MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCo
mmonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade
and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further,
PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have
lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.

ANG TIBAY v. CIR (HENRY)

February 27, 1940 | Laurel, J. | Procedural Due Process

PETITIONER: Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio Teodoro, et al.

RESPONDENTS: The Court of Industrial Relations, et al.

SUMMARY: Ang Tibay allegedly ran low of leather supplies and are unable to
commit to the Philippine Army enough leather products. This lead to the owner,
Teodoro, to decide to lay off some of its employees. All being part of NLU, they
filed against Teodoro with unfair labor practice as ground, they were alleging that
NWB was being unjustly favored as nobody from them was laid off. The CIR
ruled in favor of Teodoro, however the NWB appealed to the SC, who affirmed
the decision. There was then a motion for a new trial filed by NLU with new and
solid evidence that made the SC grant their motion in the light of procedural due
process.
 DOCTRINE: The Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements but it does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative case.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Ang Tibay, a leather company, experienced shortage of leather

soles on 1938, making it necessary for Toribio Teodoro (owner) to
temporarily lay off some of its employees (who in this case, apparently are
members of the National Labor Union Inc.).

2. The NLU claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unfair labor practices because
Teodoro is discriminating against the NLU and is unjustly favoring the
National Workers’ Brotherhood (company/employer union dominated by
him) because nobody from NWB was included in those laid off.

3. Aggrieved, the employees filed a case against Ang Tibay to the CIR, alleging
it of unfair labor practice, that Teodoro’s claim of shortage of leather is
entirely falseand unsupported by records of the BOC and the Books of
Accounts, and was only in fact a scheme to discharge members of the NLU
from work. CIR ruled in favor of NLU.

4. By appeal to the SC, the ruling was reversed after the SC found that there was
no merit to NLU’s contention.

5. NLU then prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the SC with the
following claims, among others:
a. That Teodoro’s claim of shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY is
entirely false and unsupported
b. Shortage of leather materials was but a scheme to systematically
discharge all members of NLU from work
c. NWB is dominated by Teodoro

6. NLU hence filed for a Motion for New Trial, with which Ang Tibay filed an
opposition for. Hence, this motion.

ISSUE/s:

2. WoN NLU was denied due process by the CIR. – YES

RULING: Motion for new trial granted, case is remanded to the CIR with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
RATIO:

1. Cir is a special court whose functions are stated in CA No. 103. It is more of
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive, as far as issues are concerned with employers
and laborers, landlords and tenants, among others.

2. Its duty is to prevent or arbitrate disputes which are submitted to the Secretary
of Labor which are to be dealt by the Court for the sake of public interest,
which is possible through reconciliation of parties and/or inducing them to
settle by amicable agreement.

3. SC had the occasion to point out that CIR is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and CA No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable.

4. However, this does not entail that CIR is free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements most specially the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings:
a. Right to a hearing
b. Tribunal must consider evidence presented
c. Decision must have something to support itself
d. Evidence must be substantial
e. Decision must be based on evidence presented at a hearing
f. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act n its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
g. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render to
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered

5. Since there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to
failure to receive all relevant evidence, the motion for a new trial was granted.
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with the NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR,
BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO ALMARIO
and DOMINGO LEANO, defendants-appellants.
108 SCRA 16
FACTS:

Liwayway Publications, Inc brought an action in the CFI Manila against Permanent
Concrete Workers Union for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and for damages
it incurred when its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint
from its bodega. Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sub lessee of a part of the premises
of Permanent Concrete Products, a first lessee of Don Ramon Roces. The premises
between the parties are separated by concrete and barbed wire fence with its own
entrance and road leading to the national road.

The employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who are representatives
and members of the defendant union declared a strike against their company. For
unknown reasons and without legal justification, PCWU and its members picketed,
stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from
its bodega. The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the
employees who were in the truck. Then, union members stopped and prohibited the
general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the
plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega.

Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten
its employees with bodily harm and not to blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from
getting newsprint in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give in
to the demands of the plaintiffs which Liwayway rented another bodega and incurred
expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from pier to the
temporary bodega.

ISSUE:
May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?

HELD:
The business of the appellee is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag,
Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or
connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company,
much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. The appellee is a third
party or an "innocent by-stander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled
to protection by the regular courts.

-The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase
of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot
be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is,
however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize
the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute,
including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no
industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus,
the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or `innocent bystanders' if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor
dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court,
we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a
feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute.
Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found other than their being
situated in the same premises. It is to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful
picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a
picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor
dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of
the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were
located.

-On appeal, the Supreme Court in upholding the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction, ruled that: (a) there is no connection between the
appellee, the appellant union and the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and the fact,
that the latter and appellee are situated in the same premises, can hardly be considered
as interwoven with the labor dispute pending with the Court of Industrial Relations; and
(b) the acts of the striking union are mere acts of trespass for which the lessee shall have
a direct action against the trespasser.

Benjamin Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

59 SCRA 54 – Political Law – Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde
Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop
agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the
membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a
member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming
that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a
member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any
labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU
which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-
membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close
shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s
legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member
may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the
factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to
join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to
join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a
contractual right.

Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal

Protection Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One

Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing
 and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views
on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only

after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted
from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of
the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged,
sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care
to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation,
no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
 Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement.
It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of
the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.