DE CASTRO VS.

JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in
the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after
May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if
only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.