“CO-OWNERSHIP”

1)
Facts:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin
Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888,
Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves
without an judicial authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of
the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a house in
Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot
in Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta.
Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur. Vicenta filed an action in court asking
that the judgement be rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the total
value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned
properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the
plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her
husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper
story of the house in Escolta Street.
Issue:
Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the
said property
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the
said property was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of
the limitations on a co-
owner’s right of use is that he must use it in such a way so
as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party
failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented
Vicenta from utilizing the same

2)
IGNAO V. IAC
When co-ownership is terminated by division of land, Art 448 applies to parties in good
faith. The party whose land is encroached upon has the sole right to choose whether to
sell his land encroached or to appropriate that which encroaches his land.
FACTS:
The case involves Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his Uncles Juan and Isidro Ignao as
Respondents. Both Petitioner and Respondents co-owned land with 534 sqm (about the
size of an Olympic swimming pool.) in Cavite. The parties had a falling out (maybe the
uncles had bad breath) and so attempted to partition the land, with 133 going to the
uncles and 266 going to Petitioner. The attempt failed. Later, Petitioner discovered that
the two houses of Respondent uncles encroached his land. Juan ate 42 sqm and Isidro
ate 59 sqm… for the grand total of 101 sqm. He complained.
The RTC said that uncles built in good faith therefore that exempts them from damages.
Art 448 therefore applies But things didn’t go to well for the Petitioner. The RTC said
that if Petitioner opted to appropriate the sections of the encroaching houses, the
Uncles will be left with worthless hovels. Hence, RTC ordered Petitioner to just sell his
land which was encroached. “No Good!” cried Petitioner and he appealed to the IAC.
He lost again. Petitioner trooped to the SC for vindication

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner has the right to choose whether to appropriate the house
encroaching his land or to sell his land.
2. Whether or not the courts and respondents can rob Petitioner of the options provided
for under Art 448.

HELD:
Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his land! The ruling
of the RTC and IAC contravened the explicit provisions of Art 448 which granted him the
explicit right to choose. The law is clear when it bestows choice upon the aggrieved land
owner and not upon the builders or the courts.

3)
Ining v Vega
GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA

VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON
TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA- FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ;
DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA
RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR.,
Petitioners, v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND
LENARD VEGA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died
without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and
Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short,
herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners
of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale
from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact.

ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC –
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining
2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never
sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s
estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse
possession).
(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-
interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds
of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled
by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying
the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription
shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”

ISSUES:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT
LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9,
1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled
and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained
part of Leon’s estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription
shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held
that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-
ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded
that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979,
is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is
merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and
cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect
a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s
heirs.
OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-
owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of
an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-
heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the
same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held
that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat
justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of their
rightful inheritance.
3. “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent
any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor
of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.”
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

4)
G.R. No. 189420 Case Digest
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
Raul Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz
vs Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Nolasco
Ponente: Perez

Facts:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m. Land in
Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero
Nolasco and their children.

On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners,
except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties,
saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to
the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because they were
not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale of the property.

Issue: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this
withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.

RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their consent to sale.
Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.
CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to
give their consent.

Held: CA was right.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of
the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition
of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial
conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the
right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

5)
G.R. No. 166519 Case Digest
G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009
Nieves Plasabas and Marcos Malazarte
vs Court of Appeals, Dominador Lumen and Aurora Aunzo
Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

In 1074, Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with
damages before CFI Maasin, Leyte. The subject property was a parcel of coconut land
declared in the name of Plasabas. They pray for their rights over the land be confirmed
and for Lumen and Aunzo to vacate the land.

Aunzo and Lumen interposed that they inherited the land from their common ancestor,
Francisco Plasabas. In the course of trial, it was found out that Nieves was not the
absolute owner of the land.

Aunzo and Lumen then raised the argument that the case should have been terminated
at inception for petitioner's failure to implead indispensable parties (Jose, Victor and
Victoria).

CFI dismissed the case. The instant case should have been dismissed without prejudice
a long time ago for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte
and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by
themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as
INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading
them, any judgment would have no effectiveness.

Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA. CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI. CA
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of
due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that
the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.
Held:

With a motion to reconsider, SC grants the petition and remands the case to the CFI for
disposition on the merits, citing Article 487 that provides any one of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment.

In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they
summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a
protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead
indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.

6)

JOSEPHINE MARMO v. MOISES O. ANACAY

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings, are briefly summarized
below:

On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of
Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the petitioners[6] and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2919-03.[7] The complaint
states, among others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his
wife, Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the
house built thereon, located at Blk. 54, Lot 9, Regency Homes, Brgy. Malinta,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-815595 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite; they authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject
property; petitioner Josephine sold the subject property to petitioner Danilo for
P520,000.00, payable in monthly installments of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June
2006; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments from December 2002
onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No. 815595 had been
cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephine's name by virtue of
a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001; petitioner Josephine
subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled
and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilo's name. The respondent sought
the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the
cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he demanded petitioner Danilo's
payment of the balance of P347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and the
payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, and cost of suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondent's
children, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs
because they are indispensable parties.[8] Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner
Josephine's submission in his Answer.[9]

Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for
the respondent's failure to include his children as indispensable parties. [10]

The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable
parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the
proceedings.[11]

THE RTC RULING

The RTC found the respondent's argument to be well-taken and thus denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss in an Order dated March 14, 2006.[12] It also noted that the
petitioners' motion was simply filed to delay the proceedings.

After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[13] the petitioners elevated their case
to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[14] They
charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not
dismissing the case after the respondent failed to include indispensable parties.

THE CA RULING

The CA dismissed the petition[15] in a Decision promulgated on December 28, 2007. It

found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners' motion to dismiss, noting that the respondent's children are not
indispensable parties.

The petitioners moved[16] but failed[17] to secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision;

hence, the present petition.

Following the submission of the respondent's Comment[18] and the petitioners'

Reply,[19] we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[20] Both parties complied.[21]

Meanwhile, on April 24, 2009, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the pendency of the present petition. The RTC denied the motion to
suspend as well as the motion for reconsideration that followed. The petitioners
responded to the denial by filing with us a petition for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from proceeding with the hearing of the case
pending the resolution of the present petition.
 THE PETITION and
THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS

The petitioners submit that the respondent's children, who succeeded their deceased
mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full
determination of the case cannot be made without their presence, relying on Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals,[22] Orbeta v. Sendiong,[23] and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de
Mindo.[24] They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal jurisdictional
defect.

The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondent's children are not
indispensable parties because the issue involved in the RTC - whether the signatures of
the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001
were falsified - can be resolved without the participation of the respondent's children.

THE ISSUE

The core issue is whether the respondent's children are indispensable parties in Civil
Case No. 2919-03. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is
whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the respondent's children are not indispensable parties.

OUR RULING

We see no merit in the petition.

General Rule: The denial of a

motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which is
not the proper subject of an
appeal or a petition for
certiorari.

At the outset, we call attention to Section 1 of Rule 41[25] of the Revised Rules of Court
governing appeals from the RTC to the CA. This Section provides that an appeal may
be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. It explicitly states as well
that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.

In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening developments between the

commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that
does not end the whole controversy.[26] An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an
incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves
something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits. [27]

An Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory because it does not finally

dispose of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by
the court. Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order.[28]

In the present case, since the petitioners did not wait for the final resolution on the
merits of Civil Case No. 2919-03 from which an appeal could be taken, but opted to
immediately assail the RTC Orders dated March 14, 2006 and May 8, 2006 through a
petition for certiorari before the CA, the issue for us to address is whether the RTC, in
issuing its orders, gravely abused its discretion or otherwise acted outside or in excess
of its jurisdiction.

The RTC did not commit grave

abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss; the respondent's co-
owners are not indispensable
parties.

The RTC grounded its Order dated March 14, 2006 denying the petitioners' motion to
dismiss on the finding that the respondent's children, as co-owners of the subject
property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case.

We agree with the RTC.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court[29] defines indispensable parties as

parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and
who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence
further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy in a situation
where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. He is a person whose absence disallows the court from making an
effective, complete, or equitable determination of the controversy between or among the
contending parties.[30]

When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."

We have explained in Vencilao v. Camarenta[31] and in Sering v. Plazo[32] that the term
"action in ejectment" includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio).[33] We also noted in Sering that the term "action in ejectment" includes
"also, an accion publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion
reinvidicatoria[34] (recovery of ownership)." Most recently in Estreller v. Ysmael,[35] we
applied Article 487 to an accion publiciana case; in Plasabas v. Court of Appeals[36] we
categorically stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.

We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit without impleading other
co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. We made this ruling
in Vencilao, where the amended complaint for "forcible entry and detainer" specified
that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the disputed properties. In Sering,
and Resuena v. Court of Appeals,[37] the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not
represent themselves as the exclusive owners of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo
and Teresa Santiago,[38] the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the
co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common.[39] In Plasabas, the plaintiffs
alleged in their complaint for recovery of title to property (accion reivindicatoria) that
they are the sole owners of the property in litigation, but acknowledged during the trial
that the property is co-owned with other parties, and the plaintiffs have been authorized
by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf.

These cases should be distinguished from Baloloy v. Hular[40] and Adlawan v.

Adlawan[41] where the actions for quieting of title and unlawful detainer, respectively,
were brought for the benefit of the plaintiff alone whoclaimed to be the sole owner. We
held that the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleaded the other co-owners
who are indispensable parties. In these cases, the absence of an indispensable party
rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

We read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought by a co-
owner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for
the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-
owners. However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole
ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-
owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the
suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-owners.

In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed
the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the
litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the questioned
property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more importantly, the
respondent's claim in his complaint in Civil Case No. 2919-03 is personal to him and his
wife, i.e., that his and his wife's signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioner Josephine were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which
does not require the participation of the respondent's co-owners at the trial; it can be
determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their
signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are
adequately protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since
the complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the
properties owned in common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-
owners.[42]

In sum, respondent's children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not

indispensable parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of De
Guzman[43] that in cases like this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit
is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all.[44] Thus, the respondent's children need not
be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2919-03.

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' reliance on our rulings in Arcelona v. Court of

Appeals,[45] Orbeta v. Sendiong[46] and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo,[47] for these
cases find no application to the present case. In these cited cases, the suits were either
filed against a co-owner without impleading the other co-owners, or filed by a party
claiming sole ownership of a property that would affect the interests of third parties.

Arcelona involved an action for security of tenure filed by a tenant without impleading all
the co-owners of a fishpond as party-defendants. We held that a tenant, in an action to
establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners as party-
defendants since a tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners as party-defendants
cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land. Orbeta, on the
other hand, involved an action for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages
wherein the plaintiffs prayed that they be declared "absolute co-owners" of the disputed
property, but we found that there were third parties whose rights will be affected by the
ruling and who should thus be impleaded as indispensable parties. In Galicia, we noted
that the complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and annulment of title
alleged that the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest was deprived of possession and
ownership by a third party, but the complaint failed to implead all the heirs of that third
party, who were considered indispensable parties.

In light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners' prayer for a TRO to
suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the present
petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to
show any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007 and
Resolution dated April 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673, both
of which we hereby AFFIRM. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

7)

Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.

GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his widow,

MarcelleSemoron de Ramirez, a French woman; his two grandnephews Roberto and
Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. His will was admitted to probate
by the Court of First Instance. According to the will ½ shall go to Marcelle in full ownership
plus usufruct of the 1/3 of the whole estate; the grandsons shall have the ½ of the whole
estate; and a usufruct in favour of Wanda.

ISSUE:

Is the partition according to the will valid?

RULING:

No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to give Marcelle more than
her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for his dispositions even impaired
her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.As to the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court
upheld its validity. The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for devise of a piece of land.
Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct in favour of Wanda because a
usufruct does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons but the
usufruct of the second half shall go to Wanda.

8)
Torres v. Lapinid
Facts:
The petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of the sale of real property by
respondent in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of possession and ownership of the property;
and the payment of damages. The petitioners were co-owners, with Jesus, who filed an
action for partition of the parcels of land against petitioners. The judgment was that Jesus,
Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive the
proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners which was later amended to
exclude Jesus co-owner but during inspection, it was found out that Lapinid was
occupying a portion the lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus. The petitioners
prayed that the deed of sale to be null and void. Further, the complainants prayed for
payment of rental fees. Jesus said that there was a partition case between him and the
petitioners filed in 1993 involving several parcels of land. Then, Lapinid admitted that a
deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land.
However, he insisted on the validity of sale since Jesus showed him several deeds of
sale making him a majority owner of the lot. He explained that Jesus permitted him to
occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of the
partition of the co-owners. It was ruled that the buyers, including Lapinid, were buyers in
good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the
property. A partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but it was denied.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that the compromise
agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid.

Issue:
Whether or not Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns
in favor of another person.

Held:
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Jesus
can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition
from the co-owners. Lapinid validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the
execution of a valid sale.
9)

G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016

NORMA C. MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. MAGSANO, ROQUE C.

MAGSANO, JR., NIDA M. CAGUIAT, PERLITA MAGSANO, AND SALVADOR C.
MAGSANO, Petitioners, v.PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. AND
SPOUSES EDDIE V. MANUEL AND MILAGROS C. BALLESTEROS, SUBSTITUTED
BY HER HEIRS: GEMMA C. MANUELPEREZ, ANGELO JOHNDREW MANUEL, AND
RESSY C. MANUEL, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
February 14, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99519, which affirmed the Decision4 dated April 27, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 (RTC) dismissing the complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage, certificate of sale, sheriffs final sale, deed of sale,
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 487545 filed by herein petitioners Norma,
Isidro, Ricardo, Roque, Jr., Perlita, arid Salvador, all surnamed Magsano, and Nida M.
Caguiat (petitioners) against herein respondent Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc.6 (respondent bank), respondents spouses Eddie V. Manuel and Milagros C.
Ballesteros (Sps. Manuel), and Sheriff Reynaldo C. Daroy (Sheriff Daroy), but deleted
the awards of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fee, and litigation
expenses in the latter's favor.

The Facts

On July 1, 1991, spouses Roque Magsano (Roque) and Susana Capelo (Susana;
collectively, mortgagors), the parents of petitioners,7 purportedly executed in favor of
respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage8over a 418 square-meter parcel of land
located in Dagupan City, covered by TCT No. 48754,9 as well as the improvements
thereon (subject property), as security for the payment of their P35,000.00
loan.10chanrobleslaw

The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when it fell
due, causing respondent bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property11 in
accordance with Act No. 3135,12 as amended, with notice to the mortgagors,13 and, in
the process, respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction sale
held on March 21, 1994 for a total bid price of P65,826.69.14The mortgagors then failed
to redeem the property within the redemption period15 which led to the cancellation of
TCT No. 48754 and the issuance of TCT No. 6539416 in the name of respondent
bank.17The latter subsequently sold18 the same to Sps. Manuel who were issued TCT
No. 67491.19chanrobleslaw
Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises; hence,
respondent bank applied for20 and was granted a writ of possession21 over the subject
property and, thereafter, a writ of demolition,22 resulting in the demolition of petitioners'
houses.23chanrobleslaw

Consequently, on September 6, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint24 for annulment of

Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed of Sale, and TCT
No. 4875425cralawred against respondent bank, Sps. Manuel, and Sheriff Daroy
(defendants) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-0316-D, which they
amended26 on September 3, 2007.27 They averred that Roque had already passed
away on April 17, 1991,28 or prior to the execution of the Real Estate Mortgage on July
1, 1991; hence, the said mortgage was null and void, and could not have conferred any
right on the subject property in favor of respondent bank which it could pass to Sps.
Manuel.29 They further claimed that the said property is their family home, but the
consent of the majority of the beneficiaries had not been secured. They likewise
asserted that Sps. Manuel were aware that: (a) the foreclosure proceedings were
invalid; and (b) petitioners were in possession of the subject property, hence,
purchasers in bad faith.30chanrobleslaw

For their part,31 defendants denied knowledge of the death of Roque,32 and averred that
petitioners have no cause of action to seek the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage
since they were not parties thereto.33 They contended that assuming that the latter have
a cause of action, the same had prescribed pursuant to Articles 1144, 1149, and 1150
of the Civil Code.34 They further argued that petitioners are estopped from questioning
the validity of the Real Estate Mortgage, considering that they: (a) are bound by the acts
of their mother, Susana, who signed the same, and is presumed to be the author of the
misrepresentation/falsification, and benefited from the proceeds of the loan; 35 and (b)
participated in the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of
possession.36chanrobleslaw

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision37 dated April 27, 2012, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.38 It declared that petitioners have no cause of action against the
defendants,39 holding them bound by the misrepresentation of their mother who signed
the Real Estate Mortgage, the authenticity of whose signature they never
contested.40 And even assuming that petitioners have a cause of action, the RTC ruled
that the same is barred by prescription, considering that the action to annul the Real
Estate Mortgage and the foreclosure sale was filed beyond the prescriptive period from
the time their causes of action accrued,41 pursuant to Articles 1144,42 1149,43 and
115044 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the RTC deemed it proper to grant respondent
bank's claims for attorney's fees, appearance fees, litigation expenses, exemplary
damages, and costs of suit.45chanrobleslaw

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated46 the matter before the CA.

 The CA Ruling

In a Decision47 dated February 14, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings, but
deleted the awards of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses for lack of factual and legal bases.48 On the main, it held that while
the Real Estate Mortgage was void as to the share of Roque who was shown to be
already deceased at the time the same was executed, rendering respondent bank a
mortgagee in bad faith, it declared Sps. Manuel innocent purchasers for value whose
rights may not be prejudiced.49chanrobleslaw

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,50 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution51 dated October 2, 2014; hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the Real Estate
Mortgage was void; and (b) Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. While it is not the
function of the Court to re-examine, winnow and weigh anew the respective sets of
evidence of the parties,52 there are, however, recognized exceptions,53 one of which is
when the inference drawn from the facts was manifestly mistaken, as in this case.

It is undisputed that at the time the Real Estate Mortgage was constituted on July 1,
1991, Roque was already deceased. Upon his death on April 17, 1991, the conjugal
partnership between him and his spouse, Susana, was dissolved pursuant to Article 126
(1)54 of the Family Code,55 and an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana
and the other heirs of Roque with respect to his share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership is governed
by Article 493 of the Civil Code,56 to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in
the conjugal partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion
thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or
by judicial decree.57 While she herself as co-owner had the right to mortgage or even
sell her undivided interest in the subject property, she could not mortgage or otherwise
dispose of the same in its entirety without the consent of the other co-owners.
Consequently, the validity of the subject Real Estate Mortgage and the subsequent
foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor of respondent bank should be
limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest,
in the event of partition, thereby making it a co-owner58 with petitioners pending
partition. Thus, in Rural & Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. v. Melecio-Yap,59the Court
held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While Erna, as herself a co-owner, by virtue of Article 493 of the Civil Code, had the
right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the said properties, she, could
not, however, dispose of or mortgage the subject properties in their entirety without the
consent of the other co-owners. Accordingly, the validity of the subject real estate
mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor of
RBCI should be limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it (as the
successor-in-interest of Erna) in the event of partition. In this relation, the CA's
directive to remand the case to the RTC in order to determine the exact extent of the
respective rights, interests, shares and participation of respondents and RBCI over the
subject properties, and thereafter, effect a final division, adjudication and partition in
accordance with law remains in order. Meanwhile, the writ of possession issued in favor
of RBCI, and all proceedings relative thereto should be set aside considering that the
latter's specific possessory rights to the said properties remain
undetermined.60 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, although the Court concurs with the CA's finding that respondent bank was a
mortgagee in bad faith for having failed to exercise greater care and due diligence in
verifying the ownership of the subject property,61 contrary to the CA, the Court finds that
Sps. Manuel are not innocent purchasers for value who can acquire title to the subject
entire property.

While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him
to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property, where the land
sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the
purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning
the actual possessor.62 As this Court explained in the case of Sps. Mathay v. CA:63
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing [with] a registered land need
not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are
circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or
inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants
thereon, it is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to
inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether
or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in concept of owner. As is
the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises
involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find
out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller
who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the
purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a
prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on
his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a
"purchaser in good faith."64 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when Sps. Manuel bought
the same on February 19, 1997 (and even up to the filing of the amended complaint
before the RTC on September 3, 2007).65 However, records do not show that Sps.
Manuel inspected the property and inquired into the nature of petitioners' possession
and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a similar situation, and thereby discover the
irregularity in the acquisition of title by the respondent bank. Sps. Manuel, therefore,
failed to exercise the diligence required in protecting their rights; as such, the Court
cannot ascribe good faith to them.66chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, as correctly pointed out67 by petitioners, the claim that one is an innocent
purchaser for value is a matter of defense.68 Hence, while petitioners alleged that Sps.
Manuel were purchasers in bad faith,69 the rule is that he who asserts the status of a
purchaser in good faith and for value has the burden of proving the same, and this onus
probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good
faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith.70chanrobleslaw

Besides, the fact that respondent bank succeeded in consolidating ownership over the
subject property in its name did not terminate the existing co-ownership between it and
petitioners.71 In Nufable v. Nufable,72 the Court had the occasion to
rule:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[A] co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent as in the
case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property is not
binding against co-heirs who never benefitted.

xxxx

x x x [W]hen the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had no right to
mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his 1/4 pro indiviso share as the
property was subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras.
Moreover, in case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission of title to
the buyer which is feasible only if the seller can be in a position to convey
ownership of the things sold. And in one case, it was held that a foreclosure would be
ineffective unless the mortgagor has title to the property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as
regards the remaining 3/4 pro indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the
party rightfully entitled thereto, who are the private respondents herein.

Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is
established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise, under
Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes. In the case of Noel vs. [CA], this
Court held that "a buyer of a parcel of land at a public auction to satisfy a judgment
against a widow acquired only one-half interest on the land corresponding to the
share of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her husband
became impressed with a constructive trust in behalf of said heirs."

Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the subject
property in its name terminate the existing co ownership. Registration of property is not
a means of acquiring ownership. When the subject property was sold to and
consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the winning bidder in the public auction, DBP
merely held the 3/4 portion in trust for the private respondents. When petitioner
Nelson purchased the said property, he merely stepped into the shoes of DBP
and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.73 (Emphases
supplied)
In light of the foregoing, Sps. Manuel merely stepped into the shoes of respondent bank
and acquired only the rights and obligations appertaining thereto. Thus, while they have
been issued a certificate of title over the entire property, they shall: (a) only acquire what
validly pertains to respondent bank as successor-in-interest of Susana in the event of
partition; and (b) hold the shares therein pertaining to the co-owners who did not
consent to the mortgage, i.e., petitioners, in trust for the latter74 pending partition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 14,
2014 and the Resolution dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 99519 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is ENTERED as
follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) DECLARING the Real Estate Mortgage dated July 1,

1991 VOID with respect to the share of deceased Roque Magsano;

(2) DECLARING respondents-spouses Eddie V. Manuel and Milagros C. Ballesteros

(Sps. Manuel) as co-owners of the subject property with respect to the undivided share
of Susana Capelo therein, together with petitioners Norma, Isidro, Ricardo, Roque, Jr.,
Perlita, and Salvador, all surnamed Magsano, and Nida M. Caguiat (petitioners);

(3) CANCELLING Transfer Certificate of Title No. 67491 in the name of Sps. Manuel;
and cralawlawlibrary

(4) REMANDING the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City to
determine the exact extent of the respective rights, interests, shares, and participation
of petitioners and Sps. Manuel over the subject property and, thereafter, effect a final
division, adjudication, and partition in accordance with law.

The Writ of Possession issued in favor of respondent Pangasinan Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc., formerly Pangasinan Savings and Loan Association, Inc., and all
proceedings relative thereto, are further SET ASIDE, considering that the latter's
specific possessory rights to the said properties remain undetermined.
SO ORDERED

“POSSESSION”
1)

G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991

LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge
of Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y.
LIM, respondents.

Balgos & Perez for petitioner.

Madamba, Lim & Tan for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for
forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance is the center of this litigation.

The facts are not disputed as related by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
questioned decision dated December 7, 1988 —

The record reveals that on October 23, 1987, the appellee, Reginaldo Y. Lim, had filed
a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, in part, alleging, as follows:

3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building
adverted to in the next preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their
present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City;

4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he
keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important
documents, appliances, etc.;

5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which
all the occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get
in and out therefrom;

6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the
building including plaintiff has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock
by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant corporation;
 7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of
September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read
in connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised to find out that the key
given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed;

8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he
incurred expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his
cases;

9. Plaintiff was only able to contact defendant through its Officer-in-Charge, Mr.
Rafael Lim, the following day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to be
provided with the appropriate key produced negative result, hence, this suit
where plaintiff incurred expenses in the form of attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY

INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER

10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part
of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;

11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key,
above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff, who has a
clear and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the
building owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff the
appropriate key in order to prevent great and and/or irreparable damages and
injury upon plaintiff.

In conclusion, the said appellee prayed, as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court

that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction/restraining order commanding
defendant to provide plaintiff the appropriate key or a duplicate key to the lock of
the main door of the building be immediately issued, and, after hearing the case
on its merits, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
ordering:

l. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;

2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory

damages;

3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. the cost of suit.

 Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable Court
may deem just and proper in the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)

The opening paragraphs of the questioned decision relate what had happened in the
courts below:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, grounded on pure
questions of law.

The case is simplicity itself.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation and is the owner of a building

located at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila;

Public respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
16;

For sometime prior to the filing of this petition, Lim Eng Piao, father of private
respondent, occupied said premises as a dwelling unit at the above given
address together with all the members of his family. Lim Eng Piao subsequently
died. Said occupancy was continued by private respondent. Later, the latter was
able to acquire a house and lot at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon (sic). In spite of
having transferred residence, private respondent did not vacate Room 301 of the
building in question. Instead, he utilized the same as a place where he keeps
some of his important belongings, papers, books, documents and appliances . . .

On or about September 1987, petitioner changed the lock of the common main
door of the building.

On the morning of September 30, 1987, private respondent tried to go to Room

301 but found that the key given him could not fit and open the main door. As
one of the occupants of the building in question, private respondent demanded
from petitioner's officer-in-charge the delivery to him of the appropriate keys to
the said common main door so that he could enter the premises and be restored
to possession of said Room No. 301 of the building, but his efforts proved futile
as the officer in charge did not heed his demand . . .

On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private respondent

from said premises, he instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled Reginaldo Y.
Lim vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial
Court which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was denominated as an
action for damages with injunction despite the allegations contained therein . . ..
The aforesaid case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction . . .
 On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at the
Metropolitan Trial Court docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was raffled to
Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same allegations . . .

On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent

judge pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the
appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him to enter the premises and
occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .

On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;

On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this Court, in
order to obviate any possible injustice pending the determination of the issuance
of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the
enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent
judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. 122775; . . .

In ruling in favor of the private appellee, the appellee judge, in part, stated:

In this case force was used by petitioner to deprive private respondent of the
physical possession of Room 301 when the lock of the main door was changed
without his knowledge and consent.

The issued (sic) involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and
not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership (Mercado vs. Go Bio,
78 Phil. 279; Masallo, vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134).

The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out
by strong hand, violence or terror . . . In affording this remedy, breaches of the
peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out of possession must
respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. (Supia and
Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312).

Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary
Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied. A motion to dismiss being
one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules
on Summary Procedure.

Hence, the petition must fail on this score alone.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contended that when the amount of damages
claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case
would fall under the Regional Trial Courts, as the failure to so allege would
characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
 Petitioner's contentions is (sic) not well-taken.

In Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514, the Supreme Court held that exemplary
damages must be specified and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it,
if together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not
exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000.00).

As to moral damages, the aforesaid ruling can likewise be made to apply.

What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer
cases is NOT the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the
nature of the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main
action (Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30, 1960).1

An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for lack of
merit.2 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated
May 9, 1990.3

Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that the action being one for
specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in the Regional Trial Court.

The petition must fail.

A reading of the allegations of the complaint show that private respondent and his family
resided in Room 301 of the building of petitioner until they transferred to their present
residence at No. 3 Igdalig St., Quezon City. However, private respondent retained
possession of said room to keep his important belongings, such as his law books,
important documents, appliances, etc. The building has only one common main door
through which all the occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and
out.1âwphi1 Accordingly, all occupants including private respondent were given a key to
the main doorlock by petitioner.

However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his room on September 30,
1987 to get three (3) of his lawbooks which he needed to read in connection with a case
he was then handling, he found that the key he possessed was no longer compatible
with the lock, i.e., the same was changed. Private respondent had to buy three (3) new
lawbooks for Pl,253.00 to prepare for his cases. He requested private respondent to
provide him the appropriate key but his request was denied. Petitioner also alleges that
he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room entitling him to the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate
key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in the amount of Pl,253.000,
P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit.

From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for
forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent
retained the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's building which he claimed to have
the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by
depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of the building.
Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving private
respondent of the possession of his rented room.

Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an
action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person
unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him4

This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or
tenant or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a
part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession
thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

2)
SARMIENTO V. COURT OF APPEALS 250 SCRA 108

FACTS:

Cruz was the owner of a parcel of land. Adjacent to this lot is one wherein Sarmiento
had a house built on. On trying to cause the relocation of her lot, Cruz found out that
Sarmiento was encroaching on her property. When Cruz talked to Sarmiento about
constructing a new fence, which will cover her true property, the latter vehemently
refused to do so and threatened Cruz with legal action. For fear of being sued in court,
she sought judicial relief. The trial court decided in favor of Cruz. Sarmiento tried to
assail this decision by saying that the issue was on ownership of the portion of
land and thus, the action should have been an accion reivindicatoria and not
forcible entry.

HELD:

A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by Cruz reveals that
the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
boundary dispute, which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of
ownership over the portion of a lot.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.

Cruz cannot belatedly claim that petitioner’s possession of the controverted

portion was by mere tolerance. The complaint didn’t characterize
Sarmiento’s alleged entry on the land—whether legal or illegal. The complaint
admitted also of the fact that the fence had already preexisted on the lot when she
acquired the same.

This was definitely not a situation obtained in and gave rise to an

ejectment suit for two reasons. First, forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which
right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the
Rules. Second, if a forcible entry action in the court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be no action of forcible
entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, the plaintiff may just throw in a demand, file a suit in court and summarily
throw him out of the land.

3)
PEDRO P. PECSON v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NUGUID
FACTS:
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door-2-storey
apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold
at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to the Sps. Nuguid.

Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was dismissed but the
RTC held that the apartment bldg was not subject of the litigation. On appeal, the CA
appealed in toto the decision of the RTC that the apartment bldg was not included in the
auction sale.

After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the RTC for a
motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of the
CC. The RTC issued an order declaring that the owner of the lot and apartment bldg
were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the construction cost of the apartment before a writ of
possession would be issued and to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved for
reconsideration but the Trial court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ of
possession. The CA affirmed in part the decision declaring the cost of construction can
be offset from the amount of rents to be collected and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to
appropriate the improvement, Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of
construction at the time it was built in 1965 which is at P53k and the right the retain the
improvement until full indemnity is paid.

Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar

HELD: YES
> With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy.
Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or
sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the land is
also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses ownership by sale or
donation.

> Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the
possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to
determine the value of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private
respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in
1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the
reimbursed should be the present market value of said improvements so as not to
unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent
since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to
retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered
the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of
indemnity.]

4)

G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009

PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners,
vs.
FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution2 dated
April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397, which had affirmed the
Decision3 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Branch 198 in Civil Case No. LP-04-0160.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located

in Almanza, Las Piñas City. The ownership of the land originated from respondent’s
paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in
actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation
of the land even before 1906.4

On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor

filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said
parcel of land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu-253567, before the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 71.5 On December 8, 1994, the trial court granted the petition in LRC Case No.
N-9049 and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor as
co-owners of the property. 6 The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-
Factor thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of the Factor family property during the same
year. The siblings, except Enrique Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided the
proceeds of the sale among themselves, with the agreement that Enrique would have
as his share the portion of the property located in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village,
Almanza I, Las Piñas City, known as the Factor compound.

Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in
the compound including the subject property, a rest house, where members of the
Factor family stayed during get-togethers and visits.7Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her
mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound, particularly
in No. 8 Antioch St., Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Piñas City since 1999. 8

When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor
compound including the subject rest house and other residential houses for lease was
transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao.

Gloria Factor-Labao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F.
Labao, lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest
house because Gloria collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the
Factor compound. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and
management of the Factor compound including the subject rest house, passed on to
respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill and
compassion, considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income,
respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent
visits as a guest of the Factor family.

On May 31, 2002, Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10,
2002, Ruben Labao died.

At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of
the rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then
audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully
deprived her and the Factor family of the subject property’s lawful use and possession.
Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1,
2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to
occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on
September 12, 2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint 9 for forcible entry
against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi.

Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of ownership of the subject property and
the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject
property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband
moved into the subject property, while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy, remained
in No. 8 Antioch St.

On July 13, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79
ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to:

1. To immediately vacate the subject premises and surrender possession thereof

to the plaintiff.

2. To pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time
they finally vacate the premises.

3. To pay attorney’s fee of Php 10,000.00.

The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, which,
however, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC and later denied their motion for
reconsideration.11 Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals but it was denied also. Hence, the instant petition before us.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

I.

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW

AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THAT FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION AND STEALTH HAD BEEN
COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE;

II.

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN

IT MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER RIGHT
OF PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;

III.

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING
PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY THE MONTHLY RENTAL OF ₱2,000.00 FROM
DECEMBER 1, 2002 UP TO THE TIME THEY FINALLY VACATE PREMISES. 12

The resolution of the first issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the
sufficiency of the evidence presented below, a course of action which this Court will not
do, consistent with our repeated holding that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts.13 The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court
subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in the instant
petition.14 Noteworthy, in this case, the cited findings of the RTC have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

As to the second issue, the resolution thereof boils down to a determination of who,
between petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of the
subject property.

Both parties anchor their right of material possession of the disputed property on their
respective claims of ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a better right
of possession over the subject property since she inherited the subject property as the
surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property before his
death.
Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of possession on the fact that her
predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property as early as 1975.

After careful consideration, we find in favor of the respondent.

In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set
forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself.15 Possession de facto is the
physical possession of real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is
the only issue in a forcible entry case.16 This rule holds true regardless of the character
of a party’s possession, provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles
him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.17

Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession of the subject property since
the latter never occupied the same. They claim that they have been in actual
possession of the disputed property from the time petitioner Precy married Ruben
Labao in 2002.

In this instance, however, petitioners’ contention is unconvincing.

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.18 Possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to
the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to
which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of
possessory information titles.20

While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property,
they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject property. On record,
petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as
spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject property
whenever they visit the same.21 Likewise, as pointed out by the MeTC and the RTC,
Ruben and petitioner Precy’s marriage certificate revealed that at the time of their
marriage, Ruben was residing at 123 A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Even
Ruben’s death certificate showed that his place of death and residence was at #4 Labao
St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Considering that her husband was never a resident of
the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain convincingly how she was able to
move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during their marriage.

On the other hand, it was established that respondent’s grandparents, Constantino

Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor, had been the occupants and in possession of
various agricultural parcel of lands situated in Almanza, Las Piñas City, in the concept
of owners, for more than thirty years prior to 1975. In fact, the RTC in its Decision dated
December 8, 1994 in LRC Case No. N-9049 has confirmed the rights of respondent’s
predecessors over the subject property and ordered the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title in their favor.22

The right of respondent’s predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient
to uphold respondent’s right to possession over the same. Respondent’s right to the
property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their father’s
death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is
one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate
proceedings.24

After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took
over the administration of the subject property. And as a consequence of co-
ownership,25 soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving co-
owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the
right to the administration and management of the subject property.

As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ unsupported claim of possession must

yield to that of the respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her
predecessors-in-interest who have always been in possession of the subject property.
Even assuming that respondent was never a resident of the subject property, she could
legally continue possessing the property. Visiting the property on weekends and
holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession.26 The fact of her residence
somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property.
The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to
maintain his possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is
deemed in possession.28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine.

All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved
the extent and character of her possession over the disputed property. As a
consequence of her ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession,
considering petitioners’ failure to prove prior possession. The Court stresses, however,
that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional
determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar
or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to
the subject property.29

As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that
the respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation
threat, strategy or stealth. The Supreme Court, in Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the
Philippines,30 explained:
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does
not have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property
which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.31

As expressly stated in David v. Cordova:32

The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in
open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession,
but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior
possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other
than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground
and excluding the other party.33

Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not
stay in it. So when petitioners entered said property without the consent and permission
of the respondent and the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession.
Moreover, the presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the
subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1,34 Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.1avvphi1

As to the last issue, we have previously ruled that while the courts may fix the
reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property, they could
not simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any
evidence. The reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial
notice but by supporting evidence.35 In the instant case, we find no evidence on record
to support the MeTC’s award of rent.

On the matter of attorney’s fees awarded to the respondent, we are in agreement to

delete it. It is a well-settled rule that where attorney’s fees are granted, the court must
explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof,
the legal reason for the award.36 Again, nothing in the body of both decisions of RTC
and MeTC explicitly stated the reasons for the award of attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated January
16, 2006 and Resolution dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90397 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of rentals and attorney’s
fees are DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
5)
CASE DIGEST: LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES, Petitioners, vs. JOSE
MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS
CORPORATION, Respondents. (G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010).

FACTS: Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon a lot located in Vergonville

Subdivision. Sometime in 1984, spouses Briones, after obtaining the necessary building
permit from Vergon, started constructing on the same parcel of land. After learning of
such, spouses Macabagdal demanded sposes Briones to demolish the house and
vacate the property. Spouses Briones refused.

Spouses Macabagdal thus filed a case for recovery of ownership and possession of
said parcel of land. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of spouses Macabagdal, and
ordered spouses Briones to either vacate the property or to pay spouses Macabagdal
the prevailing price of the land.

ISSUE: Are spouses Briones builders in good faith, thus, must not bear the damage
alone?

HELD: Yes. Since there was no evidence to show that spouses Briones were builders in
bad faith, they must be considered builders in good faith. Thus, the landowner is given
the option to appropriate the building by paying compensation or to oblige the builder to
pay the price of the land. Moreover, the builder in good faith is entitled to be reimbursed
the necessary and useful expenses they made of the subject land.

Thus, spouses Macabagdal cannot demand the removal of the building unless he first
exercises the option of appropriating such after payment to spouses Briones of the
proper compensation.

6)
NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION v. CRISOSTOMO GALABO ADELAIDA
GALABO, GR No. 174191, 2013-01-30
Facts:
respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo
Donato obtained Lot... a portion of the Arakaki Plantation
When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki
Plantation
Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy
and cultivate Lot No. 102.
When NQFC opened its business in
Davao City... it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102.
Donato... put up "Not For Sale" and "No Trespassing" signs on the property.
Crisostomo fenced off the... entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.
respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No.
102.
The respondents denied this claim and maintained that they had been occupying Lot
No. 102, which the BOL itself recognized
NQFC's workers, with armed policemen... entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it.
Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC's counsel demanding... that he remove his
house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down
various trees that the respondents had planted on the property.
Issues:
is prior physical possession whether NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot
No. 102.
Ruling:
We rule in the negative.
We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession
contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in
issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or... actual or
material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different
legal concepts[36] for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of
possession.
the word "possession" in... forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure
Title is not the... issue,... and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold
relief from the parties in an ejectment case."
Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself.

7)

G.R. No. 147951 December 14, 2009

ARSENIO OLEGARIO and Heirs of ARISTOTELES F. OLEGARIO, represented by

CARMELITA GUZMAN-OLEGARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO C. MARI, represented by LILIA C. MARI-CAMBA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be possession

under a claim of title or must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by
one who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in the
concept of an owner and such possessory acts, no matter how long continued, do not
start the running of the period of prescription.

In the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioners assail the April 18, 2001
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52124, reversing the October
13, 1995 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan, Branch 39. The
CA declared the respondent herein as the owner of Lot Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356
of the Mangatarem cadastral survey.

Factual antecedents

As early as 1916,4 Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a
parcel of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the
same by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence,5planting various fruit bearing trees
and bamboos6 and constructing a house thereon.7 After a survey made in 1950, Tax
Declaration No. 80488 for the year 1951 specified the subject realty as a residential land
with an area of 897 square meters and as having the following boundaries: North -
Magdalena Fernandez; South - Catalina Cacayorin; East - Camino Vecinal; and West -
Norberto Bugarin. In 1974, the subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari,
by virtue of a deed of sale.

Meanwhile, in 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and

father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration 9 for a certain 50-square
meter parcel of land, indicating the following boundaries: North - Cesario and Antonio
Fernandez; South - Juan Mari; East - Barrio Road; and West - Norberto Bugarin. Then
on May 14, 1961, Wenceslao Olegario executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered
Property"10 in favor of Arsenio Olegario transferring to the latter inter alia the
aforementioned 50-square meter property.

In the cadastral survey conducted from 1961 to 1962, the subject realty was identified
as Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356 of the Mangatarem Cadastre. At this time,
Wenceslao Olegario disputed Juan Mari’s claim over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17553.
Hence, on the two corresponding survey notification cards dated September 28,
1968,11 the claimant appeared as "Juan Mari v. Wenceslao Olegario". With regard to Lot
No. 14356, the survey notification card named Juan Mari as the claimant.

Sometime around 1988, respondent filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners
because of their encroachment into the disputed realty. After investigation, said office
decided in favor of the respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos.
17526, 17553 and 14356. Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final
and executory.

In 1989, Arsenio Olegario caused the amendment of his tax declaration12 for the 50-
square meter property to reflect 1) an increased area of 341 square meters; 2) the
Cadastral Lot No. as 17526, Pls-768-D;13 and 3) the boundaries as: North-NE Lot 16385
& Road; South-NW-Lots 14363 & 6385, Pls-768-D; East-SE-Lot 17552, Pls-768-D and
West-SW-Lot 14358, Pls-768-D.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

In 1990, after discovering the amended entries in Arsenio Olegario's Tax Declaration
No. 4107-R, respondent filed a complaint14 with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for
Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration No. 4107-R. Respondent
alleged, inter alia, that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was deprived by the
Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty which respondent owned. Trial
thereafter ensued.

On October 13, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, viz:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

as follows:

1. Declaring the defendants-Olegario the owners of Lots 17553 and 17526 of the
Mangatarem cadastral survey.

2. Dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint on the ground of prescription of action and

on the further ground that [he] failed to prove [his] ownership of any portion of the
two lots mentioned in the next preceding paragraph (assuming arguendo that
[his] action has not prescribed);
 3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of this suit. No damages are awarded by
the Court.

SO ORDERED.15

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's findings. The CA found
respondent to have adduced stronger evidence of prior possession and ownership of
the disputed realty. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated October 13, 1995 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered declaring appellant Pedro C. Mari
represented by Lilia C. Mari-Camba the lawful owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and
14356 of the Mangatarem Cadastre, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioners, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, thereafter filed
the present petition for review.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not there was failure on [the part of] the Court of Appeals to
appreciate and give weight to the evidence presented by the petitioners;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating

ownership of the said lots in favor of the respondent and [in] giving great weight
to the respondent’s evidence;

3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as
barred by laches;

4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to find an[d] declare the petitioners
as having acquired ownership of the disputed lots by acquisitive prescription;

5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in adjudicating the lot in favor of
respondent and also [in] denying award of damages to petitioners. 17

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners contend that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or
thereabouts, or for more than 30 years already. Hence, they acquired ownership
thereover by virtue of prescription. They also impute negligence or failure on the part of
respondent to assert his alleged rights within a reasonable time.

Respondent's Arguments

On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners claim ownership over only a
certain 50-square meter parcel of land, as evidenced by their tax declaration which
consistently declared only such area. It was only in September 1989 that petitioners
sought to expand the area of their claim to 341 square meters by virtue of a letter to the
Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan. Hence, respondent asserts that prescription has not
set in. Respondent also contends that petitioners' occupancy has been illegal from the
point of inception and thus, such possession can never ripen into a legal status.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners' Evidence is Weak

Considering the conflicting findings of the RTC and the CA, a circumstance that
constitutes an exception18 to the general rule that only questions of law are proper
subjects of a petition under Rule 45, we shall assess and weigh the evidence adduced
by the parties and shall resolve the questions of fact raised by petitioners.

A study of the evidence presented by petitioners shows that the CA did not err in finding
such evidence weaker than that of respondent. Arsenio Olegario testified that as early
as 1937 their family had built a nipa house on the land where they lived. Yet he also
testified that the former owner of the land was his mother, Magdalena
Fernandez.19Significantly, Magdalena Fernandez has never claimed and was never in
possession or ownership of Lot Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356. Petitioners’ evidence
thus supports the conclusion that in 1937 they were in possession, not of Lot No.
17526, but of their mother’s land, possibly 50 square meters of it, which is the
approximate floor area of the house. Conversely, petitioners' evidence fails to clearly
prove that in 1937 they were already occupying the disputed lots. The records, in fact,
do not show exactly when the Olegarios entered and started occupying the disputed
lots.

The evidence shows that a hollow block fence, an improvement introduced by the
Olegarios in 1965, now exists somewhere along the disputed lots. Petitioners' claim that
they were in possession of the disputed lots even prior to 1965 based on the existence
of the bamboo fence on the boundary of their land preceding the existence of the hollow
block fence, however, holds no water. The testimony of Marcelino Gutierrez shows that
formerly there was a bamboo fence demarcating between the land of the Olegarios and
the Maris and that in 1964 or 1965 a hollow block fence was constructed. He did not
say, however, that the place where the hollow block fence was constructed was the
exact same place where the bamboo boundary fence once stood. Even the testimony of
Arsenio Olegario was ambiguous on this matter, viz:

Q When was the [concrete] hollow block [fence] separating your property [from]
the property of Juan Mari constructed?

A It was constructed in 1965.

Q Before the construction of that concrete hollow block fence between your land
and the land of Juan Mari [in] 1965, what was the visible boundary between your
land and the land of Juan Mari?

A Bamboo fence, sir.20

Arsenio merely testified that a bamboo fence was formerly the visible boundary between
his land and the land of Juan Mari; and that a concrete hollow block fence was
constructed in 1965. His testimony failed to show that the concrete hollow block fence
was constructed in the same position where the bamboo boundary fence once stood.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence on record, embodied in Tax Declaration No.
9404 for the year 1947; the survey sketch plan of 1961; and the survey plan of 1992,
that the boundary claimed by the Olegarios kept moving in such a way that the portion
they occupied expanded from 50 square meters (in the land of his mother) to 377
square meters.21 Viewed in relation to the entire body of evidence presented by the
parties in this case, these documents cannot plausibly all be mistaken in the areas
specified therein. As against the bare claim of Arsenio22 that his predecessor merely
made an inaccurate estimate in providing 50 square meters as the area claimed by the
latter in 1947 in the tax declaration,23 we find it more plausible to believe that each of
the documents on record stated the true area measurements of the parties' claims at
the particular time each document was executed.1avvphi1

As correctly found by the CA, the earliest that petitioners can be considered to have
occupied the disputed property was in 1965 when the concrete hollow block fence was
constructed on the disputed lots.

Ownership and Prescription

As previously mentioned, respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the

disputed realty24 for tax purposes as early as 1916. The tax declarations show that he
had a two storey house on the realty. He also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos
thereon. The records25 also show that the 897-square meter property had a bamboo
fence along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in
possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916
or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,26 the respondent is the preferred possessor
because, benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners
acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.

Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not acquire
ownership. Firstly, they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any document to
show how the titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether
from respondent, his predecessor, or any other person.27 Petitioners, therefore, could
not acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription through possession for
10 years. Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and
use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. 28 In other
words, possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
possession under claim of title, that is, it must be adverse.29lawphil

Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated
by the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession
is continued, it does not start the running of the prescriptive period.30 Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to
vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstance
as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. 31

Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim of title
or right. Unlike respondent, petitioners did not have either the courage or forthrightness
to publicly declare the disputed lots as owned by them for tax purposes. Tax
declarations "prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse
claim against the state and other interested parties".32 Petitioners' omission, when
viewed in conjunction with respondent's continued unequivocal declaration of ownership
over, payment of taxes on and possession of the subject realty, shows a lack of
sufficient adverseness of the formers’ possession to qualify as being one in the concept
of owner.

The only instance petitioners assumed a legal position sufficiently adverse to

respondent's ownership of the disputed properties was when they declared Lot No.
17526 for tax purposes in their name in 1989.33 Since then and until the filing of the
complaint for recovery of possession in 1990, only one year had elapsed. Hence,
petitioners never acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription of the subject
realty.

On the other hand, being the sole transferree of his father, respondent showed through
his tax declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through his
predecessor, had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916.
"Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period - ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property."34 Ownership of immovable property is
acquired by extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. 35 For purposes
of deciding the instant case, therefore, the possession by respondent and his
predecessor had already ripened into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of
prescription as early as 1946.

Laches

Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or
delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting
complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had
the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. 36

In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice
and knew all along the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they
were standing pat on his ownership over the subject realty. This stand of respondent
and his predecessor was recorded and clearly visible from the notification survey
cards.37 From 1968, the date of the cards, until 1989 there was nothing to indicate any
change in the position of any of the parties. Moreover, that respondent had not
conceded ownership and possession of the land to petitioners is clear also from the fact
that Pedro Mari continued to declare the entire 897-square meter property in his name
and pay taxes for the entire area after his father transferred the property to him.

On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by
changing the area of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341
square meters and specifying the details to make it appear that the tax declaration for
the 50-square meter property pertained to Lot No. 17526. As previously discussed, it
was only at this point, in 1989, that it can be clearly stated that petitioners were making
their claim of ownership public and unequivocal and converting their possession over
Lot No. 17526 into one in the concept of owner.

Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners’ position
over the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for
recovery of possession and nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches in
the instant case.
In conclusion, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in recognizing the
ownership and right of possession of respondent over Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and
14356. There is, thus, also no basis for an award of damages and attorney’s fees in
favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 18, 2001 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

8)

G.R. No. 169956 January 19, 2009

SPOUSES JONEL PADILLA and SARAH PADILLA, Petitioners,

vs.
ISAURO A. VELASCO, TEODORA A. VELASCO, DELIA A. VELASCO, VALERIANO
A. VELASCO, JR., IDA A. VELASCO, AMELITA C. VELASCO, ERIBERTO C.
VELASCO, JR., and CELIA C. VELASCO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1dated February 11, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated October 4,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69997 entitled “Isauro A. Velasco,
Teodora A. Velasco, Delia A. Velasco, Valeriano A. Velasco, Jr., Ida A. Velasco,
Amelita C. Velasco, Eriberto C. Velasco, Jr. and Celia C. Velasco v. Spouses Jonel
Padilla and Sarah Padilla.”

The facts

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco (Artemio), who died single and
without any issue on January 22, 1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No.
2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters situated at Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, covered by Tax Declaration No. 4739. Artemio acquired the lot from spouses
Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated February 14,
1944.

In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr.
and Teresita Padilla (Solomon spouses).
Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The
matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach
an amicable settlement. Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area,
fenced it and built a house thereon. They harvested the crops and performed other acts
of dominion over the property.

On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting
and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna. They asked the court to order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased Artemio, as administrator of the
property, was presented as a witness. He testified that Artemio owned the property. As
evidence thereof, he presented the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan executed by spouses
Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of Artemio, and declared that he (Isauro) was
present during the signing of the instrument. He offered in evidence tax declarations
and tax receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name of Artemio. A
certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) was likewise presented by
Isauro which states that based on the records of the LRA, Decree No. 403348 was
issued on October 10, 1930 covering Lot No. 2161.3

Rolando R. Flores, a geodetic engineer, also testified that on January 16, 1993, upon
prior notice to petitioners, he conducted a survey of the land based on the technical
description of the property and the map from the Bureau of Lands. The purpose of the
survey was to verify if the area occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161. Upon his
examination and based on his survey, he concluded that the land occupied by
petitioners was Lot No. 2161.4

On the other hand, petitioners averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property;
that the said spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a
deed of sale dated September 4, 1987; that the land was identified as Lot No. 76-pt,
consisting of 10,000 square meters, located at Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna; and
that the spouses authorized petitioners to occupy the land and introduce improvements
thereon.

Petitioners further claimed that subsequent to the sale of the property to the Solomon
spouses, Lot No. 76-pt. was levied on in Civil Case No. 320 under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case was entitled “Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan, Inc. v. Spouses Hector and Emma Velasco, Valeriano Velasco and Virginia
Miso.” Petitioners alleged that Valeriano Velasco obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan, with Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the land was mortgaged by Valeriano
as collateral. Valeriano’s failure to pay the loan caused the foreclosure of the land, and
on September 17, 1980, Lot No. 76-pt was sold at a public auction by the Provincial
Sheriff. The Rural Bank of Pagsanjan was the highest bidder.
Pedro Zalameda Trinidad, Jr. (Pedro), as a witness for the petitioners, testified that he
was born in Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, and had been residing there
since birth. He said that based on his knowledge, the land belonged to Nonong
(Valeriano) Velasco because he used to buy coconuts harvested from the said land and
it was Nonong Velasco who caused the gathering of coconuts thereon.5

Petitioner Jonel Padilla also took the witness stand. He testified that Pedro was
occupying the land when he initially visited it. A representative of the Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan disclosed to him that the land previously belonged to Valeriano. He verified
from the Municipal Assessor the technical description of the land, but no longer verified
from the Bureau of Lands because he trusted the bank. Upon his recommendation, his
sister and his brother-in-law purchased the property after verifying the supporting
documents. It was his brother-in-law who went to the Bureau of Lands and found that it
was Lot No. 2161.6

On July 27, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

[respondents] ordering the [petitioners] to vacate the land presently occupied by them
and restore possession thereof to the [respondents], to render an accounting of the
proceeds from the crop harvested therefrom starting September 1987 up to the time the
property is returned to the [respondents], and to remove at their expense all the
structures they constructed thereon.8

Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February 11, 2005, the CA issued the
assailed decision affirming the decision of the RTC. They consequently filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in the assailed resolution dated
October 4, 2005.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds:

I. The alleged sale executed between Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial as seller and
Dr. Artemio [Velasco] as buyer was never established, respondents having failed to
present the original copy thereof during the trial despite their clear and categorical
commitment to do so. Furthermore, the purported Original Certificate of Title issued in
the name of Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial was never presented in evidence, thus,
creating the presumption that had it been presented, the same would have been
adverse to respondents.9

II. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property from its lawful owner in good
faith and for value.10
III. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property at the public auction sale
conducted by the provincial sheriff of Laguna based on the judgment and writ of
execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Laguna against respondent Valeriano
Velasco for non-payment of a loan considering that (1) the issuance of Tax Declaration
No. 4624 in the name of respondent Valeriano Velasco is entitled to the presumption of
regularity especially since respondents have not explained how and why it was wrongly
issued in the name of their own brother, respondent Valeriano Velasco and without any
of them taking any action to correct the alleged mistake; and (2) by their failure to assert
their alleged ownership of the property and their inaction [by not] questioning the legal
action taken by the bank against their co-respondent Valeriano Velasco and the subject
property despite their full awareness since 1980, respondents are barred by estoppel
from denying the title of the bank and the Solomon spouses. 11

IV. The action a quo was barred by prescription considering that respondents filed their
legal action against the petitioners only on October 14, 1991, more than ten (10) years
after the bank had acquired the subject property on September 17, 1980 at the public
auction conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna.12

V. At the very least, respondents are guilty of laches, they having slept on their rights for
an unreasonable length of time such that to dispossess petitioners of the property after
they had introduced substantial improvements thereon in good faith would result in
undue damage and injury to them all due to the silence and inaction of respondents in
asserting their alleged ownership over the property.13

VI. The evidence proves that Lot no. 2161 and Lot no. 76-pt are one and the same.14

VII. The failure of Atty. Asinas to present other witnesses, additional documents and to
respond to certain pleadings brought about by his serious illnesses constitutes
excusable negligence or incompetency to warrant a new trial considering that the
Supreme Court itself had recognized “negligence or incompetency of counsel as a
ground for new trial” especially if it has resulted in serious injustice or to an uneven
playing field.15

VIII. The overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence, if presented, would have
altered the result and the decision now appealed from.16

IX. The petitioners should be awarded their counterclaim for exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.17

The arguments submitted by petitioners may be summed up in the following issues:

I. Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;

II. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed; and

III. Whether the negligence of respondent’s counsel entitles them to a new trial.
 The Ruling of the Court

We deny the instant petition.

First. The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess.
This was a plenary action filed in the regional trial court to determine the better right to
possession of realty independently of the title.18 Accion publiciana is also used to refer
to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than
one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The
objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.19

Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents
were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied
the property. Lot No. 2161 was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision
dated October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.) Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The
Original Certificate of Title to the land was issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial.
On February 14, 1944, the original owners of the land sold the same to Artemio. From
the date of sale, until Artemio’s death on January 22, 1949, he was in continuous
possession of the land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of the land
with Tomas Vivero as caretaker. In 1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a
deed of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The land
bought by the Solomon spouses from the Bank is denominated as Lot No. 76-pt and
previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved during trial that the land
occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold
by the bank to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-pt.

Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled
to the possession of Lot No. 2161.

It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This
Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts
unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.20 In the instant case, we find no
exceptional reason to depart from this policy.

Second. The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The
action was filed with the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed
respondents of the property in October 1987. At the time of the filing of the complaint,
only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of dispossession.

Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana
prescribes after the lapse of ten years.21 Thus, the instant case was filed within the
allowable period.
Third. Petitioners put in issue that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one and the same,
and that the land was owned by Valeriano when it was foreclosed by the bank. This, in
effect, is a collateral attack on the title over the property which is registered in the name
of Artemio.

We cannot countenance this stance of the petitioners, and perforce, must strike it down.
Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked.22 A separate action is
necessary to raise the issue of ownership.

In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary
thereto. Only in cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the
issue of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of ownership. This rule is
enunciated in Refugia v. CA,23 where the Court declared, viz.:

Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real
owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership
and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In
the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other
contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded
merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.

Fourth. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to a new trial due to the failure of their
counsel in the proceedings before the RTC to present testimonial and documentary
evidence necessary for them to obtain a favorable judgment. They maintain that the
failure of their counsel to present these other evidence was due to counsel’s lingering
illness at that time, and therefore, constitutes excusable negligence.

It may be reiterated that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the

sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, as
well as his failure to introduce certain evidence or to summon witnesses and to argue
the case, are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel be
so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his case. 24

In this case, the illness of petitioners’ counsel and his alleged failure to present
additional evidence during the trial of the case do not constitute sufficient ground for a
new trial. The Order25 issued by the trial court in its denial of the motion for new trial
filed by petitioners aptly explains the reason why a new trial is unnecessary, viz.:

Assuming that Atty. Asinas failed to perform the imputed acts by reason of his ailments,
still, the same is insufficient ground to grant a new trial. The evidence on record
established the fact that [respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject realty for a long time. Their possession was interrupted by
[petitioners] who entered the property in [1987] pursuant to a deed of sale between the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and spouses Bartolome C. Solomon and Teresita Padilla.
Considering that this is an accion publiciana and [respondents’] earlier rightful
possession of the subject parcel of land has been adequately established, the
testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be adduced in a new trial would not
adversely affect the findings of the Court. The ownership and possession of the property
purchased by the Solomon spouses from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan could be the
subject of an appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

9)

G.R. No. 187944

VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-
DELANTAR, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and
Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr.
(Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case
No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively.
The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez
(Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents

At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No.
1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo,
Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in
the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot
No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses
Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9
 Lot No. TCT No. Heirs
1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely:
(1) Azucena Padilla, married to Felly
Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios),
married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica
Padilla (Veronica);10 and (4) Moreno Padilla
(Moreno), married to Teresita Curso
(Teresita)
1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot.
The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during
her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had
thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia,
who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs
of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked
portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance
pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12

Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R.
Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to
vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on
February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However, the respondents
did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject
lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the
execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13,
2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the
partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot
No. 1907-A.14

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents
a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged
that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, 15 the
registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the
same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to
possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate
the same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006.
The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all
the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to
pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17

In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC
ruling.18

The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for
Review19 filed before the CA.

The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of
owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for
having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on
the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8,
2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for
nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that
"even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than
one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."21 The respondents also
invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another
action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit
involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar
where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the
resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the
issue of possession.

The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was
attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious.
First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of
sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has
been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale.
Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as
among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment
suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following year after its supposed
execution.

The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject
lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis
at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by
mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which
they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document
captioned as an "Agreement,"23 dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his
spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document
stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No.
1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must
have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above,
the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to
Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action.
The certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the
name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real rights or interests
over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by
virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon
the respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint
fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year
period within which the suit can be filed.

In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued
that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition
for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise
impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s
complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house
demolished.

The Ruling of the CA

On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the
disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful
detainer. The CA explained:

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession
of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry,
the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has
the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right
to continue in possession.

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If
the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1)
year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must
be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.

A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither
one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership
which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the
respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did
not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon. It
was also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred
that their relatives previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that
after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the
respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and
their ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already. There was
no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the
respondents’] possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of,
whether express or implied, between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita]
or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the
land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took
possession of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out
a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the
respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because
[Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia]
took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely
stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to
categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession
which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.

Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the
owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of
possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in
a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:

For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another
who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a
summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim
ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case.
It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he
has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the
case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy
since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion
reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v.
Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were
each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior
physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27Instead, what is required is a
better right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just
because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.

In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:

Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged
and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of
Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s
ejectment suit.

Carmencita’s Allegations

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from
the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the
sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja,
in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’
refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding
the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was
to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral
attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful
detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property
will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of
action and are seeking different reliefs.29

Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.

CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v.
CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered
owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound
by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment
would be proper.32

The Respondents’Arguments

In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s
complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no
specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents
began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents
possessed "the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would
voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the
owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the
complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal
and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.

In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and
ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for
ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the
respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.

Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.

Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful
detainer are present in the case at bar.

"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial
remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper."37

In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property, viz:

(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived
of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats,
or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which
party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should
be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out
of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one
of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand,
accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper
regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged
and sufficiently established:
 (1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived

the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita
failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot
and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about
the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and
when such tolerance came about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal
conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the
subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the
respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession
after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the
former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite
assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades,
they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently
show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the
face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.44

As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the
partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.

In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in
the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil
action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court
declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one
of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed
in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive
of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession,
whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest
in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
resorting to the courts."

xxxx

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition
of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of
equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de
Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And
most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a
matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and
expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go
through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the
premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming
ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the
courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an

expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any
way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the
present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8,
1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from
which the Amagan case sprang:

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful
detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by
mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x,
petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written,
asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal
Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession
but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["]

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the
resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the
premises in question.["]

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will
include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of
petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on
which it stands."46 (Citation omitted)

We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition
for reasons discussed hereunder.

Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the
respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the
owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the
subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of
Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted,
the respondents’ house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would
be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the
instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's

complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of
possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven.
Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment
proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited
for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of
having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of
the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise
presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

10)

EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS

Possession of movable property acquired in GF is equivalent to title. There is no need

to produce a receipt.

FACTS:

EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these
by telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were
subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a
personal check.

Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and
was then showed the invoice for the books.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his
check cleared. Upon investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he claimed to
be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from
Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.

RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not
amount to unlawful deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract of sale so
the proper remedy is specific performance)
ISSUE:

Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD: No.

Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When
she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property
by mere failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof
was even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon
delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking, because by the delivery of
EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.