DAVID vs. ARROYO G.R. No.

171396 May 3, 2006

FACTS:

On February 24,2006, during the celebration of the 20 th anniversary of EDSA People

Power I, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of National
Emergency which subject to certain conditions by the framers of our constitution. The
basis of the declaration is the conspiracy of the opposition, the extreme left and extreme
right which have repeatedly tried to bring down the republican government.

Petitioners alleged that President Arroyo has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
declaring a State of National Emergency, assailing that PP 1017 on the grounds that it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing?

RULING:

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. In view of the number of
petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more
than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi. The difficulty of
determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public
right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person.
He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either
case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other
words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and
the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. The locus standi of petitioners in
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a

former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states
that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for
the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his
disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En
Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May
10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President

Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the
petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria
M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo
Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the
same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and
be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.

RULING:

No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments
forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to
prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in

relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether
local or national position.
BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011

FACTS:
On 2003, then Ambassador Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to DFA proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement bet USA and RP. The RP, represented by
then DFA Sec. Ople, agreed with the US proposals. Such Agreement provides that
current or former government officials or employees or military personnel of one party
present in the territory of the other shall not be surrendered to any international tribunal,
absent the express consent of the first party, and unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council. Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of discretion
to respondents and prays that the Agreement be struck down as unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Agreement was contracted validly.
2. Whether the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence,
contravenes the Rome Statute and other treaties.

RULING:
1. Yes. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art II of the 1987
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-
governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. Hence, the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among
nations.
2. No. An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent
any clear contravention of the law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring
any executive agreement invalid.
SAGUISAG V. OCHOA, JR. G.R. No. 212426 and G.R. No.212444, January 12, 2016,

FACTS:
The Philippines and the USA entered into their first military arrangement pursuant to the
Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA. In view of the impending expiration of the
1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their
defense and security relationship. However, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty. The
expiration of the MBA led to the suspension of the large-scale joint military exercise but
they agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced level. The military
arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when they concluded the first Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Then the two countries entered into a second counterpart
agreement. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) authorizes the U.S.
military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations"
in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that
to do so was no longer necessary. The petitioners question the constitutionality of the
EDCA arguing that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate,
not an executive agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in entering
into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement.

RULING:
No. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and
is intimately related to the other executive functions which is also self-executory. In light
of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and
necessary for Philippine defense interests. Despite the President's roles as defender of
the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his
ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities.
However, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the
conclusion that it applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and a
foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry" Philippine territory. It is evident that
the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject
only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not
to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The VFA has already allowed
the entry of troops in the Philippines. The power of the President to enter into binding
executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this
jurisdiction. One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their
validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. This distinctive
feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading (1961) which states that
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of twothirds of
the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the
need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. Thus, no court can tell the President to
desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international
agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,Article VII of the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being
a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
2. Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the
presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution
RULING:
1. Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court
involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our
jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding
thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission
on Elections is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral
Tribunal. Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. However, where there is
ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution. Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity
from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious
that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution,
and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of
a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a
special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be
an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department ,i.e., the
Supreme Court.
2. It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential
or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that
"it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which
to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed
out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found
in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT
v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

FACTS:
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. May 9 to 18,
2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multichannel
sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine
the area’s underwater composition. January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management
Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein
it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and
favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX’s application for an ECC. March 6, 2007,
the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town
in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. Petitioners then
applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December
17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general
law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service
contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

RULING:
No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the
utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum
benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to
the petitioners’ argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise
repealed. Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the
Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible,
that construction should be 640 preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission
on Elections expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory
construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that
the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a
statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. Note that while Presidential Decree
No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation
and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a
law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
GUDANI VS. SENGA, GR NO. 170165, AUGUST 15, 2006

FACTS:

Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan
were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify
before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue
an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal
General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani
was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully
disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2)
the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-
interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even
if the President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4
October 2005?

RULING:

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general
rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one
of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as
it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-
chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right
to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since
petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware
that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and
executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only
as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior.
The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic
with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial
power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by
the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its
rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were
initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has
fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation
of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October
2005.
PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its
concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in
UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law,
is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit
the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to
the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission
to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held NO.

The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external
relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the
mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and
enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote
of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA, JR
G.R. NO. 204819, APRIL 8, 2014

FACTS:

The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive
and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive
health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population
control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing
its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents
insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts
of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
ISSUE:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

RULING:

NO.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject”
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court
has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph
of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible

parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.
JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, et al.

G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012

FACTS:

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee,
later renamed Sulu Crisis Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of
Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration,
describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows
on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made
and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation,
Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections
1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President.

RULING:

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that
is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the
President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the
nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with
Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces. The 340 Constitution does not require that the
President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief,
he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally,
he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed
with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code.