Information could have been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with
the CA and deem the crime committed as simple rape.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The September 30, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00781 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,* Peralta, and Perez,** JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015 ]
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.[1] The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
7232[2] convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,[3] Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information[4] for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,” while
her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.[5]

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974,[6] asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that
if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was “without responsibility.”[7]

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for
the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on
which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had
already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.[8]

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage.”[9] Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:[10]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband
and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage
license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:[11]

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this
court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court
can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.[12]

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,[13] she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those
marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records
that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without
completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment[14] filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any knowledge of Santos’s
first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of
the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montañez v. Cipriano,[15] this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
(Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.[16] instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People
v. Archilla[17] likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy,
which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

The Ruling of the Court

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:[18]

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the
totality of the following circumstances:[19] (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner
in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings
of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the
important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during
the trial.[20]

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the
penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla[21] holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice
Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or
woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful
wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”[22] Therefore, her conviction should
only be that for an accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on
her is the penalty next lower in degree,[23] prision correccional, which has a duration of six
months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one
day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,[24] petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.[25] If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation
of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.[26] In this case, petitioner has
consistently[27] questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.[28]

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to
attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,[29] and
given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,[30] this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courtsa quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of
the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage
license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
marriage.[31]

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
1996[32] and that after six months of courtship,[33] she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws,[34] and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.[35] On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime
in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.[36]

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,[37] in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because
the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.[38] In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[39]we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment.”

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage.[40]

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.”[41] If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. [42]As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[43]

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,[44] petitioner married Santos while
knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this
Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951,
the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since
the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate
of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”[45] It must be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.[46]|||In keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years
of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROLLY ADRIANO
Y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO Y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE
AND PETER DOE, ACCUSED, ROLLY ADRIANO Y SAMSON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009,
convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide
(Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of
Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of
the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her
body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.[3]

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.[4]
Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (PO1 Garabiles)
and PO2 Alejandro Santos (PO2 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.[5]

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corollo
(Corollo) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the
car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.[6]

When the Corollo reached alongside the CRY, the passenger on the front seat of the Corollo shot
the CRY and caused the CRY to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4)
armed men then suddenly alighted the Corollo and started shooting at the driver of the CRY,
who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was
standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back
to the Corollo and immediately left the crime scene. PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos followed the
Corollo but lost track of the latter.[7]

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds
on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corollo was registered under the name of
Antonio Y. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corollo
but clarified that the Corollo is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which
he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corollo, where he
was identified by PO2 Santos and PO1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from
the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corollo and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately
arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in
Cabanatuan City.[8]

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered
one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber
firearm.[9]
Yersion of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at
his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the
laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there.[10]

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a
lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari's house, Adriano
went home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his
brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's house,
Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon
(Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.[11]

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At
around 5:00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet
Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corollo from him, which he rented from Rivera.[12]

At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corollo back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano
went to Rivera to return the Corollo, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the
Corollo's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.[13]

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated
Adriano's testimony.[14]

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden,"
Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) PO2 Santos,
(3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SPO2 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) PO2 Jay
Cabrera, (6) PO3 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky
Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as
witnesses.

Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the
ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC,
Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively
identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of the
defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, PO1 Garabiles
and PO2 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or
indicate that PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify
against Adriano.
The RTC found as proven the assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC
order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of P222,482.00 based on the following:
(1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) as expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (P12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV.[15]

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder,
as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php222,482.00 as actual
damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged,
for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
that attended the commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php50,000.00.[16]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the RTC erred when it failed to
appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses.
Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to the following
particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion;
2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who
triggered the fatal shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos going to Camp
Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from
that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the shooting incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification
of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies
in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in fact constitute
signs of veracity.

On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Adriano's claim
that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince
because it was not impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the crime scene, in
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than an
hour.[17] The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the
Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the
heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In
addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount
of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1)
the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating
circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure
that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or
retaliation from the victim[19] ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,
two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.[20] The "essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance
to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."[21]

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time
of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the
unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes
and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds.
When the Corollo swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly tum to the right
and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRV was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the
orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the
loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The
means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give
Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.[22]

All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending
himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed
by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no
intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's
death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray
a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[23] pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which
imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to
shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan's death caused by the bullet fired by
Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against
Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera[24] citing People v. Hilario,[25] "[t]he fact that accused
killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original
intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray
bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting
Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v.
Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be
different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for
all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.[26]
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.[27] In the
aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but
of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing
and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several acts.[28] The
doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that
"when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes,"[29] not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6)
cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst.
Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed
Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and
distinct crimes.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,[30] where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed
by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus,
we follow the Flora doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan's death was not established, a perusal of
the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution
offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.[31]

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and
unreliable because they can easily be fabricated.[32] For alibi to prosper, the accused must
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.[33] In the case at bar, Adriano
claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed
to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from
the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically
impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by
credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and friends. Therefore, the defense's evidence
which is composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's
positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish
with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable.[34]Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages in
this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages as P222,482.00. However, a perusal
of the records reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be P232,482.00 as duly
supported by official receipts.[35] Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual damages
from P222,482.00 to P232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-
appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt
of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages,
and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (P232,482.00) as
actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA
BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA
BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 195196, July 13, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. ESTANLY OCTA Y BAS,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal[1] dated 30 July 2010 from the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated 19 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the Decision[3] dated
15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
48, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
As culled from the records, the prosecution’s version is herein quoted:

In the morning of September 25, 2003, around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and Mike
Adrian Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on board a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No.
UPT 697 travelling on Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a
Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored red-orange. The four (4) armed occupants of the Lancer
car alighted. Johnny did not open the door of the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men
fired his pistol at the left window of the civic car, thus compelling Johnny to open the locked
door of the car. The armed men went inside the car and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the
back seat at that time. Inside the car, Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was even
boxed. The armed men asked for the names and telephone numbers of his mother-in-law. The
armed men called his mother-in-law giving the information that Johnny was in their custody and
they would just meet each other at a certain place. They travelled for a while and then they
stopped and Johnny was brought to a safehouse.

After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers communicated with Johnny’s wife Ana
Marie Corpuz (Ana Marie) giving the information that they have in their custody her husband
Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian. Ana Marie tried to confirm the kidnapping incident by
talking to her husband, who confirmed to his wife that he and Mike Adrian were indeed
kidnapped and they were in the custody of their abductors. Ana Marie sought the assistance of
the PACER [Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response] and stayed in a PACER safehouse
located at P. Tuazon, Cubao, Quezon City. During her stay, she had several communications
with her husband’s kidnappers. The latter started demanding the amount of P20 million for the
release of her husband and her brother but the amount was considerably reduced up to the time
that Ana Marie was able to raise the amount of P538,000.00 which was accepted by the
kidnappers.

Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10 PM, the kidnappers set up the manner on how the ransom
money would be delivered. Ana Marie travelled to Quiapo Church, then to Quezon City circle
up to SM Fairview and to Robinsons Fairview. She was made to stop at Red Lips Beer House
and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where she would see a man wearing a red cap and who
would ask her “saan yong padala ni boss”. She was instructed to deliver the wrapped bundled
ransom money to the man wearing red cap. When she saw the man with red cap, she was asked
for the money. At first, she did not give the money because she wanted to be sure that she was
giving the money to the right man. Using her own cellphone, she called up the man who had
been instructing her all along and asked him to confirm if the man in front of her is the right man
to give the ransom money to, saying “kausapin mo muna ito kung siya ba.” The man in the
phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in another dialect which Ana Marie did not
understand. When she asked the man to give back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead
instructed her to give the money to him. She described the man wearing red cap to be
goodlooking, lightly built, in his early 20s, around 5’4” in height and with dimples, which she
later identified in court as accused Estanly Octa.

On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released by his captors after the payment of ransom money. He
was detained for the duration of six (6) days. After his release, he removed his blindfold and
handcuffs but he could hardly regain his sight and see things. He flagged down a private pick-up
and learned that he was in Camarin, Caloocan City. He asked a favor that he be driven to
Meycauayan, Bulacan where he took a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took a taxi
bound home. When he was released, his brother-in-law Mike Adrian was also released.[4]

The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:

x x x [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a welder in the
welding shop of his uncle Edwin delos Reyes. He went to Daet on the second week of August
2003 and returned to Manila when he was called by his father sometime in November 2003. In
addition to his defense of denial and alibi, he clings to the theory that he himself was a victim of
abduction. He testified that, on December 1, 2003, while crossing the street, his way was
blocked by a van and thereafter, two (2) persons alighted and a gun was poked at him then he
was boarded inside the van. His hands were tied and eyes covered. The incident happened at
Susano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City. He was eventually brought to the PACER Office, Camp
Crame, Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to admit the charge filed against him. At
the PACER’s office, he was presented to a State Prosecutor of the DOJ but he claimed he was
not assisted by counsel. He said that he did not submit himself for medical examination. He
categorically stated that, when he was inquested by a State Prosecutor, he did not tell of the
alleged torture that he suffered because he was afraid.[5]

On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives of the Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City, in connection
with another kidnap for ransom incident. He was identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie
Corpuz from a police line-up as the person who had received the ransom money from her.[6]

Consequently, on 26 February 2004, an Information[7] was filed against accused-appellant

charging him with the crime of kidnapping for ransom as follows:

That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September 25, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
kidnap and deprive JOHNNY L. CORPUZ and MIKE ADRIAN BATUIGAS, a minor, of their
liberty and against their will by means of threats and intimation with the use of firearms, and
then bring them through the use of a motor vehicle to a house, wherein they were detained for a
period of six (6) days, and that the abduction of the said victims was for the purpose of extorting
Php538,000.00 was actually delivered to the above-mentioned accused in exchange for the
release of the victims.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

When arraigned on 5 July 2004, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.[9]

On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision,[10] the dispositive portion of which is herein
quoted:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the felony charge [sic] and pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum prison
term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private aggrieved party of the following:
1. The amount of P538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
2. The amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. The amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost.
In view of the conviction of the accused, the Manila City Jail is ordered to commit his person to
the National Penitentiary immediately without necessary [sic] delay.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz, wife of victim Johnny
Corpuz, steadfastly testified that she gave the ransom money in the amount of P538,000 to
accused-appellant. She did not waiver in identifying and describing him as good-looking,
wearing red cap, light in built, in his early 20’s, 5’4” and with dimples. The assertion of Ana
Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was sporting dimples was squarely corroborated by the
court’s observation when he took the witness stand.[12]

The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as sufficient evidence to establish
accused-appellant’s conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims in this case.[13]

With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC found them to be inherently weak as
opposed to the straightforward testimony of Corpuz. The claim of accused-appellant that he was
abducted did not convince the court either, inasmuch as it was not supported by evidence, nor
was it the subject of an investigation.[14]

Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision[15] promulgated on 19 July

2010, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal in this case is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 04-
224073 finding Estanly Octa y Bas guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay P538,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
and cost, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[16]

The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Ana Marie
Corpuz to be unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive identification, when
categorical, consistent, straightforward, and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over mere alibi and denial.[17] Such positive
identification constituted direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence.[18]

Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been rightly found to be a co-conspirator in
this case. At the time he received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still
continuing, since both victims were still illegally detained by the kidnappers. Accused-
appellant’s act of taking the ransom money was an overt act made in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity.[19]

Hence, the instant appeal.[20]

Issues

In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the RTC, accused-appellant Octa argues
that:

1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the prosecutions’ failure to positively
identify him as the ransom taker;[21]

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime charged;[22] and

3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged based on circumstantial
evidence.[23]

The Court’s Ruling

We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.

When the credibility of a witness is at

issue, the findings of fact of the trial court
are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect, more so if those findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court.

In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he was the one who received the ransom money. He primarily argues that prosecution
witness Ana Marie Corpuz could not have positively ascertained the identity of the ransom taker,
because the area where the transaction took place was dark, and the man was wearing a cap.
Neither did Corpuz declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who received the ransom
money was sporting a dimple, a fact that she mentioned on direct examination.[24]

Accused-appellant further insinuates that the police might have influenced his out-of-court
identification in the line-up when they informed Corpuz that they had apprehended some people
who were suspects in other kidnap for ransom cases, and that information might have
conditioned her mind that the ransom taker had already been apprehended.[25]

We disagree.

In People v. Basao,[26] the Court held that:

[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the
record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The
forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look
or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch – these can reveal if the witness is
telling the truth or lying through his teeth.[27]

xxxx

[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled
that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the
appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.”[28]

In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible witness who had
categorically testified that she saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was actually the
accused-appellant.

The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom taker was
sporting a dimple was not fatal to her testimony because she was able to positively and
categorically identify accused-appellant during the police line-up and in open court.

Even accused-appellant’s insinuation that Corpuz could have been influenced by the police
during the line-up cannot be given weight in the face of his positive identification as the ransom
taker. On this point, we agree with the observation of the CA that “assuming arguendo that the
accused-appellant’s out of court identification was defective, her subsequent identification in
court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the ‘inadmissibility
of a police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.’”[29]

To hold an accused guilty as a co-

principal by reason of conspiracy, he must
be shown to have performed an overt act
in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.

Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in

the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution of the essential
elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the
ransom money transpired only after the kidnapping had been consummated and was not an
essential element of the crime.[30]

We disagree.

On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista,[31] to wit:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must
be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.

xxxx

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown

to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. x x x.

xxxx

Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-
appellant was the one who received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of
purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the other accused can no longer be
denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping
for ransom.

Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a

principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 x x x.[32](Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the
ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being
illegally detained by the kidnappers.[33]While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material
element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in fact the main reason
for kidnapping the victims.[34] Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity.[35] Without
ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved.

The positive identification of

accused-appellant constitutes direct,
and not merely circumstantial,
evidence.

Accused-appellant’s contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial evidence

deserves scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that “[Corpuz] testified
that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of
receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the commission of the kidnapping
for ransom. The positive identification of the accused-appellant then constitutes direct evidence,
and not merely circumstantial evidence.”[36]

With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the imposition by the RTC and the CA on
accused-appellant of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the prohibition on the death
penalty.[37] To conform to recent jurisprudence,[38] we hereby modify the exemplary damages
awarded by increasing the amount from P50,000 to P100,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03490 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
P538,000 as actual damages, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191258, July 08, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VINCENT GARRIDO Y
ELORDE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Vincent Garrido y Elorde (Garrido) from the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03017 dated 20 October 2009,
affirming the Decision[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City in
Criminal Case No. 04-0931 dated 12 September 2007, in finding the accused guilty of rape
[under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code].

The Facts

Before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Garrido was charged with several counts of the crime of
rape.[3]
That on or about the 21st day of October, 2004, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA[4] for several times against her will and
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on 8 March 2005, Garrido pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[6]

Version of the Prosecution

The victim AAA, then 19 years old, narrated that on or about seven in the evening of 20 October
2004, she went to retail shop in one of the shopping centers in Las Piñas accompanied by her
sister's friend BBB to submit her application for work. While inside the shopping center, they
met two male friends of BBB, the herein accused Garrido and a certain James (James). Garrido
and James talked with BBB and invited them to attend the latter's birthday party. AAA initially
declined to go, but upon BBB's prodding, she accepted the invitation to accompany the latter.
Thereafter, they went to the jeepney terminal going to Moonwalk and Cavite and proceeded to
the house of James.[7]

Upon arrival at the house of James, AAA was surprised to learn that it was a drinking session
instead of a birthday party. Nevertheless she stayed and drank one bottle of Red Horse beer. As
the night went on, several more people arrived at the house, delaying her plans to go home. She
was asked to drink liquor but she declined as she already drank beer. However, upon further
prodding of the guests, she was acceded to drink liquor. While AAA was drunk, James sat beside
and kissed her. Garrido interceded and offered to take her home. Thereafter, AAA, BBB, Garrido
and his cousin Vernel[8] left the house. On their way, AAA walked assisted by Garrido. Instead
of going straight to AAA's house, Garrido decided to pass by his house to drink coffee first.
Trusting his concern, AAA agreed to the accused's suggestion.[9]

Upon reaching the house, Garrido brought AAA, BBB and Vernel inside one of the bedrooms
and went out of the room to take a bath. Feeling very weak, she sat on one of the beds and leaned
on the wall to support herself. Meanwhile, BBB and Vernel occupied the other bed while talking
and exchanging jokes. Upon Garrido's return, the accused turned off the lights and went on top
of AAA and kissed her on her lips and neck. She tried to resist him but Garrido was stronger.
Garrido removed her clothes and succeeded in a sexual intercourse despite her
resistance.[10]After a few minutes, Garrido repeated his act on AAA. Due to weakness and
exhaustion, AAA fell asleep in bed beside Garrido.[11]

After a few hours, Garrido once again laid on top of her for the third time and violently inserted
his penis inside her vagina. When it was over, AAA tried to look for her clothes but Garrido hid
them. AAA looked for Vernel and saw him still asleep on the other bed. She looked for BBB and
asked for help but the latter just bowed her head. When Garrido woke up, he threw clothes he
had hidden at AAA and ordered her to fix herself. AAA then waited for Garrido to take her and
BBB to the jeepney terminal for a ride home.[12]

Upon reaching home at around 9:00 in the morning, AAA took a rest and woke up at 1:00 in the
afternoon of the same day. When her sister CCC took notice of the marks all over her body, she
narrated that she was raped by Garrido. Out of anger, CCC cried and confided that Garrido was
the same man who raped her sometime in June 2004.[13]

The prosecution presented as witness Dr. Bonnie Yap Chua (Dr. Chua), the medico legal expert
assigned at PNP Crime Laboratory, National Headquarters, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who
examined AAA. Dr. Chua narrated that on 23 October 2004, he examined AAA about her
complaint of sexual abuse. Upon his examination of AAA's external physical appearance, Dr.
Chua found several ecchymosis, also known as kiss marks, on the breast area of the victim. As to
AAA's genital examination, Dr. Chua found deep healed lacerations on the hymen of the victim
probably caused by an insertion of a blunt object.[14]

Version of the Defense

Accused denied the charge of rape and maintained that the sexual intercourse between him and
AAA was consensual. He narrated that it was AAA who insisted to stay in their house for the
night after the drinking session as she could not go home drunk in the early hours of the day.
Thus, Garrido brought AAA, together with BBB and Vernel, to his house in Las Piñas City. The
four of them stayed in one room, Vernel and BBB occupied one bed while AAA occupied the
other. Thereafter, Garrido took a bath, returned to the room at around 3:00 in the morning and
switched off the light. As there was no more bed available, he laid beside AAA. At that moment,
AAA initiated sexual intimacy between them by placing her legs over his thighs. He then kissed
her and consummated sexual intercourse. He insisted that what transpired between them was
between two consenting adults.[15]

At around 7:00 in the morning of the same day, Garrido and AAA voluntarily consummated
sexual intercourse. Afterward, they took their breakfast and he accompanied AAA and BBB to
the jeepney terminal.[16]

The accused's version was corroborated by Vernel, his brother Vivence Garrido (Vivence) and
mother Walita Garrido (Walita).

Vernel, who was with AAA, BBB and Garrido from the house of James until the early morning
of 21 October 2004 denied that AAA was raped by Garrido. He narrated that when the four of
them arrived at Garrido's house, he noticed that AAA was just slightly drunk noting the clarity of
her speech and actions. When they entered the room, he and BBB occupied one bed while AAA
and Garrido occupied the other. He took note that in the other bed, AAA and Garrido were
romancing each other. When he woke up at 6:00 in the morning, he saw that AAA and Garrido
were embraced in their sleep. He also corroborated the narration of Garrido that after breakfast,
the latter accompanied AAA and BBB to the jeepney terminal to go home.[17]

Vivence narrated that his brother, accused Garrido, arrived at their house in the early morning of
21 October 2004 accompanied by AAA, BBB and Vernel. He recalled that AAA did not appear
drunk as she was able to talk clearly and even greeted their mother Walita when she opened the
door for them.[18] The next day, he saw AAA kissed his brother on his cheek before leaving the
house to go to the jeepney terminal.[19]

In further corroboration of the defense version, Walita confirmed that her son Garrido arrived at
their house in the early morning of 21 October 2004 with AAA, BBB and Vernel to spend the
night. She woke up at around 7:00 in the morning and saw AAA, BBB, Vernel and Garrido
eating breakfast. She did not notice anything unusual on the actions of AAA until the time
Garrido accompanied them to the jeepney terminal.[20]

The Ruling of the RTC

The trial court on 12 September 2007 found Garrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused VICENTE GARRIDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay AAA the sum of P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages in line with current jurisprudence and ordered to acknowledge the offspring as his
son/daughter and to support the child at P3,000.00 per month until he/she reaches the age of
majority and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
In its ruling, the trial court found more credible the testimony of AAA than the testimony of the
defense's witnesses. It concluded that though AAA was already drunk, weak and physically
exhausted to resist the sexual advances of the accused, her mental faculties were still lucid as
gleaned from her narration of the ill-fated incident.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Upon appeal, the appellate court on 20 October 2009 affirmed the ruling of the trial court with
modification on the civil indemnity reduced to P50,000.00.[21]

The appellate court sustained AAA's credibility in her full recollection of rape. AAA recounted
the material details of the acts committed against her. The lack of physical resistance was of no
moment as there is no standard reaction to rape. Further, it dismissed the argument of denial and
underlined the merit of the categorical and positive declarations of AAA in open court worthy of
credence.

Our Ruling

After a careful review, we reverse the finding of guilt and acquit the accused of the offense
charged.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction of rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force,
threat or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.[22]

In finding guilt, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, upon
careful evaluation, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
offense charged.

In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is
painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one with
malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the
lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to
disprove his guilt.[24] We are mindful that the lone testimony of the rape victim is sufficient to
sustain conviction. However, the probative value of the victim's testimony should be measured
against the evidence for the defense and must be carefully evaluated.[25] Thus, the court has the
duty to scrutinize with caution the testimony of the victim to rule a conviction.

Jurisprudence lay down the following guidelines in evaluating the testimony of the victim. First,
while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.[26]

Guided by these principles, we find a nagging doubt on the credibility of the testimony of AAA
on what really transpired on those fateful hours.

AAA's vacillating statements raise doubt on whether or not she did refuse to be inside the room
with Garrido and whether the succeeding sexual intercourse was consensual or not. During her
direct examination, AAA recounted that when she, Garrido, BBB and Vernel arrived at the house
of Garrido, she felt nervous and surprised that Garrido took them to the room and not to the
kitchen. Once inside, AAA who was already feeling weak then, sat on the side of the bed and
leaned on the wall. On the other hand, AAA noticed her other companions BBB and Vernel were
sitting and talking on another bed. However, in her cross-examination, AAA recalled that she
was pulled inside the room by Garrido and could not recall with clarity whether BBB and Vernel
were also inside the room with her. She was unsure whether they were inside the room though
she heard them creating sounds. When asked again during cross examination[27] she testified that
BBB and Vernel were inside the room when she was raped by Garrido.

Another significant inconsistency was AAA's reaction when Garrido approached her while she
was abed. In her affidavit, AAA recounted that she fell asleep while waiting for Garrido. She
was awakened when the accused forced her to lie on her back and kissed her all over her face
and body. She was not able to resist or fight him as she was shocked during the time Garrido was
raping her. She wrote, "Di na po ako nakapanlaban kasi namamanhid ako at tulala sa
nangyayari, para po akong nananaginip."[28] However, in her cross examination, AAA narrated
that when she was approached by Garrido, the latter covered her mouth when she was about to
shout.[29]

While we agree with the settled principle that lust is no respecter of time and place,[30] this
should not be applied tout de suite without considering the attending circumstances.

During her direct examination, AAA narrated that while inside the room, AAA sat on one bed
while BBB and Vernel shared the other one. For a moment, Garrido went out of the room. When
he returned, Garrido turned off the light and went on top of her and kissed her on her lips, face
and neck. He then removed AAA's clothes and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
despite her resistance. Ten minutes later, after minutes of violent sexual intercourse he again
successfully satisfied his lust. In this case, however, what raises disbelief is the fact that from the
time Garrido entered the room until those times she was sexually abused by the accused, Vernel
and BBB were present in the room, laughing and talking, and did not even offer to help her.

Furthermore, if indeed AAA was raped by Garrido, human reaction dictates that she could have
at least at the earliest opportunity taken the chance to escape when her rapist fell asleep. Her
claim that she was not able to leave as she was not familiar with place can hardly be sustained.
AAA lives in the same city as the accused. In addition, it was already past 7:00 in the morning
when the alleged third rape happened and the jeepney terminal where she can easily take
transportation home can be reached by walking. Even more baffling is that AAA even waited for
her alleged rapist to accompany her and BBB to the jeepney terminal.
When AAA arrived home, her further actions contradicted the occurrence of rape. When she
narrated to her sister CCC that she was raped by Garrido, CCC angrily disclosed that she
suffered the same plight from the same man last June. However, instead of reporting the rapes to
the authorities at the earliest chance, the sisters, with help of their friends, concocted a plan to
entrap Garrido. They agreed that CCC will call Garrido in his phone number and will invite him
into their house on a pretext that she will show him something. The incredibility of the story
deepens when upon Garrido's arrival, CCC, who earlier claimed she was also Garrido's victim,
was heard by AAA uttering the words, "sige, gawin natin dito at alisin mo na ang damit mo."
These actions and conversations, to the mind of the court, were highly inconsistent with the
normal reactions of rape victims who suffered rape from the same man. We quote:
xxxx

Q When your sister tell (sic) you that she won't tell anything to anybody what happened next,
if any?

A I cried and narrated to her what happened, sir.

Q After telling her the incident what happened next?

A She also cried because of anger, sir.

Q What happened next?

A She told me that this [Garrido] who raped me was the same person who raped her last June
2004, sir.

xxxx

Q After that, what happened next?

A Both of us cried and very angry with [Garrido] and we wanted justice, sir.

Q You said you wanted justice of what [Garrido] did to you, what do you mean justice?
A We planned to bring the matter to the barangay to file a complaint, sir.

Q What happened next?

A I was not expecting that my friends will arrive in our house on (sic) the following day, sir?

Q What date was that?

A That was October 22, sir.

xxxx

Q What happened when they arrived at your house?

A My sister told them what happened to me, sir.

Q What happened next when your friends learned about what happened to you?

A They reacted and also very angry, sir.

Q What happened next after that?

A We planned to make action and during that time [CCC] have the cell number of [Garrido]
because [Garrido] was texting her, sir.

Q Who is this CCC?

A She is my sister, sir.

Q What happened next?

A CCC called up [Garrido] and pretended that she has (sic) no knowledge of what happened
and told him that she wanted to see him, sir.

Q What happened next after that?

A My sister told us that she invited [Garrido] to our house and that she will just show him
something, sir.

Q What happened after talking with the phone?

A We started our plan. My friends and I went inside the room while CCC was waiting for
[Garrido], sir.

Q What happened next after that?

A My sister talked with our other friends because our house is just in front of the basketball
court to just pretend playing basketball, sir.

Q What happened next?

A After he knocked at the door and entered the house I heard that he was looking for me, sir.

xxxx

Q What else happened after that?

A [Garrido] was asking if there was anybody inside the room and then my sister told him that
nobody was there but it was locked, sir.

xxxx
Q What happened next after that?

A And then we heard CCC said, "sige gawin natin dito at alisin mo na ang damit mo".

Q As you heard, what was the reaction of [Garrido]?

A I did not know anymore but my sister informed me, sir.

Q What happened next at that point?

A I already heard the commotion in the sala and I heard my sister cursing already, sir.

Q What did you do, if any, when you heard your sister?

A All of us went out of the room, sir.

Q What did you notice if any?

A [Garrido] was already (sic) about to go outside and already fixed himself, sir.[31]

xxxx
On the other hand, the defense's version provides a continuous chain of narration worthy of
belief.

When AAA, BBB, Vernel and Garrido arrived at the house, they were greeted by Walita then
proceeded to one of the rooms of the house. AAA and Garrido stayed in their one bed while
BBB and Vernel occupied the other. Thereafter, AAA and Garrido consensually had sexual
intercourse twice, one in the early hour of 21 October 2004 and the other at around 7:00 in the
morning of the same day. After breakfast, Garrido accompanied AAA and BBB to the jeepney
terminal.

This was corroborated by Vernel who testified that he saw AAA and Garrido romancing each
other in bed and were in an embrace during sleep.

Walita confirmed that her son, together with his companions including AAA, arrived at their
house to spend the night. When she woke up in the morning, she saw the group drinking coffee.
She denied any unusual action among the group; AAA in particular acted normally during the
conversation.

Vivence verified the story that he was sleeping in the room when his brother Garrido and his
companions came. He was asked to go out to make room for his companions AAA, BBB and
Vernel. When he woke up, he saw his brother accompanying AAA and BBB to the jeepney
terminal. But before leaving, he saw AAA kiss her brother on the cheek.

As repeatedly held by this Court, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are generally accorded great respect and even finality on appeal. However, this
principle does not preclude a re-evaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or
circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. It is the prosecution's
duty to present the necessary evidence to prove conviction beyond reasonable doubt to convince
and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment. Upon the prosecution's failure to
meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured
with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[31]

In conclusion, the reasonable doubt entertained in the mind of the court as to whether AAA was
really raped or consented to sexual intimacy on that night results to acquittal even though
Garrido's innocence was not proven without tarnish.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 20 October 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03017 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 12
September 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City is hereby REVERSED. The
accused VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. He is
ordered RELEASED unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NONIETO GERSAMIO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision[1] dated 25 April 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. HC-CR No. 00906 affirming the Decision[2] dated 14 January 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 of Toledo City, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609, finding
Nonieto Gersamio (herein appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against AAA,[3] but, deleting the portion ordering the appellant to acknowledge
paternity and to support the child of AAA.

Two (2) separate informations were filed against the appellant charging him with rape committed
in 1999 and on 28 August 2002 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. TCS-4608 and TCS-4609,
respectively. The appellant was later acquitted in Criminal Case No. TCS-4608 per the above-
mentioned RTC Decision dated 14 January 2008 for prosecution’s failure to specify with
certainty the exact month in 1999 when the offense was committed.[4] Thus, only Criminal Case
No. TCS-4609 is the subject of this instant appeal.

The Information docketed as Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 subject of this appeal reads:

That on the 28th day of August 2002, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named [herein appellant], with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and
having carnal knowledge with the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of
the incident against her will.[5] (Emphasis supplied.)

On arraignment, the appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.[6] After the pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA, the victim herself; BBB, the grandmother of
AAA; and Dr. Shiela Faciol (Dr. Faciol), Medical Health Officer of Pinamungajan, Cebu, who
conducted the medical examination on AAA.

The prosecution’s evidence was engaged in the establishment of the following facts:

AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of the appellant happened sometime in 1999, when she
was only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986.[7] It was repeated for several times
thereafter. The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, at around
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while AAA was about to enter their house, the appellant, who was
then hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their
house - a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as the appellant pointed a knife
at her neck. The appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a
word. At the banana plantation, the appellant commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted,
prompting the former to kick the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the
ground, the appellant removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. The appellant also
threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. The appellant then lay on top of AAA
and began kissing her on her cheeks and later on her lips. After a short while, the appellant, who
was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts and brief with his right hand while his
left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant held his penis, inserted it inside
AAA’s vagina and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain and cried. After satiating his
lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked AAA on her thigh and instructed her to wear her
panty and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short pants. Before leaving, the
appellant warned AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between
them.[8]

Out of fear for her life, AAA suffered in silence. She never told anyone about the dreadful acts
done to her by the appellant. However, on 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB,
discovered her pregnancy because of the changes in her physical appearance. When asked about
the father of her child, it was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the
hands of the appellant, which began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which
was on 28 August 2002. Such sexual advances by the appellant resulted in her pregnancy.[9] At
once, BBB went to the house of the appellant and confronted him regarding what he did to
AAA. Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their whole family from shame as the appellant is
AAA’s uncle, being the first cousin of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter
among themselves and merely asked the appellant to acknowledge and support the child of
AAA. The appellant, however, denied the accusation and he even got mad at BBB. Leaving
with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB, sought the assistance of their Barangay
Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The Barangay Captain then advised them to
have a medical examination, which they did.[10]

Dr. Faciol, who conducted the physical examination on AAA, found that (1) AAA was already
five and a half months pregnant; (2) no contusion or laceration on AAA’s sex organ;[11] and (3)
AAA’s hymen is not intact anymore. Dr. Faciol likewise stated that AAA told her that she was
last rape by her perpetrator about a year ago, i.e., 28 August 2002, and she was so scared at that
time because the perpetrator had a knife. Dr. Faciol also clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the
time the victim was raped, there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on
the victim’s vagina. Thus, she could no longer determine if the penetration was forceful. Even
so, Dr. Faciol declared that her aforesaid findings did not exclude the possibility of rape.[12]

AAA and BBB subsequently proceeded to the police station, submitted the result of the medical
examination and narrated the whole incident of rape committed by the appellant against AAA.[13]

For its part, the defense presented the appellant and his mother, Dominga Gersamio, whose
testimonies consist of sheer denials and alibi. Their version of the case is as follows:

The appellant vehemently denied that he raped AAA. He maintained that from 1999 until 2002
he was in Cebu City working as a driver of a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he only went
home to Pinamungajan, Cebu, every Saturday afternoon. While working as a jeepney driver, he
stayed at the shop of his brother in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. From 1999 up to 2000, he had a
girlfriend, who is a teacher previously assigned in Consolatrix Academy. He admitted having
known AAA, being the granddaughter of her mother’s older sister. He claimed that on 22
September 2002, her mother informed him that he was being accused of raping AAA. He got
angry as it was not true and he never had any sexual relationship with AAA. On the same day, to
their surprise, AAA and BBB went to their house asking him to support AAA’s child. But, he
refused. He stated that prior to the filing of this case, his family and that of AAA were still in
good terms even though they had a previous misunderstanding regarding a video cd allegedly
stolen by AAA. He is also willing to submit himself to DNA testing to determine the paternity
of AAA’s child but he has no money to spend for it.[14]
Dominga Gersamio corroborated the appellant’s testimony that AAA and BBB went to their
house asking the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was carrying
in her womb. But, the appellant refused and got angry, as he is not the father of AAA’s
child. AAA and BBB then went home and, thereafter, charged the appellant with rape.[15]

After both parties presented their evidence, the trial court rendered its Decision dated 14 January
2008 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thereby,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court similarly ordered the
appellant to (1) pay AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages; (2) acknowledge or recognize AAA’s
offspring resulting from the rape; and (3) support AAA’s child in the event his means improves
after serving his sentence.[16]

The appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s 14 January 2008 Decision was
denied for lack of merit in the Order[17] dated 5 May 2008.

On appeal,[18] the Court of Appeals, in its now assailed Decision dated 25 April 2012, affirmed
the guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by the trial court. It deleted, however, the portion
ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child, as the issue of
whether the child is of the appellant is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.[19]

Hence, the instant recourse[20] alleging that the Court of Appeals fatally erred in affirming the
appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 despite the inherent weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence to support the verdict.[21]

The appellant argues that AAA is not a credible witness and her testimony is also not credible
being replete with several material inconsistencies, contradictions and improbabilities. Firstly,
AAA claims that the 28 August 2002 rape incident was the proximate cause of her pregnancy but
it was belied by the result of her own medical examination conducted in September 2002
confirming that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time. To explain this
inconsistency, AAA asserts that the appellant started raping her when she was still 13 years old
until she became pregnant but nothing on record substantiates this claim of repeated prior rape
incidents. Secondly,AAA’s behavior negates her claim of rape. Assuming the appellant with the
use of force or threat had repeatedly raped her, there seemed to be no signs that she suffered
trauma as a consequence thereof, or at least a change in behavior. Moreover, even if the rape
was perpetrated by means of threat, such threat was not imminent as the appellant was not
always around her. Yet, AAA never reported to her grandmother or uncle or teacher that the
appellant had repeatedly raped her until her grandmother noticed the physical changes in her
body. Thirdly, while AAA cries repeated rape, this was not the reason why she charged the
appellant with that crime but the latter’s refusal to acknowledge paternity and to support the
child she was carrying in her womb. Ill motive can therefore be attributed to AAA in filing the
case against the appellant, which ill motive was corroborated by the very own testimony of
BBB.[22]

The appellant further contends that Dr. Faciol is not an expert witness in the field of rape cases
and physical examination of child abuse. Thus, her opinion on the matter has no probative value
at all. Even the medico-legal report she made is incompetent to prove the 28 August 2002 rape
incident. Based on the record, AAA’s physical examination was conducted eight days after the
28 August 2002 rape incident, however, the medico-legal report of Dr. Faciol did not indicate
any trauma on AAA’s genitalia nor any healed lacerations on the labia majora, labia minora,
vaginal canal and/or fourchette. In other words, both Dr. Faciol’s testimony and her medical
findings could not prove the charge of rape against him.[23]

With all the foregoing, the appellant claims that since his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, he must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged.

This Court believes otherwise.

Noticeably, the appellant’s arguments primarily hinge on the issue of AAA’s credibility. Settled
is the rule that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is concerned, this Court adheres to these
jurisprudentially established guidelines: (1) it gives the highest respect to the trial court’s
evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses because of its unique position in directly observing
the demeanor of a witness on the stand, and from its vantage point, is also in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witnesses; (2) in the absence of any substantial reason that would
justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded; and (3) the rule is even more stringently applied if the Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court.[24]

A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of both
lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, the appellant raped her and his
guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

It is evident in the transcript of stenographic notes that AAA’s testimony, in contrast to the claim
of the appellant, was clear, credible, convincing and worthy of belief. Her narration of how she
was sexually abused by the appellant on that fateful afternoon of 28 August 2002 was given in a
categorical and straightforward manner. She unwaveringly described to the trial court how the
appellant raped her. She recounted in detail that while she was about to enter their house, the
appellant, who was hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her to the back
of their house - a banana plantation. With a knife pointed at her neck, she could not do anything
but cry. The appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a word. At
the banana plantation, the appellant commanded her to lie down. Though she resisted, the
appellant overpowered her. While lying on the ground, the appellant removed her t-shirt, short
pants and underwear. The appellant also threatened to kill her. Defenseless, she simply
cried. The appellant then lay on top of her and began kissing her on her cheeks and then on her
lips. After a short while, the appellant, who was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his
shorts and brief with his right hand while his left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the
appellant held his penis, inserted it inside her vagina and made push and pull movements. She
felt pain and cried. After satiating his lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked her on her
thigh and instructed her to wear her panty and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief
and short pants. Before leaving, the appellant warned her that he would kill her should she tell
anyone what happened between them.[25]

AAA’s trustworthy account proved all the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such
act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.[26] The appellant in this
case had sexual intercourse with AAA, which he accomplished through force, that is, with the
use of a knife he threatened to kill AAA to make her succumb to his bestiality. Indubitably, the
appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA.

Regarding the alleged inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions in AAA’s testimony

pointed out by the appellant, this Court finds them all inconsequential as they refer to trivial
matters that have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is, carnal
knowledge through force or intimidation. Further, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central
fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not
coached or rehearsed.[27]

Here, even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not necessarily
follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape against her. Contrary
to appellant’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore was
fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important
and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or
without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. As long as
the elements of rape are present and proven by the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged
guilty thereof notwithstanding the attendance of other matters that are completely irrelevant to
the crime.[28]

The appellant’s assertion that AAA’s behavior belies her claim that she was raped, as there
seemed to be no signs that she suffered trauma as a consequence thereof, or at least a change in
behavior, is futile. Victims of a heinous crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act within
reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be
expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.[29]

As to AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incident until BBB noticed the changes in her physical
appearance, the same can be attributed to her tender age and to the threat made upon her person
by the appellant. Even if the appellant was not always around, the fact that he is her uncle and he
lives nearby is more than enough to cause fear on AAA since he could make good of his threat at
anytime. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s failure to report the rape incident is not
an indication of fabricated charges. If she did not become pregnant she would not have revealed
the humiliating, painful experience she suffered in the hands of someone whom she may have
regarded as a father.[30] Moreover, this Court in People v. Pareja[31] citing People v.
Ogarte[32] explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to
falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her
or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and
fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many
victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to
bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

With respect to the appellant’s allegation that AAA and BBB acted with ill motive in filing the
rape case against him as he refused to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was
carrying in her womb, this Court considers it preposterous. As can be gleaned from the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, they tried to settle the matter with the appellant not only because
they belong to the same family, but, more so, to avoid exposing in public the disgraceful thing
done to AAA by the appellant. But, the latter denied the commission of the crime and even got
mad at them. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, together with BBB, sought the assistance of
their Barangay Captain and later filed the case against the appellant. To the mind of this Court,
the action taken by AAA and BBB after the appellant’s denial of the commission of the crime
was not prompted by any ill motive but by the desire to seek the truth and get justice for the
wrong done to AAA. As succinctly explained by the Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x the filing of the rape charge was done by [AAA] not by mere desire to exact revenge or ill
motive but was driven by the heinousness of the crime and the feeling of degradation and for the
lone purpose of ferreting the truth.

“Undergoing all of the humiliating and invasive procedures for the case – the initial police
interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial and the cross-
examination – proves to be the litmus test for truth, especially when endured by a minor who
gives her consistent and unwavering testimony on the details of her ordeal.”[34]

Moreover, as this Court has pronounced in Rondina v. People,[35] ill motives become
inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which
clearly establishes the liability of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically identified the
appellant as her ravisher. Her account of the incident was given credence by both lower courts to
which this Court conforms. Thus, the appellant’s flimsy allegation of ill motive is
immaterial. Besides, no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her
sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.[36]

This Court equally finds erroneous the appellant’s contentions that Dr. Faciol is not an expert
witness, thus, her testimony cannot be given any probative value and that both Dr. Faciol’s
testimony and her medical findings could not prove the charge of rape against him. In
prosecutions for rape, the testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable for a conviction for
rape. Such is not an element of rape. By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina, the victim said all that was necessary to prove rape. Also, it is well settled that medical
findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not essential to convict the appellant of
rape. Hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. What is essential is that there was
penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt
in this case by the testimony of AAA.[37] Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that after 8 to 10 days
from the time the victim was raped there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of
rape on the victim’s vagina.[38] This would precisely explain the lack of any injury on AAA’s
genitalia.

Now, in comparison to AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and her positive identification
of the appellant as her rapist, the appellant could only muster denial and alibi as his defenses. As
this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony, which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover,
for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.[39] In the case at bench, the appellant miserably failed to prove that he was not at the
scene of the crime on 28 August 2002. As comprehensively discussed by the Court of Appeals:

For one, no sufficient independent evidence was presented to support [the] appellant’s claim that
he was in Cebu City on [28 August 2002], driving a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he went
home only on Saturday afternoons, and that after he stopped driving sometime in 2002, he lived
in his brother’s shop located in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City.

As proof of his being a professional driver, he presented his professional driver’s license.

For another, it has been established from the testimony of [AAA] that her house is not far from
the house of the appellant and that she had to pass by [the] appellant’s house before reaching her
house. Based on the foregoing, this court can safely conclude that, due to the proximity of the
two houses to each other, it was not physically impossible for [the] appellant to be at the scene of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.

Still for another, [AAA] could not have made a mistake in identifying the appellant as her
rapist, as the latter not only lived in her neighborhood and is known to her for many years prior
to the rape incidents being her mother’s first cousin.

In the face, therefore, of the positive identification by [AAA], [the] appellant’s self-serving
denial and alibi cannot prevail.[40]

In light of the foregoing, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction for simple rape.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. The lower courts, therefore, correctly imposed the said
penalty.

This Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 moral damages by the lower courts. Moral
damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.[41] In
addition thereto, this Court finds it proper to also award P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 exemplary damages to AAA. Civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to
have been committed.[42] Exemplary damages are also called for, by way of public example, and
to protect the young from sexual abuse.[43] Furthermore, all damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.[44]

Finally, this Court similarly affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision
ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of
evidence thereof. In this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was
medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002
was not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999
up to 28 August 2002, only two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999
and on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in 1999 for
prosecution’s failure to specify with certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense was
committed. With these, the appellant cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s
child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt of the
appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is the
impregnation of the rape victim not an element of rape;[45] it must also be stressed that AAA
stated that the appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002.[46] Although the
appellant cannot be held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not cover other incidents
of rape prior to 28 August 2002, AAA’s testimony on this point provides a possible explanation
for her childbirth on 5 January 2003 as her child turned one on 5 January 2004.[47]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is further ordered to pay AAA
civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively, plus interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212194, July 06, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROD FAMUDULAN[1] Y
FEDELIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal[2] from the October 3, 2013 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05447 which affirmed with modification appellant Rod Famudulan's
conviction for the crime of statutory rape as defined under Article 266-A(l)(d)[4] of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) in Criminal Case No. P-7904 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.

Appellant, a 42-year-old man, was accused and charged with the crime of statutory rape against
AAA,[5] who, with her mother[6] and father,[7] filed an Information[8] with the provincial
prosecutor which reads:
That on or about the 1ST day of January, 2010 at around 12:00 o'clock noon, in Barangay [XXX],
Municipality of [YYY], Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROD FAMUDULAN y Fedelin,
with lewd and unchaste designs, by means of violence, force and intimidation, did lie and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse of one [AAA], a six (6) year-old-girl minor, against the
latter's will and without her consent, acts which affects her moral, psychological and emotional
growth, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO ART. 335 of the RPC as amended by R.A. 7659, in relation to R.A. 7610.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.[9] After pre-trial terminated, trial on the merits
ensued.

The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Adelaido Malaluan as its witnesses.

AAA,[10] a six-year-old girl,[11] testified that the appellant was her aunt's neighbor. She stated that
on January 1, 2010, at around noon, she was cornered and ordered by the appellant to fellate him
while he inserted his finger in her vaginal orifice. Thereafter, accused inserted his organ in her
orifice. Accused threatened to kill her if she told anybody of what had happened. She positively
identified accused as her assailant in open court.[12]

Dr. Malaluan, a Rural Health Physician, examined AAA and affirmed that he executed a
Medico-Legal Report[13] with the following findings:
FINDINGS:

> Contusion hematoma left frontal area;

> Fresh complete laceration at 6 and 9 o'clock position on the part of the hymen.

LABORATORY REPORT:

GRAM STAIN (CERVICO-VAGINAL SMEAR) - No Sperm cell seen.

AAA was seven years old at the time of testimony. TSN, November 2, 2010, p. 1. AAA's
Certificate of Live Birth was used to prove victim's age. Records, p 48 Dr. Malaluan stated that
the injuries sustained by AAA, i.e., hematoma, contusion and fresh lacerations, may have been
caused by a blunt object such as a hard penis.[14]

For its part, the defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant denied the charge
against him. He claimed that on January 1, 2010, at noontime, he went to his cousin Joel
Falame's house to borrow P500.00 as bus fare to Batangas. Thereafter, he boarded a van bound
for Calapan. Deciding that it was too late in the day for him to take the trip all the way to
Batangas, appellant alighted in Banus and spent the night at the house of one Evelyn Rosas. The
following day, he boarded the bus going to Batangas and arrived there the day after. He testified
that he did not know of any reason why AAA or her family would file the case against him.

In its January 12, 2012 Decision,[15] the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of statutory rape. The RTC gave credence to AAA's testimony since she was a child of
tender years, AAA being only seven years old. Moreover, the testimony was delivered in a
spontaneous and straightforward manner. On the other hand, appellant's defense of denial and
alibi was left unsubstantiated by evidence. The RTC noted that Bansud is not too far from Banus.
In light of the credible testimony and positive identification of the appellant by AAA and
appellant's unsubstantiated defense, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of statutory rape. Thus:
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the court hereby finds ROD FAMUDULAN y Fedelin
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. To pay the offended party the amount of Fifty
Thousand ([P]50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand ([P]50,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[16]
Appellant moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the RTC's January 26, 2012
Order.[17]

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling but modified the award of damages. The CA stated
that all the elements of the crime of statutory rape were proven by the prosecution. It also stated
that AAA's age was established by a certified true copy of her Certificate of Live Birth,[18] the
best evidence to prove age. Moreover, the CA sustained the RTC's finding that AAA was a
credible witness owing to her clear, candid and spontaneous testimony. Absent any iota that the
trial court overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance, the
appellate court will not disturb the credence placed by the trial courts to the testimony of
witnesses, the RTC being in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses. The CA thus
affirmed the conviction, but increased the award of damages. The CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Order in Criminal Case No.
P-7904 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant ROD
FAMUDULAN y FEDELIN is ordered to indemnify AAA the amount of [P]75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, [P]75,000.00 as moral damages, [P]30,000.00 as exemplary damages and that all
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

The sentence of imprisonment is maintained.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[19]
Hence, this appeal.

On January 14, 2015, this Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, but both
parties manifested that they would no longer file the pleadings and opted to replead and adopt the
arguments submitted before the CA.[20]

The issue for our consideration is whether the CA erred in affirming appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

We dismiss the appeal but modify the penalty imposed.

The crime of statutoiy rape is defined by Article 266-A(l)(d) of the RPC which reads:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

xxxx

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.[21] We have thus ruled that in the
prosecution of statutory rape the following elements must exist: (1) the victim is a female under
12 years of age or is demented; and (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim.[22] In
order to successfully convict an accused for statutory rape therefore, it is imperative that the
prosecution prove that the woman is under 12 years of age and carnal knowledge took place.[23]

Here, we agree with both the CA and the RTC that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of statutory rape.

One, appellant's objection that AAA's birth certificate was not offered in evidence is unfounded.
That AAA was six years old at the time of the incident was proven when her Certificate of Live
Birth[24] was introduced in evidence.[25]

Two, we agree that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.

In the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Jose Estalin Prodenciado,[26] we reiterated the
guidelines in addressing the issue of credibility of witnesses. First, this Court gives the highest
respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witness, it having the distinct opportunity
of observing the witness' demeanor on the stand.[27]Second, absent substantial reasons, i.e.,
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, that are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded, which would warrant the reversal of the RTC's evaluation, the
appellate court is generally bound by the lower court's findings.[28] Lastly, the rule is stringently
applied when the CA affirms the lower court's ruling.[29]

Here, appellant presents no compelling reason to disturb the RTC and the CA's assessment of
AAA's credibility. He merely attacks AAA's testimony for its supposed lack of detail. We
disagree.

AAA testified that appellant ordered her to perform fellatio on him while simultaneously
inserting his fingers in her genitals whereafter he had sexual relations with her. At this point in
the court proceedings, AAA testified in the following manner:
Q.- [AAA], do you know Rod Famudolan?

A.- Yes, sir.

Q.- Why do you know Rod Famudolan?

A.- Because he was residing in our place.

Q.- Do you know the house of Rod Famudolan?

A.- Yes, sir.

Q.- Where is it situated?

A.- He is a neighbor of my Auntie.

Q.- You are a victim in this case and you executed an affidavit?

A.- Yes, sir.

Q.- What did Rod Famudolan did (sic) to you?

WITNESS:

A.- He ordered me to sack (sic) his penis and he inserted his finger inside my vagina.

PROS. DE LOS REYES:

Q.- Then what else happened?

A.- And he made a pumping motion, sir.

xxxx

Q.- What did he tell you if any? A.- He will kill and he will not let me live.[30]
It has been held that when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity.[31] Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a
stoiy of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial
or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong
done to her.[32] Given AAA's immaturity and the injuries as found in the medical report,
consistent with sexual abuse, this Court finds no reason to reverse the CA and the RTC
decisions.

Moreover, appellant's defense of denial and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially
if uncorroborated.[33] Denial cannot prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical
assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one
hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[34]

However, we are constrained to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Article
266-B provides that in cases of qualified statutory rape the penalty imposed shall be death, viz.:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

xxxx
5. When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[35] prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty.[36] Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9346 instead prescribes that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole be imposed in cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or the sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, to wit:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

xxxx

SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Here, AAA's age was proven to be six years old at the time of the abuse, therefore, the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Further with respect to the damages
awarded, we find that the same is in line with current jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The October 3, 2013 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05447 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant ROD FAMUDULAN y FEDEL1N is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353, in relation to Article 266-B and is accordingly sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ORDERED to pay AAA
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,[*] J., Acting Chairperson, Del Castillo,[**] PEREZ,[***] and Perlas-

Bernabe,[****]JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OBALDO BANDRIL Y
TABLING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the September 24, 2013 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 05527 affirming appellant's conviction for three counts of rape and one count of acts of
lasciviousness.

Appellant was charged of raping his 14-year-old daughter, AAA,[2] three times and attempting to
rape her at another time. The four Informations read:

[Criminal Case No. CR-08-9204]

That on the month of March 2007, at 11:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Sitio [XXX],
Barangay [XXX], Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust,
lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation and even
taking advantage of his moral authority and influence over the private complainant [AAA], his
legitimate daughter and who was then fourteen (14) years old, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent, thereby violating her person and chastity, acts of sexual abuse which debase, degrade
and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA] as a child and as a human being, to her
damage and prejudice.

In the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances of relationship is attendant, the
accused being the father of the complainant and the complainant being then under eighteen (18)
years [of] age.

Contrary to Law.[3]

[Criminal Case No. CR-08-9205]

That on the month of June 2007, at 11:30 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio [XXX],
Barangay [XXX], Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust,
lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation and even
taking advantage of his moral authority and influence over the private complainant [AAA], his
legitimate daughter and who was then fourteen (14) years old, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent, thereby violating her person and chastity, acts of sexual abuse which debase, degrade
and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA] as a child and as a human being, to her
damage and prejudice.

In the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances of relationship is attendant, the
accused being the father of the complainant and the complainant being then under eighteen (18)
years [of] age.

Contrary to Law.[4]

[Criminal Case No. CR-08-9206]

That on the month of October 2007, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio [XXX],
Barangay [XXX], Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust,
lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation and even
taking advantage of his moral authority and influence over the private complainant [AAA], his
legitimate daughter and who was then fourteen (14) years old, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent, thereby violating her person and chastity, acts of sexual abuse which debase, degrade
and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said AAA as a child and as a human being, to her
damage and prejudice.

In the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances of relationship is attendant, the
accused being the father of the complainant and the complainant being then under eighteen (18)
years [of] age.

Contrary to Law.[5]

[Criminal Case No. CR-08-9207]

That in the evening of June 21, 2008, at Sitio [XXX], Barangay [XXX], Municipality of
Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, and with intent to have
carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a fourteen (14) year-old-girl, and with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously remove her clothes against
her will and without her consent, thus commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly
by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the strong
resistance put up by the complainant, [to] the damage and prejudice of said [AAA].

In the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances of relationship is attendant, the
accused being the father of the complainant and the complainant being then under eighteen (18)
years of age.

Contrary to Law.[6]
The prosecution established that AAA was born on December 17, 1993. She is the daughter of
appellant and BBB. They resided at Sitio XXX, Barangay XXX, Municipality of Victoria,
Province of Oriental Mindoro.

Sometime in March 2007, at around 11:00 p.m., while AAA's mother BBB was not in the house,
appellant removed AAA's clothes, took his own clothes off and ordered AAA to lie down.
Appellant mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain. After
satisfying his lust, appellant ordered AAA to wear her clothes and walk away. Out of fear of her
father's threats, she did not divulge the incident to anyone.

Sometime in June 2007, appellant and AAA were planting coconut seedlings in a coconut
plantation in Barangay XXX. Again, appellant removed AAA's clothes and ordered her to lie
down on the banana leaf gathered by appellant. Appellant inserted his penis into AAA's vagina
and fondled her breast.

Around October 2007, while at a lanzones plantation in Barangay XXX, appellant approached
AAA, ordered her to lie down on the grass and took her clothes off. Then appellant inserted his
penis into AAA's vagina, fondled her breast and kissed her lips. Thereafter, appellant clothed
AAA and ordered her to collect the lanzones.

Sometime in 2008, appellant attempted to rape AAA in their house. He was able to undress her
but failed to rape her.

Several months later, BBB noticed that AAA's stomach was getting bigger. BBB took AAA to
a hilot who told BBB that AAA is eight months pregnant. It was at this time that AAA told BBB
that she was raped by her father. AAA gave birth to a baby boy whom they gave away for
adoption. AAA said that she wants her father to pay for his crime.

Appellant denied the charges and insisted that they were instigated by some persons unknown to
him to destroy his good reputation and character.

In its Decision[7] dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 39, found appellant guilty of three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. CR-08-9204, this Court finds the accused OBALDO BANDRIL y
TABLING GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged against him in
the aforequoted Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE, and to PAY the private
 complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. C-08-9205, this Court finds the accused OBALDO BANDRIL y
TABLING GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged against him in
the aforequoted Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE, and to PAY the private
complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs;
3. In Criminal Case No. C-08-9206, this Court finds the accused OBALDO BANDRIL y
TABLING GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged against him in
the aforequoted Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE, and to PAY the private
complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs;
4. In Criminal Case No. C-08-9207, this Court finds the accused OBALDO BANDRIL y
TABLING GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, AS MINIMUM, to SIX (6) YEARS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL, AS MAXIMUM and to PAY the private complainant the amount of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs;
The aforementioned penalties shall be served by the accused SUCCESSIVELY.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant raped his own daughter
AAA sometime in March 2007, June 2007 and October 2007. The RTC noted that AAA
categorically testified as to the commission of the rapes and that AAA positively identified
appellant as the perpetrator. The medico-legal report stating that AAA has healed hymenal
lacerations also confirmed AAA's testimony, said the RTC. The RTC also noted that at the time
she was raped, AAA was only 14 years old as she was born on December 17, 1993 per her birth
certificate. Aside from appellant's admission that AAA is his daughter, the same certificate also
proved the qualifying circumstance of relationship between appellant and AAA. The RTC
rejected appellant's denial on the ground that it cannot prevail over AAA's positive testimony. On
the charge of attempted rape, the RTC found appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC
noted that while appellant was able to undress AAA and tried to sexually assault her, there is no
showing that appellant's penis touched any part of AAA's body.

Appellant appealed and claimed that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant averred that the RTC is expected to
properly evaluate and weigh the testimony of the witnesses, particularly of the victim herself.

The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision with modification in that the award
of exemplary damages in the three rape cases was increased to P30,000 and 6% interest per
annum was imposed on all the damages awarded. The fallo of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The December 6, 2011 Joint Decision x x x of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39 in Criminal Case Nos. x x x CR-08-9204,
CR-08-9205, CR-08[-]9206 and 08-9207 are AFFIRMED with modifications in that the amount
of exemplary damages awarded to "AAA" in Criminal Case Nos. CR-08-9204, CR-08-9205,
CR-08[-]9206 is increased to P30,000.00 for each case, and interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The CA found that AAA was telling the truth when she declared that her father raped her on
three separate occasions. The CA said that AAA was consistent in her narration on how she was
abused by her father in their own house, in the coconut plantation and in the lanzones plantation.
The CA also agreed with the RTC's finding that appellant is guilty of acts of lasciviousness when
he removed her clothes and tried to sexually assault her a fourth time. Appellant's acts clearly
showed lewdness and are indecent and inappropriate, said the CA.

Hence, this appeal. Appellant filed a manifestation in lieu of a supplemental brief.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit. The RTC and CA did not err in convicting appellant for
three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. On appellant's claim that the RTC
was expected to properly evaluate and weigh the testimony of the witnesses, particularly of the
victim herself, we note that the RTC properly considered AAA's testimony in ruling that AAA
categorically testified as to the commission of the rapes and positively identified appellant as her
rapist. In fact, the RTC quoted AAA's testimony in its Decision, to wit:

[Q]: So you remember when was the first time?

A: In March 2007, Ma 'am.

xxx

Q: When your father went on top of you was he nude?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: So when he went on top of you, what did he do next?

A: He already raped me, Ma 'am.

Q: When you say he raped [you], what exactly did he do to you, Madam Witness?

A: "Inaano niya ako sa ari ko."

Q: Are you telling us that your father inserted his penis to your vagina?

xxx

A: Yes Ma'am.

Q: So how long was your father's penis in your vagina, if you could tell us?

A: Quite a long time, Ma 'am x x x.[10]

[Second rape]

[Q]: xxx So when did the second rape incident happened?

A: In the month of June 2007 Ma 'am.

Q: So tell us what happened on that second time?

A: Same thing happened Ma 'am.

xxx

Q: So tell us exactly what was that same incident that happened?

A: He also took off my clothes Ma 'am.

Q: After taking off your clothes, what did he do next?

A: He inserted his penis.

Q: On what part of your body did he insert his penis?

A: Into my vagina.

Q: And for this second time, how long was he in that position?

A: Quite long, Ma 'am xxx.[11]

[Third rape]
[Q]: x x x What date was that third incident?

A: October 2007 Ma'am.

xxx

Q: After you were made to lie down, what did your father exactly do?

A: He took off my clothes.

Q: And after taking off your clothes, what happened next?

A: He also took off his clothes.

Q: So after he took off his clothes, what did he do next?

A: He went on top of me again.

Q: So after he went on top of you, what did he actually do?

A: He already inserted his penis into my vagina, Ma 'am xxx.[12]

The CA also found that AAA was telling the truth when she declared that her father raped her on
three separate occasions. The rule is that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case, is accorded full weight and credit
as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect.[13]And after our own examination of AAA's
testimony, we find no reason to disagree with the RTC and CA in finding AAA as a credible
witness.

We also agree with the RTC in rejecting appellant's denial of the rape charges against him. Said
denial cannot prevail over AAA's credible and positive testimony that appellant raped her.[14]

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man
having carnal laiowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through
force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when
the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. In incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or
intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would
suffice.[15] In this case, appellant had carnal knowledge three times of his daughter, AAA, who
was then only 14 years old.

As regards appellant's conviction for acts of lasciviousness, not for attempted rape, we find no
reason to disturb it. Appellant's acts of undressing AAA and trying to sexually assault her a
fourth time are lascivious acts. These acts are clearly lewd, indecent and inappropriate. Lewdness
is defined as an "obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous" act which signifies that form of
immorality carried on a wanton manner.[16] Indeed, appellant cannot be convicted of attempted
rape since appellant's penis never touched any part of AAA's body.[17] For there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the
vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance,
the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.[18]

For the crimes of rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and the
award of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages for each count were correct.[19] For the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty of
imprisonment for six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years of prision
correctional, as maximum, and the award of P20,000 as civil indemnity, P30,000 as moral
damages, P30,000 as exemplary damages were also correct.[20] We likewise agree with the CA in
awarding 6% interest per annum on all the damages awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision.[21]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the September 24, 2013 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05527.

With costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,[*] J., Acting Chairperson, Perez,[**] Perlas-Bernabe,[***] and Leonen,[****]JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201110, July 06, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JEFFREY VICTORIA Y
CRISTOBAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03973 which affirmed the conviction of Jeffrey Victoria (accused-
appellant) for the crime of rape.

The Information[2] dated December 5, 2006, which charged the accused-appellant with rape,
reads:
That, on or about the 1st day of December 2006, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA[3]], a minor, fifteen (15) years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
ensued.

The facts, as culled from the records, follow:

The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) AAA, the private complainant herself, (2) Police
Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Edilberto Antonio of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, the medico-legal officer who conducted the physical examination of the private
complainant, and (3) BBB, the mother of the private complainant.

AAA testified that in the evening of December 1, 2006, she was at Jumil's Funeral Homes in
Calumpang, Rizal to collect payments for "ending" a betting game of chance. While waiting for
payments from the players, AAA saw accused-appellant sit at the opposite side of the same
bench where she sat. Thereafter, Noel and Michael, friends of accused-appellant, arrived at
Jumil's Funeral Homes and invited him to eat lugaw with them. Accused-appellant accepted the
invitation and also convinced AAA to come with them. However, upon finding that
the lugawan was closed, the group decided to return to their homes. At this point, AAA claimed
that accused-appellant told her to instruct Noel and Michael to head home first. Then, AAA
alleged that accused-appellant lured her to a dark place where he covered her mouth with one
hand, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her.
BBB testified that she observed that AAA was pale and crying when she arrived at their house.
Furthermore, BBB noticed the dirty clothes of AAA and the bloodstains on her buttocks and
groin. When BBB asked AAA about her condition, the latter positively identified the accused-
appellant as her assailant. BBB proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant, but they did not
find him there. AAA and BBB reported the incident to the barangay and police authorities.

Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Edilberto Antonio testified that he conducted a physical examination of
AAA a day after the alleged act by the accused-appellant, and found the following injuries on
AAA's genitalia: shallow fresh hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock position, and perihymenal
contusions at 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions. These findings led him to conclude that AAA
suffered from a blunt force or penetrating trauma on her genitalia. Finally, he also observed that
AAA had an ecchymosis (kiss mark) on her neck.

On the other hand, accused-appellant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA, but
claimed that such act was consensual as AAA was his girl friend. Thus, accused-appellant
contended that he did not employ force, threat or intimidation in having sexual intercourse with
AAA.

Accused-appellant narrated that in the evening of December 1, 2006, he was at Jumil's Funeral
Homes when his girlfriend, AAA, approached him and invited him to make a bet in "ending".
Instead of making a bet, accused-appellant invited AAA to eat lugaw, which the latter accepted.
While they were walking towards the lugawan, they encountered Noel and Michael who invited
them to visit a certain place near the highway. When accused-appellant refused their invitation,
he persuaded AAA that they instead visit a vacant lot near the APS Construction Supply Store.
Upon reaching the vacant lot, accused-appellant started to kiss AAA. However, when accused-
appellant noticed that someone was watching them, he proceeded to the end of the vacant lot
where AAA followed him. There, they had sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant further testified that he asleep immediately after having sexual intercourse
with AAA. When he woke up, AAA was no longer beside him, so he decided to go home.

The defense also presented the testimony of Edison Baltar who claimed that in the evening of
December 1, 2006, he passed by Jumil's Funeral Homes where he saw accused-appellant sitting
on AAA's lap. He also testified that AAA kissed accused-appellant on his forehead.

On April 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, rendered
its Decision[4] in Criminal Case No. 06-700 finding accused-appellant guilty of rape, to wit:
The foregoing considered, we find accused Jeffrey Victoria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph l(a) in relation to Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code and
sentence him to serve a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. We further order him to pay P50,000.00
as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape, the trial court gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of AAA. According to the trial court, her testimony was
straightforward, candid, unshaken by cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points. Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that her testimony was
supported by the medico-legal findings of hymenal lacerations which showed forcible
defloration. On the other hand, the trial court struck down the accused-appellant's "sweetheart
defense" which was not substantiated by any documentary evidence like mementos, love letters,
notes, pictures and the like. Assuming the "sweetheart defense" can pass muster, the trial court
observed that such sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.

On May 11, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal[6] which was given due course by
the trial court.

In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant argued that his sexual intercourse with AAA
was consensual. To support his argument, accused-appellant referred to the acts and omissions of
AAA before and after the sexual intercourse which show her consent, to wit: (1) acceptance of
the invitation of the accused-appellant to eat lugawand to proceed to a dark place, (2) failure to
display emotions after the sexual intercourse, and (3) failure to report the incident immediately to
BBB. Accused-appellant also claimed that there was no force, threat, or intimidation involved
when he had sexual intercourse with AAA because at the time of the incident he was not armed
with any weapon and neither did AAA sustain any abrasions on her body.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General on behalf of the State, argued that the acts and
omissions of AAA before and after the sexual intercourse cannot be immediately construed as
consent to the sexual act. They posited that the presence of any weapon on the part of the
assailant and abrasion on the body of the victim is irrelevant in determining whether force,
threat, or intimidation was involved in the act of sexual intercourse.

On July 28, 2011, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated 29 April 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67 of Binangonan, Rizal
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED[7]
Hence, this appeal.

Accused-appellant reiterates his argument that the acts and omissions of AAA before and after
the sexual intercourse reveal that she consented thereto. He also emphasizes that the absence of
any abrasion on AAA's body indicate that the latter consented to the sexual intercourse.

We dismiss the appeal.

In People v. Bautista[8] we laid down the requirements before the accused can seek refuge behind
the "sweetheart defense" to wit:
In rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that the accused
and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The
second is as important as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love is not a
license for lust.
Accused-appellant failed in both aspects.

Firstly, in order to prove that the accused and the victim are indeed sweethearts, we have ruled in
a long line of cases that it is incumbent upon the accused to present documentary and/or other
evidence of the relationship like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.[9] In the
present case, aside from the self-serving testimony of accused-appellant and that of his friend
Edison Baltasar, the defense failed to present any other documentary evidence of the alleged
relationship between AAA and the accused-appellant. On the other hand, AAA clearly and
categorically denied having any romantic relationship with accused-appellant.

Secondly, the evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that accused-appellant employed force,
threat, or intimidation in order to succeed in having carnal knowledge with AAA.

In People v. Flores,[10] we ruled that in rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by
the guilty party need not be irresistible. It is only necessary that such force is sufficient to
consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated
in light of the victim's perception at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it
produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her
ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Hence, what is
important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of
the appellant.

We give credence to the testimony of AAA before the trial court as she specifically narrated how
the accused-appellant employed force, threat, or intimidation against her:
xxxx

Q - After you were informed that the lugawan was closed what happened?

A - I was ahead of them in walking, ma'am.

Q - What did the accused do when you were walking ahead of them?

A - He called me and told me to let Michael and Noel go ahead, ma'am.

Q - What happened? What did you do when you were instructed to let the two go ahead?

A - I stopped and he sat down at the ground, ma'am.

Q - Where was that when he sat down?

A - At the APS Construction Supply, ma'am.

Q - What happened while you were seated there in front of APS Construction Supply?

A - I asked him to leave APS ma'am.

Q - And what did the accused do when you asked him to leave the APS?

A - He stood up and proceeded to a dark place, ma'am.

Q - How about you, what did you do when he proceeded to the dark place?

A - He called me, ma'am.

Q - What did you do when he summoned you?

A - I came near, ma'am.

Q - When you approached him what happened next?

A - He stood up and he sat down again on the pile of gravel, ma'am.

Q - What happened after that?

A - He sat down and he pulled me and told me to sit down also, ma'am.
Q - What did you do when he pulled you down?

A - I sat down and he embraced me and he brought me to a grassy place, ma'am.

Q - How far was that from the APS Construction Supply?

A - It's also there at the APS ma'am.

Q - What was the source of illumination in that place?

A - None, ma'am.

Q - And after that, what happened after you were brought to the grassy area?

A - He undressed me. He removed my pedal shorts and he kissed me, ma'am.

Q - Why did you not run away from him when he was already removing your pedal shorts?

A - He was holding me, ma'am.

Q - Why did you not shout?

A - He covered my mouth with his hand, ma'am.

Q - After removing your pedal shorts and kissing you, what happened next?

A - He also removed his shorts, ma'am.

Q - So at that time he was removing his shorts, why did you not run away from him?

A - He was holding me tight, ma'am, (inipit niya ako)

Q - What was your position when he was holding you tight?

A - I was lying down, ma'am.

Q - After the accused was able to remove his shorts, what happened next?

A- He inserted his penis to my vagina, ma'am.

Q - What did you feel when he inserted his penis to your vagina?

A - "Ang sakit-sakit po!"

Q - After inserting his penis what kind of movement did he make?

A- Up and down po, ma'am.

xxxx

COURT:
Habang ini-spread niya iyong legs mo ano sinasabi niya sa iyo?

WITNESS:
None Your Honor.
COURT:
Ano sinasabi mo sa kanya?

WITNESS:
Nagmamakaawa po ako sa kanya na huwag gawin.

COURT:
Ano sabi niya?

WITNESS:
Wala po.

COURT:
Kung ayaw mong gawin niya iyon, bakit hindi mo siya itinulak?

WITNESS:
Hindi ko po siya naitulak kasi nakapatong po siya sa akin.[11]
The above testimony is bolstered by the medico-legal finding of hymenal laceration on AAA's
genitalia which is strong evidence of penile invasion.[12] It is well to note that we have
consistently declared that a rape victim's account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if
it is straightforward, candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining
physician,[13] as in the present case.

Pertinently, accused-appellant questioned the credibility of AAA as a rape victim by referring to

her acts and omissions before and after the sexual intercourse. On this score alone, our
discussion in People v. Pareja[14] is illuminating:
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the
blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has
recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has
been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape.
Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially
when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. In this case, AAA's lack of resistance was
brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke
of the incident.
AAA's conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also
not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act
within reason or in accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a
standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot
be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of
a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
In the case at bar, the lack of resistance on the part of AAA or her unusual behavior after the
sexual intercourse has no impact on her credibility as a witness.

As a final note, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Galido[15]:

Time and time again, we have said that a rape victim — especially one of tender age — would
not normally concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Thus, when a woman — more so if she is a
minor — says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed. And as long as the testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on that basis alone.
As regards the civil liability, however, the Court finds the need to correct the awards made by the
RTC and the CA. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[16] AAA is entitled to P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P3 0,000 as exemplary damages. Additionally, the
Court imposes interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded, in accordance with
current policy.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the July 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03973 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant is ordered to pay AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and
P30,000 as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages
awarded in this case reckoned from finality of this Decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid
by appellant.

With costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,[*]J., Acting Chairperson, Perez,[**] Perlas-Bernabe,[***] and Leonen,[****]JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 197731, July 06, 2015 ]
HERMIE OLARTE Y TARUG, AND RUBEN OLAVARIO Y MAUNAO, PETITIONERS,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioners Hermie Olarte y Tarug (Olarte) and Ruben Olavario y Maunao (Olavario), together
with Salvador Pasquin y Marco (Pasquin), were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in
an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about September 15, 2002 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, without any justifiable cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one EUGENE VILLOSTAS y MARTINEZ, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would constitute the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the
will of the herein accused, that is, due to the timely, able and efficient medical attendance
rendered to the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All the three accused posted[2] bail. But since Pasquin jumped bail, only petitioners were
arraigned on June 25, 2003 where they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[3] Trial thereafter
ensued.

The prosecution averred that in the early morning of September 15, 2002, the victim Eugene M.
Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother, Charlie Penilla (Penilla), from a drinking
session. On their way home, Villostas decided to buy cigarettes from a nearby videoke bar at
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela City. Inside the bar, however, three men who belonged to a group
then singing and drinking suddenly stabbed him on different parts of his body. They only
stopped when bystanders started throwing stones at them. This whole incident was witnessed by
Penilla who was then only seven to eight arms length away from the crime scene.

Barangay tanods immediately responded and brought the malefactors to the Barangay Hall
where they were later identified as petitioners and their co-accused Pasquin. Meanwhile,
Villostas was rushed to the Valenzuela General Hospital where he was treated by Dr. Jolou A.
Pascual (Dr. Pascual).

During trial, Dr. Pascual testified that Villostas sustained multiple stab wounds described as
follows:
Multiple Stab Wound
5cm 4th ICS anterior axillary, left 3.5 cm 5th ICS
5 cm curvilinear subcostal mid axillary, right
2cm anterior shoulder, left
4cm anterior shoulder, left[4]
According to him, all these wounds could have caused Villostas' death were it not for the timely
medical attention given him.[5]

The defense, on the other hand, alleged that at around 2:00 o' clock in the morning of September
15, 2002, while petitioners, Pasquin and some other companions were having a drinking spree
inside a videoke bar on Gen. T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, several persons threw stones at them
hitting Olarte and another companion. Their group thus disbanded. While most of them headed
straight home, Olarte, together with a certain Joni, went to the Barangay Hall to have the stoning
incident entered in its blotter. Upon arrival thereat, however, they were surprised that Olarte,
Olavario and Pasquin were being implicated in a stabbing incident. The three were then brought
to the Valenzuela General Hospital where Villostas identified them as his assailants. Thereafter,
they were arrested and detained at the city jail.

On April 27, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, rendered its
Decision[6] finding petitioners guilty as charged, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Hermie Olarte y Tarug and Ruben Olavario
y Maunao guilty beyond reasonable doubt as PRINCIPALS [in] the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE and [are] hereby sentenced x x x to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) years, 4
(four) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor medium as maximum. They are also ordered to pay jointly and solidarity
the victim Eugene Villostas y Martinez the amount of Php22,462.05 for medical expenses as
actual damages, Php20,000.00 as moral damages and costs of suit.

Since x x x accused Salvador Pasquin Marco has not yet been arrested and arraigned despite the
issuance of order of arrest on November 8, 2002, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against
said accused Salvador Pasquin y Marco. Meantime, let the case against him be archived to be
retrieved as soon as he is arrested.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal[8] which was granted by the RTC in its Order[9] of May 13,
2009.

Before the Court of Appeals (CA),[10] petitioners questioned the credibility of Villostas and
Penilla as prosecution witnesses. They pointed out inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting
the victim's degree of intoxication at the time of the incident, the kind or brand of liquor that he
imbibed, and the length of time that he had been drinking immediately prior thereto. Petitioners
argued that such inconsistencies rendered doubtful their identification as the culprits by said
prosecution witnesses.

The CA, in its February 9, 2011 Decision,[11] debunked petitioners' arguments as it found the
inconsistencies pointed out by them as relating to mere minor details. On the other hand, it found
no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as regards petitioners' culpability,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 27, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 759-V-02, convicting the [petitioners] of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[13] was likewise denied in a Resolution[14] dated July 13,
2011.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioners raise the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME OF
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE ON

[RECORD] THAT NEITHER OF THE PETITIONERS WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE
CRIME.[16]
Petitioners insist that the testimonies of Villostas and Penilla are devoid of credibility as they
contain several inconsistencies. These inconsistencies rendered doubtful the said witnessess'
identification of petitioners as the assailants. Petitioners also point out that they themselves went
to the authorities to report the incident. This, according to them, negates their involvement in the
crime because had they been the real perpetrators, they would not dare report the matter to the
authorities. Moreover, they contend that the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the
testimony of one Rodel Roque who categorically stated on the witness stand that he saw
Villostas being stabbed by only one person and that person was neither of the petitioners. In view
of these, petitioners pray that the assailed CA Decision be reversed and set aside and that they be
acquitted of the crime charged.

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

Suffice it to state that the errors raised by the petitioners are all "appreciation of evidence"
errors or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already explained in Batistis v. People[17] that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on
appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other
than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.

A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court,
explicitly so provides, viz[.]:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law. may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency.[18]
Here, the assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial
evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.[19] The petition must therefore be denied on this
basis because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only
legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings
of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,"[20] which was not shown
to be the case here.
At any rate, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's conviction of
petitioners for frustrated homicide. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code exist.[21] These elements were proved during trial. First, direct and positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses established that Villostas sustained seven stab wounds on vital parts of his
body caused by a pointed sharp object. Plainly, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by him demonstrate petitioners' intent to kill. Next, the injuries suffered by Villostas
were all fatal. Particularly critical were the 5-centimeter wound below his left armpit, the 3.5-
centimeter wound on the mid-part of his left chest which required inserting a tube thereon to
drain blood so as not to impede his breathing, and the 5-centimeter stab wound on the right side
of his abdomen which also injured his liver.[22] As testified to by Dr. Pascual, Villostas would
have succumbed to death due to the said injuries if not for the timely medical attention. Finally,
no qualifying circumstance for murder was alleged in the Information to have attended the
commission of the crime.

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon petitioners is also proper, there is
a need to modify the awards made in favor of Villostas. The actual damages awarded by the RTC
was only P22,642.05. Hence, there is a need to award P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages in a lesser amount.[23] Also, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
moral damages must be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00.[24] All these awards shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum to commence from the date of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 9, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CRNo. 32640 which affirmed the April 27, 2009 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 in Criminal Case No. 759-V-02 convicting
petitioners Hermie Olarte y Tarug and Ruben Olavario y Maunao of the crime of frustrated
homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the victim Eugene Villostas y
Martinez is awarded (1) temperate damages of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages; (2) moral
damages in an increased amount of F25,000.00; and that (3) the said awards shall be subject to
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,* Bersamin,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209786, July 06, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY C. PALOTES,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Court decides the appeal filed by the accused-appellant Jerry C. Palotes from the
Decision[1] dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 01301,
which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]dated February 10, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. CBU-78851. The trial court
adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of one count of rape.

On January 5, 2007, the prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing rape against
AAA[3] in the following manner:
That on or about July, 2005 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully and unlawfully have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], a 14-
year old MINOR with the mental abilities of an 8 to 9-year old child, without the consent and
against the will of the latter and knowing the mental disability of said minor at the time of the
commission of the crime.[4]
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.[5] During trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) AAA,[6] the private complainant; (2)
BBB,[7] the mother of AAA; (3) Dr. Naomi N. Poca,[8] the medico-legal officer who examined
AAA; and (4) Rosemarie C. Gonato,[9] a psychologist who examined AAA. The defense, on the
other hand, presented the testimonies of (1) the accusedappellant Jerry Palotes;[10] (2) Rose
Bistes,[11] a friend of the accusedappellant's common-law wife; and (3) Marina Abella,[12] the
owner of the house rented by the accused-appellant. Thereafter, Loren J. Borines,[13] a forensic
chemist from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), testified on the results of the court
ordered Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test that she conducted.

The Prosecution's Version of Events

As summarized in the Brief for the Appellee[14] filed before the Court of Appeals, the
prosecution's pertinent factual allegations are as follows:
The fourteen (14) years old minor victim, AAA, also known as ["ZZZ,"] lives with her mother
BBB and her father CCC in YYY, Cebu City. AAA has the mental abilities of an 8-9 years old
child. She is an illiterate and no longer goes to school.

Sometime prior to July 2005, AAA was asked by her neighbor, Dimple, to buy a diaper. While
AAA was on her way back to her neighbor's house, she was pulled by appellant Jerry Palotes
inside the latter's house. Appellant then held AAA, laid her down, removed her short pants and
underwear. He then lowered down his brief up to his knees, kissed AAA's lips and neck and
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. When AAA felt pain, appellant stopped and told her to go
home. Upon reaching home, she did not tell her mother about what happened because she was
scared.
The second time that the appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA was when her friend called
her to take care of her niece while Jerry was also inside the same house. Appellant then invited
the minor victim to enter the house, pulled her inside and closed the door. He held AAA's hands,
laid her down, removed her short pants and underwear, kissed her lips and neck and inserted his
penis and pushed it inside AAA's vagina despite her pleas not to continue. When appellant kept
on pushing his penis inside [her] vagina, AAA felt that her vagina was wet. Appellant Palotes
took off his shirt and wiped her vagina with it. He advised AAA not to tell anyone about what
happened and the latter went home.

The third time that appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA was when he was washing clothes
in front of the minor victim's house. They had a chat, with appellant telling AAA that she was
beautiful. She just smiled. He then rushed washing his clothes and told AAA to get inside the
house while he hang dry his clothes. When AAA was inside the house, the appellant followed
her and removed her short pants and panty. He then inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina just
like what he did last time. He then told AAA not to tell anyone and it would be between the two
of them. Afterwards, AAA went home.[15] (Citations omitted.)
As regards the subsequent events and the medical examinations conducted on AAA, the
prosecution stated that:
On September 23, 2005, AAA was brought by her mother, BBB, to her grandmother in [XXX],
Cebu. Her grandmother noticed that AAA did not have her monthly period. BBB and the
grandmother brought AAA to a Health Center in [XXX] where it was known that AAA was
already pregnant for five (5) months. When BBB tried to ask AAA who impregnated her, AAA
would just keep her silence and say nothing.

They then brought AAA to the Pink Room of VSMMC for medical examination where it was
confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. AAA finally told her mother that it was Jerry Palotes
whom she had sexual intercourse [with] but she cannot recall when it happened. BBB identified
appellant Jerry Palotes as their neighbor who lives in front of their house. She then asked the
appellant but he strongly denied it. AAA gave birth last April 5, 2006.

Dr. Naomi Poca, a resident physician at the Women and Children Protection Center of the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital in Cebu City, brought the medical records of the minor victim
particularly the medical chart which includes the Medical Certificate, Intake Form, and Medico
Legal Certificate. She interviewed the victim and her mother and together with Dr. Amadora, the
OB gynecologist connected with the Center, conducted a physical examination on AAA. The
medical report stated that AAA suffered a complete transection at 6 o'clock position extending to
the fossa navicularis and her ano-genital examination findings are definite for blunt or
penetrative trauma to the hymen. Dr. Poca noted that the transection indicates that blunt forces
were applied to the hymen of the vagina and the blunt penetrating trauma applied to the hymen
caused its laceration.

Dr. Rosemarie Gonato, a psychiatrist, conducted a psychological evaluation on AAA. She

confirmed that AAA's mental age is equivalent to 6 to 7 years of age and places her functioning
within the mild mental retardation [range].[16] (Citations omitted.)
The prosecution presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit A- the
Affidavit[17] of AAA; (2) Exhibit B the Affidavit[18] of BBB; (3) Exhibit B-1 - the Birth
Certificate[19] of AAA; (4) Exhibit C the Medico-Legal Certificate[20]of AAA; (5) Exhibit C-1 -
the results of the Anogenital Examination[21] on AAA; (6) Exhibit C-2 the Interview
Sheet[22]reflecting the interview of AAA conducted at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital; and
(7) Exhibit D - the Psychological Evaluation Report[23] on AAA.
The Defense's Evidence

The defense countered the prosecution's statement of facts with the testimonies of its own
witnesses which were condensed in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant[24] filed before the Court
of Appeals, thusly:
To refute the allegations of the prosecution, the defense presented the accused Jerry C. Palotes,
Marina Abella and Rose Bistes.

Accused Jerry C. Palotes strongly denied the allegations against him and alleged that when this
case was initially filed at the Office of the Barangay [YYY], [AAA] could not identify or
remember who sexually abused her. She was merely prodded by her relatives to point him as the
perpetrator in their desperate effort to get financial support for the child. He surmised that since
the complainant gave birth to the child in April 2006, he could not have been the father of the
child since he was always not in his rented house. Moreover, since he has a live-in partner, there
was no opportunity for him to do the alleged act aside from the fact that he does not have any
sexual desire on her because he treated her as a younger sister considering her mental condition
and her being a child of tender age. Further, he heard from among the neighbors that the
complainant would usually go with other people and was even seen sleeping together with a
certain Junjun, a balut vendor. There are also rumors that a certain Berto, a taxi driver, who
frequently visited the place, was also seen together with complainant. Since complainant is very
susceptible to suggestion, she merely adopted the suggestion by some of her relatives including
her mother that he [the accused] should be pointed out as the one who fathered her new born
child. Furthermore, on two occasions, [he] was approached by the mother of the complainant
telling him that she would not pursue the filing of the case if he promise[d] to shoulder the
hospital expenses when the complainant would give birth as well as the expenses for food, milk
and other needs of the child.

Marina Abella testified that she is the owner of the house rented by the accused. She also lives
within said vicinity and she can attest to the fact that accused is not usually at the rented house as
he was busy in his work as a janitor. She also attests to the fact that she saw [AAA] in the
company of several people; children, men, women and even strangers. The charge against
accused was merely a product of prodding by some of the relatives of the complainant for the
purpose of getting support from accused.

Rose Bistes testified that she is one of the neighbors of the accused. She can attest to the fact that
accused is known to be good in their place.[25] (Citations omitted.)
The defense also submitted in evidence the following documents: (1) Exhibit 1 - the Counter-
Affidavit[26] of the accused-appellant; (2) Exhibit 2 the Affidavit[27] of Rose Bistes; and (3)
Exhibit 3 - the Affidavit[28] of Marina Abella.

During trial, the defense requested for the conduct of a DNA test in order to prove that the
accused-appellant was not the father of AAA's child.[29] The RTC granted this request in an
Order[30] dated May 21, 2009. On May 6, 2010, Loren J. Borines, the NBI forensic chemist who
conducted the DNA testing, testified that she analyzed the buccal swabs and blood samples taken
from the accused-appellant, AAA and DDD, AAA's child. The results of her examination were
contained in a report designated as DNA Case No. DNA-09-32, wherein she concluded that
"there is a 99.9995% Probability of Paternity that [the accused-appellant] is the biological father
of [DDD]."[31]

The prosecution marked as its Exhibits E and E-1, respectively, the report of Borines entitled
DNA Case No. DNA-09-32 and the visual aid[32] she displayed when she testified in court.[33]

The Decision of the RTC

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of one count of rape in its Decision dated February 10,
2011. The dispositive portion thereof provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is rendered finding accused,
GERRY C. PALOTES, GUILTY as principal beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE pursuant to
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. 8353 and sentences him to an
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua under the first paragraph of Article 266-B.

He is also ordered to pay the minor through h[er] parents the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(Php50,000.00[)], for and as civil damages.

Costs de oficio.[34]
The trial court ruled that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses established the fact that
AAA was not only a 14-year old minor but she had the mental abilities of an eight to nine-year
old child. According to the RTC, the accused-appellant himself admitted that he treated AAA as
a younger sister given her mental condition and her being a child of tender age. Likewise, Marina
Abella, a witness for the defense, acknowledged that AAA was mentally deficient.

The RTC ascribed greater weight to the testimony of AAA. The trial court noted that the same
was replete with specifics on how the accused appellant sexually abused AAA and she alone
could have supplied such details. The RTC further observed that AAA's testimony was given in a
straightforward manner. If there were inconsistencies therein, the trial court deemed the same
inconsequential given AAA's mental condition. As regards the corroborative testimonies of the
defense witnesses Marina Abella and Rose Bistes, the trial court concluded that the same were
hearsay evidence. Given that so many persons allegedly talked to said witnesses, not one of them
testified for the defense. The RTC added that the insistence of the accused-appellant that he be
subjected to a DNA test together with AAA and DDD, and the positive result of said test, had no
bearing on the outcome of the case since paternity is not an element of rape.

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

On appeal,[35] the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for one
count of rape in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the February 10, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 ofCebu City is AFFIRMED subject to
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant JERRY PALOTES is ORDERED to pay
AAA, [through] her parents, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil
indemnity plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full
payment thereof.[36]
The Court of Appeals found that despite AAA's mental condition, she clearly identified the
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the rape and the father of her child. The appellate court
posited that AAA's testimony was complete with specifics on how the accused-appellant
sexually abused her. Her categorical. and consistent identification of the accused-appellant was
devoid of any showing of ill motive and the same, therefore, prevailed over the latter's defenses
of alibi and denial. The Court of Appeals also ruled as credible and consistent the sworn
statement of AAA dated April 27, 2006, wherein she made a candid and straightforward
narration of how the accused-appellant raped her. To the appellate court, AAA's mental
retardation per se did not affect her credibility and the inconsistencies in AAA's testimony on
collateral and minor matters were not enough to discredit the same. Moreover, AAA's assertion
that the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her was substantially corroborated by the
medical findings on her vaginal injuries.

The Ruling of the Court

In his appeal[37] before this Court, the accused-appellant reiterated his argument that the trial
court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the fact that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant admitted that he knew of AAA's
mental handicap and he claimed that other people merely prompted AAA to execute her sworn
statement. The accused-appellant further alleged that the testimony of AAA was unclear and
inconsistent, thus falling short of the required credibility to be the basis of the accused-
appellant's conviction. As the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, he argued that his acquittal must follow.

The Court finds no merit in the accused-appellant's appeal.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as
follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Thus, for a charge of rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through
force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.
The element of carnal knowledge in this case was adequately established by the testimony of
AAA. Before the trial court, AAA stated that a neighbor asked her to buy diapers. After buying
the diapers, she was on her way to her neighbor's house when she encountered the accused
appellant. The latter made AAA get inside his house and made her lie on the floor. The accused-
appellant removed his shorts and underwear and that of AAA's. He lay beside AAA and started
kissing her lips and neck. He then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina and she felt pain.
Afterwards, AAA went home. AAA did not tell her mother about the incident because she was
afraid of the accused-appellant. AAA also positively identified the accusedappellant in open
court and she denied that her mother merely forced her to wrong1y accuse him.[38]

The RTC found worthy of credence the above testimony of AAA and her positive and consistent
identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals
similarly held AAA to be a credible witness when it affirmed the accused-appellant's conviction.
After reviewing the testimony of AAA, as well as the records of this case, the Court finds no
reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts. Verily, we see no justification to
disturb the lower courts' appreciation of the credibility of AAA's testimony. As discussed
in Dizon v. People[39]:
Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in
this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether
they were telling the truth. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. (Citation
omitted.)
Furthermore, the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual abuse was bolstered by the Medico-
Legal Certificate (Exhibit C) issued by Dr. Naomi N. Poca, a physician at the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Hospital in Cebu City, which revealed that AAA was in a non-virginal state and was
in fact pregnant. Dr. Poca concluded that: "[a]nogenital examination findings are definite for
blunt or penetrative trauma to the hymen. Pregnancy, uterine, 20-24 weeks age of gestation by
fundal height."[40]

To disprove the charge against him, the accused-appellant denied AAA's accusations and
interposed an alibi. In his counter-affidavit that was made part of his testimony, the accused-
appellant claimed that at the time when the alleged sexual abuse occurred in July 2005, he was
busy looking for a job so he was not always in his rented house in YYY, Cebu City. Moreover,
the accused-appellant alleged that he had a live-in partner such that there was no opportunity for
him to commit the crime charged. Said refutations, however, ring hollow.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses; unless supported by clear and convincing
evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.[41] In the case of an
alibi, the requirements of time and place should be strictly complied with by the defense,
meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[42]
The accused-appellant in the instant case utterly failed to substantiate his allegations. In his
cross-examination, he stated that in July 2005, he was indeed the neighbor of AAA in YYY,
Cebu City. At that time, he said he was busy looking for work but only within the city.
Furthermore, he would return to his house in YYY everyday after his job hunting.[43] Clearly, the
alibi of the accused-appellant is at most unspecific and vague as to his exact whereabouts and the
fact that he goes back everyday to his house the locus criminis in this case does little in proving
the requisite physical impossibility of his presence therein when the crime was committed.

Other than his own flimsy testimony, he presented the testimonies of defense witnesses Rose
Bistes and Marina Abella.[44] However, said testimonies were insufficient to validate the
accused-appellant's averments.

Rose Bistes merely stated that the accused-appellant could not have committed the crime
charged because he was known in their locality to be a good person,[45] but she admitted in her
cross-examination that her knowledge of the case was only derived from what a certain Fe
Berdin told her.[46] Marina Abella, on the other hand, stated that the accused-appellant could not
have raped AAA because he was "not usually at [his] rented house as he was busy in his work as
[a] janitor" and that she saw AAA in the company of other male persons anyone of whom could
have fathered AAA's child.[47] On cross-examination, however, Marina Abella said that she could
not even remember the month and year when the accused-appellant was busy working as a
janitor, nor could she recall the time when AAA was supposedly raped by the accused-
appellant.[48] Clearly, the testimonies of the above witnesses hardly provide any concrete
corroboration of the accused-appellant's allegations.

Set against the credible testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-
appellant as her abuser, the latter's self-serving denial and alibi cannot absolve him of the crime
charged.

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is mentally deficient constitutes rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as such a woman is automatically
considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. We held in People v. Caoile[49] that "the
phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation." Accordingly, what needs to be proven are
the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the
latter.[50]

That AAA was mentally deficient - thus, deprived of reason - when the accused-appellant
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her was clearly established in this case. Dr.
Rosemarie Gonato, a psychologist at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital, testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of AAA. The results thereof indicated that "[AAA's]
mental age [was] equivalent to a child [of] 6 to 7 years of age and x x x her functioning [was]
within the mild mental retardation."[51] Dr. Gonato also issued a Psychological Evaluation
Report, which was marked in evidence by the prosecution. Moreover, as found by the trial court,
the accused-appellant himself admitted that he knew of AAA's mental deficiency[52] and defense
witness Marina Abella likewise attested that AAA had a mental problem.[53] Therefore, the Court
sustains the conviction of the accused-appellant of the crime charged.

Incidentally, the Court notes that the prosecution filed only one information for rape against the
accused-appellant yet in the statement of facts set out in the Brief for the Appellee filed before
the Court of Appeals, the prosecution related three instances of rape committed by the accused-
appellant against AAA. Nonetheless, we agree with the lower courts that the accused should be
penalized for only one count of rape. This is so as AAA testified to only one count of rape,
without any mention at all of any other instance of sexual abuse. No other evidence was
presented to substantiate the alleged second and third incidents of rape. Settled is the rule that
every charge of rape is separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[54]

The Proper Penalty

The accused-appellant's knowledge of AAA's mental deficiency at the time he committed the
rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death in accordance with Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Said provision pertinently provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

xxxx

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellant's knowledge of AAA's mental condition was specifically alleged in
the information, proven by the evidence of the prosecution and admitted by the accused-
appellant during trial, said qualifying circumstance is applicable. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty in this case is death. However, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No.
9346,[55] the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.

As to the accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court ordered him to pay AAA the amount of
50,000.00 as "civil damages." The Court of Appeals, thereafter, modified the same by awarding
50,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of
judgment until full payment thereof.

Following our recent ruling in People v. Cataytay,[56] which is akin to the present case involving
the crime of qualified rape punishable by death but reduced to reclusion perpetua, the Court
increases the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed against the accused-appellant as
follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Additionally, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment
until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 01301 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the amounts of indemnity and damages are increased as follows:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All amounts are also subject to interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 208686, July 01, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ALELIE TOLENTINO A.K.A.
"ALELIE TOLENTINO Y HERNANDEZ," APPELLANT.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 29 November 2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04558, affirming the trial court's decision, finding appellant Alelie Tolentino
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.

The Facts

Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Informations against appellant read:

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-755

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment committed as follows:

That on or about [or sometime in] the last week of August, 2001 and 1st week of November,
2001 and thereafter, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused jointly with NARCISA SANTOS did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously advertise for employment, enlist, contract and promise
employment to the following persons: LEDERLE PANESA, ORLANDO LAYOSO, JIMMY
LEJOS, MARCELINO LEJOS and DONNA MAGBOO for a fee without first securing license
and/or permit from the government agency concerned.
Contrary to law.[2]

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-756

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about or sometime in the first week of August 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one LEDERLE PANESA, in the following manner: accused represented to
the said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is
capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for her travel and employment at
Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as placement
fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce
complainant to part with her money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of PI
5,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in
the amount of P15,000.00.

Contrary to law.[3]

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-757

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par,, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ORLANDO LAYOSO, in the following manner:
accused represented to the said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant
at Korea and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00
as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to
induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the
amount of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the
said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the amount of P35,000.00.

Contrary to law.[4]

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-758

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one DONNA MAGBOO, in the following manner: accused
represented to the said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea
and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for her travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00
as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to
induce complainant to part with her money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount
of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the said
amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the amount of P35,000.00.

Contrary to law.[5]

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-759

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one JIMMY LEJOS, in the following manner: accused
represented to the said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea
and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00
as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to
induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the
amount of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the
said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the amount of P35,000.00.

Contrary to law.[6]

CRIM. CASE NO. 02-760

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows: That on
or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARCELINO LEJOS, in the following manner: accused
represented to the said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea
and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00
as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to
induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the
amount of P20,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the
said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the amount of P20,000.00.

Contrary to law.[7]

Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, Jimmy Lejos, and Marcelino
Lejos[8] alleged that sometime in the first week of November 2001, they had a meeting with
appellant Alelie Tolentino (appellant) in her office at the 3rd floor, Arevalo Building, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. Appellant told them the procedure for overseas employment and offered them
assistance to find work abroad for a fee of P80,000. Appellant showed them pictures of those she
allegedly helped find work abroad and told them that they would be earning $630 monthly as
factory workers in Korea. When asked about her license to recruit overseas workers, appellant
told private complainants that she would show it to them at some other time. On 14 November
2001, private complainants again met with appellant at her office and each of them gave
appellant P20,000 as partial payment of the agreed fee, which included expenses for medical
examination and processing of their documents for work in Korea. Appellant promised to secure
their visas and employment contracts within three months.

On 30 January 2002, private complainants met with appellant, who was accompanied by a
certain Narcisa Santos, at Wendy's in Arquiza Street, Manila for signing of contract. However,
the names written on the employment contracts were not private complainants' names. Appellant
explained that the contracts were supposedly for other applicants who sought her services but
later backed out. Appellant assured them that original contracts bearing their names would
subsequently be provided. Private complainants signed the contracts and paid PI5,000 each as
their second partial payment.

On 7 February 2002, private complainants received information that the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group arrested appellant for illegal recruitment. When private complainants
confronted appellant at the Manila City Hall where she was held, they demanded the return of
their payments amounting to P35,000 each, except for Marcelino Lejos whose total payment
only amounted to P-20,000. Appellant denied the charges against her and promised them that
they would get their money back. Subsequently, private complainants were able to secure a
certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that appellant
was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Another complainant, Lederle Panesa, alleged that in August 2001, she met with appellant, who
offered her work in Korea for a placement fee of P75,000. On 7 September 2001, Panesa gave
appellant P15,000 as initial payment. Appellant assured Panesa that she would be leaving for
Korea on the second week of November 2001 and that the balance of the placement fee could be
paid upon her receipt of the visa. However, after said meeting, Panesa no longer heard from
appellant, which prompted Panesa to visit appellant's office. Appellant informed Panesa that
there were no job openings in Korea at that time. Appellant offered Panesa employment in other
countries such as Malaysia and Palau, but Panesa refused the offer and demanded the return of
her money. Nevertheless, appellant was able to persuade Panesa to wait until December 2001.
Appellant never contacted Panesa thereafter. On 7 February 2002, Panesa was informed that
appellant was apprehended for illegal recruitment. Panesa proceeded to the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Manila, but failed to confront appellant. It was only then that Panesa learned about
appellant not being authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.

For the defense, appellant was presented as the lone witness. Appellant denied the charges
against her. She testified that she was introduced to private complainants by a certain Cezar
Manonson and that the owner of the office she is renting is her relative. Private complainants
allegedly sought her help regarding possible work in Korea and that she merely explained the
procedure for overseas employment to them. She was hesitant to help them because she does not
recruit workers as she herself was also applying for work as factory worker through Narcisa
Santos. She admitted having received money from private complainants and issuing receipts for
the payments, upon instructions from Narcisa Santos. She confirmed her signature on the petty
cash vouchers she issued to private complainants, evidencing their payments. She testified that
she gave the payments to Narcisa Santos. However, she admitted that she does not have proof
that she indeed turned over the money to Narcisa Santos.

On 9 June 2010, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alelie (also known as Alelie Tolentino) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of large scale illegal recruitment, which constitutes economic
sabotage in Criminal Case Case No. 02-755 and sentences her to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00; and five counts of estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in the following criminal cases and sentences her, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 02-756, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in its
maximum to four years two months and one day of prision correccional in its maximum as the
maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of P5,000.00 as and for moral
damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount of PI5,000.00 she illegally collected
from the private complainant.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758 and 02-759, an indeterminate penalty [of] six months of
arresto mayor in its maximum to twelve years of prision mayor in its maximum, and to pay the
private complainants individually each in the amount of P15,000.00 as and for moral damages.
Accused is further ordered to return the amount of P35,000.00 she illegally collected each from
the private complainants.

In Criminal Case No. 02-760, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in its
maximum as the minimum period to six years and one day of prision mayor in its minimum as
the maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of P8,000.00 as and for
moral damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount of P20,000.00 she illegally
collected from the private complainant.

Her full period of preventive imprisonment shall be credited in her favor in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals held
that the prosecution adequately proved that appellant engaged in illegal recruitment in large
scale. The Court of Appeals noted that appellant admitted that she had no authority or valid
license to engage in recruitment and placement of workers. The testimonies and the documentary
evidence submitted by the prosecution showed that appellant led complainants to believe that she
had the power or ability to send private complainants to Korea to work as factory workers and
that the latter were convinced to give their payment to appellant in order to be employed.
Appellant even issued petty cash vouchers acknowledging receipt of private complainants'
payment and she made them sign Trainee Agreements, which were purportedly their contract
with their Korean employer. Based on the facts and evidence presented, the Court of Appeals
concluded that appellant clearly engaged in illegal recruitment activities. Appellant's claim that it
was Narcisa Santos who recruited the private complainants and who profited from the illegal
transaction was disregarded by the Court of Appeals for lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals
noted that it was appellant who dealt directly with private complainants.

On the charge of estafa, the Court of Appeals likewise upheld appellant's conviction for said
crime. The evidence presented to prove appellant's liability for illegal recruitment also
established her liability for estafa. The Court of Appeals ruled that a person may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Hence, this appeal.

The Court's Ruling

We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the ruling of the
trial court that the appellant's guilt of the crimes she was accused of was clearly established by
the witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution.

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not."

Illegal recruitment, on the other hand is defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment

(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.

(c) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Secretary shall order the search of
the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements
used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphases supplied)

Illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code, encompasses recruitment
activities for both local and overseas employment. However, illegal recruitment under this article
is limited to recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority.[10] Thus, under the Labor Code, to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three
elements must concur:

1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[11]

RA 8042,[12] otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
established a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of the migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal
recruitment for overseas employment and increased the penalties, especially for Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate, which are
considered offenses involving economic sabotage.[13] Part II of RA 8042 defines and penalizes
illegal recruitment for employment abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority or by a licensee or holder of authority.

Section 6 of RA 8042 provides for the definition of illegal recruitment, while Section 7
enumerates the penalties therefor, thus:

SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or
non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad for two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a
worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;

(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment
or employment;

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;

(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to
offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and
conditions of employment;

(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has
not applied for employment through his agency;

(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or
morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;

(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of
foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;

(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by
the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of
the Department of Labor and Employment;

(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member
of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly
in the management of a travel agency;

(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary
or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations;

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment: and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case
of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall
be liable.

SEC. 7. Penalties. -

(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less
than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.

Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority. (Emphases supplied)

Unlike illegal recruitment as defined under the Labor Code which is limited to recruitment
activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, under Article 6 of RA 8042,
illegal recruitment (for overseas employment) may be committed not only by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority but also by licensees or holders of authority. Article 6 enumerates
thirteen acts or practices [(a) to (m)] which constitute illegal recruitment, whether committed by
any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority. Except for the
last two acts [(1) and (m)] on the list under Article 6 of RA 8042, the first eleven acts or
practices are also listed in Article 34[14] of the Labor Code under the heading "Prohibited
practices." Thus, under Article 34 of the Labor Code, it is unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee or holder of authority to engage in any of the enumerated prohibited practices, but such
acts or practices do not constitute illegal recruitment when undertaken by a licensee or holder of
authority. However, under Article 38(A) of the Labor Code, when a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority undertakes such "prohibited practices," he or she is liable for illegal recruitment. RA
8042 broadened the definition of illegal recruitment for overseas employment by including
thirteen acts or practices which now constitute as illegal recruitment, whether committed by a
non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for

overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; and (2) by
undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042. On the other hand, a
licensee or holder of authority is also liable for illegal recruitment for overseas employment
when he or she undertakes any of the thirteen acts or practices [(a) to (m)] listed under Section 6
of RA 8042. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, the offense of illegal recruitment
must be committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant engaged in large-scale illegal
recruitment.

First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence submitted by

the prosecution is a POEA Certification[15] dated 10 March 2003, stating that appellant is not
licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Appellant admitted that she
has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers.

Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment activities, appellant
gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure work for private complainants in
Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos all testified that
appellant promised them work as factory workers in Korea and induced them to pay placement
fees, which included the expenses for medical examination and the processing of their
documents for work in Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of previous applicants, whom she
allegedly helped find work abroad. Appellant also explained to them the procedure for overseas
employment and promised them that she would secure their visas and employment contracts
within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were
corroborated by private respondents Marcelino Lejos and Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of
Complaint were adopted as their direct testimonies.

This Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he could send
workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal
recruitment.[16]

Third, there are at least three victims in this case which makes appellant liable for large-scale
illegal recruitment.

Appellant denies that she gave private complainants the distinct impression that she had the
power or ability to send them abroad for work. She insists that she herself had been applying
then as a factory worker in Korea through Narcisa Santos, who had previously deployed her as
domestic helper in Hongkong. Although appellant admits having received payments from private
complainants and issuing receipts, she submits that she did so only upon the instructions of
Narcisa Santos, to whom she turned over the money collected from private complainants.

The Court is not swayed by appellant's contentions. As found by the trial court and the appellate
court, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants: she
explained to them the procedure for overseas employment; she charged them placement fees to
cover their medical examination and the processing of their travel documents; she issued petty
cash vouchers with her signature, acknowledging receipts of their payments; she promised the
eventual release of their visas and employment contracts; and she made them sign Trainee
Agreements, purportedly their contract with their Korean employer. Clearly, appellant, despite
being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, engaged in recruitment activities, making her
liable for illegal recruitment.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies.[17] Appellant's mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimonies of the complainants.[18] The trial court's findings are accorded great respect unless
the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might
affect the result of the case.[19] Furthermore, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are deemed binding and conclusive.[20]

Thus, we affirm the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court that appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale. However, we modify the penalty
imposed.

The penalty imposed by the trial court in this case for large-scale illegal recruitment, which
constitutes economic sabotage, is life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000. Section 7 of RA
8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P5 00,000 nor
more than P1,000,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Said
article further provides that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if committed by a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority. Thus, the proper penalty in this case is life imprisonment
and a fine of P1,000,000.

Estafa

We likewise affirm appellant's conviction for five counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315(2)(a)[21] of
the Revised Penal Code.[22]

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation.[23] In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability
to send them to Korea for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit
workers for overseas employment. She even showed them pictures of past applicants whom she
allegedly sent abroad for work. She also assured them that she would be able to secure their visas
and employment contracts once they pay the placement fee. Because of the assurances given by
appellant, private complainants paid appellant a portion of the agreed placement fee, for which
appellant issued petty cash vouchers[24] with her signature, evidencing her receipt of the
payments. Clearly, these acts of appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or redusion temporal, as the case may be;

xxxx

Thus, when the amount of fraud is over P12,000 but not exceeding P22,000, the penalty imposed
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, i.e., from
4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, which is prision correccional in its minimum to medium period. The time included in this
penalty is from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

When the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period,
and adding one year for every PI0,000 in excess of P22,000. But, the total penalty imposed
should not exceed 20 years. The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code. The range of penalty under Article 315 is composed of only two periods. To
compute the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included
in the two periods should be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a
period. Following this computation, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the
prescribed penalty are:

1. Minimum Period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days;
2. Medium Period - 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days;
3. Maximum Period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.

Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every PI 0,000 in excess of P22,000, shall be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the court's discretion, provided the
total penalty does not exceed 20 years.[25]
We find that the penalty imposed by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court, is not in
accord with the penalty prescribed. The trial court erroneously imposed the minimum period of
"six months of arresto mayor in its maximum." Hence, we modify the penalty imposed on the
five counts of estafa and we delete the moral damages awarded for having no basis in law.
Considering the number of victims defrauded, we find that a minimum period of 2 years
of prision correccional is appropriate.

In Criminal Case No. 02-756, where the amount defrauded is PI5,000, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken from the medium
period of the penalty prescribed (i.e. 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20
days). Appellant should be sentenced to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758, and 02-759, where the amount defrauded is P35,000
each, the maximum period (anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) shall be
imposed, plus the incremental penalty of one year (additional 1 year imprisonment for the
PI0,000 in excess of P22,000). We fix the maximum term at 7 years of prision mayor. Adding
the incremental penalty of 1 year to the maximum term, appellant should be sentenced in each of
these cases to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 02-760, where the amount defrauded is P20,000, appellant should be
sentenced to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as maximum.

Furthermore, appellant should indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to her, with
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, which shall be deemed as
the same day the Informations were filed against appellant, until the amounts are fully paid.[26]

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated 29 November

2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04558 to read as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 02-755, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as
defined and penalized in Section 6 and Section 7(b) of RA 8042. She is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000).
2. In Criminal Case No. 02-756, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered
to indemnify private complainant Lederle Panesa in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
 (P15,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 28 June
2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
3. In Criminal Case No. 02-757, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Orlando Layoso in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 28 June
2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
4. In Criminal Case No. 02-758, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Donna Magboo in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 28 June
2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
5. In Criminal Case No. 02-759, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Jimmy Lejos in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 28 June
2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
6. In Criminal Case No. 02-760, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered
to indemnify private complainant Marcelino Lejos in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Bersamin,[*] Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 209845, July 01, 2015 ]
MELCHOR G. MADERAZO AND DIONESIO R. VERUEN, JR., PETITIONERS, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Assailed in this petition for review[1] are the Decision[2] dated 30 May 2013 and the
Resolution[3] dated 13 November 2013 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27916, which
found petitioners Melchor G. Maderazo (Maderazo) and Dionesio R. Veruen, Jr. (Veruen) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Facts

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 21 January 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran, Biliran, composed of Victor Maderazo
(Victor), Jovencio Pantas, Camilo Go, Nestorio Rosario, Cesar Almen, Florentino Banquilay,
Camilo Brasil and Imelda Cuevas (collectively, SB Members), unanimously passed and
approved Resolution No. 01, Series of 1998, authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a
negotiated contract with a local fabricator of tapping saddles for the improvement of the water
system of Caibiran, Biliran.

On 28 January 1998, Maderazo, the Acting Mayor due to the suspension of Mayor Rodito
Ramirez (Ramirez), entered into a Job Contract with Artemio Vermug (Vermug), proprietor of
Vermug Welding Shop. The Job Contract provided that: (a) Vermug Welding Shop would
fabricate 400 pieces of two-diameter tapping saddles; (b) the Local Government Unit (LGU) of
Caibiran would pay Vermug Welding Shop P400.00 for each tapping saddles fabricated; (c)
Vermug Welding Shop would complete the fabrication within 30 days after the signing of the
Job Contract; and (d) the LGU of Caibiran would pay Vermug Welding Shop the whole amount
due upon completion of the orders.

On the same day, Acting Municipal Treasurer Domingo Vidal (Vidal) issued Land Bank Check
No. 21408930 with an amount of P454,036.37 in the name of Vermug, upon submission of the
following documents to him: (1) Request for Obligation and Allotment; (2) Disbursement
Voucher; (3) Official Receipt No. 0020 issued by Vermug Welding Shop; and (4) undated
Inspection Report certified correct by Victor and Veruen, and noted by Maderazo.

On 8 February 1998, Ramirez resumed his position as mayor and found that there were no
tapping saddles delivered despite the payment made. On 18 June 1998, Ramirez filed an
Affidavit-Complaint, docketed as OMB-VIS CRIM-98-0475, before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Maderazo, Veruen and the SB members with Malversation and violation
of RA3019.

On 20 August 1998, Biliran Provincial Auditor Rogelio C. Abiera directed State Auditor
Evangeline C. Bernil (Bernil) and Narciso Brun (Brun) to conduct a physical inventory and
inspection of the tapping saddles. In their report, Bernil and Brun stated that: (a) on 25 August
1998, they counted 188 pieces of tapping saddles, consisting of 156 pieces measuring 20 x 1/2"
and 32 pieces measuring 40 x 1/2", in the Office of the Municipal Engineer; (b) the tapping
saddles were delivered on 10 August 1998 as alleged by Ramirez and Municipal Engineer
Arnulfo Y. Camarines (Camarines); (c) one of the supporting documents was an undated
Inspection Report certified correct by Victor and Veruen, and noted by Maderazo; (d) a Job
Contract was signed between Maderazo and Vermug on 28 January 1998; (e) the creditor was
paid on the same day that the Job Contract was executed; and (f) there were no Purchase
Request, Purchase Order, Delivery Receipts and Acceptance Report attached to the voucher as
supporting documents.

Upon finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Ombudsman issued an
Information dated 22 October 2003:
That [o]n or about the period from 21 to 28 January 1998, in the Municipality of Caibiran,
Province of Biliran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, a high ranking public officer, being then the
Acting Mayor, VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., JOVENCIO PANTAS, CAMILO GO, NESTORIO
ROSARIO, CESAR ALMEN, FLORENTINO BANQUILAY, CAMILO BRASIL AND
IMELDA CUEVAS, being then Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Members and DIONESIO R.
VERUEN, JR., then Acting Municipal Accountant, all of Caibiran, Biliran, commit[t]ing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions,
conniving and confederating with each other, thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality, (or,
at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause[d] undue injury to the government by enacting SB Resolution No. 01 Series of
1998 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a negotiated contract with any local
fabricator of tapping saddles and thereafter, enter[ed] into a Job Contract with one Artemio
Vermug, the Proprietor of Vermug Welding Shop for the fabrication of four hundred (400)
pieces of tapping saddles, worth ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (PI 60,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency to be used in the water system of the Municipality of Caibiran, when in truth
and in fact said tapping saddles are not yet needed and despite non-compliance with the
requirements of the negotiated contract and the non-delivery of the tapping saddles the accused
prepare[d] the corresponding Disbursement Voucher and release[d] the corresponding Check in
the amount of PI54,036.37 and thereafter receive[d] the proceeds thereof for their own personal
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, Maderazo, Veruen, Victor, Nestorio Rosario, Florentino Banquilay, and
Imelda Cuevas entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused, Jovencio Pantas, Camilo Go,
Cesar Almen and Camilo Brasil, are still at large. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against
Florentino Banquilay on 30 July 2006 upon submission by the prosecution of his death
certificate.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In a Decision dated 30 May 2013,[5] the Sandiganbayan convicted Maderazo and Veruen for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Sandiganbayan found that all the elements of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 were present. The Sandiganbayan held that both Maderazo and Veruen, who
were then public officers, acted in evident bad faith for disbursing the amount of PI60,000,
without the delivery of the tapping saddles. According to the Sandiganbayan, their actions
violated the pecuniary interest of the LGU of Caibiran and caused undue injury in the said
amount.

The Sandiganbayan held that conspiracy existed between Veruen and Maderazo, since the crime
would not have been possible without each other's participation as shown by their execution and
approval of the Disbursement Voucher, check, and undated Inspection Report. The
Sandiganbayan, however, found no sufficient evidence to link the SB members to the crime,
considering that their participation was limited to the collective passage and approval of
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1998.

The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO and
DIONESIO R. VERUEN, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the Information
and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and to suffer the perpetual disqualification
from public office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Municipality of Caibiran, Biliran,
the amount of PhP 160,000.00 representing the losses that it suffered by reason of the non-
delivery of the 400 pieces [of] tapping saddles with legal interest from the finality of this
decision until the same is fully paid, and to proportionately pay the costs; and for insufficiency of
evidence, ACQUITTING accused JOVENCIO PANTAS, NESTORIO ROSARIO, VICTOR
MADERAZO, and IMELDA CUEVAS with cost de oficio. In this connection, the respective
cash bonds posted by the said accused are hereby RELEASED to them subject to the usual
accounting anil auditing procedures, and the Hold Departure Orders issued against them are
hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

With respect to accused CAMILO GO, CESAR ALMEN and CAMILO BRASIL, who are at-
large and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, this Case is ordered ARCHIVED.

SO ORDERED.[6]
In a Resolution dated 13 November 2013,[7] the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Maderazo and Veruen. Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The principal issue to be resolved is whether Maderazo and Veruen violated Section 3(e) of RA
3019.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court, except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (6) the findings of
fact are premised on an absence of evidence on record.[8]

In the present case, Maderazo and Veruen question the conclusions reached by the
Sandiganbayan in so far as its appreciation of facts is concerned. However, Maderazo and
Veruen failed to show that the present case falls within any of the above exceptions.

Maderazo and Veruen are charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e)[9] of RA 3019,
which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.[10]

As found by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are present in this case. It is undisputed that
both Maderazo and Veruen were public officers discharging administrative functions at the time
material to this case. Maderazo, as the Acting Mayor, and Veruen, as the Acting Municipal
Accountant, ensured the release of the payment for the tapping saddles on the same day that the
Job Contract was executed. However, the tapping saddles were not delivered upon payment:
The evidence on record, however, reveals that despite the disbursement of the amount of
PhP160,000.00 on January 28, 1998, for 400 pieces [of] tapping saddles, no tapping saddles were
actually delivered to the municipality on the said date, as confirmed by Municipal Engineer
Arnulfo Y. Camarines in the Certification that he issued that 'there was no tapping saddles
received or kept by this office as of May 18, 1998." x x x.

xxxx

xxx While it is true that Mr. Vermug admitted that he signed the Job Contract and the
Disbursement Voucher, and even issued Official Receipt No. 0020 dated January 28, 1998,
evidencing receipt of the amount of PhP 160,000.00 for the 400 pieces [of] tapping saddles, the
Court finds the testimony of Mr. Vermug credible that he did not deliver or
fabricate/manufacture the said 400 pieces [of] tapping saddles as per contract because it was
impossible for him to fabricate and deliver the 400 tapping saddles on the same day that the Job
Contract was executed on January 28, 1998. Moreover, Mr. Vermug also testified that he never
received any cent from the proceeds of the contract because after he had endorsed the Land Bank
Check, he returned it to accused Mayor Melcor Maderazo upon the latter's request only to
discover later that it was encashed by Municipal Treasurer Domingo Vidal from the Land Bank
Branch in Naval, Biliran. This testimony of Mr. Vermug was corroborated by Municipal
Treasurer Domingo Vidal who testified that in the afternoon of January 28, 1998, he encashed
the said check of Mr. Vermug at the Land Bank Branch in Naval, Biliran at the request of
accused Melchor Maderazo, as shown by his signature on the back thereof, and that he delivered
the proceeds thereof to accused Melchor Maderazo. Hence, the endorsement of the check by Mr.
Vermug for no apparent reason further proves that when the check was released on January 28,
1998, he had not yet delivered the tapping saddles.

Besides the Court finds no proof/evidence to show that the 400 pieces [of] tapping saddles that
were allegedly delivered by Mr. Vermug were actually installed in the different households of
the municipality."
The evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Maderazo processed the Request for
Obligation and Allotment instead of the municipal engineer, received the amount of P160,000 on
28 January 1998, and covered up the non-existent tapping saddles by belatedly effecting the
delivery of the tapping saddles, which did not even conform to the Job Contract. For his part,
Veruen approved the Disbursement Voucher despite the lack of supporting documents, as found
upon audit, in violation of his duties. Moreover, Maderazo and Veruen signed the glaringly
incomplete and undated Inspection Report. Verily, Maderazo and Veruen acted in evident bad
faith, or such state of mind affirmatively operating'with furtive design or with some motive or
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[12] By disbursing P160,000 despite the non-
existent tapping saddles, Maderazo and Veruen caused undue injury to the LGU of Caibiran for
the said amount. Their concerted actions, which demonstrate a common design, justify the
finding of conspiracy.

In Lihaylihay v. People of the Philippines,[13] the Court found petitioners in evident bad faith for
affixing their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects on it and for
approving the "ghost" purchases in the amount of P800,000. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[14] the
Court convicted petitioners for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 upon a finding of conspiracy in
the irregular preparation, processing, and approval of simulated documents, and in the payment
to the contractors for the non-existent projects.

As to the affidavit of desistance executed by Ramirez, we reiterate that retractions are generally
unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.[15]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 30 May 2013 and the
Resolution dated 13 November 2013 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27916.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin,[*] Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209137, July 01, 2015 ]
EDUARDO CELEDONIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo
Celedonio (Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013 Decision[1] and the September 17, 2013
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18,
2011 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 35668-MN.

The Information,[4] dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with
Force Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by
destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following:
(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00

(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00

(2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00

(1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00

(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00

(1) one sun glass Guess P Php5,000.00

(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00

(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00

(1) one calculator Php1,500.00

(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00

(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills

(22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills

(2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00

(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00

(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00

(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00

(1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00

(1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00

(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00

(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00

(60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00

(100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00

(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00

owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and
prejudice of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00.

Contrary to law.[5]
Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano
Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman
(De Guzman) while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was
left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio,
which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the
incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo be investigated for
possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.

Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque) and SPO2
Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St.,
Navotas, to survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On
their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo
Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was
Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.

SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still
remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?"
Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw
some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a
wristwatch, among others.[6]

PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan
po."[7] Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More items
were seized from Celedonio at the police station.

Version of the Accused

After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of
court) citing as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his
motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio's
arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial of the case. It
considered the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio's apparent
consent to it, but also because the subject items were in a moving vehicle.[8]

In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of the
incident. His wife corroborated his statement.

In its Decision, dated August 18, 2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision[9] reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and penalized
under Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the amount of
Php108,000.00 which is the worth of what has not been recovered from the loss she suffered by
reason of the robbery.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been
committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were
found in Celedonio's possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of
the stolen goods.[11]

Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the
RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence; 2) in not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered
inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in
testifying against him.[12]

The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted
the finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime.[13]

In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio's argument that he was illegally arrested and that
the items seized should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested
when he voluntarily opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the
police for investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his motorcycle
compartment.[14] Further, Celedonio's failure to raise the issue before his arraignment constituted
a waiver on his part to question the legality of his arrest.[15]

Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER'S GUILT
WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS
ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
III

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL-
MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.

Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence
does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution
establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime through credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed
crime, the latter should be convicted.[16]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[17]

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together,
constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the
perpetrator. The CA opined that:
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door
neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence
separating their houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one
was inside complainant's house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently
demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night
were found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when
accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her
stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession
and claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery.
In short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his
sole possession.

xxxx

We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and

legally tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been
proved through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, POi Rommel Roque and Carmencita
de Guzman.[18]
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedonio
himself acknowledged that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous
and inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed
recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he
had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.[19] Celedonio, however, still
insisted that he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was not caught in
exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him was illegal thereby
rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the witness Marquez was ill-motivated in
testifying against him.

These arguments, however, do not hold water.

First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the
police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a
reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.

Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were
found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of
being the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed
to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be
inferred therefrom was that he took the items.

Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the
stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-
up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the
stolen items were in Celedonio's motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that
the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing
either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry.
Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if
the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it.[20] The police officers, therefore, were
left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance,
the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have
any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the
stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.

Third, contrary to Celedonio's argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also
tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill
motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.[21]

In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a
water meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant
that it could not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus,
posited:
xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached
by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final
judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach him.

More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere say
so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water meter.
Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth,
honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution witness
Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant Celedonio.[22]
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims
that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's
house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail
over the strong circumstantial evidence.[23]

Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the RTC and the CA
overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court
will not disturb their factual findings.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015 ]
JOVITO CANCERAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 10, 2012
Decision[1] and the March 7, 2013 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00559, which affirmed and modified the September 20, 2007 Judgment[3] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), in Criminal Case No.
2003-141, convicting petitioner Jovito Canceran (Canceran) for consummated Theft.

The records disclose that Caneeran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was
charged with "Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery
Department, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jovito Caneeran, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another with his co-accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser,
and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama Mega Center, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty
Cream valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William
Michael N. Arcenio, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent
of accused's will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who
prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, to the
damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega Center.

Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]
Version of the Prosecution

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc), a
security guard; and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer of
Ororama Mega Center (Ororama), as its witnesses. Through their testimonies, the prosecution
established that on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Caneeran approach one of the counters
in Ororama; that Caneeran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for
which he paid P1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been
checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the
two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream
worth P28,627.20; that Caneeran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don
Mariano gate, Caneeran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being questioned,
he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he
tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were deposited in
the office of Arcenio.[5]

Version of the Defense

Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo
merchandiser of La Tondena, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to buy
medicine for his wife. On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person of
around 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he did
not know the name of this man who gave him P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled
Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because he was struck by
his conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at
the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons ran
after him, and he was caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was
mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110 cellular
phone and cash amounting to P2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while a
certain Amion took his necklace.[6]

Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on October 9,
2002 which was eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information was filed for the
same offense over the same incident and became the subject of the present case.[7]

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People[8] that
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), there is no crime of "Frustrated Theft."
Canceran was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years, eight (8) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[9]

The RTC wrote that Canceran's denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported
by sufficient and convincing evidence and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate
his claims. As such, his denial was considered self-serving and deserved no weight. The trial
court was also of the view that his defense, that the complaint for theft filed against him before
the sala of Judge Maximo Paderanga was already dismissed, was not persuasive. The dismissal
was merely a release order signed by the Clerk of Court because he had posted bail.[10]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for the first
time. The CA held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea
and so the first jeopardy never attached.[11]

The CA also debunked Canceran's contention that there was no taking because he merely pushed
the cart loaded with goods to the cashier's booth for payment and stopped there. The appellate
court held that unlawful taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender gained
possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the same.[12]

The CA affirmed with modification the September 20, 2007 judgment of the RTC, reducing the
penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Canceran moved for the reconsideration of the said decision, but his motion was denied by the
CA in its March 7, 2013 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

As can be synthesized from the petition and other pleadings, the following are the issues: 1]
whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the
information; and 2] whether there was double jeopardy.

Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction. He insists that there was already
double jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and yet he was
convicted in the second case. Canceran also contends that there was no taking of the Ponds
cream considering that "the information in Criminal Case No. 2003-141 admits the act of the
petitioner did not produce the crime of theft."[13] Thus, absent the element of taking, the felony of
theft was never proved.

In its Comment,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no double
jeopardy as the first jeopardy never attached. The trial court dismissed the case even before
Canceran could enter a plea during the scheduled arraignment for the first case. Further, the
prosecution proved that all the elements of theft were present in this case.
In his Reply,[15] Canceran averred that when the arraignment of the first case was scheduled, he
was already bonded and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that the evidence was
insufficient or the evidence lacked the element to constitute the crime of theft. He also stressed
that there was no unlawful taking as the items were assessed and paid for.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
against Him.

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.[16] It is
fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be
set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[17]

Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain;
(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. "Unlawful
taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal property, is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all."[18]

"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves
into the concept of 'taking' itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such
degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the
acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished."[19]

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged
with "Frustrated Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:
x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega
Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus performing ail the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of some cause independent of accused's will x x x.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to
charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was
never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being
charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of
the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in
the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily
included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right."[20]

Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.[21] An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.[22]

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted
stage. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of
consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the
overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not
charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined,
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged
to have been violated - these being conclusions of law - but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information."[23] In the case of Domingo v. Rayala,[24] it was written:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made
by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.[25]
In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which was
"Frustrated Theft," may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was
qualified by the additional allegation, but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of accused's will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama
Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream, x x x[26] This averment, which could also be deemed by some as a mere
conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the
doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the
charge against him was consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling of the
CA.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. The rule of double
jeopardy has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with
an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.[27]

Canceran argues that double jeopardy exists as the first case was scheduled for arraignment and
he, already bonded, was ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that there was
insufficient evidence to constitute the crime of theft.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d)
a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.[28]

Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy before
the RTC. Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same
must still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He
himself admitted that he was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even
before he was able to do so. Second, there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The
case was not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he posted bail.
Absent these two elements, there can be no double jeopardy.

Penalty of Attempted Theft

The penalty for consummated theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29] The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon principals in an attempt to commit a felony.[30] The basis for reduction of penalty
by two degrees is the penalty prescribed by law for the consummated crime. Also, when the
offenses defined in the RPC are punished with a penalty composed of two periods, like in the
crime of theft, the penalty lower by one degree is formed by two periods to be taken from the
same penalty prescribed.[31]

Here, the products stolen were worth P28,627.20. Following Article 309 par. 1 of the RPC, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in the same paragraph, because
the value of the things stolen exceeded P22,000.00. In other words, a special aggravating
circumstance shall affect the imposable penalty.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be within the range
of Arresto MayorMinimum to Arresto Mayor Medium. In view of the special aggravating
circumstance under Article 309 (1), the maximum penalty should be Arresto Mayor Maximum
to Prision Correccional Minimum in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 10, 2012 Decision and
the March 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals m CA-G.R. CR No. 00559 are
hereby MODIFIED, in that, the Court finds accused Jovito Canceran guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Attempted Theft.

Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term ranging
from Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months
of Prision Correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Bersamin*, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 214466, July 01, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO BALCUEVA Y
BONDOCOY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Antonio Balcueva y
Bondocoy (Balcueva) assailing the Decision[2] dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05791, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated September 11, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. Q-07-145514
finding Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,[4] otherwise known as
the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

On February 20, 2007, a criminal information was filed before the RTC charging Balcueva of
raping his biological daughter, AAA,[5] viz.:
That on or about the 15th day of February 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design by means of force,
threat and intimidation had carnal knowledge upon the person of [AAA], a minor fourteen (14)
years of age, his daughter, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.[6]
According to the prosecution, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, AAA
just returned home from school and since Balcueva did not want her to leave the house, she
decided to just take an afternoon nap. At that time, Balcueva asked AAA's siblings to leave the
house and thereafter, approached AAA who was lying in bed, removed her shorts and
underwear, and threatened to spank her if she told anybody about this incident. Balcueva then
removed his shorts and underwear, mounted AAA, restrained her hands, and inserted his penis
into her vagina. AAA resisted and even told Balcueva that she was having her menstruation, but
Balcueva simply told her to keep quiet and that it was better as she will not get pregnant. While
Balcueva was ravishing AAA, the latter's sister sought the help of their neighbor, who then
peeped through a hole, interrupting Balcueva in his dastardly act. Thereafter, AAA's sister and
their neighbor reported the incident to the barangay hall, which led to Balcueva's apprehension.[7]

For his part, Balcueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that at around 12
and 1 o'clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, he was repairing appliances when AAA and
a friend arrived from school and asked him if they can roam around. When he did not allow them
to do so, AAA and her friend got angry. In retaliation, they went to the barangay hall and
fabricated the story that he raped AAA.[8]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[9] dated September 11, 2012, the RTC found Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[10]

It found that the prosecution was able to prove that Balcueva indeed raped AAA, pointing out
that her failure to shout for help while she was being ravished by her father does not mean she
was not raped; rather, it showed the moral ascendancy and influence Balcueva exerted over her,
and that the absence of injuries on AAA's hymen did not negate a finding of rape. In this
relation, the RTC observed that no woman would undergo the rigors of trial if she was not
motivated to put her culprit behind bars.[11] Moreover, the RTC did not give any probative value
to AAA's subsequent desistance from pursuing the case, considering that she had completed her
testimony at that time, and that it found her desistance to be a mere afterthought. Finally, it
declared that Balcueva's defense of denial and alibi could not prevail over AAA's positive
identification.[12]

Aggrieved, Balcueva appealed[13] his conviction to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[14] dated April 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto.[15] In upholding
Balcueva's conviction, the CA relied on AAA's testimony, holding that it is unlikely for a young
lass like AAA to concoct a story of her being raped by her own father and to go through the
rigors of trial if she was not telling the truth.[16]

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Balcueva's conviction for Qualified Rape should
be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains Balcueva's conviction.

Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC reads:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxxx

Art. 266-B. Penalty. - x x x.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the victim is a
female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.[17]

A perusal of the records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. Thus, the
RTC and the CA committed no reversible error in convicting Balcueva of the crime of Qualified
Rape.

As correctly ruled, AAA's clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was
indeed raped by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva's flimsy defense of
denial and alibi cannot prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony and identification
of him as the perpetrator of the crime.[18] Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a
crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private
part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.[19] Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA
would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did
not happen.[20]

Anent the penalty to be imposed on Balcueva, the RTC and the CA properly sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole,[21] in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9346.[22]

Finally, in view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death
which, however, cannot be imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of RA 9346, the
Court hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.[23] In
addition, the Court imposes interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.[24]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05791 finding accused-appellant Antonio Balcueva y
Bondocoy (accused-appellant) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised
Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, with MODIFICATION ordering him to pay
AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193388, July 01, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO BOCADI Y
APATAN, ACCUSED, ALBERTO BATICOLON Y RAMIREZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the 29 May 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00709. In that Decision, the CA affirmed the Regional Trial
Court's (RTC) 15 February 2007 Decision in Criminal Case No. 17494 finding the accused-
appellant Alberto.Baticolon y Ramirez (Baticolon), together with Rodolfo Bocadi y Apatan
(Bocadi), guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents

Accused-appellant Baticolon, together with Bocadi, was charged before RTC, Branch 30,
Dumaguete City with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.ANo. 9165 in an information that
reads:
That on or about the 1st day of March 2005, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully,
and feloniously sell and deliver to an NBI poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly called shabu, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.[2]

Having been found in possession of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.17
gram of white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
called shabu, Bocadi was separately charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.

Upon arraignment, the two accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged. The two cases were consolidated and thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

At around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 1 March 2005, Special Investigator Arnaldo Fineza
(SI Fineza) and SRA Miguel Dungog (Agent Dungog) of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) received information from a confidential asset regarding the open sale
of shabu in Barangay Looc. After verification of the information received, a team was formed to
conduct a buy-bust operation wherein SI Fineza was designated as the poseur buyer to handle the
marked money.

Before proceeding at the target area, a briefing was conducted and the office of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was informed of the operation.

SI Fineza, together with two informants, went to Barangay Looc. As they reached the locus
criminis, they were met by four men, one of whom was identified by the informant as Baticolon.
A man later identified as Bocadi offered them shabu. This led to the agreement for the purchase
of P300.00 worth of the illicit drug. Bocadi then went inside a house, and when he came back, he
gave to SI Fineza one transparent sachet of suspected shabu. Simultaneously, SI Fineza handed
over the marked bills to Baticolon who was then nearer to him.

Thereafter, the group immediately arrested Bocadi. During this time the other suspects, including
Baticolon, were prompted to scatter and escape. SI Fineza and one of the informants pursued and
caught up with Baticolon who ran inside a nearby house. Baticolon was apprehended and
dragged back to the locus criminis. SI Fineza informed the accused of the nature of their arrest
and of their constitutional rights. SI Fineza then pre-marked the sachet of suspected shabu.

SI Fineza then physically searched Bocadi and discovered from him another sachet of
suspected shabu. This was also pre-marked by SI Fineza. SI Fineza also recovered the marked
money from Baticolon after a search was made on the latter's person.

Subsequently, the suspects, as well as the seized and recovered items, were brought to the NBI
Office where these were photographed and inventoried. The inventory was prepared, signed and
witnessed by SkyCable media man Juancho Gallarde, Barangay Looc Kagawad Rogelio
Talavera, Agent Dungog and PDEA representative SPO1 Manuel Sanchez.

The seized items were then brought to the Negros Oriental PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination. Tests results revealed that the contents of the two confiscated sachets
yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or more commonly known as shabu. The
urine samples from the two accused also confirmed the presence of shabu.[3]

Version of the Defense

Both accused denied the allegations against them. The defense claimed that on 1 March 2005,
Baticolon was merely resting in his house when he heard someone call out his name. When
Baticolon responded, a man by the name of Walter Adarna (Walter) barged inside his house and
yanked him out. Walter is allegedly a known police asset with whom Baticolon had a previous
altercation. While outside, Walter punched Baticolon on the stomach and told the latter that he
can finally exact his revenge. Thereafter, Walter bodily searched Baticolon and took his wallet.
Baticolon was thereafter handcuffed and brought to the NBI office together with co-accused
Bocadi. Baticolon testified that Bocadi came into the picture only when the latter was asked by
Walter to pinpoint his house. Baticolon's version was corroborated by defense witness May-May
Artus, a neighbor of Baticolon who allegedly saw the entire incident.[4]

Ruling of the RTC

On 15 February 2007, the trial court rendered a Decision[5] finding accused Bocadi and Baticolon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of shabu and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to each pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00.). Bocadi was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of 0.17 gram of shabu and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum term to fourteen (14) years as maximum term and to pay a
fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).

The trial court held that the elements of illegal sale of drugs were clearly established through the
evidence presented by the prosecution. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the fact
that both accused were caught in flagrante delicto in a valid buy-bust operation. It noted that the
defense of denial offered by the accused cannot overturn the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to the apprehending officers.

The trial court likewise held that the acts of the accused demonstrated the presence of
conspiracy. It averred that the conduct of the two accused during the entrapment revealed a
common design or community of interest between them as they acted in concert in committing
the crime.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Only Baticolon appealed the Decision of the RTC. On intermediate appellate review, the CA
found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld in toto its ruling. The appellate
court was convinced that the testimonial and object evidence on record amply support the RTC's
finding that the guilt of Baticolon has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[6] It agreed with the
RTC that credence should be accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in
holding that the apprehending officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody and
disposition of the seized drugs.

Issues

Whether the trial courts erred in upholding the existence and validity of the buy bust operation
conducted by the NBI.

Whether the trial courts erred in ruling that conspiracy to sell illegal drugs was established by the
prosecution.

Whether the trial courts erred in convicting Baticolon of the crime charged despite the fact that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[7]

Our Ruling

We find the appeal bereft of merit.

In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution
is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to
the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the
buy-bust transaction.[8]

The evidence for the prosecution clearly established all these elements. The prosecution proved
that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted with SI Fineza as the buyer and Baticolon, in
connivance with Bocadi, as the sellers of the shabu. Likewise, the prosecution presented in
evidence the plastic sachet containing shabu as the object of the sale and proved that P300.00
was received as consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment
were clearly testified to by the prosecution witnesses.

Baticolon's defense which is anchored principally on denial and frame-up cannot be given
credence. It does not have more evidentiary weight than the positive assertions of the prosecution
witnesses. His defense is unavailing considering that he and his cohort were CEiught in flagrante
delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation. This Court has ruled that the defense of denial or
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[9]
We agree with the trial court that the testimony of prosecution witness SI Fineza not only
established the fact of sale of shabu, but also the fact that Baticolon and Bocadi acted in concert
in committing the crime, thus:
Pros. Zerna -

DIRECT EXAMINATION

xxxx

Q: What transpired when you arrived at Barangay Looc?

A: Arriving at the vicinity sir after entering a narrow pathway, a group of men whom one of
them was positively identified by the informant as Alberto Baticolon and we approached
them and then there was one man who was wearing black sleeveless shirt and shorts who
offered us shabu.

Q: Can you still remember how many men were in this group?
A: [There] were four of them.

Q: And what were they doing before you approached them?

A: Maybe they were talking to each other sir.

Q: When you said one of them asked or offered to you a sachet of shabu, what then did you do?
A: We agreed that we were going to buy sachet of shabu worth P300 and this man wearing
black T-shirt sir went inside the house leaving the three of them; one of them beside me.

Q: You mean to say, you first gave your money before this man went into the house?
A: No sir.

Q: You did not give the money first?

A: No sir.
Q: And when you said you would buy P300 worth of shabu and this man went into the house,
did he come back?
A: Yes sir, he went out and then he handed over to me sachet of shabu and then the money, I
gave it to the person standing beside the door wearing white sando and maong shorts.

Q: How many sachets were handed over to you?

A: Only one sachet sir.

xxxx

Q: Now you said after you have received the sachet handed to you by accused Rodolfo Bocadi
you gave the money to another person, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Do you know this other person to whom you gave the money?
A: The man wearing white sando and maong shorts sir was positively identified by our
informant as Alberto Baticolon.

xxxx

Q: You said, Mr.Witness, that you gave to Alberto Baticolon P300?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Is this the same money that was handed to you by Miguel Dungog in your office?
A: Yes, that is the marked money sir.

Q: After you have handed the P300 marked money, what happened next?
A: We immediately made an arrest of Rodolfo Bocadi sir and this Alberto Baticolon, upon
seeing the arrest of Rodolfo Bocadi, ran inside the nearby house sir.

xxxx
Q: So, as you said, when you arrested Mr. Bocadi, Mr. Baticolon ran but you were still able to
arrest him?
A: Yes sir.

Q: How were you able to arrest Mr. Baticolon?

A: After he entered the house, we were able to catch him sir.

Q: Where did you bring him after you caught Mr. Baticolon?
A: We brought Alberto Baticolon near Rodolfo Bocadi and that time I informed them the
reason for their arrest and their Constitutional Rights sir.[10]
The aforesaid testimony gave a complete picture on how Baticolon and Bocadi connived with
each other in the consummation of the offense of illegal sale of a dangerous drug. The trial court
found SI Fineza's testimony to be positive, clear and credible, especially during cross-
examination where he remained steadfast and unwavering. His testimony, being candid and
straightforward, is sufficient for a finding of guilt.

On the other hand, the trial court did not err in not giving much weight on the testimony of May-
May Artus, the neighbor of Baticolon who testified for the defense, since she buckled and even
admitted on cross-examination that she cannot remember the description of the apprehending
officer who accompanied the informant and that she was not very sure of the details of the arrest
of Baticolon and Bocadi.[11]

As correctly noted by the appellate court, although baticolon was not the one who offered and
delivered the shabu to the poseur buyer, his act in thereafter receiving the marked money gives
rise to the inference that he was in connivance with the seller.[12] Indeed, no person in his right
mind would receive and keep the money given in payment for an illegal drug unless he is a part
of such sale. We also took into consideration the fact that after the arrest, the P300 was found
still in Baticolon's possession.

Baticolon questions the validity of the buy-bust operation. He contends that with the enactment
of R.A. No. 9165, it is now required that all anti-drug operations shall be coordinated with the
PDEA, and only specially trained and competent drug enforcement personnel shall conduct drug
enforcement operations. He argues that the NBFs operation is highly questionable considering
that it is neither a deputized agent of PDEA nor is buy-bust operations its primary mandate.

The provision relevant to the issue raised is Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. - The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of
the 'NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall
continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the ' PDEA, subject to
screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and
the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided,
That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the
PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately
reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are
transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions
similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions
in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this
Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide
to join the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP
on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That
when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is
found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency.
The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the
PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
Baticolon's argument is no longer novel. In People v. Sta. Maria,[13] this Court has already ruled
that a buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, does not violate
appellant's constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic
Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest
made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an
arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.

Further, such contention is untenable because in this case the prosecution was able to establish
that coordination with the PDEA was made prior to the buy-bust operation and even after the
arrests were made. It is therefore evident that the arrests made by the NBI were legal and the
evidence seized therefrom admissible in evidence.

Baticolon also submits that the evidence presented against him were insufficient for his
conviction, especially considering the non-presentation of the marked money by the prosecution.

The procedure to be followed by arresting officers in apprehensions involving dangerous drugs is

outlined in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]
It is clear from the aforesaid issuance that the presentation of the marked money is not essential
in the validity of a arrest. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the
money used in a buy-bust operation. It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delictiin evidence. These were done,
and were proved by the prosecution's evidence.[14]

In this case; the prosecution has successfully established the unbroken chain of custody over the
seized drugs. After the buy-bust operation was completed, SI Fineza pre-marked the items seized
and brought these to the NBI office for photograph and inventory. At the NBI office, an
inventory of the seized items was conducted and these were photographed in the presence of a
Sky Cable media man, barangay kagawad and a PDEA representative. A photograph of the
accused with the seized items was also taken. SI Fineza then prepared a written request for
laboratory examination. The written request for laboratory examination and the item seized were,
thereafter, delivered by SI Fineza to the Negros Oriental PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory for
examination. The request and seized item were received by PSI Llena, the forensic chemist who
conducted a chemistry examination of the substance.[15] In her Chemistry Report No. D-039-05,
Police Senior Inspector Josephine S. Llena (PSI Llena) certified that the specimen tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[16] The substance tested was .the same item marked;
offered in evidence as Exhibit "D" 17494; and positively identified during trial by SI Fineza as
the very same item sold by and taken from Bocadi during the buy-bust operation.

We have previously ruled that as long as the state can show by record or testimony that the
integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous
whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the prosecution can maintain that it was
able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[17]

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Appellant bears the burden
of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that
public officers properly discharged their duties.[18] Appellant in this case failed to present any
plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of
the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.[19] We note that appellant did not even
question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. His appeal harped primarily on the fact that
it was not a PDEA initiated operation and that the marked money was not presented in evidence.

Finally, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
viz.:
Sect 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
We sustain the penalty imposed on appellant as this in conformity with the above-quoted
provision of the law.

Finding no reason to depart from the rulings of the trial court and the CA, we hereby adopt the
same.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 May 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00709 AFFIRMING the Joint Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court finding Rodolfo Bocadi y Apatan and Alberto, Baticolon y
Ramirez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of selling shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002," sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering them to each
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015 ]
DANDY L. DUNGO AND GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision[1] and the October 8, 2013 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and
Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
4 of R.A. No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information[4] against the petitioners before the RTC, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers,
whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information[5] which reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-name accused, during a plannedinitiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y
MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby
subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,[6] but it was
denied by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and
jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[7] Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies
are summarized as follows:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did
not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Villanueva's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he
saw large cpntusions on both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to
the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him
that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned
them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of
the men just said that they were headed somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.[8] Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with
hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student and also
because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City,
testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed
down his findings in an autopsy report.[9] Upon examination of the body, he found various
external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries,
with various severity and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage
due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body,
and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were
hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the
marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fratemity.[10]

Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba
City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006,
at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney
with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person
seated beside the driver of the jeepney.[11] She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to
be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white
long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced
each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like
they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was
shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went
to her store.[12] It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the
policemen visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.

Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the
comer of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the
resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed
a ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very
weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried
and sensed it was cold.

Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside
the emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go
home. Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards
on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men,
who signed on the logbook[13] under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the
lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the
security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police
station so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital.
During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dungo as the two persons who brought
Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (PO2 Ignacio) testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock
in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless
body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When PO2 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva's
corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. PO2 Ignacio and his policemen
companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what
happened, but they invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy.
Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they
knocked on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.

The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added
that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting
the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following mornmg.

Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic
year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the
UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away
from her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.[14] They were wearing
black shirts with the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived
and, with their heads bowed, approached the three men. One of thm was Villanueva, who was
carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter
did not report to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice,
but the latter just kept quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.

Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates
at the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali
Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva
introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also
to undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.

Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and
Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.

McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a
B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños,[15] as evidenced by his official
transcript of record.[16]

Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the
UP Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006
against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of
Villa Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as
witnesses for the complainant.[17]

Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified
that he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman to
convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her
safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked
and vandalized.

Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son,
her family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the
aggregate amount of P140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.[18] Her husband also
incurred travel expenses in the amount of P7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his
son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane ticket.[19] She further attested that she experienced
mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a
result of her son's death.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:

Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006,
around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate
School. Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in
the negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Cornelio again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine
along; Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked
Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he
and his girlfriend had something to do.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo
Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate
School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there
from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her
boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and
slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they
were roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding house.

Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements
for a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked
about their fraternity's final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo
and Rivera then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near
Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half
hours. Then they walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met
Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he
would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative.
Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept
there.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was calling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to
Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo's arrival at the resort, Sibal led
him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and
Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the
hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital.
He identified himself before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his
real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO- Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at
the tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that
night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada,
Los Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a
bruise on the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to
the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around
11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to
stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes,
Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up
B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in
charge of fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood
donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the
fraternity's tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for
the initiation rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños,
where he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a
bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter
to take a rest. A few minutes later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on
Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort
until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told him that the final initiation rite was
cancelled, and that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but he
was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.

After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping
on the second floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1:00 o'clock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who
looked unconscious, seated in one of the benches on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After
Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital.
There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.

The RTC Ruling

On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4
of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
court stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los
Baños Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:0.0 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of
Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day
by the testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr.
Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.

According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP
Los Baños student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal
were members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported
Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba
City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort,
performed under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by
Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and
that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.

The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort
for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final
initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial
of Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect
because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family/heirs of
Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:

1. P141,324.00 for and as actual damages;

2. P200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. P100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. P50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the
prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049.
They also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere
presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding
them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.

It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.

The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the
venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the
final initiation rites.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the
assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE
OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT
FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR
NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.[22]

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."[23] Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating
R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"[24]during the initiation rites. The
crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included
in the information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.

In its Comment,[25] filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserted
that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and
convicted for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty
members and officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite
would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the
victim to be present thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others.[26]

In their Reply[27] filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance
between the offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the
offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat."[28] The prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or
circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the
petitioners and the other twenty accused.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Matter

An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher

court authority.[29]The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions oflaw.[30]

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court
when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[31] According to the
said provisiOn, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals."

Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties.[32] Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[33]

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law.[34]Moreover, such review is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons.[35]

In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an
accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and
raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule
45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail
the existence of conspiracy in their reply,[36] which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty
of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.[37]

Substantive Matter

In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due
to hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders ofyoung men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony,
cries and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter
how modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of
fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of
the academe.

The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case
of Villareal v. People.[38] It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of
hazing were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.[39] Thus, a
study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current
predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.

United States Laws and Jurisprudence on Hazing

There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.[40] In the case
of People v. Lenti,[41]the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the· state law
defining hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it
would have been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms
of hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or
emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.[42]

Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence,
acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.[43] The physical form of hazing
may include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual
hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.[44] Moreover, hazing does
not only result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and
traumatic stress.[45]

Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.[46] Forty-four states, with the exception
of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed antihazing
laws.[47] The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to
six years.[48] In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that
result in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.[49]

In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,[50] a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident,
was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or
she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily
injury or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law
ofNew York.[51]

Interestingly, some states included notable features in their antihazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and
Texas, the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing.[52] In fact, in Alabama, no
person is allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the
offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.[53]

Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.[54] In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.[55] By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts
to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.[56]

In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned.[57] Hazing, which
threatens to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are
possible.[58]

In State v. Brown,[59] a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted
for complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand
on their heads, beating them with paddles, and 'smacking and striking initiates in the face and
head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v.
Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,[60] a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of
aspirating his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation
ritual. The defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to
the victim. The court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively
contributed to the death of the victim as part of their hazing.

Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,[61] a tenth-
grade wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing,
including a ritual where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with
his buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the
incident despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement ofthe parties
in the amount of US$151,000.00.

More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College[62] involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi
Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its
activities.

The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain
redress before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the
pistinct dilemma of hazing.

Anti-Hazing Law in the Philippines

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to
the rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa.[63] Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin
Reglos of the San Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the
Philippines - Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for
an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?

To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would ot be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.[64] When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered
injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.[65]

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however,
there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.[66]

Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.[67]

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.[68]

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would
show that the lawmakers intended the antihazing statute to be malum prohibitum, as follows:

SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,

fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain
acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but
it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very
same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or
group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization,
the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in
these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide,
mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong
kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
"Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor.
But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we
create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements
of anycnme.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate,
the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the
Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in
the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters. intended to
kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of
hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape
responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites.
This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. x x x

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We
will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[69]

[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead,
it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.[70] In Vedaña v.
Valencia,[71] the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken,
through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[72] The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the
law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.[73]

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization;
and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating

situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the
definition of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities.[74] In fact,
the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and
Citizen's Army Training. Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.[75]

R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness
of prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff
of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.

And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the
following requisites are met:

1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities
or head of organization;

2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such
initiation;

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;

b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such

initiation rites.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or
their representatives that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to
be present during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative is to see to it that no
physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or
organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and
organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the
law, which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and
accomplices.

The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof,
the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in
the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.[76]

The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the
victim.[77] The penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less
serious physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,[78] with the penalties for
hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would
aggravate the imposable penalty.[79]

Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical
or psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of
physical harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the
victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate
him, there is still a prescribed penalty.[80]

The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing.[81] Although these
planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be
liable as principals. The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or alumni.

The third class of principals would be officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat.[82] These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct
participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing.

The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when
the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.[83] The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing,
but also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity,
group, or organization.[84] The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or
members. The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and
failed to take any action to avoid the same from occurring.

The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed
to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices.[85]

Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to
the crime.[86] The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same.

Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.[87]Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of
the victim shall not be a defense in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be
included as a punishable act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled:

SENATOR LINA x x x

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable
because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the
consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at lflll. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain1 or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense
of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death: or
physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent
is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committedr
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President. SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.[88]

[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. It provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military
or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on
the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their
conviction.[89] Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal
actions against the offenders.[90]

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the
penalties imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage
would be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law
can be effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.

The Information properly charged the offense proved

The petitioners claim that the amended information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their
contention must faiL The Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, during a plannedinitiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less tvventy other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y
MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby
subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[91]

On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly.[92]

The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One
of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present.
Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the
death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the
petitioners that induced the victim to be present.

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.[93] To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception
of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous
task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity,
which has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned
initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the offenders was duly proven

The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.

The Court disagrees.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.[94] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[95]

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.[96]Responsibility of a conspirator is
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[97]

The lawmakers ·deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.[98]

The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.[99]

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption
of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6
thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This
provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to
prevent the commission of the hazing.

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, but did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain
facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce."[100]

Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders
are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives
rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;[101] (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is. prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;[102] and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.[103]

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the
crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts
that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a
requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing;
and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because
of their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal
during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She
testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:

MR. DIMACULANGAN

Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?

WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.

Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or
this group of people coming from?

A: Inside the resort, sir.

Q: And around what time was this?

A: Around 9:00, sir.

Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?

A: They went to my store, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?

xxxx

A: "Meron po".

Q: Who were these visitors?

A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.

Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-
Trial, can you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom
you said visited your store is here?

xxxx

A: "Siya rin po."

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture
on the first row.

xxxx

ATTY. PAMAOS:

For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the
witness has been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the
defense as referring to Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case...[104]
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the
night of the hazing, to wit:

COURT

Q: x x x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then
how would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?

WITNESS

A: "lyon pong...di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po..."

Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say
that you could identify those people?

A: "Hindi po: Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng
driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapas iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod
nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."

Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?

A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa
kabila iyon."

Q: And who was that person?

A: "Siya po, iyon po."

Q: Who are you pointing to?

A: "lyon pong naka-dilaw na..." (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)

Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver
came out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the
jeepney, is that your testimony?

A: Yes, your Honor.[105]

The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of
their actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut
and overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that
they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it
based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.[106] Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the
criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facieevidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

The guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing,
the petitionersguilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not
merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[107] In criminal law, proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.[108]

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed
in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous
crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.[109]

Needless to state, the crime of hazi,ng is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities,
especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to
give any information regarding initiation rites.[110] The silence is only broken after someone has
been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is
revealed and the activities become public.[111] Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is
only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial
evidence to prove it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.[112] To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.
Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.[113]

The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey
Atienza.

2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at
their tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way
from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not
know the third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi
Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing
arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim,
Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two
fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took
back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."

4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo,
stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did not
report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the victim
on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed down.
Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards the Entomology wing.

5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of
13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic].
Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.

6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more
than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney. She
estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons rirling
a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.

7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked
like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store
to buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she
was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald Christopher
Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.

8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that around
3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner
of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone inside the
resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the
gate who will be riding his tricycle.

9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of the
man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.

10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital
and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of
January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper
Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room containing four
(4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He
identified two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and
Glindo helped the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the
emergency room.

11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two men for identification cards. The latter replied that they did
not bring with them any I.D. or wallet. Instead of giving their true names, the appellants listed
down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y
 Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly called
the police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a dead
body was brought to the hospital.

12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.

13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did not
respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He
further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.

14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs
which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back
of the knee.

15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he was
a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing
when he was a student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing incidents.

16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver
of the victim on January 14, 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma.
From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2) persons
whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions
and injuries on different parts of their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and
lower extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the
injuries found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva,
sustained similar injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries
and contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazing-related.[114]
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are
the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.[115] As properly held
by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would
stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers,
likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and disinterested witnesses to
substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.

After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by
the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They
took part in the hazing and, together with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted
physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical
injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young
life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven,
the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

Final Note

Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049
was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in
penalizing the crime of hazing.

Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of
R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the
court, it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused
to be overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate
the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider
hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.

While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,[116] the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the
discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be
a penalty or liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and
with Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should
also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs
on R.A. No. 8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated.

R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there
must, and should, be another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of
violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for
justice is the spark that lights the candles of their graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance
for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for non compliance with its Section 2
and 3, and the penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur