3c Col Digests PDF

3C | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY.
ARIS GULAPA 1
CONFLICT OF LAWS ABACAN, CLA

AGUILA, TRICIA
JALANDONI, JANINA NADENE
KOGA, KEN
ALCANTARA, FRANCIS LAIDAN, KRISTOFFER
ALCANTARA, REGINE ANDREI LAZARO, PHOEBE ANN
CASE DIGESTS
BAUTISTA, PEARL CHARISSE LOMOTAN, JONATHAN JOSEPH
BELLO, CRISTINA MARIE LUCIDO, LE IRIS
CAMIÑA, GERARD MARTIN LUMANOG, ERLAINE
CARANDANG, NINA HERSCHELICA MADAMBA, AYAH CRISTINA
CARIÑO, MARIANNE MAGPANTAY, REGINE EMPRESS
CARINGAL, KRISTIA LORRAINE MANUEL, KAREN KAYE
CHING, MARIA ADELA MESINA, MARI JANINE EVAN
CLEMENTE, CHRISTINE PRESBITERO, JULIAN SANTOS
CONSUNJI, PENNY RELLOSA, RASHY
DEVESA, VAN LEE REYES, JOSEPH
ESPIRITU, DAYNE SANTOS, JJ
ESQUIVIAS, MA. CARMELA SEVILLA, TONI LOU
EVANGELISTA, CARLO SOLIMAN, NELLAINE
FARCON, JOSE FLORINIO SOLLANO, MIKAELLA
GARCIA, CESAR DOMINI TUAZON, LARA KARINA
GRAIDO, HELEN MAUREEN YAO, AISLYN
GRANTOZA, CAMILLE
HABANA, GABRIEL
HERNANDEZ, JASON
3C
2012-2013
nd
2 SEMESTER
ABACAN, AGUILA, ALCANTARA F, ALCANTARA R, BAUTISTA, BELLO, CAMIÑA, CARANDANG, CARIÑO, CARINGAL, CHING, CLEMENTE, CONSUNJI, DEVESA, ESPIRITU, ESQUIVIAS, EVANGELISTA,
FARCON, GARCIA, GRAIDO, GRANTOZA, HABANA, HERNANDEZ, JALANDONI, KOGA, LAIDAN, LAZARO, LOMOTAN, LUCIDO, LUMANOG, MADAMBA, MAGPANTAY, MANUEL, MESINA, PRESBITERO,
RELLOSA, REYES, SANTOS, SEVILLA, SOLIMAN, SOLLANO, TUAZON, YAO.
3C | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. ARIS GULAPA 2
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 4. The orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted departure from
established jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction in is the orders complained of]
1. SWEET LINES INC. V. TEVES
[Claims of Tandog and Tiro:
Facts: Respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, bought tickets for
1. Condition No. 14 is not valid, since the same is not an essential element of the
Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, Sweet Lines Inc.,
contract of carriage, being in itself a different agreement which requires the mutual
a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan
consent of the parties to it
de Oro City. Tandog and Tiro were to board Sweet Lines’ vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope"
2. They had no say in its preparation, the existence of which they could not refuse,
bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu.
hence, they had no choice but to pay for the tickets and to avail of Sweet Lines’
shipping facilities out of necessity
Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol (since many passengers
3. The carrier "has been exacting too much from the public by inserting impositions in
were bound for Surigao), Tandog and Tiro, per advice, went to the branch office for
the passage tickets too burdensome to bear," that the condition which was printed in
proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said vessel was already filled to
fine letters is an imposition on the riding public and is not binding, citing - while venue
capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection
of actions may be transferred from one province to another, such arrangement
of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard."
requires the "written agreement of the parties", not to be imposed unilaterally]
Tandog and Tiro alleged that they were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and
Held: There was a valid contract of carriage entered into by Sweet Lines and Tandog
the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits during the trip and that the tickets
and Tiro. Furthermore, the passage tickets are the best evidence thereof. All the
they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were
essential elements of a valid contract (consent, cause or consideration and object)
constrained to pay for other tickets. Hence, they sued Sweet Lines for damages and
are present.
for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before CFI of
Misamis Oriental.
Whenever a passenger boards a ship for transportation from one place to another, he
is issued a ticket by the shipper, which has all the elements of a written contract: (1)
Sweet Lines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue based
the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger
on the condition printed at the back of the tickets:
boards the ship and the shipper consents or accepts him in the ship for
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the
transportation; (2) cause or consideration which is the fare paid by the passenger as
conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed
stated in the ticket; (3) object, which is the transportation of the passenger from the
in the competent courts in the City of Cebu.
place of departure to the place of destination which are stated in the ticket.
The motion was denied. MR was filed but was also denied. Hence, this instant
However, in this case, with respect to the 14 conditions printed at the back of the
petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging that the respondent judge
passage tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity
Teves has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial preoceeding" and
and/or enforceability of which will have to be determined by the peculiar
"had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or in gross abuse of
circumstances obtaining in each case and the nature of the conditions or terms
discretion.
sought to be enforced.
Issue: May a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru a
Generally, stipulations in a contract come about after deliberate drafting by the
condition printed at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions
parties. However, there are certain contracts almost all the provisions of which have
arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a particular province or
been drafted only by one party. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion,
city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all others?
because the only participation of the other party is the signing of his signature or his
'adhesion'. Insurance contracts, bills of lading, contracts of make of lots on the
[Claims of Sweet Lines:
installment plan fall into this category.
1. Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since Tandog and Tiro acceded to it
when they purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro branch office and took
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into, in
its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to Tagbilaran, Bohol
which the other party, in this case, the passengers, who are made to adhere thereto
2. The condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue
on the "take it or leave it" basis, certain guidelines in the determination of their validity
may be validly waived
and/or enforceability have been formulated for justice and fair play.
3. Condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory, the words and phrases "any and
all", "irrespective of where it is issued," and "shag" leave no doubt that the intention of
In recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the protection of the
Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of other
disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code: Art. 24. In all contractual
places
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the
of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental weakness, tender age and suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental will not cause inconvenience or prejudice Sweet
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. Lines.
In line with that, the court ruled that Condition No. 14 should be held as void Public policy is that principle of the law, which holds that no subject or citizen can
and unenforceable for the following reasons: lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good. Under this principle, the freedom of contract or private dealing is
1. Under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not restricted by law for the good of the public.
just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the
back of the passage tickets. Petition for prohibition was dismissed.
There is an acute shortage in inter-island vessels plying between the country's Separate Opinions
several islands, and with that, the facilities they offer leave much to be desired, thus,
passengers literally scramble to whatever accommodations may be availed of, even BARREDO, J., concurring: Although, agreements regarding change of venue are
through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their safety and this was precisely the enforceable, there may be instances where for equitable considerations and in the
experience of Tandog and Tiro. Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and better interest of justice, a court may justify the laying of the venue in the place fixed
proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets for conditions that may be by the rules instead of following written stipulation of the parties. I take it that the
printed much charge them with having consented to the conditions, so printed, importance that a stipulation regarding change of the venue fixed by law entails is
especially if there are a number of such conditions in fine print, as in this case. such that nothing less than mutually conscious agreement as to it must be what the
rule means.
Also, it should also be stressed that companies are franchise holders of certificates of
public convenience and therefore, posses a virtual monopoly over the business of 2. HSBC V. JACK ROBERT SHERMAN
transporting passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This being so,
shipping companies, like Sweet Lines, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual FACTS: A complaint for collection of a sum of money was filed by petitioner
monopoly of the business of transporting passengers and may thus dictate their Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (BANK) against private respondents
terms of passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj, before the RTC QC.
of their vessels and facilities.
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
Lastly, bulk of those who board these inter-island vessels come from the low-income (COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by,
groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice but to avail of the Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the maximum amount
petitioner's vessels. of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently increased to
Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK prime rate,
2. Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security for the
proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK to it through the
innumerable passengers from different places of the country who, under aforesaid overdraft facility, on October 7, 1982, both private respondents and a
Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against Sweet Lines only in the City of certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such
Cebu. time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of petitioner BANK whereby
private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all
For, although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft
agreement of the parties in writing, based on Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, facility.
such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the
claimants. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is (IMPT) The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: This guarantee and all rights,
the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under
justice. and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City arising under this guarantee.
would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide
not to file the action at all. The condition will defeat the ends of justice. The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded
payment of the obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions
On the other hand, Sweet Lines has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed
to pay, petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned complaint. State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts
and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.
On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a MTD on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the SM and persons of the defendants. Acting on the motion, the trial As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to
court issued an order denying the MTD ruling that there is nothing in the Guarantee improper venue has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the
which says that the courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the respondent Court that: While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically
courts of other countries or nations and that jurisdiction over the persons of use with exactitude the words 'improper venue' it can be perceived from the general
defendants is acquired by service of summons and copy of the complaint on them. thrust and context of the motion that what is meant is improper venue, The use of the
There has been a valid service of summons on both defendants and in fact the same word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-cat the same word employed in the
is admitted when said defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File guarantee agreement but conveys the concept of venue. At any rate, this issue is
Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984. MR was filed thereafter but still got now of no moment because We hold that venue here was properly laid for the same
denied. reasons discussed above.
Private respondents then filed before CA a petition for prohibition with preliminary The respondent Court likewise ruled that: “In a conflict problem, a court will simply
injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. CA rendered a decision granting the refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And
injunction. even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the
principle of forum non conveniens “.However, whether a suit should be entertained or
ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit. (YES) dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the
HELD: While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and trial court Thus, the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle.
that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very
essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is a contract
rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined of adhesion and that consequently, it cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to
under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. the stipulations of the contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of
We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes forum, as discussed earlier.
arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby REVERSED and the
rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, with costs against private
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in respondents.
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based
on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and 3. BELLIS V. BELLIS
substantial justice.
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He
Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, in trust, in the following order and manner
private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them)
who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the a) $240,000.00 to his first wife Mary Mallen
process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Philippine court try and resolve the case. The defense of private respondents that the Miriam Palma Bellis,or $40,000.00 each, and
complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives.
The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective oppositions to the
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction
over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with executor’s final account, report and administration, and project of partition. Relying
the permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A this case is which did not provide for legitimes.
to the unrestricted jurisdiction of the local courts. Its shares of stocks are not immune
ISSUE: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional from lawful court orders. The actual situs of shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
rights? corporation being domiciled here.
HELD: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas Since the domiciliary persistently refuses to deliver that owned by the decedent to the
law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his ancillary, there was nothing arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring
national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his issuance of new certificates in lieu thereof.
testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
Benguet’s contention that its by-laws should be followed requiring a final court
Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the resolution on ownership first before issuance of a new certificate is also without merit.
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) There is no question of ownership since Country Trust did not even appeal. Even
the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity assuming it did, the command of a court decree prevails over a by-law.
of provisions of will, and (d) the capacity to succeed.
5. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES V. OPLE
ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country to where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions, FACTS: Pakistan Intl Airlines (PIA) executed 2 separate contracts of employments in
both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount of successional Manila, one with Farrales and the other with Mamasig. The pertinent portions of the
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated contract state that (1) the agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, by the mutual consent of the parties; (2) notwithstanding anything to contrary as
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by
wherein said property may be found. giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended
termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one
4. TAYAG V. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED month's salary; (3) this agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the
laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction
FACTS: Idonah Perkins died in New York and left stock certificates covering 32,000 to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
shares of Benguet Consolidated under the possession of County Trust Co. of New
York, the domiciliary administrator of the estate. 1 year and 4 months before the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA sent
separate letters to Mamasig and Farrales, advising them that their services as flight
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in Manila and Renato Tayag was stewardesses would be terminated. Farrales and Mamasig filed a complaint for illegal
later appointed as ancillary administrator. A dispute arose between the domiciliary dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses. PIA contended that F
and ancillary administrator as to who was entitled to the possession of the stock & M were habitual absentees and had the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable
certificates. So that claims of Perkins’ local creditors could be satisfied, the lower quantities of personal effects.
court ordered the domiciliary administrator to surrender the stock certificates but the
domiciliary refused to comply. This prompted the ancillary administrator to petition to ISSUE: WON the provision in the contract that the agreement shall be governed by
the court that the stock certificates be considered lost and cancelled, and that the laws of Pakistan (first clause) and that only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall
Benguet be ordered to issue new certificates to it. The CFI granted the petition. From have jurisdiction over any controversy arising out of the agreement (second clause),
such order, Benguet Consolidated appealed contending that it cannot be declare lost may be given effect (NO)
because they are in actual existence and is in the possession of Country Trust in
New York. HELD: NO. The first clause cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Phil labor
laws and regulations to the subject matter of the case. The ER-EE relationship
ISSUE: Whether the lower court had the power to issue the questioned order? YES between PIA and F&M is affected with public interest and the applicable Phil laws
and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other
HELD: SC affirmed the Lower Court. The power of the ancillary administrator to gain law to govern their relationship. The second clause cannot also be invoked because
control and possession of all the assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the the circumstances of the case shows multiple substantive contacts (no ‘r’) between
Philippines is undisputed. The administration extends to all assets of the decedent Phil law and Phil courts on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties on
within the state where it was granted and the administrator of one state has no power the other: contract was executed and partially performed in the Phils., F&M are
over assets in another state. Filipino citizens and PIA is licensed to do business in the Phils., and F&M were based
in the Phils. in between their flights. All the above contacts point to the Philippine
The court has the authority to require that the ancillary administrator’s authority over courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual
the stock certificates be respected. Benguet Consolidated is a domestic corp subject disputes between the parties. The challenged portion of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, PIA did not undertake certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
applicable provisions of Philippine law. authenticated by the seal of his office.
As to the dismissal of Farrales & Mamasig: they were illegally dismissed and are TWA relied solely on the statement of its customer service agent, Ms. Lather, in her
entitled to 3 years backwages without qualification or deduction. PIA’s right to deposition. Aside from such, there is no official publication of said code presented as
procedural due process was observed as it was given the opportunity to submit a evidence. Respondent court’s finding that overbooking is allowed has no basis.
position paper and present evidence. Also, the provisions of the employment contract
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, public policy. The Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations exist, the same isn’t applicable
employment contract prevents security of tenure of F&M from accruing. in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
6. ZALAMEA V. COURT OF APPEALS passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets Philippines, the applicable law would be Philippine law.
from the Manila agent of TransWorld Airlines for a flight to NY-LA. The tickets were at
a discount of 75% and the daughter was a full fare. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of
bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract
While in NY, they received a notice of the reconfirmation. On the appointed date, they of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent
checked in at 10am for their 11am flight but were placed on the waitlist. The daughter TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to
appeared as No.13 on the waitlist while the two Zalameas were listed as No. 34, properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be
showing a party of two. Out of the 42 names, the first 22 names were eventually prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
allowed to board, including the father. The others weren’t able to fly. As it were, those TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less
holding full-fare tickets were given first priority. The father later discovered that he priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time,
was holding his daughter’s full-fare ticket. Thos with discounted tickets were denied and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten
boarding. Even in the next flight to LA, the mother and daughter couldn’t be minutes beforedeparture time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given
accommodated because it was fully book. They were constrained to book in another priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
flight and purchased 2 tickets from American Airlines at $918.
The Court ordered TWA to pay the $918 worth of tickets from American Airlines, 50k
In the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract moral damages, 50k exemplary damages, 50k atty’s fees and the costs of suit.
of air carriage before the RTC Makati. The RTC ordered the airline company to pay
the ticket costs, as well as moral damages and attorney’s fees. Notes: The tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines; thus, Philippine law is
applicable, under the principled of lex loci contractus.
CA: Moral damages are recoverable only where there is fraud or bad faith (in a
breach of contract of carriage). Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of 7. CADALIN V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR
flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked. There EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of
was no bad faith in placing the petitioners in the waitlist along with 48 passengers. the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations.
ISSUE: W/N there was bad faith on the part of TWA, considering that TWA contends EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any
that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice in the US foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy.
HELD: Yes, there was fraud or bad faith. The US law or regulation allegedly FACTS: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine
must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied
construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding
recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to
foreign principals. be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to
give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of
the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said
all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs
to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII. based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds
of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the
EASIER FACTS: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute
respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]).
various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by
in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred,
Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the
complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
contract of employment is one year. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil
ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
law.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
HELD: AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
"borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where
such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common- law conflicts rule (G.R. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46). public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402,
64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be on the protection to labor.
the governing law.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides: A claim arising out of a that: The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the (Sec. 10).
date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]). and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the
characterization given such a law. next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is
three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil to suffer shame, humiliation and embarrassment. The chastening situation even
Code of the Philippines. caused the younger Fontanilla to break into tears. After some time, Linda, without
any explanation, offered the Fontanillas $50.00 each. She simply said "Take it or
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil leave it." This, the Fontanillas declined. The Fontanillas then proceeded to the United
Code of the Philippines, which provides: The following actions must be brought within Airlines customer service counter to plead their case. The male employee at the
ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) counter reacted by shouting and left without saying anything.
Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
United Airlines has a different version of what occurred at the LA Airport. According
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the to it, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get their seat
Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: Money claims-all assignments for the flight. They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the
money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the aircraft without first securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket and
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of boarding passes. Having no seat assignments, the stewardess at the door of the
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. plane instructed them to go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded
to the check-in counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at
8. UNITED AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS the counter informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them on the
next available flight and offered them denied boarding compensation. Linda
FACTS: Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from United Airlines, through the Philippine vehemently denies uttering the derogatory and racist words attributed to her by the
Travel Bureau in Manila three "Visit the U.S.A." tickets for himself, his wife and his Fontanillas.
minor son Mychal for four routes. All flights had been confirmed previously by United
Airlines. The Fontanillas then proceeded to the US as planned. While there, Aniceto The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file case for damages before the RTC of
bought two additional coupons for his family at United's office in Washington Dulles Makati however the latter dismissed the complaint.
Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words "CHECK-IN REQUIRED," On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. Hence, United Airlines sought
set to leave from Los Angeles to San Francisco. redress with the SC.
The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas at the LA airport is the bone of ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in applying US laws in the case at bar? Yes
contention of this controversy.
HELD: The court held that the CA erred in applying the laws of the US as Philippine
Aniceto's version is upon their arrival at the LA Airport for their flight, they proceeded law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in
to United's counter where they were attended by Linda. Linda examined their tickets, the US, the tickets were purchased through United's agent in Manila. It is true that the
punched something into her computer and then told them that boarding would be in tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the
fifteen minutes. When the flight was called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane. nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
To their surprise, the stewardess at the gate did not allow them to board the plane, as
they had no assigned seat numbers. They were then directed to go back to the According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a general rule, the law of the place
"check-in" counter where Linda subsequently informed them that the flight had been where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
overbooked and asked them to wait. The Fontanillas tried to explain to Linda the validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though
special circumstances of their visit. However, Linda told them in arrogant manner, the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be
"So what, I can not do anything about it." Subsequently, three other passengers with performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of
Caucasian features were graciously allowed to baord, after the Fontanillas were told performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where
that the flight had been overbooked. The plane then took off with the Fontanillas’ the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the
baggage in tow, leaving them behind. forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the airline.
The Fontanillas then complained to Linda, who in turn gave them an ugly stare and 9. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS V. COURT OF APPEALS
rudely uttered, "it’s not my fault. It’s the fault of the company. Just sit down and wait."
When Mr. Fontanilla reminded Linda of the inconvenience being caused to them, she FACTS: Asiavest Merchant Bankers, a corporation organized under the laws of
bluntly retorted, "Who do you think you are? You lousy Flips are good for nothing Malaysia, initiated a collection suit before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
beggars. You always ask for American aid." After which she remarked "Don’t worry against Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a corporation duly
about your baggage. Anyway there is nothing in there. What are you doing here incorporated and existing under Philippine laws. Asiavest sought to recover the
anyway? I will report you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home." Such rude indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of PNCC to guarantee
statements were made in front of other people in the airport causing the Fontanillas completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended for the
completion of another project. The High Court of Malaya rendered judgment in favor the Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by
of Asiavest and against PNCC, ordering the latter to pay the former. the Malaysian Court over the person of PNCC due to alleged improper service of
summons upon PNCC and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from PNCC under the judgment, represent PNCC in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident
Asiavest initiated a complaint before the RTC to enforce the judgment of the High collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites
Court of Malaya. PNCC moved to dismiss the case contending that the foreign for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian
judgment should be denied recognition or enforcement for want of jurisdiction, want judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the “every
of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. The RTC decision must state the facts and law on which it is based.”
and CA dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the foreign judgment should be given recognition and enforcement The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by PNCC in preventing enforcement
in the Philippines. and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and
procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated
HELD: YES. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is
to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in
country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the
certain conditions that may vary in different countries. authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so
long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular that determines the validity of the service of court process on PNCC as well as other
proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question
the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and
administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested
judgment. or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon PNCC to present
evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it,
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the stand.
instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the to which he has a meritorious defense. Intrinsic fraud is one which goes to the very
Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the existence of the cause of action is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore,
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.
the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign Evidence is wanting on the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated
judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity. allegation cannot give rise to liability therein.
Having thus proven through evidence of the existence and authenticity of the foreign Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable
judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein PNCC, to prove otherwise. favor of the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum governs matters of remedy and procedure. Considering that under the
PNCC failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even
and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based,
then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot (2) Whether or not Rederick was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace
invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide (NO)
otherwise.
HELD:
All in all, PNCC had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such (1) Yes. Before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
foreign judgment, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code .
Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, PNCC merely argued, to which the trial However, in this case, when the divorce decree of 1989 was submitted in evidence,
court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money counsel for Grace objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled
of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be that it was admissible, subject to Grace’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
required to first establish its validity. evidence and accorded weight by the judge. The failure of Grace’s counsel to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
10. GARCIA V. RECIO of Sydney, Australia. Furthermore, compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and
52) of the Family Code is not necessary as Rederick was no longer bound by
Doctrine: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained (2) No. Rederick merely presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. On its face, the herein
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio (Rederick), a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and died) commits the offence of bigamy."
wife in Australia. In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court. Rederick later became an Australian Citizen Therefore, the divorce decree did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
in 1992. remarry according to his national law. Hence, there is no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
In 1994, petitioner Grace J Garcia (Grace) – a Filipina – and Rederick were married Rederick’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared
as "single" and "Filipino." The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
In March 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of Rederick, had he duly presented it in
ground of bigamy. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
Samson only in November 1997. In his Answer, Rederick averred that, as far back as capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. However,
1993, he had revealed to Grace his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He based on the records submitted, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree Rederick’s legal capacity to marry Grace.
obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in
1994. The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed Rederick
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence
In July 1998, while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – Rederick was to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney because his marriage prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Neither can we declare the
with Grace had " irretrievably broken down." Thus, Rederick prayed in his Answer marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. It may turn out that under Australian
that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The law, Rederick was really capacitated to marry Grace as a direct result of the divorce
trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in decree. Hence, the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian divorce had receive evidence, if any, which show Rederick’s legal capacity to marry Grace.
ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we
ISSUES: REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
(YES) of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.
In an Order, the RTC denied Raytheon’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the
11. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL V. ROUZIE factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were
sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, USA, and enforce judgment on Raytheon, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract in the Philippines.
whereby BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of Raytheon filed a MR of the order, which motion was opposed by Rouzie. In an Order,
the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a service contract with the Republic of the the trial court denied Raytheon’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the
eruption and mudflows. twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin
the trial court from conducting further proceedings.
On July 16, 1994, Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a suit
against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. On 28 August 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied Raytheon’s MR in the assailed Resolution
employment contract. Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering issued on 10 March 2004. The appellate court held that although the trial court
BMSI and RUST to pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC should not have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the also considered evidence aliunde in resolving Raytheon’s omnibus motion, it found
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie elevated the case to this Court but was the evidence presented by Raytheon, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning,
dismissed in a Resolution which became final and executory on November 9, 1998. insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause
of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the other on
On 8 January 1999, Rouzie, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for the issue of whether the corporations, including Raytheon, named as defendants in
damages before the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, named as the case had indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented by
defendants Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two Rouzie. Thus, it held that the issue should be threshed out during trial. Moreover, the
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not
the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed Rouzie to negotiate the to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle
sale of services in government projects and that Rouzie was not paid the of forum non conveniens.
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf
of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as Raytheon itself ISSUE: WON the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
had combined and functioned as one company. forum non conveniens? (NO)
In its Answer, Raytheon alleged that contrary to Rouzie’s claim, it was a foreign HELD: Raytheon mainly asserts that the written contract between Rouzie and BMSI
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by
any arrangement with Rouzie or paying the latter any sum of money. Raytheon also the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American
obligation of the said companies. Raytheon also referred to the NLRC decision which corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Raytheon theorizes
denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause
of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined 3 consecutive phases involved
counterclaim. in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law,
and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where the
On 18 May 1999, Raytheon filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies
on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the
complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the
Rouzie opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its
Chicago. decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in 12. HSBC V. SHERMAN
a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict- FACTS: A complaint for collection of a sum of money was filed by petitioner
of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (BANK) against private respondents
of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj, before the RTC QC.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective (COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by,
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs the Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the maximum amount
sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently increased to
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK prime rate,
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security for the
repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK to it through the
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over aforesaid overdraft facility, on October 7, 1982, both private respondents and a
Rouzie (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such
jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon (as party defendant) was acquired by its time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of petitioner BANK whereby
voluntary appearance in court. private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all
sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by facility.
the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. (IMPT) The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: This guarantee and all rights,
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
merits of the case is fair to both parties. arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded
The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues payment of the obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed
trial court. to pay, petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned complaint.
On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a MTD on the ground of lack of
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may jurisdiction over the SM and persons of the defendants. Acting on the motion, the trial
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available court issued an order denying the MTD ruling that there is nothing in the Guarantee
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. which says that the courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to courts of other countries or nations and that jurisdiction over the persons of
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the Civil Case and the parties involved. defendants is acquired by service of summons and copy of the complaint on them.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non There has been a valid service of summons on both defendants and in fact the same
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as is admitted when said defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File
a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984. MR was filed thereafter but still got
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are denied.
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance. Private respondents then filed before CA a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. CA rendered a decision granting the
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the CA respected its injunction.
conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit. (YES)
courts because their findings are binding on this Court.
HELD: While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very
and Resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against Raytheon. essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all
rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined of adhesion and that consequently, it cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to
under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. the stipulations of the contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of
We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes forum, as discussed earlier.
arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all
rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby REVERSED and the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, with costs against private
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based respondents.
on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 13. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA
Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a FACTS: On January 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff (herein private
very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate respondent) Milagros P. Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah,
before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Saudi Arabia.
private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them)
who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the On April 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Philippine court try and resolve the case. The defense of private respondents that the Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels,
complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in
the room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape
The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, SAUDIA officials interrogated her
over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help
States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah
the permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused
State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not
and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them. want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to
sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights. Plaintiff
improper venue has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
respondent Court that: While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
use with exactitude the words 'improper venue' it can be perceived from the general detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In
thrust and context of the motion that what is meant is improper venue, The use of the September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-cat the same word employed in the
guarantee agreement but conveys the concept of venue. At any rate, this issue is On January 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already
now of no moment because We hold that venue here was properly laid for the same behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer
reasons discussed above. of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
The respondent Court likewise ruled that: “In a conflict problem, a court will simply incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so
even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
principle of forum non conveniens “.However, whether a suit should be entertained or Jeddah.
dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the One year and a half later or on June 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes
trial court Thus, the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle. before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the
plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is a contract Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and October 1994, Morada filed her Opposition.
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. In the Reply filed with the trial court, SAUDIA alleged that since its MR raised lack of
jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that
again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant
receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
Respondent Judge denied SAUDIA’s Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June portion of the assailed Order reads as follows: “Acting on the Motion for
27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines
take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight and filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiff’s
took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
further orders. damages plus attorney’s fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article
On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this
where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.”
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and Consequently, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.” Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO with the CA. Respondent CA
promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting the
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed,
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the in the interim. In another Resolution, now assailed, the CA denied SAUDIA’s Petition
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and On October 1995, SAUDIA filed with the SC the instant Petition for Review with
Allah continued to serve in the international flights. Prayer for TRO.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent CA rendered the
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, Decision, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the considering that the Amended Complaint’s basis for recovery of damages is Article
cause. 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It
further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
On November 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse
Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager. ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On January 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the On May 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for TRO,
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, the
SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. The trial ISSUE:
court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss 1)W/N the case is a conflict of laws? YES
Amended Complaint filed by SAUDIA. 2) W/N CA erred in holding that the RTC of QC has jurisdiction? YES
3) W/N CA erred in Ruling that in this case, Philippine Law should govern? YES
From the Order of respondent Judge denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on ***Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at
September 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. It alleged that the trial the outset. It maintains that private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. heavily in favor of the RTC of QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
Respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 1935 interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious.
and 2136 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may
not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant,
HELD: e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance
1) YES. Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. disturbed.
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts” Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case. case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element
may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex respondent has voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. The
form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise. We the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
thus find private respondent’s assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A
conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts the 3) As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
court a quo. answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
2) YES. After a careful study of the private respondent’s Amended Complaint, and situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2)
the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with
“The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.
of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
statutes.” category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
“characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process of deciding
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that violations of The purpose of “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum. Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event,
or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of “connecting factor” or “point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
Court on jurisdiction we find that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691. performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or
the determination of the applicable law. These “test factors” or “points of contact” or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
“connecting factors” could be any of the following:
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
“(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the
origin; tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give
her her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where
The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts; the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
exercised;
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liabilit1 have been advanced to offer
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern
theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now,
lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we have seen given the factual context of this case.
earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.”60 (Italics ours.) parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that overall injury occurred and
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, we are convinced that there is lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion thatalthough she was already resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship”
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by
and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. There is likewise logical basis on record for private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view,
the claim that the “handing over” or “turning over” of the person of private respondent has been properly established.
to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,” we find, by way of
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon
But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had
burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA. Kitamaru then
by private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove the law of the filed for specific performance & damages with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon Files a
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of Motion to Dismiss.
the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case5 And as Nippon’s contends that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and
correctly held by the respondent appellate court, “considering that it was the between Japanese nationals. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no
petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the substantial relationship to the parties following the [state of the] most significant
burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.” relationship rule in Private International Law. The claim for improper pre-termination
of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.
trial court’s denial of defendant’s (herein petitioner’s) motion to dismiss the case. Not
only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci
obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was
hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in
outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
vindication of the country’s system of law and justice in a transnational setting.
ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for
With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country
case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as contractus, the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non
prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever. conveniens.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. HELD: In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are
Q-93-18394 entitled “Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines” is hereby involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
REMANDED to RTC of QC for further proceedings.
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
14. HASEGAWA V. KITAMURA considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
FACTS: Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum
projects of foreign governments, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum
(ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
services to Nippon for a year. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to
project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the enter a judgment.
Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine
Government. In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has
various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy,
When the STAR Project was near completion, the DPWH engaged the consultancy it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the
services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering and construction respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In
assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject
Petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International matter jurisdiction.
Division, then informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because
to adjudicate the claims. Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a
suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion
court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
a Civil Case for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship 15. INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO V. WASHINGTON
rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
DOCTRINE: the Supreme Court formally adopted the minimum contacts/fair play and
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of substantial justice test for determining whether there was proper personal jurisdiction
the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci over the defendant.. “Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,”
to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which FACTS:
state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a 1. International Shoe Co. (Appellant) assails the constitutionality of the Washington
case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, unemployment compensation statute as it is applied to them for infringing the due
was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause.
incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular 2. The statutes in question set up a comprehensive scheme of unemployment
issue to be resolved. compensation, the costs of which are defrayed by contributions required to be made
by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a
dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine 3. International Shoe Co. (Appellant) is a Delaware corporation, having its principal
which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale
problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of- of shoes and other footwear. Its merchandise is distributed interstate through several
law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. sales units or branches located outside the State of Washington. Appellant has no
office in Washington, and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact merchandise there.
that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours.
Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws 4. During the years from 1937 to 1940, International Shoe Co employed 11-13
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis.
foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the These salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. state, and they were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their
sales. .
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is 5. For the said years, the State of Washington issued notice of assessment which
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the was personally served upon the sales solicitor employed by it in the State of
latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or Washington, and a copy of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case address in St. Louis, Missouri.
and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and 6. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment, and moved to set
take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service upon
hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant; that appellant was not a
may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign corporation of the State of Washington, and was not doing business within the state;
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding that it had no agent within the state upon whom service could be made;
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
7. the appeal tribunal, ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the
unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner; both the To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within
Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state and subjects it to
its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether, International Shoe Eo., has, by its activities in the State of
Washington, rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state to 16. PERKINS V. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING
recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund exacted
by state statutes? Yes FACTS: Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins, a nonresident of Ohio, filed 2 actions in
personam in the Court of Common Pleas of Clermont County, Ohio, against the
HELD: SC held that in view of 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a), providing that no person shall be several respondents one of which is the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
relieved from compliance with a state aw requiring payments to an unemployment ("mining company"). It is styled as a "sociedad anonima" under the laws of the
fund on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce, the fact that the Philippine Islands, where it owns and has operated profitable gold and silver mines.
corporation is engaged in interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for In one action petitioner seeks approximately $68,400 in dividends claimed to be due
payments to the state unemployment compensation fund. The activities in behalf of her as a stockholder. In the other she claims $2,500,000 damages largely because of
the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of the State to recover payments the company's failure to issue to her certificates for 120,000 shares of its stock.
due to the state unemployment compensation fund.
In each case the trial court sustained a motion to quash the service of summons on
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on the mining company. The CA of Ohio affirmed that decision as did the SC of Ohio.
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the The SC of Ohio held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment prohibits the Ohio courts from exercising jurisdiction over the respondent corporation.
personally binding him. now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to The present case is a consolidation of the cases filed against the respondents.
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that,
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within ISSUE: W/N, as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio by the
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the
substantial justice. cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, it is clear that, unlike an individual, its HELD: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
"presence" without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by the U.S. leaves Ohio free to take or decline jurisdiction over the corporation.
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. Demands of Provisions for making foreign corporations subject to service in the state is a matter
due process may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the of legislative discretion, and a failure to provide for such service is not a denial of due
forum as make it reasonable, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit process.
which is brought there.
The cases relied on by the SC of Ohio are different from the present case. Unlike the
While it has been held, in cases on which appellant relies, that continuous activity of case at bar, no actual notice of the proceedings was received in those cases by a
some sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation responsible representative of the foreign corporation. In each case, the public official
be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, , there have been instances in which who was served with process in an attempt to bind the foreign corporation was held
the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of to lack the necessary authority to accept service so as to bind it in a proceeding to
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings enforce a cause of action arising outside of the state of the forum. The necessary
entirely distinct from those activities. result was a finding of inadequate service those cases and a conclusion that the
foreign corporation was not bound by it. At the time of rendering the above decisions
The activities carried on in behalf of International Shoe, Co. in the State of this Court was aided, in reaching its conclusion as to the limited scope of the
Washington were systematic and continuous throughout the years in question. They statutory authority of the public officials, by this Court's conception that the Due
resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a state from giving its
received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to public officials authority to accept service in terms broad enough to bind a foreign
resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights.. It is evident that these corporation in proceedings against it to enforce an obligation arising outside of the
operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it state of the forum. That conception now has been modified by the rationale adopted
reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and in later decisions.
substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has
incurred there. Today if an authorized representative of a foreign corporation be physically present in
the state of the forum and be there engaged in activities appropriate to accepting
service or receiving notice on its behalf, we recognize that there is no unfairness in this proceeding. The judgment of the SC of Ohio is vacated and the cause is
subjecting that corporation to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state through such remanded to that court for further proceedings.
service of process upon that representative. This has been squarely held to be so in
a proceeding in personam against such a corporation, at least in relation to a cause JUSTICE MINTON'S DISSENT: As I understand the practice in Ohio, the law as
of action arising out of the corporation's activities within the state of the forum. agreed to by the court is stated in their syllabus. The law as declared in the syllabus
of the SC of Ohio, which is the whole court speaking, is clearly based upon adequate
The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation state grounds. This brings this situation clearly within the settled rule whereby this
in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the Court will not review a State court decision resting on an adequate and independent
corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each case. The non-federal ground even though the State court may have also summoned to its
corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, make it support an erroneous view of federal law.
necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom
process may be served provide a helpful but not a conclusive test. On the other hand, What we are saying to Ohio is: "You have decided this case on an adequate state
if the same corporation carries on, in that state, other continuous and systematic ground, denying service, which you had a right to do, but you don't have to do it if you
corporate activities as it did here—consisting of directors' meetings, business don't want to, as far as the decisions of this Court are concerned." I think what we are
correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of doing is giving gratuitously an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court. I would
machinery, etc.—those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
that corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the
proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to those very 17. PANTALEON V. ASUNCION
activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.
FACTS: On June 12, 1953, plaintiff, Vicenta Pantaleon, instituted in the Court of First
In the instant case brings us to a proceeding in personam to enforce a cause of Instance of Nueva Ecija, an action to recover from said Asuncion, the sum of
action not arising out of the corporation's activities in the state of the forum. Using the P2,000.00, with interest thereon, in addition to attorney’s fees. The summons
tests mentioned above, the court finds no requirement of federal due process that originally issued was returned by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija unserved, with the
either prohibits Ohio from opening its courts to the cause of action here presented or statement that, according to reliable information, Asuncion was residing in B-24 Tala
compels Ohio to do so. The company's mining properties were in the Philippine Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issued, therefore, for service in the
Islands. Its operations there were completely halted during the occupation of the place last mentioned. However, the provincial sheriff of Rizal returned it unserved,
Islands by the Japanese. During that interim the president, who was also the general with information that Asuncion had left the Tala Estate since February 18, 1952, and
manager and principal stockholder of the company, returned to his home in Clermont that diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avail.
County, Ohio. There he maintained an office in which he conducted his personal
affairs and did many things on behalf of the company. He kept there office files of the On plaintiff’s motion, the court ordered, on March 9, 1955, that defendant be
company. He carried on there correspondence relating to the business of the summoned by publication, and the summons was published on March 21 and 28,
company and to its employees. He drew and distributed there salary checks on and April 4, 1955, in the “Examiner”, said to be a newspaper of general circulation in
behalf of the company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of two Nueva Ecija. Having failed to appear or answer the complaint within the period stated
company secretaries who worked there with him. He used and maintained in in the summons, defendant was, by an order dated July 12, 1955, declared in default.
Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts carrying substantial balances of
company funds. From that office he supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation Subsequently, or on September 8, 1955, after a hearing held in the absence of the
of the corporation's properties in the Philippines and he dispatched funds to cover defendant and without notice to him, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and
purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus he carried on in Ohio a against said defendant, for the sum of P2,300.00, with interest thereon at the legal
continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of rate, from October 28, 1948, and costs.
the company. He there discharged his duties as president and general manager, both
during the occupation of the company's properties by the Japanese and immediately About forty-six (46) days later, or on October 24, 1955, the defendant filed a petition
thereafter. While no mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the for relief from said order of July 12, 1955, and from said judgment, dated September
company, many of its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being 8, 1955, and upon the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. Annexed to said
given the personal attention of its president in that State at the time he was served petition were defendant’s affidavit and his verified answer. In the affidavit, Asuncion
with summons. Consideration of the circumstances which, under the law of Ohio, stated that, on September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San Francisco del Monte
ultimately will determine whether the courts of that State will choose to take Quezon City, which is his residence, he received notice of a registered letter at the
jurisdiction over the corporation is reserved for the courts of that State. Post Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; that he proceeded
immediately to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received on
The court concludes that, under the circumstances above recited, it would not violate September 28, 1955; that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12, 1955,
federal due process for Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in and of the judgment of September 8, 1955, much to his surprise, for he had not been
summoned or notified of the hearing of this case; that had copy of the summons and Said section 21, however, is unqualified. It prescribes the “proof of service by
of the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule 7, section publication”, regardless of whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or
21, of the Rules of Court said summons and order would have reached him, “as the not. Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21, which complements it. Then,
judgment herein had”; and that his failure to appear before the court is excusable it too, we conceive of no reason, and plaintiff has suggested none, why copy of the
being due to the mistake of the authorities concerned in not complying with the summons and of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident
provisions of said section. defendants, but not to resident defendants. We can not even say that defendant
herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly
Upon denial of said petition for relief, defendant perfected his present appeal. residing in Rizal – where he, in fact (San Francisco del Monte and Quezon City used
to be part of Rizal), was residing – could reasonably be expected to read the
ISSUE: W/N the summons by publication had been made in conformity with the summons published in a newspaper said to be a general circulation in Nueva Ecija.
Rules of Court.
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer
HELD: NO. More specifically, defendant maintains that copy of the summons and of jurisdiction through service by publication, the conclusion is inescapable that the
the order for the publication thereof were not deposited “in the post office, postage lower court had no authority whatsoever to issue the order of July 12, 1955, declaring
prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address”, in the defendant in default and to render the decision of September 8, 1955, and that
violation of Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court, and that, had this provision been both are null and void ad initio.
complied with, said summons and order of publication would have reached him, as
had the decision appealed from. Said section 21 reads: If the service has been made Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an
by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In
copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process
directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address. (Emphasis clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.
supplied.). Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and,
when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights
Plaintiff alleges, however, that the provision applicable to the case at bar is not this and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary
section 21, but section 16, of Rule 7, of the Rules of Court, which provides: appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to
Whenever the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process.
whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effect upon him by publication in Lastly, from the viewpoint of substantial justice and equity, we are of the opinion that
such places and for such times as the court may order. defendant’s petition for relief should have been granted. To begin with, it was filed
well within the periods provided in the Rules of Court. Secondly, and, this is more
It is, moreover, urged by the plaintiff that the requirement, in said section 21, of an important, defendant’s verified answer, which was attached to said petition, contains
affidavit showing that copy of the summons and of the order for its publication had allegations which, if true, constitute a good defense. Thus, for instance, in paragraph
been sent by mail to defendant’s last known address, refers to the extraterritorial (2) of the “special denials” therein, he alleged: That it is not true that he failed to pay
service of summons, provided for in section 17 of said Rule 7, pursuant to which: the said indebtedness of his said wife, as alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint, for
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the as a matter of fact, plaintiff and defendant agreed upon a settlement of the said
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which indebtedness of the latter’s deceased wife on December 5, 1948, whereby defendant
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or was allowed to pay it out of his monthly salary by installment of P10.00 monthly
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in beginning January, 1949, to May 1953 and in accordance therewith, defendant paid
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the unto plaintiff a total P460.00.
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court,
be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by The specification of the dates of payment, of the amounts paid each time, of the
registered mail; or by publication in such places and for such time as the court may manner in which each payment was made, and of the number of the money orders in
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by which eighteen (18) payments had been effected, constitutes a strong indication of
ordinary mail to the last known address of the defendant; or in any other manner the the probable veracity of said allegation, fully justifying the grant of an opportunity to
court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable prove the same.
time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, said order of July 12, 1955, and the
aforementioned decision of September 8, 1955, are hereby set aside and annulled,
and let the record of this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, Calder,
with costs against plaintiff-appellee. It is so ordered. South and the company must “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” to
answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. Finally, an individual
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though
and Endencia, JJ., concur. remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California.
PONENTE: Concepcion (Pedro), J.: 19. PHILSEC INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS
18. CALDER V. JONES FACTS: Ventura Ducat obtained separate loans from Ayala International Finance
Limited (“AYALA”) and Philsec Investment Corp. (“PHILSEC”) in the sum of $ 2.5 M
FACTS: Respondent Shirley Jones, a resident of California, brought this suit against secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat. 1488, Inc. assumed Ducat’s obligation.
the National Enquirer, Inc., its local distributing company and Calder and South for 1488 sold to Athona Holdings a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas while Philsec
libel and invasion of privacy. The article at issue questioned the professionalism of and Ayala extended a loan to Athona to finance payment of the purchase price. Thus,
Jones stating that the she drank so heavily preventing her from fulfilling her Ducat was released from the obligation. As Athona failed to pay the balance of the
professional obligations. purchase price, the entire debt became due and demandable. 1488 sued Philsec,
Ayala and Athona in the US for payment of the balance plus damages. While the civil
South, a reporter employed by the Enquirer, a resident of Florida, wrote the first draft case was pending, Philsec filed a complaint and Writ of Preliminary Attachment
of the challenged article, his byline appeared on it. Most of his research for the article against Ducat, et al. in the Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that private
was done in Florida with the aid of sources located in California. Aside from his respondent Ducat committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400% more than
frequent trips and phone calls, South has no other relevant contacts with California. its true value. RTC of Makati issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real
and personal property of Ducat. Ducat filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
Calder, also a Florida resident and president/editor of the Enquirer, has only been to pendentia and forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action for PHILSEC as
California twice; once on a pleasure trip and the other to testify in an unrelated trial PHILSEC is not a party to the sale. 1488, Inc. also filed a Motion to Dismiss
and has no other relevant contacts with California. He reviewed/approved the initial contending that the action being in personem, extraterritorial service of summons by
evaluation of the subject of the article & edited it in its final form. publication was ineffectual and did not vest the court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc.,
which is a non-resident foreign corporation.
Originally, the suit was filed in California Superior Court, but was dismissed on the
grounds that First Amendment concerns weighed against an assertion of jurisdiction The trial court granted Ducat’s motion even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in
otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause. The California Court of Appeals the US case. The Motion to Dismiss of 1488, Inc. was also granted on the ground of
reversed, stating that a valid basis for jurisdiction did exist on the theory that litis pendentia considering that the “main factual element” of the cause of action is the
petitioners intended to, and did, cause tortuous injury to Jones in California. validity of the sale of real property in the US. The trial court also held that it was w/o
jurisdiction over the case as 1488, Inc. is a non-resident and the action involve is not
ISSUE: W/N Jones, a California resident, bring suit against a Florida corporation’s in rem or quasi in rem. The extraterritorial service of summons was therefore
employees (Florida residents) in a California court for a claim of libel by asserting that ineffective.
California has personal jurisdiction over Florida residents.
ISSUE:
HELD: YES. California is the focal point of both the story and the harm suffered. 1. W/N the dismissal of the case was proper? NO.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Calder, South, and the company is proper in California 2. W/N the principle of forum non conveniens is applicable? NO.
based on the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California.
HELD:
California’s “long-arm” statute permits an assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident 1. The case was arbitrarily dismissed. While this court has given the effect of res
person whenever permitted by the state and federal Constitutions. Therefore, turning judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the
to the Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment permits personal judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under
jurisdiction over a person in any state with which the person has “certain minimum Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
contacts…such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." It is not necessary for this
fair play and substantial justice.’ " purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign
judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
This follows that South and Calder wrote/edited an article that they knew would have judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in
a potentially devastating impact upon Jones. Furthermore, they knew that the brunt of this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
that injury would be felt by Jones in the state in which she lives/works and in which rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. estate of Tanquinyeng, requested the court to set aside the order of default alleging
that the judgment rendered was void because the court never acquired jurisdiction
In this case, neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies over defendant or the subject matter of the action.
of the pleadings in the US Court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to
assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the US ISSUE:
court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be 1) WON the court acquired necessary jurisdiction
rendered would constitute res judicata. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case 2) WON there was denial of due process of law
even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
HELD:
2. Forum non conveniens is not applicable base on three grounds: first, it is not a 1) Yes. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a
ground for a motion to dismiss. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after power of legal process exerted over the person.
"vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances" require the
court's desistance, and; third, the extraterritorial service of summons is valid. In this Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either
case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
failed to consider that PHILSEC is a domestic corporation and Ducat is a Filipino, and wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object of the recognized and made effective.
transaction under litigation.
The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of
20. EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO V. PALANCA such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations,
namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the
FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng mortgaged his lands in Manila as security litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
for debt he owed to Plaintiff El Banco Español-Filipino. After the execution of the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the
mortgage, Tanquinyeng returned to China (where he’s a native) and eventually died property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying
there. Because the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the the mortgage debt.
present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff bank to give notice to the defendant The Court noted the following matters regarding foreclosure proceeding against the
by publication in a newspaper of the city of Manila. The Court also ordered that a property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself
copy of the summons and complaint be sent to the defendant at his last place of personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is
residence at the city of Amoy, in China. This order was made pursuant to the derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over
following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure: the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court
must be limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court,
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due and to make an order
deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary
served, at his place of residence precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was entered
contains the following words: “Because it is declared that the said defendant
It does not appear that the clerk fulfilled the order of sending the letter to China. Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of
There was only an affidavit signed by Bernardo Chan, employee of the lawyers of the P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said
Plaintiff bank, showing that he deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc., etc.”
addressed to Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the
plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing publication. This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely
as a compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and
CFI ruled in favor of the bank. In case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the that the evidence of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil
judgment within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be
should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the
made; so the court ordered the sale of the property. The property was bought by the mortgage debt.
bank for P110,200.
Whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the CFI to
7 years after the confirmation of the sale, Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could not
impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court. Code of Civil Procedure which provides that whenever conflicting claims are or may
be made upon a person for or relating to personal property, or the performance of an
obligation or any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to several actions
2) No, the failure of the clerk to mail the notice is not such an irregularity, as amounts by different persons, such person may bring an action against the conflicting
to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, claimants, disclaiming personal interest in the controversy, and the court may order
would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a them to interplead with one another and litigate their several claims among
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. themselves, there upon proceed to determine their several claims.
The Court held that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not
absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in ISSUE: W/N through the summon by publication, the CFI has acquired jurisdiction
the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is over the person of Idonah Perkins as a non-resident defendant, or, notwithstanding
evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, the want of such jurisdiction, whether or not said court may validly try the case.
to be considered absolutely necessary.
HELD: Yes, CFI has acquired jurisdiction. Idonah Perkins lost. Section 398 of Code
The Court also noted the lapse of time which affected the case. Laches on the part of of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant is sued in the
the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed sufficient ground for refusing the relief. Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the action
relates to real or personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant has
As regards the allegation that the defendant was prejudiced because the bank or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
purchased the property greatly below that which has been agreed upon in the consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such person from any interest therein, service
mortgage, the Court held that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset of summons maybe made by publication.
price, does not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the
foreclosure proceedings. First, the action brought by Eugene Perkins is quasi in rem, for while the judgment
that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, "it fixes and settles the
J.Malcolm (Dissent):No man shall be condemned in his person or property without title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the
notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. Protection of the parties judgment in rem." The amended complaint against Idonah Perkins seeks to exclude
demands a strict and an exact compliance with this constitutional provision in our her from any interest in a property located in the Philippines. The situs of the shares
organic law and of the statutory provisions in amplification. Literally hundreds of is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the certificated
precedents could be cited in support of these axiomatic principles. Where as in the evidencing the ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction.
instant case the defendant received no notice and had no opportunity to be heard,
certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law. Second, no money judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for against Idonah
Perkins. The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be without any
21. PERKINS V. DIZON interest in the shares.
FACTS: Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the CFI of Manila against the Third, on the claim of Idonah Perkins that an interpleader is in personam, the court
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for payment of dividends amounting to has not issued an order compelling the conflicting claimants to interplead with one
P71,379.90 on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name being withheld by the another and litigate their several claims among themselves, but instead ordered the
company and, for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said plaintiff to amend his complaint including the other two claimants as defendants.
shares against the claims of 2 other persons: George H. Engelhard and Idonah Slade Thus, the publication of the summons was ordered not in virtue of an interpleading,
Perkins (both are non residents, but the case did not indicate the country/ies they are but upon the filing of the amended complaint wherein an action quasi in rem is
residing at). The Benguet Co. motioned the court that such parties be required to alleged.
interplead and settle the rights among themselves.
CFI Manila ordered Eugene Perkins to include in his complaint as party defendants 22. GULF OIL CORPORATION V. GILBERT
George Engelhard and Idonah Perkins. Then, pursuant to the order of the CFI,
summons by publication were served upon Engelhard and Idonah Perkins. FACTS: Gilbert operates a public warehouse. He alleges that Gulf Oil Corp
carelessly handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps, causing
Engelhard filed an answer. Idonah Slade Perkins, through counsel, filed her pleading fire and an explosion, which consumed the warehouse building, merchandise and
entitled "objection to venue, motion to quash, and demurrer to jurisdiction" wherein fixtures within. Hence, the action is one of tort.
she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person.
Gilbert brought this action in New York, but he resides at Lynchburg, Virginia. Gulf Oil
Idonah Perkins contends that the proceeding instituted against her is one of is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, qualified to do business in
interpleading and is therefore an action in personam on the basis of Section 120 of both Virginia and New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to
receive service of process. resident of New York, nor did any event connected with the case take place there,
nor does any witness with the possible exception of experts live there. No one
Gulf Oil, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate connected with that side of the case save counsel for the plaintiff resides there. His
place for trial is Virginia, not New York where the Gilbert lives and the former does affidavits and arguments are devoted to controverting claims as to Gulf Oil’s
business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, inconvenience, rather than to showing that the present forum serves any
and where both state and federal courts are available to Gilbert and are able to convenience for himself, with one exception -- that this case involves a claim for an
obtain jurisdiction of the Gulf Oil. amount close to $400,000 which may stagger the imagination of a local jury
unaccustomed to dealing with such amounts. This is a strange and unproven premise,
The US District Court dismissed the case, and that the case is best left to Virginia an assumption we do not easily make.
courts. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Hence, this case is here
on certiorari. Gulf Oil points out that not only Gilbert but every person who ever participated in the
acts charged to be negligent resides in or near Virginia. The Complaint itself alleges
ISSUE: that the Gulf Oil violated Virginia (Lynchburg) ordinances. The source of all proofs in
1. W/N the US District Court has the inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the either side is in Virginia, which is some 400 miles from New York. It does not do well
doctrine of forum non conveniens – YES; to fix the place of trial at an inconvenient forum. The course of adjudication in New
2. W/N that power was abused in this case - NO. York federal court might be beset with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the
case is litigated in Virginia, where it arose.
HELD:
1. A federal district court has the power to dismiss an action at law pursuant to the HENCE, the District Court did not exceed its powers or the bounds of its discretion in
doctrine of forum non conveniens -- at least where its jurisdiction is based on dismissing Gilbert’s complaint and remitting him to the courts of his own community.
diversity of citizenship and the state courts have such power. The principle of forum The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is thus reversed.
non conveniens means simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These Petition GRANTED.
are statutes drawn with generality, giving a plaintiff a choice of courts to pursue his
remedy. However, the plaintiff may not, by choosing an inconvenient forum, harass a 23. TRAVELERS HEALTH ASSN V. VIRGINIA
defendant by inflicting upon him trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his
remedy. But, if the choice of forum is strongly in favor of the defendant, the choice FACTS: The Virginia “Blue Sky Law” was enacted to protect its citizens from
should rarely be disturbed. unfairness, imposition and fraud in the sales of certificates of insurance and other
forms of securities. The law requires those selling or offering such securities to obtain
Here, the venue statues of US permit Gilbert to commence his action in New York. a permit from the State Corporation Commission. Applicants for permits must provide
But that does not settle the question whether he must do so. The doctrine of forum detailed information concerning their solvency, and must agree that suits can be filed
non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of against them in Virginia by service of process on the Secretary of the Commonweath.
venue. Courts of equity and of law occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to Sec. 6 provides that after notice and a hearing on the merits, the State Corporation
exercise jurisdiction where the suit is between aliens or nonresidents, or where, the Commission is authorized to issue a cease and desist order restraining violations of
litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal. the Act. It also provides for service by registered mail where other types of service
are unavailable because the offering is by advertisement and/or solicitation through
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private periodicals, mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of communication from
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to beyond the limits of the State.
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, Travelers Health Association was incorporated in Nebraska as a nonprofit
if view would be appropriate to the action, and all other practical problems that make membership association. It conducts a mail-order health insurance business from its
trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to office in Omaha, Nebraska. New members pay an initiation fee and obligate
the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative themselves to pay periodic assessments at the said office. The funds collected are
advantages and obstacles to fair trial. The court is not required to always respect on used for operating expenses and sick benefits to members. New members are
the forum chosen by the plaintiff. What is clear in a long list of cases, is that when the obtained through the unpaid activities of those already members, who are
defendant consents to be sued, it extends only to give the court jurisdiction over the encouraged to recommend the Association to friends and submit their names to the
person. home office. Pratt then mails solicitations to these prospects. He encloses blank
applications which, if signed and returned to the home office with the required fee,
2. Turning to the question whether this is one of those rather rare cases where the usually result in election of applicants as members. Certificates are then mailed.
doctrine should be applied, we look to the interests of the litigants. Gilbert is not a Travelers has solicited Virginia members in this manner and had approximately 800
Virginia members. create continuing obligations between Travelers and each of the many certificate
holders in the state. Travelers and Pratt have caused claims for losses to be
Cease and desist proceedings under Sec. 6 were instituted by the State Corporation investigated and the Virginia courts were available to them in seeking to enforce
Commission against Travelers and R. E. Pratt, as treasurer of the Association and in obligations created by the group of certificates.
his personal capacity. Having received notice by registered mail only, they appeared
'specially' for the purpose of objecting to the alleged jurisdiction of the For these reasons, Virginia has power to subject Travelers to the jurisdiction of its
Commonwealth of Virginia and of its State Corporation Commission, and of moving Corporation Commission, and its cease and desist provisions designed to accomplish
to set aside and quash service of summons. this purpose can not be attacked merely because they affect business activities
which are carried on outside the state.
The Commission rejected Travelers' objection to jurisdiction and their motion to
quash service. Travelers and Pratt were ordered to cease and desist from further 24. WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP V. WOODSON
solicitations or sales of certificates to Virginia residents unless and until it obtained
authority in accordance with the “Blue Sky Law.” The Virginia CA affirmed this order. FACTS: Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from petitioner
Seaway Volkswagen in Massena, NY in 1976. In 1977, the Robinson family moved
ISSUE: W/N the Commonwealth of Virginia has jurisdiction over Travelers - YES from NY to Arizona. On their way, their car was hit in the rear by a truck, which
caused a fire and severly burned Kay Robinson and their 2 children.
HELD: Travelers’ contention is that this is in violation of the due process clause and
that all their activities take place in Nebraska, consequently Virginia has no power to The spouses Robinsons filed a products liability action in the District Court of Creek
reach them in cease and desist proceedings to enforce any part of its regulatory law. County, OK, claiming that their injuries resulted from the defective design and
The court held that the state has power to issue a cease and desist order enforcing at placement of Audi’s gas tank and fuel system. They joined as defendants the
least that regulatory provision requiring Travelers to accept service of process by automobile’s manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union AG; its importer, Volkswagen of
Virginia claimants on the Secretary of the Commonwealth. America, Inc.; its regional distributor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corp; and its
retail dealer, Seaway. Seaway and World-Wide entered special appearances,
The Court held in the case of Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn that since claiming the Oklahoma’s exercise of jurisdiction over them offended the limitations on
the contracts were executed and to be performed in one State (Minnesota), the the State’s jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause (14th Amendment).
Association was not doing business in another State (Montana). Therefore, the
Association could not be sued in Montana courts unless 'consent' to Montana suits World-Wide is incorporated and has its business office in NY. It distributes to retailers
could be implied. But where business activities reach out beyond one state and in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. Seaway is incorporated and has its
create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, courts business office in NY. Seaway and World-Wide are fully independent with each other
need not resort to a fictional 'consent' in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory and with regard to VW and Audi, contractual only. The spouses Robinsons adduced
agencies in the latter state. no evidence to show that either World-Wide nor Seaway does business in OK, or
sells or ships to that state, or has an agent to receive process, or purchases
A state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents advertisements in any media to reach OK. Robinson’s counsel conceded that World-
against risks, an interest which the state can protect even though the state action Wide and Seaway never entered OK, with the exception of the vehicle owned by
may have repercussions beyond state lines. The court rejected the contention that a Robinsons.
state's power to regulate must be determined by a 'conceptualistic discussion of
theories of the place of contracting or of performance. Instead, great weight was The District Court rejected the constitutional claim. World-Wide’s Motion for
given to the consequences of the contractual obligations in the state where the Reconsideration was also denied. World-Wide sought a Writ of Prohibition from the
insured resided and the 'degree of interest' that state had in seeing that those SC of Oklahoma to restrain the District Court Judge Woodson. The SC of Oklahoma
obligations were faithfully carried out. Due process requires only that in order to denied the writ holding that personal jurisdiction over World-Wide was authorized by
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the Oklahoma’s “long-arm” statute. The SC of Oklahoma ruled that considering that the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the product sold is, by its very design, so mobile that World-Wide can foresee its possible
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial use in OK. This is especially true to the distributor who has the exclusive right to
justice. distribute in NY, NJ and Connecticut. The SC of OK found it reasonable to infer that
World-Wide derive substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are
In the case at bar, the contacts and ties of Travelers with Virginia residents, together used in OK.
with that state's interest in faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify
subjecting Travelers and Pratt to cease and desist proceedings under Sec. 6. ISSUE: Whether, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Travelers did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived transactions. Its insurance Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a
certificates, systematically and widely delivered in Virginia following solicitation, nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products liability
action, when the defendants' only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, emphasizing the
automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an accident reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed “in the
in Oklahoma? NO. context of our federal system of government” is adopted.
HELD: The District Court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over The Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
World-Wide because of the lack of contacts, ties or relations with the State of judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
Oklahoma. Judgment of the SC of OK is reversed. state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or
no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before tribunals of another State; even
The Due Process Clause (14th Amendment) limits the power of a state court to render if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if
a valid personal judgment before a nonresident defendant. A judgment rendered in the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitle to full faith and acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
credit elsewhere. Due process requires that the defendant be given adequate notice State of its power to render a valid judgment.
of the suit and be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
The US Supreme Court finds that there is a total absence of those affiliating
A State Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state court
as long as there exists “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the jurisdiction. World-Wide carry no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no
forum State. sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges
and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through
The concept of “minimum contacts” (1) protects the defendant against the salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum, and (2) it acts to ensure does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma
that States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed customers or residents, or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. the Oklahoma market. In short, the Robinsons seek to base jurisdiction on one,
isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents,
“reasonableness” or “fairness.” The defendant’s contacts with the forum State must happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.
be such that maintenance of the suit “does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” The relationship must be such that it is “reasonable Even if it is foreseeable that the automobile is mobile by its very design, it is never
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” Implicit been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
in this reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while Nonetheless, foreseeability is not wholly irrelevant. Foreseeability is critical not in the
always a primary concern, in an appropriate case be considered in light of other mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State, but it is that the
relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that reasonable anticipate being haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, the ensuring the orderly administration of the laws, gives a degree of predictability to the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with
controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
substantive social policies. liable to suit.
This limitation on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause has been relaxed, due The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
to the fundamental transformation in the American economy. There is an increase in asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
commercial transactions touching 2 or more states. Also, the modern transportation stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend in the forum State. But there is no such or similar basis for Oklahoma jurisdiction over
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity. World-Wide or Seaway in this case. Seaway's sales are made in Massena, N. Y.
World-Wide's market, although substantially larger, is limited to dealers in New York,
Nonetheless, the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisidictional purposes New Jersey, and Connecticut. There is no evidence of record that any automobiles
is not accepted by the US SC. Despite the Commerce Clause providing for the distributed by World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside this tristate area. It is
Nation as a common market, a “free trade unit,” the Framers also intended the States foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by World-Wide and Seaway may
retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including the sovereign power to try take them to Oklahoma. But the mere "unilateral activity of those who claim some
causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each Sate, in turn, implied a limitation on relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
the sovereignty of all its sister States – a limitation express or implicit in both the with the forum State."
original scheme of the Constitution and th 14th Amendment. The flexible standard
It is contended that jurisdiction can be supported by the fact that petitioners earn ISSUE:
substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Supreme Court so 1. Whether or not the defendant (Banco) is granted sovereign immunity as an agency
found, drawing the inference that, because one automobile sold by petitioners had of the government. (no)
been used in Oklahoma, others might have been used there also. While this 2. Whether or not the act of state doctrine may be raised by the defendant (Banco).
inference seems less than compelling on the facts of the instant case, we need not (yes)
question the court's factual findings in order to reject its reasoning.
HELD:
This argument seems to make the point that the purchase of automobiles in New 1. On the first issue the court considered the activities to be jure gestionis
York, from which the petitioners earn substantial revenue, would not occur but for the (commercial) in nature and not subject to sovereign immunity.
fact that the automobiles are capable of use in distant States like Oklahoma.
Respondents observe that the very purpose of an automobile is to travel, and that 2. The economic measure was one taken by the Cuban Government and with which
travel of automobiles sold by petitioners is facilitated by an extensive chain of the Bank complied with is an act of state. Courts will not inquire into the validity of the
Volkswagen service centers throughout the country, including some in acts of a foreign government done within its own territory. Every sovereign state is
Oklahoma.However, financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of
relation to the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done
constitutionally cognizable contact with that State. within its own territory. Courts will not examine a foreign law to determine whether it
was adopted in conformity with the internal procedures and requirements of the
25. FRENCH V. BANCO NATIONAL DE CUBA enacting state. So long as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it matters not
how grossly the sovereign has transgressed its own laws. If no institution of legal
FACTS: On this appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action for a authority would refuse to effectuate the decree, its formal status (because it was not
breach of contract, two questions were originally briefed and argued — first, whether published in the Official Gazette in Cuba) is irrelevant. It has not been seriously
the defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity and, second, whether the defendant contended that the judicial institutions of Cuba would declare the decree invalid." Nor,
may invoke the "act of state" doctrine. Case is grounded in a proclamation by Fidel it should be noted, does the plaintiff before us make any such claim.
Castro's government that foreign investors can only receive their return on
investments in the Cuban Peso. Consequently, there is no basis whatever for the plaintiff's contention that the action
dishonoring and repudiating the certificates held by Ritter was not an "act of state."
The investor (Alexander Ritter) in the case at bar invested $350,000 in a cuban farm. Regardless of whether or not Decision No. 346 was published in the Official Gazette
At the time the Cuban government allowed foreign investors to convert their proceeds or otherwise complied with internal Cuban standards of regularity, it was issued by
from their enterprises into foreign currency and exempted such proceeds from tax on the Currency Stabilization Fund, an official instrumentality of the Cuban Government.
the importation of money. Certificates of tax exemption amounting to $150,000 were Moreover, in compliance with that Decision — or even if only in purported compliance
acquired by the investor. — Banco Nacional, also an agency of the Cuban Government, refused and continues
to refuse to exchange pesos for dollars as the certificates had required. These
The certificates stated that: undisputed facts establish, as matter of law, that the breach of contract, of which the
plaintiff complains, resulted from, and, indeed, itself constitutes, an act of state.
ALEXANDER S. RITTER or a member Bank of the System, as endorsee hereof, will
receive from Banco Nacional de Cuba [defendant herein] against delivery to said On this analysis, there is no issue of burden of proof. Rather, the question is, what
Bank of $ ____ Cuban Pesos and surrender of this Certificate, a check on New York need be proved. The defendant introduced evidence showing that Decision No. 346
for an equal amount of United States Dollars, exempt from the Tax on Exportation of had been issued by the Currency Stabilization Fund, that it was adopted as a
Money. measure to control currency and foreign exchange and that defendant bank had
regarded the Decision as binding upon it and as prohibiting performance of the
This certificate was signed by defendant bank and the government agency agreement in the tax exemption certificates. The plaintiff adduced evidence to the
responsible for issuing the certificates (Cuban Government's Currency Stabilization effect that the Decision did not conform to Cuba's fundamental law and that it had not
Fund). Later that government agency issued Decision No. 346 which suspended the been published in the "Official Gazette." But that was insufficient, as matter of law, to
processing of tax exemption certificates "for the time being until reorganization of the establish that the action dishonoring and repudiating the certificates was not an act of
system of exemptions." The investor then went to get his proceeds in dollars but was state. It was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the Cuban authorities themselves
denied. Hence this case. would deem Decision No. 346 invalid and would disregard it. This she was obviously
unable to do.
The act of state doctrine was raised as a defense because the decision of the Cuban
Government's Currency Stabilization Fund was not published in the official gazette. The act of state doctrine is a sign of respect between countries and between the
judiciary and the political branch that the handles foreign affairs.
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
26. IN RE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. (Underhill v. Hernandez)
FACTS: There are 2 parties in this case which sought the estate of Marcos. One is
the Class Plaintiffs and the other is the Republic of the Philippines (RP). The District Court’s orders in issue violated this principle. In order to obtain assets
from the Philippine National Bank, or to hold the Bank in contempt for the transfer of
The U.S. District Court (USDC) in Hawaii rendered judgment in favor of the class of those assets to the Republic of the Philippines, the District court necessarily (and
plaintiffs against the Marcos estate for Human Rights violations by the Marcos expressly) held invalid the forfeiture judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court.
Regime. The judgment included an injunction restraining the estate from transferring
any estate’s assets. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines sought to NOTES: Other issues raised by the Class Plaintiffs:
forfeit the Marcos estate’s assets on the ground that they were stolen by Marcos from
the Phil. Gov’t and its people. W/N the act of state doctrine do not apply to judicial decisions
There was an earlier case (Credit Suisse Case) wherein the Swiss Asset of Marcos Although the act of state doctrine is normally inapplicable to court judgments arising
estate had been frozen by the Swiss Gov’t at the request of the Republic of the from private litigation, there is no inflexible rule preventing a judgment sought by a
Philippines. The Class plaintiffs obtained injunction from USDC of Hawaii to hold the foreign government from qualifying as an act of state. (Liu v. Republic of China)
assets for the benefit of the class Plaintiffs. The US CA issued a writ of mandamus
and held that the injunction violated the act of state doctrine, which preclude W/N the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the judgment of the Philippine
American courts from declaring “invalid” a foreign sovereign’s official act, that is, the Supreme Court did not concern matters within its own territory
freeze order of the Swiss gov’t. The USCA held that, “generally, the act of state doctrine applies to official acts of
foreign sovereigns “performed within their own territory.” (Credit Suisse Case). The
Thereafter, the Swiss government released the funds frozen in Switzerland for act of the Philippine Supreme Court was not wholly external, however. Its judgment,
transfer to the Philippine National Bank in escrow pending a determination of proper which the district court declared invalid, was issued in the Philippines and much of its
disposal by a competent court in the Philippines. The Philippine National Bank force upon the Philippine National Bank arose from the fact that the Bank is a
deposited the funds in Singapore. The Philippine Supreme Court subsequently held Philippine corporation.
that the assets were forfeited to the Republic of the Philippines.
Because the RP’s “interest in the enforcement of its laws does not end at its borders,”
The USDC of Hawaii then made a ruling that the Philippine SC had violated “due the fact that the escrow funds were deposited in Singapore does not preclude the
process by any standard” and the latters judgment was entitled to no deference. It application of the act of state doctrine.
ordered reinstatement of an earlier settlement agreement in the District Court
wherein the RP refused to approve and consent to it. 27. REPUBLIC V. MARCOS
The District Court then issued an “Order to Show Cause” against the Philippine FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) brought a civil suit against its
National Bank, which was not a party to the litigation in the district court, requiring the former president, Ferdinand Marcos, and his wife Imelda (the Marcoses), asserting
Bank to show why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court’s injunction claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and
against transfer of assets by the estate. other applicable law.
The Philippine National Bank then filed the present petition for mandamus in the U.S. The Republic alleges that the Marcoses engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud, and the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to restrain the District Court from enforcing its transportation of stolen property in the foreign or interstate commerce of the United
“Order to Show Cause” and from pursuing discovery against the Bank officer. States. The Republic alleges that the acts were repeated, forming a pattern of
predicate acts.
The Bank asserted that it had transferred nearly all of the funds in issue to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court. The Republic alleges that the Marcoses and the other defendants arranged for the
It contended that the entire proceeding against it for its transfer of funds to the investment in real estate in Beverly Hills, California of $4 million fraudulently obtained
Republic of the Philippines violated the “act of state” doctrine. by the Marcoses; that the Marcoses arranged for the creation of two bank accounts in
the name of Imelda Marcos at Lloyds Bank of California totaling over $800,000 also
ISSUE: W/N USDC of Hawaii violated the act of State doctrine? fraudulently obtained by the Marcoses; and that the Marcoses transported into
Hawaii money, jewels, and other property worth over $7 million also fraudulently
HELD: Yes. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every obtained by them.
warrant its application. On the present record, the defense does not apply.
Before determining whether issuance of an injunction was appropriate we consider
two defenses which, if accepted, would block trial of the case: the Marcoses maintain, The Marcoses maintain that the Republic's action should have been dismissed, even
first, that their acts are insulated because they were acts of state not reviewable by if the district court had jurisdiction, on the ground of forum non conveniens. They
our courts; and second, that any adjudication of these acts would involve the point to the foreign character of the plaintiff, the nature of the Republic's claims about
investigation of political questions beyond our courts' competence. the Marcoses' conduct in office, and the fact that the court will be called upon to
decide questions of Philippine law. The inconvenience of the forum was argued by
ISSUE: Whether the acts of state doctrine applies as a defense in this case. the Marcoses to the district court. But the court did not address the argument. On the
present record the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
HELD: No. The classification of certain acts as "acts of state" with the consequence Republic's action on forum non conveniens grounds before issuing the preliminary
that their validity will be treated as beyond judicial review is a pragmatic device, not injunction.
required by the nature of sovereign authority and inconsistently applied in
international law. The purpose of the device is to keep the judiciary from embroiling In Summation. Jurisdiction to hear the Republic's claims and to enter the preliminary
the courts and the country in the affairs of the foreign nation whose acts are injunction exists. A serious question of liability has been presented and the Republic
challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from making has a fair chance of success on the merits of its case. The Marcoses have not
pronouncements on matters over which it has no power; maximally interpreted, the presented any preclusive defense. The scope of the injunction is justified. It was
classification prevents the embarrassment of a court offending a foreign government imperative for the district court to preserve the status quo lest the defendants prevent
that is "extant at the time of suit." resolution of the case by putting their property beyond the reach of the court.
Hardship to the Republic would have been great and irreparable if the district court
The "continuing vitality" of the doctrine depends on "its capacity to reflect the proper had not taken its prudent, amply justified action to keep the Marcoses' assets from
distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government disappearing.
on matters bearing upon foreign relations." Consequently, there are "constitutional
underpinnings" to the classification. A court that passes on the validity of an "act of 28. K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO AND FU HING OIL CO, LTD V.
state" intrudes into the domain of the political branches. COURT OF APPEALS
As a practical tool for keeping the judicial branch out of the conduct of foreign affairs, Facts: Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing
the classification of "act of state" is not a promise to the ruler of any foreign country under the law of Japan, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with
that his conduct, if challenged by his own country after his fall, may not become the preliminary attachment before RTC Manila against Atlantic Venus Co., (Atlantic), a
subject of scrutiny in our courts. No estoppel exists insulating a deposed dictator from corporation registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping
accounting. No guarantee has been granted that immunity may be acquired by an ex- Corporation (Crestamonte), a Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the owner of MV
chief magistrate invoking the magic words "act of state" to cover his or her past Estella.
performance.
Manila alleged that Crestamonte, as bareboat charter and operator of the MV Estella,
The classification might, it may be supposed, be used to prevent judicial challenge in appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation (NSS), a Japanese corporation, as its general
our courts to many deeds of a dictator in power, at least when it is apparent that agent in Japan. The appointment was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in
sustaining such challenge would bring our country into a hostile confrontation with the turn appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the MV
dictator. Once deposed, the dictator will find it difficult to deploy the defense Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed
successfully. The "balance of considerations" is shifted. A fortiori, when a ruler's to pay the amounts due. NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (Keihin) filed
former domain has turned against him and seeks the recovery of what it claims he complaints in intervention.
has stolen, the classification has little or no applicability. The act of state doctrine is
supple, flexible, ad hoc. The doctrine is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (Fu Hing), a corporation organized in HK and not doing
United States, not to furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed business in the Phils, files a motion for leave to intervene with an attached complaint
leader. un intervention, alleging that Fu Hing supplied marine diesel oil to the MV Estella and
incurred barge expenses for the total sum of 152,412.56 USD but such has remained
In the instant case the Marcoses offered no evidence whatsoever to support the unpaid despite demand and that the claim constitutes a maritime lien. The issuance
classification of their acts as acts of state. The burden of proving acts of state rested of a writ of attachment was also prayed for.
upon them. They did not even undertake the proof. The act of state doctrine, the
Executive declares, has "no bearing" on this case as it stands. As the doctrine is a K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (KK Shell), a corporation organized in Japan
pragmatic one, we cannot exclude the possibility that, at some later point in the and not doing business in the Phils, likewise filed w motion to intervene with an
development of this litigation, the Marcoses might produce evidence that would attached complaint in intervention alleging that upon request of NSS, Crestamonte's
general agent in Japan, KK Shell provided and supplied maritime diesel oil to the MV that the private respondents have yet to file their answer in the proceeding below and
Estella at the ports of Tokyo and Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous trial on the merits is still to be conducted, whether or not petitioner are indeed
demands, Crestamonte has failed to pay the amounts of 16,996.96 USD and ¥1M maritime lienholder and as such may enforce the lien against the MVEstella are
and that KK Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella The complaint matters that still have to be established. Neither is the court ready to rule on the
in intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the exact
allowed the intervention of Fu Hing and KK Shell. nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be established. We leave this matter
to the LC who is the best position to decide such. It was clearly reversible error on
Writs of preliminary attachment were issued and upon the posting of the counter- the part of the CA to annul the LC's orders. There are still numerous material facts to
bonds, writs of attachment were discharged. Atlantic and MV Estella moved to be established in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the true nature of the
dismiss the complaints in intervention and Atlantic filed a petition in the CA against relationship between Crestamonte and KK Shell and between NSS and KK Shell.
the lower court judge, Kumagai NSS and Keihin seeking the annulment of the orders The best recourse would have been to allow the trial court to proceed with the case
of the trial court. The CA annulled such orders and directed the LC to cease and and consider whatever defenses may be raised by private respondents after they
desist from proceeding with the case. have filed their answer and evidence to support their conflicting claims has been
presented.
CA: Fu Hing and KK Shell were not suppliers but sub-agents of NSS therefore they
were bound by the Agency Agreement between Crestamonte and NSS. The LC 29. COMMUNICATIONS MATERIAL AND DESIGN V. COURT OF APPEALS
should have disallowed the motions for intervention.
Facts: Petitioners CMDI and ASPAC are both domestic corporations. Private
Issues: 1. W/N Fu Hing and KK Shell should be allowed to intervene? NO. Respondent ITEC is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
2. W/N the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be invoke? NO. State of Alabama, United States of America, and is a foreign corporation not licensed
to do business in the Philippines.
Held: 1. No express reference to the contracting of sub-agents or the applicability of
the term of the agreement, particularly the choice-of-forum clause, to sub-agents is ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC referred to as “Representative
made in the text of the agreement. What the contract clearly states are NSS' principal Agreement”. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its “exclusive
duties, i.e., that it shall provide for the necessary services required for the representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s products, in consideration of
husbanding of Crestamonte's vessels in Japanese ports and shall be responsible for which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. The said agreement was initially
fixing southbound cargoes with revenues sufficient to cover ordinary expenses. Also, for a term of 24 months. After the lapse of the agreed period, the agreement was
the complaint in intervention filed by KK Shell merely alleges it provided and supplied renewed for another 24 months.
!v Estella with marine diesel oil upon request of NSS who was acting for and as duly
appointed agent of Crestamonte. There is no basis for the CA to state that KK Shell ASPAC and ITEC also entered into a “License Agreement” wherein ASPAC was able
admitted in its intervention that it was appointed as local agent/sub-agent or to incorporate and use the name “ITEC” in its own name becoming legally and
representatives by NSS by virtue of said Agency Agreement. The CA was publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
erroneously referring to another case involving another ship in another court. thus,
additional evidence must be given to establish such allegation. By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported by ITEC, to
their sole customer PLDT.
2. Atlantic and MV Estella are invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens to be a
valid ground for the dismissal of KK Shell's complaint in intervention. KK Shell, in One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement, ITEC
turn, argued by invoking his right as maritime lienholder under PD No. 1521, the Ship decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its
Mortgage Decree of 1978. contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements.
Section 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such ITEC filed a civil case against the petitioners with the RTC of Makati and charged
lien Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry them and another Philippine corporation, DIGITAL 1 , of using knowledge and
dock or marine railway, or other necessaries to any vessel, whether information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their own line of equipment
foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering
of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on them to ITEC’s former customer.
the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be
necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel.
However, in order to invoke this, it must be established that the credit was extended
1
to the vessel itself. In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact Petitioner Francisco Aguirre is the majority stockholder and President of CMDI and ASPAC. He is also
the President of DIGITAL.
A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by CMDI, et al. on the following grounds: When a foreign corporation enters into a single or isolated transaction or occasional,
(1) that plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing incidental, or casual transactions, which do not come within the meaning of the law,
business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and the foreign corporation is deemed not engaged in business in the Philippines. Where
(2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application a single act or transaction, however, is not merely incidental or casual but indicates
against it of the principle of “forum non conveniens”. the foreign corporation’s intention to do other business in the Philippines, said single
act or transaction constitutes “doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business in the
RTC of Makati issued an Order: (1) denying the motion to dismiss, and (2) directing Philippines.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court is persuaded to conclude that private respondent ITEC had been
CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court. “engaged in” or “doing business” in the Philippines. This is the inevitable result after a
scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its
Issues: 1. W/N private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation doing business various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with these entities
in the Philippines? ITEC is doing business in the Philippines. indicate convincingly ITEC’s purpose to bring about the situation among its
2. If it is, whether this fact bars it from invoking the injunctive authority of our customers and the general public that they are dealing directly with ITEC, and that
courts? Barred by estoppel ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country.
Held: Doing Business A perusal of the agreements between petitioner ASPAC and the respondents shows
that there are provisions (ex. “No Competing Product” provision) which are highly
Generally, a “foreign corporation” has no legal existence within the state in which it is restrictive in nature, such as to reduce petitioner ASPAC to a mere extension or
foreign. This proceeds from the principle that juridical existence of a foreign instrument of the private respondent.
corporation is confined within the territory of the state under whose laws it was
incorporated and organized, and it has no legal status beyond such territory. Notwithstanding such finding that ITEC is doing business in the country, petitioner is
nonetheless estopped from raising this fact to bar ITEC from instituting this injunction
Before a foreign corporation can transact business in the Philippines, it must first case against it. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in
obtain a license to transact business in the Philippines, and a certificate from the Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine
appropriate government agency. If it transacts business in the Philippines without citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. One who
such a license, it shall not be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit, or has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but it may be its corporate existence and capacity.
sued on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.2
The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of Commodum ex injuria sua non
The Supreme Court has not altogether prohibited a foreign corporation not licensed habere debet - no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong. This is as
to do business in the Philippines from suing or maintaining an action in Philippine it should be for as mandated by law, “every person must in the exercise of his rights
Courts. What it seeks to prevent is a foreign corporation doing business in the and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
Philippines without a license from gaining access to Philippine Courts. observe honesty and good faith.”
The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on the failure to acquire a local license
Philippines be licensed to do so and that they appoint an agent for service of process is based on considerations of sound public policy. The license requirement was
is to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the imposed to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the
jurisdiction of its courts. The object is not to prevent the foreign corporation from jurisdiction of its courts.
performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of
business without taking steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local
courts.
3
The true test of what constitutes “doing business in the Philippines” is whether the “[S]oliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called “liaison” offices or
foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any
for which it was organized. calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or
more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or
corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity or commercial dealings

2
or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of
Section 133 of the Corporation Code. some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
3
Acts that constitute “doing business in the Philippines” Article 44 of the Omnibus Investments Code of purpose and object of the business organization.”
1987:
By entering into the “Representative Agreement” with ITEC, Petitioner is charged with down any disciplinary action against the ACCRA lawyers but they were warned that a
knowledge that ITEC was not licensed to engage in business activities in the country, repetition will be dealt with more severely.
and is thus estopped from raising in defense such incapacity of ITEC, having chosen
to ignore or even presumptively take advantage of the same. 2. Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the bank manager, Rivera,
entered into the agreement with apparent authority. This apparent authority has been
Having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of duly proved by the evidence presented which showed that in all the dealings and
the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum transactions, Rivera participated actively without the opposition of the conservator. In
non conveniens. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in fact, in the advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was designated
spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition of the Bank’s assets.
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites
are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently 31. MANILA HOTEL CORP V. NLRC
resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision
as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have FACTS: Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker, a printer at the Mazoon Printing
power to enforce its decision. Press, Sultanate of Oman when he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing by
its GM Gerhard Shmidt as he was recommended by Nestor Buenio, his
Petition is hereby DISMISSED. friend. Santos resigned from Mazoon and thereafter signed an employment contract
mailed to him. The contract stated it would be for a period of 2 years.
30. FIRST PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. CA
After a short vacation in the Phil & barely a year into the contract, Santos was
FACTS: Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has terminated from his job due to retrenchment, and repatriated to the Phil. Santos,
been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank through his lawyer, demanded full compensation pursuant to the employment
had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase agreement which Shmidt denied. Santos then filed a complaint with the NLRC
the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement against MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel & Shmidt for illegal dismissal.
was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Bank’s manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later
however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the The Labor Arbiter grants payment of damages to Santos which was vacated on
repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into appeal by the NLRC. On an MR, the NLRC found Santos illegally dismissed &
such an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the
Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of unexpired portion of his contract. MRs were denied, hence this petition.
Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a ISSUE: W/N Manila Hotel Corp. is liable to Santos
motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the
trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, HELD: Granted. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction – fact that MHC is an
Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Demetria and incorporator & owns 50% of the capital stock of MHICL is not enough to pierce the
Janolo seeking to have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable veil. Even if we assume: NLRC had jurisdiction over the case & MHICL was liable for
against the Bank. Demetria et al argued that the second case constitutes forum Santos’ retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate & distinct juridical entity, cannot be
shopping. held liable. Piercing the veil is an equitable remedy. When the notion of legal entity
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
ISSUES: the law will regard the corp as an association of persons. It is done only when the
1. Whether or not there is forum shopping. corp is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or another corp.
2. Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale.
Clear & convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. There is
HELD: no such evidence to show that MHICL & MHC are 1 & the same entity.
1. Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties
between the first case and the second case. There is identity of interest because both Test to enable piercing of the veil, except in express agency, estoppel or direct tort:
cases sought to have the agreement, which involves the same property, be declared a)Control, not mere majority or complete domination; b)Such control must have been
unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, etc.; c)The aforesaid control &
case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of breach of duty must approximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry Co
essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability
from the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al. The Supreme Court did not lay
Fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel Group is not enough to that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of
pierce the corporate veil – there is no evidence to show that they are 1 & the same Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the
entity. complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.
Contrary to what Santos claims that MHICL signed his employment contract, MHICL Issue: W/N the CA gravely erred in ruling that the labor arbiter a quo has jurisdiction
Vice-President signed as a mere witness under the word ‘noted’. Furthermore, there over respondent Schonfeld’s claim despite the undisputed fact that respondent, a
is no EER between Santos & MHICL. foreign national, was hired abroad by a foreign corporation, executed his employment
contract abroad, and had agreed that any dispute between them “shall finally be
32. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS V. SCHONFELD settled by the court of arbitration in London” – NO (CA did not commit a mistake
because the Philippines HAS jurisdiction over the case)
Facts:
• Respondent Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen. Held:The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held in the vintage case of
• Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly established and Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and is a subsidiary of and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do NOT, as a rule, supersede
Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence
• In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
sanitation in the Philippines. Respondent Schonfeld was employed by PCIJ as agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
PPI Sector Manager in its Water and Sanitation Department. His salary was to They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties
be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ. were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
• In 1998, Henrichsen sent a letter of employment to Schonfeld in Canada. categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them
Schonfeld made some revisions, signed the contract, and sent a copy to be litigated only at the place named by them.
Henrichsen.
• The arbitration clause of the contract provides that “any question of In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court,"
interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as "in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of
well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company which is equal import were stated in the contract. It CANNOT be said that the court of
in consequence of our connected with his employment with the Company and arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of
cannot be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties the employment contract.
through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.”
• Schonfeld received his compensation from PPI and was also reimbursed for the Petitioners contend that respondent Schonfeld should have filed his complaint in his
expenses he incurred in connection with his work as sector manager. He place of permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at the
reported for work in Manila except for occasional assignments abroad, and place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their
received instructions from Henrichsen. contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filed his
complaint, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the
• On May 5, 1999, Schonfeld received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that
his employment had been terminated effective Aug. 4, 1999. However, on July employment contract is merely permissive.
24, 1999, Henrichsen, requested him to stay put in his job after Aug. 5, 1999.
Schonfeld continued his work with PPI until Oct. 1, 1999. As for petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non
conveniens, the same must be rejected. The bare fact that Schonfeld is a Canadian
• Respondent Schonfeld filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid
citizen and was a repatriate does NOT warrant the application of the principle for the
salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods
following reasons:
to Canada. PPI partially settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to
(1) The Labor Code of the Philippines does NOT include forum non
pay the rest.
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
• In 2000, he filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and
(2) The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter.
factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.
• Labor Arbiter: The employment contract between Schonfeld and PCIJ was (3) In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of
controlling. Since the parties had agreed that any differences regarding Appeals, the Court held that:
employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do
court of arbitration in London, only the court of arbitration in London has so if the following requisites are met: (1) the Philippine Court is one to
jurisdiction. which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) the Philippine Court is in
• NLRC: affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
• CA: Even under the employment contract, the parties are NOT precluded from
bringing a case related thereto in other venues. Even if there is an agreement
(3) the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
decision. regardless of the country where said property may be found.
All the foregoing requisites are present in this case. Thus, the Labor Arbiter has The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
jurisdiction to hear the case at hand. The decision of the CA is affirmed, and the case residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Article 946 of
is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for disposition of the case on the merits. the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
Kaufman, is its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules
33. AZNAR V. CHRISTENSEN-GARCIA of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited in Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
Facts: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California where he State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled
resided and consequently was considered citizen thereof. He came to the Philippines in California but in other jurisdictions.
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself a citizen of The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
California. laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
In his will, Edward instituted his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
but left a legacy of P3600 in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in his will was not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, which is the Philippines in the
described as "not in any way related to" him but in a decision rendered by the case at bar.
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
The Philippine court therefore must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
Helen alleged that the will deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural laws rule of the state of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
child. She claims that under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the California law should be hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
applied, and the question of the validity of the testamentary provision should thus be partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines. She
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as RENVOI DOCTRINE
follows: “If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
his domicile.” Accordingly, her share must be increased in view of successional rights foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'
On the other hand, the executor and Lucy argue that the national law of the
deceased must apply, and thus the courts must apply internal law of California on the Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
(Kaufman Case). to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
Issue: W/N Philippine law should ultimately be applied? YES
Residence Domicile
Held: Edward was a US Citizen and domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his Requires bodily presence of an Requires bodily presence in that place
death. inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicle
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows: 34. BELLIS V. BELLIS
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He
country where it is situated. executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of in trust, in the following order and manner
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose a) $240,000.00 to his first wife Mary Mallen
b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to
Miriam Palma Bellis,or $40,000.00 each, and recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective oppositions to the the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund
of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted
The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
executor’s final account, report and administration, and project of partition. Relying the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII.
upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is which did not provide for legitimes. EASIER FACTS: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by
respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on
ISSUE: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects
rights? in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were
HELD: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the
law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a
national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his contract of employment is one year.
testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri
Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) law.
the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity
of provisions of will, and (d) the capacity to succeed. HELD: AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a
ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where
country to where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions, such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common- law conflicts rule (G.R.
both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount of successional No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be
wherein said property may be found. the governing law.
35. CADALIN V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides: A claim arising out of a
contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the
GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of
the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy. requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the
FACTS: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers
(OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII. characterization given such a law.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied
the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding
that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil
be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to Code of the Philippines, which provides: The following actions must be brought within
give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions. ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2)
Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: Money claims-all
substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the
place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute
has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]).
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by
the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred,
it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex

proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402,
64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that: The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
(Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the
next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is
three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
â
FOREIGN LAW 1906: PETRONILA died
1. SY JOC LIENG v. GREGORIO SY QUIA (G.R. No. L-4718; 1910) The plaintiffs in this case are the alleged grandchildren of SY QUIA. They claim that
they are the only legitimate heirs of SY QUIA and that since the death of SY QUIA,
Doctrine: EXISTENCE OF FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROVED AS A QUESTION the defendants occupied, possessed, and managed the properties of SY QUIA found
OF FACT. — When in a litigation the application of a foreign law is sought, it is in the Philippines. On the other hand, defendants claim that they are the legitimate
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands, in a satisfactory manner, the heirs and descendants of the deceased by virtue of his legal marriage to
existence of such a law as a question of fact; and when proof of such a law is lacking, PETRONILA. They further claimed that SY QUIA did not have any property before
it is improper to apply unknown laws to suits pending before the courts of the Islands. said marriage and neither did he brought any property into the conjugal partnership.
In their answer, it was also mentioned that when they initiated the proceedings to
ACCORDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS ACCORDING TO THE DEFENDANTS settle the estate of the deceased, no oppositions were filed by the plaintiffs even if
during this time they were in the Philippines and they had notice of the death of SY
1847: SY QUIA born in China and a 1852: SY QUIA, an infidel in the QUIA and the initiation of the proceedings; they also stated that the Chinese heirs
citizen of China was married in the city Philippines who has residered therein were never recognized or considered by SY QUIA as his descendants, relatives, or
of Amoy to YAP PUAN NIU; had 2 many years prior thereto as an heirs.
children: SY BY BO and SY BY GUIT immigrant was baptized a Catholic in
â Ilocos Sur under the name of VICENTE Through the course of the hearing and upon motion of the parties, depositions were
1880: SY BY GUIT died intestate in RUPERTO ROMERO SY QUIA taken in China and in Ilocos from their respective witnesses. Defendants on a later
China leaving SY JOC LIENG and SY (evidenced by a certificate of baptism) date asked the court to declare that the depositions taken in China should not be
CHUA NIU as his only legitimate â admitted since these contained formal defects (certificates by the officer who took the
children and legitimate heirs 1853: SY QUIA got married to deposition did not comply with the essential requisites provided by law) concerning
â PETRONILA ENCARNACION the manner in which the oath as administered to the witnesses.
1882 : SY BY BO died intestate in China (evidenced by a certificate of marriage)
leaving SY YOC CHAY and SY JUI NIU â CFI: plaintiffs were declared heirs and were entitled to ½ of the properties divided by
as his only legitimate children and since their marriage, they had fixed their the court in 1900.
legitimate heirs domicile in the Philippines
â â A motion for new trial was filed by the defendants. On the other hand, the plaintiffs
1891: YAP PUAN died intestate in 5 legitimate children: APOLINARIA, also appealed the decision and requested that the court modify its decision and
China leaving SY QUIA (husband) and 4 MARIA, GREGORIO, PEDRO, JUAN (all conclusions of law by declaring that the plaintiffs were the only heirs of SY QUIA and
grandchildren as her legitimate heirs have certificates of baptism) that they were entitled to all the properties of the deceased. They further alleged that
â â the court erred in finding as a conclusion of law and that the said SY QUIA was a
1894: SY QUIA died intestate in Manila 1894: SY QUIA died intestate leaving subject of the Chinese Empire so his estate should be distributed in accordance with
leaving his 4 grandchildren as his only behind his wife, children, and the laws of China.
legitimate heirs grandchildren (children of APOLINARIA)
â as his legitimate heirs Issues: 1. W/N SY QUIA was lawfully married to YAP PUAN NIU? NO.
1906: SY JUI NIU died â 2. Whether the distribution of SY QUIA's estate be done in accordance with the laws
1894: his Filipino heirs (defendants) of the Philippines or of China? (PHILIPPINES)
initiated the necessary legal proceedings
to settle the estate of the deceased; Held: 1) The Court held that the plaintiffs were not able to show the matrimonial
â letters evidencing the alleged marriage in China in accordance with their tradition (as
1894: then CFI issued a decree was based by the Court on certain books discussing the traditions in China). It was
declaring the Filipino heirs as the further held that the party obliged to exhibit these letters can only be relieved from the
abintestate heirs of the deceased necessity of so doing by proving that the same have been lost or dissappeared, for in
â the absence of such proof (there being none of this character in the record), they
since then, they have in quiet, peaceful, must be produced at the trial in order to establish the fact of the marriage alleged to
and uninterupted possession of the have taken place, and only in the cases expressly excepted by law can any other
properties in question as owners in good proof, such as the testimony of witnesses, be allowed, but the letters themselves
faith and with a just title until 1900 when must be produced as evidence of the contract to which they relate, in accordance
the plaintiffs filed their complaint with the provisions of section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The failure to
produce the said matrimonial letters and the lack of proof that they had been Therefore the questions raised by those who now claim to be his descendants should
destroyed or lost give rise to the legal presumption that the marriage was not be decided in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines to which SY QUIA
performed; and such presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of submitted himself from the time he applied for a resident's license and abstained from
witnesses; for this is a most important contract, which, according to the ancient laws registering in 1870 as a foreigner. Most of the property left by him being real, the
and customs of China, must be evidenced by such letters or cards. same is subject to the laws of the country in which it is located.
On the other hand, defendant's documents and witnesses were able to prove the Furthermore, aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear from the record
marriage with PETRONILA was true and lawful and that at the time of the said what are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case, there is no proof of
marriage SY QUIA was single. This was evidenced by the marriage certificate and the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the plaintiffs, nor is there anything to
witnessed by the clerk of court who facilitated the administrative proceedings in show what the books or pamphlets introduced by them in evidence contain any
acquiring the necessary permission to marry PETRONILA. Being a public specific laws of the Celestial Empire. The jurisprudence of American and Spanish
proceeding reflected in public records, such were given weight by the Court. The tribunals is uniform on this subject. A judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the
canonical documents presented were also given weight as these also have the 26th of May, 1887 said:
character of being public documents.
"Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence must be satisfactory
As the first marriage was not proven and the second marriage was established to be established as any other fact.'6
lawful, the plaintiffs do not have any right of claim to the properties since these are
fruits of a valid conjugal partnership, which, under the Philippine laws, will belong Even if arguably the plaintiffs presented witnesses and "mortuary tablets" (shows
only to the surviving spouse and legitimate child/children (subject to certain claims certain events in the family of SY QUIA in accordance with Chinese customs such as
and proceedings). date of marriages, birth, death, etc.) as proof in their favor, these were not enough in
accordance with the laws then. As to the tablets, these were said to be unreliable
2) Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having become a regularly domiciled denizen4 under the based on the fact that it stated that SY QUIA died on 1891 when he died in 1894.
laws5 the prevailing by reason of his long residence in this country (Binondo, Manila) The witnesses were contradicting each other and some of their testimonies were
for more than fifty years and by reason of the further fact that he married a native even declared to be improbable. The Chinese consul himself even stated that he
woman, established himself in this city with a home of his own, acquired real property had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged compilation of laws used by
and engaged in business generally, most of the property left by him at the time of his the plaintiff, the books not being duly certified, adding that he could not say whether
death real property, the questions raised by plaintiffs' petition must be determined in the book marked "Exhibit AH" was an exact copy of the original.
accordance with the laws of the Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself when
he came to the Islands and secured a residence therein, and not in accordance with 2. IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
any other foreign or unknown law. Following the laws then, it will be clear that SY
QUIA gained residence in these Islands under the laws of the Novisima Recopilacion. FAST FACTS: Emil Johnson died in the City of Manila; however he was a
naturalized American citizen. He left a will through which he disposed an estate

4 valued at 231,800php. However, the will was signed by two witnesses instead of the
Law 3, title 11, book 6 of the Novisima Recopilacion
three required by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, a petition was
"There shall be considered as denizens... those who residing therein may be converted to made stating that the will was made in conformity with US Law, thus valid in the
our holy Catholic faith; those who, being self-supporting, establish their domicile therein; Philippines as provided for in Section 636 in the Code of Civil Procedure. The will
those who walk who ask for and obtain residence in any town thereof; those who marry a
native woman of the said kingdoms and are domicile therein... those who establish
6
themselves in the country by acquiring real property; these who have a trade or professional Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
and got there to practice the same... those who hold public or honorary offices or any such "Books printed or published under the authority of the United States, or of one of the States
position whatsoever which can only be held by natives... those who shall reside on the said of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain statutes, codes, or other
kingdoms for a period of ten years in a home of their own..." written law of such State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of
such State or country as evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine
5
1) Law 1, title 11, book 6 of the Novisima Recopilacion (acceptance of foreigners in the country who Islands as evidence of such law."
have trade or industry here and has lived here for a period of 10 years and is married to a native Section 301 of the same code provides:
women for 6 years) "A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State or country, attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State or country,
2) There was published in the Official Gazette of this city on September 18, 1870, the decretal law of is admissible as evidence of such law or writing."
the 4th of July of the said year relating to foreigners, section 2 of which provides: Section 302 provides as follows:
"The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten
"Domiciled foreigners are those who have a regular residence and have lived for three years law of the United States or of any State of the United States, or foreign country, as are also
in any province or who may have registered as such residents in the registry of domiciled printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the United States or of
persons kept for this purpose," such State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in such courts."
was later probated and declared legal, however the testator's daughter, Ebba ISSUE: W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator
Ingeborg entered an appearance, claiming that as a legitimate child she cannot be was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity
deprived of the legitime which she is entitled to as provided by Philippine law. She with the laws of that State? NO.
moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration
in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father. HELD:In the testimony submitted to the trial court, Johnson first came to the United
States as a boy and settled in the State of Illinois. Eventually he married one Rosalie
FACTS: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a Johnson and they would have one daughter, the petitioner Ebba Ingeborg. Johnson
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated remained in Illinois until he came to the Philippines as a soldier in the United States
September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as Army. On November 20, 1902, he went back to the US so that Rosalie Johnson could
estimated by him, was 231,800php. be granted a decree of divorce in the Circuit Court of Illinois, on the ground of
desertion. In 1903 Emil Johnson would return to obtain a certificate of naturalization.
This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator’s own Thereafter he returned to the Philippines and would conduct his business here until
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three his death. He had marital relations with two women. From Alejandra Ibanez he would
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure - therefore the will have three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. From Simeona Ibanez he
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills would have two children: Eleonor and Alberto.
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved
under section 618. . All this being said, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to
the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State
However, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila of his permanent domicile. Further, there is no law in force at that time by virtue of
for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the
citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America. The will was duly executed in Philippine Islands. Thus it was impossible for the testator, even if he had so
accordance with the laws of that State, hence could properly be probated here desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This
being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois
Will made here by alien. – A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or along with his status as a citizen of the United States
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of
the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic
and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed due execution of the will. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be
according to the laws of these Islands. determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.
After a hearing, the document was declared to be legal, and administrators were 3. FLUEMER V. HIX
nominated: Victor Johnson, the deceased's brother and John T. Pickett.
Pickett declined, and Johnson was appointed sole administrator. In the will, the Facts: Tuason, the Judge of First Instance, denied the probate of the document
testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased (Edward Randolph Hix).
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of Thus, the special administrator of the estate of Hix, Fluemer (the petitioner in this
P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra case) appealed the said decision. However, appellee Annie Hix (who is the ex-wife of
Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, Edward Hix) contends that the appellant Fluemer as a mere special administrator is
spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the not authorized to carry on this appeal.
testator’s five children – Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
Issue: Whether the appellant/special administrator Fluemer is authorized to carry this
However, three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for the appeal – YES
petitioner, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson, entered an appearance in her behalf and
asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived Held: Appellant Fluemer was a person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a
of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary will by the CFI and so should be permitted to appeal to the SC from the disallowance
successions in these Islands. She moved to annul the decree of probate and put the of the will.
estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole
legitimate heir of her father. It is the theory of petitioner Fluemer that the alleged will was executed in West
Virginia on Nov. 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that
the laws of West Virginia govern. Thus, a copy of Sec. 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as
found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, Facts: This case involves the liability of A.H. Muzzal, a former resident of the State of
and as certified to by the Director of the National Library was submitted. However, California, now residing in the Philippines, for obligations contracted by Meyer-
this cannot be considered as compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign Muzzal Company, a California corporation, on 5 Nov 1928 and 22 Dec 1928 with
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Willamette Iron & Steel Works. Stanley Hermann, a CPA/auditor hired by Meyer-
Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various Muzzal Company on said dates, testified that A.H. Muzzal subscribed and owned
States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. 1,433 out of the 5,000 Meyer-Muzzal Company shares (par value of $10 each) at the
time the obligations were contracted. Willamette seeks to recover under Sec. 322 of
In this case, the requirements of the law were NOT met. There was no showing that the Civil Code of California, which provides:
the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in Sec. 300 of the Code of Civil “Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was
having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as a stockholder as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of
provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced the subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the
to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders, for
alleged will was executed. the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in such action the court must (1)
ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and
Also, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this (2) a several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith. If any
point is to be found in the testimony of the prisoner. No evidence was presented to stockholder pays his proportion of any debt due from the corporation, incurred while
prove that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of 2 competent he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further personal liability for such
witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator debt, and if an action has been brought against him upon such debt, it must be
and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the costs, or such proportion thereof as may be
that the witnesses to the will reside outside the Philippines, it would then be the duty properly chargeable against him. The liability of each stockholder is determined by
of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, the amount of stock or shares owned by him at the time the debt or liability was
sec. 633). incurred; and such liability is not released by any subsequent transfer of stock.”
It was also necessary for Fluemer to prove that the testator had his domicile in West The CFI of Zamboanga rendered judgment in favor of Willamette; hence this appeal
Virginia and not in the Philippines. The only evidence introduced to establish this fact by A.H. Muzzal.
consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of Fluemer.
Issue: 1. W/N Willamette has sufficiently proven the existence of the foreign law
While the appeal was pending submission in the court, Fluemer’s lawyer presented involved? YES
an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the
documents attached to the petition. One of the documents discloses that a paper 2. W/N the CFI erred in enforcing the law of California? NO
allegedly the last will and testament of Edward Hix was presented for probate in 1929
before the clerk of Randolph Country, West Virginia, and was duly proved by the Held: 1. YES. Mr. Arthur Bolton, an attorney of San Francisco, California since the
oaths of Wamsley and Madden. Another document shows that in 1929, the clerk of year 1918, under oath, quoted verbatim Sec. 322 of the California Civil Code and
court appointed Maxwell as the administrator cum testament annexo of the estate of stated that said section was in force at the time the obligations of Muzzal to
Hix. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will Willamette were incurred. This evidence sufficiently established the fact that the
in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West section in question was the law of the State of California on the above dates. A
Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly reading of Secs. 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that
indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove
West Virginia the ancillary administration. However, no attempt has been made to the existence of a foreign law. “The foreign law is a matter of fact. You ask the
comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil witness what the law is; he may from his recollection, or on producing and referring to
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been books, say what it is.” (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice
proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that Denman in a well known English case where a witness was called upon to prove the
the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he referred to a book
contention that he left any in West Virginia. containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as controlling.) Aside from the
testimony of Attorney Bolton, Ragland’s Annotated Civil Code of California was
4. WILLIAMETTE V. MUZZAL presented as evidence. This book contains that State’s Civil Code as adopted 21
March 1872, with the subsequent official statute amendments, including the year
1929.
2. NO. A.H. Muzzal argues that since the law of California, as to the liability of 2. W/N the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122
stockholders of a corporation, is different from and inconsistent with the Philippine of the NIRC exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the
Corporation Law the courts here should not impose liability provided in that law upon 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.? NO.
a resident of these Islands who is a stockholder of a California corporation. A.H.
Muzzal is chargeable with notice of the law of California as to the liability of 3. W/N the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861,
stockholders for debt of a corporation proportionate to their stock holdings, in view of U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the NIRC? NO
the fact that he was one of the incorporators of the Meyer-Muzzal Company in the
year 1924 and was still a stockholder in that company in the year 1928. Exhibit 10 of 4. W/N the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the
Willamette is a certified copy of the articles of incorporation of Meyer-Muzzal 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly
Company in which it appears that the company was incorporated on 22 Aug 1924, appraised by the lower court? NO.
and that the incorporators were A.H. Muzzal, Leo W. Meyer and James Rolph, Jr.,
“all of whom are residents and citizens of the State of California.” A.H. Muzzal cannot 5. W/N the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and
now escape liability by alleging that the California law is unjust and inconsistent with administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate
the Philippine Corporation Law. taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred
by the decedent during his lifetime? YES, except indebtedness.
NOTE: Secs. 300 and 301 of the then Code of Civil Procedure were mentioned in the
case but were not quoted. The Code of Civil Procedure referred to was that in effect 6. W/N the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to
in 1935. have overpaid the government and to be refundable to it? NO.
5. CIR V. FISHER HELD:1. Lower court CORRECTLY DEDUCTED the half of the conjugal property in
determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
Facts: The case relates to the determination and settlement of the estate of Walter
Stevenson (born in the Philippines , of British parents, married in the City of Manila to The application of Art 1325 of the Old Civil Code (adheres to the dominance of the
Beatrice, British also). Walter instituted his wife as the sole heiress to the following nationality law in determining the property regime of spouses) is misplaced because
real and personal property, which they acquired while residing in the Phils: it covers marriages between an alien and a Filipino and a marriage celebrated
abroad. This makes the English law applicable to the case at bar (because again,
Real Estate in Baguio: they are both British), but it was not satisfactorily proved that the English law states
• Shares of stock from Mindanao Mother Lode Mines that the ownership of the property of the spouses should all vest in the husband, thus
• Shares of stock Canacao Estate it cannot indulge in a processual presumption on what the English law has to say on
• Cash and credit from Canacao Estate the matter.
• Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China
2.Reciprocity provided by the Philippine and Californian Laws CANNOT be availed
(Only the first two are relevant to the case) of. The reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any
and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if
Manila for the settlement of the estate. any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death,
- Ancillary administrator submitted a preliminary estate and inheritance tax legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally
appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson. 3. P 4,000 deduction CANNOT be allowed. the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under
- Beatrice Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a DEDUCTION and not of an
spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein exemption regarding which RECIPROCITY CANNOT BE CLAIMED under the
- Basically, the case tackles disputes regarding considerations in making provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity
deductions, exemptions, valuation of property and the property regimes for authorized under the Federal Law.
alien spouses residing in the Phils.
4. For the valuation of the Baguio real estate: CIR appraisal upheld. Properties are
Issues: 1. W/N, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of required to be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof
the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in shall be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to the contrary has
accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of not been shown. Valuation made is justified by evidence.
the NIRC? YES
For the Mindanao Mother Lode shares of stocks: Respondents' claim that the shares 2. W/N the evidence on whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become
of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after naturalized citizens of their country is sufficient? YES
the death of Stevenson has merit. Situs of taxation is the Philippines so it should be Held: 1. The lower court found that such testimony was an extravagant
valued on the basis of prices prevailing in the country. understatement of the reality that since he has lived in the country for 44 years,
mingling and dealing with people who use Tagalog in their daily intercourse, Pardo
The reservation made by the ancillary admin should be respected still, that the has definitely gained a working knowledge of the language. To this, the SC agreed
shares of stock shall be valued based on the prices 6 months from the death of the to.
decedent
2. The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain in the
5. Judicial and admin expenses : Allowable deduction, upheld by the probate court Philippines, stating that in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil
also Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in
Spain. Article 17 provides that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of
Funeral expenses: P86.52 additional funeral expense disallowed, lack of evidence of naturalization and those who have not obtained such certificate but have acquired
incurring this additional funeral expense domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards. No discrimination being made in
these provisions, they apply to persons of any nationality.
- P2000 funeral expense, allowed
- Real estate taxes: Was actually allowed, shown by computations in the original As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the
text Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges
of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and nay be judicially recognized
- Indebtedness: Disallowed, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the by them without the introduction of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.) Moreover, in a
portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate number of decisions mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the
in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. No statement of Chinese Consulate General of Manila has been held to be competent proof of that
the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part of the law.
indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted. Administrator was not able to -------
include the gross estate of the Stevenson in the three returns submitted to the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
court. 28 April 1950
6. Request to pay interest denied. In the absence of a statutory provision clearly or We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the
expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by applicant's country does not conform to the requirement concerning the certification
respondents, the National Government cannot be required to pay interest and authentication of such law (sec. 41, Rule 123). But the case at bar and the cases
cited therein as precedents are not governed by the Rules of the Court. Rule 1342,
6. PARDO V. REPUBLICS entitled "Applicability of the Rules," provides that "These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
NOTE: guys, weird talaga ung pagkakasulat ng case. Hehe but I included everything and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
found in the case, including the MR, he might ask eh. character and whenever practicable and convenience. By reason of this provision,
literal adherence to the Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not
Facts: Vicente Rosal Pardo is a Spanish citizen who was born in Spain in 1895. He obligatory in a proceeding like that under the Philippine law is judicial in character,
has been residing in the Philippines since 1905, has married a Filipina and is, here, and strict compliance with the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would
presently employed. He has been adjudged by the CFI of Manila as entitled to be essential, yet when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it
become a Filipino citizen. The Government now contends this eligibility on the ground is only necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached
that Pardo is unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino languages. To on a far consideration of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly, evidence of
this, the applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood in that the law of a foreign country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
language. His testimony was further corroborated by Lino Gutierrez, a respectable although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section 41 of Rule 123, may
citizen who has intimately known Pardo for 27 years and having had business be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in the light of all
relations with him. circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.
Issues: 1. W/N the contention of the Government sufficient to deny Pardo of The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
eligibility? NO.
7. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BANK V. ESCOLIN
Doctrine of Processual Presumption: The foreign law, whenever applicable, judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such
should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to laws must be proved as facts. The proponent should show the foreign law; as
be exactly the same as the law of the forum. certified by person holding/having custody of such law, with a certificate that
such officer does have custody over said law. v Garcia case can't be used to
Facts: The Hodges spouses, both Texas citizens and domiciled in the Philippines, show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference between this
made in their individual wills, provisions which provide that upon their deaths, their case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in between the
whole estate would be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could rulings
manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property, and
the remainder upon the death of the surviving spouse would redound to the brothers PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linnie is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal
and sisters of the deceased surviving spouse (basta ung asawang huling namatay property, they having argued that it is so.
LOL).
The SC held that the estate of Linnie inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
Linnie Jane Hodges died first in Iloilo leaving a will executed in Texas but probated in more that just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper
the CFI of Iloilo City with the widower Charles Newton Hodges appointed as Executor, application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the
pursuant to the provisions of the will. Charles was previously appointed Special pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
Administrato, in which capacity he filed an “urgent ex-parte motion to allow or Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
authorize himself to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining
acts which he had been doing while deceased was living” which was granted by the and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position
court. As Executor he filed another motion to approve all sales, conveyances, leases, to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
mortgages that he had made further and subsequent transaction which he may do in therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first
accordance with the last wishes of his wife” which was also approved by the court. In instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that
financial statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered
of Linnie is 1/2 of the conjugal estate. He also allegedly renounced his inheritance in opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges,
a tax declaration in the U.S. her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated
to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have
Subsequently, Charles also died. Magno was appointed as the admistratrix for the disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
estate of both spouses but later replaced by PCIB as to Charles’ estate. Charles which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the
before his death, failed to make accounting, and also failed to acquire final conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
adjudication of Linnie’s estate. Since there was no liquidation of Linnie’s estate, the earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third
brothers and sisters of Linnie wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under
could inherit. Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the
ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable
Issue: w/n Philippine Law or Texas Law shall govern (regarding Conflict of Laws) portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under the Civil Code.
Remanded (Texas law may be applied but must be proved)
(note: sobrang haba at sobrang daming issues, I just put the issue related to our topic
Held: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven in Conflict of Laws)
whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary
provisions valid. In line with Texas law, which should be proven is the law enforced 8. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO V. GUERRERO
during the death of Linnie and not in any other time.
Facts: On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero) filed a
Art 16 of the Civil Code provides that the law of the nationality of the decedent complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or
applies. But if we apply Texas law, personal property is governed by the law of Chemical Bank (Bank) with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of damages
domicile of the decedent and real property is governed by its situs (both of which is allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
the Philippines). Furthermore Texas law provides no legitime. Thus the renvoi account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
doctrine. Philippine law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,gets verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account.
1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the
estate of the decedent goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging that by stipulation
Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property. The Court said that Texas law may Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of
apply, but was not proven. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
in our courts, The courts of the Philippines Islands are not authorized to take Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims contending
that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s
motion. fees.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Issue: W/N CA erred in holding that Walden affidavit, which proves foreign law as a
Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit (Walden affidavit) stated that fact, is "hearsay" and thereby cannot serve as proof of the New York law relied upon
Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law by petitioners in their motion for summary judgment? NO
and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Held: No, the CA correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment.
Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: “are the issues raised in
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
reconsideration. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court admissions accompanying the motion”? A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings
of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the Guerrero’s complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on
New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. It which he relies for his claim for damages. In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense
likewise denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition. that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of
damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint
The Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for
consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where
fees. material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution of whether a
foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero) filed a complaint for the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.
damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
(Bank) with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law
(1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on material
Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging that by stipulation authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims contending certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
motion. in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official
Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit (Walden affidavit) stated that seal of the attesting officer. An exception to the Rule is that a foreign law may be
Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law proved in open court by the testimony of an active law practitioner familiar with the
and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine foreign law and quoting the specific foreign law involved.
Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The Bank, however, cannot rely on this exception because said exception was
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for established in cases wherein the attorneys testified in open court during the trial in
reconsideration. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On
of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the testified in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New
New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. It York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
likewise denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition. state the specific New York law on damages.
The Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and
the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for opinion of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without
citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court incurred additional expenses of US$8,572 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.
decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts.
While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, Crescent
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action for a sum of money with prayer for
official records or decisions of foreign courts. TRO and writ of preliminary attachment against Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or
Transmar.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with
on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit bond at P2,710,000. Crescent withdrew its prayer for a TRO and posted the required
did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank bond. On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to Vessel and SCI, and Portserv
has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. Pioneer Insurance and Surety
the matters at issue. Corporation (Pioneer) filed a counter-bond for Vessel and SCI.
9. CRESENT PETROLEUM V. M/V “LOK MAHESHWRI” For failing to file their respective answers and upon motion of Crescent, the trial court
declared Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar in default. Petitioner Crescent
Fast Facts: Portserv (Canadian Company) ordered bunker fuels for the Vessel from was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Crescent (Canadian Company). Crescent had it delivered through its supplier, Marine Crescent.
Petrobulk (Canadian Corporation). Crescent paid Marine Petrobulk and tried to
collect from Vessel (owned by a Indian Corporation), et al. It was not paid; hence, it Vessel and SCI appealed to the CA. They attached copies of the charter parties
filed a case before the RTC of Cebu City. between SCI – Halla, Halla – Transmar, and Transmar – Portserv. It was pointed out
that Portserv was a time charterer and that there is a clause in the time charters
Facts: M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry between SCI – Halla, and Halla – Transmar, which states that “the Charterers shall
that is owned by Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and provide and pay for all the fuel except as otherwise agreed.” They submitted a copy
existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the Government of India. of Part II of the Bunker Fuel Agreement between Crescent and Portserv containing
a stipulation that New York law governs the “construction, validity and
1. SCI time-chartered the Vessel to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South performance” of the contract. They likewise submitted certified copies of the
Korean company. Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act of the United States, some US cases,
2. Halla sub-chartered it to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar), a corporation and some Canadian cases to support their defense.
organized and existing under the laws of Canada
3. Transmar sub-chartered it to Portserv Limited (Portserv), a corporation organized CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. Case was dismissed for want of
and existing under the laws of Canada. jurisdiction. MR was denied on the ground of forum non conveniens, considering
that the parties are foreign corporations which are not doing business in the
Portserv requested Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized Philippines.
and existing under the laws of Canada, engaged in the business of selling petroleum
and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine Hence, this petition.7
fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Crescent granted and confirmed the request
through an advice via facsimile.
7
Issues in the Petition for Resolution:
1. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a foreign vessel found inside Philippine waters for the
As security for the payment, Crescent received 2 checks. Thus, Crescent contracted enforcement of a maritime lien against said vessel and/or its owners and operators;
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian 2. The principle of forum non conveniens is inapplicable to the instant case;
corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel. Marine 3. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case, as well as over the res
Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, and over the persons of the parties;
4. The enforcement of a maritime lien on the subject vessel is expressly granted by law. The Ship
Vancouver, Canada. Marine Petrobulk was payed by Crescent via a check. Mortgage Acts as well as the Code of Commerce provides for relief to petitioner for its unpaid claim;
5. The arbitration clause in the contract was not rigid or inflexible but expressly allowed Crescent to
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, Crescent issued a revised invoice to “Portserv Limited, enforce its maritime lien in Philippine courts provided the vessel was in the Philippines;
and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok 6. The law of the state of New York is inapplicable to the present controversy as the same has not been
Maheshwari” in the amount of US$103,544 with the instruction to remit the amount properly pleaded and proved;
7. Crescent has legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts as it is suing upon an isolated business
on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made transaction;
but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to Crescent as security for the 8. Respondents were duly served summons although service of summons upon respondents is not a
payment were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, Crescent jurisdictional requirement, the action being a suit quasi in rem;
9. The trial court’s decision has factual and legal bases; and,
Cresent’s claim, taking the following into consideration:

Issue: Whether Crescent is entitled to a maritime lien under Philippine Laws?
NO. 1. PD 1521 was enacted “to accelerate the growth and development of the shipping
industry” and “to extend the benefits accorded to overseas shipping under PD 214 to
Held: This case is for the satisfaction of unpaid supplies furnished by a foreign domestic shipping.” Sections 21, 22 and 23 of PD 1521 are identical to Subsections P,
supplier in a foreign port to a vessel of foreign registry that is owned, chartered and Q, and R, respectively, of the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, which is part of the
sub-chartered by foreign entities. Federal Maritime Lien Act. Hence, U.S. jurisprudence is relevant in determining
whether PD 1521 can by applied in this case. In the US, the following tests are
Under BP 129, RTCs exercise exclusive original jurisdiction “(i)n all actions in used to determine whether a maritime lien exists:
admiralty and maritime where the demand or claim exceeds P200,000…” Two tests
have been used to determine whether a case involving a contract comes within the a. Scotia Case: In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a court furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court
a. Locational test (English rule) – Maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, with a few has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies
exceptions, is exercised only on contracts made upon the sea and to be executed were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved."
thereon.
b. Subject matter test (American rule) – In determining whether a contract is b. Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases replaced the law of the place of supply:
maritime depends on the nature and subject matter of the contract, having reference i. Multiple-contact test: The following were considered to determine, in the
to maritime service and transactions. absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statute’s reach,
which jurisdiction’s law should be applied:
In International Harvester Company of the Philippines v. Aragon, the court adopted 1) Place of the wrongful act;
the American rule and held that “(w)hether or not a contract is maritime depends not 2) Law of the flag;
on the place where the contract is made and is to be executed, making the locality 3) Allegiance or domicile of the injured;
the test, but on the subject matter of the contract, making the true criterion a maritime 4) Allegiance of the defendant shipowner;
service or a maritime transaction.” 5) Place of contract;
6) Inaccessibility of foreign forum; and
A contract for furnishing supplies like in this case is maritime and within the 7) Law of the forum. (Lauritzen v. Larsen Case)
jurisdiction of admiralty. It may be invoked before the Philippine courts through an ii. The factors in the case of Lauritzen were applicable not only to personal
action in rem or quasi in rem or an action in personam. In the Philippines, any vessel, injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under
even though foreign, found in any port within its Archipelago, may be attached and maritime law in general. (Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.)
sold under the substantive law which defines the right, and the procedural law iii. The application of the Lauritzen test is not a mechanical one – the
contained in the Code of Commerce. But, where neither the law nor the contract significance of one or more factors must be considered in light of the
between the parties creates any lien or charge upon the vessel, the only way in which national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction. The list of
it can be seized before judgment is by pursuing the remedy relating to attachment 7 factors was not intended to be exhaustive. (Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
under Rule 59 (now Rule 57) of the Rules of Court. Rhoditis)
Crescent based its claim of a maritime lien on Sections 21, 22 and 23 of PD 1521, c. The factors provided in Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law: In the
also known as the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978.8 The court disagreed with absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the forum contacts to be
considered include:
a) Place of contracting;
10. The respondents should be held jointly and solidarily liable. b) Place of negotiation of the contract;
8
c) Place of performance;
PD 1521:
Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such lien. - Any person furnishing repairs,
supplies, towage, use of dry dock or maritime railway, or other necessaries, to any vessel, whether
foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, vessel.
shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be
necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel. Sec. 23. Notice to Person Furnishing Repairs, Supplies and Necessaries. - The officers and agents of a
vessel specified in Section 22 of this Decree shall be taken to include such officers and agents when
Sec. 22. Persons Authorized to Procure Repairs, Supplies and Necessaries. - The following persons appointed by a charterer, by an owner pro hac vice, or by an agreed purchaser in possession of the
shall be presumed to have authority from the owner to procure repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry vessel; but nothing in this Decree shall be construed to confer a lien when the furnisher knew, or by
dock or marine railway, and other necessaries for the vessel: The managing owner, ship’s husband, exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that because of the terms of a charter party,
master or any person to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted. No agreement for sale of the vessel, or for any other reason, the person ordering the repairs, supplies, or
person tortuously or unlawfully in possession or charge of a vessel shall have authority to bind the other necessaries was without authority to bind the vessel therefor.
d) Location of the subject matter of the contract; and maritime lien before Philippine courts depended on the existence of a maritime
e) Domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of lien under the proper law. By erroneously claiming a maritime lien under
business of the parties Philippine law instead of proving that a maritime lien exists under Canadian
law, Crescent failed to establish a cause of action.
The initial choice of law determination is significantly affected by the statutory policies
surrounding a maritime lien. (Gulf Trading and Transportation Co. v. The Vessel Even if the court applies the doctrine of processual presumption, the result will still be
Hoegh Shield) the same. Under PD 1521, the following are the requisites for maritime liens on
necessaries to exist:
2. PD 1521 cannot apply and a maritime lien does not exist. 1) The “necessaries” must have been furnished to and for the benefit of the vessel;
a. Out of the 7 basic factors in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law falls only 2) The “necessaries” must have been necessary for the continuation of the voyage of
under one – the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign: the vessel;
i. Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of 3) The credit must have been extended to the vessel;
the injured and the place of contract; 4) There must be necessity for the extension of the credit; and
ii. India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. 5) The necessaries must be ordered by persons authorized to contract on behalf of
the vessel.
b. Under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, PD 1521 is inapplicable. PD
1521 was enacted primarily to protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to These do not avail in the instant case based on the following:
create a lien from a contract for supplies between foreign entities delivered in a a. It was not established that benefit was extended to the vessel. It was sub-charterer
foreign port. Applying PD 1521 and the rule that a maritime lien exists would not Portserv, which placed the orders to Crescent. Hence, it is incumbent upon Crescent
promote the public policy behind the law’s enactment – to develop the domestic to prove that benefit was extended to the vessel.
shipping industry. Opening up the Philippine courts to foreign suppliers by granting
them a maritime lien under Philippine laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime b. Crescent did not show any proof that the marine products were necessary for the
lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. continuation of the vessel.
c. When the parties entered into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not c. It was not established that credit was extended to the vessel. In this case, it was
have intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to determine the the sub-charterer Portserv, which requested for the delivery of the bunker fuels. The
creation of a lien by the mere accident of the Vessel’s being in Philippine territory. issuance of 2 checks in favor of Crescent prior to the delivery of the bunkers as
security for the payment weakened Crescent’s contention that credit was extended to
3. Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. the Vessel. Also, when copies of the charter parties were submitted in the CA, the
a. Injured party (Crescent) – Canadian corporation time charters between SCI – Halla and Halla – Transmar were shown to contain a
b. Sub-charterer (Portserv), which placed orders – Canadian clause, which states, “The Charterers shall provide and pay for all the fuel except as
c. Entity (Marine Petrobulk), which physically delivered the bunker fuels – in otherwise agreed.” This is a conclusive factor against Crescent’s position that
Canada Portserv is authorized by the shipowner to contract for supplies upon the credit of the
d. Place of contracting and negotiation – in Canada vessel.
e. Supplies – delivered in Canada.
d. There was no proof of necessity of credit.
The arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel Agreement, which states that
New York law governs the construction, validity and performance of the contract, is d. The necessaries were not ordered by persons authorized under PD 1521 to
only a factor that may be considered in the choice-of-law analysis. It is not contract in behalf of the vessel (the managing owner, the ship’s husband, master or
conclusive. The lien that is the subject matter of this case arose by operation of law any person with whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is
and not by contract because the shipowner was not a party to the contract under entrusted). A time charter is a contract for the use of a vessel for a specified period of
which the goods were supplied. time or for the duration of one or more specified voyages wherein the owner of the
time-chartered vessel retains possession and control through the master and crew
Crescent’s contention: Even if foreign law applies, since the same was not properly who remain his employees. Not enjoying the presumption of authority, Crescent
pleaded and proved, such foreign law must be presumed to be the same as should have proved that Portserv was authorized by the shipowner to contract for
Philippine law pursuant to the doctrine of processual presumption. supplies.
A party whose cause of action or defense depends upon a foreign law has the A discussion on the principle of forum non conveniens is unnecessary. CA decision
burden of proving the foreign law. Such foreign law is treated as a question of was affirmed, and the instant petition for review on certiorari was denied.
fact to be properly pleaded and proved. Crescent’s insistence on enforcing a
10. EDI-STAFF BUILDERS INTERNATIONAL INC V. NLRC The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was neither underpayment nor illegal dismissal.
The NLRC, however, reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
FACTS: Petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI) is a corporation
engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER EDI HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF
Expertise Search International (ESI) is another recruitment agency which SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY
collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private REASON OF INCOMPETENCE. COROLLARY HERETO, WHETHER THE PRIETO
respondent to Saudi Arabia. VS. NLRC RULING, AS APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS APPLICABLE
IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work
for Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. HELD: In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by
It appears that OAB asked EDI for curricula vitae of qualified applicants for the the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between
position of "Computer Specialist." In a facsimile transmission, OAB informed EDI that, the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties
from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
the position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a order, or public policy.
monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for
Gran's immediate dispatch. In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994. all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary—his In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
month. forum law.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
terminated on the following grounds: thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
primarily on your salary and contract duration. Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment
agency In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or that the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal
instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several and just.
instructions).
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code states that:
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS3
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and
OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him. their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized
cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint against ESI/EDI, OAB, of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation with the sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City for underpayment of wages/salaries causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
and illegal dismissal. heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he
so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful
the workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro Sales
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience, we must determine
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the
or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. x x x employee, and pertains to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the
case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the order of the company which was
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a
cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of
causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not the company policy, Gran's job description, or any other document that would show
justified and therefore illegal. Taking into account the character of the charges and that the "Daily Activity Reports" were required for submission by the employees,
the penalty meted to an employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, more particularly by a Computer Specialist.
consistent, and convincing evidence to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal.
This is consistent with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by the Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment
Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional
evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment was validly and legally
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer but also
dismissed for just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not only an agent of the
To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The first is the July 9, former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities
1994 termination letter, addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing arising from the dismissal of the worker.
Director of OAB. The second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter from OAB
addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined the reasons why OAB had terminated Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
Gran's employment. incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position
because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC, as used by the CA in its
ACAD system." Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to Decision, is not applicable to the present case.
insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required
"Daily Activity Reports." However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment, the
evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, petitioners were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted by the
insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the recruiting agency to insure employment of only technically qualified workers for the
burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed. foreign principal." The CA, using the ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must
have passed the test; otherwise, he would not have been hired. Therefore, EDI was
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient at fault when it deployed Gran who was allegedly "incompetent" for the job.
knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on
the above mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence. According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case at
hand, Gran misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a Computer Specialist;
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may thus, he was not qualified for the job for which he was hired. We disagree.
be shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI
failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent. The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is to weed
out incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is supposed to
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or willful reveal applicants with false educational backgrounds, and expose bogus
disobedience to prosper were not present. qualifications. Since EDI deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be presumed that Gran had
passed the required trade test and that Gran is qualified for the job. Even if there was
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that: For willful disobedience to no objective trade test done by EDI, it was still EDI's responsibility to subject Gran to
be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must concur: (1) the a trade test; and its failure to do so only weakened its position but should not in any
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a way prejudice Gran. In any case, the issue is rendered moot and academic because
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been Gran's incompetency is unproved.
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge. 11. DACANAY V. FLORENDO
Facts: A joint and reciprocal will was executed by the spouses Isabel Florendo and Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition
Tirso Dacanay in 1940. After the death of Isabel, Tirso now seek to probate said will for the grant of letters of administration in CFI of Caloocan. They alleged among
in CFI La Union, with the will providing in substance that whoever of the spouses, others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to
joint testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to
an agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-
of his or her demise. Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The relatives of the deceased Isabel opposed the probate of said will on the ground The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
that it is null and void for being in violation of Art. 669 of the Civil Code: "Two or more Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in
persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person." with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent,
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
The court ruled on the dismissal of the probate, hence this appeal with Tirso
contending that Art. 669 has been repealed by Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) CFI: Sy Kiat legally married to Yao Kee
which he claims provides for and regulates the extrinsic formalities of wills, and
making the issue on whether two wills should be executed conjointly or separately a CA: marriage to Yao Kee not proven
mere extrinsic formality.
Issue: WON the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was proven (NO)
Issue: W/N Art. 669 of the Civil Code was repealed by Act No. 190 (Code of CivPro).
Held: Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
Held: NO. The Supreme Court applied its ruling in In re: Will of Bilbao, wherein alleged and proved as any other fact. To support the case of Yao Kee, the following
several articles of the Civil Code regarding wills have not only been referred to but pieces of evidence were presented:
have also been applied side by side with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The provision of article 669 is not unwise and is not against public policy. 1) Yao Kee’s testimony that she was married to Sy Kiat in 1931 in Fookien, China;
The reason for this is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time
spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder
dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents
he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either of her husband; that she and Sy Kiat, have been living in FooKien, China before he
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her
desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole marriage was a written document is exchanged between the parents of the bride and
property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that
tempted to kill or dispose of the other. there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who
would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree
Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its engagement day; that during the wedding the document would be signed by the
provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during
subject of wills, said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force. Lastly, this article 669 the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
has been reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New CivilCode (Republic Act well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
No. 386, enacted 1949). The implication is that the Philippine Legislature that passed document; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed
this Act and approved the NewCivil Code, including the members of the Code the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and
Commission who prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669 of Sy Kiat were married for 46years already and the document was left in China and
the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure. she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of
Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document
12. YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it
was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they
P300,000.00 more or less. were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China;
that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Kiat as husband and
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made a. In England, against Liberian Transport, Eshley Compania, El Challenger,
back to China. Espriona Shipping, Eddie Navigation, Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua in 1992
2) the statement of the younger brother of Yao Kee that he was present at the b. In England, against El Challenger, Espriona Shipping, Eduardo & Aurelio
wedding and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese govt, a document Litonjua
signed by the parents being sufficient. c. In Hongkong, SC of HKG High Court, against same parties as A
d. In Hongkong, SC of HKG High Court, against Eshley, El Challenger,
3) Asuncion Gillego’s testimony that Sy Kiat admitted to her that he has a Chinese Espriona Shipping, Pacific Navigator, Eddie Navigation Corporation,
wife whom he married according to Chinese custom Litonjua Chartering, Eduardo Katipunan
Bottom line: 2 cases in England, 2 cases in Hongkong
4) Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registered Alien, which states that he was married in
China to Yao Kee In the cases before foreign courts, ARC as the 3rd party mortgagor wasn’t impleaded
as party-defendant. Also in 1992, BANTSA filed an application for extrajudicial
5) certification issued by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China that Sy Kiat foreclosure of real estate mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
and Yao Kee were married in China. Bulacan. After publication and due notice, the mortgaged real properties were sold,
with Integrated Credit & Corporation Services (ICCS) as the highest bidder for 24m.
At most, these evidence prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
But it is not sufficient to establish the validity of the marriage in accordance with ARC then filed before the Pasig RTC an action for damages for BANTSA’s act of
Chinese law or custom. extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before
foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan. BANTSA alleged that the rule
To establish a valid foreign marriage, two things must be proven: (1) the existence of prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for
the foreign law as a question of fact and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by collection has been filed is not applicable here, because: 1) ARC is a 3rd party
convincing evidence. The petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative mortgagor and not a party in the principal restructuring agreements, and not made as
to the law and custom of China on marriage. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of a defendant in HKG and England 2) There is no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours. Philippines since they were filed in HKG and England, so such decisions which may
Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is be rendered are not enforceable unless there is a separate action and 3) Under
known in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it English Law, which is the governing law under the principal agreements, the
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil actions for sums of money.
jurisdiction.
ARC filed a motion for suspension of the redemption period because it cannot
Status of children: children with Yao Kee and Gillego are acknowledged natural exercise the right without waiving its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of
children the mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid.
13. BANK OF AMERICA V. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION RTC granted the motion for suspension. RD of Meycauyan received the order. After a
month, ICCS consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting in the
Facts: Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking institution issuance of TCT in its name. ICCS then sold them to Stateland Investment
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized under the laws of the State Corporation for 39m, and TCTs were issued to its name.
of California. American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation. Bank of America
International Limited (BAIL) is a limited liability company organized and existing The Pasig RTC rendered a decision in favor of ARC. CA affirmed.
under the laws of England.
Issue: W/N BANTSA’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for
BANTSA and BAIL granted three multimillion USD loans to 1. Liberian Transport 2. El the recovery of the loan before the foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy
Challenger and 3. Eshley Compania (herein referred to as borrowers). All are existing of foreclosure
under the laws of Panama, and are foreign affiliates of ARC.
Held:
BANTSA and the borrowers signed restructuring agreements due to the default. As SC does not agree with BANTSA that there are two requisites (ordinary civil action
additional security, ARC, as 3rd party mortgagor, executed 2 real estate mortgages for collection filed, and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered)
over land parcels in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Eventually, the borrowers and that absent such, he mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived the
defaulted in the restructured loans, prompting BANTSA to file civil actions before remedy. SC upholds Bachrach, that in the absence of express statutory provisions, a
foreign courts for the collection, in the following courts: mortgage creditor may institute against the debtor either a personal action for debt, or
a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either but not
both. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
In our jurisdiction, the remedies are alternative and not cumulative. ARC constited Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or
real estate mortgages, and it subjected itself to the liabilities of a 3rd party mortgagor. any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
The mere act of filing an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
mortgagee-creditor’s remedy to foreclose the mortgage. BANTSA is deemed to have relief in the Supreme Court.
elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise.
No final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply. Issue: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
BANTSA alleged that under English Law, the mortgagee doesn’t lose its security Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. This is untenable. Philippine
law should apply. There is no judicial notice of any foreign law. Any foreign law must Held: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. When the foreign law, judgment or contract 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
judgment or order shall not be applied. hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be judgment.
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to
The public policy sought to be protected is the principle embedded in our jurisdiction fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign law should his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for
not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental provisions.
principles of Conflict of Laws.
2nd issue: ARC is entitled to the actual and compensatory damages, because it was a It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
violation of ARC’s rights as 3rd party mortgagor. country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of
14. SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
Facts: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good
and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times
each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and It has thus been said that — But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and
Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
seducing the complainant.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: The present petition has
Basically, Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong
of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a
him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien.
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency
P1,000,000.00. deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not
come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long. protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through. country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
xxx xxx xxx protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines
refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960: justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
6426: interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern. Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central
Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a
amended by P.D. 1246, thus: crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as ends of justice.
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the
written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity
whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then
proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention
of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
NATURE OF CONFLICTS RULE, THE PROBLEM OF succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
CHARACTERIZATION, AND RENVOI
The court held that the application of the aforementioned in the case at bar requires
1. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" as used therein. The
court noted that there is no single American law governing the validity of
Facts: Edward E. Christensen executed a will in Manila on March 5, 1951. He stated testamentary provisions in the US since each state has its own private law applicable
therein that he has one child, Mary Lucy Christensen (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), a to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Filipino citizen but a resident of Los Angeles and that he had no other living no Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
ascendants and no descendants. To her, he devised and bequethed all the income American law. it refers then to the private law of the State of California.
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated. He also stipulated Thus, the crux of the matter is if the California state law applies in the case at bar?
the he was devising and bequething to Maria Helen Christensen the sum of P3,600
and paid to her in monthly increments of P100. Thus, the executor in accordance with In answering the question the court applied the theory of doctrine of renvoi. It first
these provisions finalized the account and project of partition and ratified the payment stated that the problem behind the theory of doctrine has bee encapsulated by
of only P3,600 to Maria Helen as well as proposed that the residue of the estate be authorities in the statement; "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
transferred to Maria Lucy. jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of
law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of
Maria Helen opposed the approval of the project of partition as it deprives her of her Laws rules?"
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared the court in as
such in a previous case. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution The court also discussed two types of renvoi. One type of renvoi is where a jural
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law,
distribution is contrary to law as it denies her one-half of the estate. Furthermore, she the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of
alleged that the law that should govern Edward's estate should not be the internal law the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are process is 'Ruckverweisung.' Thus, after a decision has been arrived that a foreign
involved. she alleged further that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise:
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, requires that the Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
domicile of the decedent should apply. resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in
but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
The court below ruled that as Edward was a citizen of the United States and of the essayists. The doctrine involved has been descriptively designated as the "Renvoyer"
State of California at the time of his death. It follows then that the successional rights to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung." If an affirmative
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by California law. answer to the question postulated above and the operation of the adoption of the
Therefore, it held that he had the right to dispose of his property in the way he foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
desires because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and decided according to the law of the forum.
inviolable.
The second theory is known as the "doctrine of renvoi." The doctrine postulates that
Issue: Whether or not under Renvoi Doctrine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account
disposition of the distribution should be governed by the Philippine Laws? the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
Held: There is no question that Edward was a citizen of the United States and of the prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
State of California at the time of his death and there is also no question that at the been repudiated by the American authorities. The recognition of this renvoi theory
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. Hence, the law that governs implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
the Philippines, which is as follows: conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. The court in explaining the doctrine cited Von Bar theses. (He presented it in meeting
of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900 just in case he asks.)
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of foreign laws.
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect: internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred. Therefore, the court found that the domicile of Edward although, a citizen of
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one California, is the Philippines. Hence, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a his acknowledged natural child Maria Helen should be governed by Philippine Law
question to the same system of law. pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California. The appealed decision is reversed and the case is returned to the lower
The Court noted that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, court so that the partition can be made pursuant to Philippine law on succession.
while the rule invoked by Maria Helena is an internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own 2. AZNAR V. CHRISTENSEN-GARCIA
intended and appropriate sphere, the internal law should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in Facts: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California where he
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the resided and consequently was considered citizen thereof. He came to the Philippines
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself a citizen of
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. California.
In the case at bar, the estate of Edward through its executor argues that what Article In his will, Edward instituted his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir,
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal but left a legacy of P3600 in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in his will was
law of California. However, the laws of California have prescribed two sets of described as "not in any way related to" him but in a decision rendered by the
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
in other jurisdictions. Reason then demands that the California internal law
should be enforced as it is prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and Helen alleged that the will deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If the court child. She claims that under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the California law should be
then must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so applied, and the question of the validity of the testamentary provision should thus be
declared in Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code, then we must enforce the law referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines. She
of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of- follows: “If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
laws rule for those domiciled abroad. situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile.” Accordingly, her share must be increased in view of successional rights
It is further argued by the executor that that the clause "if there is no law to the of illegitimate children under Philippine laws.
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil
Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the On the other hand, the executor and Lucy argue that the national law of the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of deceased must apply, and thus the courts must apply internal law of California on the
the deceased should govern. The court held that this contention cannot be sustained. matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict (Kaufman Case).
of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e. Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The Issue: W/N Philippine law should ultimately be applied? YES
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his Held: Edward was a US Citizen and domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot death.
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the country where it is situated.
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of in trust, in the following order and manner
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose a) $240,000.00 to his first wife Mary Mallen
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
regardless of the country where said property may be found. Miriam Palma Bellis,or $40,000.00 each, and
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for seven surviving children by his first and second wives.
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Article 946 of
the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective oppositions to the
Kaufman, is its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
in California but in other jurisdictions. executor’s final account, report and administration, and project of partition. Relying
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of this case is which did not provide for legitimes.
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in ISSUE: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is rights?
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, which is the Philippines in the
case at bar. HELD: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas
law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his
The Philippine court therefore must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his
laws rule of the state of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
RENVOI DOCTRINE the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity
A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this country to where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions,
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.' both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount of successional
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as wherein said property may be found.
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. 4. LLORENTE V. CA
Residence Domicile Facts: Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. During his
Requires bodily presence of an Requires bodily presence in that place term of duty, Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman
inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it one’s Catholic Church, in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
domicle departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Camarines
Sur. Afterwards, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American Citizen. Upon the end of
3. BELLIS V. BELLIS the World War II, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the US Navy, to visit his
wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, Llorente. Paula gave birth to a boy registered as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the birth
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
was left blank. must be alleged and proved.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the CA did not admit the foreign
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States law. The CA and the RTC called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily “American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized. First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the US. Each State
of California and was issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. The divorce decree of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State.
became final afterwards. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was
a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente in Manila. Apparently, called for or required by New York State law.
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
together as husband and wife. Their 25 year union produced three children, Raul, probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC Camarines Sur, Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. RTC aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
admitted the will to probate. Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo law.
died.
Once proven that the person who initiated the divorce was no longer a Filipino citizen
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s when he obtained the divorce from his spouse, the spouse will lose her right to inherit
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, from him.
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s
will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding a respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. RTC gave due course to Paula's status of persons.
petition. RTC held that the divorce decree was and void and inapplicable in the
Philippines and therefore the second marriage with Alicia was also void. CA affirmed The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
RTC's decision. this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of
Issues: Whether Lorenzo’s first marriage has been validly dissolved through a the trial court.
divorce decree, which capacitated him to remarry Alicia.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
Held: YES. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. Since he was a foreigner, he is not
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.”
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
foreign law. True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
5. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
FACTS: On January 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff (herein private In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
respondent) Milagros P. Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
Saudi Arabia. plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to
On April 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight and
dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, further orders.
they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court
the room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice. Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, SAUDIA officials interrogated her (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.”
about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help
arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the
release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to
to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and
want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to Allah continued to serve in the international flights.
allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights. Plaintiff Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the
detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In cause.
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On November 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and
On January 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.
behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer
of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police On January 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the
station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim
statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. The trial
Jeddah. court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint filed by SAUDIA.
One year and a half later or on June 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes
before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the From the Order of respondent Judge denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on
plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the September 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. It alleged that the trial
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and October 1994, Morada filed her Opposition.
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. In the Reply filed with the trial court, SAUDIA alleged that since its MR raised lack of
that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that HELD:
the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant 1) YES. Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that
case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
Respondent Judge denied SAUDIA’s Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts”
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows: “Acting on the Motion for case.
Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws
October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign
filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiff’s element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
damages plus attorney’s fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article
21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element
Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a
might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.” situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex
form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
Consequently, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO with the CA. Respondent CA resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to
in the interim. In another Resolution, now assailed, the CA denied SAUDIA’s Petition Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise. We
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit: thus find private respondent’s assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A
On October 1995, SAUDIA filed with the SC the instant Petition for Review with conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts the
Prayer for TRO. court a quo.
2) YES. After a careful study of the private respondent’s Amended Complaint, and
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent CA rendered the the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on
Decision, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
considering that the Amended Complaint’s basis for recovery of damages is Article
21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, “The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept
inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
ruling, find recourse in an appeal. moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the
statutes.”
On May 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for TRO,
given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, the Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
instant case is now deemed submitted for decision. provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
ISSUE: municipal forum.
1)W/N the case is a conflict of laws? YES
2) W/N CA erred in holding that the RTC of QC has jurisdiction? YES Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of
3) W/N CA erred in Ruling that in this case, Philippine Law should govern? YES Court on jurisdiction we find that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over
***Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for
the outset. It maintains that private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691.
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. heavily in favor of the RTC of QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
Respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 1935 interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious.
and 2136 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may
e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed. (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.
In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the
case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
respondent) should be upheld. exercised;
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
respondent has voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. The
records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The
dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we have seen
Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction. reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
3) As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.”60 (Italics ours.)
to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions After a careful study of the pleadings on record, we are convinced that there is
of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion thatalthough she was already
the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery
“characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process of deciding and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. There is likewise logical basis on record for
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.” the claim that the “handing over” or “turning over” of the person of private respondent
The purpose of “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law. to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under
“connecting factor” or “point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust,
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful.
performance, or the place of wrongdoing. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or
the determination of the applicable law. These “test factors” or “points of contact” or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
“connecting factors” could be any of the following:
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
“(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the
origin; tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.”
and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the
her her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect trial court’s denial of defendant’s (herein petitioner’s) motion to dismiss the case. Not
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the vindication of the country’s system of law and justice in a transnational setting.
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liabilit1 have been advanced to offer element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as
fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No.
given the factual context of this case. Q-93-18394 entitled “Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines” is hereby
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 6. PCIB V. ESCOLIN
business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. Doctrine of Processual Presumption: The foreign law, whenever applicable,
should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that overall injury occurred and be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation Facts: The Hodges spouses, both Texas citizens and domiciled in the Philippines,
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” made in their individual wills, provisions which provide that upon their deaths, their
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is whole estate would be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property, and
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by the remainder upon the death of the surviving spouse would redound to the brothers
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, and sisters of the deceased surviving spouse (basta ung asawang huling namatay
has been properly established. LOL).
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,” we find, by way of Linnie Jane Hodges died first in Iloilo leaving a will executed in Texas but probated in
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount the CFI of Iloilo City with the widower Charles Newton Hodges appointed as Executor,
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. pursuant to the provisions of the will. Charles was previously appointed Special
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Administrato, in which capacity he filed an “urgent ex-parte motion to allow or
parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon authorize himself to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform
City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable acts which he had been doing while deceased was living” which was granted by the
petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the court. As Executor he filed another motion to approve all sales, conveyances, leases,
burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said mortgages that he had made further and subsequent transaction which he may do in
by private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove the law of the accordance with the last wishes of his wife” which was also approved by the court. In
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of financial statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate
the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent of Linnie is 1/2 of the conjugal estate. He also allegedly renounced his inheritance in
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case5 And as a tax declaration in the U.S.
correctly held by the respondent appellate court, “considering that it was the
Subsequently, Charles also died. Magno was appointed as the admistratrix for the disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
estate of both spouses but later replaced by PCIB as to Charles’ estate. Charles which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the
before his death, failed to make accounting, and also failed to acquire final conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
adjudication of Linnie’s estate. Since there was no liquidation of Linnie’s estate, the earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third
brothers and sisters of Linnie wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under
could inherit. Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the
ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable
Issue: w/n Philippine Law or Texas Law shall govern (regarding Conflict of Laws) portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under the Civil Code.
Remanded (Texas law may be applied but must be proved)
NOTES:
Held: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven
whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary • Texas law applies, but because of estoppel and it is yet to be proven…
provisions valid. In line with Texas law, which should be proven is the law enforced o no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly averred that
during the death of Linnie and not in any other time. under the laws of Texas, there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said
conjgal estate
Art 16 of the Civil Code provides that the law of the nationality of the decedent o PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
applies. But if we apply Texas law, personal property is governed by the law of should be less than as contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of
domicile of the decedent and real property is governed by its situs (both of which is the estate), for admissions by a party related to the effects of
the Philippines). Furthermore Texas law provides no legitime. Thus the renvoi foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
doctrine. Philippine law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,gets controverted fact, create estoppel.
1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the
estate of the decedent goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then • Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr. Hodges did renounce his
Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property. The Court said that Texas law may share, it is clear from the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges himself as executor
apply, but was not proven. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves of his wife's estate that there are properties which constitute the estate of Mrs.
in our courts, The courts of the Philippines Islands are not authorized to take Hodges which should be distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such
laws must be proved as facts. The proponent should show the foreign law; as • It is now beyond controversy that whatever be the provisions of Texas Law
certified by person holding/having custody of such law, with a certificate that applicable, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE CONJUGAL
such officer does have custody over said law. v Garcia case can't be used to ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference between this o Existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it
case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in between the being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
rulings pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3 of the conjugal estate,
such contention constitutes and admission of fact, and consequently, it
PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linnie is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim
property, they having argued that it is so. that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven
later to be the actual provisions of Texas law.
The SC held that the estate of Linnie inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
more that just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper • Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any
pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by proceeding, with the rare exceptional n instances when the said laws are already
Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it
and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position and none of the parties concerned claim otherwise.
to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first
instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that
pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered
opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges,
her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated
to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have
PROPERTY
Held: Conflict issues: We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when
no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1)
1. LAUREL V. GARCIA
There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
Facts: This case is a consolidation of two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
respondents in their capacities as Head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Secretary of
conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, and members of the Principal and Bidding
its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Committees on the Utilization/Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
Japan from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the “Roppongi property”.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired
with the validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose
Japan, the other lots being: (1) The Nampeidai Property, which is the present site of
of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
the Philippine Embassy Chancery; (2) The Kobe Commercial Property, categorized
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
Furthermore, the Japanese law – its coverage and effects, when enacted, and
staff; and (3) The Kobe Residential Property, which is now vacant.
exceptions to its provisions – has not been presented to the Court. Respondents
simply assert that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
what the law provides.
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
Other issues: The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Art.
War II.
420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for
Philippine Embassy". As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until
general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and
the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major
resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person,
repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
but the citizens; it is intended for the common public welfare and cannot be the object
Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
of appropriation.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by the former
The respondents have failed to convincingly show that the property has become
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to
patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange for the construction of 2 buildings
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery
such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably on said proposal, but instead,
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and
government to withdraw it from being such. In the present case, the recent
AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government
citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of
properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi
signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296 does not declare
property were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause. Amidst opposition
that the properties lost their public character, but merely intends to make the
by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi
other disposition. Ultimately, there is no law authorizing the conveyance of the
lot.
Roppongi property.
These petitions claim that the Roppongi property forms part of the public domain as
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ
characterized under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, and thus cannot be alienated, being
of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the
outside the commerce of man. On the other hand, respondents invoke lex loci rei
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining
sitae, or lex situs and insist Japanese Law and not our Civil Code should apply.
Order is made PERMANENT.
Issue: Whether or not Japanese law should govern the sale of the Roppongi property
SO ORDERED.
(NO)
Basically, Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts
CRUZ, J., Concurring: The sale of the property may be authorized only by Congress of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from
through a duly enacted statute and there is no such law. him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
PADILLA, J., Concurring: It is Congress which can decide and declare the conversion awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property. P1,000,000.00.
Congress had made no such decision or declaration. It is clear that the President
cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise without a Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
property to a State patrimonial property and second, authorizing the President to sell Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or
the same. any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
FELICIANO, J., Dissenting: The only requirement which is legitimately imposable is relief in the Supreme Court.
that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear from a consideration of the act or
acts of the Executive Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to Issue: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
have effected such conversion. Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Assuming that the majority opinion is right in saying that E.O. No. 296 is insufficient
to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property; it is here submitted with respect that Held: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
E.O. No. 296 is more than sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the property 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
previously devoted to public service into patrimonial property that is capable of being INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
sold or otherwise dispose of. hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring: In holding that there is “a need for a law or formal judgment.
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it
alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property,” the If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to
majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act – executive or legislative – fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than
is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative decree his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for
is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
earlier interpretations that the nature of property – whether public or patrimonial – is country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, provisions.
repudiates the Government’s position that the continuous non-use of “Roppongi”,
among other arguments, for “diplomatic purposes”, has turned it into State It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
patrimonial property. country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of
2. SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
Facts: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good
and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times
each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and It has thus been said that — But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and
Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
seducing the complainant.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: The present petition has
far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention
committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against
attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long. protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through. country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
xxx xxx xxx protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines
refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960: justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
6426: interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern. Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central
Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a
amended by P.D. 1246, thus: crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as ends of justice.
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the
written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity
whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then
proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those
PERSONAL LAW, NATIOANLITY, AND DOMICILE ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under
date of December 26, 1930, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to Gibbs
1. GIBBS v. GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the
(Note: Cited in the syllabus as TEMPLETON V. GOVERNMENT)
parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the order
of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
Facts: This is an appeal from a final order of the CFI Manila, requiring the register of
deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial
28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in
upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the
lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with
requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case is
now before us with the supplementary evidence.
The order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by
said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D.
For the purposes of this case, the Court considered the following facts as established
Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that Eva died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on
by the evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison has been continuously, since
November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens
the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and
of the State of California and domiciled therein.
Eva were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no ante-nuptial
marriage contract between the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the
It appears further from said order that Allison was appointed administrator of the state
spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands, as
of his said deceased wife in a case in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the
conjugal property:
Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in intestate proceedings,
Allison on September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by TCT No. 20880, dated March
parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of Allison and
16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson
his wife, Eva", describing in detail the 3 facts here involved; and further alleging that
Gibbs".
his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by TCT No. 28336, dated May
accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are
14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by TCT No. 28331, dated April
partnership of Allison and Eva Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no
6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the
one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and 17 others not here
owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on
involved) to be the absolute property of Allison as sole owner. The court granted said
November 28, 1929, living surviving her husband, the appellee, and 2 sons, Allison J.
petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating to Allison as the
Gibbs, now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.
sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of
California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances,
demanded that the latter issue to him a TCT.
legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every
transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part
following tax."
that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any
Issue/s:
document transferring real property or real rights therein or any
1. WON Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible
chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or
interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned? (YES)
inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and
2. WON Register of Deeds erred in declining to register the transfer title of the
actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately
conjugal property on the ground of unpaid inheritance tax? (NO)
notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the non-payment of the tax discovered by
Held: Allison contends that the law of California should determine the nature and
them. . . .
extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva under the 3 certificates of title Nos. 20880,
28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila,
the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the
declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and
refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison on the
Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the In construing the above language the Court met at the outset with some difficulty by
2nd paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code. the expression "the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by
reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. The Court
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows: encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey.
(Miciano v. Brimo) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands,
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, as above stated, the Court concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in
condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf.
argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson,
real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status,
that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the
to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband;
acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the
with the lex rei sitae. There is not the slightest doubt that a death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of
California married woman can acquire title to land in a common the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the
law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but
subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is
vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke, the court said:
husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the
vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the
conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though
personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed
by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very The argument of Allison apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by
terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to succession from his deceased wife, how can the 2nd paragraph of article 10 be
citizens of the Philippine Islands). invoked? Can Allison be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law
of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, seems clear that the 2nd paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or
August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with
determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the 2nd
therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a
international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
organized territory or state of the United States. We should,
therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and In the case of Clarke v. Clarke, the court said: It is principle firmly established that to
domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which
applied here as law were there any question as to her status. govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills
and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the
rests upon the 2nd paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows: nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated.
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478: In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where
property or the country in which it may be situated. the marriage was celebrated.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to
Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be dismiss the petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted that the Philippine lands
here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of 2. ALCANTARA V. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
Allison and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title
equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: FACTS: The petitioners allege that they are qualified voters residing at Culion Leper
Colony, Culion, Palawan, having voted in previous elections in the Philippine Islands;
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership that in a public mass meeting held on April 5, 1935, they adopted a resolution
property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the demanding the right to vote in the plebiscite and requesting that electoral precincts
husband or to the wife. be established within the radius of the Culion Leper Colony in order that the qualified
voters therein could register, which resolution was sent to his Excellency, the
Article 1395 provides: "The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law Governor-General, who referred it to the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior; that
applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which such rules do not the Department of the Interior, through its legal division, ruled that no new electoral
conflict with the express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the precincts could be created at Culion Leper Colony inasmuch as the plebiscite is
husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal treated as and considered as a special election; that in view of this ruling the
partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership petitioners requested, by telegram, the Interior Department to authorize the Balala
and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property Electoral Board of Inspectors, Culion, Palawan, to register the qualified voters of
shall be divided share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their Culion Leper Colony; that this request was refused upon the ground that the
respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence petitioners were not bona fide residents of Culion, Palawan; that on April 23, 1935,
prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes the petitioners Juan L. Alcantara, Miguel Valdes, Adolfo Almeda and Dionisio
immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, Pañgilinan, accompanied by Attorney Martin Miras, appeared before the chairman of
subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors and requested him to register and inscribe
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as them in the officials list of qualified voters in order that they might vote on May 14,
is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her 1935, and that their request was denied on the ground that no specific instructions to
heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code) register them had been received from the Department of the Interior.
It results that the wife of Allison was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a The principal allegation of the respondents, by way of special defense, is "that the
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by herein petitioners are not qualified voters, because they shall not have been
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to residents of Culion for six months next preceding the day of voting, for they have not
the date of her death. Allison himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title acquired residence in Culion as they are confined therein as lepers against their will,
and interest in manifest from the end of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, and they have no intention to permanently reside there (sections 430-431 of the
1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison Administrative Code as finally amended by Acts Nos. 3387, sec. 1, and 4112, secs. 1
D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands to 3); and in view thereof, the respondent Secretary of the Interior has ruled that the
therein described." petitioners are not qualified voters and therefore cannot be registered under the law."
The descendible interest of Eva in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by At present the nearest approach to a constitution that we have in the Philippines in
virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section our Organic Act, the Jones Law, enacted August 29, 1916, by the Congress of the
1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on United States. "The organic law (or Act) of a territory takes the place of a constitution
inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of as the fundamental law of the local government." The only provisions contained in
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) that law as to the qualification of voters reads as follows:
which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in
effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs. SEC. 15. That at the first election held pursuant to this Act, the qualified
electors shall be those having the qualifications of voters under the present
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case law; thereafter and until otherwise provided by the Philippine Legislature
would be nor that Allison in any way challenged the power of the Government to levy herein provided for the qualifications of voters for Senators and
an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds Representatives in the Philippines and all officers elected by the people
refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting that Allison is the exclusive owner of shall be as follows:
the Philippine lands included in the 3 certificates of title here involved. Every male person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power twenty-
one years of age or over (except insane and feeble-minded persons and
those convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of an infamous offense
since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight), who HELD: In some of the states there is a constitutional provision to the effect that for
shall have been a resident of the Philippines for one year and of the the purpose of voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence
municipality in which he shall offer to voter for six months next preceding while a student at any seminary of learning. Under such a provision it has been held
the day of voting, and who is comprised within one of the following classes: "that a student does not acquire a residence for voting purposes merely by attending
(a) Those who under existing law are legal voters and have exercised the such an institution." In addition to such provisions as to students, constitutions of
right of suffrage. some states provide that "For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to
(b) Those who own real property to the value of 500 pesos, or who annually have gained or lost a residence by reason shall be deemed to have gained or lost a
pay 30 pesos or more of the established taxes. residence by reason of his presence or absence while ... kept at any almshouse or
(c) Those who are able to red and write either Spanish, English, or a native other asylum at public expense; ... ."Under such a provision the rule in some
language. jurisdictions is "that inmates of soldiers' homes, by going to and residing in such
home, neither lose their old, nor gain a new, residence, though they intend to reside
Under the authority conferred upon it by the above quoted section the Philippine in the home permanently. Hence they are not entitled to vote except at their place of
Legislature has prescribed the qualifications and disqualifications of voters in residence before becoming such inmates.
sections 431 and 432 of the Revised Administrative Code, which read as follows:
In other jurisdictions, however, a contrary conclusion has been reached,
SEC. 431. Qualifications prescribed for voters. — Every male or female upon the theory that under such a constitutional provision an inmate such
person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power, twenty-one years an institution may acquire a residence at the home.
of age or over, who shall have been a resident of the Philippines for one
year and of the municipality in which he shall offer to vote for six months In the absence of such a constitutional prohibition the rule is that a
next preceding the day of voting is entitled to vote in all elections if permanent member of a soldiers' home has a residence at such home for
comprised within either of the following three classes: the purpose of voting.
(a) Those who, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands upon the
twenty-eight day of August, nineteen hundred and sixteen, were legal There being no such provisions or prohibitions in the Jones Law nor in the sections of
voters and had exercised the right of suffrage. the Revised Administrative Code, quoted above, we see no reason for applying in
(b) Male persons who own real property to the value of five hundred pesos, this jurisdiction the legal doctrine of the courts of the states which have adopted such,
declared in their name for taxation purposes for a period of not less than or similar, constitutional provisions.
one year prior to the date of the election, or who annually pay thirty pesos
or more of the established taxes. There are a large number of people confined in the Culion Leper Colony. They are
(c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, or English, or a not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are not allowed to visit
native language. their former homes even though they have been separated from near and dear
SEC. 432. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified relatives who are not afflicted as they are. Why split hairs over the meaning of
from voting: residence for voting purposes under such circumstances? Assuming that the
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred petitioners intend to return to their former homes if at some future time they are
and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less cured, this intention does not necessarily defeat their residence before they actually
than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been do return if they have been residents "of the Philippine Islands for one year and of the
removed by plenary pardon. municipality in which they offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of
(b) Any persons who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the voting." Surely a mere intention to return to their former homes, a consummation
United States. every humane person desires for them, not realized and which may never be realized
(c) Insane or feeble-minded persons. should not prevent them, under the circumstances, from acquiring a residence for
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write. voting purposes.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next preceding section
who, after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of This court is of the opinion that, under our liberal law, such of the petitioners as have
inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they been residents of the Philippine Islands for one year and residents for six months in
are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical the municipality in which they desire to vote and have the other qualifications
disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, prescribed for voters in section 431 of the Revised Administrative Code and who
irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned. have none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of the same Code were
entitled to register and vote in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935. Having reached this
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners have acquitted a residence for voting purposes conclusion and being unable to determine from the record whether the petitioners
in the municipality in which they desire to vote. have the prescribed qualifications for voters and none of the prescribed
disqualifications this court on May 11, 1935, sent the above mentioned telegram to residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my
the parties in this case. last Will and Testament * * *"
• Plaintiff contends: "That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of
3. VELLILA V. POSADAS the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be
levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of
DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine
and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax xxx…
chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due
permanent place of abode, one's home. process of law. It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur
G. Moody was a "non-resident of the Philippine Islands".
FACTS:
• Arthur Graydon Moodydied in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931 and ISSUES: W/N Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his
executed in the Philippine Islands a will, by virtue of which, he bequeathed all his death? YES
property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and W/N Moody’s estate is subject to inheritance tax? YES
resident of the State of New York, USA
• A petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased HELD:
Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the CFI of Manila • Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal
• Subsequently a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which
said will of the deceased Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated time he accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands.
by the court. • He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the
• Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following
Arthur Graydon Moody; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had
Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine
addressed to her by Moody authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law.
• The property left by Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left
and other personal properties, as are more fully shown in the inventory filed by the Islands the latter part of February, 1928. The record does not show where
the special administrator (Thebaut). Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris,
• The BIR prepared for the estate an inheritance tax return and an income tax France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was
return for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931 receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not
• The estate of the late Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26,
1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making a total of 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to
P90,019.75, of which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for inheritance tax and sell him his interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in
the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he
estate. states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business again." He wrote
• The CIR overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney. letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the -same line to
• In addition to the facts, it appears that Moody, an American citizen, came to the Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were
Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated
Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was,
• He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper
consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands.
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and • There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had
personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was
P609,767.58 and by the CIR for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death
• All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it
within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his
of any kind located anywhere else. business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again.
• In his will executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of • Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal
the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. domicile in Paris in February, 1929. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he
Palmer, he stated: "I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen 'of the United States of America, had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no
evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of
business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative his death was within the Philippine Islands.
factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative
evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does not 4. GALLEGO V. VERA
prove that he had established a domicile in Paris.
• The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the
from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to the
for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of Dec. 1940, on the
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver while
he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a school
not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he
in foreign parts. ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. In June 1938, he worked in
• Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up for the
place of their usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until
minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant he resigned in Sept. 1940.
describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and
toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the election
visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940, He obtained and paid for his
• To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was
and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in stated that he had resided in the said municipality for 1.5 yrs.
the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's
fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was
of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a elected mayor there on the grounds that:
foreign country. 1. He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
• The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant 2. He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody 3. He obtained a residence cert from the municipality of Malaybalay
estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by
the CIR appear to us to be sound. ISSUE: Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and
• That the amount of P259,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly
established by the evidence. HELD:Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as
• Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate there
follows: for 1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.
"SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation.—Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of In the definition of “residence” in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it
inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur:
and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the 1. Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality
Philippine Islands; of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any 2. An intention to remain there
corporation or sociedad anónima organized or constituted in the Philippine 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile
Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership,
business or industry established in the Philippine Islands or of any personal The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of time.
property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax: The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely
xxx" because:
• Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant, 1. When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in
plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be included as Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937
income subject to tax. 2. His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial
drawback caused by his loss in the election
• We affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate
3. He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him
of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within
4. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the ISSUE : W/N on the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
plantation offered to him by the government Florentina, Delfin is a national not subject to deportation? Not a National
5. He visited his family no less than three times despite the great distance
between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon Held:9 There are two reasons why Delfin Co must be returned to China. First, he is
not now a Filipino citizen; and second, granting that he is, at the time he entered this
The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is country from China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and any subsequent
to: change in his status can not erase the taint of his unlawful, surreptitious entry.
“exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those who are citizens of the
office to serve that community.” Philippines, as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was adoption of the Constitution.
now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
5. VILLHERMOSA V. COMMISSIOENR OF IMMIGRATION Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE: After the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that jus the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
sanguinis instead off jus soli is the predominating factor on questions of citizenship, (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
FACTS: Delfin Co's claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on paragraph 4 of the
1. In the night of March 24, 1947, a party of 69 Chinese landed clandestinely on above section. But, being a minor he has not had the opportunity to elect Philippine
the shores of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, in an attempt to evade our immigration citizenship, and therefore he is as yet an alien, his father being a Chinese.
laws. Leading them was 18 year old Delfin Co.
2. Delfin Co was born in Paniqui, Tarlac, of a Chinese father named Co Sut, alias We have heretofore held1 that, after the Constitution, mere birth in the
Yu Kui, and Florentina Villahermosa his wife. Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer
3. In 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China as a Chinese repatriate. Philippine citizenship and that jus sanguinis instead off jus soli is the
4. Due to financial difficulties in China, he took steps to return while there he met a predominating factor on questions of citizenship, thereby rendering obsolete the
Chines (Co Soon Tiong), who informed him of a plan to smuggle their decision in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., and U.S. vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil., and
compatriots into the Philippines. similar cases on which petitioner's counsel relies.
5. Delfin agreed to lead the party to Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives
who could render valuable assistance. Nevertheless, it is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina, Delfin Co,
6. The voyage was undertaken; but unfortunately, the immigrants were discovered should likewise be a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that
and apprehended immediately after arrival, and on the 27th day of March, Delfin upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship. It
Co was examined by the Commissioner of Immigration. would be illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother, because he never
7. Formal investigation of the case began. The Commissioner of Immigration was a Filipino citizen and could not have reacquired such citizenship.
rendered a decision ordering the deportation of Delfin Co.
8. After knowing the apprehension of her son Delfin, Florentina Villahermosa, filed
in the civil registry of Tarlac under Commonwealth Act No. 63 an oath of 9
This petition is moreover to be denied on the strength of precedents heretofore established, because
allegiance for the purpose of resuming her Philippine citizenship which she had Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any posterior change of status can not affect the
lost upon her marriage to Co Suy. legality of his detention for purposes of deportation.
9. On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by Florentina, it In Juan Co vs. Rafferty, 14 Phil., 235, a Chinaman claimed the right to enter the Islands, and being
refused by the customs officials, gave bond that he would present himself for deportation if the claim
was contended that Delfin, being a minor, followed the citizenship of his mother, were disallowed. While under bond, he was adopted as a son by another Chinaman domiciled herein, in
and was a national not subject to deportation. These contentions were overruled legal form. Held: he is subject to deportation, because such adoption had no effect upon his right to
by the immigration authorities. enter or remain in the Islands. This Court said that the status of an immigrant and his right to stay
10. Judge Sotero Rodas, (CFI of Manila) denied the writ of habeas corpus here is to be determined as of the time of his entry (U.S. vs. Ju-Toy, 198 U.S., 253, 263) and that
requested by Florentina Villahermosa on behalf of her son Delfin Co. She he could not do afterwards anything to render valid what was originally an illegal entry.
A Chinese person, not a merchant at the time he applies to enter the Islands, will not be permitted
appealed. to remain here upon the theory that he became a merchant during the time he was waiting for the
decision of the proper authorities, (Tan Guam Sien vs. Collector of Customs, 31 Phil., 56.) (See
also, U.S. vs. Chan Sam, 17 Phil., 448)
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen
While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not a of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Act.
Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such father, Villahermosa continued to The petition shall also set forth the names and post office addresses of such
be a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947. After that witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case."
reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of According to this provision, the witnesses must be citizens of the Philippines and
paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution; but, according to that same "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of
Organic Act, he had to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until he time required by this Act," which in cases of petitioners born in the Philippines is five
becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that he was at the years (Sec. 3) and in other cases ten years (Sec. 2, par. 2).
time of his father's demise.
By their testimony, the two witnesses who made affidavits and gave evidence in
SC declared that Delfin Co is not now a Filipino and he, having entered this country support of the application were not qualified for this role. Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng
surreptitiously, is subject to deportation. admitted that his father was a Chinese national and his mother a Filipina; and when
asked, "Did you actually elect the Philippine citizenship? Have you filed any
6. IN RE: ROBERT CU citizenship application by election in writing?", he answered, "I have not in the sense
that I did not have any proceedings in it," True, he said, "I am a member of the
FACTS: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization setting forth facts required and reserve force of the Philippine Army. I was an R. O. T. C. trainee. I trained in the
appropriate for that purpose, but at the hearing he said that he was a citizen of the Philippine Army. I was called during the war." And he also said, in answer to further
Philippines; and upon the conclusion of the trial, the CFI of Rizal found him "to be a questions, that he had voted in one of the post-liberation elections and that "at
Filipino citizen, both by right of birth and by right of selection," and dismissed the present I am a government employee, and I am a member of the faculty of the
petition for naturalization, holding impliedly that being already a Philippine citizen he University of the Philippines, and also I am a resident physician of the Philippine
did not have to be naturalized. The CFI's pronouncement that Cu is a Philippine General Hospital." But these circumstances alone made this witness neither a citizen
citizen is based solely on the applicant’s testimony that he was born in Angat, of this country nor eligible as a vouching witness in a proceeding of this character. As
Bulacan in 1913. That he was a subject of the Phil. and that when he was a kid of to the other witnesses, Dr. Pastor Gomez, he testified that "he had known Mr. Cu
about 5 months old, his mother, who was a Filipina, died. Then his father allegedly since liberation, about August, 1945." But after this answer was given, the counsel for
brought him to China right after that and at the age of 5, left China was given to the the Govt. objected to the witness' testifying any further, and the objection having
care of Doña Margarita Mangahas. been sustained, Dr. Gomez was withdrawn.
Upon motion of the attorney for the Government, who protested that the last answer US Jurisprudence provides that a petition not so verified by at least two persons who
(that the applicant is a Filipino citizen) was a mere conclusion of the witness, the are citizens is not merely voidable but void. The Court went further and said that such
testimony was ordered stricken out. But the Cu proceeded that he considered himself petition could not be amended. Also, the Courts cannot be expected to possess
a Filipino citizen on account of the fact that his mother was a Filipina and he was acquaintance with the candidates with the presenting themselves for naturalization —
born in the Philippines. He said that his only fault was that he failed to file his in fact, no duty rests upon them in this particular; so that witnesses appearing before
application to elect Philippine citizenship and so he filed his application now. them are in a way insures of the character of the candidate concerned, and on their
testimony the courts are of necessity compelled to rely. A witness who is incompetent
ISSUE: W/N the Cu is entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship under the renders an application void. The question of a witness' qualifications in naturalization
present application? (NO) proceedings is therefore a matter of more than usual importance.
HELD: As observed, Cu’s statements make plain that the he was at best uncertain The above US rulings are not binding upon this Court, but it is a rational rule of
that his parents were unmarried to each other and are therefore utterly inadequate to statutory construction that a statute adopted from another state or country will be
serve as basis for declaring him a Philippine citizen. If the applicant's parents were presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that
legally married, which is however to be presumed, then he was born a Chinese state or country before its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight,
citizen and continued to be so, unless upon the age of majority he elected Philippine or at least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in
citizenship which he confessedly did not do. harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction
on the subject. We find the United States courts' reasoning to be sound and
Sec7 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides that the petition for citizenship, reasonable and we make it our own.
besides stating the petitioner's qualifications as enumerated in the Act, "must be
signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at It is unnecessary to consider whether the application could be granted if witnesses,
least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and other than the vouching witnesses, who were Philippine citizens and knew the
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time applicant for the time required by the statute, had testified and established the
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that petitioner's qualifications for admission to citizenship; as already indicated, no such
witnesses were introduced in support of the petition. The appealed decision is P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
affirmed in so far as it dismissed the petition for naturalization and reversed in so far
as it declared the applicant a citizen of the Philippines. This dismissal, however, will The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the
be without prejudice to the right of the Robert Cu to file a new application for testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,
naturalization claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form
concede to them.
7. PHILIPPINE TRUST V. BOHANAN
ISSUE: W/N Magdalena and her two children have been deprived of the legitime due
FACTS: On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, to them? NO
presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed
by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. HELD: The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena
C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have
therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena
properties are located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction,
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315,
and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb
of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22.
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of
residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right. his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides: Every person over the age
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate,
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's
will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of debts.
Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company,
named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a
filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after share in the testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in
taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its an order dated June 19, 1955, which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan
trust. does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16,
1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, and the
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance court in its said error found that there exists no community property owned by the
with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As
estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained
U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the testator and
which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan
similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
(testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and
Hastings, P2,000; since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson
P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary
his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore,
have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving
the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
8. CARABALLO V. REPUBLIC
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by Facts: Ricardo R. Caraballo, an American citizen, was living with his wife Graciela
the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this Caraballo in Clark Field, Angeles, Pampanga. He enlisted in the US Air Force as staff
point: Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of sergeant detailed in Clark through a verified petition before the CFI of Pampanga.
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose He alleged that he and his wife have no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the children, natural children by legal fiction or any other descendants, and that with his
country in which it is found. wife’s written consent, he desires to adopt Norma Lee Caber, a five-year old
daughter of Mercedes Caber of an unknown father. Caber gave her consent in a
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that sworn statement.
the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. So the question at issue is whether the The verified petition was ordered to be published, but no one appeared to contest the
testementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the adoption. Provincial and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga moved to dismiss
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed the petition since the petitioner, being a non-resident alien, is not qualified to adopt.
that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. It does MD denied.
not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted
provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The CFI granted the adoption of Norma Lee Caber after finding the following facts:
petitioner is 32 years old, the child is 3 months old, he had the child in his household
The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form since the day following her birth and has developed fondness for her. He is a staff
and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows: sergeant in the US Air Force and is adequately compensated, and he has never been
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his Issue: W/N Caraballo is qualified to adopt.
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. Held: NO.
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have (Law in effect at that time, 1962)
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Article 335 of the Civil Code provides:
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section The following cannot adopt -
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
counsel as Exhibits "2". Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor children by legal fiction;
and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January (2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval of his accounts;
23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo. (3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;
(4) Non-resident aliens;
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above- (5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has
quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above broken diplomatic relations;
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, (6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial the penalty imposed was six months’ imprisonment or more.
notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition. A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where he has his
abode and lives there permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily,
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary although he may later on change his mind and live elsewhere. A place in a country or
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been state where he lives and stays permanently and to which he intends to return after a
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. A sojourn such as a tourist
of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his though actually present at a place of his free choice cannot be deemed a resident of
that place. A foreigner who has a business or interest therein or property located in a
country or state and goes and stays in that country or state to look after his business Held: Edward was a US Citizen and domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his
or property or to check up the manner or way his business or property is being death.
conducted or run by his manager but does not intend to remain in the country
indefinitely cannot be deemed a resident of such country. Actual or physical presence The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
or stay of a person in a place, not of his free and voluntary choice and without intent 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
to remain there indefinitely, does not make him a resident of the place.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with country where it is situated.
safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gainsaid that an adopted
minor may be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and protection of the country of his birth. succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
Ricardo R. Caraballo, the petitioner, an American citizen who now lives in Clark Field, succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
municipality of Angeles, province of Pampanga, Republic of the Philippines, because regardless of the country where said property may be found.
of his assignment as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force – his stay in the
Philippines then being temporary – is a non-resident alien who, pursuant to clause 4 The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
of the above quoted article of the Civil Code, is disqualified to adopt a child in the residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Article 946 of
Philippines. the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
Kaufman, is its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules
9. AZNAR V. CHRISTENSEN-GARCIA of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
Facts: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California where he State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled
resided and consequently was considered citizen thereof. He came to the Philippines in California but in other jurisdictions.
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself a citizen of The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
California. laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
In his will, Edward instituted his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
but left a legacy of P3600 in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in his will was not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, which is the Philippines in the
described as "not in any way related to" him but in a decision rendered by the case at bar.
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
The Philippine court therefore must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
Helen alleged that the will deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural laws rule of the state of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
child. She claims that under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the California law should be hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
applied, and the question of the validity of the testamentary provision should thus be partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines. She
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as RENVOI DOCTRINE
follows: “If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
his domicile.” Accordingly, her share must be increased in view of successional rights foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'
On the other hand, the executor and Lucy argue that the national law of the
deceased must apply, and thus the courts must apply internal law of California on the Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
(Kaufman Case). to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
Issue: W/N Philippine law should ultimately be applied? YES
11. ZITA NGO BURCA V. REPUBLIC

Residence Domicile
Requires bodily presence of an Requires bodily presence in that place Facts: This is about the petition of Zita Ngo Burca to declare her as possessing all
inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it one’s qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization under
domicle Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the
Bureau of Immigration. Petitioner Zita was born in Gigaquit, Surigao (now Surigao del
10. LAO CHAY V. GALANG Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay Suy and her mother was Dee
See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of China. She holds Native Born
FACTS: Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age, came to the Certificate of Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054. She
Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary visitors, having been allowed to stay in married Florencio Burca a native-born Filipino.
this country until January 26, 1961. Instead of departing on that date, however,
appellees asked the Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of their alien Notice of hearing was sent to the SolGen and duly published. SolGen opposed and
certificates of registration as well as those of their children on the basis of Lao Chay's moved to dismiss the petition because 1) there is no proceeding established by law,
admission to Philippine citizenship on December 12, 1960. or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual; and (2) that
as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for failure
On January 20, 1961, appellant Commissioner of Immigration granted the petition as to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the
far as Lao Chay and the three children were concerned, but denied the same with Naturalization Law", such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence,
respect to Ng Siu Luan on the ground that "she is not qualified to acquire Philippine and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
citizenship of her husband under the provision of paragraph 1, Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she lacks the requirements provided for under During trial, the sole witness was petitioner. Lower court ruled in favor of Zita, that
paragraph 2 of the same Act." He therefore asked her to leave the country on she be declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of
January 26, 1961. The Immigration Commissioner denied a subsequent motion for allegiance.
reconsideration, although he gave Ng Siu Luan a five-day extension within which to
arrange for her departure. Issue: WON Zita’s petition should be granted
To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan appellees filed a petition for Held: No. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a
mandamus and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila and secured from it Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a
a writ of preliminary injunction. Filipino citizen. Citizenship is limited to Article 4 of the Constitution.
After trial, the court granted the petition, and held that the law does not require that On the legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines,
an alien wife should have the same qualifications as those required of applicants for Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated
naturalization, it being enough that she is not otherwise disqualified. the following: Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines. In line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
ISSUE: Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of Philippine citizenship, citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must not be
automatically follows the citizenship of her husband if not otherwise disqualified disqualified under those enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law.
under the Naturalization Law.
From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals. The court ruled that 1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
HELD: Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law citizen of this country must apply by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
Effect of the naturalization on wife and Any woman who is now or may possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
here-after be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. petition must be filed in the CFI where petitioner has resided at least 1 year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office,
It is now settled that under this provision, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her husband only if he has all the competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications provided in citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
Section 4 of the law.1 Since Ng Siu Luan admittedly does not possess the
qualifications for naturalization, her marriage to Lao Chay be deemed as In this case, Zita was born Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence was Surigao,
automatically vesting in her Filipino citizenship. Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court,
however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took
up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law 2. She must not only be not among those disqualified but also she must prove she
requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former is qualified. Based on Sec.15 of the Revised Naturalization Law which provides:
places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually “Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or
and physically resided. Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself
the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines,” COI
former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to asserted that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably
his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue
surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications
petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. Thus, LY Yeung
while claiming not to be disqualified, cannot allege that she possesses all the
Another flaw is that said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least 2 credible qualifications to be naturalized, because (1) she has been admitted as a
persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the temporary visitor only, and (2) it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required.”Petitioner req’d length of residence in the Philippines. If the intention of the law that that
likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the alien need only be not disqualified, it would have been worded "and who
the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
3. There was deliberate and voluntary representation by LY Yeung that she will
--Petition dismissed enter and stay only for a period of 1 month and was able to secure a visa, thus,
she cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
12. MO YA YIM YAO V. CIR departing from the Philippines as she had promised. Based on Sec. 9 (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, “An alien who is admitted as a non-
Case: Chinese woman married a Filipino citizen. Court held she became a Filipino immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
citizen through marriage. admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
Facts: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung (LY Yeung) applied for a passport visa thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interview for her application for a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese the requirements of this Act.”
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the 4. COI, under Sec.3 of the Commonwealth Act 613, is charged with the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for 1 month. She was administration of all laws relating to immigration is given the authority to perform
permitted to come and stay in the Phils. until April 13, 1961. Upon her arrival, one the quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him in relation to
Asher Cheng filed a P1Million bond to ensure that she would actually depart from the alien immigrants
country on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay or within the
period the COI or his authorized representative might allow. Repeatedly, LY Yeung ISSUE: W/N marriage of a foreigner woman to a Filipino citizen confers ipso facto to
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. her Philippine citizenship?
But days before, on January 25, 1962, she married Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto RULING: YES. The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien woman ipso facto confer
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino. The COI ordered her arrest, deportation and confiscation of Philippine citizenship upon the alien if she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." She
her bond. It was noted that she could not write either English or Tagalog, and could need not prove that she has the qualifications set by Naturalization Law. What she
speak only a few words in those language. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, needed to prove is that she is not among those disqualified by the law.
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-
in-law, or sisters-in-law. LY Yeung and her husband Lim contended that she has 1. With regard to the use of marriage for convenience of naturalization—Doubtless
become a Filipino through her marriage, thus prayed for the court to enjoin the COI’s that there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take
order. advantage of the of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide
matrimonies but the court cannot, as a matter of law, rule merely on the basis of
The COI and Office of Solicitor General (OSG) won in the lower court on the following these possibilities; the construction of the Naturalization Law should be dictated
basis: inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and
practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice
1. It is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
avoid her then impending compulsory departure [or deportation]. 2. With regard to the interpretation of Sec. 15 of CA 473—
First, the section is an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name
USA, which, at the time of the approval of CA 473, the Americans had already was left blank.
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives
to submit to regular naturalization proceedings. Despite this, the Philippine Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written
legislature still opted to copy the prior law of USA. Thus, the Court would have to agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
construe on the basis of how the Americans construed their older law, which is Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily
the ipso facto grant of naturalization by marriage. maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
Second, since the general purpose of the 1st paragraph of Sec. 15 was obviously union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
not similarly granted to other aliens, and with no other objective than to maintain Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. Section 15 was intended admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement
to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all stepmother. The agreement was notarized.
that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." If the
Court will interpret it such that the alien wife must prove the qualifications Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
prescribed by the law (Sec 2 of CA 473), the privilege granted to alien wives of California and was issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. The divorce decree
would become illusory. The wife is required to prove only that she may herself became final afterwards.
be lawfully naturalized (or not disqualified) in order to establish her citizenship
status as a fact. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente in Manila. Apparently,
Third, the Court enumerated several cases, the standing rule under the 2nd case Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
of Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang (1st Ly Giok Ha case decided on 1959, the 2nd in 1966) Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived
is that the alien wife becomes ipso facto a Filipino citizenship by reason of together as husband and wife. Their 25 year union produced three children, Raul,
marriage to a Filipino, and the bond must be returned. Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
Fourth, for the phrase "herself may be lawfully naturalized," the wife need no
longer prove qualifications. The OSG has implicitly conceded that had it been Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
established in the proceedings that LY Yeung possesses all the qualifications property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC Camarines Sur,
required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. RTC
requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization. Hence, LY admitted the will to probate. Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
Yeung is not among those disqualified under Section 4 of CA 473, and “may be died.
lawfully naturalized.”
3. With regard to interpretation of Sec.9 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
1940—the provision implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse,
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s
all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
the country, outside the authority of the COI on aliens, since the Immigration legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding a
Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. RTC gave due course to Paula's
petition. RTC held that the divorce decree was and void and inapplicable in the
13. LLORENTE V. CA Philippines and therefore the second marriage with Alicia was also void. CA affirmed
RTC's decision.
Facts: Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. During his
term of duty, Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman Issues: Whether Lorenzo’s first marriage has been validly dissolved through a
Catholic Church, in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo divorce decree, which capacitated him to remarry Alicia.
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Camarines
Sur. Afterwards, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American Citizen. Upon the end of Held: YES. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the
the World War II, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the US Navy, to visit his time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente. Paula gave birth to a boy registered as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the birth Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law. True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
must be alleged and proved. Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the CA did not admit the foreign 14. SALUDO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS
law. The CA and the RTC called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was
“referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law. Facts: Saludo filed a complaint for damages against American Express Inc. (AMEX)
and/or its officers Fish (Vice President & Country Manager) & Mascrinas (Operations
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the Head) with Branch 25, RTC Maasin, Southern Leyte (S.Leyte). Petitioner Saludo is a
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that Filipino, a member of the House of Reps and resident of S.Leyte. Respondent AMEX
“American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when is a corporation doing business in the Phil, engaged in providing credit and credit
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. facilities & allied services with an office in Makati.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Saludo’s cause of action stemmed from the wrongful dishonor of his AMEX credit
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is card & supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened
no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the US. Each State when Saludo’s daughter used her card to pay for her purchases in the US in April
of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. 2000. The second happened when Saludo used his card to pay his account in Hotel
It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was Okawa (Tokyo) while there with other delegates from the Phil to attend the
a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Tanaka. Allegedly, these dishonors
called for or required by New York State law. resulted from AMEX’s unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo’s account for his
failure to pay the balance covering the period of March 2000. Saludo denied
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already receiving the statement of account. Further, he alleged a wrongful charge for late
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, payment in June 2000, and subsequent cancellation of the cards in the following
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. month.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only AMEX raised the defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same latter, they said that the residents are not residents of S.Leyte, and even Saludo was
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, allegedly not a resident thereof as evinced by his community tax certificate (CTC)
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national which was issued in Pasay. Saludo responded that at the time of the filing of the
law. complaint, he was already a resident of S. Leyte; that his CTCs were issued in Pasay
was only because he had an office there.
Once proven that the person who initiated the divorce was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from his spouse, the spouse will lose her right to inherit Issue: Did the appellate court err in declaring an improper venue, because none of
from him. the parties was a resident of S. Leyte at the time of the filing of the complaint? YES.
Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Held: This complaint is a personal action, governed by Sec 2, Rule 4 of ROC10 . The
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to the plaintiff.
status of persons.
Jurisprudence has held that the term “resides” means the place of abode, whether
The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in permanent or temporary of the plaintiff of the defendant, as distinguished from
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the “domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent one
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of has the intention of returning. Similarly, in Conflict of Laws, residence applies to a
the trial court. temporary stay of a person in a given place, while domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person. This distinction is very well emphasized in cases
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. Since he was a foreigner, he is not cases involving stateless persons.
covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.”
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was 10
Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to MARRIAGE, ADOPTION, AND FAMILY RELATION
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
1. ADPONG V. CHEONG SENG GEE
residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga. He left property
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
worth nearly 100K. The estate of the deceased was claimed by the 2 following
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
parties:
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
1. Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by the
residence must be more than temporary. We note that Sec 2, Rule 4 uses the term
marriage of Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895, and
“residence,” not domicile.
2. Mora Adong, who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong
Boo in 1896 in Basilan, according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book
For purposes of ELECTION LAW, residence and domicile are synonymous. When
on marriage of the Koran, w/ her daughters Payang and Rosalia
parsed, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the CFI. The
conduct indicative of such intention. Thus, "the place where a party actually or
trial judge Abeto reached the conclusion that the proof did not sufficiently establish
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
the Chinese marriage but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
natural child. As to the allegations of Adong the conclusion was that the marriage
law."
between Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the
laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; so, the
For purposes of VENUE, a less technical definition of residence is adopted, and is
daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
judge was for there to be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia. Both parties
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
appealed.
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
Issues:
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.”
1. W/N the marriage contracted in China, and proven mainly by an alleged
matrimonial letter, is valid in the Philippines – NO because there is no proof
S. Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is
as to produce a conviction as to the existence of the Chinese marriage
understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but
2. W/N the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Mohammedan religion is valid - YES
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in S. Leyte could likewise be properly taken
judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution,
Held:
one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
Cheong Seng Gee claimed that Cheong Boo was married in Amoy, China to Tan Dit
in 1985. Witnesses (one was Cheong Boo’s brother) were presented who testified to
Petition GRANTED
having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in
evidence a document in Chinese which says that the father of Tan Dit accepted the
offer of marriage of Cheong Boo and that such document serves as the proof of the
acceptance. Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for more than 1 year,
during this time Cheong Seng Gee was born. Cheong Boo then left China for the
Philippines and had a concubine Mora by whom he had 2 children. In 1910, Cheong
Seng Gee went to the Philippines who, as appears from documents presented, was
permitted to land in the country as the son of Cheong Boo. Cheong Boo never
returned to China and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to
have had any further relations w/ her.
The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing
between the Cheong Boo and son Cheong Seng Gee but do not establish the
marriage between the deceased and Seng Gee’s mother. Sec. IV of Marriage Law
(General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted without these Islands, denomination and faith. A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel,"
which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the Lastly, Sec. VI provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The 2 essentials of a valid
competent testimony as to what the laws of Amoy, China concerning marriage were marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the
in 1895. There is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance,
moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. there is no question of capacity nor consent. While it is true that during the
Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that Cheong Boo and Adong did in
Adong claimed that a marriage ceremony took place in Basilan according to the rites fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as
of Mohammedan religion. This is established by the Iman who solemnized the husband and wife.
marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, such as Adong’s father and the chief of the
rancheria. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of 2. RAMIREZ V. GMUR
P250 in money and P250 in goods. From then day until the death of Cheong Boo,
they cohabited as husband and wife. They had 5 children, 2 are living at the time of Facts: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland but a resident of the
this case. In his relations w/ 3rd persons, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful Philippines, died in Iloilo City on Junne 29, 1913, leaving valuable asset which he
wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, disposed by will. His will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo, which allowed it.
when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Werthmuller’s widow, Doña Ana M. Ramirez, was named as executrix. Everything
Cheong Boo stated that he was married to Adong and he gave written consent to the was given to the widow, as the will provided, except for a piece of real property in
marriage of his minor daughter, Payang. the City of Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to Werthmuller’s brothers and
sisters.
3 sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into
consideration. Sec. IX provides "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any Werthmuller seemed to have ignored in making his will that he had heirs from his
person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority natural daughter, Leona Castro.
or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the
belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been Leona Castro was the daughter of Felisa Castro and an unknown father. There was
lawfully married." Marriage in this jurisdiction is both a civil contract and a new an annotation on the margin of the original baptismal entry of Leona Castro that a
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. public document (an “escritura”) states that she was recognized by Samuel Bischoff
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. on June 22, 1877. This annotation was authenticated by the signature of Father
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of Ferrero, whose deposition was taken in this case. Father Ferrero testified that the
contrary evidence, to be in fact married. Sec. IX is in the nature of a curative word “escritura” in this entry means a public document; and he says that such
provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. The courts can document was exhibited to him when the marginal note was added to the baptismal
properly incline the scales of their decisions in favor of the solution which will more record and supplied the basis of the annotation in the entry.
effectively promote the public policy. Here the consequences entailed in holding that
the marriage of the Adong and the deceased, in conformity with the Mohammedan Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona Castro as his daughter and treated her as
religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result such. Leona Castro was later married to Frederick von Kauffman, a British
because there are at least 150K Moros who have been married according to local subject, born in HK and lived in Iloilo City. Leona Castro and von Kauffman had 3
custom. The court has the power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; children (Elene, Federico and Ernesto). Leona Castro was then brought to Thun,
either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them Switzerland to recuperate her health. Years later, Leona Castro informed von
legitimate. The court held that the evidence produced a moral conviction of the Kauffman that she does not want to stay married with the latter.
existence of the Mohammedan marriage and regarded the provisions of Sec. IX as
validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion. Von Kauffman later obtained a divorce decree in Paris, France. It showed that Leona
Thus, the Mohammedan marriage is valid, giving to the widow and the 2 legitimate Castro lived in Paris, though there is no evidence showing that she acquired
children the rights accruing to them under the law. permanent domicile in Paris.
Also, Sec. V provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any The estrangement of von Kauffman and Leona Castro was because Leona Castro
court inferior to the SC, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel of any was attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, the physician in charge of the sanitarium in
denomination . . ." "Priest" and "minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every Switzerland where Leona Castro was brought. Dr. Mory and Leona Castro was
later married in London, England. It appears that Dr. Mory was already married to other public instrument. We are of the opinion that the recognition of Leona Castro is
a certain Helena Wolpman, but had divorced her. sufficiently shown whether the case be judged by the one provision or the other.
Before Dr. Mory and Leona Castro got married, they begot a daughter named But it is contended by counsel for Doña Ana Ramirez that only children born of
Leontina Elizabeth in Thun, Switzerland. A 2nd daughter, Carmen Maria, was born in persons free to marry may possess the status of recognized natural children, and
Berne, Switzerland, and a 3rd daughter, Esther. On October 6, 1910, Leona Castro there is no evidence to show that Felisa Catro was either a single woman or widow at
died. the time of the conception or birth of Leona. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it
must be presumed that she was single or a widow.
Now, the 2 sets of children are claiming from the estate of Samuel Werthmuller. Otto
Gmur is the guardian of the 3 Mory daughters. Frederick von Kauffman From the fact that Leona Castro was an acknowledged natural daughter of her father,
appeared as guardian for his own children. it follows that had she survived him she would have been his forced heir, he having
died after the Civil Code took effect; and as such forced heir she would have been
Ana Ramirez insists, as against the Mory daughters, that the Leona Castro had entitled to one-third of the inheritance.
never been recognized by Samuel Werthmuller at all.
To determine the rights of the Mory daughters, the SC had to look into the
As to the Mory daughters, Leontina Elizabeth is considered an illegitimate daughter validity of the divorce decree obtained by von Kauffman in Paris. If the decree
which was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro. is valid, then the marriage of Mory and Leona Castro is valid and the Mory
Carmen Maria and Esther Renate, on the other hand, are to considered legitimate daughters are entitled to participate in the division of the estate. Otherwise, the
offspring of Leona Castro since the latter’s marriage to von Kauffman was already Mory daughters would have no such right.
divorced when they were born and Leona was already married to Dr. Mory.
As to the Mory daughters, the SC held that the divorce decree relied upon
The von Kauffman children insists that the divorce decree was wholly invalid; cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippines. The French
that the Mory daughters are the offspring of an adulterous relationship; and that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a
von Kauffman daughters alone should be entitled to participate in the division of the marriage contracted in the Philippines by a person domiciled here, such
estate. marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.
Issue: Whether or not the Mory daughters and the von Kauffman children are The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von Kauffman at all times since
entitled to participate in the division of the estate of Samuel Bischoff earliest youth has been, and is now, domiciled in the city of Iloilo in the Philippine
Werthmuller. Islands; that he there married Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the Philippine
Islands, and that Iloilo was their matrimonial domicile; that his departure from iloilo for
Held: The SC held that the von Kauffman children are entitled to participate in the purpose of taking his wife to Switzerland was limited to that purpose alone,
the inheritance as legitimate children of Leona Castro and Frederick von without any intent to establish a domicile elsewhere; and finally that he went to Paris
Kauffman. Leona Castro’s relationship to Samuel Werthmuller was ruled as follows: in 1904, for the sole purpose of getting a divorce, without any intention of establishing
a permanent residence in that city. The evidence shows that the decree was entered
It is satisfactorily shown that Leona Castro was a recognized natural daughter of against the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is nothing to show
Samuel Bischoff. The memorandum made by Father Ferrero as to the recognition of that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a permanent domicile in the City
Leona Castro was found satisfactory, despite the fact that the original was not of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was
presented after diligent search and secondary evidence as well as Fr. Ferrero’s due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other.
deposition was presented.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in
It will be observed that the recognition of Leona Castro as the daughter of Samuel which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them
Bischoff occurred prior to the date when the Civil Code was put in force in these may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to
Islands; and consequently her rights as derived from the recognition must be determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is
determined under the law as it then existed, that is, under Law 11 of Toro, which not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the
afterwards became Law 1, title 5, book 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion. Under that defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
law recognition could be established by proof of acts on the part of the parent
unequivocally recognizing the status of his offspring. In other words at tacit It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's
recognition was sufficient. Under article 131 of the present Civil Code, the residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must
acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, by will, or in be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State
for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining,
his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that
State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized The trial court adjudicated the case in her favor and ordered the defendant E.
by the laws of the State of his own domicile. Randolph Hix to pay her the sum of P500 in advance on or before the 5th day of
each month for the maintenance of herself and her son.
As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not In the month of May, 1925, that is, one year after his arrival at Elkins, West Virginia,
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for the deceased filed a complaint for a divorce with the Circuit Court of Randolph
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. County, West Virginia, alleging, among other things, that he was a citizen of the
The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff must United States of America, and of the State of West Virginia, and had been for more
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and than one year prior to the date of the institution of the suit, an actual bona fide citizen
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly and resident of Randolph County, West Virginia; that Annie cousins Hix was a
excluded. The word "descendants," as used in article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be resident of the City of Peking, China; that on December 1, 1921, his wife had
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. abandoned and deserted him, taking up a separate residence and declining to live or
have anything to do with him; that he, Hix, freely, voluntarily, and adequately
Even if the claims of the children were made after the probate, the same are not supported his wife and child, paying her the sum of $175 per month; that he intended
divested by the decree admitting the will to probate since such decree is only to reside permanently in the United States, and that it was with such intention that he
conclusive as to the due execution of the will and not its intrinsic validity. had returned to West Virginia; that he and his wife had been living apart for three
years, and that she had rejected his offer of reconciliation. As the appellant was not a
3. HIX V. FLUEMER resident of the State of West Virginia, she was summoned upon the complaint for
divorce by publication, and not having entered an appearance in the case, either
FACTS: E. Randolph Hix was born in the year 1866 in Union, South Carolina, where personally or by counsel within the term fixed, the Circuit Court of Randolph County,
he lived with his parents until the age of 15. They then removed to Rye, Westchester West Virginia, rendered judgment against her in 1925 declaring her marriage with the
County, New York. A few years later, he was sent to the University of Lehigh, and to plaintiff dissolved. Having procured the divorce, E. Randolph Hix returned to Manila
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, leaving the latter before graduating, to in 1927, where he continued to live and engaged in business up to the time of his
accept employment with the Edison Company where he worked for about three death in the year 1929.
years. After resigning from his position he opened an office and engaged in private
work as consulting engineer and contractor until the year 1895, when he removed to ISSUE: whether the Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia acquired
Wheeling, West Virginia, to engage in the general engineering business as a member jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for divorce filed by E .Randolph Hix
of the firm of Hogg & Hix, surveyors. and to render a valid and binding judgment against the petitioner and appellant,
Annie Cousins Hix.
After fifteen years of residence in Wheeling, he took an examination and received an
appointment as coal expert for the Philippine Government, arriving at Manila some HELD: The pertinent part of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as
time during the year 1910. While E. Randolph Hix was living in Manila in 1912, he follows:
met the appellant and married her in Shanghai, China, on or about June 24, 1913,
returning to Manila where they established their domicile. A son was born of this SEC. 306. Effect of Judgment. — The effect of a judgment or final order in
union in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 1, 1915, named Preston Randolph Hix, an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine
while she was in the United States where she had gone on the month of May of the Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United
same year to visit her family and the mother and sister of her husband. The appellant States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
returned to Manila in November, 1916, and continued to live with the deceased as follows:
husband and wife.
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
On March 16, 1919, the appellant left for Canada, where she remained with their the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
child until February, 1921, when she returned to Manila in a very precarious condition person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation
of health and was given medical treatment in the St. Paul's Hospital at the expense of of a particular person, the judgment or order in conclusive upon the title of
her husband. After she regained her health, she lived apart from her husband by the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the
mutual consent. person: . . . .
On December 7, 1922, the appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance These provisions show that in order that a judgment of a court or judge of any state
of Manila against her husband, E. Randolph Hix, for the purpose of compelling him to of the American Union with respect to the personal or legal condition of a particular
provide adequate support for herself and her son, Preston Randolf Hix. person may be conclusive and constitute res judicata, it is essential that the court
have jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is presumed in the absence of evidence to the The divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia,
contrary. may also be impeached by evidence of fraud, according to section 312 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, quoted above.
Section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
E. Randolph Hix alleged in his complaint for a divorce filed with the aforementioned
SEC. 312. How Judicial Record May be Impeached. — Any judicial record court, that on December 1, 1921 his wife had abandoned and deserted him, living
may be impeached by evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court or separately and declining to live or have anything to do with him; that she was a
judicial officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the party resident of the City of Peking, China; and that he freely and voluntarily provided
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. adequately for her and their son, paying her $175 per month. These allegations,
being false, tended to deceive and did in fact deceive the aforesaid Circuit Court of
One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce is that the Randolph County in West Virginia into granting the decree of divorce applied for,
court granting it has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, and to this because, had he alleged in his complaint that his wife lived apart from him by mutual
end the plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith, and for the length of time consent, as was a fact, said court would not have granted the divorce, since in the
fixed by the law, in the state in which it was granted. E. Randolph Hix was case of Bacon vs. Bacon (68 W. Va., 747; 70 S. E., 762), the Supreme Court of West
domiciled in the City of Manila where he lived apart from his wife and child, by Virginia laid down the doctrine that separation by mutual consent does not constitute
mutual consent, and here he had his business. He removed to the State of desertion or abandonment before the law.
West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife and child and his business behind, for
the purpose of obtaining an absolute divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the
the year 1927 to reside in the City of Manila, and continuing his business. residence acquired in a state of the American Union by a husband, who, for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, abandons the country wherein are his matrimonial
Although the opponent and appellee attempted to show that E. Randolph Hix went to domicile and his wife, who is living apart from him by mutual consent, and then
West Virginia with the intention of residing there permanently, as allege in the returns to said matrimonial domicile after obtaining a divorce, continues residing,
complaint for divorce, such an intention was contradicted by the fact that before therein and engaging in business, is not bona fide residence, and does not confer
leaving the City of Manila, he did not liquidate his business but placed it under the jurisdiction upon the court even if he alleges in the complaint for divorce that he
management of said opponent, and once having obtained his divorce, he returned to intends to reside permanently in said state; (2) that the summons by publication in a
the City of Manila to take up his residence and to continue his aforesaid business, complaint for divorce, filed in a state by the husband who has gone to said state,
and that his purpose in going to West Virginia was to obtain a divorce. abandoning his matrimonial domicile where his wife continues to reside, does not
confer jurisdiction upon the court over the person of said wife when she has not
By the fact that E. Randolph Hix was a citizen of the United States and of the State of entered an appearance in the case, and the decree issued by said court dissolving
West Virginia, since it is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers the marriage is not binding upon her; and (3) that a decree of divorce issued by a
jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State where he applies for court of any state or territory of the American Union, or of a foreign country, may be
a divorce. That E. Randolph Hix himself believed he had relinquished his former legal impeached in another case for lack of jurisdiction in said court over the subject
residence in West Virginia, of which he was a citizen, upon establishing his marriage matter, or over the person of the defendant, or for fraud in obtaining it on the part of
domicile in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, is shown by the fact that he had to the person procuring it.
reestablish his residence in said State for the length of time fixed by the law in order
to be able to file his complaint for a divorce. 4. BARRETTO V. GONZALES
Since E. Randolph Hix was not a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia, the FACTS: Plaintiff and defendants are citizens of Phil, resident of Manila and married
divorce decree he obtained from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, is null and in the Phil. They voluntarily separated and not lived as husband and wife. They have
void, said court having failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. 4 children, who are 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age. They agreed to allow the husband
for the wife’s support and their children, 500 pesos monthly and to be increased
But even if his residence had been taken up in good faith, and the court had acquired during illness and necessity, and the title of properties be put in her name. After the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not agreement, husband left the Philippines and resided to Reno, Nevada and secured
binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which was approved in November
of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons 1927. During that time, he married a Filipina and has three children as a result of that
made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either marriage. Defendant reduced the amount he agreed for the support and has not
personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. made payments fixed in the divorce decree.
When he went back to Philippines, the wife brought an action before CFI Manila
requesting that the court confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the state
of Nevada. And that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows: It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of
the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the
until one year thereafter. divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of
innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the
the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what the personal
them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to
year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional.
portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
the community of property.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected
equivalent of what would have been due to their children. It is also prayed that the by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary
community existing between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it becomes unnecessary to
defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in his first
of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony assignment of error.
at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month,
5. ARCA V. JAVIER
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as
intervenors and join their mother in these proceedings. CFI rendered judgment Facts: Alfredo Javier was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937,
against the defendant. married Salud R. Arca, another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had
already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927
Issue: w/n the decree of divorce could be enforced in the Philippines (no) appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United States aboard a
navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife and child, and on
Held: the SC said that the action of the husband was clearly to circumvent the laws August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a
status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things,
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and that appellant was not a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines,
the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was abandonment on her
securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer part but that appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered
which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941.
refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the
negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9,
we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. 1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and
Article 9 thereof reads as follows: bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis,
defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant
legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950. After
reside in a foreign country. his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his
first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis
And article 11, the last part of which reads: — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant
Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).
and those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be
rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the
done or any agreements entered into a foreign country. City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court
of First Instance of Manila,
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to
Issue: Whether the divorce decree has a effect in this jurisdiction dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile
plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted. So it has County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple
been held that "it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the
jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State." Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County
when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his
Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there
action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941,
its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from
residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines
imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore
special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently
over the case. residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer
In several cases this court laid down the following doctrines: jurisdiction on the court.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the
to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our
is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, concept or moral values which has always looked upon marriage as an institution.
59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a And such concept has actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the
tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our
188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.) law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to
any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's customs, morals, and traditions.
residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must
be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another 6. WONG WOO YUI V. VIVO
State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Facts: In proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry in June, 1961, Wong
courts of the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one Woo Yiu declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her
not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, husband, Perfecto Blas, a Filipino citizen to whom she was married in Chingkang,
181.)" (Ramirezvs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.) China on January 15, 1929, that they had several children all of whom are not
located in the Philippines, and that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had village leader.
acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree
issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Las, thus declaring legal her admission
having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, into the country. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on
she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date
counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. by the Secretary of the Board.
(Cousins Hix vs.Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)
However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision contrary to that of the
Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the
husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide country, after discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her
alleged husband during several investigation conducted by the immigration -‐ Pastor Tenchavez - 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
authorities concerning the alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, undistinguished stock
thus concluding that the petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas -‐ They exchanged marriage vows without the knowledge of her parents,
was without basis in evidence as it was "a mass of oral and documentary evidence
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was the
bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship,” the Board of Commissioners
motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. civil register.
-‐ They planned to get married and then elope. Elopement did not, however,
Issue: WON Wong Woo Yiu's marriage to Perfecto Blas is valid and making her materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage,
admission into the country legal. NO! her mother was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena
Held: SC affirmed the latter Board's decision. Indeed, not only is there no
Escaño (Escaño parents) were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas
but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the
to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This clandestine marriage would provoke.
claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of -‐ Escano parents wanted them to have a church wedding but Escano changed
our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of her mind when she received an anonymous letter stating that Tenchavez had
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it another woman. Escano parents did not agree as well.
is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may
-‐ Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in
be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme
Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination Manila.
duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). -‐ They continued to exchange letters that were not as endearing as before.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as -‐ Vicenta went to Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her
reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted
Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage.
the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity -‐ She did not sign the petition however and the case was dismissed without
can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing.
marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the
absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the -‐ She applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that
same as our own. her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after 2 yrs.
The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as -‐ In US, Escano filed divorce against the Tenchavez in the Second Judicial
any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In the District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
to be the same as our own.
-‐ Oct/21/1950 - decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it will court by the said tribunal.
be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. -‐ Later, Escano married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are -‐ Aug/8/1958 - She acquired American citizenship.
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
-‐ Jul/30/1955 amended on May 31, 1956 - Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar against Vicenta F. Escaño, legal separation for bigamy,
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s against Escano Parents, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
7. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages.
FACTS: - Vicenta Escaño(Escaño) - 27 y.o. (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
Escano – claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her -‐ NCC does not allow absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and does
present husband, Russell Leo Moran not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute
Escano Parents - denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts,
divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband
and counterclaimed for moral damages.
(Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the NCC only provides for legal separation
CFI, Cebu - did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary -‐ The grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would,
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant (P45,000.00). Thus, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court. wealthy citizens, whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON the divorce is valid.
HELD: NO. Escano and Escano Parent’s liability - denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
Authority of the solemnizing officer - Nowhere shown that said priest was not duly entitled to the corresponding indemnity.
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. Authorization from the parish
priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not -‐ Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and
Philippine Legislature (OCC) which was the marriage law in force at the time entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our
expressly provided that — SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for law, on the basis of adultery"
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. -‐ Tenchavez claim that Escano Parents, alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible
-‐ Actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement,
evidence:
and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects. SEC. 27. Failure to
o 1.) He was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, -
comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because
No records WON they would refuse if courtship and marriage were
of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act x x x
done in the traditional religious way; 2.) It was Escano’s decision. She
is acted independently, and being of age. They just supported her.
Validity of Escano-Tenchavez marriage - The very act of Vicenta in abandoning her
original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding. -‐ Tenchavez, in falsely charged Escano parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
-‐ Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue divorce, w/c caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Award for Damages – For Tenchavez - should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
-‐ Such a vice did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and damages and attorney's fees; For Escano Parents – P45K excessive. Lawsuits have
the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. become a common occurrence in present society. Reduced to P5k.
-‐ This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in CFI,
8. VAN DORM V. ROMILLO
Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
Facts: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard
Validity of the divorce decree - Marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife obtained. in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against
petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita
-‐ When it was issued, Escaño and Tenchavez were still both Filipino citizens. Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that
Thus, Escano was then subject to Philippine law, and Art. 15 NCC of the Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, administrator of the said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce 9. DE LEON V. CA
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below Facts:
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property • Oct. 18, 1969 – private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of
case. Binangonan Rizal
• Aug. 28, 1971 – Susana L. De Leon were born from this union
Issue: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private • Oct. 1972 – de facto separation between the spouses occurred due to
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino irreconcilable marital differences; Sylvia left the conjugal home
citizen? YES • March 1973 – Sylvia went to the US and obtained American citizenship
• Nov. 29, 1973 – Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, a petition for
Held: Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente; also filed claims for support and
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce distribution of properties/ but since Jose Vicente was a Philippine resident and
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that did not have any assets in the US, Sylvia held the divorce proceedings in
the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's abeyance and concentrated her efforts to obtain property settlements with Jose
claim is barred by prior judgment. Vicente
• March 16, 1977 – Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with private
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court respondent Macaria De Leon (her mother-in-law)
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
• March 30, 1977 - Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the CFI of Rizal a joint
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
• Trial court: declared that the conjugal partnership of the spouses is DISSOLVED
within its jurisdiction.
• March 17, 1980 – Sylvia moved for the execution of the Order of the trial court;
Vicente moved for MR
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also • April 20, 1980 – Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene,
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address authorized his alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case; assailed the
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community termination of the marital relations of the spouses
property nor community obligations. • CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, Issue: Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid - NO
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this Held: The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. subject matter of the Letter-Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. The third
paragraph of the Letter-Agreement, reads: In consideration for a peaceful and
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their the termination of property relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose
national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other
dissolves the marriage. hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of
marital relationship.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as RTC said that the cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets, he is having executed the Letter-Agreement was the termination of the marital relationship
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.
over the alleged conjugal property.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it
terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides:
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. "The interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity"
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void
and inexistent from the beginning. Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy; There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his
xxx xxx xxx person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants
or ascendants, to give his consent.
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of person shall be borne in mind.
illegality be waived.
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just
But marriage is NOT a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. or legal, does not vitiate consent.
52 of the Civil Code provides:
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the determining
nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the
stipulations... threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there
being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can
From the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code, the court believes that Macaria De offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a
Leon’s undertaking that the termination of marital relationship is not only conratry to reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes
law but also to Filipino morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.
obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public
policy should be deemed null and void. In this case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to
court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to
the spouses and not those belonging to a third party, who, in the case at bar., is the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by
Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to law. With respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither is Macaria's alleged
appear that the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to mistake in having signed the Letter-Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will
prove that the questioned properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente, the mistake referred
Vicente adduced any contrary evidence. to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code. It does not appear that the condition that Sylvia
"will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the
Even granting that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of contract. Rather, such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof
property relations, the Court said that: which, is the termination of marital relations.
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the
proper law to be applied. It provides:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the may be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been
conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third person. In
between husband and wife; such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow
the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and
in this regard, the ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e.,
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been engagement day; that during the wedding the document would be signed by the
accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during
the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
the transaction was entered into. document; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed
the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and
Petition is DENIED. CA’s decision is AFFIRMED. Sy Kiat were married for 46years already and the document was left in China and
she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of
10. BALLADOS V. CA Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document
because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it
11. YAO KEE, ET. AL V. SY-GONZALES was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China;
P300,000.00 more or less. that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Kiat as husband and
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made
Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition back to China.
for the grant of letters of administration in CFI of Caloocan. They alleged among
others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to 2) the statement of the younger brother of Yao Kee that he was present at the
their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to wedding and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese govt, a document
Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy- signed by the parents being sufficient.
Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
3) Asuncion Gillego’s testimony that Sy Kiat admitted to her that he has a Chinese
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun wife whom he married according to Chinese custom
Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in
1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased 4) Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registered Alien, which states that he was married in
with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, China to Yao Kee
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
5) certification issued by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China that Sy Kiat
CFI: Sy Kiat legally married to Yao Kee and Yao Kee were married in China.
CA: marriage to Yao Kee not proven At most, these evidence prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
But it is not sufficient to establish the validity of the marriage in accordance with
Issue: WON the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was proven (NO) Chinese law or custom.
Held: Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be To establish a valid foreign marriage, two things must be proven: (1) the existence of
alleged and proved as any other fact. To support the case of Yao Kee, the following the foreign law as a question of fact and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
pieces of evidence were presented: convincing evidence. The petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative
to the law and custom of China on marriage. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of
1) Yao Kee’s testimony that she was married to Sy Kiat in 1931 in Fookien, China; the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.
that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is
was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder known in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it
brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
of her husband; that she and Sy Kiat, have been living in FooKien, China before he jurisdiction.
went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her
marriage was a written document is exchanged between the parents of the bride and Status of children: children with Yao Kee and Gillego are acknowledged natural
the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that children
there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who
would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree 12. EUGENIO V. VELEZ
to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with application for restraining Held: 1) Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original
order and/or injunction. jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Regional Trial
Facts: Unaware of Vitaliana's death on August 28, 1988, her full blood brothers and Court. It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the
sisters (Vargases) filed on September 27, 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action,
the RTC of Misamis Oriental. They alleged that Vitaliana was forcefully taken by and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be
Eugenio and was detained in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. At granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced
the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25, single, and living so warrant. When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it
with Eugenio. The next day, the court issued the writ of habeas corpus but the writ was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of
was returned unsatisfied. Counsel of Eugenio stated that Vitaliana already died on right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the
Aug. 28 because of heart failure due to her pregnancy and that Eugenio refused to filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts
surrender the corpse on the ground that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his
corpus and that he had already obtained a burial permit. Furthermore, since he is the judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. While the court may refuse to
common law spouse, he has the right to the custody of the body and to perform the grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue
burial rights. Eugenio filed an urgent motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima
over the nature of the action. A special proceeding for habeas corpus, Eugenio facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for
confinement or detention of a live person. On the side of the Vargases, they were the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause
granted leave of court to amend their petition. They alleged that Eugenio was in no of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
way related to Vitaliana and that he was wrongfully interfering with the Vargases' duty petition.
to bury her. They invoked the Civil Code provisions on asserting that they are to be
considered as the next of kin in the Philippines and therefore they are the legal After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
custodians of the corpse. The motion to dismiss was denied. Thereafter, the court a corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was
quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision, resolving proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored
the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may
treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of
file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
original petition for habeas corpus. circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. As correctly
The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue
that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body
because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since 2) Eugenio claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
this case. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
rightful custody over the dead body. The order of preference to give support under as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
another woman. of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to
the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
Issue: 1) Whether the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case,
the proceedings (YES) herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
2) Whether Eugenio can be considered as the spouse of Vitaliana. (NO) which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the
Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally In the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, BOC seeks to set aside the
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. abovementioned TRO and resolutions of the Manila and Valenzuela RTC.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving *BOC’s contentions:
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). 1. It is the CA, not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the BOC and the BOSI.
2. Even if the RTC had jurisdiction, the judges acted with GAD in preempting it
13. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS V. DELA ROSA in the exercise of its authority and jurisdiction to hear and determining the
deportation case and William’s citizenship.
FACTS: In 1960, Santiago Gatchalian was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration 3. Judge dela Rosa acted with GAD in ruling the that issues are beyond the
as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother. He BOC’s competence and jurisdiction.
had 5 children with his wife, Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and *William Gatchalian’s contentions:
Benjamin. 1. BOC has no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the
courts have finally resolved the question of his citizenship.
On June 27, 1961, 2 of Santiago’s children (Gloria and Francisco), together with 2. BOC cannot fairly resolve the question of his citizenship because of their
Francisco’s sons (William and Johnson), arrived in Manila from Hong Kong seeking bias and prejudice against him.
admission as Filipino citizens. They had with them Certificates of Registration and 3. The ground for this deportation has prescribed.
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in HK. After investigation, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 (BOSI) rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961 (Decision 1) ISSUES + HELD:
admitting William and his companions as Filipino citizens. They were then issued an 1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the BOC and BOSI.
Identification Certificate by the immigration authorities.
Yes. RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether there has been
The following year, the DOJ Secretary directed the Board of Commissioners (BOC) GAD on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The quasi-
to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the CA are those,
Philippine citizen, including the case of William and his relatives. On July 6, 1962, which under the law are specifically appealable to the CA. It is only when a
the BOC reversed the decision of the BOSI (Reversal = Decision 2) and a warrant of specific law provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the CA that
exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued. the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in
terms of rank, stature and logically are beyond the control of the RTC. The
William and the others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re- Bureau of Immigration is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by
hearing with the BOSI where the deportation case was assigned. The Acting law whose decisions, orders and resolutions are directly appealable to the CA.
Commissioner reaffirmed Decision 1 and recalled the warrant of arrest against As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may
William. be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for
certiorari by, the RTC.
However, in 1990, the NBI Acting Director recommended that William be charged
with a violation of the Immigration Act of 1940 to the Justice Secretary, who then The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
indorsed the recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
and immediate action. William was arrested but was also released on the same day citizenship. A mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
upon posting a P200K cash bond. Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. An exception to
this rule, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned, is when the
William then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Manila RTC evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
(Judge dela Rosa presided). BOC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the judge immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
had no jurisdiction over the BOC and/or the BOSI. The MTD was denied and the enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
judge restrained the BOC from continuing with any of the proceedings that would molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation
lead to the deportation of William. proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his
protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground
Two days later, William’s wife and minor children filed an injunction case before the that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
Valenzuela RTC alleging that BOC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings
institution of the deportation proceedings against William. A TRO was issued to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
restraining the BOC from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William. investigation of his undesirability. It appearing from the records that
respondent’s claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial intervention should be
allowed.
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order

*After resolving the issue on jurisdiction, the SC proceeded with the issue on dated July 12, 1960.
citizenship instead of remanding the case to the RTC considering the voluminous
pleadings submitted and the evidence presented by the parties. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
2. W/N William is a Filipino citizen and therefore should NOT be deported. Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
Filipino citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent this Constitution. Xxx
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of h i s f a t h e r, a F i l i p i n o a s
l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d . R e s p o n d e n t b e l o n g s t o a c l a s s o f F i l i p i n o s who This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of
are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution. respondent William Gatchalian.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject

are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed
by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian’s testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by
the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the case at bar is diametrically
opposed to settled government policy.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a
marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to
marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family
Code) provides that “(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . .” And any doubt as to
the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of
such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is
answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: “In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or
facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.” (Italics supplied). Bearing
in mind the “processual presumption” enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he
who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of
proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian

follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of
the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of
Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
SUCESSION
However, three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for the
petitioner, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson, entered an appearance in her behalf and
1. IN RE JOHNSON
asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived
of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
FAST FACTS: Emil Johnson died in the City of Manila; however he was a
successions in these Islands. She moved to annul the decree of probate and put the
naturalized American citizen. He left a will through which he disposed an estate
estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole
valued at 231,800php. However, the will was signed by two witnesses instead of the
legitimate heir of her father.
three required by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, a petition was
made stating that the will was made in conformity with US Law, thus valid in the
ISSUE: W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator
Philippines as provided for in Section 636 in the Code of Civil Procedure. The will
was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity
was later probated and declared legal, however the testator's daughter, Ebba
with the laws of that State? NO.
Ingeborg entered an appearance, claiming that as a legitimate child she cannot be
deprived of the legitime which she is entitled to as provided by Philippine law. She
HELD:In the testimony submitted to the trial court, Johnson first came to the United
moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration
States as a boy and settled in the State of Illinois. Eventually he married one Rosalie
in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
Johnson and they would have one daughter, the petitioner Ebba Ingeborg. Johnson
remained in Illinois until he came to the Philippines as a soldier in the United States
FACTS: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
Army. On November 20, 1902, he went back to the US so that Rosalie Johnson could
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated
be granted a decree of divorce in the Circuit Court of Illinois, on the ground of
September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as
desertion. In 1903 Emil Johnson would return to obtain a certificate of naturalization.
estimated by him, was 231,800php.
Thereafter he returned to the Philippines and would conduct his business here until
his death. He had marital relations with two women. From Alejandra Ibanez he would
This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator’s own
have three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. From Simeona Ibanez he
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
would have two children: Eleonor and Alberto.
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure - therefore the will
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
All this being said, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved
the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State
under section 618. .
of his permanent domicile. Further, there is no law in force at that time by virtue of
which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the
However, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
Philippine Islands. Thus it was impossible for the testator, even if he had so
for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a
desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political
citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America. The will was duly executed in
status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This
accordance with the laws of that State, hence could properly be probated here
being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
along with his status as a citizen of the United States
Will made here by alien. – A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of
validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the
the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved
due execution of the will. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be
and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and
determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.
2. MICIANO V. BRIMO
After a hearing, the document was declared to be legal, and administrators were
FACTS: Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased
nominated: Victor Johnson, the deceased's brother and John T. Pickett.
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
Pickett declined, and Johnson was appointed sole administrator. In the will, the
the brothers of Joseph, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of
The errors which Andre assigns are:(1) The approval of scheme of partition; (2)
P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra
denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) denial of the MR of the order
Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez,
approving the partition; (4) approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
testator’s five children – Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
the Turkish laws. His opposition is based on the fact that the partition puts into effect whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
the provisions of Joseph Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws persons who fail to comply with this request.
of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or Art.
10 of the OLD Civil Code.11 The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
ISSUE: accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
1. What law should govern? Turkish but must be proven first Philippines. If this condition were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with
2. W/N Andre was properly excluded as legatee? NO it, as Andre who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, is prevented from receiving his legacy. However, said condition is void,
HELD: being contrary to law, for Art 792 of the Old Civil Code provides that conditions
1. The fact is that Andre did not prove that Joseph’s testamentary dispositions are contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
not in accordance with Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even if the testator otherwise
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. In the absence of evidence on provides.
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. Andre,
himself, acknowledges that said laws have not been proven in these proceedings Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
when he asked the court to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; national law when, according to Art 10, such national law of the testator is the
so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then is considered
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give Andre another consequently valid and effective even as to the Andre. From all this, the second
opportunity to prove such laws does is not an error. It is discretionary with the trial clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
court, and, taking into consideration that Andre was granted ample opportunity to imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the
introduce evidence, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this remaining clauses of the will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national
the testator was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, law.
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not Therefore, the orders appealed from were modified and distribution of Joseph
erroneous. Brimo’s estate was directed to be made in such a manner as to include Andre Brimo
as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the Miciano was
2. In regard to the 1st assignment of error, which deals with the exclusion of Andre approved in all other respects.
as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must
be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the 2nd 3. VARELA V. CALDERON
clause of the will, which says:
FACTS: The deceased, a physician by profession, was a Filipino citizen resident of
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, the City of Manila where he owned real properties assessed at P188,017.81. He
this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by traveled abroad for his health and temporarily resided in Hendaye-Plage, France. Not
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for feeling very well, but in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, he decided to make
a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded his last will and testament, on April 14, 1930, in Paris, France, with the assistance of
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller and Henri Gadd. Sometime later,
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, that is on July 15, 1930, he died in Switzerland.

11
On September 20, 1930, the herein petitioner-appellee, Francisco Carmelo Varela,
The law then in force was the Old Civil Code of the Philippine which, among other things, provides:
filed a petition in the CFI of Manila, praying that said will be admitted to probate. Said
petition was opposed by the deceased's brother Jose Miguel, Angel, Jesus, Trinidad,
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their Paula, Pilar and Maria, surnamed Varela Calderon, although, later on, the first
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in mentioned opponent withdrew his opposition giving as his reason therefor that it was
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be out of respect for the testator's wishes because the will was executed in his own
situated. handwriting. The grounds of the opposition are as follows:
Civil Code and on the decisions of the French Court of Appeals cited in the appelee's
(a) That the will sought to be probate was not holographic in character and did not brief, but principally on the fact established in the depositions made by practicing
comply with the requisites prescribed by article 970 of the French Civil Code; attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller and Henri Gadd of Paris, France,
(b) that the witnesses to the will did not possess the qualifications required by article who emphatically declared that the will in question did not lose its holographic
980 of the French Civil Code; character by the addition of the aforementioned attestation clause and that it may be
(c) that for not having complied with the requisites prescribed by the French law, said allowed to probate in conformity with the French laws under which it had been made
will is null and void; and executed.
(d) that neither has it the character of an open will, not having been executed in
accordance with article 1001 of the French Civil Code; and 4. GIBBS V. GOVERNMENT
(e) that the provisions of article 1007 of the same Code relative to the recording of
wills were not complied with in connection with the will in question. Facts: This is an appeal from a final order of the CFI Manila, requiring the register of
deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the last will and testament of the 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in
deceased Francisco Varela Calderon, was a valid holographic will made and lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without
executed, in accordance with the laws of the French Republic. requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
HELD: The petition for the allowance and probate of said will is based on the
provisions of article 970 of the French Civil Code which considers as a holographic The order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by
will that which is made or executed, dated and signed by the testator in his own said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D.
handwriting without the necessity of any other formality, and on section 635 of the Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that Eva died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on
Code of Civil Procedure in force in this jurisdiction which provides that a will made out November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens
of the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country in which it of the State of California and domiciled therein.
was made and which may be allowed and admitted to probate therein, may, also be
proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands in the same manner and with It appears further from said order that Allison was appointed administrator of the state
the same effect as if executed in the latter country. Both provisions of law literally of his said deceased wife in a case in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the
copied from the English text, read as follows: Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in intestate proceedings,
Allison on September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the
Article 970, French Civil Code à A holographic will is not valid unless it is entirely parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of Allison and
written, dated, and signed by the testator. No other formality is required. his wife, Eva", describing in detail the 3 facts here involved; and further alleging that
his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in
Article 635, Code of Civil Procedure à Will made out of the Philippine Islands. — A accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are
will made out of the Philippine Islands which might be proved and allowed by the citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
laws of the state or country in which it was made, may be proved, allowed, and belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed partnership of Allison and Eva Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no
according to the laws of these Islands. one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and 17 others not here
involved) to be the absolute property of Allison as sole owner. The court granted said
It is an admitted fact that the will was written, dated and signed by the deceased petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating to Allison as the
testator, for which reason, there is no doubt that it had been made and executed in sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of
accordance with article 970 of the French Civil Code were it not for the attestation California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
clause which appears at the bottom of the document. demanded that the latter issue to him a TCT.
The appellants contend that the addition of said of clause has entirely vitiated the will, Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part
because it ceased to be a holographic will, neither does it possess the requisites of a that:
public or open will in accordance with the French law. The court which originally took Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any
cognizance of the case decided that such circumstance does not invalidate the will. document transferring real property or real rights therein or any
We concur in said opinion and hold that a clause drawn up in such manner is chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or
superfluous and does not affect in any way the essential requisites prescribed for inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and
holographic wills by the French law, and, consequently, it has not invalidated the will actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately
nor deprived it of its holographic character. In reaching this conclusion, we base our notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
opinion not only on the clear and conclusive provisions of article 970 of the French
provincial treasurer of the non-payment of the tax discovered by

them. . . . Held: Allison contends that the law of California should determine the nature and
extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva under the 3 certificates of title Nos. 20880,
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if
declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the
refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison on the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the
ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under 2nd paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.
date of December 26, 1930, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to Gibbs Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the
parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the order The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal. condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community
upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must,
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status,
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called
reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case is to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from
now before us with the supplementary evidence. acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance
with the lex rei sitae. There is not the slightest doubt that a
For the purposes of this case, the Court considered the following facts as established California married woman can acquire title to land in a common
by the evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison has been continuously, since law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia,
the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would
Eva were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no ante-nuptial vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California
marriage contract between the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be
spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands, as vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite
conjugal property: conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely
personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by TCT No. 20880, dated March rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed
16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very
Gibbs". terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by TCT No. 28336, dated May citizens of the Philippine Islands).
14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described. The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress,
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by TCT No. 28331, dated April August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the
6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the
owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government,
November 28, 1929, living surviving her husband, the appellee, and 2 sons, Allison J. therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
Gibbs, now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law. international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an
organized territory or state of the United States. We should,
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and
legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be
transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the applied here as law were there any question as to her status.
following tax."
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision
Issue/s: rests upon the 2nd paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
3. WON Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible
interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned? (YES) Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
4. WON Register of Deeds erred in declining to register the transfer title of the the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
conjugal property on the ground of unpaid inheritance tax? (NO) successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the the marriage was celebrated.
property or the country in which it may be situated.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs.
In construing the above language the Court met at the outset with some difficulty by Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be
the expression "the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted that the Philippine lands
reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. The Court here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of
encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. Allison and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title
(Miciano v. Brimo) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
as above stated, the Court concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in
question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership
accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the
Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, husband or to the wife.
39 Phil., 156, 166.)
Article 1395 provides: "The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which such rules do not
entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; conflict with the express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the
that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal
death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership
the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property
community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but shall be divided share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their
because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence
extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke, the court said: prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes
"The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband,
effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the
wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as
required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife." is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her
heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code)
The argument of Allison apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by
succession from his deceased wife, how can the 2nd paragraph of article 10 be It results that the wife of Allison was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a
invoked? Can Allison be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to
seems clear that the 2nd paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or the date of her death. Allison himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title
testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with and interest in manifest from the end of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14,
the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison
order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the 2nd D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a therein described."
descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
The descendible interest of Eva in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by
In the case of Clarke v. Clarke, the court said: It is principle firmly established that to virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section
the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on
govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra)
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in
nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
situated.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478: In accord with the rule that real property is subject to would be nor that Allison in any way challenged the power of the Government to levy
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds
absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the
refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting that Allison is the exclusive owner of P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
the Philippine lands included in the 3 certificates of title here involved.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,
dismiss the petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs. claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form
concede to them.
5. PHILIPPINE TRUST V. BOHANAN
ISSUE: W/N Magdalena and her two children have been deprived of the legitime due
FACTS: On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, to them? NO
presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed
by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. HELD: The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena
C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have
therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena
properties are located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction,
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315,
and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb
of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22.
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of
residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right. his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides: Every person over the age
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate,
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's
will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of debts.
Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company,
named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a
filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after share in the testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in
taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its an order dated June 19, 1955, which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan
trust. does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16,
1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, and the
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance court in its said error found that there exists no community property owned by the
with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As
estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained
U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the testator and
which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan
similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
(testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and
Hastings, P2,000; since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson
P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary
his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore,
have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death,
in accordance with the laws of the forum valid? 6. AZNAR V. CHRISTENSEN-GARCIA
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by Facts: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California where he
the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this resided and consequently was considered citizen thereof. He came to the Philippines
point: Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself a citizen of
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose California.
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the In his will, Edward instituted his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir,
country in which it is found. but left a legacy of P3600 in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in his will was
described as "not in any way related to" him but in a decision rendered by the
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. So the question at issue is whether the Helen alleged that the will deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
testementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the child. She claims that under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the California law should be
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed applied, and the question of the validity of the testamentary provision should thus be
that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. It does referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines. She
not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. follows: “If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form his domicile.” Accordingly, her share must be increased in view of successional rights
and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows: of illegitimate children under Philippine laws.
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof On the other hand, the executor and Lucy argue that the national law of the
or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deceased must apply, and thus the courts must apply internal law of California on the
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
that such officer has the custody. testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires
(Kaufman Case).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Issue: W/N Philippine law should ultimately be applied? YES
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) Held: Edward was a US Citizen and domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his
counsel as Exhibits "2". Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor death.
and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January
23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo. The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-
quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, country where it is situated.
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial
notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
project of partition. succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been regardless of the country where said property may be found.
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State
of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Article 946 of
the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective oppositions to the
Kaufman, is its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
in California but in other jurisdictions. executor’s final account, report and administration, and project of partition. Relying
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of this case is which did not provide for legitimes.
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in ISSUE: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is rights?
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, which is the Philippines in the
case at bar. HELD: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas
law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his
The Philippine court therefore must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his
laws rule of the state of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
RENVOI DOCTRINE the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity
A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this country to where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions,
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.' both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount of successional
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as wherein said property may be found.
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. 8. BILBAO V. BILBAO
Residence Domicile FACTS: Victor Bilbao jointly with his wife Ramona M. Navarro, executed the will in
Requires bodily presence of an Requires bodily presence in that place question on October 6, 1931, on a single page or sheet. The two testators in their
inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it one’s testament directed that "all of our respective private properties both real and
domicle personal, and all of our conjugal properties, and any other property belonging to
either or both of us, be given and transmitted to anyone or either of us, who may
7. BELLIS V. BELLIS survive the other, or who may remain the surviving spouse of the other."
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He The petition for probate was opposed by one Filemon Abringe, a near relative of the
executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, deceased, among other grounds, that the alleged will was executed by the husband
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, and wife for their reciprocal benefit and therefore not valid, and that it was not
in trust, in the following order and manner executed and attested to as required by law. After hearing, the trial court found the
will to have been executed conjointly by the deceased husband and wife for their
a) $240,000.00 to his first wife Mary Mallen reciprocal benefit, and that a will of that kind is neither contemplated by Act No. 190,
b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, known as the Code of Civil Procedure nor permitted by article 669 of the Civil Code
Miriam Palma Bellis,or $40,000.00 each, and which provides:
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same passed this Act and approved the New Civil Code, including the members of the
instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third Code Commission who prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article
person. 669 of the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The thesis of the appellant is, that inasmuch as the present law on wills as embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure has been taken from American law, it should be In conclusion, we believe and hold that the provision of the Code of Civil procedure
interpreted in accordance with the said law, and because joint and reciprocal wills are regarding wills have not repealed all the articles of the old Civil Code on the same
neither regarded as invalid nor on the contrary they are allowed, then article 669 of subject matter, and that article 669 of the Civil Code is not incompatible or
the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of joint wills whether reciprocal or for the inconsistent with said provision of the Article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force.
benefit of a third party should be considered as having been repealed and
superseded by the new law. 9. ENRIQUEZ V. ABADIA
ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in not finding that a joint and reciprocal will FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay,
particularly between husband and wife is valid under the present law. Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident
of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan,
HELD: We cannot agree to the contention of the appellant that the provisions of the Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
Code of Civil Procedure on wills have completely superseded Chapter I, Title III of October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate
the Civil Code on the same subject matter, resulting in the complete repeal of said of the will in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who
Civil Code provisions. In the study we have made of this subject, we have found a would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
number of cases decided by this court wherein several articles of the Civil Code
regarding wills have not only been referred to but have also been applied side by side During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses,
Father Sancho wrote out in longhand the will in Spanish which the testator spoke and
The authorities all go to show that it is not exactly correct to say that the provisions of understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page of each of the
the Code of Civil Procedure regarding wills completely cover the subject matter and three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same
therefore have superseded the provisions of the Civil Code on the point. with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was
The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page
or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
or for the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
reason for this provision, especially as regards husbands and wife is that when a will The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the
is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the
stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because
his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code
And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under
happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless, or desperate, knowing as he or she a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial
does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court
and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other. admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The
oppositors appealed from that decision.
Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has
not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that
provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the when it was executed the civil code proscribes the execution of such wills.
subject of wills, we believe and rule that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in
force. And we are not alone in this opinion. Mr. Justice Willard as shown by his notes HELD: The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code
on the Civil Code, on page 18 believes that this article 669 is still in force. Sinco and allowing the execution of holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot
Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code, Vol. II, page 33, favorably cite Justice be allowed and admitted to probate. This is because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code,
Willard's opinion that this article is still in force. Judge Camus in his book on the Civil the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law existing at the time of
Code does not include this article among those he considers repealed. Lastly, we find the testator’s death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing at
that this article 669 has been reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New Civil the time of the execution of the instrument. For the very simple reason that although
Code (Republic Act No. 386). The implication is that the Philippine Legislature that
the will becomes operative only after the testator’s death, still his wishes are given with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and
expression at the time of execution. Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer
who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
10. CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS proceedings case.
FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez several motions for postponement. Petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to
and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of lack of jurisdiction.
the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos. Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the
filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his
was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief.
of the estate of the deceased testatrix. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure
to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a MR but the same was
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for
her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with
her sister Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, as on its face, patently
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last
death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court. A motion to dismiss the
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged
waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment children and forced heirs was denied. Petitioner Cayetano persists with the
of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
located in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging 1. WON the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. NO
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a 2. WON the national law should apply as regards the intrinsic validity of the
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if provisions of the will. YES
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply 3. WON CFI of Manila acquired jurisdiction. YES
inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him. Later, however, the
petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss HELD:
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to 1. The first issue raised by the petitioner is anchored on the allegation that the
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
No proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, admitting and allowing was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
probate in the Philippines of Adoracion Campos’ Last Will And Testament and counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the
appointing Nenita Campos Paguia as Administratrix of the estate of said decedent. petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on, confirming the withdrawal of his Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed. was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn
from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the
Subsequently, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was
the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-
Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
CONTRACTS
2. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
1. MOLINA V. DELA RIVA
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
FACTS: This is an action to recover a debt due upon a contract executed July 27,
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
1903, whereby plaintiff transferred to the defendant the abaca and coprax business
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
theretofore carried on by him at various places in the Island of Catanduanes, with all
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
the property and right pertaining to the said business, or the sum of 134,636 pesos
and 12 cents, payable in Mexican currency or its equivalent in local currency.
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed
Defendant paid at the time of the execution of the contract, on account of the
the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
purchase price, the sum of P33,659 pesos and 3 cents, promising to pay the balance
legitime which was reserved by the law for him. This contention is without merit.
on three installments P33,659 pesos and 3 cents each, with interest at the rate of 5
per cent per annum from the date of the contract. The first installment became due
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
July 27, 1904. It was for the recovery of this first installment that their action was
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents
brought in the CFI of the City of Manila.
have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which
of the subject of the action. The court overruled the demurrer and defendant refused
governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
to and did not, as a matter of fact, answer plaintiff’s complaint.
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the
Judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 33,659 pesos
testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
and 3 cents, Mexican currency, equal to 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos, Philippine
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would
currency, an interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from July 27, 1903
run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
and costs, the defendant duly excepted.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
ISSUES:
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
1.) WON the court had jurisdiction of the subject of the action. YES.
decedent must apply.
2.) WON the court erred in fixing in Philippine currency the sum which the appellee
should recover, without hearing evidence as to the relative value of Mexican and
3. Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
Philippine currency. NO.
devoid of merit. Applying Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, the settlement of
3.) WON the court erred in not directing that payments be made in Philippine
the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she
currency. NO.
had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death
4.) WON the court erred in rendering judgment in a sum larger than that sought to be
was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and
recovered in the complaint. YES.
not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
5.) WON the court erred in taking into consideration as the basis of its judgment the
now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
contract in question, the same being null and void. NO.
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
HELD:
or question that same jurisdiction.
1.) It is alleged that plaintiff and defendant were residents of the Island of
Catanduanes, as would appear, as the plaintiff is concerned, from a power of
attorney, executed by him to Antonio Vallejo Valencia and introduced in evidence
during the trial. This power of attorney was executed August 22, 1901. The
instrument in fact contains the statement that plaintiff was a resident of Catanduanes.
Nothing is said however, either in the power of attorney or in the contract upon which
this action is based, as to the residence of the defendant.
The complaint was filed March 10, 1905, and it alleges that both plaintiff and
defendant were residents of the city of Manila. This allegation was not either
generally or specifically denied by the defendant, who refused and failed to give an
answer to the complaint, having merely demurred thereto. The power of attorney
above referred to, does not and can not by itself prove that the parties were not’ 2.) The amount sought to be recovered in this action, under the terms of the contract,
residents of the city of Manila in March, 1905, when the complaint was filed. The was 33,859 pesos and 3 cents, payable in Mexican currency, or its equivalent in local
actual residence, and not that which the parties had four years, prior to the filing of currency.
the complaint, is the one that should govern the question as to the jurisdiction of the This contention was not denied by the defendant. Plaintiff’s allegation must therefore
court. be deemed admitted. Consequently it was not necessary for the court to hear
evidence as to the relative value of Mexican and Philippine currency. There is no
A personal action like this for the record of a debt may be brought, under dispute between the parties as to the fact that the 33,659 pesos and 3 Cents,
section 377 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, in the CFI of the province where Mexican currency, referred to in the contract, were equal to 28,049 pesos and 19
the plaintiff resides or in the province where the defendant may reside, at the centavos, Philippine currency, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
election of the plaintiff. Both parties to this case being residents the city of Manila, it
is apparent that the Court of First Instance of that city had jurisdiction to try and The proof required by section 3 of Act No. 1045, cited by the appellant, should be
determine this action. received only when the parties disagree as to the relative value of the currency. The
court below did not, therefore, err in not hearing evidence upon this point, even under
It is further urged in support of the alleged want of jurisdiction on the part of the court the assumption that no such evidence as heard in regard thereto, as claimed by the
below, that the parties had mutually designated in the contract in question the town of appellant.
Bato, Islands of Catanduanes, as the place where all judicial and extrajudicial acts
necessary under the terms thereof should take place. Paragraph 9 of the contract 3.) The appellant also assigns as error the fact that defendant was given the option to
contains in fact a stipulation to that effect. This the appellant claims amounted to an pay the debt either in Mexican or Philippine currency, claiming that the court should
express submission by the contracting parties to jurisdiction of the CFI of the have directed payment to be made in the latter currency as required by Act No. 1045.
Province of Albay, in which the town of Bato was located. Assuming that this contention is correct, it should nevertheless be true that it did not
prejudice any of his essential rights. He was rather favored thereby, since he was
We are of the opinion that the designation of the town of Bato made by the parties given an option to pay in whatever currency he might see fit. It is well known that in
had no legal force and could not have the effect of depriving the Court of First the case of an alternative obligation the debtor has the right to choose the method of
Instance of Manila of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law. This would be true even meeting the obligation unless the creditor has expressly reserved that right to himself.
though it may be granted that the parties actually intended to waive the rights of (Art. 1132 of the Civil Code.)
domicile and expressly submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI of
Albay, contended the appellant, all of which it may be said seems to be very doubtful, 4.) Section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows:
judging from the vague and uncertain manner in which the designation was made. The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, can not exceed that which he
The jurisdiction of a court is filed by law and not by the will of the parties. As a matter shall have demanded in his complaint. . . .”
of public policy, parties can only stipulate in regard to that which is expressly
authorized by law. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a plain The defendant failed to answer. Under such circumstances plaintiff could not have
and definite rule for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of courts obtained more than what he had demanded in his complaint. Plaintiff’s demand was
according to the nature of the action. Neither that section nor any other for the sum of 28,049 pesos and 19 centavos only. The court had no power to enter
provision of law, of which we have any knowledge, authorizes the parties to judgment in favor of the plaintiff for 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos. We hold that this
submit themselves by an express stipulation to the jurisdiction of a particular was error on the part of the trial court. The judgment of the court below should be
court to the exclusion of the court duly vested with such jurisdiction. modified in this respect.
It is not true as contended by the appellant that the right which litigants had under the 5.) The last error assigned by the appellant is that the court took into consideration as
Spanish law to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court was the basis of its judgment the contract in question, the same being null and void. The
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Such right was recognized and appellant alleges in support of his contention that the contract did not bear the
governed by the provisions of the Law of Procedure and not by the substantive law. internal-revenue stamp required by Act No. 1045 of the Philippine Commission
The right to contract, recognized in the Civil Code and referred to by appellant, enacted January 27, 1904, and relies particularly upon the provisions of sections 9
has nothing to do with the right to establish and fix the jurisdiction of a court. and 10 of the act.
This right can only be exercised by the legislative branch of the Government,
the only one vested with the necessary power to make rules governing the The contract under consideration was executed July 27, 1903. Such contract was not
subject. In this connection it may be said that the jurisdiction of a court can not subject to the stamp tax provided in Act No. 1045. The penalty of nullity prescribed in
be the subject-matter of a contract. section 10 of the act is not applicable to that contract. The court, therefore, committed
no error in finding that the absence of revenue stamp did not render the contract void.
2. INSULAR GOVERNMENT V. FRANK

promulgation of the Code in 1901. After the execution of Exhibit T and U, both
Facts: In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and a representative Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa participated in the
of the Insular Government of the Philippines entered into a contract whereby the management of Aldecoa and Co, as partners by being present and voting at
former shall serve as stenographer in the Philippines for a period of 2 years. The meetings of the partners of the company upon matters connected with its affairs.
contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms, Mr. Frank shall be
liable for the amount incurred by the Philippine Government for his travel from On the 23rd of February, 1906, the defendant firm of Aldeco and Co. obtained from
Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period. After serving for 6 the bank a credit in account current up to the sum of P450,000 upon the terms and
months, defendant left the service and refused to make further compliance with the conditions set forth in the instrument executed on that date (Exhibit A). Later it was
terms of the contract, therefore the Government sued him to recover the amount of agreed that the defendants, Isabel Palet and her two sons, Joaquin and Zoilo, should
$269.23 plus damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hence the mortgage, in addition to certain securities of Aldecoa and Co., as set forth in Exhibit
defendant appealed presenting minority as his special defense. By reason of the fact A, certain of their real properties as additional security for the obligations of Aldecoa
that under the laws of the Philippines, contracts made by person who did not reach and Co. So, on March 23, 1906, the mortgage, Exhibit B, was executed wherein
majority age of 23 are unenforceable. Defendant claim that he is an adult when he certain corrections in the description of some of the real property mortgaged to the
left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived in Manila and at the time the plaintiff bank by Exhibit A were made and the amount for which each of the mortgaged
attempted to enforce the contract. properties should be liable was set forth. These two mortgages, Exhibits A and B,
were duly recorded in the registry of property of the city of Manila on March 23, 1906.
Issue: Whether or not the contract is valid.
On the 31st day of December, 1906, the firm of Aldecoa and Co. went into liquidation
Held: Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the place and time the on account of the expiration of the term for which it had been organized, and the
contract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the place intervener, Urquhart, was duly elected by the parties as liquidator, and be resolution
where the contract is being enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a minor under dated January 24, 1907, he was granted the authority expressed in that resolution
Philippine laws, he was nevertheless considered an adult under the laws of the state (Exhibit G).
of Illinois,the place where the contract was made.No rule is better settled in law than
that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are On June 30, 1907, Aldeco and Co. in liquidation, for the purposes of certain litigation
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected to about to be commenced in its behalf, required an injunction bond in the sum of
its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of its performance. P50,000, which was furnished by the bank upon the condition that any liability
Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit, admissibility of evidence, incurred on the part of the bank upon this injunction bond would be covered by the
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is mortgage of February 23, 1906. An agreement to this effect was executed by
brought. Aldecoa and Co. in liquidation, by Isabel Palet, by Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa, who
had then attained his full majority, and by Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa, who was not yet
3. IBANEZ V. HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK twenty-three years of age. In 1908, Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa, Zoilo Ibañez de
Aldecoa, and Cecilia Ibañez de Aldecoa commenced an action against their mother,
FACTS: The defendants, Joaquin Ibañez de Alcoa, Zoilo Ibañez de Alcoa, and Isabel Palet, and Aldecoa and Co., in which the bank was not a party, and in
Cecilia Ibañez de Alcoa, were born in the Philippine Islands on March 27, 1884, July September of that year procured a judgment of the Court of First Instance annulling
4, 1885, and . . . , 1887, respectively, the legitimate children of Zoilo Ibañez de Alcoa the articles of copartnership of Aldecoa and Co., in so far as they were concerned,
and the defendant, Isabel Palet. Both parents were native of Spain. The father's and decreeing that they were creditors and not partners of that firm.
domicile was in Manila, and he died here on October 4, 1895. The widow, still
retaining her Manila domicile, left the Philippine Islands and went to Spain in 1897 The real property of the defendant Isabel Palet, mortgaged to the plaintiff, corporation
because of her health, and did not return until the latter part of 1902. the firm of by the instrument of March 23, 1906 (Exhibit B), was, at the instance of the
Aldecoa & Co., of which Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa, deceased, had been a member defendant, registered under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, subject to
and managing director, was reorganized in December, 1896, and the widow became the mortgage thereon in favor of the plaintiff, by decree, of the land court dated
one of the general or "capitalistic" partners of the firm. The three children, above March 8, 1907.
mentioned, appear in the articles of agreement as industrial partners.
On the 6th of November, 1906, the defendants, Isabel Palet and her three children,
On July 31, 1903, Isabel Palet, the widowed mother of Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa, Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa, and Cecilia Ibañez de Aldecoa,
and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa, who were then over the age of 18 years, went before a applied to the land court for the registration of their title to the real property described
notary public and executed two instruments (Exhibits T and U), wherein and whereby in paragraph 4 of the instrument of March 23, 1906 (Exhibit B), in which application
she emancipated her two sons, with their consent and acceptance. No guardian of they stated that the undivided three-fourths of said properties belonging to the
the person or property of these two sons had ever been applied for or appointed defendants, Isabel Palet, Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa, and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa,
under or by virtue of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure since the were subject to the mortgage in favor of the plaintiff to secure the sum of
P203,985.97 under the terms of the instrument dated March 22, 1906. Pursuant to By a public instrument dated February 18, 1907, Aldecoa and Co. acknowledged as
this petition the Court of Land Registration, by decree dated September 8, 1907, indebtedness to Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa in the sum of P154,589.20, a like
registered the title to the undivided three-fourths interest therein pertaining to the indebtedness to Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa in the sum of P89,177.07. On September
defendants, Isabel Palet and her two sons, Joaquin and Zoilo, to the mortgage in 30, 1908, Joaquin, Zoilo, and Cecilia recovered a judgment in the Court of First
favor of the plaintiff to secure the sun of P203,985.97. Instance of Manila for the payment to them f the sum of P155,127.31, as the balance
due them upon the indebtedness acknowledged in the public instrument dated
On December 22, 1906, Aldecoa and Co., by a public instrument executed before a February 18, 1907.
notary public, as additional security for the performance of the obligations in favor of
the plaintiff under the terms of the contracts Exhibits A and B, mortgaged to the bank On November 30, 1907, Joaquin, Zoilo, and Cecilia instituted an action in the Court
the right of mortgage pertaining to Aldecoa and Co. upon certain real property in the of First Instance of the city of the Manila against the plaintiff bank for the purpose of
Province of Albay, mortgaged to said company by one Zubeldia to secure an obtaining a judicial declaration to the effect that the contract whereby Aldecoa and
indebtedness to that firm. Subsequent to the execution of this instrument, Zubeldia Co. mortgaged to the bank the shares of the Pasay Estate Company recovered from
caused his title to the mortgaged property to be registered under the provisions of the Alejandro S. Macleod, was null and void, and for a judgment of that these shares be
Land Registration Act, subject to a mortgage of Aldecoa and Co. to secure the sum sold and applied to the satisfaction of their judgment obtained on September 30,
of P103,943.84 and to the mortgage of the mortgage right of Aldecoa and Co. to the 1908. Judgment was rendered by the lower court in favor of the plaintiffs in that
plaintiff. action in accordance with their prayer, but upon appeal this court reversed that
judgment and declared that the mortgage of the shares of stock in the Pasay Estate
As the result of the litigation Aldecoa and Co. and A. S. Macleod, wherein the Co. to the bank was valid.
injunction bond for P50,000 was made by the bank in the manner and for the purpose
above set forth, Aldecoa and Co. became the owner, through a compromise In October, 1908, Joaquin and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa instituted an action against
agreement executed in Manila on the 14th of August, 1907, of the shares of the the plaintiff bank for the purpose of obtaining a judgment annulling the mortgages
Pasay Estate Company Limited (referred to in the contract of March 13, 1907, Exhibit created by them upon their interest in the properties described in Exhibits A and B,
V), and on the 30th day of August of that year Urquhart, as liquidator, under the upon the ground that the emancipation buy their mother was void and of no effect,
authority vested in him as such, and in compliance with the terms of the contract of and that, therefore, they were minors incapable of creating a valid mortgage upon
June 13, 1907, mortgaged to the plaintiff, by way of additional security for the their real property. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint as to Joaquin
performance of the obligations set forth in Exhibits A and B, the 312 shares of the upon the ground that he had ratified those mortgages after becoming of age, but
Pasay Estate Company, Limited, acquired by Aldecoa and Co. entered a judgment annulling said mortgages with respect to Zoilo. Both parties
appealed from this decision and the case was given registry No. 6889 in the
On the 31st day of March, 1907, Aldecoa and Co. mortgaged, as additional security Supreme Court.
for the performance of those obligations, to the plaintiff the right of mortgage,
pertaining to the firm of Aldecoa and Co., upon certain real estate in that Province of On the 31st day of December, 1906, on which date the defendant Aldecoa and Co.
Ambos Camarines, mortgaged to Aldecoa and Co. by one Andres Garchitorena to went into liquidation, the amount of indebtedness to the bank upon the overdraft
secure a balance of indebtedness to that firm of the sum of P20,280.19. The created by the terms of the contract, Exhibit A, was P516,517.98. Neither the
mortgage thus created in favor of the bank was duly recorded in the registry of deeds defendant Aldecoa and Co., nor any of the defendants herein, have paid or caused to
f that province. On the 31st day of March, 1907, Aldecoa and Co. mortgaged as be paid to the bank the yearly partial payments due under the terms of the contract,
further additional security for the performance of the obligations set forth in Exhibits A Exhibit A. But from time to time the bank has collected and received from provincial
and B, the right of mortgage pertaining to the firm of Aldecoa and Co. upon other real debtors of Aldecoa and Co. the various sums shown in Exhibit Q, all of which sums
property in the same province, mortgaged by the firm of Tremoya Hermanos and so received have been placed to the credit of Aldecoa and Co. and notice duty given.
Liborio Tremoya, to secure the indebtedness of that firm to the firm of Aldecoa and Also, the bank, from time to time, since the date upon which Aldecoa and Co. went
Co. of P43,117.40 and the personal debt of the latter of P75,463.54. the mortgage into liquidation, has received various other sums from, or for the account of, Aldecoa
thus created in favor of the bank was filed for record with the registrar of deeds of and Co., all of which have been duly placed to the credit of that firm, including the
that province. sum of P22,552.63, the amount of the credit against one Achaval, assigned to the
bank by Aldecoa and Co. The balance to the credit of the bank on the 31st day of
On the 30th day of January, 1907, Aldecoa and Co. duly authorized the bank to December, 1911, as shown on the books of Aldecoa and Co., was for the sum of
collect from certain persons and firms, named in the instrument granting this P416.853.46. It appeared that an error had been committed by the bank in liquidating
authority, any and all debts owing by them to Aldecoa and Co. and to apply all the interest charged to Aldecoa and Co., and this error was corrected so that the
amounts so collected to the satisfaction, pro tanto, of any indebtedness of Aldecoa actual amount of the indebtedness of Aldecoa and Co. to the plaintiff on the 15th of
and Co. to the bank. February, 1912, with interest to December 10, 1912, the date of the judgment, the
amount was P344,924.23.
The trial court found that there was no competent evidence that the bank induced, or
attempted to induce, any customer of Aldecoa and Co. to discontinue business We understand that the bank is not seeking to exercise its mortgages rights upon the
relations with that company. The court further found that Urquhart had failed to show mortgages which the defendant firm holds upon certain real properties in the
that he had any legal interest in the matter in litigation between plaintiff and Provinces of Albay and Ambros Camarines and to sell these properties at public
defendants, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, as auction in these proceedings. Nor do we understand that the judgment of the trial
required by section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure. courts directs that this be done. Before that property can be sold the original
mortgagors will have to be made parties. The banks is not trying to foreclose, in this
ISSUES: section, any mortgages on real property executed by Aldecoa and Co. It is true that
1. W/N the court erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer based upon the alleged the bank sought and obtained a money judgment against that firm, and at the same
ambiguity and vagueness of the complaint. time and in the same action obtained a foreclosure judgment against the other
2. W/N the court erred in ruling that there was no competent evidence that the defendants. If two or more persons are in solidum the debtors mortgage any of their
plaintiff had induced Aldecoa and Co.'s provincial debtors to cease making real property situate in the jurisdiction of the court, the creditor, in case of the solidary
consignments to that firm. debtors in the same suit and secure a joint and several judgment against them, as
3. W/N the court erred in rendering a judgment in a special proceeding for the well as judgments of foreclosure upon the respective mortgages.
foreclosure of a mortgage, Aldecoa and Co. not having mortgaged any real estate of
any kind within the jurisdiction of the trial court, and the obligation of the persons who
had signed the contract of suretyship in favor of the bank having been extinguished 4. COMPANIE DE COMMERCE V. HAMBURG-AMERIKA
by operation of law.
FACTS:
HELD: With respect to the contention set forth in the s assignment of error to the • HAMBURG owned a steamship named SAMBIA, which proceeded to the port of
effect that the bank has prejudiced Aldecoa and Co. by having induced customers of Saigon and was taking the cargo belonging to COMPAGNIE. Apparently, there
the latter to cease their commercial relations with this defendant, the ruling of the were rumors of impending war between Germany and France and other nations
court that there is no evidence to show that there was any such inducement is fully of Europe. The master of the steamship was told to take refuge at a neutral port
supported by the record. It may be possible that some of Aldecoa and Co.'s (because Saigon was a French port). So, to stop that, COMPAGNIE asked for
customers ceased doing business with that firm after it went into liquidation. This is compulsory detention of his vessel to prevent its property from leaving Saigon.
the ordinary effect of a commercial firm going consideration, for the reason that it was However, the Governor of Saigon refused to issue an order because he had not
a well known fact that Aldecoa and Co. was insolvent. It is hardly probable that the been officially notified of the declaration of the war.
bank, with so large a claim against Aldecoa and Co. and with unsatisfactory security • The steamship sailed from Saigon, and was bound for Manila, because it was
for the payment of its claim, would have taken any action whatever which might have issued a bill of health by the US consul in Saigon. The steamship stayed
had the effect of diminishing Aldecoa and Co.'s ability to discharge their claim. The continuously in Manila and where it contends it will be compelled to stay until the
contention that the customers of Aldecoa and Co. included in the list of debtors war ceases. No attempt on the part of the defendants to transfer and deliver the
ceased to make consignments to the firm because they had been advised by the cargo to the destinations as stipulated in the charter party. That BEHN, MEYER
bank that Aldecoa and Co. had authorized the bank to collect these credits from the and COMPANY (agent of HAMBURG in manila) offered to purchase the cargo
defendant's provincial customers and apply the amounts so collected to the partial from COMPAGNIE, but the latter never received the cable messages so they
discharge of the indebtedness of the defendant to the bank. Furthermore, the bank never answered.
was expressly empowered to take any steps which might be necessary, judicially or • When a survey was done on the ship, it was found that the cargo was *weevily
extrajudicially, for the collection of these credits. The real reason which caused the and heating* (whatever that means), so BEHN asked for court authority to sell
defendant's provincial customers to cease making shipments was due to the fact that the cargo and the balance to be dumped at sea. The proceeds of the sale were
the defendant, being out of funds, could not give its customers any further credit. It is deposited in the court, waiting for orders as to what to do with it.
therefore clear that the bank, having exercised the authority conferred upon it by the • BEHN wrote COMPAGNIE again informing the latter of the disposition which it
company in a legal manner, is not responsible for any damages which might have made upon the cargo. COMPAGNIE answered that it was still waiting for orders
resulted from the failure of the defendant's provincial customers to continue doing as to what to do.
business with that firm. • COMPAGNIE of course wanted all the proceeds of the sale to be given to them
(damages for the defendants’ failure to deliver the cargo to the destinations
In the third assignments of errors two propositions are insisted upon: (1) that in these Dunkirk and Hamburg), while defendants contend that they have a lien on the
foreclosure proceedings the court was without jurisdiction to render judgment against proceeds of the sale (amount due to them because of the upkeep and
Aldecoa and Co. for the reason that firm had mortgaged no real property within the maintenance of the ship crew and for commissions for the sale of the cargo).
city of Manila to the plaintiff; and (2) that the mortgages given by this defendant have • The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
been extinguished by reason of the fact that the bank extended the time within which • On appeal, the defendants made the ff: assignments on appeal (that the court
the defendant's provincial debtors might make their payments. had no jurisdiction, that the fear of capture was not force majeure, that the court
erred in concluding that defendant is liable for damages for non-delivery of cargo, FACTS: This is an action to collect P59,082.92, together with lawful interests from 14
and the value of the award of damages) October 1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs. The claim
• On appeal, the plaintiffs also contended that the court erred in not giving the full arises out of a shipment of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion sold by the plaintiff, as
value of damages (kasi binawas un expenses ng mga defendants) agent of the defendant, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, who in turn assigned it to Fortrade
Corporation. Under an agency agreement set forth in a letter dated 7 November 1946
ISSUE: W/N the master of the steamship was justified in taking refuge in Manila in New York addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the 22nd day
(therefore being the cause of the non-delivery of the cargo belonging to the plaintiffs) of the same month, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the
sale of coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 1/2
• COMPAGNIE contends that the master should have in mind the accepted per cent on the total actual sale price of sales obtained through his efforts in addition
principles of public international law, the established practice of nations, and the thereto 50 per cent of the difference between the authorized sale price and the actual
express terms of the Sixth Hague Convention (1907), the master should have sale price.
confidently relied upon the French authorities at Saigon to permit him to sail to
his port of destination under a laissez-passer or safe-conduct, which would have After the trial where the depositions of the plaintiff and of Jas. Maxwell Fassett and
secured both the vessel and her cargo from all danger of capture by any of the several letters in connection therewith were introduced and the testimony of the
belligerents. The SHIPOWNER contends that the master was justified in defendant was heard, the Court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint. A
declining to leave his vessel in a situation in which it would be exposed to motion for reconsideration was denied. A motion for a new trial was filed, supported
danger of seizure by the French authorities, should they refuse to be bound by by the defendant's affidavit, based on newly discovered evidence which consists of a
the alleged rule of international law. duplicate original of a letter dated 16 October 1946 covering the sale of 1,000 tons of
coconut oil soap emulsion signed by Jas. Maxwell Fassett assigned by the latter to
HELD: the defendant; the letter of credit No. 20122 of the Chemical Bank & Trust Company
• The Court held that after examining the terms and conditions of the convention in favor of Jas. Maxwell Fassett assigned by the latter to the defendant; and a letter
that at the outbreak of the present war, there was no such general recognition of dated 16 December 1946 by the Fortrade Corporation to Jas. Maxwell Fassett
the duty of a belligerent to grant "days of grace" and "safe-conducts" to enemy accepted it on 24 December 1946, all of which documents, according to the
ships in his harbors, as would sustain a ruling that such alleged duty was defendant, could not be produced at the trial, despite the use of reasonable diligence,
prescribed by any imperative and well settled rule of public international law, of and if produced they would alter the result of the controversy. The motion for new trial
such binding force that it was the duty of the master of the Sambia to rely was denied. The defendant is appealing from said judgment.
confidently upon a compliance with its terms by the French authorities in Saigon.
• It was nothing but a *pious wish* at least, adherence to the practice by any ISSUE: W/N a contract executed in a foreign country is cognizable by Philippine
belligerent could not be demanded by virtue of any convention, tacit or express, courts.
universally recognized by the members of the society of nations; and that it may
be expected only when the belligerent is convinced that the demand for HELD: The contention that as the contract was executed in New York, the Court of
adherence to the practice inspired by his own commercial and political interests First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over this case, is without merit, because a
outweighs any advantage he can hope to gain by a refusal to recognize the non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where the defendant
practice as binding upon him. may be summoned and his property leviable upon execution in the case of a
• The Court concluded that under the circumstances surrounding the flight of the favorable, final and executory judgment. It is a personal action for the collection of a
Sambia from the port of Saigon, her master had no such assurances, under any sum of money which the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try and decide.
well-settled and universally accepted rule of public international law, as to the There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, because it is only a question of
immunity of his vessel from seizure by the French authorities, as would justify us enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract; and unless the
in holding that it was his duty to remain in the port of Saigon in the hope that he enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced.
would be allowed to sail for the port of destination designated in the contract of
affreightment with a laissez-passer or safe-conduct which would secure the The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and P50,000 for one-half
safety of his vessel and cargo en route. of the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88, lawful interests thereon from the date of the
• The Court also held that it was the duty of the ship-owner to sell, and not to just filing of the complaint, and costs in both instances.
transship the cargo, due to the fact of the perishable nature of the cargo (rice)
and that he was justified in the delay of acting, so as to ascertain reasonably 6. SHEWARAM V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
what course of action to take.
• RE: jurisdiction. It cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Facts: A PAL ticket, on the reverse side, stated in fine print that if the value of
baggage is not stated, and the baggage is lost, the maximum liability of PAL is
5. KING MAU WU V. SYCIP P100.00 if value in excess of P100.00 is stated, PAL will charge extra because PAL
is being held liable for an amount exceeding P100.00. Shewaram, a Hindu from
Davao, boarded a PAL plane for Manila. Among his baggage was a camera with Ong Yiu that his luggage had already been forwarded on the assumption that by the
P800.00 and it was lost. PAL offered to pay P100.00. Shewaram wanted full payment time the message reached Butuan City, the luggage would have arrived.
of P800.00.
Early in the morning of the next day, Ong Yiu went to the Bancasi Airport to inquire
Issue: Whether the limited liability rule shall apply in the case at bar? about his luggage. He did not wait, however, for the morning flight which arrived at
10am, and which carried the missing luggage. The porter clerk, Maximo Gomez,
Held: The limited liability rule shall not apply. Since this is a stipulation on qualified paged Ong Yiu, but the latter had already left. A certain Emilio Dagorro, a driver of a
liability, which operates to reduce the liability of the carrier, the carrier and the shipper “colorum” car, who also used to drive for Ong Yiu, volunteered to take the luggage to
must agree thereupon. Otherwise, the carrier will be liable for full. PAL is fully liable Ong Yiu. As Maximo Gomez knew Dagorro to be the same driver used by Ong Yiu
(for full) because Shewaran did not agree to the stipulation on the ticket, as whenever the latter was in Butuan City, Gomez took the luggage and placed it on the
manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not sign the ticket. Ticket should have counter. Dagorro examined the lock, pressed it, and it opened. After calling the
been signed. attention of Maximo Gomez, the “maleta” was opened, Gomez took a look at its
contents, but did not touch them. Dagorro then delivered the “maleta” to Ong Yiu,
7. ONG YIU V. CA with the information that the lock was open. Upon inspection, Ong Yiu found that a
folder containing certain exhibits, transcripts and private documents were missing,
FAST FACTS: Ong Yiu was scheduled to travel from Cebu to Butuan on board a aside from two gift items for his parents-in-law. Ong Yiu refused to accept the
PAL flight. He checked in one piece of baggage (a blue maleta) containing important luggage. Dagorro returned it to the porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, who sealed it and
documents that he needed for the trials he was scheduled to attend. Upon arrival at forwarded the same to PAL Cebu.
Butuan, he discovered that the luggage was missing and demanded that PAL deliver
it to him the following day. PAL, despite their extensive efforts, failed to deliver the Meanwhile, Ong Yiu asked for postponement of the hearing due to loss of his
baggage on time, causing Ong Yiu to postpone the hearing. Ong Yiu sued PAL for documents, which was granted by the Court. Ong Yiu returned to Cebu City on 28
damages for breach of contract of transportation. August 1967. In a letter dated 29 August 1967 addressed to PAL, Cebu, Ong Yiu
called attention to his telegram, demanded that his luggage be produced intact, and
Facts: On 26 August 1967, Augusto B. Ong Yiu was a fare paying passenger of that he be compensated in the sum of P250,000.00 for actual and moral damages
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), on board Flight 463-R, from Mactan, Cebu, bound for within 5 days from receipt of the letter, otherwise, he would be left with no alternative
Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend two trials set for hearing on August 28-31, but to file suit. On 31 August 1967, Messrs. de Leon, Navarsi, and Agustin, all of PAL
1967. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a blue “maleta” for which Cebu, went to Ong Yiu’s office to deliver the “maleta”. In the presence of Mr. Jose
he was issued a claim check. The plane left Mactan Airport at about 1pm, and arrived Yap and Atty. Manuel Maranga, the contents were listed and receipted for by Ong
at Bancasi airport, Butuan City, at past 2 pm of the same day. Yiu. On 5 September 1967, Ong Yiu sent a tracer letter to PAL Cebu inquiring about
the results of the investigation which Messrs. de Leon, Navarsi and Agustin had
Upon arrival, Ong Yiu claimed his luggage but it could not be found. According to promised to conduct to pinpoint responsibility for the unauthorized opening of the
Ong Yiu, it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended “maleta”.
to by the porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, which, however, the latter denies. At about
3pm, PAL Butuan, sent a message to PAL Cebu inquiring about the missing luggage, On 13 September 1967, Ong Yiu filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for
which message was, in turn, relayed in full to the Mactan Airport teletype operator at breach of contract of transportation with the CFI of Cebu, which PAL traversed. After
3:45 pm. It must have been transmitted to Manila immediately, for at 3:59 pm, PAL due trial, the lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice and
Manila wired PAL Cebu advising that the luggage had been overcarried to Manila declared petitioner entitled to moral damages in the sum of P80,000.00, exemplary
aboard Flight 156 and that it would be forwarded to Cebu on Flight 345 of the same damages of P30,000.00, attorney’s fees of P5,000.00, and costs.
day. Instructions were also given that the luggage be immediately forwarded to
Butuan City on the first available flight. At 5pm of the same afternoon, PAL Cebu sent Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 22 August 1974, the Court of
a message to PAL Butuan that the luggage would be forwarded on Flight 963 the Appeals, finding that PAL was guilty only of simple negligence, reversed the
following day. However, this message was not received by PAL Butuan as all the judgment of the trial Court granting Ong Yiu moral and exemplary damages, but
personnel had already left since there were no more incoming flights that afternoon. ordered PAL to pay Ong Yiu the sum of P100.00, the baggage liability assumed by it
under the condition of carriage printed at the back of the ticket. Hence, this petition
In the meantime, Ong Yiu was worried about the missing luggage because it for review.
contained vital documents needed for trial the next day. At 10 pm, Ong Yiu wired PAL
Cebu demanding the delivery of his baggage before noon the next day, otherwise, he ISSUES:
would hold PAL liable for damages, and stating that PAL’s gross negligence had 1. W/N PAL acted in bad faith and failed to exercise due diligence
caused him undue inconvenience, worry, anxiety and extreme embarrassment. This 2. W/N Ong Yiu is entitled to damages; does the doctrine of limited liability apply
telegram was received by the Cebu PAL supervisor but the latter felt no need to wire
HELD: contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the
1. PAL did not act in bad faith latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation”. It is what is known as a
Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. contract of “adhesion”, in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
It was the duty of PAL to look for Ong Yiu’s luggage which had been miscarried; and wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane
PAL exerted due diligence in complying with such duty. PAL had not acted in bad ticket in the present case, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres
faith. to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.
The failure of PAL Cebu to reply to Ong Yiu’s rush telegram is not indicative of bad Limitation of liability to agreed valuation is not contrary to law
faith. The telegram was dispatched by petitioner at around 10pm of 26 August 1967.
The PAL supervisor at Mactan Airport was notified of it only in the morning of the And as held in Randolph v. American Airlines and Rosenchein vs. Trans World
following day. At that time the luggage was already to be forwarded to Butuan City. Airlines, Inc., “a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend
There was no bad faith in the assumption made by said supervisor that the plane against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own
carrying the bag would arrive at Butuan earlier than a reply telegram. Had Ong Yiu negligence.”
waited or caused someone to wait at the Bancasi airport for the arrival of the morning
flight, he would have been able to retrieve his luggage sooner. No declaration of greater value nor payment of tariff for value of luggage
2. Ong Yiu not entitled to moral damages, nor exemplary damages The liability of PAL for the loss, in accordance with the stipulation written on the back
Articles 2217 and 2220 cannot apply. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of the ticket is limited to P100.00 per baggage. Ong Yiu not having declared a greater
of fraud or bad faith, Ong Yiu is not entitled to moral damages. Ong Yu is neither value, and not having called the attention of PAL on its true value and paid the tariff
entitled to exemplary damages. In contracts, as provided for in Article 2232 of the therefor. The validity of the stipulation is not questioned by Ong Yiu. They are printed
Civil Code, exemplary damages can be granted if the defendant acted in a wanton, in reasonably and fairly big letters, and are easily readable. Moreover, Ong Yiu had
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, which has not been proven been a frequent passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back, and he, being
in the present case. a lawyer and businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions. Considering,
therefore, that Ong Yiu had failed to declare a higher value for his baggage, he
However, Ong Yiu is entitled to recover P100 as indicated by the stipulation on cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P100.00. Besides, passengers are
limited liability in the contract of carriage, printed at the back of the plane ticket. The advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage but “to avail of our V-cargo
total liability is limited to P100/baggage for lost or damaged baggage. The contract of service.” It is likewise to be noted that there is nothing in the evidence to show the
carriage is a contract of adhesion, and as such, Ong Yiu had given his consent when actual value of the goods allegedly lost by Ong Yiu.
he purchased the ticket. Also, he did not declare any higher value of his baggage, nor
did he pay any tariff as to the actual value of his baggage. He is bound by the Additional notes (but not connected to contracts, di naman yata important):
contract of carriage and he cannot recover any amount in excess of P100. Technicality yields to the interests of substantial justice
SC dismissed the petition. Ong Yiu can only recover the P100/ticket as per the On 24 October 1974 or two months after the promulgation of the Decision of the
limited liability stipulation. appellate Court, Ong Yiu’s widow filed a Motion for Substitution claiming that Ong Yiu
died on 6 January 1974 and that she only came to know of the adverse Decision on
IMPORTANT NOTES: AS TO CONTRACTS 23 October 1974 when Ong Yiu’s law partner informed her that he received copy of
the Decision on 28 August 1974. Attached to her Motion was an Affidavit of Ong Yiu’s
Condition of carriage printed at back of plane ticket law partner reciting facts constitutive of excusable negligence. The appellate Court
noting that all pleadings had been signed by Ong Yiu himself allowed the widow “to
The pertinent Condition of Carriage printed at the back of the plane ticket reads “8. take such steps as she or counsel may deem necessary.” She then filed a Motion for
BAGGAGE LIABILITY . . . The total liability of the Carrier for lost or damaged Reconsideration over the opposition of PAL which alleged that the Court of Appeals
baggage of the passenger is LIMITED TO P100.00 for each ticket unless a Decision, promulgated on 22 August 1974, had already become final and executory
passenger declares a higher valuation in excess of P100.00, but not in excess, since no appeal had been interposed therefrom within the reglementary period.
however, of a total valuation of P1,000.00 and additional charges are paid pursuant Under the circumstances, considering the demise of Ong Yiu himself, who acted as
to Carrier’s tariffs.” his own counsel, it is best that technicality yields to the interests of substantial justice.
Besides, in the last analysis, no serious prejudice has been caused PAL.
Contract of adhesion
8. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS V. IAC
While it may be true that Ong Yiu had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless
bound by the provisions thereof. “Such provisions have been held to be a part of the
Facts: PanAm Airlines refused to accommodate Respondent Tinitigan on Pan Am Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six American dollars and fifteen cents (US$1,546.15)
Flight No. 431 from Sto. Domingo, Republica Dominica to San Juan, Puerto Rico computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment was retained and
notwithstanding that she possessed a confirmed plane ticket. While plaintiff was granted.
standing in line to board the aircraft, a Pan Am employee ordered her in a loud voice
to step out of line because her ticket was not confirmed to her embarrassment in the 9. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES V. OPLE
presence of several people who heard and order. Despite her Pleas she was not
allowed to board the aircraft. And her seat was also given to a Caucasian. The plane Facts: Pakistan Intl Airlines (PIA) executed 2 separate contracts of employments in
took off without her but with her luggage on board. She was forced to return to her Manila, one with Farrales and the other with Mamasig. The pertinent portions of the
hotel without any luggage much less an extra dress. contract state that (1) the agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended
by the mutual consent of the parties; (2) notwithstanding anything to contrary as
While in Sto. Domingo, Tinitigan is expected to be in San Juan that same day to meet herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by
a client to sign a contract or lose it. She was expected to make a profit of $1,000 in giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended
said contract but because she was unable to board the flight, said profit was lost. termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one
month's salary; (3) this agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the
The refusal of accommodation, and consequent loss of profit, caused Respondent laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction
Tinitigan to suffer mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
feelings and social humiliation. She prayed that she be awarded moral damages of
P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P200,000.00, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 1 year and 4 months before the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA
and actual damages sustained by her in the amount of US$1,546.15. Defendant sent separate letters to Mamasig and Farrales, advising them that their services as
denied that plaintiff was a confirmed passenger since the ticket issued to her was on flight stewardesses would be terminated. Farrales and Mamasig filed a complaint for
an open space basis, which meant that she could only be accommodated if any of illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses. PIA contended
the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. The lower that F & M were habitual absentees and had the habit of bringing in from abroad
court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages as sizeable quantities of personal effects.
prayed for. Said decision was affirmed, hence the instant petition.
Issue: WON the provision in the contract that the agreement shall be governed by
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was proper. the laws of Pakistan (first clause) and that only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall
have jurisdiction over any controversy arising out of the agreement (second clause),
Held: Yes, but subject to modifications. Evidence shows petitioner as confirmed may be given effect (NO)
passenger.
Held: NO. The first clause cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Phil labor
1.) Defendant issued a Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check with assigned seat laws and regulations to the subject matter of the case. The ER-EE relationship
and the corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol. between PIA and F&M is affected with public interest and the applicable Phil laws
and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other
2.) Plaintiff paid the fare and terminal fee. law to govern their relationship. The second clause cannot also be invoked because
the circumstances of the case shows multiple substantive contacts (no ‘r’) between
3.) plaintiff’s passport was stamped by immigration. Phil law and Phil courts on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties on
the other: contract was executed and partially performed in the Phils., F&M are
4.) Plaintiff’s name was included in the passenger manifest. There is a contract or Filipino citizens and PIA is licensed to do business in the Phils., and F&M were based
carriage perfected between plaintiff and defendant for the latter to take plaintiff to her in the Phils. in between their flights. All the above contacts point to the Philippine
place of destination. By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight, defendant had courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual
willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff disputes between the parties. The challenged portion of the employment agreement
to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. There is showing of bad cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
faith. Self-enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, PIA did not undertake
motive of defendant, but it is malice nevertheless. Malice is shown by the fact that to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
that plaintiff was ordered out of the line under some pretext in order to accommodate presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
a white man. applicable provisions of Philippine law.
SC reduced the moral and exemplary damages to the combined total sum of Two As to the dismissal of Farrales & Mamasig: they were illegally dismissed and are
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos and the attorney’s fees to Twenty entitled to 3 years backwages without qualification or deduction. PIA’s right to
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. The award of actual damages in the amount of One procedural due process was observed as it was given the opportunity to submit a
position paper and present evidence. Also, the provisions of the employment contract 1. No. Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, public policy. The shows that Osdana was terminated in violation of such, as well as Article 284.
employment contract prevents security of tenure of F&M from accruing.
“Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination – An employer may terminate the
10. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES V. NLRC services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well
Facts: In 1992, Osdana was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with Gulf as the health of his co-employees: x x x.”
Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Osdana was
engaged to work as a food server for 36 months wth a salary of SR550. She claims “Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal – Where the employee suffers from a
that she was required by Triple Eight to pay a total of 11,950 pesos in placement fees, disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
without receipts. She was asked to undergo a medical examination, too. It also asked health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his
Osdana to sign another ‘Contractor Employee Agreement’ which provided that she employment unless there is a certification by competent public authority that the
would be employed for 12 months as a waitress with a salary of $280. This 2nd disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of
employment agreement was approved by the POEA. six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured
within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the
Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi and commenced working for GCC. She was assigned employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and was made to position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.”
wash dishes, cooking pots, etc. which were unrelation to being a ‘waitress.’ She was
made to work a 12-hour shift, without overtime pay. Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness wasn’t prohibited by law, and it
wasn’t prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. The medical
Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms, and had to be confined from report that she got stated that ‘she had very good improvement of the symptoms.’
June 18 to August 22, and wasn’t paid her salaries. She was allowed to resume work Carpal Tunnel is not contagious.
as Food Server, where she worked 7 days a week, but was not paid. She was again
confined. Regarding the medical certificate requirement
The Court notes that aside from these allegations, petitioner hasn’t presented
She was re-assigned to the Oleysha University, like her first assignment. She was any medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health
diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. The pain then became authority in support of its claims. Triple Eight argues that she was employed in
unbearable, and she underwent two surgical operations. She wasn’t given any work Saudi Arabia and not in the Philippines, so there was a physical impossibility
assignments in between operations. After her 2nd operation, she was dismissed from to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical
work allegedly on ground of illness, even after being given a certificate that she was certificate that her illness won’t be cured within a period of six months. But the
fit to work. rule is simply ‘certification by a competent public health authority,’ and NOT
Philippine public health authority. The requirement cannot be dispensed with,
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of Triple Eight, but to no otherwise, it would defeat the public policy on protection of labor.
avail. She was constrained to file a complaint before the POEA for the unpaid and
underpaid salaries, for the unexpired portion, and damages. Under the Migrant The law of the place where the contract is made governs in this jurisdiction. The
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, the case was transferred to the arbitration contract was perfected here, so the Labor Code applies. The courts of the forum
branch of the NLRC and assigned to Labor Arbiter Canizares. The labor arbiter ruled won’t enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
in favor of Osdana.
Regarding the contract
NLRC affirmed. MR was denied. Though the contract that was approved by POEA was only for a period of 12 months,
Osdana’s actual stint was 1y 7.5m. The employer renewed her, impliedly, so the
Issues: award for the unexpired portion should have been $280 x 4.5 months.
1. W/N there was GAD because of ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no
factual or legal basis for the award (illegal dismissal) Regarding award of moral and exemplary damages
According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made
Please see below for issues regarding Conflict of Laws to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others,
contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours
Held: without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery
twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue
working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or
compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her Prior to the deadline, upon foreseeing the impossibility to meet it, the surety bond
illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for was also extended for more than 12 times until May 1987 and the Advance Payment
attorney’s fees is likewise upheld. Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement
11. PHIL. EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GURANTEE CORP. V. V.P. On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner
EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION INC. demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee
Facts: This case is an offshoot of a service contract entered into by a Filipino VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Mohammad Fadhi
construction firm with the Iraqi Government for the construction of the Institute of Hussein to recall the telex call on the performance guarantee for being a drastic
Physical Therapy-Medical Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, at a time when the action in contravention of its mutual agreement that (1) the imposition of penalty
Iran-Iraq war was ongoing. would be held in abeyance until the completion of the project; and (2) the time
In a complaint filed with the RTC Makati, petitioner Philippine Export and Foreign extension would be open, depending on the developments on the negotiations for a
Loan Guarantee Corporation (hereinafter Philguarantee) sought reimbursement from foreign loan to finance the completion of the project.
the respondents of the sum of money it paid to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait pursuant to a
guarantee it issued for respondent V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. (VPECI). VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay yet Al Ahli Bank because efforts were
On November 8, 1980: State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project.
and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical
Therapy–Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, (Project) to Ajyal VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already
Trading and Contracting Company (Ajyal), a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait paid to Rafidain Bank the sum of US$876,564 under its letter of guarantee, and
Chamber of Commerce for ID5,416,089/046 (or about US$18,739,668) demanding reimbursement by Philguarantee.
March 7, 1981: 3-Plex International, Inc. represented by Spouses Eduardo and VPECI requested the Central Bank to hold in abeyance the payment by the
Iluminada Santos a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a Philguarantee "to allow the diplomatic machinery to take its course, for otherwise, the
joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under Philippine government , through the Philguarantee and the Central Bank, would
the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB), it had to assign and transfer all become instruments of the Iraqi Government in consummating a clear act of injustice
its right to VPECI. and inequity committed against a Filipino contractor.
VPECI entered into an agreement that the execution of the project will be under their Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank.
joint management.
Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit US$876,564 to Al Ahli Bank, and
To comply with the requirements of performance bond of ID271,808/610 and an an reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the
advance payment bond of ID541,608/901, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance Philguarantee for the advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay
of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to so a case was filed in the RTC.
issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of
approved service contracts abroad. RTC and CA: Against Philguarantee since no cause of action since it was expired
because VPECI. Inequity to allow the Philguarantee to pass on its losses to the
Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Filipino contractor VPECI which had sternly warned against paying the Al Ahli Bank
Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was, therefore, engaged to provide a and constantly apprised it of the developments in the Project implementation.
counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its
favor from the Philguarantee. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine laws should be applied in determining VPECI's default in
the performance of its obligations under the service contract
The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage from P6.4
million to P6.967 million and to change the bank in whose favor the petitioner's HELD: YES. No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided
guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait for in our laws.
SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a
construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy – Medical Rehabilitation Center, contract must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This
Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq. It commenced only on the last week of August 1981 is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law
instead of the June 2 1981 intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis) - none in this
case TORTS AND CRIMES

In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one
1. SS LOTUS CASE
of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence,
the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be
On August 2, 1926, the S.S. Lotus, a French steamship, collided on the high seas
determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly
with the Boz-Kourt, a Turkish collier. The Boz-Kourt split in two and sank, and eight of
pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the
its crew members were killed. The Lotus remained to assist the survivors of the Boz-
processual presumption, comes into play.
Kourt, including its captain, Hassan Bey, and then continued with the survivors to
Constantinople. Turkish authorities subsequently requested that Lieutenant Demons,
Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
the officer of the watch on board the Lotus when the collision occurred, come ashore
is that foreign law is the same as ours
to give evidence. At the conclusion of the questioning, Turkish authorities placed
Demons and Hassan Bey under arrest pending trial on charges of manslaughter. At
In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as
trial, Demons argued that the Turkish court lacked jurisdiction, but the court convicted
"kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the
both Demons and Hassan Bey, sentencing each to a term of imprisonment. The
absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that "has the most
French government protested the arrest and the conviction and requested that the
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties Another authority proposed
case be transferred to a French court. Turkey proposed, and France agreed, to pose
that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid
the following question to the PCIJ: “(1) Has Turkey . . . acted in
excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of performance
conflict with the principles of international law—and if so, what principles—by
or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to
instituting . . . criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law against M.
the contract in a significant way
Demons . . .?”
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one
The French government invoked the 1923 Convention of Lausanne in arguing
of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence,
against Turkish jurisdiction. Article 15 of the Convention indicated that “all questions
the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be
of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other contracting Powers, be decided
determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly
in accordance with the principles of international law.” France maintained that such
pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the
principles precluded criminal jurisdiction in this case. The Court, somewhat
processual presumption, comes into play.
significantly, condensed the positions of the parties in the following way:
Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
The French Government contends that the Turkish Courts, in order to
is that foreign law is the same as ours.
have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title to jurisdiction
recognized by international law in favor of Turkey. On the other hand,
Delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors not imputable to
the Turkish Government takes the view that Article 15 allows Turkey
the respondent contractor such as the war in Iraq.
jurisdiction whenever such jurisdiction does not come into conflict with
a principle of international law.
Petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is, it cannot be
compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been
Having thus framed the question as one inquiring whether international law is
exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by
essentially permissive or prohibitive, the Court then issued its famous dictum:
the creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may
owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly
International law governs relations between independent States. The
waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own
yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
debtor.
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or
with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
The Court ultimately ruled, in a six-six split with President Huber casting the
deciding vote, that trying Demons was not an exercise of power on the territory of
another State, that the Court could deduce no rule or principle of international law
preventing Turkey from exercising jurisdiction, and that under the circumstances replaced Marcos as president, created the Presidential Commission on Good
France and Turkey had concurrent jurisdiction. Government, an official agency charged with recovering the assets of the Republic
from the Marcos family and its associates.
2. FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA
These assets, which have never been comprehensively identified in any litigation,
FACTS: Filartiga's 17yrold son Joelito was kidnapped and tortured to death by D, originally included U.S. and Philippine real estate holdings, valuable art works, cash
Pena, in Paraguay. P claims this was done in retaliation for his father's political and other property seized by U.S. Customs officials in Hawai‘i, and funds in bank
activities and beliefs. P brought a criminal case in Paraguayan court, but his attorney accounts in California and Switzerland. The Republic contends that the Marcoses
was arrested , threatened with death, and supposedly disbarred without just cause. and their associates obtained these assets through misuse of Marcos' official
Four years later, another man confessed to the murder, claiming he found Joelito and position, and Philippine law provides for the forfeiture to the national treasury of
his wife together, and said the crime was one of passion, but he was never convicted, property unlawfully obtained by public officials.
and also the evidence showed that Joelito's death "was the result of professional
methods of torture." A number of lawsuits were filed against the Marcos family in American courts.
Among them were five suits filed in the Northern District of California and the District
In 1978, Dolly Filártiga and (separately) D (Peña) came to the US. Dolly applied for of Hawai‘i by individuals alleging that they or their relatives had been arrested,
political asylum, while Peña stayed under a visitor's visa. Dolly learned of Peña's tortured, or executed by military intelligence personnel acting pursuant to martial law
presence and reported it to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who arrested declared by Marcos in 1971. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos (In re Estate of
and deported Peña for staying past the expiration of his visa. When Peña was taken Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (“Estate
to the Brooklyn Navy Yard pending deportation, Dolly lodged a civil complaint in U.S. II  ”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126, 115 S.Ct. 934, 130 L.Ed.2d 879 (1995). The
courts for Joelito's wrongful death by torture, asking for damages in the amount of district courts dismissed all five suits on the ground that the Act of State doctrine
$10 million. precluded liability. Id.
ISSUE: Whether U.S. courts can punich non-U.S. citizens for tortious acts committed In an appeal of those decisions to this court, the Republic filed an amicus curiae brief
outside the U.S. that were in violation of the law of nations or any treaties to which urging the U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over the human rights claims. This
the U.S. is a party. court reversed in two unpublished decisions.1 The human rights cases were
subsequently consolidated in the district court in Hawai‘i and certified as a class
HELD: Yes. This case extended the jurisdiction of United States courts to tortious action suit against the Estate. 25 F.3d at 1469.
acts committed around the world.
Meanwhile, in a separate action filed in the Central District of California, the Republic
The appellants argued that Peña's actions had violated wrongful death statutes, the sued the Estate and Imelda Marcos, asserting RICO and pendent state law claims,
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration and seeking the recovery of $1.55 billion allegedly plundered from the Philippines
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and other customary international law. Petitioner treasury. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir.1987),
claimed the U.S. courts had jurisdiction to hear the case under the Alien Tort Statute, reheard en banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
which grants district courts original jurisdiction to hear tort claims brought by an alien 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1933, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989). On 25 June 1986, the district court
that have been "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United enjoined the Marcoses and their associates from disposing of any assets anywhere
States." This case interpreted that statute to grant jurisdiction over claims for torts in the world. We affirmed the injunction. 862 F.2d at 1358.
committed both within the United States and abroad. The Republic's suit against the Estate was settled in October 1991 and dismissed on
4 November 1991. As part of the settlement, the Estate and Imelda Marcos agreed
The U.S. courts eventually ruled in favor of the Filártigas, rewarding them roughly to transfer the Estate assets impounded by U.S. Customs officials in Hawai‘i,2 except
$10.4 million. Torture was clearly a violation of international law (aka "the law of for some personal items and the cash in three accounts at a Los Angeles bank,3 to
nations"), and the U.S. did have jurisdiction over the case since the claim was lodged the Republic.4
when both parties were inside the United States. Additionally, Peña had sought to
dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens (saying that Paraguay was a more The assets in Swiss banks were not transferred under the terms of the settlement,
convenient location for the trial), but did not succeed. perhaps because the Swiss courts had frozen all Marcos assets in Switzerland in
1986 at the request of the Republic and had agreed that the assets would be
3. IN RE: ESTATE OF FERDINAND MARCOS returned to the Philippines if criminal prosecutions against the Marcos family in the
Philippines succeeded.5
FACTS: hortly after being deposed as president of the Philippines in February 1986,
Ferdinand Marcos (“Marcos”) and his wife Imelda fled to Hawai‘i, taking with them The injunction freezing the Estate's assets was dissolved as part of the settlement.
dozens of crates filled with gold, jewelry, and cash. President Corazon Aquino, who However, the district court in Hawai‘i granted Hilao's request to have the injunction
reinstated on 19 November 1991. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1469. We upheld the

injunction on 16 June 1994. Id. at 1468. In the meantime, Hilao had won a A court should not issue an unenforceable injunction:  “The rule that a ‘court of equity
favorable liability verdict on 24 September 1992. Id. at 1469. On 23 February will not issue an unenforceable decree of injunction’ comprehends as a reason for
1994, the jury awarded Hilao $1.2 billion in punitive damages. Id. denying injunctive relief[  ] that the court ․ does not have the means to punish
disobedience once discovered.”
On 20 July 1994, Hilao filed a motion to modify the injunction to identify the Republic
as an agent, representative, aider or abettor of the Estate subject to the injunction. In order to determine whether the attempt to enjoin the Republic was futile, we must
Hilao contended that the Republic had seized assets of the Estate in the Philippines examine whether the district court could have personal jurisdiction over the Republic.
worth $672 million, as well as $2 million of the $409 million in cash that the Estate The FSIA is the sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state. Personal jurisdiction
had deposited in Swiss banks. It claimed that the Republic had sold $481 million over a foreign state depends on subject-matter jurisdiction over the action against the
worth of stock, held in the Meralco Foundation for the benefit of the Estate, and had foreign state under the FSIA. “[P]ersonal jurisdiction, like subject-matter jurisdiction,
appropriated the proceeds to itself. It also asserted that the Republic and the Estate exists only when one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity in [the FSIA]
entered into two agreements on 26 June 1992, to transfer works of art  6 from the applies.”
United States to the National Museum of the Philippines, and to divide the Estate's
other assets between the Estate and the Republic. The FSIA sets forth the general rule that foreign states are immune from the
jurisdiction of courts in the United States unless a claim against them falls within an
On 12 September 1994, the district court heard argument on the motion;  the exception to immunity under the Act. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 706. Thus,
Republic appeared specially and asserted its sovereign immunity. The district court the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Republic absent the existence of an
the following day issued an order identifying the Republic as a “representative, agent, applicable exception under the FSIA.
aider or abettor” of the Estate, and subjecting it to the injunction. On 23 September
1994, the Republic filed an appeal (No. 94-16739) from this order. Hilao claims that both the commercial activity and waiver exceptions of the FSIA
apply. Once a plaintiff offers evidence that one of the FSIA's exceptions to immunity
On 18 January 1995, a jury in Hawai‘i awarded Hilao $766 million in compensatory applies, the party claiming immunity bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
damages. On 3 February 1995, the district court entered a final judgment, which of the evidence that the exception does not apply.
included a permanent injunction against the Estate and its “aiders and abettors” and
a finding that the Republic is an aider and abettor of the Estate. On 6 February A. Commercial-Activity Exception
1995, the Republic filed a notice of appeal (No. 95-15259) from this final judgment.
The FSIA directs that a foreign state is not immune from suit in U.S. courts if: the
ISSUE: W/N Such acts are covered by sovereign immunity action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state;  or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
HELD: commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;  or upon an act outside the territory
1. The Republic claims that the district court lacked authority to subject it to the of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
injunction because it enjoys sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (“FSIA”). Hilao argues that the FSIA
does not govern because Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  8 makes The commercial character of an activity “shall be determined by reference to the
an injunction binding upon “those persons in active concert or participation with” an nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
enjoined party to the action where those persons have actual notice. Therefore, reference to its purpose.” “[T]he issue is whether the particular actions that the
Hilao argues, the district court did not need to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by
Republic in order to find that the Republic is an aider and abettor of the Estate and which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.” “[T]he question is
therefore bound by the injunction. not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the
aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.” Id. The central question is “whether
While Rule 65(d) indeed automatically makes the injunction against the Estate the activity is of a kind in which a private party might engage.”
binding upon persons “in active concert or participation with” the Estate who have
actual notice of the injunction, the district court went further by specifically finding that Hilao argues that the Republic is attempting to recover indebtedness, while the
the Republic is such a person and thus expressly binding it by the injunction. Republic describes itself as pursuing misappropriated public assets. The Republic's
However, in order to enforce this injunction against the Republic, through, for description is more accurate, in that a governmental agency of the Philippines is
example, contempt proceedings, the district court would have to have personal acting under a statutory mandate to recover property allegedly stolen from the
jurisdiction over the Republic. An injunction against the Republic in the absence of treasury. This exercise of police power is a governmental rather than commercial
personal jurisdiction over it would be futile, as the court would be powerless to activity, and, thus, the commercial-activity exception does not apply.
enforce its injunction.
B. Waiver Exception Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
A foreign state is not immune from suit if it “has waived its immunity either explicitly or When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, SAUDIA officials interrogated her
by implication․” “The FSIA's waiver exception ‘is narrowly construed.” “[C]ourts about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help
have found such waivers in cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah
another country or where a foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate
country should govern a contract. An implicit waiver would also include a situation release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused
where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not
defense of sovereign immunity.” want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to
The House Report does not purport to provide an exclusive list of the circumstances allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights. Plaintiff
giving rise to implied waiver. However, to support a finding of implied waiver, there learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
must exist a direct connection between the sovereign's activities in U.S. courts and Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
the plaintiff's claims for relief. detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
Hilao argues that the Republic waived immunity by (1) submitting the amicus curiae
brief in Trajano and Hilao and (2) using the U.S. courts to pursue assets held by the On January 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already
Estate. behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer
of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
4. TRAJANO V. MARCOS station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
FACTS: Agapita Trajano, a citizen of the Philippines, sued Marcos, Ver, and Marcos' statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so
daughter Imee Marcos, alleging that the defendants were responsible for the did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
kidnapping, torture and murder of her son Archimedes Trajano in 1977. Trajano Jeddah.
alleged false imprisonment, wrongful death, kidnapping, and violation of international
law on behalf of Archimedes' estate, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress One year and a half later or on June 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes
for her own suffering on being shown the tortured body of her son. before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the
plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
ISSUE: whether a United States district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
claim of official acts of torture committed outside the United States brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
HELD: The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") confers federal district courts with subject Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
matter jurisdiction over alien plaintiffs' civil actions for torts committed in violation of June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
the law of nations. ATS' jurisdictional grant was constitutional and encompassed
extraterritorial causes of action, the appellate court held that the district court properly Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
exercised its subject matter jurisdiction. again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
5. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
FACTS: On January 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff (herein private In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
respondent) Milagros P. Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
Saudi Arabia. plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to
On April 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight and
dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, further orders.
they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court
the room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and Consequently, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.” Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO with the CA. Respondent CA
promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting the
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed,
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the in the interim. In another Resolution, now assailed, the CA denied SAUDIA’s Petition
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and On October 1995, SAUDIA filed with the SC the instant Petition for Review with
Allah continued to serve in the international flights. Prayer for TRO.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent CA rendered the
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, Decision, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the considering that the Amended Complaint’s basis for recovery of damages is Article
cause. 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It
further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
On November 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse
Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager. ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On January 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the On May 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for TRO,
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, the
SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. The trial ISSUE:
court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss 1)W/N the case is a conflict of laws? YES
Amended Complaint filed by SAUDIA. 2) W/N CA erred in holding that the RTC of QC has jurisdiction? YES
3) W/N CA erred in Ruling that in this case, Philippine Law should govern? YES
From the Order of respondent Judge denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on ***Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at
September 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. It alleged that the trial the outset. It maintains that private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of
October 1994, Morada filed her Opposition. Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
Respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 1935
In the Reply filed with the trial court, SAUDIA alleged that since its MR raised lack of and 2136 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.
that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that HELD:
the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant 1) YES. Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that
case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
Respondent Judge denied SAUDIA’s Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts”
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows: “Acting on the Motion for case.
Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws
October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign
filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiff’s element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
damages plus attorney’s fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article
21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element
Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a
might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.” situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex
form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise. We the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
thus find private respondent’s assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A
conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts the 3) As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
court a quo. answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
2) YES. After a careful study of the private respondent’s Amended Complaint, and situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2)
the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions
of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.
“The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept
of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
statutes.” “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its The purpose of “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event,
municipal forum. or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or
“connecting factor” or “point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
Court on jurisdiction we find that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691. Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for
the determination of the applicable law. These “test factors” or “points of contact” or
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh “connecting factors” could be any of the following:
heavily in favor of the RTC of QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. “(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his
Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may origin;
e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed. (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.
In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the
case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
respondent) should be upheld. exercised;
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
respondent has voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. The
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now,
lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we have seen given the factual context of this case.
earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.”60 (Italics ours.) parties is centered.
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, we are convinced that there is As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that overall injury occurred and
reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion thatalthough she was already lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship”
crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. There is likewise logical basis on record for Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by
the claim that the “handing over” or “turning over” of the person of private respondent private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view,
to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. has been properly established.
Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,” we find, by way of
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon
But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the
redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said
by private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove the law of the
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of
“connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case5 And as
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the correctly held by the respondent appellate court, “considering that it was the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.”
and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the
her her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect trial court’s denial of defendant’s (herein petitioner’s) motion to dismiss the case. Not
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the vindication of the country’s system of law and justice in a transnational setting.
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liabilit1 have been advanced to offer element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as
fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION
Q-93-18394 entitled “Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines” is hereby
AND FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH V.
STOLT-NIELSEN PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On 9 January 1985, United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. shipped 404.774 metric
tons of distilled C6-C18 fatty acid on board MT "Stolt Sceptre," a tanker owned by
Stolt-Nielsen Philippines Inc., from Bauan, Batangas, Philippines, consigned to
"Nieuwe Matex" at Rotterdam, Netherlands, covered by Tanker Bill of Lading BL No.
BAT-1. The shipment was insured under a marine cargo policy with Petitioner
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg (hereinafter referred to as
INSURER), a non-life American insurance corporation, through its settling agent in
the Philippines, the American International Underwriters (Philippines), Inc., the other
petitioner herein.
Upon receipt of the cargo by the consignee in the Netherlands, it was found to be
discoloured and totally contaminated. Hence, a claim was made on the Insurer of the
cargo. The insurer as subrogee filed a claim for damages against the carrier with the
RTC of Manila. The carrier filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case was
arbritrable and pursuant to the charter party as embodied in the bill of lading,
arbitration must be done. The insurer opposed the motion by arguing that the
provision on arbitration was not included in the bill of lading and even if it was
included, it was nevertheless unjust and unreasonable. The RTC denied the motion
but upon reconsideration, the resolution on the motion to dismiss was suspended or
deferred.
The carrier then filed a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction/TRO
which was granted by the CA.
ISSUE: Are the terms of the Charter Party, particularly the provision on arbitration,
binding on the INSURER?
HELD: The pertinent portion of the Bill of Lading in issue provides in part:
xxx [A]ll the terms whatsoever of the said Charter except the rate and
payment of freight specified therein apply to and govern the rights of the
parties concerned in this shipment.xxx
The provision on arbitration in the Charter Party reads:
4. Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or

termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and
Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or
individual experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they
cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall be an admiralty 2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a
lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in
and procedure of the United States arbitration act, and a judgment of the an exchange of letters or telegrams.
court shall be entered upon any award made by said arbitrator. Nothing in
this clause shall be deemed to waive Owner's right to lien on the cargo for 3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
freight, deed of freight, or demurrage. respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
Clearly, the Bill of Lading incorporates by reference the terms of the Charter Party. It arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
is settled law that the charter may be made part of the contract under which the inoperative or incapable of being performed.
goods are carried by an appropriate reference in the Bill of Lading. As the respondent
Appellate Court found, the INSURER "cannot feign ignorance of the arbitration clause It has not been shown that the arbitral clause in question is null and void, inoperative,
since it was already charged with notice of the existence of the charter party due to or incapable of being performed. Nor has any conflict been pointed out between the
an appropriate reference thereof in the bill of lading and, by the exercise of ordinary Charter Party and the Bill of Lading.
diligence, it could have easily obtained a copy thereof either from the shipper or the
charterer.
In fine, referral to arbitration in New York pursuant to the arbitration clause, and
We hold, therefore, that the INSURER cannot avoid the binding effect of the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 13498 below, pending the return of
arbitration clause. By subrogation, it became privy to the Charter Party as fully as
the arbitral award, is, indeed called for.
the SHIPPER before the latter was indemnified, because as subrogee it stepped into
the shoes of the SHIPPER-ASSURED and is subrogated merely to the latter's rights.
2. QUERUBIN V. QUERUBIN
It can recover only the amount that is recoverable by the assured. And since the
Note: This case is entirely in Spanish with random insertions of American doctrines.
right of action of the SHIPPER-ASSURED is governed by the provisions of the Therefore, the facts are shit. I guess the importance of the case is to take note of the
Bill of Lading, which includes by reference the terms of the Charter Party, doctrines (since we won’t discussing this in class anyways.)
necessarily, a suit by the INSURER is subject to the same agreements. It has
not been shown that the arbitral clause in question is null and void, inoperative, or
Facts: It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the interlocutory judgment
incapable of being performed. Nor has any conflict been pointed out between the of divorce hereinbefore entered on February 27, 1948, in Book 1891, page 319, be
Charter Party and the Bill of Lading. and the same is hereby modified in the following particulars in connection with the
custody of the minor child of the parties only:
(1) The care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, Querubina
Querubin, is hereby awarded to defendant and cross-complainants;
Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settling disputes, has long been recognized and
accepted in our jurisdiction (Chapter 2, Title XIV, Book IV, Civil Code). Republic Act
(2) Said child is to be maintained in a neutral home, subject to the right of reasonable
No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) also expressly authorizes arbitration of domestic
visitation on the part of both parties to this action;
disputes. Foreign arbitration as a system of settling commercial disputes of an
international character was likewise recognized when the Philippines adhered to the
United Nations "Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign (3) Each party shall have the right to take said child away from said neutral home but
plaintiff and cross-defendant is restrained from taking said child to her place of
Arbitral Awards of 1958," under the 10 May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine
residence;
Senate, giving reciprocal recognition and allowing enforcement of international
arbitration agreements between parties of different nationalities within a contracting
(4) Each party is restrained from molesting the other, or in any way interfering with
state. Thus, it pertinently provides:
the other's right of reasonable visitation of said child;
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences (5) Each party is restrained from removing the child from the State of California
without first securing the permission of the court; said parties are further restrained
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
from keeping the child out of the County of Los Angeles for more than one day
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration. without first securing the consent of the court.
Under interlocutory decree of March 7, 1949, the child, a girl now 3 1/2 years old,
was granted to defendant husband, but the child was to be kept in a neutral home;
both parties were given reasonable visitation and both were restrained from removing A consideration of all the facts and circumstances leads to the conclusion that comity
the child out of the state. Defendant has taken the child with him to the Philippine does not require the courts of this state, regardless of the well-being of the child, to
Islands. At time of trial custody was apparently denied plaintiff because she was then lend their aid to the enforcement of the Iowa decree by returning Winifred to the
living with another man. She is now married to this man and they have a well custody of her grandmother. A child is not a chattel to which title and the right of
equipped home. Plaintiff appears to be a devoted mother. She has one child, the possession may be secured by the decree of any court. If the decree had been
issue of her present marriage, and is also caring for a child that was abandoned by rendered by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, it would not have conclusively
certain friends of hers. Plaintiff’s husband is regularly and permanently employed. established the right to the custody of the child. In a contest between rival claimants,
Witnesses testified in behalf of the plaintiff in reference to her motherly qualities and this court would have been free, notwithstanding the decree, to award the custody
the condition of her home. She visited the child in question sufficiently when the child solely with an eye to the child's welfare. (State ex rel. Aldridge vs. Aldridge, 204 N.W.
was in the neutral home and brought her toys and other articles. Service of the order 324.)
to show cause was made on deft's attorneys of record.
On habeas corpus by the mother to obtain possession from the father of two children
The interlocutory decree was modified so as to provide that custody of the child shall aged four and six years, whose custody she alleged had been awarded her in divorce
be awarded to the plaintiff and the defendant shall have the right of reasonable proceedings in another state, it appeared that the mother was without property, and
visitation. Defendant shall pay plaintiff for the support of the child $30 each month on had no means of support save her personal earnings of $15 per month, was in poor
the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950. health, and lived with her mother, in immoral surroundings, and that the father was an
industrious and sober man, earnings $100 per month. Held, that the welfare of the
[my interpretation of what happened next: Plaintiff wife sought to enforce the children was the only thing to be considered, and a judgment awarding their custody
interlocutory decree of the California courts awarding her custody by filing a case in to the mother should be reversed. (Kentzler vs. Kentzler, 28 Pac., 370.)
the Philippines against the husband]
On the question of comity, this court said in the habeas corpus case of In re
Issue: Whether or not an interlocutory decree of one state can be enforced in Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876:
another (NO)
"Comity cannot be considered in a case like this, when the future welfare of the child
Held: The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a court of is the vital question in the case. The good of the child is superior to all other
another state between the same parties on the same cause of action, on the merits of considerations. It is the polar star to guide to the conclusion in all cases of infants,
the case is conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the merits only. Where whether the question is raised upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court of
the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the court chancery." (Ex parte Leu, 215 N.W., 384.)
which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties." (National
Park Bank vs. Old Colony Trust Co., 186 N.Y.S., 717.) 3. BORTHWICK V. CASTRO BARTOLOME
As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final and not subject to
modification, is entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the
FACTS: Based on an action commenced in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
federal Constitution and must be enforced in this state. If, however, a part of the
State of Hawaii, U.S.A., Joseph E. Scallon sought to compel payment by William B.
Minnesota decree in not final, but is subject to modification by the court which Borthwick on four (4) promissory notes in the amounts of $32,408.95, $29,584.94,
rendered it, then neither the United States Constitution nor the principle of comity
$2,832.59 and $40,000.00, plus stipulated interest. Scallon's complaint alleged that
compels the courts of this state to enforce that part of the decree; for no court other
Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests
than the one granting the original decree could undertake to administer relief without in Hawaii where he last resided and transacted business therein; that business
bringing about a conflict of authority. (Levine vs. Levine, 187 Pac., 609.) dealings which transpired in Honolulu, Hawaii had given rise to the promissory notes
sued upon, and Borthwick had failed to pay the debts despite demand. The
A judgment rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction in one state, is
promissory notes, which although uniformly specifying the city of Palos Verdes, Los
conclusive on the merits in the courts of every other state, when made the basis of an
Angeles, California as the place of payment, also provided that—
action and the merits cannot be reinvestigated. Our own Supreme Court so holds.
Cook vs. Thornhill, 13 Tex. 293, 65 Am. Dec. 63. But before such a judgment
rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in the courts of another state, as
conclusive on the merits, it must be a final judgment and not merely an interlocutory
decree. Freeman on Judgment, Sec. 575; Baugh vs. Baugh, 4 Bibb (7 Ky.) 556; "in the event that payment *** shall not have been made in full on or before the
Brinkley vs. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460; Griggs, vs. Becker, 87 Wis. 313, maturity date *** at *** (such) place ***, payee may select, at his option, Manila,
58 N.W. 396. (Walker vs. Garland et al., 235 S.W., 1078.) Philippines, or Honolulu, Hawaii as additional places for payment *** and *** any
court in any of said places having jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be a As to Borthwick's attack on the validity of the foreign judgment, the Trial Court ruled
proper Court for the trial of any action brought to enforce payment of this note and that "under the ** Hawaii Revised Statute cited by the defendant the Hawaii Court
the law of the place in which said action is brought shall apply." has jurisdiction" because the factual premises upon which the exercise of such
jurisdiction was based "had not been refuted by the defendant" although he "appears
to be a lawyer, and the summons in the Hawaii case was served personally on him."
Finally, the Trial Court disposed of Borthwick's other defenses saying that the present
action "is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment" where the validity of his
Borthwick being then in Monterey, California, summons was served upon him defenses to the original action is immaterial. Borthwick proceeded directly to this
personally in that place, pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of process on a Court and filed a petition for review.
person outside the territorial confines of the State, if he had otherwise submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of its courts as to causes of action arising from the act of
transacting any business within Hawaii Borthwick ignored the summons. Default was
entered against him, and in due course a default judgment was rendered against him.
ISSUE: Is the judgment renderred by the Hawaii Court against Borthwick enforceable
in the Philippines?
However, Scallon's attempts to have the judgment executed in Hawaii and California
failed, because no assets of Borthwick could be found in those states. Scallon and
his wife, Jewell, then came to the Philippines and on March 15, 1980 brought suit HELD: YES. It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely
against Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, seeking enforcement of the "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties," and rejection thereof
default judgment of the Hawaii Court. may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction" of the
issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of
two facts in accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real property
in Hawaii, or the promissory notes sued upon resulted from his business transactions
The sheriff's initial efforts to serve summons on Borthwick personally at his address therein. Scallon's complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was accorded
at 861 Richmond St., Greenhills, Mandaluyong having been unsuccessful because opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear
Borthwick was "always out on official business", the sheriff effected substituted and was in consequence declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the
service by leaving a copy of the summons and the complaint with Borthwick's "house record of the Hawaii case upon which to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction, as
caretaker/gardener" named Fred Daniel. Borthwick now urges.
Borthwick filed no answer to the Scallons' complaint. He was declared in default. The opportunity to negate the foreign court's competence by proving the non-
After due proceedings judgment by default was rendered against him. existence of said jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again
afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, where enforcement of
the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the summons of the domestic court
which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was declared in
default. And in the default judgment subsequently promulgated, the Court a quo
There was no response from Borthwick until after the Court subsequently amended decreed enforcement of the judgment affirming among others the jurisdictional facts,
its judgment so as to make the sums due under the Hawaii Court decision payable in that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted business therein.
their equivalent in Philippine currency. Notice of this amendatory order was
personally accepted by Borthwick at this time. Borthwick then moved for a new trial
but was denied by the trial court.
In the light of these antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is
one more opportunity, a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the
merits of the cause of action which that Court had adjudged to have been established
against him. This he may obtain only if he succeed in showing that the declaration of
his default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that; hence, the The RTC ruled in favor of Interpool ordering all petitioners to jointly and severally pay
verdict must go against him. Interpool pursuant to the U.S. District Court judgment. Petitioners' appeal to the CA
was denied.
4. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING V. CA
Petitioners' side: They allege that both the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S.
Facts: Interpool, Ltd. is a foreign corporation, duly organized and existing under the District Court and the RTC decision are null and void on jurisdictional grounds
laws of Bahamas Islands with office and business address in New York and not because the U.S. District Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they
licensed to do, and not doing business, in the Philippines. Principal petitioner is PISC. had not been served with summons and a copy of the Complaint in the case there.
The other petitioners are Phil. Construction Consortium Corporation, Pacific Mills And in the RTC case, they contend that such jurisdictional error effectively prevented
Inc., and Universal Steel Smelting Company, Inc. They are all corporations duly the RTC from taking cognizance of the Complaint and from enforcing the U.S. District
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The other petitioners Lim, Court's Default Judgment against them. And that assuming the validity of the
Bautista, Laude, Sing Lim, Lao and Teh are Philippine residents. disputed Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only against PISC since the
other petitioners were not impleaded originally in the case filed in New York.
Issues:
In 1979 - 1981, PISC leased from Interpool and its wholly owned subsidiary,
1. W/N the U.S. District Court validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC - YES
Container Trading Corporation, several containers pursuant to the Membership
Agreement and Hiring Conditions (Exhibit B) and the Master Equipment Leasing 2. W/N the Default Judgment is valid and enforceable here - YES
Agreement (Exhibit C), both dated June 1979. Phil. Construction Consortium, Pacific 3. W/N the other petitioners can be held liable for the default judgment - YES
Mills and Universal Steel guaranteed to pay all money due, or to become due, to
Interpool from PISC and any liability of the latter arising out of the leasing or
purchasing of equipment. Lim, et. al. also unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed Held:
to pay Interpool all payments due to it and any liability that may arise under the 2
agreements. 1. The evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over PISC under the procedural law applicable in that forum
(the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure). Copies of the Summons and
Complaint, which were attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court,
were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC Manila." indicating that service
PISC incurred outstanding and unpaid obligations with Interpool amounting to of
had been made upon and acknowledged by PISC office in Manila on, 18 Jan.
$94,456.28, representing unpaid per diems, drop-off charges, interest and other
agreed charges. Interpool sent letters to the other petitioners demanding payment of 1983, and that PISC had actual notice of such Complaint and Summons.
their outstanding and unpaid obligations, but to no avail. So Interpool filed a case Moreover, copies of said Summons and Complaint had likewise been served
upon Prentice-Hall Corporation New York, PISC's agent, expressly designated
against the PISC before the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York.
by it in the Leasing Agreement with Interpool. The record also shows that PISC,
Interpool obtained a Default Judgment against PISC ordering it to pay Interpool
without, however, assailing the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court over the
liquidated damages, together with interest and costs.
person of petitioner, had filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which Motion
was denied. All of the foregoing matters, which were stated specifically in the
U.S. District Court's disputed Default Judgement, have not been disproven or
otherwise overcome by petitioners.
Because of the unjustifiable failure and refusal of PISC and its guarantors to jointly
and severally pay their obligations to Interpool, the latter filed a complaint with the QC
RTC to enforce the default judgment of the U.S. District Court against PISC and also
to enforce the individually executed Continuing Guaranties of the other petitioners.
2. That foreign judgment-which had become final and executory, no appeal having
Petitioners failed to answer the complaint so they were declared in default.
been taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner PISC-is thus "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties [i.e., PISC and Interpool] and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Further there has been no showing
by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S. District Court was Northwest and Sharp’s Japan branch entered into an International Passenger Sales
vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or Agency Agreement, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell its tickets. However,
fact." The Default Judgment imposing upon PISC a liability of $94,456.28 in Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales prompting Northwest to file a
favor of Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction. case for the collection of the unremitted proceeds with a claim for damages.
The Japanese court issued a writ of summons against Sharp, but despite 2 attempts,
its service in Japan proved unsuccessful. At the first try, the person in Sharp’s Japan
office advised the bailiff that the person believed to be authorized to receive court
3. The existence of liability on the part of PISC having been duly established in the processes was in Manila and would be back in a few days. On the day of the return
U.S. case, it was not improper for Interpool in seeking enforcement in this of the authorized person, the bailiff went back but the former refused to accept the
jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such liability, to have included the summons claiming that he was no longer Sharp’s employee.
other petitioners as defendants in the civil case filed with the RTC. Sec. 6, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Due to the failed attempts, the Japanese court decided to serve the summons and
the complaint at Sharp’s head office in Manila though diplomatic channels.
Eventually, Sharp received the writ of summons from a Deputy Sheriff in Manila.12
Despite receipt, however, Sharp failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. The
Japanese court decided in favor of Northwest and Sharp later received a copy of the
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against judgment from the same Deputy Sheriff. Since Sharp did not appeal, the judgment
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same became final and executory.
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in Since plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, it filed a suit for
these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one enforcement of the judgment before the RTC of Manila.
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court Sharp’s defense:
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or 1. The judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction; and
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with 2. The judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered
any proceedings in which he may have no interest. without due process of law (rendered without due and proper notice to the
defendant)
RTC and CA: Dismissed the complaint. The process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant
The other petitioners had executed continuing guarantees to secure by serving him beyond the boundaries of that State. Since it is an action in personam,
performance by PISC of its contractual obligations under the 2 agreements with personal or substituted service of summons within the forum is required for the court
Interpool. As guarantors they held themselves out as liable "whether jointly, to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. The summons effected in Manila was null
severally, or in the alternative," to Interpool under their separate "continuing and void and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Japanese court over the person of
guarantees" executed in the Philippines, for any breach of those Agreements on Sharp. Therefore, the foreign judgment is null and void.
the part of PISC. The liability of the other petitioners was, in other words, not
based upon the 2 agreements to which they were not parties. While, the New ISSUE: W/N the Japanese court acquired jurisdiction over Sharp by serving
York award is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its own obligations summons through diplomatic channels at its principal office in Manila. (YES)
under those agreements.
HELD: Yes, it acquired jurisdiction because the service of summons was valid.
5. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC V. CA Sec. 3, Rule 141 of the ROC provides that a court, whether of the Philippines or
*Claim for unremitted sales proceeds; Japanese court served summons in Sharp’s elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it as acting in the lawful exercise of
Manila office.

12
The Japan court requested the Japan SC to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
FACTS: Northwest- Minnesota, US company; Sharp- Philippine company with a
documents to the Philippines. acting on that request, the Japan SC sent the summons and other legal
branch in Yokohama, Japan. documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which, in turn, forwarded the same to the
Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the DFA, then to the
Executive Judge of the Manila RTC, who forthwith ordered the Deputy Sheriff to serve the same on
Sharp at its principal office in Manila.
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party Ducat's obligation through a Warranty Deed, by which it sold to ATHONA a parcel of
attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming this presumption. land in Texas, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ANTHONA as the
purchase price. PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and
Matters of remedy and procedure, such as those relating to the service of process delivered to 1488 Ducat's shares of stock.
upon a defendant, are governed by the lex fori (in this case, Japan procedural law).
Since Sharp failed to plead and prove the applicable Japanese law, the processual ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of the loan so the entire amount
presumption may be invoked. became due and demandable. 1488 then sued PHILSEC, AYALA and ATHONA in
Texas, USA for the payment of the balance and for breach of contract.
Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the ROC provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made (1) on its RESIDENT AGENT ATHONA filed a counterclaim against 1488, Daic, Ducat, Perlas, and Craig (counter-
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or (2) if there is no such agent, defendants), for allegedly conspiring in selling the property at a price over its market
on the GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL designated by law to that effect, or (3) on ANY OF value. PHILSEC and AYALA also filed a counterclaim against the same counter-
ITS OFFICERS/AGENTS WITHIN THE PHILIPPINES. (Remember that Sharp has 4 defendants.
branches in Japan so it is considered a foreign corporation doing business in Japan.)
While this case was pending in the US, PHILSEC, BPI and ATHONA
Since Sharp did not plead having a resident agent in Japan, the impression is that it (PETITIONERS) filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against 1488,
had none. Therefore, service on the designated government official or on any of its Daic, Ducat, Perlas, and Craig (PRIVATE RESPONDENTS) in RTC Makati. They
officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. Either of the 2 options is allowed. allege that because of the private respondents’ fraudulent misrepresentations, they
Therefore, the service done in this case (see Footnote for the detailed process) is were induced to purchase the Texas property, and at an overpriced rate.
equivalent to service on the proper government official under Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the
ROC, in relation to Sec. 128 of the Corporation Code. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that "the controversy may be
more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the
Inasmuch as Sharp was admittedly doing business in Japan through its 4 duly principle in private international law of forum non conveniens." It also held itself
registered branches at the time of the filing of the case, in light of the processual without jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they were non-residents and
presumption, it may be deemed a resident of Japan and as such, was amenable to the action was not an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of
the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said summons was ineffective. The CA affirmed this decision. (Maenwhile, the US District
courts’ lawful methods of serving process. Court rendered judgment while the case was pending in the CA.)
In sum, the extraterritorial of summons by the Japanese court was valid not only Issue: W/N the Philippine case is barred by the judgment of the US Court. (NO)
under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity - Petitioners argument: Foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res
of performance of official duty. judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated
in Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: “want of jurisdiction, want of
6. PHILSEC V. CA notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
US Case Held: Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of
PLAINTIFF: 1488 res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to
DEFENDANTS: Philsec Investment Corporation (PHILSEC); Ayala International the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed
Finance Limited (AYALA); Athona Holdings (ATHONA); BPI under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or
COUNTER-CLAIMANT: ATHONA proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there
COUNTER-CLAIMANT #2: AYALA and PHILSEC is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS (for both counter-claims): 1488, Inc.; Drago Daic; Ventura properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to
Ducat; Precioso Perlas; William Craig actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
Philippine Case is subject to proof to the contrary.13
PLAINTIFFS: PHILSEC; BPI; ATHONA
DEFENDANTS: 1488; Daic; Ducat; Perlas; Craig
13
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
Facts: Ventura Ducat obtained separate loans from AYALA and PHILSEC, secured thing;
by shares of stock owned by her. 1488, through its president Drago Daic, assumed (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver
A foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in the 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it paid PAWI
jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought. Hence, in the interest of $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels are defective and did
justice, the complaint should be considered as a petition for the recognition of not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a California
the foreign judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in court. In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply with the terms of
order that the defendant may present evidence of lack of jurisdiction, notice, the agreement. A second agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its
collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable. obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the purchase
price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the wheel in installment.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were actually made beyond the
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding number of wheels.
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the agreement and it received
were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished a favorable judgment from the California court. PAWI is then ordered to pay an
copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was not ordered to return the
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to comply with the court order in the US. So in
the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that 1983, FASGI filed a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-
might be rendered would constitute res judicata. Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the
ground that the foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not
Other COL issues: ordered to return the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that
On forum non conveniens PAWI’s American lawyer entered into the agreements without the consent of PAWI.
The trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case is not justifiable under the On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds
under Rule 16, §1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is
more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
should do so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
circumstances” require the court’s desistance. opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a
failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino. procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in
the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
On jurisdiction presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign
It was error for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over forum.
1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and
summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on extraterritorial In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWI’s
service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant may be insistence that its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the
effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, “the property compromise agreement without PAWI’s authority is belied by the fact that PAWI
of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.” It is not disputed that the initially complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim the agreement. It sent two
properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver
service of summons under a trial court order. that the agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for the California
court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWI’s arrears.
7. PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS INC. V. FAGSI ENTERPRISES
8. PRISCILLA MIJARES V. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA
FACTS: In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine Aluminum Facts: Complaint in US district court of Hawaii against estate of Marcos brought by
ten Filipino citizens for a class of people, around 10,000, alleging human rights
abuses against them during the Marcos regime. Alien Tort Act was invoked to give
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, jurisdiction. Award in their favor was One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). efficacy. It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to
Petitioners tried to have a foreign court’s award enforced against the estate of enforce a foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the
Marcos but the trial court asked for a filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an
Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00). motion to dismiss alleged by estate, one ground opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly
was the non-payment of filing fees the petitioners only having paid P410.00. determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
Complaint dismissed by trial court without prejudice. Subject matter deemed capable burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. The rules are silent as to what
of pecuniary estimation even if it involved a foreign judgment. Petitioners submit that initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum appropriate measure for such purpose.
of money or recovery of damages. Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that “Free access to the courts and Complaint is capable of pecuniary estimation.
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the
by reason of poverty,” a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission
exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations
RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust. or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the
facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case. It hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the
urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment. For the CHR, the Makati
RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the
case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission
same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations
relitigated again in another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the
and of vested rights. Hence this appeal. facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other
hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the
Issue: Whether the action filed with the lower court in dismissing the case? foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
Held: Petitioners’ complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal
where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the
policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous
This is not a real action, as it involves no real property or title or possession nor does litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task
the foreign award pertain to any real property. of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint. However, generally accepted
conditions that may vary in different countries. The court then cites the relevant principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
provision in our rules of court concerning the effect of foreign judgments. There is an form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in This along with the principles of comity and others calls for the recognition and
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign
title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right
and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in
the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally
accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave a. The summons was sent to the accountant of the PNCC, Cora Deala;
concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the she is not authorized to receive the summons for and in behalf of the
value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will private respondent.
almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the 2. Private respondent was not represented by counsel in the proceedings
applicable laws and standards of the forum.[72] The vagaries of inflation, as well as a. According to Abelardo, the private respondent’s executive secretary
the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an said that there is no resolution granting or authorizing Allen and
award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket Glendhill (the said to be lawyers of the company) to admit all the
fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought claims of the petitioner.
to be enforced. 3. That the decision of the Malaysian High Court is tainted with fraud and clear
mistake of fact/law;
One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the a. Since there is no statement of facts and law given which the award is
Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of given in favor of the petitioner.
the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not
precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to HELD: GRANTED. The Malaysian High Court acquired jurisdiction over PNCC due
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as to the following grounds:
it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the
enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the 1. The rules of procedure (such as those serving of summons) are
Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented governed by the lex fori or the internal law forum—which is in this case
before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within is Malaysia
the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other a. It is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was
hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and rendered that determines the validity of the service of court
contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court. process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by
it.
9. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS V. COURT OF APPEALS i. Since the burden of proof of showing that there are
irregularities in the serving of summons as to the
FACTS: procedural rules of the Malaysian high court should be
• The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad : Malaysian corporation shouldered by the private respondents; however, the
• Private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation : Philippine private respondent failed to show or give proof in the
corporation said irregularities therefore the PRESUMPTION of
• 1983 : petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent before validity and regularity of service of summons and the
the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. decision rendered by the High Court of Malaya should
• Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up stand.
in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project
and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the 2. On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project. Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did the private
• September 13, 1985: the High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered respondent's witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen and Gledhill
judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia.
• The private respondent was asked to pay 5,108,290.23 Ringgits a. but of greater significance is the fact that petitioner offered in
• Following UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS to secure payment from private evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence to the effect that
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988 the i. it is not necessary under Malaysian law for counsel
complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to ENFORCE THE appearing before the Malaysian High Court to submit a
JUDGMENT of the High Court of Malaya special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a
client before said court,
• The RTC of Manila and the CA denied the motion for lack of want of jurisdiction
ii. that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court
has full authority to compromise the suit
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian High Court acquired jurisdiction over the
iii. That counsel appearing before the Malaysian High
PNCC or the private respondent
Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as
required under Philippine law to appear and compromise
Contentions of Private Respondent: (more of the rules of procedure)
judgments on behalf of their clients before said court.
1. The Malaysian High Court did not serve the summons to the right persons
3. On the ground that collusion, fraud and, clear mistake of fact and law
tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the ISSUE: W/N the court can take into consideration the foreign judgment relied upon by
same was adduced or shown. Since the burden of proof again should be the Government? NO
shouldered by the private respondent
a. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum HELD: The Court is not to reverse its previous rulings based on factual
governs matters of remedy and procedure. premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly,
i. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or
Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka nor
even without stating in the judgment every fact and law Asahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have not presented any claim
upon which the judgment is based, then the same must which could be acted upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Agan v.
be accorded respect and the courts in the jurisdiction PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no
cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any
simply because our rules provide otherwise. right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have
not yet been established by the courts of the land. It must be emphasized that the
10. REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON conclusive ruling in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as builder of the
facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance with law and equity for the
FACTS: This is an MR of the 2005 Resolution of the Case, where in it was held that Government to take over the facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated
the Government first pay PIATCO (the builder) the amount of 3.02 Billion Pesos this case in its 2005 Decision.
before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities of NAIA 3.
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in
The Government propounds several reasons for the reconsideration of the Court’s favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82
Decision dated 19 December 2005. Some of the arguments merely rehash points Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on
raised in the petition and already dispensed with exhaustively in the Decision. This Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
applies in particular to the argument that Republic Act No. 8974 does not apply to the Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is
expropriation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction,
3), which is not a right-of-way, site or location. This Resolution will instead focus as it want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is
should on the new arguments. likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a
foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public
On the newly raised arguments, there are considerable factual elements brought up policy.
by the Government. In the main, the Government devotes significant effort in
diminishing PIATCO’s right to just compensation as builder or owner of the NAIA 3. Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating
Particularly brought to fore are the claims relating to two entities, Takenaka to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to
Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation, who allegedly overturn the Decision mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the amount
claim “significant liens” on the terminal, arising from their alleged unpaid bills by virtue of 3.02 Billion Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities.
of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract they had with PIATCO. This directive enjoining payment is in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and
On account of these adverse claims, the Government now claims as controvertible under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid is that
the question of who is the builder of the NAIA 3. which is provisionally determined as just compensation.
The Government likewise claims as “indispensable” the need of Takenaka and There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for Reconsideration wherein
Asahikosan to provide the necessary technical services and supplies so that all the all other claims relating to the airport facilities may be ventilated, proved and
various systems and equipment will be ready and operational in a manner that allows determined. Since such claims involve factual issues, they must first be established
the Government to possess a fully-capable international airport terminal. by the appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded any respect by or
binding force on this Court.
The Government’s concerns that impelled the filing of its MR are summed up in the
following passage therein: “The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of 11. JORGE GONZALES, ET AL. V. CLIMAX MINING LTD., ET AL.
its Php3.02 billion deposit is released directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past,
does not wish to settle its obligations directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, Facts: Jorge Gonzales is a claimowner of mineral deposits in Quirino and Nueva
the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in Vizcaya. He entered into a letter-agreement in May 14, 1987 with Geophilippines
excess of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other [GEO], Inc, and Inmex Ltd. [INMEX] wherein he granted to these 2 companies the
hand, ends up with the P3.02B in its pockets gratuitously.” exclusive right to explore and survey, operate and exploit the mining claims for 36
mos. In 1989, the agreement was extended for 3 more years. In 1991, Jorge, Arimco 1. W/N the complaint filed raises a mining dispute or a judicial question, in order to
Mining Corp, GEO, INMEX and Anumex Phils. Inc. signed an Addendum to the determine if the Panel has jurisdiction? JUDICIAL QUESTION thus jurisdiction
agreement providing that Arimco would apply to the Phil. Gov’t permission to mine with regular courts.
the claims as the government’s contractor under a Financial Technical Assistance 2. W/N the dispute should be brought for arbitration under RA 876 (Arbitration
Agreement (FTAA). The following contracts were also entered into by the parties: Law)? NO.
1996 Operating and Financial 1st Parties: CLIMAX ARIMCO and Held:
Accommodation Contract CLIMAX MINING 1. The main assertion of Jorge is that the contracts are void. This claim indicates
2nd Party: Australasian Phil. Mining that the complaint was not merely for the determination of rights under the
Inc. [APMI] mining contracts since the very validity of those contracts is put in issue. The
1996 Assignment, Accession Agreement CLIMAX ARIMCO and APMI resolution of the validity of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question as it
1991 Memorandum of Agreement – CLIMAX MINING and APMI requires the exercise of judicial function which is with the regular courts. The
Transfer of FTAA to APMI Panel does not have jurisdiction since it does not involve the application of
technical knowledge and expertise relating to mining. Allegations of fraud and
duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
In 1999, Jorge filed before the Panel of Arbitrators [Panel] of the Mines and
ordinary courts of law.
Geosciences Bureau of DENR against CLIMAX ARIMCO, CLIMAX and APMI, a
2. SC held the case should not be brought under the ambit of the Arbitration Law,
complaint to annul or terminate the Addendum Contract, the FTAA, and the 3 other
contracts (in the table). His complaint is grounded on “FRAUD, OPPRESSION and/or but for a different reason. The question of validity of the contract containing the
agreement to submit to arbitration will affect the applicability of the arbitration
VIOLATION of Section 2, Article XII of the CONSTITUTION perpetrated by these
clause itself. A party cannot rely on the contract and claim rights or obligations
foreign RESPONDENTS, conspiring and confederating with one another and with
under it and at the same time impugn its existence or validity. Indeed, litigants
each other….” Jorge alleges that the companies conspiring and misrepresented
are enjoined from taking inconsistent positions. (SIMPLY PUT: If the contract is
under the Addendum Contract and FTAA that CLIMAX ARIMCO possessed financial
void is adjudged by the regular courts to be void, then the clause will also be
and technical capacity to put the project into commercial production. In turn, the
void. Therefore the issue on validity should first be resolved not by arbitration but
companies have allegedly caused damage not only to him but also to the Republic of
by the regular courts.)
the Philippines.
12. KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO, LTD V. LERMA
The Panel initially dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On MR, it favored
Jorge with regard to the issues of nullity, termination, withdrawal or damages, but
with regard to the constitutionality of the Addendum Agreement and FTAA, it FACTS: Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation
which is engaged in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
maintained that it had no jurisdiction. However, according to the Panel, a ruling on
Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private respondent Pacific General Steel
the validity of the assailed contracts would result to the grant or denial of mining
Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic corporation.
rights over the properties; hence, the question on the validity of the contract amounts
to a mining conflict or dispute w/c involve the exploration and exploitation of minerals
over the disputed area.
CA ruled that the Panel of Arbitrators did not have jurisdiction because the fraud
On March 5, 1997, PGSMC and KOGIES executed a contract in the Philippines
allegations in the complaint called for the interpretation and application of laws, and
whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Carmona,
did not involve any mining dispute. Also, the complaint (1) did not specify the Cavite. On April 7, 1997, in Korea, the parties executed Contract No. KLP-970301
particular acts constituting fraud and oppression, (2) the action has prescribed since dated March 5, 1997 amending the terms of payment. On October 14, 1997,
the Addendum Contract was executed in 1991, the action to annul it should have
PGSMC entered into a Contract of Lease with Worth Properties, Inc. (Worth) for use
been brought not later than 1995 (4yrs from discovery of fraud), (3) fraud and duress of Worth’s 5,079-square meter property with a 4,032-square meter warehouse
only makes a contract voidable, and (4) the Addendum Contract Clause 19.1
building to house the LPG manufacturing plant.
provides that the petition should have been settled thru arbitration under RA No. 876
(Arbitration Law).
Clause 19.1 states, “[a]ll disputes arising out of or in connection with the Contract,
which cannot be settled amicably among the Parties, shall finally be settled under On January 22, 1998, it was shown in the Certificate that, after the installation of the
R.A. 876.” plant, the initial operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered financial
difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that
Issues:
KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and Arbitration Board (KCAB) in Seoul, Korea pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as
conditions of the March 5, 1997 contract. amended.
For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the installation and initial operation of On July 3, 1998, KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, against
the plant, PGSMC issued two postdated checks. When KOGIES deposited the PGSMC before the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC granted a
checks, these were dishonored for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED." Thus, on May temporary restraining order. In its complaint, KOGIES alleged that PGSMC had
8, 1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening criminal action for initially admitted that the checks that were stopped were not funded but later on
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in case of nonpayment. On the same date, the claimed that it stopped payment of the checks for the reason that "their value was not
wife of PGSMC’s President faxed a letter dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES’ President received" as the former allegedly breached their contract by "altering the quantity and
who was then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained that not only did lowering the quality of the machinery and equipment" installed in the plant and failed
KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press from that agreed upon but it had to make the plant operational although it earlier certified to the contrary as shown in a
not delivered several equipment parts already paid for. January 22, 1998 Certificate. Likewise, KOGIES averred that PGSMC violated Art. 15
of their Contract, as amended, by unilaterally rescinding the contract without resorting
to arbitration. KOGIES also asked that PGSMC be restrained from dismantling and
transferring the machinery and equipment installed in the plant which the latter
threatened to do on July 4, 1998.
On May 14, 1998, PGSMC replied that the two checks it issued KOGIES were fully
funded but the payments were stopped for reasons previously made known to
KOGIES.
On July 9, 1998, PGSMC filed an opposition to the TRO arguing that KOGIES was
not entitled to the TRO since Art. 15, the arbitration clause, was null and void for
being against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the instant
On June 1, 1998, PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their controversy.
Contract dated March 5, 1997 on the ground that KOGIES had altered the quantity
and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered to PGSMC,
and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer the machineries, equipment, and
facilities installed in the Carmona plant. Five days later, PGSMC filed before the
Office of the Public Prosecutor an Affidavit-Complaint for Estafa docketed as I.S. No. On July 23, 1998, the RTC issued an Order denying the application for a writ of
98-03813 against Mr. Dae Hyun Kang, President of KOGIES. preliminary injunction, reasoning that PGSMC had paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000, the
value of the machineries and equipment as shown in the contract such that KOGIES
no longer had proprietary rights over them. And finally, the RTC held that Art. 15 of
the Contract as amended was invalid as it tended to oust the trial court or any other
court jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise between the parties. KOGIES’
On June 15, 1998, KOGIES wrote PGSMC informing the latter that PGSMC could not prayer for an injunctive writ was denied.
unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and
equipment on mere imagined violations by KOGIES. It also insisted that their
disputes should be settled by arbitration as agreed upon in Article 15, the arbitration
clause of their contract.
PGSMC filed a Motion for Inspection of Things to determine whether there was
indeed alteration of the quantity and lowering of quality of the machineries and
equipment, and whether these were properly installed. KOGIES opposed the motion
positing that the queries and issues raised in the motion for inspection fell under the
On June 23, 1998, PGSMC again wrote KOGIES reiterating the contents of its June coverage of the arbitration clause in their contract. KOGIES asserted that the Branch
1, 1998 letter threatening that the machineries, equipment, and facilities installed in Sheriff did not have the technical expertise to ascertain whether or not the
the plant would be dismantled and transferred on July 4, 1998. Thus, on July 1, 1998, machineries and equipment conformed to the specifications in the contract and were
KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial properly installed. The trial court granted the motion. On November 11, 1998, the
Branch Sheriff filed his Sheriff’s Report finding that the enumerated machineries and April 2, 2004. And while RA 9285 was passed only in 2004, it nonetheless applies in
equipment were not fully and properly installed. the instant case since it is a procedural law which has a retroactive effect.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and declared the arbitration clause against
public policy.
Among the pertinent features of RA 9285 applying and incorporating the UNCITRAL
Model Law are the following:
ISSUE: W/N the arbitration clause is against public policy. (NO)
HELD: Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the (1) The RTC must refer to arbitration in proper cases
contract is made governs. Lex loci contractus. The contract in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, our laws ought to govern. Nonetheless, (2) Foreign arbitral awards must be confirmed by the RTC
Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or
the finality and binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, "Any
stipulation that the arbitrators’ award or decision shall be final, is valid, without (3) The RTC has jurisdiction to review foreign arbitral awards
prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040."
(4) Grounds for judicial review different in domestic and foreign arbitral
awards
Arbitration clause not contrary to public policy: The arbitration clause which (5) RTC decision of assailed foreign arbitral award appealable
stipulates that the arbitration must be done in Seoul, Korea in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, and that the arbitral award is final and
binding, is not contrary to public policy.
PGSMC has remedies to protect its interests: Thus, based on the foregoing
features of RA 9285, PGSMC must submit to the foreign arbitration as it bound itself
through the subject contract. While it may have misgivings on the foreign arbitration
Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to done in Korea by the KCAB, it has available remedies under RA 9285. Its interests
the question on what governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any are duly protected by the law which requires that the arbitral award that may be
dispute arising from the contract, an arbitral panel will be constituted in a foreign rendered by KCAB must be confirmed here by the RTC before it can be enforced.
country and the arbitration rules of the foreign country would govern and its award
shall be final and binding. With our disquisition above, petitioner is correct in its contention that an arbitration
clause, stipulating that the arbitral award is final and binding, does not oust our courts
of jurisdiction as the international arbitral award, the award of which is not absolute
and without exceptions, is still judicially reviewable under certain conditions provided
for by the UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA as applied and incorporated in RA 9285.
RA 9285 incorporated the UNCITRAL Model law to which we are a signatory:
For domestic arbitration proceedings, we have particular agencies to arbitrate
disputes arising from contractual relations. In case a foreign arbitral body is chosen
by the parties, the arbitration rules of our domestic arbitration bodies would not be
applied. As signatory to the Arbitration Rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Finally, it must be noted that there is nothing in the subject Contract which provides
International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on that the parties may dispense with the arbitration clause.
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in the New York Convention on June 21, 1985,
the Philippines committed itself to be bound by the Model Law. We have even
incorporated the Model Law in Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 entitled An Act to Institutionalize the Use
of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Unilateral rescission improper and illegal: Having ruled that the arbitration clause
Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes, promulgated on of the subject contract is valid and binding on the parties, and not contrary to public
policy; consequently, being bound to the contract of arbitration, a party may not
unilaterally rescind or terminate the contract for whatever cause without first resorting company owning the trademarks and trade names of "Panavision" and "Panaflex,"
to arbitration. decided to establish a world wide web site, and in so doing, discovered that Toeppen
had registered their preferred domain name.
When Panavision notified Toeppen of its intent to use "panavision.com" for its
Internet address, Toeppen demanded $13,000 to discontinue his use of the name.
In addition, whatever findings and conclusions made by the RTC Branch Sheriff from Toeppen then registered "panaflex.com" as well.
the inspection made on October 28, 1998, as ordered by the trial court on October
19, 1998, is of no worth as said Sheriff is not technically competent to ascertain the The California federal district court noted that Toeppen is the owner of numerous
actual status of the equipment and machineries as installed in the plant. other trademark-based domain names, including "aircanada.com",
"deltaairlines.com", "eddiebauer.com", and "neiman-marcus.com". Toeppen was also
the owner of "arriflex.com", a domain name remarkably similar to the name of
Panavision's main competitor. Toeppen has over 200 trademark-based domain
names. This activity is referred to in industry parlance as "domain name hoarding" or
RTC has interim jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties: While the issue "cyber-squatting".
of the proper installation of the equipment and machineries might well be under the
primary jurisdiction of the arbitral body to decide, yet the RTC under Sec. 28 of RA Panavision filed claims in the Central District court of California, for violation of
9285 has jurisdiction to hear and grant interim measures to protect vested rights of California and federal statutes governing trademark dilution and infringement, unfair
the parties competition, and a number of other business torts. Toeppen filed a motion to dismiss
under FRCP 12(b)(6), arguing that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
because he resided in Illinois and the allegations concerned his actions taken in
Illinois.
While the KCAB can rule on motions or petitions relating to the preservation or ISSUE: whether the requirements of due process are satisfied by the district court's
transfer of the equipment and machineries as an interim measure, yet on hindsight, exercise of personal jurisdiction over Toeppen.
the July 23, 1998 Order of the RTC allowing the transfer of the equipment and
machineries given the non-recognition by the lower courts of the arbitral clause, has HELD: The district court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper and comported with the
accorded an interim measure of protection to PGSMC which would otherwise been requirements of due process. Toeppen did considerably more than simply register
irreparably damaged. KOGIES is not unjustly prejudiced as it has already been paid Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on the Internet. He registered those
a substantial amount based on the contract. Moreover, KOGIES is amply protected names as part of a scheme to obtain money from Panavision.
by the arbitral action it has instituted before the KCAB, the award of which can be
enforced in our jurisdiction through the RTC. Besides, by our decision, PGSMC is A district court's determination that personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised is
compelled to submit to arbitration pursuant to the valid arbitration clause of its a question of law reviewable de novo when the underlying facts are undisputed.
contract with KOGIES.
There is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction in this case.
Accordingly, we apply the law of California, the state in which the district court sits.
California's long-arm statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
PGSMC to preserve the subject equipment and machineries: While PGSMC
may have been granted the right to dismantle and transfer the subject equipment and
Personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction or specific
machineries, it does not have the right to convey or dispose of the same considering
jurisdiction.General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum
the pending arbitral proceedings to settle the differences of the parties. PGSMC
state or his activities there are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic."The
therefore must preserve and maintain the subject equipment and machineries with
district court correctly concluded that it did not have general jurisdiction over
the diligence of a good father of a family until final resolution of the arbitral
Toeppen. Toeppen is domiciled in Illinois and his activities in California are not
proceedings and enforcement of the award, if any.
substantial or continuous and systematic.
13. PANAVISION INTERNATIONAL V. DENNIS TOEPPEN
We apply a three-part test to determine if a district court may exercise specific
jurisdiction:
FACTS: Illinois resident Dennis Toeppen registered the domain name, or Internet
address, "panavision.com". He used the address to establish a web site displaying
aerial views of Pana, Illinois. Panavision, a California photographic equipment
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction
with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the C. Reasonableness à Even if the first two requirements are met, in order to satisfy
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and the Due Process Clause, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable.
protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from For jurisdiction to be reasonable, it must comport with "fair play and substantial
the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be justice." "[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum
reasonable. residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."
A. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENTà The purposeful availment requirement ensures that
a nonresident defendant will not be haled into court based upon "random, fortuitous As we have said, Toeppen purposefully directed his activities at Panavision in
or attenuated" contacts with the forum state. This requirement is satisfied if the California. This placed the burden on him to "present a compelling case that the
defendant "has taken deliberate action" toward the forum state. It is not required that presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id.
a defendant be physically present or have physical contacts with the forum, so long [12] In addressing the question of reasonableness, we consider seven factors: (1) the
as his efforts are "purposefully directed" toward forum residents. extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in
defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
In the present case, the district court's decision to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the
Toeppen rested on its determination that the purposeful availment requirement was most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to
satisfied by the "effects doctrine." the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an
alternative forum. No one factor is dispositive; a court must balance all seven.
In tort cases, jurisdiction may attach if the defendant's conduct is aimed at or has an
effect in the forum state. Under Calder v. Jones, personal jurisdiction can be based The district court found that Toeppen had not presented a compelling case that
upon: "(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, jurisdiction was unreasonable.
the brunt of which is suffered--and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-
-in the forum state." 14. COMPUSERVE V. PATTERSON
Toeppen argues he has not directed any activity toward Panavision in California, Facts: CompuServe, a nationwide provider of both electronic network and
much less "entered" the state. He contends that all he did was register Panavision's information services via the internet has its headquarters in Columbus, Ohio. Among
trademarks on the Internet and post web sites using those marks; if this activity the services provided by CompuServe is the opportunity for subscribers to post and
injured Panavision, the injury occurred in cyberspace. sell softwares in the form of “shareware”. Subscribers are able to download for free
(free trial period) and later purchase, sharewares created and posted by other
We agree that simply registering someone else's trademark as a domain name and subscribers in the internet. CompuServe accepted payment for the shareware from
posting a web site on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party domiciled in one purchases and remitted that payment, less a commission, to the authors of the
state to jurisdiction in another. As we said in Cybersell, there must be "something shareware.
more" to demonstrate that the defendant directed his activity toward the forum state.
Id. Here, that has been shown. Toeppen engaged in a scheme to register Atty. Patterson, a resident of Houston, Texas, subscribed to CompuServe. Patterson
Panavision's trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of extorting money took advantage of CompuServe’s shareware service by posting Internet navigation
from Panavision. His conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring software that he developed but marketed via his own corporation, Flashpoint
Panavision in California where Panavision has its principal place of business and Development. Patterson before use of the shareware service, entered into a
where the movie and television industry is centered. Under the "effects test," the “shareware Registration Agreement (SRA) that provided that Ohio law governed the
purposeful availment requirement necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is parties’ relationship.
satisfied.
After Patterson posted his navigation software via shareware, CompuServe itself
B. Defendant's Forum-Related Activities à The second requirement for specific, began to market its own navigation software. Patterson believed that CompuServe’s
personal jurisdiction is that the claim asserted in the litigation arises out of the software was confusingly similar to his own trademarked software and notified
defendant's forum related activities. We must determine if the plaintiff Panavision CompuServe.
would not have been injured "but for" the defendant Toeppen's conduct directed
toward Panavision in California. CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, seeking a declaration that it had not infringed Patterson’s trademarks.
This requirement is satisfied. Toeppen's registration of Panavision's trademarks as Patterson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which the court
his own domain names on the Internet had the effect of injuring Panavision in granted. District court dismissed based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
California.
CompuServe appealed arguing that Patterson’s repeated availment of the shareware jurisdiction. The "purposeful availment" requirement is satisfied when the defendant's
sales procedures constituted minimum contacts with the forum state. CompuServe contacts with the forum state "proximately result from actions by the defendant
further argued that the existence of the Shareware Registration Agreement clearly himself that create a `substantial connection' with the forum State," and when the
stipulating the Ohio law governed disputes regarding the agreement meant that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he "should
exercise of personal jurisdiction is inline with the traditional notions of fair play and reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. It does not, however, mean that a
substantial justice. defendant must be physically present in the forum state, so long as a commercial
actor's efforts are `purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have
Issue: w/n CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the personal jurisdiction there.
Due Process Clause, to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Patterson? YES There is no question that Patterson himself took actions that created a connection
with Ohio in the instant case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and then he entered
Held: The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of into the Shareware Registration Agreement when he loaded his software onto the
these historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment CompuServe system for others to use and, perhaps, purchase. Once Patterson had
and knowledge - that is, people like Patterson - to operate an international business done those two things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed
cheaply, and from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled to by Ohio law, with an Ohio-based company. Then, he repeatedly sent his computer
the protection of the Due Process Clause, which mandates that potential defendants software, via electronic links, to the CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised
be able "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to that software on the CompuServe system. Moreover, he initiated the events that led
where the conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via electronic and regular
mail messages.
Patterson consciously reached out from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe,
and to use its service to market his computer software on the Internet. He entered Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there.
into a contract which expressly stated that it would be governed by and construed in Patterson chose to transmit his software from Texas to CompuServe's system in
light of Ohio law. Ohio has written and interpreted its long-arm statute, and Ohio, that myriad others gained access to Patterson's software via that system, and
particularly its "transacting business" subsection, with the intent of reaching as far as that Patterson advertised and sold his product through that system. Though all this
the Due Process Clause will allow, and it certainly has an interest "in providing happened with a distinct paucity of tangible, physical evidence, there can be no doubt
effective means of redress for its residents. that Patterson purposefully transacted business in Ohio. Patterson sent software to
CompuServe repeatedly for some three years, and the record indicates that he
The Ohio long-arm statute allows an Ohio court to exercise personal jurisdiction over intended to continue marketing his software on CompuServe. Admittedly, merely
nonresidents of Ohio on claims arising from, inter alia, the nonresident's transacting entering into a contract with CompuServe would not, without more, establish that
any business in Ohio. It is settled Ohio law, moreover, that the "transacting business" Patterson had minimum contacts with Ohio. Patterson frequently contacted Ohio to
clause of that statute was meant to extend to the federal constitutional limits of due sell his computer software over CompuServe's Ohio-based system. Patterson
process, and that as a result Ohio personal jurisdiction cases require an examination repeatedly sent his "goods" to CompuServe in Ohio for their ultimate sale.
of those limits. CompuServe, in effect, acted as Patterson's distributor, albeit electronically and not
physically.
In the instant case, because CompuServe bases its action on Patterson's act of
sending his computer software to Ohio for sale on its service, CompuServe seeks to Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant
establish such specific personal jurisdiction over Patterson. must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to make the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether, given
the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the We conclude that Patterson has knowingly made an effort - and, in fact, purposefully
forum state that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with contracted - to market a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. This court has repeatedly operating, in effect, as his distribution center. Thus, it is reasonable to subject
employed three criteria to make this determination: Patterson to suit in Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network service he
chose to employ. Someone like Patterson who employs a computer network service
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in like CompuServe to market a product can reasonably expect disputes with that
the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Whether a service to yield lawsuits in the service's home state.
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the
forum state is "the sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction to insure that "random," Here, we have an entrepreneur who purposefully employed CompuServe to market
"fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts do not cause a defendant to be haled into a his computer software product. It may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit
in Ohio, but he knew when he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement Issue: WON it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the U.S. for another
with CompuServe that he was making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he nation to regulate speech by a U.S. resident within the U.S. on the basis that such
hoped that connection would work to his benefit. Further, Ohio has a strong interest speech can be accessed by Internet users in that nation.
in resolving a dispute involving an Ohio company, which will involve the Ohio law on
common law trademarks and trade names. Held: NO. Generally, no legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the
limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. However, the U.S.
15. YAHOO! INC. V LA LIGUE CONTRE LE RECISME ET L’ANTISEMITISME Constitution requires that full faith and credit be given to judgments of sister states.
The extent to which the U.S., or any state, honors the judicial decrees of any other is
Facts: La Ligue Conte Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and L’Union Des a matter of choice, governed by the comity of nations. Comity is neither a matter of
Etudiants Juifs De France are French non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
anti-Semitism. Yahoo!, Inc., on the other hand, is a corporation organized under other. U.S. courts generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees unless
Delaware laws having its principal place of business in Santa Clara, California. enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to the country’s interests.
Yahoo! operates an auction site, which allows anyone to post an item for sale and In this case, the French Court’s content and view-point based regulation of the web
solicit bids from any computer user around the globe. Yahoo! monitors the pages and auction site of Yahoo! are clearly inconsistent with the First Amendment if
transactions through limited regulation by prohibiting particular items to be sold. mandated by a court in the U.S. The protection of free speech and the press
Auction sellers must comply with Yahoo!’s policies and may not offer items to buyers embodied in the First amendment would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of
in jurisdiction in which the sale of such item violates the jurisdiction’s applicable laws. foreign judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in another
However, Yahoo! does not actively regulate the content of each posting and country but considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S.
individuals have been able to post offensive items, including Nazi and Third Reich Constitution. Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with
related memorabilia. respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing
the enforcement of such standards to speech originating within the U.S., the principle
LICRA sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo!, which informed it that the sale of of comity is outweigh by the court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.
Nazi and Third Reich goods through its auction site violates French Law. LICRA
threatened legal action if Yahoo! failed to prevent such sales within eight days. 16. AMERICA ONLINE, INC. V. SUPERIOR COURT
LICRA subsequently filed a civil complaint against Yahoo! in the Tribunal de Grande
Instance de Paris (French Court). FACTS: A class action was filed by Mendoza for himself and others against AOL
seeking compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and restitution. The
The French Court found approximately 1,000 Nazi and Third Reich related goods complaint alleges that real parties are former subscribers to AOL's Internet service
being offered for sale on Yahoo!’s auction site. Since French citizens could access who, over the past four years, paid between $5 and $22 each month for the service.
these materials, the French Court concluded that Yahoo!’s auction site violates the Monthly payments were made by allowing AOL to debit automatically the credit cards
French Criminal Code which prohibits the exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts of class members. The class members terminated their subscriptions to AOL but,
for sale. The French Court ordered Yahoo! to: (1) eliminate French access to the without authorization, AOL continued to debit their credit cards for monthly service
materials on the auction site that offer Nazi artifacts for sale; (2) eliminate French fees. Mendoza individually alleged that he gave AOL notice of the cancellation of his
access to web pages displaying text, extracts, or quotations from Mein Kampf and subscription in October 1999, but AOL continued to charge monthly fees against his
Protocol of the Elders of Zion; (3) post a warning on Yahoo.fr that any search through credit card at least through February 2000, at which time Mendoza cancelled his
Yahoo.com may lead to sites containing Nazi propaganda, and that the viewing of the credit card in order to stop the debits. The complaint alleged separate causes of
such material may result in legal action against the Internet user; and (4) remove action including violations of California's Unfair Business Practices Act (First Cause
from all browser directories accessible in France the index headings entitled of Action) (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 17200 et seq.), violations of California's CLRA
"negationists” and from all hypertext links the equation of “negationists" under the (Second Cause of Action) (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(14)), common law
heading “Holocaust.” The order also subjects Yahoo! to a penalty of 100,000 Euros conversion/trespass (Third Cause of Action), and common law fraud (Fourth Cause
for each day of non-compliance. of Action).
Yahoo! claims that it does not have the technology to block French access to the Shortly thereafter, AOL filed a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of
related auction sites without banning the Nazi-related material altogether. Yahoo! inconvenient forum. As noted, the motion was based on the forum selection clause
further claims that such a ban would infringe upon its rights under the First contained in the "Terms of Service" (TOS) agreement entered into between Mendoza
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. and AOL at the time he subscribed to AOL's proprietary Internet service which
provides: "You expressly agree that exclusive jurisdiction for any claim or dispute with
AOL or relating in any way to your membership or your use of AOL resides in the
courts of Virginia and you further agree and expressly consent to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in the courts of Virginia in connection with any such dispute
including any claim involving AOL or its affiliates, subsidiaries, employees, Turning to the question of which side has the burden of proof when a forum selection
contractors, officers, directors, telecommunications providers and content clause is challenged, as we have noted, the trial court in the case before us found:
providers...." Additionally, paragraph 8 contained a choice of law provision "Defendant AOL did not meet its burden of showing that the substantive rights
designating Virginia law as being applicable to any dispute between the parties. afforded California plaintiffs were not diminished by enforcement of the forum
selection clause." Normally, the burden of proof is on the party challenging the
Mendoza objected to Exhibit A, claiming that the document did not accurately reflect enforcement of a contractual forum selection clause. However, the lower court
what was displayed to him when he commenced service with AOL. Instead, he assigned the burden of proof to AOL based on its conclusion that Wimsatt v. Beverly
described seeing displayed on his home computer monitor a "densely worded, small- Hills Weight Etc. Internal, Inc. (1995) controls this case. The trial court in the present
size text that was hard to read on the computer screen." This objection formed the case concluded that because Mendoza seeks recovery, in part, under the CLRA
leitmotif for Mendoza's claim that the TOS was an unconscionable adhesion contract, (Civ.Code, §§ 1750 et seq.), which contains a statutory anti-waiver provision like that
and that under applicable rules of contract construction, the forum selection clause involved in Wimsatt, the burden of proof was on AOL to prove that enforcement of the
was unenforceable. In addition, Mendoza contended the TOS was unreasonable and forum selection clause would not result in a significant diminution of rights to
unenforceable because it necessarily required him and the putative class members to California consumers. We agree. In comparing the purpose and remedies afforded to
relinquish legal rights in derogation of California public policy. The court entered its California franchisees under the FIL to those afforded California consumers under the
order denying AOL's motion. AOL then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. On CLRA, we find identical policy considerations which command shifting the burden of
February 28, 2001, the high court granted the petition for review, and transferred the proof here to AOL, the party seeking enforcement of the forum selection clause, as
matter back to this court with directions to issue an order to show cause why the was done in Wimsatt. The FIL and the CLRA were each enacted to protect the
relief requested in the petition should not be granted. statute's beneficiaries from deceptive and unfair business practices. Each statutory
scheme embodies strong remedial provisions for violations of the statute. Important
ISSUE: W/N the a forum selection clause in AOL’s contracts with Al Mendoza, Jr. to the trial court's finding is the fact that the CLRA, like the FIL, embeds in its
and the potential class members, which designated Virginia as the jurisdiction in statutory scheme a provision prohibiting waivers by consumers of any of these
which all disputes arising out of the relationship would be litigated and which also remedies. Civil Code section 1751 warns: "Any waiver by a consumer of the
included a choice of law provision requiring that Virginia law be applied to any such provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and
dispute is valid? NO void." While the remedial aspects of each statutory scheme are indigenous to the
business practices regulated, in both cases the Legislature has ensured that the
HELD: A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof rights afforded to California citizens against unfair practices cannot be diminished or
In the case of Cal-State the court explained why a different standard of review avoided by contract. Where the effect of transfer to a different forum has the potential
applied depending on whether the motion to stay or to dismiss was contractually of stripping California consumers of their legal rights deemed by the Legislature to be
derived: "While none of the contractual forum non conveniens cases have explicitly non-waivable, the burden must be placed on the party asserting the contractual
stated the standard of review, it is apparent from their discussion that they are de forum selection clause to prove that the CLRA's anti-waiver provisions are not
facto applying the substantial-evidence test, and there is a meaningful basis for violated. For this reason we too embrace the rationale of the Wimsatt decision and
distinction. In ruling on a forum non conveniens motion where no contract is involved, conclude that the CLRA claim pleaded by Mendoza, like the FIL claims asserted
the lower tribunal decides whether or not to exercise jurisdiction based on the in Wimsatt, mandates departure from the general rule which normally places the
evidence before it in light of legally prescribed criteria. Some criteria may be present, burden of proving unfairness or unreasonableness of the forum selection clause on
some not; ultimately, the review does not depend upon the sufficiency of the the party opposed to its enforcement.
evidence before the lower tribunal but whether it correctly applied the pertinent
criteria. On the other hand, in a contractual forum non conveniens motion, the trial B. Overview of Forum Selection Clause Enforcement
court must determine if there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements for AOL correctly posits that California favors contractual forum selection clauses so long
invalidating a binding contract. If the trial court finds there are facts present that as they are entered into freely and voluntarily, and their enforcement would not be
satisfy these criteria, it must act in a particular way; there is no discretion involved. unreasonable. But this encomium is not boundless. Our law favors forum selection
The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, agreements only so long as they are procured freely and voluntarily, with the place
not the manner in which factors were applied.” While we understand the distinction chosen having some logical nexus to one of the parties or the dispute, and so long as
intended by Cal-State, we are not persuaded that appellate review of a contract California consumers will not find their substantial legal rights significantly impaired
interpretation issue can be properly analogized to review of an unambiguous forum by their enforcement. Therefore, to be enforceable, the selected jurisdiction must be
selection clause. Instead, given existing guidance on this question from our Supreme "suitable," "available," and able to "accomplish substantial justice." The trial court
Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise determined that the circumstances of contract formation did not reflect Mendoza
apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State 's conclusion that exercised free will, and that the effect of enforcing the forum selection clause here
the substantial evidence standard applies instead. Therefore, we review the lower would violate California public policy by eviscerating important legal rights afforded to
court's decision using the abuse of discretion standard. this state's consumers.
arising from their relationship which would have significantly greater value. We are
C. Enforcement of the Forum Selection Clause Violates Strong California also unpersuaded by AOL's contention that the trial court erred in not granting AOL's
Public Policy request for a stay of the California action to allow the Virginia court to determine
California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would whether the relief available to Mendoza is consistent with California consumer law.
substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our AOL claims that if the Virginia court found inconsistency, the California court could
state's public policy. The CLRA parallels the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, at then re-assert jurisdiction, deny enforcement of the forum selection clause, and allow
issue in the case of Hall, insofar as the CRLA is a legislative embodiment of a desire Mendoza to proceed in the California forum. We reject this claim because: 1) it is
to protect California consumers and furthers a strong public policy of this state. "The unnecessary for us to defer our decision until a Virginia course clarifies its consumer
CLRA was enacted in an attempt to alleviate social and economic problems law, for we do not find Virginia consumer law to be nearly as opaque as suggested by
stemming from deceptive business practices, which were identified in the 1969 counsel for AOL; 2) AOL suggests no procedural device which would allow a
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Certainly, the CLRA California court to proceed with the underlying case after a Virginia court has ruled;
provides remedial protections at least as important as those under the Corporate and 3) a stay would take an already financially impractical legal dispute and
Securities Law of 1968. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, enforcement of AOL's compound the expense to resolve it by necessitating perhaps two lawsuits. The order
forum selection clause, which is also accompanied by a choice of law provision to show cause is discharged and the petition for writ of mandate is denied. Costs are
favoring Virginia, would necessitate a waiver of the statutory remedies of the CLRA, awarded to Mendoza.
in violation of that law's anti-waiver provision (Civ.Code, § 1751) and California public
policy. For this reason alone, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
This conclusion is reinforced by a statutory comparison of California and Virginia

consumer protection laws, which reveals Virginia's law provides significantly less
consumer protection to its citizens than California law provides for our own.
Consumers who prove violations of the CLRA within the three-year limitations period
may be entitled to a minimum recovery of $1000, restitution or property, power of
injunctive relief, and punitive damages. Attorney fees and costs are also recoverable
if the plaintiffs prevail on their claim under the act. In addition to these extraordinary
remedies, if the complaining consumer is a senior citizen or disabled person, up to
$5000 may be awarded for substantial physical, emotional distress, or economic
damage. Of course, the CLRA specifies that actions under that act may be
prosecuted as class actions. Virginia also has a statutory scheme denominated the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (VCPA). The purpose of the VCPA is to
"promote fair and ethical standards of dealings between suppliers and the consuming
public." The panoply of prohibited acts appears to be as comprehensive as those
under the CRLA, and covers the specific misconduct by AOL alleged in Mendoza's
complaint. Under the VCPA, individuals are entitled to sue and recover actual
damages, or a minimum of $500, whichever is greater. If willful misconduct is proved,
the minimum damages increase to $1000. Attorney fees and costs "may" be awarded.
Restitution is also available. However, if the violation is determined to be
"unintentional," the only remedies obtainable are restitution and attorney fees and
court costs. The Virginia act has a two-year limitations period. Of greater importance
is the absence of any provision in the VCPA that allows suits under the Act to
proceed as class actions. Unless specifically allowed by statute, class action relief is
not generally available in Virginia in actions at law. In contrast to Virginia consumer
law's ostensible hostility to class actions, the right to seek class action relief in
consumer cases has been extolled by California courts.
However, mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of

unreasonableness since it may be assumed that the plaintiff received under the
contract consideration for these things. Although the current dispute between
Mendoza and AOL might make it impractical for Mendoza to pursue an individual
claim in Virginia, there may be other potential disputes between Mendoza and AOL

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3C | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY.

CONFLICT OF LAWS ABACAN, CLA

PONENTE: Concepcion (Pedro), J.: 19. PHILSEC INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex

Cresent’s claim, taking the following into consideration:

11. ZITA NGO BURCA V. REPUBLIC

Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian

provincial treasurer of the non-payment of the tax discovered by

2. INSULAR GOVERNMENT V. FRANK

case TORTS AND CRIMES

reinstated on 19 November 1991. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1469. We upheld the

B. Waiver Exception Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

The provision on arbitration in the Charter Party reads:

4. Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or

4. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING V. CA

This conclusion is reinforced by a statutory comparison of California and Virginia

However, mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of

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