Continental Steel v.

Montano

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental

Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their
unborn child.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.

The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee
to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has
life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Limbona v. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Norlanie Limbona, husband of Mohamad limbona who was running for mayoralty
versus Malik Bobby Alngan were candidates in Pantar, Lanao Del Norte. After filing their
certificate of candidacy, respondent file a petition to disqualify the husband for non-compliance
with one-year residence requirement. But at the time it was filed, petitioner filed withdrawal of
candidacy of her husband. Petitioner filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate
for her husband who was approved by the COMELEC then respondent again sought petitioner’s
disqualification. Petitioner claimed that she has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her
house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is considered a domicile for one year to qualify for candidacy.

Ruling:

No, in order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be residence in the new locality, an
intention to remain there, and an intention to abandon the old domicile. When a law does not fix
the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established where they exercise their principal functions.
Bayot vs. CA

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa.
They had a child name Alix who was born in California.

Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to judgment

ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties.

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition
is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to
the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an
American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains
to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the
principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still
may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented
herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate,
when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is
secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.