Victory Liner Inc. vs. Heirs of Andres Malecdan (Gr no.

154278)
Facts:
Andres, a 75 year old farmer, was crossing the national highway. As he was crossing, a bus of Victory
Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., hit him and the carabao he was riding on which caused Andres’
death. The heirs of Andres brought a suit for damages in the RTC which held that the driver is guilty of
gross negligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence in
the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. In which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Victory Liner has exercised diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising its employees for them not to be liable for the act committed by Joson.
Ruling:
Victory Liner was not able to prove that they exercised diligence of a good father in selecting and
supervising its employees. Although it has shown that they require certain requirements before they
hire, they were not able to prove that Joson has more than 9 years of experience in driving. They were
also not able to prove that Joson has attended any of the said seminars they required and the records
of the speed meters, tickets and of the field inspectors were not shown which shows that Victory Liner
was negligent in supervising Joson. Hence, Victory liner is vicariously liable under Art. 2180 of the CC.
Mariano C. Mendoza and Elvira Lim v. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez and Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. no.
160110 June 18, 2014
Facts:

On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW 582, owned by
respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) and driven by Antenojenes Perez (Perez), was hit by a Mayamy
Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) with temporary plate number 1376-1280, registered under the name
of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza). Owing to the
incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical
injuries was filed against Mendoza.9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate
complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost
income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu truck, namely Melchor
V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca (Banca), and Jimmy Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries
necessitating medical treatment amounting to P11,267.35,which amount was shouldered by
respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and
steering wheel, amounting to P142,757.40.

Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily income of P1,000.00.
Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and delivering them to recycling plants, respondents
claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the furtherance of their business.

For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in question.
Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1
Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy
Transport) under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.

Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners]: Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA. After
evaluating the damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the
award of unrealized income which the CA ordered deleted. Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners
filed an appeal by certiorari before the Court.

Issue:

In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez, the actual owner of the bus or
Lim, the registered owner of the bus?

Ruling:
 In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the latter’s vicarious liability as
espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business of
industry.

Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed
negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused
damage or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25 In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is
embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said article is
the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.

Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection
(culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may
be rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that
in the selection and supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability. 32 However, with the enactment of
the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the
employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage – are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle,
because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.

As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza.

ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS:
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2
o’clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by NestorMartin, it crashed into a Meralco
electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely
damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was
rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was
liable to it as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was
not his employee. However, petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on his ground was
denied. The case was considered submitted for decision with the express waiver by Martin of his right
to present his own evidence. Ernesto Martin thus did not rebut the Meralco's allegation that he was
Nestor Martin's employer. On the other hand, Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that
Nestor Martin was the employee of Ernesto Martin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ernesto Martin can be held liable for the incident.
RULING:
No. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary
to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in
that article.
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was
the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence
of the employer-employee relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It
noted that although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present
any proof to substantiate his allegation."
Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary
to establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do
this was fatal to its action. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and
Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It
was enough for the defendant to deny thealleged employment relationship, without more, for he was
not under obligation to prove this negative averment. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the
rule that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligationto
prove his exception or defense.”Petitionwas granted.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
Facts:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and
Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to
bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the
picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned and later on
died. Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against the St.
Francis High School, and the teachers contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of
the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning. The trial court found the teachers liable but dismissed the case against the school. The Court
of Appeals declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
guard against the foreseen harm. Also, the school and the principal Benjamin Illumin was declared
jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand Castillo, under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the school St. Francis High School, principal, teachers were liable for the death of Ferdinand.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners
were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school
premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic which had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin
because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
activity. Also, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the
students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the
holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it
supported by any jurisprudence.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages
to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged did her best
and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all
the students who joined the picnic.
RAFAELA CAMPO v. JUAN CAMAROTE
Juan Camarote was in 1953 the registered owner of a jeep with plate license DV-807 while Gregorio
Gemilga, a duly licensed (professional) driver with license No. 77675, was his driver. On August 30,
1953, as Gemilga drove the jeep along the road in Davao, it bumped against the rear of another which
two passengers had just boarded. As a result of the impact Felix Giluano suffered many physical
injuries and he later died. So on October 26 a criminal information was filed against Gemilga. The trial
was scheduled for December 11, 1953, but on December 5, 1953 Gemilga pleaded guilty to the
information and was sentenced to imprisonment and indemnity of P3,000." No execution of the
indemnity was asked for and none was issued.
On October 19, 1953, before Gemilga entered his plea of guilty the present action was instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Davao by the heirs of the deceased Giluano against Juan Camarote, the
owner of the jeep, and Gemilga, the driver. The case was submitted for judgment upon a stipulation of
facts, the most important of which are set forth in the above statement. On the basis of the stipulation,
judgment was entered for plaintiff against defendants sentencing them to pay plaintiff P6,000 as
damages and P500 as attorney's fee. Against this judgment this appeal was presented.
The principal contentions of the defendants Juan Camarote are: (1) that his liability as owner of the jeep
is only subsidiary, and (2) that if the action is against him for his negligence, he is not guilty of such
negligence but exercised the diligence of a good father of a family because he was not in the jeep at
the time of the accident and the driver of the jeep whom he employed is a competent driver. There is no
question that the basis of the action is the supposed negligence or lack of good diligence on the part of
the owner of the vehicle. Thus the complaint alleges
"* * * and neither the operator (owner) observed the due care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the employment of the driver Gregorio Gamilga * * *." (Paragraph 5.)
The law which defines the scope of the liability of a car owner in relation to accidents and injuries
caused by the vehicle driven by another is Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
* * * * * * *
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
* * * * * * *
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Under the civil code of Spain the provisions governing the case were articles 1903 to 1910.
Article 1903 of said code provides as follows:
"The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, Hot only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, or in case of his death, or incapacity, the mother, is liable for any damages caused by the
minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done .by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority
and living with them.
Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage
shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions or the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused, by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage."
A comparison between the above Article and Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines shows
that paragraph 15 of the latter is not contained in the former. This paragraph reads as follows:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry."
Rulings under the old provision (Article 1908) are to the effect that the owner of a vehicle will not be
liable if at the time of the accident causing injury £6 a third person the owner of the vehicle is not
present therein, because he does not fall within the list of persons enumerated in Article 1903 of the
Civil Code (Johnson vs. David, 5 Phil. 663; Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil. 374; Marquez vs.
Castillo, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 5, 204). Under the new Civil Code, however, the owner of the vehicle is
included among the persons who may respond for the acts of their employees who cause damage to
third persons in the course of their employment. By reason of this newly inserted provision the owner of
a jeep driven by another becomes responsible for the driver's negligence under the terms and
circumstances specified in the last paragraph of article 2180. In accordance with this paragraph the
owner of the vehicle is responsible unless he proves that he exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. But in the case at, bar, Camarote, the jeepney-owner, was not in the
jeep; and the only manner in which he could have avoided damage to third persons would have been
by the exercise by him of the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of his
driver. Did: he satisfy the requirement of the law in this case?
Defendant Juan Camarote argues that the mere fact that the driver was a professional driver is a
sufficient exercise of the diligence required of a good father of a family, which would exempt him from.
responsibility. We think that this is a. mistaken view of the law, taking into account the fact, of which we
take judicial notice, that licenses are easy to obtain and no strict examination is required before
professional driver's licenses are given, and that the holding of a driver's license is no guarantee or
assurance of the carefulness of the holder of the license. In order that the defendant may be
considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined
the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. Defendant-
appellant did not take these steps, which are considered essential, and we must hold that he has failed
to exercise all due diligence required of a good father of a family in the choice of selection of his driver.
The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the carelessness of a
driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of. the vehicle in the choice of the
driver. Were " we to require the injured party to prove the owner's lack of diligence, the right will in.
many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially in the cities, have the
opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So the law imposes the burden of
proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law
presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
Finding that the conclusion of the trial judge as to defendant-appellant's responsibility is correct, we
hereby affirm the decision, with costs against defendant-appellant.
HEIRS OF LATE RUBEN REINOSO v. CA
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a
passenger of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The passenger jeepney was
owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was
owned by Jose Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).

On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Tapales
and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance
Corporation (FGAC) under Policy Number OV-09527.

On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and against Guballa.
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation,
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under
policy No. OV-09527 in the amount of ?50,000.00 undertaking plus ?10,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.

For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano
Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims as specified above, respectively.
Totality of evidence preponderance in their favor.

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid
down in Manchester v. CA. [4] In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in, petitioners
could no longer pay the required docket fees. [5]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was denied in a resolution dated
June 30, 1994. [6] Hence, this appeal, anchored on the following

GROUNDS:

A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of the Supreme Court in the case
of Manchester Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to this case.

B. The issue on the specification of the damages appearing in the prayer of the Complaint was
NEVER PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT) NOR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.

C. The issues of the case revolve around the more substantial issue as to the negligence of the
private respondents and their culpability to petitioners." [7]

The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have been applied retroactively in this
case, since it was filed prior to the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that
though this Court stated that failure to state the correct amount of damages would lead to the dismissal
of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.

Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint in 1979, they were not
certain of the amount of damages they were entitled to, because the amount of the lost income would
still be finally determined in the course of the trial of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial
court remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as the correct amount would
be paid subsequently.

Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue either in the RTC or in the
CA.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, [9] it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was,
however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[10] wherein
the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the
plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required.[11] Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,[12] the Court explained that
where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the
court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances, allowed the
relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin,[13] the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also
recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be
used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances. [14]

While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater
demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably,[15] for it is far better to dispose of a case on
the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had
already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was
never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.

Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level
rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[16]

The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling came
out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in
view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases
of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals [17] and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC
of Zamboanga. [18] In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat
(Mactan), [19] it was stated that the "intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to
comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the
changes introduced by the new rules."In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to
pay the correct docket fees on time.

As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners' claim would be
dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the
case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this
Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher
interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case
on the merits.

The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney passenger, died as a result of the collision of
a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening along E. Rodriguez
Avenue, Quezon City. It was established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the
negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot
report of the police authorities and the narration of the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision
was brought about because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side
portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the passenger jeepney as a
consequence.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as follows:
"Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. - Unless a different course of action is required in the interest
of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of
operation in compliance therewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle
on highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left
when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going
from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway."
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is convinced of the veracity of the version of
the passenger jeepney driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs' and Tapales' witness) that while running on
lane No. 4 westward bound towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6,
1984) the "sand & gravel" truck from the opposite direction driven by Mariano Geronimo, the headlights
of which the former had seen while still at a distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade
astride lanes 1 and 2, upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3 and 4
at high speed "napakabilis po ng dating ng truck." (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985) in the process hitting them
(Jeepney passenger) at the left side up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner "pahilis" (57
tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due to the strong impact was thrown
"resting on its right side while the left side was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)". The passengers of
the jeepney and its driver were injured including two passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney
suffered considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-Tapales, pages 331-332, records)
taken while at the repair shop.

The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect that the "gravel & sand" truck was
running in high speed on the good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the wooden
barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when
suddenly confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the same in a manner of a reflex
reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the
time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on its right lane No. 4 and even during the moments
before said bumping, moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then somewhat rough
because being repaired also according to Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one
of those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are convincing and consistent in
depicting the true facts of the case untainted by vacillation and therefore, worthy to be relied upon.
Their story is forfeited and confirmed by the sketch drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba,
Traffic Division, NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst
fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166-168, records; the Certified
Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-
Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the
bumping indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the `gavel & sand' truck is positioned in
relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch having been made right after the accident is a piece of
evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the bumping-occurrence. The rule that
official duty had been performed (Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of Court) -
there being no evidence adduced and made of record to the contrary - is that said circumstance
involving the two vehicles had been the result of an official investigation and must be taken as true by
this Court. [21]

While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, [22] the
position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the
truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding along E.
Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney was coming from the
opposite direction. When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front
portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck driver should have been
more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.

The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa, failed to rebut the
presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision of his employee
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in
the selection or supervision of his employee.[23] Thus, in the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and
service record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence. [24] Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that the evidence
presented by respondent Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow this presumption of
negligence by showing that he had exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it
that the driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the
compound like the oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo
had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation came about (5-6 tsn,
ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of the compound to make deliveries, it is always
accompanied with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered as
selection and supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility.
This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of all the care of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver Mariano Geronimo." [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.