Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Statcon Case Digest
Statcon Case Digest
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, parying “that judgment be rendered declaring
its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public”.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the
contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for
advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal
authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983
of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information
concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme.
The court ruled that the “petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and
the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by
the mails�. The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
3) Ruling
4) Ratio
Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga
City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao
manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood).
On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office
for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union
issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice;
nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May
1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against
the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of
private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The
motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and
set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the
writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in
his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further
action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of
dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5
August 1982.
Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Issues:
Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of
the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase “shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,”
meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing
forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent
now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16
October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent
the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the
DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section
878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further
amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of
being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27
November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused
of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to
two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of
the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in
possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions
which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or
marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental
duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made
for a secret agent.
Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,”
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned,
to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning
in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
wthout pronouncement as to costs.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner
contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first
Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election
as a regular local election.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become
moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay
office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining
Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made
permanent.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of
remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held
that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the
Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New
Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the
Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”
Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the
court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind
of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on
personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the
incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and
wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and
the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was
issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana
M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad
Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the
accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit
of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However,
Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was
ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest
Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong
moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was
directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and
confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and
Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure
of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four
(4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the
depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim
Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically
referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of
judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject
to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry
into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach
of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did
not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27
March 1972, with costs against the petitioners.
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World
War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy,
and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine
Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged
with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of
veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955,
Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act
65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from
Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to
Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to
establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the
Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to
complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing,
the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he
was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.
Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for
an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and
each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was,
however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases
provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were
released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to
pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were
released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of
the benefits thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension,
which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his
application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved.
The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that
since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be
approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive
his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from
the date of approval of the application.
Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from
1968.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the
Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18
December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for
each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount
increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring
the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his
unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June
1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the
availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He
was survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and
Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted
of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950,
Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27,
covered by Tax Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra
sold Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and
in consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to
Venancio. Bartolome’s share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24
September 1968, an “Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale” was
executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of
Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters
consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749
square meters), Anselmo owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs
of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15
June 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter
portion of Lot 26 to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was
discovered in 1982 through a relocation survey that the 149 square meter
portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalong’s fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was
able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221)
covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay
level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to
yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the latter the 149 square
meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of
the said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the
grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the
land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from
discovery of the alleged fraud committed by defendants’ predecessor
Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should have filed their action
had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to
sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro
indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein.
Hence, the appeal.
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the
literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article
1370 of the Civil Code (“If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.”) Contracts which are the private laws of the
contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter
what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity
are present. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and
stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial Partition with
Confirmation of Sale). Since Macario’s share (later Anselmo’s) is only 405 of
the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the
remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was
sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the prescriptive period
on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA,
Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years
after the constitution of Anselmo’s fraudulent Original Certificate of title.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against
petitioners.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its
petition for mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was
enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees’ debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’
credit union; but which does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first
priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for
the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope
of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil
Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on
preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of
Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be
applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62
of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would
have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act
2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to
credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’
wages and salaries.
Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City
with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving
his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its
passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores,
and Estelita Nemeño. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in
favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded.
Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al.
filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and
independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the
reckless driving of Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the
alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the
dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no
reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued
by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was
already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April 1967 that
the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He
noted that the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or
reserved their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which
they filed in the CFI. In view of the waiver and reservation, the Court would
be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of
the offended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari
does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the
deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive
officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules
and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by
Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3
February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the
public as far back as 1 May 1974, although its date of effectivity was
postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more
than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory
rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court
certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules.
As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as
ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose
duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily
control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded
in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” There
was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v.
Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive
officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a
doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given
controlling weight.”
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner
PAFLU.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order
was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred the
case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the
machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this
order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the
order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious
lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that
agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per
month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions
provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union
filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same
on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used
in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the
exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties,
the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation
and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains
the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the
construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it
was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because
it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision
of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the
increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase
of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees;
with costs against the company.
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for
the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation
having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for
arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T.
Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s
complaint for payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal
from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor
Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1
on leave
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid
employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to
all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and
dismissed the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on
Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9,
claiming the rule that “If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less
than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is
uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the
10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly
salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”
Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation,
which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits
or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of
the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear
and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the
benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid
employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s 7 September
1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest
payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30
October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its
Circular 22 providing that “effective 1 November 1958, all employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and
include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as
well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will
comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2%
and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any
one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc.,
wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a
previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of
the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22
is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion
as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling,
petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against
appellant.
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint
Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus,
the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive
all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.
2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.
The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v.
Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed
office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for
associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the
Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of
compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with
the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for
their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the
judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that
in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section
13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase
“which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government
is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding
taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members
of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4
December 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the
issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila
that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s
attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further
the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around
the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and
add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a
choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified
Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at
P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1
on leave
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.
Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory
opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section
18 of the Rules of Court).
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop.
He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S.
1964), for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued
to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school
building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal
complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for
violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for
the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of
Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge
Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29
June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the
ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of
preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It
also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace
throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiff’s driver’s license,
and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The
ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother
statute” (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not
distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks
and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average
man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and
ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of
conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid
down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four
classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications
which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36
which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or
enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds
other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the
foregoing, is void.
On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The
Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-
examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The
Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18
January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the
Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does
not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601,
as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor,
Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition
for review in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the
exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as
amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).
Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from
the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters or
farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers
exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through
their cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted to mean
“without anything intervening”. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers
made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is
not imported directly as required by the exemption.
When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law
is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed
liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from
tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes
are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer.
Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers
through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering
useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers
imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.
CIR v. CA
GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)
Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring
At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the
said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition was pending before
the respondent court, petitioner issued a final decision dated 3 August 1988
reducing the assessment for deficiency contractor’s tax from P193,475.55 to
P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the
respondent court set aside respondent’s decision, and canceling the
deficiency contractor’s tax assessment in the amount of P46,516.41
exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978.
No pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR
SP 31790, affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord
with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a petition for
review.
Issues:
The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be
construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and
unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for
that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the
letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and
the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.” In case
of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the
government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not
to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly
and clearly import. In the present case, Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine
Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a
business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the
university. Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are
technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or donations which are
“tax-exempt” as shown by private respondent’s compliance with the
requirement of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing
for the exemption of such gifts to an educational institution.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the private respondent is not a
contractor selling its services for a fee but an academic institution
conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and,
ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued
operating for so long despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can
only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals that
“education and not profit is motive for undertaking the research projects.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged
decision and order of the RTC Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.
Serfino v. CA
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the
lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985;
issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the
plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties
appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of
errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court
declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff
to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the
unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the
property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the
prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being
in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict
adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of
collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce
such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in
general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-
fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar
Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record
shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor
was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros
Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the
Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus
sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of
the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the
public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way
be attributed to the mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds
to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public
auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare
the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes
thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as
ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that
PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.
Manahan v. ECC
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides
that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their
accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of
Offenses and Claims), workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to the
effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to
31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with
the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this
Court applied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, on passing upon petitioner’s claim.. The illness that claimed the
life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974, thus, his
action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of
doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social
legislations — like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code —
should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give
relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former
should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying
now the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS
to pay the petitioner the amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation
benefit and P600.00 as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the petitioner’s
expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the
deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to
pay administrative fees.
Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her
son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the
petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the
fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The
petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).
On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim.
Hence, the petition.
Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic
necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in
this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental
stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is
no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a “bout of alcoholic
intoxication” shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used
drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine
(by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is
clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis
which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed
as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine
Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor.”
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS
to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.
Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.
entered into a “Contract of Services” with Calmar Security Agency whereby
the latter undertook to supply the former with security guards at the rate of
P300.00 per month for each guard. Thereafter, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo
Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security Agency and
petitioner, for underpayment of salary, non-payment of living allowance, and
13th month pay. Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for the
same causes of action. Petitioner contended that complainants have no
cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship
between them. They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy
of the amounts paid to it under the Contract of Services, it could not
possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws.
Issue(s):
Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal
defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected by requiring
an oath. The appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed. Failure to
pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion
must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to
substantial justice. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power
must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of
circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances.” Moreover, as
provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code “in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor
Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that “in the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the
work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he
is liable to employees directly employed by him,” and Article 107 provides
that “the provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of
any work, task, job or project.” In the case at bar, petitioner became an
indirect employer of respondents-complainants when petitioner entered into
a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the
complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioner’s
liability should be without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against
the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming
that petitioner’s payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is
charged with knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation
that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
other’s.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice
to petitioner’s right to seek reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for
such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. Costs against
the private respondent.
Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which
dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which
absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.
Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between
the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the
case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between
“temporary disability” and “total disability” need not be made in relation to
one’s occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that
common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or
renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the
plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can
not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all
of which define partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation
through the bones of the wrist.” There was no such amputation in the case
at bar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy,
filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under
the insurance policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI
Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant
insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his
participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not
covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision in
favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff
for the death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s
fees. Hence, the appeal.
Held: The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously,
without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight
or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no
accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which
produces or brings about the result of injury or death. Where the death or
injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act,
which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of
policies insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present
case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is
voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he
could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died.
Further, death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests
was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract (What
was included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured
engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing,
racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the
defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing
match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for
such death.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against
appellant.
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance
GR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)
First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.
With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the
Court of First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain
fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon
certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21
June 1940. The records of the original case were destroyed during the
liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that
lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of
P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000
(4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in
accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September
1940, until each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed
the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire
insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal
and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a flash
point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below
300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.
Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of
“oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products
having a flash point below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly ambiguous
and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not
gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance
company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity
must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the
insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the
prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises could not be expressed
clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public
can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the
company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to
have been plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the
keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by the
policy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and
according to the weight of authority, even though there are printed
prohibitions against keeping certain articles on the insured premises the
policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the
prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the
trade or business conducted on the premises. In the present case, no
gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which
was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the
other insured bodegas.
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance
company authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent,
Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern
Shipping Lines denies the allegation of plaintiff’s capacity to sue for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof,
while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV
Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied plaintiff’s
capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the
same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the
petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its
insurance business in the Philippines during the filing of the case. Hence,
the petition.
Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable,
not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the
development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial
intercourse among countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously
embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it
would markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means
that no foreign corporation shall be permitted ‘to transact business in the
Philippine Islands,’ as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it
shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies with the law,
shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary
holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result
which should be and can be easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of
capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural
aspects of these cases.The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue
when it averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company,
that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr.
Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala
Avenue, Makati; as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
General denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of
capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do
so. Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue was not
properly raised as an issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced
documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance
business at the time it filed the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set
aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping
Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home
Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal
rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of
the costs. The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose
Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent
Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98
with interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum
of P500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint
against Guacods, Inc.
Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He
owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to
Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of
Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his
primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized
by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been
accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization.
He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never
gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant
dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in
Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00
which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to
civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to
town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in
the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have
earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which
he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of
less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a
co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a
salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the
same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been
delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his
income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than
P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco
business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing,
the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner
after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all
the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision
of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he
believes in, he answered “democracy.; that he stated that his father had
already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his
income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of
registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and
child.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court
erred in granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for
naturalization.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs
against petitioner.
Guerrero v. CA
GR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)
Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.
In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to
gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino Latigay
to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage
where Benitez and his family lived, thus, making the Benitez feel that they
meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to
warrant reinstatement to the plantation
Bello v. CA
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged
for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated
a lady’s ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were
convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a
“petition to dismiss appeal” on the ground that since the case was within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the city
court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to
the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic
Act 296, as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that
the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but
ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city
court “for execution of judgment.” Thereafter, the City court denied
petitioners’ motion “for having been erroneously addressed to this court”
instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners’ predicament that the CFI had
already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without
notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its
judgment of conviction against them.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of
dismissal was not indispensable and could be “overlooked in the interest of
speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals ‘ act of dismissing the petition
and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was
tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating
substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The
procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather
than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the
CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals
as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them
of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in
lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition
against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction
against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to
elevate petitioners’ appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latter’s
disposition on the merits; without costs.
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands,
therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending
Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation,
contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public
character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of
the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all
liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the
judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the
State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes
with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening
the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers
every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment
of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.
Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy,
one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as
independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30
January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an
unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of
candidacy “for personal reasons.” His unsworn withdrawal had been
accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25
January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendoza’s withdrawal, filed his own sworn “Certificate of
Candidacy in substitution” of Mendoza’s for the said office of vice mayor as a
one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear
winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as
stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer’s opinion that
petitioner’s name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The
canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only
unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute
candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of
the very day of the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on the last
hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed
earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after
the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the
Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should
not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The
will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact
that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely
directory and Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement should be
considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva
as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in
his favor must be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned
Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-
mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected
vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office,
take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is made
immediately executory.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament,
Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada
Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the
last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition
on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling.
The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it
involves purely a question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is
fatal to render the will void
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with
the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case,
the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three
testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be
sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the
will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three
instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore
cannot be admitted to probate.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between
live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation
between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and
his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the
language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It
is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower
court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)
remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated
to sit in 2nd division
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of
firearms
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana,
canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-
opening of Cadastral Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express
mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of
others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative
intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for
applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the
same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free
patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The
intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands
which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to
RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so
included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his
petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for
respondents’ contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to
reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968,
no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit
for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public
land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for
by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the
earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA
6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different
from “filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.”
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent
Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral
Court; without pronouncement as to costs.
Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate
opinion
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred
to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act
contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”). Taped jingles
therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind
the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently
restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without
pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only
if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of
the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the
term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors,
it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not
exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously
made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature
has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including
therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges
of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court
and remanded the case for trial on the merits.
Lopez vs. CTA
GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding
customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released.
Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost
and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment,
additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal,
filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax
Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the
ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme
Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in
lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions
among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is
really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more reasonable and
logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and
intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may
appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control
of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the
Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the
persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but
even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation
but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the
wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident
intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the
Customs Law and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal
decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.
Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1
took no part
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of
a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of
more than one construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the
positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors,
members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as
contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-
encompassing clause reading “any person holding public appointive office or
position,” is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the
language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one
construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose
and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole,
must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative
intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials
mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local
elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan
Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the
President as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of
his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils,
he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for,
holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
officials; without costs.
Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with
interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs. Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The
motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract
which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may
be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the
complaint. Hence the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of
the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against
defendant-appellee Ocampo.
Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952
at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at
the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila.
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs.
Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector
Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella
Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high
school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show
that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has
exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed
any felony or misdemeanor.
She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be
changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December
1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname.
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of
estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524,
525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was
rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of
17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months
and fifteen 15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for
execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was
opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is
disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law
(i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month
and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court denied the
application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due
course to the petitioner’s application for probation; without costs.