Process Safety

Process Safety

Description

This course is designed to provide the necessary knowledge and tools which can be applied for to prevent explosions,
fires and accidental releases at hydrocarbon / processing facilities. The aim of this course is to develop fundamental
competencies related to Process Safety Engineering as it applies to the upstream oil and gas industry.

Duration: 5 days

Agenda:

Day Content/Topics
 Process safety
o Objective
o Primary level of protection
o Secondary level of protection
 Facilities protection system
o Safety barrier principles
o Bow tie concept
o Overpressure protection
o Specification breaks
o Process SD system
o Fire gas system
o SD system
o Exercises
 Basic Risk Assessment Methodology
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o Concept of a frequency - consequence matrix
o Frequency Analysis using the risk matrix
o Consequence modeling using the risk matrix
o Concept of risk mitigation measures
 Concept of Safety barriers to be introduced
o Swiss cheese model
o LOPA (Layers of Protection ) analysis methodology to be discussed
 Case study utilizing a generic risk matrix
 Overview of the Shutdown system
o Level 1 Unit Shutdown (USD)
o Level 2 Process Shutdown (PSD)
o Level 3 Emergency Shutdown (ESD)-
o Level 4 Emergency Depressurize Shutdown (EDP)
o ESD/PSD system requirements per IEC 61508 / 61511

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 Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

Terminology
o
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
o
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)
o
Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
o
Concept of Layers Of Protection
o
SIS design considerations
o
 Needs to be independent of all control functions
 Requires no human intervention
 Needs to be "fail safe"
 Conducts self diagnostics
 Has inbuilt redundancy
 Has voting capability
 Could lead to spurious trips
 SIL assignment methods`
 Ignition Sources
o Revisit the fire triangle / ignition databases
o Auto Ignition temperature concept
o Typical ignition sources
o Typical measures to avoid hot surfaces
2 o Electrical equipment as an ignition source
o Static electricity
o Mechanical ignition sources
o Piping system failure modes
o Pump failure modes
o Compressor failure modes
o Storage system failure modes
o Fired heater failure modes
o Mitigation measures to avoid failure
 Relieve System
o These relief systems protect the plant from overpressure.
o Overpressure protection provided an instrumented system - less common
o Overpressure protection via Rupture Discs (less common)
o Overpressure protection provided via relief valves - more common
o Relief valve terminology
 Set pressure
 Back pressure
 Allowable over pressure
 Accumulation
 Simmer
o Relief valve types
 Conventional

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 Pilot operated - Modulating and non-modulating

 Balanced bellows
 Selection criteria for relief valve type
 Advantages / disadvantages of different tpes of relief valves
o Relief valve sizing based on API RP 520
o Relief valve sizing scenarios
o Rupture discs
 Types of rupture discs
 Advantages / disadvantages of rupture discs

 Flare System
Key components of a Flare System
o
 Flare Collection Headers
 Flare Knockout Drums c/w pumps
 Flare Stack
o Design considerations of a Flare System
 Maximum throughput at worst case scenario
 Maximum intervention time by operator during emergency
 KO Drum sizing criteria
 Flare Header slope
 Sonic velocity concept for Flare Header sizing
 Allowable radiation / noise limits from Flare Stack
 Purge requirements for Flare Stacks
 Molecular seal concept at Flare Stack
 Flare tip design - normal / sonic tip
3  Flare tip maintenance
 Flash back and its prevention
 Flare ignition system
 Flare pilots
o Environmental considerations - the need for zero flaring
 Fire Protection
o Objective - to minimize loss of life and property due to fire / explosion
o Passive and active fire protection concept
 Passive fire protection design considerations
 Keep equipment at safe distances from one another
 Provide drainage to prevent liquid pooling following a spill
 Fireproofing to delay radiation damage
 Electrics certified for hazardous area operation
 Blast walls
o Active fire protection design considerations
 Fire and Gas detection

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 Gas Detector
 layout and alarm initiation
 Alarm on gas detection
 Line gas detectors
 Hydrogen sulfide gas
 Fire Detector
o layout
o Fire detector type
o Manual detection
o Alarm on fire detection
 Deluge systems using firewater / foam
 Battery limit fail safe shutdown valves
o Depressurization
 Why depressurize?
 15 minute rule during depressurization
 Design requirements for the blowdown valve
 Assess / inspection of the blowdown valve
Plant Layout Considerations
 Concept of a plot plan to be introduced
 Typical plot plan
 Design considerations of a plot plan
o Minimum inter unit distances to be maintained
o Prevailing wind direction via wind rose
o Flares and vents to be located downwind of process units
o Control room to be located upwind of units per API 752
o Overpressure contours to be shown on plot plan
o Toxic contours to be shown on plot plan
o Radiation contours to be shown on plot plan
o Temporary accommodation to comply with API 753
o Firewater headers to access all areas via two or more independent paths
o Firewater tenders to access all areas via two or more independent roads for
firefighting. Keep similar process units together
o Evacuation routes to be shown
o Temporary routes to be shown during maintenance turnarounds via a MOC
(Management of Change) process
 HAZID
o Information required for HAZID
o Hazard identification
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o HAZID worksheet
o Hazard checklist
o Case studies
 HAZOP Method
o HAZOP Terminologies

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o Systematic Features and creative thinking

o Guide Word Approach
o Process Deviation
o HAZOP Matrix
o General Process Deviations
o HAZOP study Assumptions
o HAZOP Review Applications
o Guidelines of choosing Node
o Factors affecting Node selection
o HAZOP Technical Suggestions
o HAZOP Review Suggestions
o HAZOP Recommendations and reporting

 Exercise on process safety on unstabilized crude oil

HAZPO and HAZID
o
Control protection system and SIL
o
Detection and mitigation method: application of HAZOP for
o
 Onshore storage tank
 Reference documentation:
o API RP 14C excerpts
o API RP 520 excerpts
o Video with effects of a BLEVE
o Video with effects of an confined explosion
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o Piper Alfa video
o Safety case from the UK sector
o CSB videos on accidents caused by
o Inadequate isolation
o Lack of knowledge
o Not following procedures
o Design faults
o Improper handover
o Human error

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