YNOT vs IAC

Facts

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos
(EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only
banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6
carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The
lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police
power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate
slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-
A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
 Villacicencio Vs Lukban

Facts :
One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that
the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted
by the respondents.

ISSUE :

WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD :

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On
the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei
rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make
some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race.
These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse,
without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal
must be severely punished
 Primicias v Fugoso

Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to
issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on
the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well
to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119,
Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held:

Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for
two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly
or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First
construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the
streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power
may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.
 The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE

FACTS:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the
controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a
classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was
considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her
services.

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua
in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The
petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his
employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified
School Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for
termination.

ISSUE:

Was her dismissal valid?

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts
which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and or grave misconduct?

RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:

“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old
lady teacher] took advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If
 the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic
levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its
own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and
universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation
of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it

follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers
would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner
took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

Oposa vs Facturan

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the

country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing,
or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant
in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
 ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Calalang vs Williams
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to
5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one
year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was
subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting
chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its
constitutionality.
 Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice

Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all
people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.