Professional Documents
Culture Documents
* Gerrit, what is your view about Attorney-General Christian Porter’s statement regarding
religious reforms?
**#** INSPECTOR-RIKATI®, he refers to stakeholders, etc, but let us look at the current case
v=governing seeking to deport 2 girls I understand born in Australia as stateless. Despite being
Australians by birth. That may in my view underline his gross incompetence.
* Surely mere claiming about CITIZENSHIP is not enough?
**#** As I on 19 July 2006 comprehensively and so unchallenged by any Attorney-General
regarding my s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS regarding CITIZENSHIP
defeated them then the Act is and remains ULTRA VIRES Ab Initio unless and until if ever at all
a court of competent jurisdiction declares it to be INTRA VIRES. And yet more than 13 years
later we have a Commonwealth not understanding the implications of this? Come on how stupid
are their legal advisors calling themselves constitutional lawyers when they cannot understand
basic constitutional issues.
Let us never again due to gross incompetence of politicians, their staff, lawyers and
judges wrongly deport a native born Australian child!
As I submitted in my writings:
ADDRESS TO THE COURT
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
I take the position that Subsection 245(14) of the Constitution is not and cannot be regarded to
limit the right of a objection to be only a (theistic belief ) “religious objection” but includes also
any secular belief objection.
If Subsection 245(14) was limited to being “theistic belief” then it would be unconstitutional.
Re; “religious objection” (Subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918)
offend Section 116 if the Constitution if it excludes secular belief based objections.
Madam,
As you are aware I continue to refer to my religious objection albeit do wish to indicate
that while using the “religious objection” referred to in subsection 245(14) of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 I do not consider that this subsection 14 limits an objection
only to an “theistic belief” based “religious objection” but in fact it also includes any secular
belief based “religious objection”, as it must be neutral to whatever a person uses as grounds for
an “objection”. This, as Section 116 of the Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth of
Australia to limit the scope of subsection 245(14) to only “theistic belief” based “religious
objections”. Therefore, any person having a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source of
“religious objection” have a valid objection.
Neither do I accept that a person making an “religious objection” requires to state his/her
religion, and neither which part of his/her religion provides for a “religious objection” as the
mere claim itself is sufficient to constitute what is referred to in subsection 245(14) as being a
“religious objection”. Therefore, the wording “religious objection” is to be taken as “objection”
without the word “religion” having any special meaning in that regard.
If you do not accept this as such, then there is clearly another constitutional issue on foot!
I request you to respond as soon as possible and set out your position in this regard.
WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333, WELSH v. UNITED
STATES, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT, No. 76., Argued January 20, 1970, Decided June 15, 1970
1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra,
and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who
in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual
analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training
and belief" to limit religion to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized
worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that
provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
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3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief
while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with
that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from
a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the
longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than
nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who
have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367.
END QUOTE Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
We so to say copied from the USA provisions the legal principles for Section 116 of the
constitution:
HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.-
What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the
liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of
liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good
government for the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the
people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta
for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole
history of the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of
Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new
charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Sir EDWARD BRADDON (Tasmania).-I have an amendment to move on behalf of Tasmania, and also an
amendment of my own. The clause we have before us says that a state shall not make any law prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion. It is quite possible that this might make lawfull practices which would otherwise be strictly
prohibited. Take, for instance, the Hindoos. One of their religious rites is the "suttee," and another is the
"churruck,"-one meaning simply murder, and the other barbarous cruelty, to the devotees who offer
themselves for the sacrifice.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-Yes. If this is to be the law, these people will be able to practise the rites of their
religion, and the amendment I have to suggest is the insertion of some such words as these:-
But shall prevent the performance of any such religious rites, as are of a cruel or demoralizing character or
contrary to the law of the Commonwealth.
QUOTE
Mr. FRASER (Victoria).-I think that if we give the right to an infinitesimal minority to come here and
indulge in extraordinary practices, under the pretence that this is a new religion, we may have all the theatres
and all the music-halls in Australia open on Sundays. If that is possible we ought to do what we can to provide
against it.
Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I want if I can to recommend the Commonwealth Bill and get it carried. But why
should we be faced with this difficulty? You have put in the preamble a religious recital which is not in the
Constitution of the United States of America, but you have not put in the safeguard against religious intolerance
which they have there. I ask honorable members how I shall face that difficulty? There is a grave suspicion
evidenced by what I said that there were 36,000 distinct signatures upon this very point. I do not think it is too much
for me to say that we ought to reassure those persons. They may be wrong. It may be right, as my friend (Mr.
Barton) says, that there is no power by implication in the Commonwealth to pass this law. It may be right as he says,
that the Commonwealth ought to have the power. But I only say that it is a state matter, and it should be left to the
states. My honorable friend (Mr. Fraser), with all respect to him, shows the current ignorance on this matter because
he will not understand that the state, if my proposal is carried, will have the same power as it has now to stop any
theatrical performances on Sunday.
END QUOTE
What should be understood is that any so called religious cruelty being it circumcision or else
can be dealt with by ordinary State legislation against such practices. Those are constitutional
inherited human rights issues and nothing to do with religious conduct. Anyone can claim to
device a new religion that say allows politicians to be killed but if they were to actually exercise
this then they would fall within criminal law. Any religious conduct must be within ordinary
provisions of law and not despite of it. As such, even promoting so called religious violence can
be dealt with by ordinary law that promoting violence is a violation of criminal law. It makes
absolutely no difference of a person is an atheist or religious as in the end it is the promotion of
violence that is a criminal conduct regardless if this is or isn’t based upon a religious doctrines.
Likewise the promotion by politicians to invade another country, against which the Governor-
General has not published in the Gazette a DECLARATION OF WAR naming the specific
country (consider Iraq) then the politicians promoting the invasion and those involved in
executing this should within ordinary law be held legally accountable for doing so as any other
so to say common criminal.
* Don’t you follow the litigation in the USA on discrimination subjects involving religion,
homosexuals, etc?
**#** Indeed I have for many years. Essentially the Supreme Court of America has ruled that
because of FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Which we actually also have embedded as a legal principle
in our constitution but most lawyers/judges/politicians fail to grasp and understand/comprehend
this) one cannot force a person to be subjected to demands where it involves his/her creativity.
For example, if a baker has a cake on display then he cannot discriminate to whom he sells it but
if someone were to request that a cake be decorated in a particular manner contrary to the bakers
views (religious or otherwise) then the baker is entitled to refuse this. If for example a ppoet
writes poetry for say a heterosexual couple but homosexuals change some words to make it
fitting to them then this would be plagiarism and unlawful. This, as the poetry was clearly
created for a particular meaning. Likewise if a painter is requested to create a painting for a
particular homosexual couple to which he objects, then he is entitled to refuse to do so because a
painting is his personal creation. As such, even photographs/video makers, etc, all can refuse to
do something that requires their CREATIVITY input. However, if a person regardless of
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sexuality, goes to a store to purchase something of the shelf then I view this cannot be denied
albeit the person purchasing something of the shelf still cannot manipulate the item purchased to
interfere with the original. If I were to purchase a painting of the shelf and then manipulate the
painting to portray something else on it then I would violate the painters inherited copy rights
and other entitlements. This as I would cause an alteration of what the painter sold to me.
If therefore a cake say showing a heterosexual couple is altered to show 2 males or 2 females
then this in my view violates the bakers creation as much if a baker were to create a cake
especially for a homosexual couple and then this is altered to be used for a heterosexual couple.
the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make any laws not applicable to the general
community; but so that this power shall not extend to authorize legislation with respect to the affairs of
the aboriginal race in any state.
Mr. ISAACS.-My observations were extended much further than that. The term general community" I
understand to mean the general community of the whole Commonwealth. If it means the general
community of the whole Commonwealth, I do not see the meaning of saying that the Parliament of the
Commonwealth shall have the exclusive authority to do that, because any single state would have the right to
do it under any circumstances. If it means less than that-if it means the general community of a state-I do not
see why it should not be left to the state. We should be placed in a very awkward position indeed if any
particular state is forbidden to pass any distinctive legislation in certain well-known instances. For instance, if
Victoria should choose to enact that Afghans shall only get hawkers' licences under certain conditions which
are not [start page 228] applicable to Europeans she may be debarred by this sub-section from doing so. I do
Mr. ISAACS.-If any other race possess the same characteristic as the Afghans I will put them in the same
class. At all events, the expression general community" means the whole community of the Commonwealth. I
do not think that this has any application. If it is to have any application at all, it seems to me to be intended to
debar the state from passing legislation-necessary legislation, but purely confined to that state. I do not think
that that sub-section ought to be there at all if that is the meaning of it.
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I think the original intention of this sub-section was to deal with
the affairs of such persons of other races-what are generally called inferior races, though I do not know
with how much warrant sometimes-who may be in the Commonwealth at the time it is brought into
existence, or who may under the laws of the Commonwealth regulating aliens come into it. We have
made the dealing with aliens, which includes a certain degree of coloured immigration, a power of the
Commonwealth, and we have made the dealing with immigration a power of the Commonwealth, so
that all those of the races who come into the community after the establishment of the Commonwealth
will not only enter subject to laws made in respect to their immigration, but will remain subject to any
laws which the Commonwealth may specially devise for them. There is no reason why the Commonwealth
should not have power to devise such laws.
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-If it does not exercise it can the state exercise it?
Mr. BARTON.-Once the Commonwealth legislates with reference to the question of aliens and
immigration, its legislation displaces the state law.
END QUOTE
I maintain that the purported Racial Discrimination Act is unconstitutional. The commonwealth
cannot use its treaties power to circumvent legislative limitations and to deny states, where they
have so, their legislative powers. The Commonwealth then could make a treaty with a
confederation that it too will abandon any state parliament then surely no one in his right mind
can accept that such treaty can override constitutional limitations?
This is also why this CITIZENSHIP issue is sheer and utter nonsense as if the Commonwealth
could legislate on this, albeit it was specifically denied to do so, then it could simply deny any
State resident to vote in a State election and that would be the end of the States.
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the
operation of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a
citizen of the state? There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a
state to remain outside the pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual
citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may
be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a
citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual
citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen
of the Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all.
But if we introduce this clause, it is open to the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those
who say that it is putting on the face of the Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not
expect will be exercised adversely or improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in
Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this
Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a
citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or
restrict those rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to
disabilities, as aliens, and so on.
END QUOTE
If we are going to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with regard to
Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the Parliament to pass
legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact,
to play ducks and drakes with it. That is not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal
Parliament."
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-I do not think so. If you say "Trust the Parliament," no Constitution is required
at all; it can simply be provided that a certain number of gentlemen shall be elected, and meet together, and,
without limitation, do what they like. Victoria would not agree to that. But there is a desire to draw the very
life-blood of the Constitution, so far as the states are concerned, by this insidious amendment, which would
give the Houses authority from time to time to put different constructions on this most important part
of the Constitution. I hope we will do as we have done in many instances before, in matters that have been
much debated-adhere to the decision we have already arrived at.
END QUOTE
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA
27 (17 June 1999)
QUOTE
Constitutional interpretation
1. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the
intention of its makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs, hopes
or expectations. Constitutional interpretation is not a search for the mental states of those
who made, or for that matter approved or enacted, the Constitution. The intention of its
makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in the historical context in
which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my
opinion[53]:
END QUOTE
Because we in a sense copied the USA provisions and as the Framers of the Constitution made
clear and embed this as a legal principle in the constitution:
Hansard 11-3-1891 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
END QUOTE
Therefore it cannot be claimed that Australians has any less freedom then those in the USA.
Hence, where the Supreme Court of America makes clear one cannot be forced to be dictated to
once artistic creations to provide for someone against your personal (religious or otherwise)
beliefs then no legislation can overcome this.
.
It is therefore absurd to purport State and/or federal legislation that somehow someone can be
punished for say anti-Semitic expressions as it is an embedded constitutional rights to be able to
publicly express once views provided it is not to say promote a form of violence. Why should I
having Jewish blood flowing through my veins be entitled to criticize any Jew, but others who
have no Jewish blood cannot express the same criticism? To deny a person his constitutional
right to express himself/herself about certain religious issues is to deny the person his political
rights also, this because politicians who are already far too often more interested in rorting the
system then will claim that few citizens expressed an opposition. As such, it is not only
unconstitutional as to Section 116 but also a gross denial of FREEDOM OF SPEECH.
What we need is a better educated judiciary sitting in the High Court of Australia who do not
seek to intrude into legislative powers or executive powers but who will adjudicate strictly within
the concepts of the constitution. Regretfully the Bjelke-Peterson judgment about the purported
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 in my view underlines how bad the judges were prepared to deal
appropriately with this matter. Perhaps curtailing their overseas trips and have them
appropriately studying the true meaning and application, as I did, may enable us to have a
judiciary we can be proud upon.
We need to return to the organics and legal principles embed in of our federal constitution!
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® (Our name is our motto!)