ESTACS:

5. Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion on Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR (GR No. 135385,
December 6, 2000)

1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they
have lived there even before the Spanish colonization. “Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐
conquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as
memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputable
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.”

2. Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine: As held in Oh Cho vs Director of

Lands: “This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial”

3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership:

“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. ‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view
that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their
cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains
are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore
cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.”

4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned
by the IPs
* The IPs claims are limited to “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains;”
* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found within the
ancestral domains

Discussion related to the topic of the Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring Ownership (land):
I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A. Laws of the Indies
“The Regalian Theory is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.”
 By virtue of Spain’s "discovery" and conquest of the Philippines, its lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown
 Back then, the Spanish Government distributed the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian

B. Valenton‐vs‐Murciano Case (1904, American Regime)

 Long‐time occupation will not necessarily lead to ownership of the land
 "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
 that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and
until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
3⁄4 Provides rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the
Philippine Islands
1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874)
3⁄4 more comprehensive but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos,
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges

1936: Present Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141)

3⁄4 Almost the same as Act 2874, except that it gave the Filipino citizens and corporations
which were previously only granted to Americans

**1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496)

3⁄4 It placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system
3⁄4 almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898

II. TORRENS SYSTEM

Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
Government’s Role:
The government must issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves
Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the
parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.

III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

 Despite of several legal developments on land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is still
retained in our Constitution.
 Under this concept, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State.

(FOR REFERENCE inde ni part sang Digest, ang Separate Opinion lang ang nasulat sa List.)
Main Case: Isagani Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR et.al., (GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
Facts:
In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of certain
provisions of IPRA, among others:
a) It allows the indigenous people/cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCES;
b) It defines ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private
lands owned by other individuals;
 c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public
land;
d) It violates due process in allowing NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to
take jurisdiction over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these.

In the first deliberation of the Supreme Court, the votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐deliberated
upon.

Issue/s:
Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?
A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a
CADT/CALT, will be recognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning‐ thus,
has never been part of public domain.
B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the
State

Held:
No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and
constitutional (7 to grant ‐7 to dismiss).

N. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Republic Act No. 6975: AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

2. Antonio M. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, et.al. (GR No. 96409. February 14,
1992)

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this
petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the
consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463 with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

Republic Act No. 6975 allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution, which
provides that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national
in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law.”

Issues:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution Particularly Sec. 12 RA 6975 as it
constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of,
executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that RA 6975 is constitutional.

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President. Supreme Court held that the President has
control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of
control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment
of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Thus, “the
President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who,
in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to
repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in
nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
3. Jesulito A. Manalo vs. Pedro Sistoza, et.al. (GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999)

Facts:

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued
by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were
promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of
Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and
Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their
salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a
tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Held:

The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental
law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

 The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.–It is petitioner’s submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose
rank is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is
separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less,
sets forth the distinction.
 Directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.