FLSCU1 (2) 7QJ (9QJ) Spurious Warnings on A318,

A319 and A320 pre-mod 155636

ATA: 28-46 FIN: 7QJ Ref: 28.46.00.009

9QJ
A/C Type: A318 A/C Serie: Potential Line First Issue 01-MAR-
A319 Impact: Maintenance Date: 2005
A320
Part 3530000-1 Key Last 08-JUN-
Number: 3540000-1 Information: Publication 2018
B539AAM0307 Date:
SIC5059-14-20
30042-0000-
0501
30042-0000-
0401
SIC5059-04-
0106
SIC5059-04-
0107
SIC5059-04-
0206
SIC5059-11-
0206
SIC5059-11-
0207
SIC5059-13-10
SIC5059-13-20
B539AAM0206
Supplier: EATON Solution
LIMITED Benefit:
GOODRICH
SENSORS AND
GE AVIATION
Linked TFU Linked SB 28-
Articles: 28.00.00.040 Documentation: 1168
TFU SB 28-
28.00.00.056 1169
SB 28-
1177
SB 28-
1902
VSB
SIC5059-
28-470
Linked FAIR- Status: Open
ISP:
 Engineering Support
Fault Code/ECAM Warning: FUEL LEVEL SENSING First Issue Date: 01-MAR-2005
FLSCU2 9QJ
FUEL LEVEL SENSING
FLSCU1 7QJ
Model: Last Publication Date: 08-JUN-2018
Manufacturer:
Status: Open

Issue Description
A320 family operators pre-common gauging (MOD 155635 and MOD155636)
experience a significant number of fault messages "Fuel Level Sensing FLSCU1 (2) 7QJ
(9QJ)". These messages are not associated with a particular standard of Fuel Quantity
Indication (FQIC) or Fuel Level Sensing and Control Unit computer (FLSCU). However the
latest FQIC and FLSCU standard are less affected. These faults are identified as class 1
faults and are identified to the flight crew.
Airbus' analysis has shown that the majority of the faults appear in flight phase 2. The
faults are detected during the Fuel Level Sensing System (FLSS) BITE at power up, and
stored in the FQIC memory until flight phase 2, at which time they are transferred to the
PFR. The remaining occurs in flight phase 5 or 6.
Consequence
If all FLSCU failure messages are considered as spurious and no troubleshooting is
carried out, genuine FLSCU or level sensor faults may be missed.
Investigation Status
Aircraft testing completed identified that the aircraft did not have SB 28-1029 embodied.
This SB improves the Low Level warning system by moving a level sensor from outer cell
at rib 21 to inner cell rib 02. For repetitive FLSCU faults confirm if this SB has been
embodied.
Two other in-service aircraft that had a high level of FLSCU fault messages were also
tested. These aircraft had FLSCU1(2) 7QJ(9QJ) fault messages biased towards one
FLSCU. Investigations showed on both aircraft one level sensor, associated with the
biased FLSCU, was indicating failed. This message could then be cleared by performing
the FLSS commanded BITE. This did not correctly identify the failed level sensor. The
associated FLSCU TSD indicated 1E(2E) on the grid.
The failed level sensors were tested, and it was identified that there was high resistance
between the terminal on the level sensor and the mounting pillars. Airbus are continuing
to investigate the causes of failures of the level sensors, but would need further samples
of failed level sensors to confirm common failure modes and identify any product
improvements.
It is also identified that the dual FLSCU1 (7QJ) and FLSCU2 (9QJ) failures are related to a
short interruption and then re-initialisation of the FLSCU BITE. This causes the FLSCU
BITE to fail, leading to failures of both FLSCU 1 and 2 being reported in flight phase 02.

.Maintenance Information
Spurious FLSCU faults can be considered as faults that do not occur regularly, and which
affect both FLSCU 1 and FLSCU 2 at the same time. On A321 aircraft it is normal that
both FLSCU's are reported as failed with a number of associated level sensors.
If FLSCU fault messages are occurring regularly and biased towards one FLSCU, this is
symptomatic of at least one level sensor failure and the following troubleshooting should
be done.
TEST 1:
(a) Before refuelling take the FQIC Discrete Input, ref AMM Task 28-42-00-740-003
"Interrogation of the FQIS Input Parameters Pages".
(b) Check state of level sensors (ref sub task 28-42-00-740-058) against the required
state for the actual fuel quantity in the fuel tank. Refer to TSM 28-46-00 Page Block 301
for these fuel levels.
(c) Repeat step (a) and (b) following refuel.
(d) If any level sensor is indicating the wrong state for the fuel level it indicates the level
sensor or level sensor circuit has failed, and should be replaced.
TEST2:
(a) Refuel each inner tank between 1800 and 1850kg;
(b) Perform a FQIS BITE and check the state of underfull (24QJ1/2) and full (23QJ1/2)
level sensors (as per sub task 28-42-00-740-058)
(c) If the full and underfull sensors indicate the wrong state, it may be caused by an
incorrect wiring between these two sensors.Check sensors' wiring as per ASM 28-46-03
sch 03.
Refer to TSM 28-46-00-810-818 - FLSCU1(2) 7QJ(9QJ) for A318/A319/A320 aircraft.
Repercussion on A/C Dispatch
N/A
Solution
The latest FQIC standard of software for the A318/A319/A320, which is the xx-20
standard, has been completed and this standard of software has now been introduced on
in service aircraft by the SIC5059-14-20 from the end of 2007 (ref SB A320-28-1168)
and by the SIC5059-13-20 (ref SB A320-28-1177).
For A318/A319/A320 aircraft, FLSCU faults associated with BITE interruption has been
addressed in the latest standard of FQIC software xx-31 available through SB 28-1215.
For the A321, which are installed with the Goodrich FQIC, the latest Software standard is
Stage 08 Software. Analysis has shown that average rate of FLSCU faults on A321
aircraft is low (<30/1000 FC). Currently no modification is planned to the Goodrich FQIC
software in relation to this issue. Please refer also to ISI 28.46.00009
TSM tasks have been updated to provide recommendations on actions if there are FLSCU
faults biased towards one of the FLSCU's.
Relevant Documentation
AMM 28-42-00-740-003 ; AMM 28-42-00-740-003 ; AMM 28-42-00-740-003 ; AMM 28-
42-00-740-003 ; AMM 28-46-00-740-001 ; AMM 28-46-00-740-001 ; AMM 28-46-00-
740-001 ; AMM 28-46-00-740-001 ; TSM 28-46-00 ; TSM 28-46-00 ; TSM 28-46-00 ;
TSM 28-46-00

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