G.R. No.
L-47448 May 17, 1978 (FIRST DIVISION) which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch
VI, Province of Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO
and DIOSDADO MARAPAO, respondents.
Arcadio D. Fabria and Camilo E. Tamin, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon for petitioner.
Eusebio P. Aquino for private respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing the
information for supposed lack of jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent judge
wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the elemental rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information and that the offense
of serious physical injuries charged in the information had duly vested his court with
jurisdiction. The Court orders the transfer of the case below to another branch of the
Bukidnon court of-first instance, since it is doubtful that the State and offended party
may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from
respondent judge who with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections has
adversely prejudged their case for serious physical injuries as one merely of slight
or less serious physical injuries.
The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed an
information dated October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge, charging the
three private respondents- accused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao and
Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then
and there willfully unlawfully and feloneously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the
twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, by then and there wrestling her to the
ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone at the face
thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES:-
lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width at the
level of the m arch of the face, with contusion and swelling all around the
inflicted area
LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her
weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her
from performing her customary labor for a period of more than thirty days.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held,
much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead,
after "scanning the records of (the) case" and noting that the thereto attached
medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim Lolita Ares would
require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore, 4 "may either be slight or
less serious physical injuries only" contrary to victim's affidavit that she was
incapacitated from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal's
findings as to the prominent sear left on the victim's face as a result "which
considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the information), respondent
judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less
physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of October
27, 1977, stating as his reason that
The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury
case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of
treatment, and not what the victim declares because the same is self-serving.
The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in his
Order of November 16, 1977 denying the same, evaluating the case without having
heard the parties or their witnesses (particularly the physician who issued the
medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and ruling against the
deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception from a reading of
the medical certificate and the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis for the
filing of the information, that
Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a big scar at
the left cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the filing of the charge of serious
physical injuries, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
attending physician certified that what he found was a lacerated wound on
the right side of the face? Clearly, the scar found by the investigating fiscal
could not be the result of the acts imputed to the accused but for some other
cause, for how could the scar be found on the left side when the injury inflicted
was on the right side? (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of
respondent judge's orders.
The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and factual
basis for the information charging serious physical injuries, stating that "(T)hat the
allegations in the Information that a fist-size stone hit the face of Lolita Ares causing
lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the face which considerably deformed her
face (are) not only supported by the medical certificate, but also by the admission of
accused Diosdado Marapao during the pre investigation that he threw a fist-size
stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares and the personal finding of Fiscal Tamin
during the preliminary in. investigation that there is a prominent scar on her face,"
and that the offense as charged falls under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes thereon a penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods and is therefore properly cognizable by respondent judge's
court.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
precipitately dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis of
his totally wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the
medical certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the victim
declares because the same is self-serving."
Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the
victim's declaration as to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious
doubts as to whether the State and the offended party may expect a fair and
impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly with his
erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their case
as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below should
therefore be transferred to another court presided by another judge.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and
void. The case below for serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered
transferred to Branch V of the court of first instance below, and the judge presiding
the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest and to proceed
with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-accused and the trial and
determination of the case on the merits. Let copy of this decision be attached to the
personal record of respondent judge. No pronouncement as to costs.

It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the SO ORDERED.
allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the
evidence presented at the trial,' much less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case without
hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial.

It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would
indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was committed
does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the
allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction attaches to the
person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events,
although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case
had only resulted in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records
when respondent trial judge dismissed the instant case for want of jurisdiction, when
it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused and try him. "

Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with
proper study and circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed
within their court's cognizance and needlessly burdening the appellate courts with
cases such as that at bar which should not have reached us at all in the first
instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the established rule that the information
for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear
the case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser offense was established,
that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is
difficult of comprehension. Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate
had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could corroborate the victim's
testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first been estimated
by him as well as clearify the location of he victim's facial scar.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989 (SECOND DIVISION)
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable
Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City,
raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve. Considering
the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the
Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September
1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best
friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the
morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan)
placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed
from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his
left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated
petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to
be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through
reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently
filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of
age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the
necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to
persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired,
in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with
rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said
carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the
left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused
his untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the
following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE
WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first
and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground
was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2)
issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED
WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE,
AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE
BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary
controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the
term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment"
connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs.
Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation
of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should
be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner
completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the
information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully
unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction
tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or
constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97,
Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15
may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are
two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two
terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of
the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the
design resolve, or determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent
p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of
committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other
hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the
RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey
two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a
person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to
the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may
not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does,
that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with
discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot
his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment,"
it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary
to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act, no crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not
capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine
years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are
presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The
preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as
defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not
therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they
refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a
distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are
indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as
an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below
fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent
act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must
discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a
minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-
offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would reveal
such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction
or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and
"discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra.
However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the
ruling he now invokes, which reads:
 That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore
information that she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law
criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any
the Peñaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the
Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been
pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous
wrong. (Emphasis supplied) perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales
vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
and "discernment." What We meant was that the combined effect of the words
used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the accused WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED
Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September
validly contend that since the information now in question alleged 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the
"discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the merits. No cost.
Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter
signifies activity.
SO ORDERED.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
that the case against him should have first been brought before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). He
submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating
circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the
penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an
original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed
in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a
criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the
offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil.
263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs.
Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same principle applies in construing Section
2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine

exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted

P.D. 1508 has said:

The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider
the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the
penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant
circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006 (EN BANC)
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the
Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining
order) filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General,
respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that
some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their
designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The
President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and
arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and
the Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards
and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned
with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through
broadcast media, announced their grievances against the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale
of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City
intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared
their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet
members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
declaring a state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and
PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in
Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the
afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue
with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the
law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing
them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of
the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended
that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the
Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the
corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent
General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the
soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own
separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an
Information for coup d’etat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F.
Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678,
involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City,
presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-
Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No.
408, 4 as amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are:
(a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National
Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c)
violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct
prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners
herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial
court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall
have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the
AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood
incident be charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67,
96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found
probable cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal
Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended
Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and
dropped the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its
Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the
"doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etatbefore the RTCshould not be
charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat."
The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the
JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that
29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top
brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer
to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of
February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed
in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055
specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are
violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of
these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against
petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected
offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the
additional issue that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has
prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their original petition,
respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them
with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the case to the
General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27,
2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under
questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the
prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged
prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the
prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s
midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the
accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and
asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners
moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order
dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for
lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were
duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on
July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor
Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in
open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of
prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law.
Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known
as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer."
Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these
articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military
law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the
dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing
military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to
duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of
the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal
laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-
accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be
tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be
tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest
of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses
be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down
the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it
provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment,
has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be
tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where
the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected
crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles
are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and
the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar
nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected
offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the
highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war,
but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is
nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look
upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in
enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel,
Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath
as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities
and abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among
others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force
and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation
they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96
of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21
provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the
Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.
(Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-
connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055.
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation
of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
– dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military court.Such penalty
is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession
of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same
has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically
amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-
connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take
away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal,
body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is
only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be
done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find
it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges
before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed Articles 72 to 92:
and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such
declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055)
explicitly specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or
Secretary of National Defense. Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders. Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over
the foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected
crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation
of this case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the
alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court
has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to
military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a
system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
[1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not
allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate
that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not
applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may
question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a
civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or
injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations.
If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to
enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and
discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing
Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form
part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian
supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who
exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles
of War; quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so
sparingly and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of
Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer,
75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the
ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal
charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense
charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055.
Such is not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental
Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are
at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the
dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our
power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the
one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer
involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent
the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings
that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
which they have not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court
martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009 (EN BANC) Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City
Prosecutor filed an Information10 for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING
No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent. Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime
N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment
to the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent’s father-in-law.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case
[Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009 Branch 101 of the RTC.

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal
vs. of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent. an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during
his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
DECISION Sandiganbayan.12

NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45
and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002 1 and the June
23, 20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the
September 18, 20024 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus:
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No.
Q-02-109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. While the
RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment
was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his
office—he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was
the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.14

G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5,
2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.6
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he
stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a
registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that
isn’t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now,
they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to
the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso
price tag.7
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint8 for libel.
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT
BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE
WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS
CASE.16
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner
Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and
televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was
entitled "COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign
against you? Is that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [it’s] not COMELEC funds, [it’s] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly,
according to [c]hargé d’[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it
is what’s been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4
[m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that’s about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?]
[T]hey wouldn’t tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think it’s pretty
obvious.18
Petitioner considered respondent’s statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized
representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if
criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan. 22
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further
assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.25
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on
pure questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF
LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same
parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court, 28 consolidated the cases.29
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of
whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They
are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which
court—the RTC or the Sandiganbayan—has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The
Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost
concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our
current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared
by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is
committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to
try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,34 acknowledged the
unmistakable import of the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed. 35
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in
Bocobo v. Estanislao,36where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial
court even if the libelous act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact that the
phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. 38 In these cases,
and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the
expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus,
in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs.
MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over
libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had
jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent
judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: C

"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING
respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring supplied)40
day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is
lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of
law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Quezon City, Br. 32,41Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare
Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs.
herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for
Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that
damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in over defamations in writing or by similar means.42The grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of
ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued. jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try
written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail
The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character.
by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply
Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of
modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.45
a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691 Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it
does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC. jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court,
therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or
that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the
alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have
petitions.
clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must
be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are
pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and
prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new
and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which
SO ORDERED.
broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring
Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been
priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was
categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The
inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of
criminal libel.

Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the
proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:

"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,

DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.

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G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004 (FIRST DIVISION)
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioner’s – (1) motion to
quash the information; and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002
Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5, 2003
Order2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair
competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual
Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and
places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the
registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI
Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinson’s Galleria,
EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR
products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and
paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or
designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the
buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior
adopter, user and owner of the following internationally: "CATERPILLAR",
"CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING
MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch;
and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to
charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial
court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and
motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He contended
that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of imprisonment for
unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioner’s twin
motions.6 A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5,
2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are – (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent
Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of – (a) the
existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false
designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2
to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions
imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five
(5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who
is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155
[Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and
civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before
the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus –
 SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. – All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and
166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate
jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166
(The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) –
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. – All actions under this Chapter
[V – Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be
brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed
by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads –
SEC. 239. Repeals. – 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act
No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code;
Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety,
otherwise, it would not have used the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent
herewith;" and it would have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended;
Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all doubts that said specific
laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases "parts of
Acts"and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No.
8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would
have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between
a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a
special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law
to Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8 conferring
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court.
They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9 Hence,
jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged
with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less
than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to
P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations
of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-
11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as
Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a
Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code
and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner finds no application
in the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No.
166 was repealed by R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling
therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual property rights is
lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on the repeal
of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the enactment of
the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a
jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a
prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003
order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons,
however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to
comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-
41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial
question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section
3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition
under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted13 by
private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides –
 SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases –
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(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
(Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his
discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted
before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his
motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the
burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that
the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges
must prove his allegations.

In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not
established that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his
failure to attach documents relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the
petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with

requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service
thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated
as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution,
or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are
referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.

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