G.R No.

206666 January 21, 2015

Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored
to his civil and political rights.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena and run for the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Issue:

Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Ruling:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “he is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

Facts:

In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended by President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, clemency could
be given even before conviction).

On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking for automatic reinstatement to her
position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of
Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City Treasuries. The Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of
Monsanto but said that appointment was only to retroact from the date of she was given pardon.
Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the pardon was given when her case was still
pending on appeal before the SC, no final verdict has yet been handed and consequently the accessory penalty
attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did not attach. Also, she contends that the pardon given
before the final verdict is tantamount to acquittal.

Issue:

Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her
former position without need of a new appointment?

Ruling:

No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him
to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but
it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.

G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017

Representative Edcel C. Lagman, et al vs. Honorable Salvador C. Medialdea. Executive Secretary

Facts:

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole
island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the
president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by
the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City.
According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and
lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the
Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report
and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a
declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were
derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with
these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
exists.

G.R. Nos. 171396 May 3, 2006

David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al.

Facts:

Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments
were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed
petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

Ruling:

No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.