Section 1.
The judicial power shall be vested in one (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to
quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this
Rule.
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall
not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two
successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. (n)
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage
of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 129
AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a
Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and
domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the
special rules of procedure applicable under present laws
to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless
subsequently amended by law or by rules of court
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
judicial self-restraint????????????
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically
and regularly released.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall
be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member
of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age,
and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of
a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed
judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and
a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed
by the President for a term of four years with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the
Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record
of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges
of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The adversarial system or adversary system is a legal
system used in the common law countries where two
advocates represent their parties' case or position before
an impartial person or group of people, usually a jury or
judge, who attempt to determine the truth and pass
judgment accordingly.
Advantages of the Adversarial System. The advantages
of the adversarial system are that it protects the rights of
individuals and the presumption of innocence, serves to
protect citizens from potential abuses of government, and
works to check bias in the courtroom setting.
Family law issues and contract issues. Family law is very
much a court of equity subject matter, while contracts are
very much a court of law issue.
The easiest example is a painter for your house. If you
sign a contract for someone to paint your house and it
does not work out well, you have an "action" based on a
court of law issue. Either the painter painted according the
contract or not.
However, if a painter thought you had a contract, but you
did not, and yet it improved your house, then the painter
has an action in equity.
In my experience, contract, landlord/tenant, foreclosure
and other written document cases are court of law cases.
It doesn't matter whether you could pay or not pay, the
matter is "black letter law" that you should have paid. It is
a matter of "you did or did not do" something, regardless
of the social circumstances.
Your equity cases are family law cases, bankruptcy
cases, and sometimes cases like my painting situation
above. The court will hear what is fair, and the outcome is
based on factors rather than contract terms.
In the court of law cases, the facts are what they are, and
you win or lose; in equity cases, the court will fashion
almost any remedy it seems fit so that both parties win or
both parties lose.
If you are in a legal battle, the difference between whether
a judge is sitting in a court of equity or law makes a huge
difference. Specifically, a judge in a court of law MUST
follow the law even if you were justified stealing the bread.
In a court of equity, the court can use its own discretion to
determine whether you were justified in stealing the bread
(with exceptions on the criminal nature of this, as always).
Make sure you figure out your burden of proof in your
case, and hopefully this column will help you figure out
whether it is black or white or shades of gray.
A quasi-judicial body is a non-judicial body which can
interpret law. It is an entity such as an arbitrator or tribunal
board, generally of a public administrative agency, which
has powers and procedures resembling those of a court
of law or judge, and which is obliged to objectively
determine facts and draw conclusions from them so as to
provide the basis of an official action. Such actions are
able to remedy a situation or impose legal penalties, and
they may affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of
specific parties.
Rule 6, Sec. 1.
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective
claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court
for appropriate judgment
Allowed Pleadings
Rule 6, Sec. 2
The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counter-
claim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint – in – intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the
pleading asserting a claim against him.
An answer may be responded to by a reply.
Republic Act No. 9285 April 2, 2004
AN ACT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE USE OF AN
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND TO ESTABLISH THE OFFICE
FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - it is hereby declared the
policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in
the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to
make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes.
Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively
promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial
justice and declog court dockets. As such, the State shall
provide means for the use of ADR as an efficient tool and
an alternative procedure for the resolution of appropriate
cases. Likewise, the State shall enlist active private sector
participation in the settlement of disputes through ADR.
This Act shall be without prejudice to the adoption by the
Supreme Court of any ADR system, such as mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, or any combination thereof as a
means of achieving speedy and efficient means of
resolving cases pending before all courts in the
Philippines which shall be governed by such rules as the
Supreme Court may approve from time to time.
SEC. 6. Exception to the Application of this Act. - The
provisions of this Act shall not apply to resolution or
settlement of the following: (a) labor disputes covered by
Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations; (b) the civil status
of persons; (c) the validity of a marriage; (d) any ground
for legal separation; (e) the jurisdiction of courts; (f) future
legitime; (g) criminal liability; and (h) those which by law
cannot be compromised.
SEC. 53. Applicability of the Katarungan
Pambarangay. - This Act shall not be interpreted to
repeal, amend or modify the jurisdiction of the Katarungan
Pambarangay under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Legal systems around the world vary greatly, but they
usually follow civil law or common law. In common law,
past legal precedents or judicial rulings are used to decide
cases at hand. Under civil law, codified statutes and
ordinances rule the land. Some countries like South Africa
use a combination of civil and common law.
urisdiction (from the Latin ius, iuris meaning "law" and
dicere meaning "to speak") is the practical authority
granted to a legal body to administer justice within a
defined field of responsibility, e.g., Michigan tax law. In
federations like the United States, areas of jurisdiction
apply to local, state, and federal levels; e.g. the court has
jurisdiction to apply federal law.
Colloquially it is used to refer to the geographical area to
which such authority applies, e.g. the court has
jurisdiction over all of Colorado. The legal term refers only
to the granted authority, not to a geographical area.
Jurisdiction draws its substance from international law,
conflict of laws, constitutional law, and the powers of the
executive and legislative branches of government to
allocate resources to best serve the needs of society.
WHAT IS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER?
> Power to hear and decide cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers .
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION OVER
SUBJECT MATTER?
1. Nature of the offense
2. Authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable
given the allegation in the information
3. Territorial jurisdiction of the court imposing the penalty
Limited jurisdiction, or special jurisdiction, is the
court's jurisdiction only on certain types of cases such as
bankruptcy, family matters, etc.[1]
Courts of limited jurisdiction, as opposed to general
jurisdiction, derive power from an issuing authority, such
as a constitution or a statute. Special jurisdiction courts
must demonstrate that they are authorized to exert
jurisdiction under their issuing authority. In contrast,
general jurisdiction courts need only to demonstrate that
they may assert in personal jurisdiction over a party.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas
set up by the
defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss,
otherwise, jurisdiction would be dependent on his whims.
The allegations in petitioners’ complaint show that the
action is one for recovery of possession, not one which
involves an agrarian dispute.
Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines
"agrarian dispute" over which the DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction as:
(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements
including any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act
and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Since petitioners’ action is one for recovery of
possession and does not involve an agrarian
dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.9
That respondents’ only basis in assailing the jurisdiction
of the trial court is that the subject matter of the case is an
agricultural land and that they do not deny at all the
allegation of the complaint of petitioners that there is no
tenancy or leasehold agreement between them
unmistakably show that there is no agrarian dispute to
speak of over which the DARAB has exclusive original
jurisdiction.
The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore,
be struck down.
To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the
Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented
before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said
evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the
charges against him.
However, it must be emphasized that the action
commenced by respondent before the Regional Trial
Court is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the
court to render said decision – the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the
administrative case against respondent was filed way
back in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of
procedure.
The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari
does not toll the running of the period to appeal.4
However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In
Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of
procedure in order to promote substantial justice where
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other
instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police
officer who has rendered years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent
immediately resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of
pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief’s
decision as an appeal before the National Appellate
Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to
which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint
filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41
and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department
of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section
41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought
before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB),
while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has
authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP
member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police
officer.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals,7
promulgated in 2005 or after respondent had already
filed the petition for certiorari with the trial court, when
the Court resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction
over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A.
No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP
Chief and regional directors have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against
members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from
service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief
or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case,
respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to
fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of
the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB,
pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled
jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the
Court stressed thus:
After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends
in themselves but are primarily devised to help in
the proper and expedient dispensation of justice.
In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be
construed liberally in order to meet and advance
the cause of substantial justice.10
Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB
should be deemed available to respondent in the higher
interest of substantial justice.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Preliminary Issues
The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the
findings and conclusions of the Deputy Ombudsman.
No further need exists to exhaust administrative
remedies from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the
Ombudsman
We disagree with the CA’s application of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies which states that
when there is "a procedure for administrative review, x x
x appeal, or reconsideration, the courts x x x will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum."17
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, dated
April 10, 1990, provides that:
Section 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. — Where the
respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or
a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary, the decision
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a
motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA
6770. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another
appeal from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to
the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for certiorari may be filed in
all other cases where the penalty imposed is not one
involving public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)
month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an
opportunity for the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain
cases. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all
administrative remedies when he filed his motion for
reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case
at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman
has already acted on the case and he was acting for and
in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts or administrative agencies
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less
than the Constitution.18 It is tasked to exercise disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials, save
only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The
Ombudsman Act19 and the Local Government Code both
provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials,
the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been
resolved in cases decided by this Court.20
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,21 we pointed out that "there is
nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it
has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent x x x as to compel us to only uphold one and
strike down the other." The two laws may be reconciled
by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate
any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770
provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore
ours]
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public
officials occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 and higher.22
Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Rodriguez,23 any act or omission of a public officer or
employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the
regular courts or other investigative agencies.24
In administrative cases involving the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to
take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.25 In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay
Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 14.26 Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any
elective barangay official, as follows:
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.
– A verified complaint against any erring local elective
official shall be prepared as follows:
xxxx
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall
be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be
final and executory. [italics supplied]
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion
of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction
is concurrent.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose
administrative sanctions
Section 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority. This provision
covers the entire range of administrative activities
attendant to administrative adjudication, including, among
others, the authority to receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules
of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as
warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the
corresponding penalty.28
These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the
Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative
sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory. We
held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio29 that:
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out
its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only
of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer
under its authority pending an investigation when the case
so warrants.30 (italics supplied; emphasis and underscore
ours)
Substantive Issue
The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
At the outset, we point out that the maintenance of peace
and order is a function of both the police and the Barangay
Chairman, but crime prevention is largely a police matter.
At the time when the police officers were hauling the
confiscated equipment, they were creating a commotion.
As Barangay Chairman, the petitioner was clearly in the
performance of his official duty when he interfered. Under
Section 389(b)(3) of RA 7160, the law provides that a
punong barangay must "maintain public order in the
barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the
performance of their duties and functions." The PNP-
CIDG’s anti-water pilferage operation against the car-
wash boys was affecting the peace and order of the
community and he was duty-bound to investigate and try
to maintain public order.31
After the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about
the operation, the police officers immediately showed
their identifications and explained to him that they were
conducting an anti-water pilferage operation. However,
instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered
several bystanders to defy the PNP-CIDG’s whole
operation. The petitioner’s act stirred further commotion
that unfortunately led to the escape of the apprehended
car-wash boys.32
The petitioner, as Barangay Chairman, is tasked to
enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay, in the same manner that the police is
bound to maintain peace and order within the community.
While the petitioner has general charge of the affairs in
the barangay, the maintenance of peace and order is
largely a police matter, with police authority being
predominant33 especially when the police has began to
act on an enforcement matter.34 The maintenance of
peace and order in the community is a general function
undertaken by the punong barangay. It is a task expressly
conferred to the punong barangay under Section
389(b)(3) of RA 7160.35 On the other hand, the
maintenance of peace and order carries both general and
specific functions on the part of the police. Section 24 of
RA 6975 (otherwise known as "the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990"),36as
amended,37 enumerates the powers and functions of the
police. In addition to the maintenance of peace and order,
the police has the authority to "investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution," and
are charged with the enforcement of "laws and ordinances
relative to the protection of lives and properties."38
Examined side by side, police authority is superior to the
punong barangay’s authority in a situation where the
maintenance of peace and order has metamorphosed into
crime prevention and the arrest of criminal offenders.
In this case, a criminal act was actually taking place and
the situation was already beyond the general
maintenance of peace and order. The police was, at that
point, under the obligation to prevent the commission of a
crime and to effect the arrest, as it actually did, of criminal
offenders.1âwphi1
From another perspective, the peace and order function
of the punong barangay must also be related to his
function of assisting local executive officials (i.e., the city
mayor), under Section 389(b), Chapter III of the Local
Government Code.39 Local executive officials have the
power to employ and deploy police for the maintenance of
peace and order, the prevention of crimes and the arrest
of criminal offenders.40 Accordingly, in the maintenance of
peace and order, the petitioner is bound, at the very least,
to respect the PNP-CIDG’s authority even if he is not in
the direct position to give aid. By interfering with a
legitimate police operation, he effectively interfered with
this hierarchy of authority.1âwphi1 Thus, we are left with
no other conclusion other than to rule that Alejandro is
liable for misconduct in the performance of his duties.
Misconduct is considered grave if accompanied by
corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant
disregard of established rules, which must all be
supported by substantial evidence.41 If the misconduct
does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify
the misconduct as grave, the person charged may only be
held liable for simple misconduct. "Grave misconduct
necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple
misconduct.''42
Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher
penalty against the petitioner. His open interference in a
legitimate police activity. and defiance of the police's
authority only show his clear i1itent to violate the law; in
fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot
official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of the
law. The photographs, taken together with the
investigation report of the Police Superintendent and the
testimonies of the witnesses, even lead to conclusions
beyond interference and defiance; the petitioner himself
could have been involved in corrupt activities, although
we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point.43 We
make this observation though as his son owns MICO
whose car-wash boys were engaged in water pilferage.
What we can conclusively confirm is that the petitioner
violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate
police activity where his own son appeared to be involved.
This act qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section
52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the
service.
a. Definition; distinguished
from exercise of jurisdiction
–
The issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for
review is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
The governing rule is Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders
and Resolutions. Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule provide for
its coverage and the grounds therefor, thus:
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief.
Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments
may only be availed of on the following grounds: (1)
extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial
of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.13
Petitioners in this case did not allege nor present evidence
of fraud or deception employed on them by the
respondents to deprive them of opportunity to present
their case to the court. They, however, assert that the
negligence of their former counsel in failing to file the
appeal brief amounts to extrinsic fraud which would serve
as basis for their petition for annulment of judgment. We
disagree. The Court has held that when a party retains the
services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel’s actions
and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is
true especially where he does not complain against the
manner his counsel handles the suit.14 Such is the case
here. When the complaint was filed before the trial court,
summons was served upon the petitioners.15 They
allegedly referred the matter to Atty. Villamor who was
holding office at the building owned and managed by
respondent Tempus Place Realty Management
Corporation.16 However, after they have endorsed the
summons to said lawyer, they did not exert any effort to
follow up the developments of the suit. Hence, they were
declared in default and judgment was rendered against
them. Even in the course of the appeal, they never
bothered to check with their counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Santos, the status of the appeal. The notice of appeal was
filed on November 3, 1997 and petitioners learned of the
dismissal of the appeal in October 1999, after petitioner
Tolentino received notice of garnishment of his insurance
benefits in connection with the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-96-29207. It was only at that time that they learned that
Atty. Santos had migrated to Australia. This only shows
that petitioners, as what happened during the pendency
of the case before the trial court, never bothered to confer
with their counsel regarding the conduct and status of
their appeal. The Court stated in Villaruel, Jr. vs.
Fernando:17
xxx Litigants represented by counsel should not
expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their case. To agree
with petitioner’s stance would enable every party
to render inutile any adverse order or decision
through the simple expedient of alleging
negligence on the part of his counsel. The Court
will not countenance such ill-founded argument
which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial
and procedure.18
We reiterate the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes
of his counsel except when the negligence of his counsel
is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court.19 Only when the application
of the general rule would result in serious injustice should
the exception apply.20 We find no reason to apply the
exception in this case.
In addition, it is provided in Section 2 of Rule 47 that
extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief. In other words, it is effectively barred
if it could have been raised as a ground in an available
remedial measure.21 The records show that after
petitioners learned of the judgment of default, they filed a
motion for new trial on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It was
however denied by the trial court. They filed a notice of
appeal thereafter. Hence, they are now precluded from
alleging extrinsic fraud as a ground for their petition for
annulment of the trial court decision.
We are also not persuaded by petitioners’ assertion that
the trial court judge lacked jurisdiction so as to justify the
annulment of his decision in Civil Case No. Q-96-29207.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment
refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.22
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court,
or by coercive process issued by the court to him,
generally by the service of summons. The trial court
clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party, the petitioners herein, when the latter received the
summons from the court. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law
and is determined from the allegations in the complaint.
Under the law, the action for specific performance and
damages is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners’
submission, therefore, that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction does not hold water.
We note that petitioners’ arguments to support their stand
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction actually pertain
to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the
same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from
the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to
decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.23 The errors raised by petitioners in
their petition for annulment assail the content of the
decision of the trial court and not the court’s authority to
decide the suit. In other words, they relate to the court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction, but petitioners failed to show
that the trial court did not have the authority to decide the
case.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is
the central personnel agency of the government, it has
been expressly granted by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292 the authority to assume original jurisdiction over
complaints directly filed with it. The CSC explains that
under the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction over all
administrative disciplinary proceedings and original
jurisdiction over complaints against government officials
and employees filed before it by private citizens.16ςrνll
Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction,
together with the PUP Board of Regents, over the
administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar and it
can take cognizance of a case filed directly with it, despite
the fact that the Board of Regents is the disciplining
authority of university employees.
Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand,
fully adopted the position of the CA in its questioned
decision and propounded the additional argument that the
passage of R.A. No. 8292 has effectively removed from
the CSC the authority to hear and decide on cases filed
directly with it.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the power to appoint and discipline its
officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal.17ςrνll Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of
the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil
service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, 18ςrνll
PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making
it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter whose employees are part of the Civil
Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No.
292.19ςrνll
The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and
Cezar are government employees and part of the Civil
Service. The controversy, however, stems from the
interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as
specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book
V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint
may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize
any department or agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall
be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that
paragraph one of the same provision abovequoted allows
the filing of a complaint directly with the CSC, it makes a
distinction between a complaint filed by a private citizen
and that of an employee under the jurisdiction of the
disciplining authority involved. The CA resolved that
because Cueva was then the Dean of the College of Law
and the Chief Legal Counsel of PUP when he filed the
complaint with the CSC, he was under the authority of the
PUP Board of Regents. Thus, it is the Board of Regents
which had exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative
case he initiated against Guevarra and Cezar.
The Court finds itself unable to sustain the reading of the
CA.
The issue is not novel.
The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states
that "a complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee" is that the CSC can only take
cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint
was made by a private citizen.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private
citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule
of statutory construction which requires that when the law
is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a
simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention
of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-
established rule that laws should be given a reasonable
interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for
which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation
is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results."20ςrνll In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,21ςrνll
the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on
the overzealous application of the plain meaning rule:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in
a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation
of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead
to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the
statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive
a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words
meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequences.22ςrνll
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only
private citizens can file a complaint directly with the CSC.
For administrative cases instituted by government
employees against their fellow public servants, the CSC
would only have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a
plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would
effectively divest CSC of its original jurisdiction, albeit
shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly
unreasonable as it would be tantamount to
disenfranchising government employees by removing
from them an alternative course of action against erring
public officials.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a
complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a
member of the civil service, especially in light of Section
12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same
E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal" without any
qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria,23ςrνll the Court stated
that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state
university official may be filed with either the universitys
Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service
Commission."24ςrνll It is important to note that the Court
did not interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such
authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by a
member of the civil service.
Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service
Commission,25ςrνll the Court interpreted Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as
allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official
of a complaint against a fellow government employee. In
the said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor Charito Planas
directly filed with the CSC a complaint for usurpation,
grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross
insubordination, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service against the City Legal Officer of
Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the
respondent official should not be allowed to continue
holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the
Supreme Court, the official in question asserted that the
City Mayor was the only one who could remove him from
office directly and not the CSC. The Court upheld the
decision of the CSC, citing the same provision of the
Administrative Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is
nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a
complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus,
when the CSC determined that petitioner was no longer
entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was
acting within its authority under the Administrative Code
to hear and decide complaints filed before it. 26ςrνll
[Underscoring supplied]
It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in
point.27ςrνll While it is true that the circumstances
present in the two cases are not identical, a careful
reading of Hilario reveals that petitioner therein
questioned the authority of the CSC to hear the
disciplinary case filed against him, alleging that the CSCs
jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence, the
reference to the abovequoted passage in Hilario is very
appropriate in this case as respondents herein pose a
similar query before us.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the
complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite
clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may
deputize any department or agency to conduct an
investigation.
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service28ςrνll (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the
CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly
brought before it:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it,
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of
the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil
service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service" to mean that the CSC could
only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this
case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and
decided on the charges against the respondents.
Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the
succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably
granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and
belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take
cognizance of cases on appeal:
Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of
Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent
jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective
officers and employees.29ςrνll [Emphasis supplied]
It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform
Rules is silent as to who can file a complaint directly with
the CSC, it cannot be construed to authorize one who is
not a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the
CSC. This is because a rule issued by a government
agency pursuant to its law-making power cannot modify,
reduce or enlarge the scope of the law which it seeks to
implement.30ςrνll
Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the
Uniform Rules does not contradict the Administrative
Code. Rather, the former simply provides a reasonable
interpretation of the latter. Such action is perfectly within
the authority of the CSC, pursuant to Section 12(2),
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292,
which gives it the power to "prescribe, amend and enforce
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions
of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws."
Another view has been propounded that the original
jurisdiction of the CSC has been further limited by Section
5 of the Uniform Rules, such that the CSC can only take
cognizance of complaints filed directly with it which: (1)
are brought against personnel of the CSC central office,
(2) are against third level officials who are not presidential
appointees, (3) are against officials and employees, but
are not acted upon by the agencies themselves, or (4)
otherwise require direct or immediate action in the interest
of justice:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Proper. The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought
before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty
days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission
Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not
presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and
employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and
such other complaints requiring direct or immediate
action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases
being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising
out of or in connection with the foregoing enumerations.
It is the Courts position that the Uniform Rules did not
supplant the law which provided the CSC with original
jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so
provided, the Court invites attention to the cases of Civil
Service Commission v. Alfonso31ςrνll and Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor,32ςrνll to be further discussed in the
course of this decision, both of which buttressed the
pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its
authority to discipline erring school officials and
employees with the CSC. It can be presumed that, at the
time of their promulgation, the members of this Court, in
Alfonso and Sojor, were fully aware of all the existing laws
and applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the CSC, including the Uniform Rules. In
fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support
of its ruling allowing the CSC to take cognizance of an
administrative case filed directly with it against the
president of a state university. As the Court, in the two
cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules as
a limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction of the
CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is merely
implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of
the CSCs powers. The CSC itself is of this view as it has
vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through
this petition.
The case of Alfonso33ςrνll is on all fours with the case at
bench. The case involved a complaint filed before the
CSC against a PUP employee by two employees of the
same university. The CA was then faced with the identical
issue of whether it was the CSC or the PUP Board of
Regents which had jurisdiction over the administrative
case filed against the said PUP employee. The CA
similarly ruled that the CSC could take cognizance of an
administrative case if the decisions of secretaries or
heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities were appealed to it or if a private citizen
directly filed with the CSC a complaint against a
government official or employee. Because the
complainants in the said case were PUP employees and
not private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case. It further
posited that even assuming the CSC had the authority to
do so, immediate resort to the CSC violated the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the complaint
should have been first lodged with the PUP Board of
Regents to allow them the opportunity to decide on the
matter. This Court, however, reversed the said decision
and declared the following:
xxx. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases decided by government departments,
agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint
may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission
has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it
may opt to deputize a department or an
agency to conduct the investigation. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the
creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies
in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide
administrative complaints against their respective officers
and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the
creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as
R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such
disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its
inherent power to supervise and discipline government
employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for
which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill
professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil
service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution
itself.
xxxxxxxxx
But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument
must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he had already
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he
filed his counter-affidavit and his motion for
reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not
from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-
Central Office to the CSC-NCR. It was only when his
motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of
heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction. This
cannot be allowed because it would violate the doctrine of
res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to
administrative cases as well. At the very least,
respondents active participation in the proceedings by
seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him
from impugning the Commissions authority under the
principle of estoppel by laches.
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two
PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged
before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead
filed before the CSC, with averments detailing
respondents alleged violation of civil service laws, rules
and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the
Commission found that a prima facie case existed against
Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge
against the latter. Verily, since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of
jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may,
however, choose to deputize any department or agency
or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to
conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation
to the proper regional office. But the same is merely
permissive and not mandatory upon the
Commission.34ςrνll [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case
at bar because respondent therein submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-
affidavit before it, thereby preventing him from later
questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. Such
circumstance is said to be totally absent in this
case.35ςrνll
The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents
herein submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the CSC
when they filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.36ςrνll It was
only when their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case37ςrνll was denied
by the CSC that they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction
of the CSC before the CA, clearly a desperate attempt to
evade prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso,
respondents are also estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion
is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative
case filed directly with it against an official or employee of
a chartered state college or university. This is regardless
of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a
member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction
is shared with the Board of Regents of the school.
Gaoiran not applicable
In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v.
Alcala38ςrνll to support its judgment that it is the Board
of Regents, and not the CSC, which has jurisdiction over
the administrative complaint filed against the
respondents.
A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that
it is irrelevant to the issues discussed in the case at
bench. Gaoiran speaks of a complaint filed against a high
school teacher of a state-supervised school by another
employee of the same school. The complaint was referred
to the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher
Education (LAS-CHED). After a fact-finding investigation
established the existence of a prima facie case against
the teacher, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Director of LAS-CHED issued a formal charge for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, together with the Order of Preventive
Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-CHED,
however, dismissed the administrative complaint on the
ground that the letter-complaint was not made under oath.
Unaware of this previous resolution, the Chairman of the
CHED issued another resolution finding petitioner therein
guilty of the charges against him and dismissing him from
the service. The trial court upheld the resolution of the
director of LAS-CHED but on appeal, this was reversed
by the CA, affirming the decision of the CHED chairman
removing petitioner from service. One of the issues raised
therein before this Court was whether the CA erred in
disregarding the fact that the complaint was not made
under oath as required by the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292.
In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of
the CA that it was the formal charge issued by the LAS-
CHED which constituted the complaint, and because the
same was initiated by the appropriate disciplining
authority, it need not be subscribed and sworn to and
CHED acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court
further affirmed the authority of the heads of agencies to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against their officers and employees. It bears
stressing, at this point, that there is nothing in the case
that remotely implies that this Court meant to place upon
the Board of Regent exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed against their employees.
In fact, following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued
that it was CSC Resolution No. 060521 which formally
charged respondents that constituted the complaint, and
since the complaint was initiated by the CSC itself as the
disciplining authority, the CSC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment
refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.16
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no
jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest
it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred
by law.
There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate
jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC,
MTC or MCTC. We note that petitioners’ attack on the
validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously
granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment
provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.18 While
the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of
ownership or possession de jure solely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession de facto, it has no
jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of ownership 19
and any pronouncement made by it on the question of
ownership is provisional in nature.20 A judgment in a
forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue
than possession and establishes only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership.21 We have held that although it was proper for
the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the
issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession
de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the
ownership of the property to either party by ordering the
cancellation of the TCT.22
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of
simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any
counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners),
it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the
basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease
which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased
premises within a certain period (two years from date of
execution) and for a fixed price (₱150,000.00).23 This
cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue
for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the
physical possession of the property.
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on
appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the
RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause,
and not the decision rendered therein.24 The ground for
annulment of the decision is absence of, or no,
jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest
it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.25
a. How determined
b. The petition is meritorious.
c. It is a settled rule that
jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.
It is not affected by the pleas
or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a
motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of
the defendant.18 Also
illuminating is the Court’s
pronouncement in Go v.
Distinction Properties
Development and
Construction, Inc.:19
d. Basic as a hornbook
principle is that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and
determined by the
allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action.
The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the
allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the
complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted. Once
vested by the allegations in
the complaint, jurisdiction
also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.
x x x20
e. Based on the allegations
made by respondent in his
complaint, does the
controversy involve intra-
corporate issues as would
fall within the jurisdiction of
the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court or an
ordinary action for damages
within the jurisdiction of
regular courts?
f. In determining whether a
dispute constitutes an intra-
corporate controversy, the
Court uses two tests,
namely, the relationship test
and the nature of the
controversy test.21
g. An intra-corporate
controversy is one which
pertains to any of the
following relationships: (1)
between the corporation,
partnership or association
and the public; (2) between
the corporation, partnership
or association and the State
insofar as its franchise,
permit or license to operate
is concerned; (3) between
the corporation, partnership
or association and its
stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4)
among the stockholders,
partners or associates
themselves.22 Thus, under
the relationship test, the
existence of any of the
above intra-corporate
relations makes the case
intra-corporate.23
h. Under the nature of the
controversy test, "the
controversy must not only be
rooted in the existence of an
intra-corporate relationship,
but must as well pertain to
the enforcement of the
parties’ correlative rights and
obligations under the
Corporation Code and the
internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the
corporation."24 In other
words, jurisdiction should be
determined by considering
both the relationship of the
parties as well as the nature
of the question involved.25
i. Applying the two tests, we
find and so hold that the
case involves intra-
corporate controversy. It
obviously arose from the
intra-corporate relations
between the parties, and the
questions involved pertain to
their rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code
and matters relating to the
regulation of the
corporation.26
j. Admittedly, petitioner is a
condominium corporation
duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws,
charged with the
management of the Medical
Plaza Makati. Respondent,
on the other hand, is the
registered owner of Unit No.
1201 and is thus a
stockholder/member of the
condominium corporation.
Clearly, there is an intra-
corporate relationship
between the corporation and
a stockholder/member.
k. The nature of the action is
determined by the body
rather than the title of the
 complaint.1âwphi1 Though
denominated as an action for
damages, an examination of
the allegations made by
respondent in his complaint
shows that the case
principally dwells on the
propriety of the assessment
made by petitioner against
respondent as well as the
validity of petitioner’s act in
preventing respondent from
participating in the election
of the corporation’s Board of
Directors. Respondent
contested the alleged unpaid
dues and assessments
demanded by petitioner.
l. The issue is not novel. The
nature of an action involving
any dispute as to the validity
of the assessment of
association dues has been
settled by the Court in
Chateau de Baie
Condominium Corporation v.
Moreno.27 In that case,
respondents therein filed a
complaint for intra-corporate
dispute against the petitioner
therein to question how it
calculated the dues
assessed against them, and
to ask an accounting of
association dues. Petitioner,
however, moved for the
dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction
alleging that since the
complaint was against the
owner/developer of a be authorized by law to take cognizance of
condominium whose
condominium project was
registered with and licensed
by the HLURB, the latter has
the exclusive jurisdiction. In
sustaining the denial of the
motion to dismiss, the Court
held that the dispute as to
the validity of the
assessments is purely an
intra-corporate matter
between petitioner and
respondent and is thus
within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting
as a special commercial
court. More so in this case as
respondent repeatedly
questioned his
characterization as a
delinquent member and,
consequently, petitioner’s
decision to bar him from
exercising his rights to vote
and be voted for. These
issues are clearly corporate
and the demand for
damages is just incidental.
Being corporate in nature,
the issues should be
threshed out before the RTC
sitting as a special
commercial court. The
issues on damages can still
be resolved in the same
special commercial court just
like a regular RTC which is
still competent to tackle civil
law issues incidental to intra-
corporate disputes filed
before it.28
JURISDICTION CANNOT BE WAIVED
The three errors assigned in appellant's brief raise but one
issue: Jurisdiction.
1. Appellant plants his case upon the provisions of
Section 21 of Republic Act 1199 (approved August 30,
1954), known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines", which reads:
Sec. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction.
— All cases involving the dispossession of a
tenant by the land-holder or by a third party and/or
the settlement and disposition of disputes arising
from the relationship of land-holder and tenant, as
well as the violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter
tenancy relations and disputes.
The statutory precept just quoted is supplemented
by Section 7, Republic Act 1267, creating the first Court
of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as
amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on
September 9, 1955. Said Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. — The
Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle all
questions, matters, controversies or disputes
involving all those relationships established by
law which determine the varying rights of persons
in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
where one of the parties works the land: . . . .3
As heretofore adverted to, Tongham Chua's
complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 — long after
Republic Acts 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in
our statute books. Well to remember then is that Tongham
Chua's complaint positively avers that Hatib Abbain is his
tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that
he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his non-
compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of
the several harvests he made." The Justice of the Peace
Court itself found, after hearing, that Hatib Abbain
continued to be the tenant of Tongham Chua after the
latter became, on January 16, 1952, owner of the
plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a
donation; and that Hatib Abbain refused to give "the share
of his landlord of the harvest."
If both the complaint and the inferior court's
judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the Justice of
the Peace Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right
at the outset, the complaint should have been rejected.
Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed
during the course of the trial, when it became all the more
evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The
judge had no power to determine the case. Because,
Tongham Chua's suit comes within the coverage of the
statutory provision (Section 31, R.A. 1199) heretofore
mentioned that "[a]ll cases involving the dispossession of
a tenant by the land-holder," shall be under the "original
and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of
tenancy relations and disputes" and the broad sweep of
Section 7, Republic Act 1267, which lodged with the Court
of Agrarian Relations "original and exclusive jurisdiction .
. . to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions,
controversies or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
where one of the parties works the land."
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations over cases of this
nature. 4 Such exclusive authority is not divested by a
mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts
ownership over the land, "since the law does not exclude
from the jurisdiction" of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
"cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land
given to him for cultivation by the landlord." 5
The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the
Peace Court are null and void.
2. We take note of the observation of the Court of
First Instance that the petition for relief from judgment
must have to be ruled out because it was filed beyond the
60-day period after appellant learned of the judgment. But
this is beside the point.
The judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court is
not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on its face. It
may be attacked directly or collaterally. Here, the attack is
direct. Petitioner-appellant sought to annul the judgment.
Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed,
appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action.
More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of that
judgment. 6 In varying language, this Court has expressed
its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without
jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be "a dead limb on
the judicial tree, which should be lopped off or wholly
disregarded as the circumstances require." 7 In the
language of Mr. Justice Street: 8 "Where a judgment or
judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head." And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, 9 this Court quoted
with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments:
"A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.
All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be
responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by
virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without
redress."
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio,
the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are
inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any
way and at any time, even when no appeal has been
taken." 10
JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
t must be remembered that although the action, originally,
was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the
Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948
when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ
of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on
Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights
and assumed specific obligations in connection with the
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17,
Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil.
885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its
liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied
upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of
the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead
of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question
in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St.
Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape a penalty.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a
claim can originally be addressed in a court but would be
better addressed first by an administrative body[i]. It is
concerned with promoting proper relationships between
the courts and administrative agencies charged with
particular regulatory duties.
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies prevents a
litigant from seeking a remedy in a new court or
jurisdiction until all claims or remedies have been
exhausted (pursued as fully as possible) in the original
one. The doctrine was originally created by case law
based on the principles of comity.
view of the above considerations, we apply the principle
of primary jurisdiction:
In cases involving specialized disputes,
the trend has been to refer the same to
an administrative agency of special
competence. As early as 1954, the Court
in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.
932,941), held that under the sense-
making and expeditious doctrine of
primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot
or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal
prior to the decision of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the Purposes of
the regulatory statute administered."
Recently, this Court specaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said:
"In this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case
of grave abuse of discretion, has become
well nigh indispensable." (Abejo v. de la
Cruz, 149 SCRA 654, 675). (Saavedra,
Jr., et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 80879,
March 21, 1988)
It has also been the policy of the courts not to ignore or
reject as incorrect the acts and determinations of
administrative agencies unless there is a clear showing of
arbitrary action or palpable and serious error. Thus, we
ruled in the recent case of Beautifont, Inc., et. al. v. Court
of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29,1988):
xxx xxx xxx
... The legal presumption is that official
duty has been duly performed; (Sec. 5,
m, 121 Rules of Court) and it is
"particularly strong as regards
administrative agencies ...vested with
powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature,
in connection with the enforcement of
laws affecting particular fields of activity,
the proper regulation and/or promotion of
which requires a technical or special
training, aside from a good knowledge
and grasp of the overall conditions,
relevant to said fields, containing in the
nation (Pangasinan Transportation v.
Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil. 221).
 The consequent policy and practice
underlying our Administrative Law is that
courts of justice should respect the
findings of fact of said administrative
agencies, unless there is absolutely no
evidence in support thereof or such
evidence is clearly, manifestly and
patently insubstantial (Heacock v. NLU,
95 Phil. 553)." (Ganitano v. Secretary of
Agriculture etc., 16 SCRA 543, citing
Pajo v. Ago, G.R. No. L-15414, June 30,
1960; see also, Central Bank v. Cloribel,
44 SCRA 307, 317; Macatangay vs. Sec.
of Public Works, 17 SCRA 31, citing
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821,
Nov. 29,1963; Bachrach Transportation
v. Camunayan, 18 SCRA 920 citing
cases: Santos v. Sec. of Public Works, 19
SCRA 637; Atlas Development Corp. v.
Gozon, 20 SCRA 886; Gravador v.
Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742; Rio y Cia v.
WCC, 20 SCRA 1196)."
In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown through
the laying down of concrete factual foundations that the
respondents' questioned acts were done with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
At the outset, the parties in their various pleadings discuss
issues, although ostensibly legal, actually require the
Court to make findings of fact. It is long settled, by law and
jurisprudence, that the Court is not a trier of facts.10
Therefore, the only relevant issue to be resolved in this
case is whether or not the remedy sought by the petitioner
in the trial court is in violation of the legal principle of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of
our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts
must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts
of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.11
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,12 we expounded on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the
same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.13
It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions,
such that in Lacap, we also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel
on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where
the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. x x x.14
A. Jurisdiction cannot be the subject of compromise
- Civil Code, Art. 2035
B. Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
C. (1) The civil status of persons;
D. (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
E. (3) Any ground for legal separation;
F. (4) Future support;
G. (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
H. (6) Future legitime. (1814a)
Retroactivity of jurisdiction –
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil
cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.
However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases
cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the
provisions of this Act may be transferred from the
Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of
the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the
administrative procedure of transferring the cases
affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.
– A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in
their motion for reconsideration before it, the Court of
Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of
this Court’s resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC.
The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter.
Contrary to private respondent’s allegation that the matter
was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of
whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still
pending reconsideration when the amendment took effect
on September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its
retroactive application.
The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding,
petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on. The order of
the trial court granting private respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss the complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order
and as such, it was subject to appeal, 5 not a petition for
certiorari. At the time petitioners filed before the appellate
court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day following
their receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial
court denying their Motion for Reconsideration of its
dismissal order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had
become final and executory after the 15th day following
petitioners’ receipt thereof.
=Adherence of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction, once
attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent statute,
unless so provided
CASE: ime and again, We stress that "(t)he rule is that
where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed
to the final determination of the cause is not affected by
new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceeding
in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction
of a court has retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a
case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute." (Bengzon v. Inciong, G.R. Nos. L-48706-07, 91
SCRA 248, 256). We find the aforementioned principle
applicable to the case at bar. To require the private
respondent to file a single suit combining his actions for
illegal dismissal and damages in the NLRC would be to
sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on march 21, 1989, where the same law does
not expressly so provide, or does not intend to operate as
to actions pending before its enactment, hence prejudicial
to the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the
lower court, acting in accordance with the law then
prevailing, has jurisdiction over the claim of damages of
the private respondent.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the
act of the respondent judge in deferring the determination
of the motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the
court until after trial does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
=As a requirement of res judicata
CASE: The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 129829 supporting private respondent's motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata are without cogent
basis. We sustain petitioner's claim that respondent trial
judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he
issued said orders because he thereby traversed the
constitutional precept that "no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law" and that jurisdiction
is vitally essential for any order or adjudication to be
binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for technicality.
Originally, the action for collection of the loan, evidenced
by a promissory note, was only for P100,000.00 but
petitioner claims that as of March 5, 1981, the obligation
was already P429,219.74. It is a cardinal rule that no one
must be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of
another without just cause.
In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028,
the trial court admitted that it did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of private respondents and yet, it held
that it was of no moment as to the dismissal of the case.
We disagree. For the court to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the private respondents as parties to Civil
Case No. 116028, it cannot render any binding decision,
favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss the case with
prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits.7 The controverted orders in Civil Case No.
116028 disregarded the fundamental principles of
remedial law and the meaning and the effect of
jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata,
must be binding, and must be rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a
nullity.
The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case
because the court that rendered the same did not have
the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants therein.
This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it
cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal
may be considered as one without prejudice. 8
Trial courts have the duty to dispose of controversies after
trial on the merits whenever possible. In this case, there
are no indications that petitioner intentionally failed to
prosecute the case. The delay could not be attributed to
its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with diligence, but
jurisdiction could not be acquired over defendants-private
respondents. The sheriff had not yet submitted his return
of the alias summons when the action was precipitately
dismissed by the trial court. These are proven
circumstances that negate the action of respondent judge
that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 has the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits and constitutes a bar
to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 129829. The court
finds that the two questioned orders of the trial court are
irregular, improper, and, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner correctly states that its appeal to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67288 pertaining to the
questioned orders of the trial court is not an adequate
remedy, because petitioner was not able to present
evidence in the trial court. The sole issue involved in this
case is one of jurisdiction, which is appropriate for
resolution by the instant petition.
Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions.
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
contain complete findings of facts on all issues properly
raised before it.
A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision
maybe filed within (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the final order or judgment, and such petition for
reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days
from submission thereon.
Decisions and final orders shall be subject to review on
certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court shall decide
any case on appeal promptly and without the necessity of
placing it upon the regular calendar. Whenever, in any
case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed,
the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court,
whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for
review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate.
Final judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
FINAL ARBITER
CASE: We think not. There is but one Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this Supreme
Court which cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court
remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions.
Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court.
Actions considered in any one of these divisions and
decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same
Tribunal. The two divisions of this court are not to be
considered as two separate and distinct courts but as
divisions of one and the same court. In the exact words of
the law which is questioned, "the Supreme Court shall, as
a body, sit in banc, but it may sit in divisions . . . ." (See
generally 15 C. J., 869, citing authorities.)
The Legislature has merely attempted to regulate the
organization of the court in a way not prohibited by any
constitutional provision. The constitution of divisions has
been permitted for convenience and the prompt dispatch
of business. The provisions in no way involves the
question of jurisdiction.
We are not without some Philippine authority serving to
clarify the distinction which should be drawn between an
attempt of the Legislature to diminish the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, which must always be resisted, and an
attempt of the same Legislature to pass laws relating to
the judicial organization, practice, and procedure, which
must ordinarily be confirmed. For instance, in the case of
the United States vs. Canent [1914], 28 Phil., 317), the
appellant contended that section 4 of Act No. 2041, as
amended, providing for the assignment by the respective
judge of the district to the justice of the peace in provincial
capitals, of certain specified cases originally cognizable
by said Court of First Instance, was unconstitutional in that
it diminished the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, in
violation of the Organic Act. This court, however, held that
"the provisions mentioned do not diminish or curtail the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance by the facts of
authorizing him to assign the trial of such cases to the
justice of the peace of the capital of the province in order
that this latter officer, sharing the former's powers, may
act in his stead, especially in the cases limitedly specified
by law, and relieve the Court of First Instance from the
duty of attending to them so that its attention may not be
diverted from the more serious and important cases that
come before it." The court further of this country has
merely made use of the power and authority conferred
upon it by the said section 9 of the Act of Congress called
the Philippine Bill." Again, when the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2347 reorganizing the Courts of First
Instance, this was held to be a proper exercise nor
diminished authority because the law neither increased
nor diminished jurisdiction. (Conchada vs. Director of
Prisons [1915], 31 Phil., 94.) Again, when in quo warranto
proceedings the Supreme Court was called upon to
consider section 7 of the same Judicial Reorganization
Act, fixing the qualifications of judges of first instance and
especially providing that every judge of the Courts of First
Instance shall case to be such on the completion of the
sixty-fifth year of his age, the court held that this section
was valid and did not contravene the act of a superior
power. The contention that any Act of the Philippine
Legislature repugnant to Act No. 136 was as null and void
as though in conflict with the Philippine Bill, was refuted.
The court found that Congress had not legislated on the
question of qualifications of judges of the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands to such an extend as to
exclude the Philippine Legislature from that field. (Chanco
vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) Just as certainly, in our
view of the question, does it seem that Congress has left
untouched the constitution of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, leaving such organization within the
purview of the powers of the local legislature. 1awph!l.net
We hold that the Philippine Legislature had power to enact
law authorizing the Supreme Court to sit either in banc or
in divisions to transact business.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem
judgment is conclusive only between the parties. ... In an
action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case.
First Issue: Validity of the Service of Summons on
Margarita
Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served
with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit
voluntarily to its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over
the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem
or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate
courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper
summons by publication effected through the Department
of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the
trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision
declaring the marriage a nullity.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of
the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person.9
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or
quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15,10 Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.11
Actions in personam12 and actions in rem or quasi in rem
differ in that actions in personam are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the
other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and
seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.13
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the
marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United
States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her
two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines.
Since the petition affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of
summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
The term "personal status" includes family relations,
particularly the relations between husband and wife.14
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-
resident and is not found in the country may be served
with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons
may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2)
by publication and sending a copy of the summons and
order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any
other means the judge may consider sufficient.
An action in personam is an action against a person on
the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the
person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.14
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.15
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the
defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.16
A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in
court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally
served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2)
by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge
thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted
by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court
with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure
proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner is not required, it being
sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
SUMMONS
ection 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses
to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
substituted service
Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes,
the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation and in such places and for such time
as the court may order. (16a)
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out
of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6;
or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than
sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (17a)
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
— When any action is commenced against a defendant
who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines, as under the
preceding section. (18a)
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (23a)
RULE 18
Pre-Trial
Section 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading
has been served and filed, if shall be the duty of the
plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for
pre-trial (5a, R20)
Section 2. Nature and purpose. — The pre-trial is
mandatory. The court shall consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of
a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments
to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the
pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing
the action should a valid ground therefor be found
to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending
the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action. (1a, R20)
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the
pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof,
the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail
the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken
thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and
the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed
to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues
to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified before
trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a, R20)

RULE 8 Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must

specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which
he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set
forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny
only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.
Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and
this shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)

RULE 34

Judgment on the Pleadings

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an

answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may; on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. (1a, R19)

RULE 10 Section 5. Amendment to conform to or

authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if
the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends
of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be
made. (5a)