SECOND DIVISION Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
[G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010] A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn's
marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at
that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been
gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to
Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito's marriage was arranged and they were married on
March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan. Without any means to support themselves,
Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito's parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito's relatives as household help. Angelito, on the
other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn's efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has
since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above
historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred
with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff
because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence
and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became
very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the
parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents
of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these
declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern
before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is there
any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn's testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the respondent
is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This
disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her, the
petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last
paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had
already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent('s) immature,
irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship.
His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality
Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring,
concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and
appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and became manifest thereafter
due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you
explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered marriage
apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not
detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder
do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the wedding
or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, ma'am."
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)? nothing person.[4]
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states: [5]
on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder. Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)? ANGELITO D. SUAZO
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind of GENERAL DATA
disorder (sic). [This pertains to Jocelyn's]
Court: BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)? xxxx
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic). Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest
Court: among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)? gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even shouted involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering
at them for no apparent reason (sic). and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
Court: TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)? Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so that it
A. Yes, sir. does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly
Court: in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)? containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic). environment.
Court: She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she
Q. How was the petitioner tortured? had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic). is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in
Court: order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable? coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
A. Yes, sir. REMARKS :
Court: [Already cited in full in the psychologist's testimony quoted above][6]
Q. Why did you know? The Office of the Solicitor General - representing the Republic of the Philippines - strongly opposed the
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that
of personality affect the other party (sic). the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.
Court: THE RTC RULING
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)? The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of alcohol, While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to
significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment
petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
who took sustainance of the vices. (sic) excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner? a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39,
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he need is 1988 ed.)
to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic). The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to
Court: one thing - that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the
Q. What are the vices? contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the former's being
A. Alcohol and gambling. irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all - a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to
Court: bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation? messy days, to leave the respondent.
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she
was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latter's niece (sic) and
because they were living with her husband's family, she was obliged to do the household chores - an
indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husband's
family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their
marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The
petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent
blamed the petitioner's family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist' testimony quoted above] would only
tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only
grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA
198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar
(sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has
been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation
and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered
wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a
grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of
her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering
petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious
anti-social behavior of herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and
Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes
of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however,
the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to
be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself,
the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically
incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an
underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and
it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material
support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got
from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due
simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca
vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the
part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not
under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and
more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining
characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the
petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be
extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of
the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks
to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are
convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on
the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in
declaring the marriage null and void - Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v.
Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner
has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-Ã -vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to give
the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36
though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would
make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties
which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic
nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with
discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and
the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological
incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it
is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract
concept - psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage -
without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law
based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the
reasoning that the court's interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of
the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b)
requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony
and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the
Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases - involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code - that came to us were invariably decided
based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples
of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [18] Te thus assumes it a basic
premise thatthe law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos' doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon
Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court's judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled
that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating
children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept
should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that,
following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Te's lead
when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and
to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be
too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that
there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by
a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by
the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also
noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family
Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the
most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [25] It is
not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos' juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos' continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn's evidence insufficient to establish Angelito's psychological incapacity to
perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on
record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate
court's appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn's presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Angelito's alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's
testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course
be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court
must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid
and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory
requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances
given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party's
complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party's
close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows
flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report
or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this
is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological
incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist's report and testimony simply provided a
general description of Angelito's purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito's personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito
has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early
developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with
any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew
up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist's own equivocation on this point -
she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The
veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed knowledge of
Angelito's family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelito's
personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito's awareness of and
his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of
psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn's cause.
b. Jocelyn's Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist's testimony
impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn's testimony, to find out whether she provided the court
with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito's psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him - all of
which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs
of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at
the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the
marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place - whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or
years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related
jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not,
by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede
that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our
finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn's
account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the
requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly
and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court
in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn's main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in
this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to
the facts and the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 155800 : March 10, 2006]
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed
into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit
to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims
any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years
of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila
City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the
boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's parentage
when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of
her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales
of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters
to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who
wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized
that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not
known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired
it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He
tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed
that respondent's persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached
the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all
the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories,
told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David's
act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not
fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos
was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter
in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her
husband's whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly
budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends,
were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to
lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling
was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that
only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient
to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC
to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because
the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did
not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial
question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards
set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case
at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there
was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse
was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36
of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained
as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2)
of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on
consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted
the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights
and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that
this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to
the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only
voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the
marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the
Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity
"is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of
Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by
this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity
of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone,
the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from
this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion
of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that
the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was
derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages
already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to
disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article
36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the
interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of
this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial
of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the
State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent
of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions
for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally'subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the
petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great
weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.
Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough.
Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by
expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of
things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?cralawlibrary
A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of
love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities
of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of
the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?cralawlibrary
A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis
on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that
is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then;
but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband
is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform
the basic obligations of the marriage?cralawlibrary
A - Yes, Ma'am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent,
but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that
[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the
trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these
witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient
basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's
psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She
practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of
the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity,
as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according
to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3)
vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse.
In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts
to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage
in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that
a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective
and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of
the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of
the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent
made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with
a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on
the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this
case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the
appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to
make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued
to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent's condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is incurable? It
would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10
August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing
the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at
its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's
opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not
clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration
of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose
only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not
apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of
that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there
would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need
to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity
of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a
case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we
are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established
by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals,
which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was
warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185286 : August 18, 2010]
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON REYES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other
hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a
marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very
reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless
partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
89761[2] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854.[3]
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines
(UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one
university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted
to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.[4] Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home
together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent's style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other
couples their age who were restricted by a university student's budget. At that time, respondent held a job in
the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner's good impression of the respondent was not
diminished by the latter's habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the
UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the
Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner's graduation and her father's death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the
Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent's family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondent's parents, and the couple's respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further,
respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the
respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family
business. Respondent's game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his
young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that
the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from
her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner
struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent's business
floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family's financial woes and further
straining the parties' relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to
remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner's
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as
well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the
newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with
nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent's fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent
came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of
respondent's business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not
only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked
respondent's gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially
for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their
family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties' marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner
for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that
she had had enough of respondent's lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the
recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner
approached respondent's siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her
rope. Yet, even respondent's siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent's elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter
group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions
with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties' relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist's recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent's siblings, told respondent to move out of
their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent's relationship with
his children.
Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
the respondent, alleging the latter's psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner's allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family--both as a spouse
to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court
ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop's Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared
null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already
of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies,
are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of
Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties,
the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no
properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued
by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where
the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and
Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the
respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage.
Taking exception to the trial court's rulings, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court,
agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties' marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to
affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order
dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.[7]
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I xxxx
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES
PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON
IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY
ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A
TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY
VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO
CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8]
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab
initio on the ground of both parties' psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence
obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and
Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely
to the Court on a case to case basis.
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in
conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of
the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and
Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between
the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to
the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in
relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render
help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the
respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent's impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or
powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same
as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he
was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the
respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also
requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed
by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage
between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder
of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing
wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed.
Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be
harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized
person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the
respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on
their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a
pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological
incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful
and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to
any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the
funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court
finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in
paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots
and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to
sustain.[9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court
diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-Ã -vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality
Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno
found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-
social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may
place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical
psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are
"unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayan's personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information
gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the
[respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give
regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo's findings regarding the [respondent's] alleged mixed
personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial
support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner's] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult
[petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. [Respondent's] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to
live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner]
admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary
in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent]
resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business
ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation,
Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas' Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only
after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment
be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04
December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent
at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
While [petitioner's] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36
should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of
the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.[10]
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling that
the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision
declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors
characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2)
juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[12]
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder,
to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community
services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern
came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing,
sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not
permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This
trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense
of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity
predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less
of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem
and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for
more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic).
She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of
being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondent's] shortcomings, the
bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved,
unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic), where
there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged
as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he
manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high
intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit",
attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no
remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure
for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family
employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with
each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face
which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense
of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with
emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision
to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions
especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss
of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways,
such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed
to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on
himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in
his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as
pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong
masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do
so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical
evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with
strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized
by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult
behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive
of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are
external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the
unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments
to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness,
unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His
narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and
stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development,
and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree,
because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustments. (emphasis supplied)[13]
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]'s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them,
respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life.
He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His
brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see
that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing.
They wish that he'd be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the
breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]'s brothers learned from friends that
[petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen.
She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His
brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had
been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the
moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that
he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person
but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of
people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he'd rather be
submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make
other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and
as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt
to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his
tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner.
He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does
not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of
companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this
feeling. [Respondent's] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated
insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people.
Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still
tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety.
He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many
plans but he can't accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of
hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to
give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning - Fair (Emphasis supplied)[14]
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner's] case history and from her psychological assessment, and
despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this
marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial
personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and
irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere,
and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this
explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long
to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse's immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondent's] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken
cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent's] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared]
by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondent's] mother grew up believing that she was not her mother's
favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondent's] mother's reaction to her perceived
rejection was to act out--with poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had
terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent's] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks
and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people
wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he
borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that
he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent's] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to
Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g.
he would just "come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g.
felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally
exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy
(e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.)
The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and
verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested
by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing
things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and
aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality
disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)[15]
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno
and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior
of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the
other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties'
marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their
marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent's pattern of behavior which she could
then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists' and psychiatrist's assessment were not based solely on the narration
or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent's own son, siblings and in-laws,
and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent's behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.[17] These were also used as the basis of
the doctors' assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV),[19] instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of
the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15
years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic
episode.[20]
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person
based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will
not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the
doctors' separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan's findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for
therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and
Saddock's textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,[21] treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan's
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondent's psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.[22] As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her
separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:[23]
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the
person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
... [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several
failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist's or psychiatrist's diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist's or psychiatrist's finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is
valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties' or both parties' psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert's opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25] we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive
list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[27] must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article
36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn
between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by
psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were
made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from
making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of his conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts' conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following
clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and
ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy,
running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that
patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it
seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress
observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to
any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is,
they appear to lack a conscience.[28]
In the instant case, respondent's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a
job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner's purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CA's ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest
only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration
of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner's] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform
to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas' finding that
[petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of
[petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere,
and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas' psychiatric report, it was stated that
[petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner's] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within
the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.[29]
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate
statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:[30]
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample
basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761
is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 161793 : February 13, 2009]
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, v. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our
laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however,
with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the
concept was formulated free in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition
further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged
decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowena's close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena.
That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree
of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward's P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle's house and Edward to his parents' home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
with Rowena at her uncle's place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle's place where Edward was treated like a prisoner he
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter
not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that
they should stay at their parents' home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however,
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father
about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward
must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena's uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. 10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter's
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. 12 In the meantime, on
July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to
appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. 13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there
was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. 14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at
Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He
is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the
grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are
also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are
said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales
Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet
and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by
being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he
only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said
to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to
that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they
should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week
of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat
going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner
was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner's parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to
go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to
be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he
went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does
not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at
this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed
to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent's uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on
that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner.
But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner
was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened
that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family.
Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for
him at his parents[Û¥] and relatives[Û¥] houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and
he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving
him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioner's parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would
only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties['] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He
was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with
herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach's Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an
introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with
other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is
seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a
rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way
out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to
marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere
and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave,
severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on
the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and
set aside the trial court's ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements
stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the
required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG's reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari . On June 15, 2005,
the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent's psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties' psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound
by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies
of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or
clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article
36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter
dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce
in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds:
(a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding
joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as'
'a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.'
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people
as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and
also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the
two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State.
Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
'(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
'Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'
'Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.'
xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of
marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father
Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man
who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit
with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have
found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even
before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity
of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop
Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is:
"Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but
Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice
Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted
spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which
stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from
the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open
to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf
from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3.
(those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to
their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and
void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087
(the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to
be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed
such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of
the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing,
it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the
Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases
of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment
of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41This interpretation is, in
fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the
second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the
incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an
ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that
they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract,
viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent
because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent
as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an
object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not
with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a
free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent
he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with
respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand
as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are
there sexual anomalies that are purely so - that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of
the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so
that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant
that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which
are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity
itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage
freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot
fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken
by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to
posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under
such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line
of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible
compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances,
lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true
that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely
possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies;
his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the
exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through
this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on
the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such
persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference
between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a
person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of
the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited,
supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming
the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations
of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some
anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the
intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the
impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself
in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.
xxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable
of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties
is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the
other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact
that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the
very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good
of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A
spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person
who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have
understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities
is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment
of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question
of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one
speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in
fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as
regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others
feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually
present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order
to achieve one's ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the
right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good
of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable,
may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in
which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage - that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations.
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of
marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous
ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer
not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent
because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with
the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage
because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by
the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to
the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the
person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is
found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one's consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of
this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in
the development of the habit, while one accepts as given one's psychic constitution. It would seem then that
the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of
freedom.42
Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court's judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on
the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals,
ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally' subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other'shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court's membership concurred in the ponencia of
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result"
and another three including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero took pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on 'all fours'
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge
of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to
fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage
to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a
would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter's disorder recurring in their
marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner's behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent's, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming
or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of
the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or
sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into."58 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62Parenthetically,
the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a
court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological
state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties'
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced
the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders'to repeat, dependent personality
disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows'
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person's recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or
old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is
the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some
individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other
people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems.
Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely,
isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality
types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages
of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low
cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression
and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major
clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for
other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific
personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be
long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner'
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others' comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make
most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows'
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of
others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to
control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are
prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others
may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others
being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties' psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial
court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses' deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding
takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand
of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did
not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged
non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended
to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the
parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his
side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without
trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily
due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders,
such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual
intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however,
that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void
may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have
sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering
from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent;
that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with
her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover
what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that
there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120
Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled
self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest
in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship
with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that:
they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to
her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to
come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her
for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a
total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera
as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force
and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is
illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted
by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However,
as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that
may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and
the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file
his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of
the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of
nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired
during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship
between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in
order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in
this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50
and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed
for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family
Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes
of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to
remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution
of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had
earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once
again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and
held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court
a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the
152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is
valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that,
even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested
that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the
declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is
valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because
the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested
that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the
family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for
the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both
parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed.
And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy
could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly,
quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is
filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of
Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members
of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge
Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would
not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of
possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition
as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for
"the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the
following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved
and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in
bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration
of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first
marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992
and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of
his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of
Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June
25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed
upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing
the following Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution
based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code),
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED