Professional Documents
Culture Documents
hydropower: The São Luiz do Tapajós
project in Brazil
Highlights
•
A qualitative method for the analysis of socioenvironmental conflicts is proposed.
A stakeholder definition is carried out and discussed.
Different conflicts caused by the same project are identified and analysed.
Conflict management schemes must transcend single project and tackle energy policy.
Abstract
Economic expansion and related resource and infrastructure needs provoke an increase of socio
environmental conflicts worldwide, and methodologies for their comprehensive analysis and understanding
are necessary. The present paper suggests a methodology for the analysis of socioenvironmental conflicts on
hydropower, developed from a case study on the São Luiz do Tapajós project in Brazil. On the basis of
qualitative semistructured interviews, a stakeholder definition and conflict analysis were carried out. The
analysis shows that at least five different subconflicts, each one with its own characteristics, can be
distinguished, and that negotiation on many of these conflicts is difficult. Confrontation processes are
therefore likely to occur. The current strategy of conflict treatment falls short of the situation; instead
solutions must be sought looking at the underlying conflict causes. A restructuring of the energy policy and
the approach to traditional populations is a necessary precondition if robust and comprehensive solutions on
the current socioenvironmental conflicts on hydropower in the Amazon were to be found.
Graphical abstract
Keywords
Socio-environmental conflicts
Conflict management
Water resources management
Stakeholder processes
Hydropower
Amazon
1. Introduction
Conflicts on natural resources have been increasing worldwide during the last decades (Martínez Alier 2007:
334), and Yasmi et al. (2006) suggest that such conflicts are “ubiquitous”. According to Nascimento (2001:
88), modern capitalism is characterized by a structural conflict between the economy, tending to
globalization, and its instrument for realization, the nation state, and the resolution of this conflict seems to
reside in the form of global expansion of the economy, the politics and the culture. This helps to understand
the underlying dynamics for the increase of conflicts on natural resources, a subcategory of socio
environmental conflicts. The socioenvironmental concept comprises three dimensions: the biophysical
world and its multiple natural cycles, the human world and its social structures, and the dynamic and
interdependent relationship between them (Little 2001: 107). Acselrad (2004: 26) provides a definition of
socioenvironmental conflicts:
Environmental conflicts are, therefore, those involving social groups with different ways of appropriation, use
and signification of territory, originating when the continuity of the social forms of appropriation of the
environment developed of at least one group is threatened by undesired impacts – transmitted through soil,
water or living systems – resulting from the activities of other groups.
According to Kuzdas and Wieck (2014: 181), deficiencies in governance regimes are often seen as a primary
source for complex water problems, including conflicts. However, Acuña (2015) argues that this approach
does not take into account the underlying conflict causes and remains therefore superficial. Accordingly,
WesterHerber (2004: 110) suggests that it might be important to look at the root of a conflict rather than to
the conflict itself.
Following this discussion, the two realms “underlying conflict causes” and “conflict treatment” of socio
environmental conflicts can be distinguished (Table 1). This article examines the conflict over a large
hydropower project (São Luiz do Tapajós) in the Brazilian Amazon, aiming at providing a qualitative
methodology for a structural analysis and understanding of socioenvironmental conflicts on hydropower. It
suggests that the conceptualization of the underlying causes is a necessary first step in conflict analysis which
defines and clarifies the potential and limits of any conflict management strategies.
Table 1. Two realms of socioenvironmental conflicts.
Building a framework for the classification of socioenvironmental conflicts according to their underlying
causes, Little (2001) suggests three categories, which are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Categories of socioenvironmental conflicts.
–
Category Explanation Examples
Large scale water withdrawal
for industrial use threatens the
water supply of inhabitants
and/or farmers
Application of genetically
modified crops
Conflicts on risk perception, on
Use of environmental the use of environmental
–
knowledge knowledge (bio piracy) or on
sacred or spiritual sites
Oil exploration, mining or
dams affecting indigenous
peoples
(adapted from Little 2001: 108).
However, most socioenvironmental conflicts include further elements. In his theory of human motivation,
Maslow (1943) establishes a “hierarchy of basic needs”, arguing that these can be briefly summarized as
“physiological, safety, love, esteem, and selfactualization”. Thus, as a socioenvironmental conflict may be
driven by (real or perceived) physiological threats to a group of people, also other needs are at stake.
Nascimento (2001: 96–97) calls attention that the disputed object can be “material or symbolic, real or
unreal”, and that most conflicts involve not only material goods but also ideas, status and power positions.
Although the objects and causes of the conflict are usually known, the involved actors may have different
perceptions of them: “Its interpretation and understanding, just as its valorisation, are different for each of the
actors.” Therefore, Martínez Alier (2007: 352–353) distinguishes between conflicts within one system of
valorisation (usually monetary), and conflicts on the system of valorisation itself, involving an
incommensurability of values. The latter occurs when conflict actors do not agree on how to value one or
more of the disputed objects. This is often the case in socioenvironmental conflicts, as the valorisation of the
environment is difficult and frequently itself a cause of conflict.
Accordingly, the valorisation of territory and environment is in many cases a central aspect in conflicts on
hydropower projects, additional and closely connected to the biophysical socioenvironmental impacts. Chan
et al. (2012) point out that “many values or properties of a material ‘thing’ can also have intangible qualities
that are as or more important, and which are deemed central to identity to a selfdefined population or
recognized cultural group.”
WesterHerber (2004: 113) suggests that identity is closely linked to environment, what she calls “place
identity”. Such placeidentity was found to be crucial in hydropower conflicts, as for example by Poma
(2013), who argues that the relation with the territory has very important emotional and symbolic dimensions.
Emotions contribute in a crucial way to the behaviour of actors in a socioenvironmental conflict and to “the
conformation and strengthening of a collective identity”.
Hence, the place identity of an affected group plays a central role in their perception. Zhouri et al. (2005: 21)
see “two rationalities in confrontation” in the case of conflicts over hydropower projects:
Two rationalities in confrontation can be highlighted: the one of the rural communities, who perceive the land
as ‘patrimony' of the family and the community, protected by the ‘collective memory' and by rules of use and
share of the resources; and the one of the electricity sector, who, from a market perspective, understands the
territory as property and, as such, commodity [emphasis in original] amenable to monetary valorisation.
Therefore, the incommensurability of values is an important feature of socioenvironmental conflicts in
general and conflicts on hydropower specifically, increasing the caseś complexity and setting the framework
for possible conflict treatment strategies.
Little (2001: 119) distinguishes between five basic ways to deal with a conflict: Confrontation, repression,
political manipulation, negotiation/mediation, and cooperation. Ideally, conflicts would be handled through
cooperation. Hon, political manipulation, negotiation/mediation, and cooperation. Ideally, conflicts would be
handled through cooperation. However, this case is rare in reality if economic, political and social interests
are involved. If a conflict involves issues related to economic bases or identities (real or perceived risk of
dissolution of one group), the possibilities for cooperation are minimal (Little 2001: 121). As a result,
confrontation may occur, which in turn is often responded by repression and political manipulation.
Negotiation and mediation are strategies of conflict management. Bercovitch and Jackson (2001) distinguish
between negotiation as a bilateral process and mediation as assisted negotiation involving an independent
third party. Glasl (1999) suggests that conflict management strategies should be based on the level of conflict
escalation. On lower levels of escalation direct negotiations or possibly professional chairing are suitable,
whereas for higher escalation levels mediation or even power interventions become necessary. Yasmi et al.
(2006) describe how “conflict escalates as engagement becomes difficult and actors gradually lose their
flexibility towards their opponents”. They also state that “[t]hose with ample power are most likely to be able
to control resources in their favor and therefore have little incentive to make concessions”.
Confrontation, although often seen as something to be avoided, can also have positive effects and may even
be necessary to turn negotiations possible and fruitful. Castro and Nielsen (2001: 231), writing on co
management agreements with indigenous people, call attention that some “degree of conflict” may be
necessary to achieve such agreements. Regarding environmental problems, Martínez Alier (2007: 108) argues
that the resolution of a conflict does not imply the resolution of the problem: “Actually, what is necessary to
advance in the solution of the problem is to exacerbate it [emphasis in the original].”
In the same way conflict management efforts including negotiation/mediation have been criticized (Acselrad,
2004, Little, 2001, Zhouri et al., 2005) if they primarily aim at resolving the conflict without resolving its
causes or “sweep them under the carpet” (Martínez Alier 2007: 108). Dhiaulhaq et al. (2015), on the other
hand, show a different perspective:
[M]ediation has facilitated the creation of a conductive environment for multistakeholder dialog, built trust
among the conflicting parties, as well as assisted problem solving processes, resulting in improved
relationships, mutually agreed on solutions and commitment to longterm cooperation and collective action.
Regarding hydropower in Brazil, the emergence of the Movement of the Dam Affected People (MAB,
acronyms in Portuguese) is an example for the positive aspects of confrontation. By mobilizing and
organizing the affected population and articulating their demands this movement exacerbated conflicts on
hydropower in Brazil. Only on this base further negotiation could lead to real improvements, as for example
the right of collective negotiation, proper compensation and resettlement programs (Vainer, 2004).
Summarizing, it can be concluded that negotiation or mediation of a socioenvironmental conflict is desirable
if the process has a realistic potential to lead to innovations which can possibly result in (at least partial)
solutions of the underlying socioenvironmental problems and/or a fairer allocation of benefits and impacts to
stakeholders. Mediation may further be necessary in situations where otherwise escalating violence can be
expected. However, care has to be taken that processes of negotiation/meditation are not misused in a way
that they lead to the perpetuation or aggravation of socioenvironmental problems or injustices.
3. Study context
The hydropower project São Luiz do Tapajós (SLT) is projected in the Tapajós River, an 825 km long
tributary of the Amazon River. Fig. 1 shows the Tapajós, indicates its position within Brazil and the
approximate location of the SLT hydropower project near to the town of Itaituba, in the Brazilian state of
Pará.
1. Download high-res image (675KB)
Fig. 1. (single column): Tapajós River and location of the São Luiz do Tapajós hydropower project
(elaborated from OpenStreetMap and its contributors).
The Brazilian Amazon1 experienced several economic cycles throughout the last century. At the end of the
19th century the region experienced an economic boom with the extraction of rubber, which went into rapid
decline after Asiatic countries entered the market and later synthetic rubber production was introduced. In the
1960ies the area became a focus of interest of the Brazilian government and several attempts to include the
Amazon in the national and international economy were conducted since then. In the 1970ies the government
encouraged immigration from the northeast of Brazil, where land was scarce and conflicts frequent. In this
context the Amazon was seen as a “spatial escape for unsolved social conflicts” (Kohlhepp 2002: 37), and the
following colonization led to a rapid increase of deforestation and social tensions especially with indigenous
tribes. The enforcement of extensive cattle ranches largely failed because the ecologic conditions were not
taken into account properly: “Instead of poles of growth with impulses for irradiating development artificially
maintained enclaves emerged.” (Kohlhepp 2002: 40). In the 1980ies a new cycle, the cycle of megaprojects
(Kohlhepp 2002: 41), began. Large deposits of minerals were found and their extraction for export came into
interest of national and international capital. This was the beginning of extractivism (Acuña 2015: 85) in the
Brazilian Amazon, and in this context also the first large hydropower projects emerged. Hydropower in the
Amazon is therefore closely associated with extractivism, and as will be seen in Section 5 this background is
crucial in order to understand current socioenvironmental conflicts.
Today the Amazon constitutes the hydroelectric frontier for the future expansion of hydropower in Brazil.
Although hydropower is well developed and accounted for 64% of the countrýs electricity production in 2015
(EPE 2016: 16), only about 38% of its total estimated potential was already in operation and another 5.6%
under construction in December 2015 (Eletrobras, 2014).
The bulk of the remaining potential, including the most attractive sites for investors, is located in the Amazon
basin. In 2014, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) planned that 30 new large hydropower plants2 with
a total capacity of 30,332 MW should enter into operation until 2023. 91% of this planned capacity is located
in the Amazon, and three plants account for 71% of it: Belo Monte (11.000 MW), São Luiz do Tapajós (8.040
MW) and Jatobá (2.338 MW) (MME 2014: 79–80).
These numbers reveal that SLT has had a priority position in the Brazilian governmentts energy planning. If
built, it will be the fourth largest plant in Brazil and the single largest electricity project after the Belo Monte
dam, which is already under construction in the neighbouring Xingú River basin. SLT is the biggest out of
many planned large hydropower plants in the Tapajós drainage area. According to the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) of SLT, inventory studies resulted in a total number of 26 possible large plants with a total
installed capacity of 26,408 MW (CNEC 2014a: Volume 1, 43–45). Fearnside (2015a) calls attention that
different projects appeared over the years in the energy expansion plans of the MME and counted a total
number of 43 large projects. SLT is part of the so called “Tapajós Complex” (Complexo Tapajós), which
consists of five large plants with a total capacity of 12,589 MW.
Although hydropower is often referred to as “green energy”, especially large plants are highly controversial
due to their large socioenvironmental impacts. In the Brazilian Amazon, these impacts include: flooding of
native forest and its impacts on biodiversity; decline of fish populations, especially migrating fish which are
of high importance for (subsistence) fishery; negative impacts on water quality (eutrophication) and related
health concerns for drinking water supply; mobilisation and methylation of mercury; negative impacts on
traditional populations; greenhouse gas emissions; and socioeconomic impacts on municipalities and
communities due to large labour migration and resulting economic activities (Zhouri, 2011, Sousa Junior and
Bermann, 2012, Fearnside, 2015b). Many of these impacts heavily affect local people, whereas benefits
accrue to distant cities, sometimes even located in other countries. Additionally, according to Fearnside
(2014), the environmental impacts assessments of past projects showed a systematic tendency to
underestimate its impacts.
To understand current conflicts in the area it is further important that the Tapajós basin is also a focus of the
agricultural frontier (Kohlhepp 2002: 39) for the expansion of soy production and transport. Several harbours
for soy exportation are being implemented in Itaituba and Santarém. Also, although extensive cattle ranching
initially failed, it is now well established throughout most of the Brazilian Amazon. Both soy and cattle
ranching constitute major pressures on native forest areas.
This situation leads to tensions between “globalist and localist perspectives” (Zhouri, 2004), which are
aggravated by the contrasts between the local situation and the scope of planned projects. A large part of the
Tapajós basińs area is covered with forest and 65% is formally protected as environmental protection and
indigenous areas (CNEC 2014a: Volume 3, 74). Of special importance is the presence of traditional
populations. Traditional populations are defined in Brazil as “culturally differentiated groups, who recognize
themselves as such, possess their own forms of social organization, occupy and use their territories and
natural resources as condition for their cultural, social, religious, ancestral and economic reproduction, using
knowledge, innovations and practices developed and transmitted through tradition.” (Brazil, 2007). In the
scope of this work, two important traditional populations are indigenous peoples and riverine settlers. Several
indigenous tribes live in the extension of the Tapajós basin, out of which the Munduruku is the most
expressive one, with a total population estimated at 11,630 individuals in 2010 (CNEC 2014a: General
Appendix Vol. 22). Riverine settlers (ribeirinhos) live at the margins of the rivers in the whole basin and
occupy the floodplains according to seasonal fluctuations. In the past decade, some of their communities
organized successfully to defend themselves against the threat of growing commercial fishery activities, and
several attempts to develop communitybased floodplain management systems were conducted, especially in
the area of Santarém (McGrath et al., 2008). The economic basis of both the indigenous people and the
riverine settlers is to a large extent (subsistence) fishery, family or communitybased farming and local trade.
The licensing process of SLT was cancelled in August 2016 by the Environmental Agency IBAMA 3 due to
the interference of the planned reservoir on indigenous land (see Section 5.2).
Social actors of a socioenvironmental conflict can be individuals, groups or organizations, and their
motivation can include material or political interests, status (recognition), values, ideologies and religion
(Nascimento 2001: 95). Actors in a conflict are often referred to as stakeholders. There is however a
difference between these two concepts, as a stakeholder does not necessarily take an active role, which is
implied in the denomination actor.
A general challenge regarding stakeholder definition in a conflict situation is their heterogeneity. The
grouping of large contingents of people as one stakeholder involves the danger of overriding internal
differences and heterogeneities. On the other hand, a very detailed separation of groups turns conflict analysis
very difficult (if not impossible) and obscures the existence of collective interests. A stakeholder definition
can therefore never describe the reality in all its details, but must rather aim to provide an adequate
approximation for the analysis and handling of the respective conflict.
In this study, a predefinition of stakeholders was made based on the review of secondary sources (journalistic
and academic articles, the Environmental Impact Assessment and press releases). Subsequently, public
representatives of the defined stakeholder groups were selected as interviewees. An interview form was
developed in order to cover conflict issues which were found in the literature review. Eleven interviews were
conducted during the study.4 In general, the stakeholder groups opposing the project were more willing to
conduct an interview. The planning consortium did not answer the interview questions but issued a statement,
highlighting that they are responsible for the viability studies but not (necessarily) for the construction of the
plant. Individual companies sought for an interview did not answer.
The interviews were analysed with coding techniques in two steps. First, the answers to each question were
depicted according to their frequency in vertical bar charts. Subsequently, the stakeholders were sorted in
charts according to their answers to different questions, as shows the example in Fig. 2.5 The analysis showed
that the answers of the stakeholder representatives showed a strong correlation with their general position
towards the project. Based on these results, the initial stakeholder definition was refined and complemented,
sorting the stakeholder groups as follows: In favour (pro), in favour under explicit conditions (pro with
demands), diverse or no clearly articulated positions (undecided) and opposing the project (contra).
Additionally, the stakeholders were classified according to their level of involvement: Primary stakeholders
are those who actively engage in the project and the discussion around it. Secondary stakeholders have strong
interests but do not play the same role in the discussion as primary stakeholders. Tertiary stakeholders,
finally, are those who are affected but essentially stand aside the discussion so far. 6 The result of the
stakeholder definition is illustrated in Fig. 3.
1. Download high-res image (322KB)
Fig. 2. (1.5 columns): Example of stakeholder sorting according to their answers on different questions.
1. Download high-res image (811KB)
Fig. 3. (doublecolumn): Result of the stakeholder definition.
The applied methodology has proven effective in building a structural outline of the conflict, revealing major
stakeholder groups as they define themselves, as they are − to a large extent − perceived as such in public, and
their principal standing towards the project. However, it is important to have two of its limitations in mind.
Firstly, stakeholder processes are not static but dynamic, and the stakeholdeŕs movements and discourses are
not always coherent and clearly perceptible (Nascimento 2001: 95–97). The study remains therefore on a
structural basis and reflects the situation at the time of its realisation (June–December 2015). Secondly, the
selected interviewees were public representatives, and their representativeness may vary. In general, it
decreases with increasing heterogeneity. Examples of relatively homogeneous stakeholder groups in this case
study are the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Consortium, the Munduruku and the Federal Prosecution
Service. Rather heterogeneous groups are local populations, the fishermen and riverine settlers. Also, there
may be a difference between the heterogeneity of representative bodies and the people they actually claim to
represent. This applies to the Local Businessmen Association, the Social Movements and the Trade Union of
Rural Workers. The MAB, for example, claims to represent all affected people, but its influence is
traditionally stronger within family farmers and rural workers. In the case of the Federal Government, the
Presidency and the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) were both strongly in favour of the project, while
the Ministry of Environment publically expressed some criticism and was therefore categorised in the group
pro with demands.
5. Conflict analysis
The interview analysis revealed a complex conflict situation where different subconflicts can be identified.
Table 3 provides a categorization of these conflicts, their central aspects and the presence or absence of an
incommensurability of values. The following subsections provide an outline of the conflicts.
Table 3. Identified subconflicts and their categorization.
Resettlement
-
With directly
Control over the use of
1 affected Economic survival and Yes
natural resources
communities autonomy
Relation with territory
-
No. Sub-conflict Category Central aspects IoVa
Perception, interpretation
and valorisation of the
nature and rivers
Recognition on land rights,
religious/spiritual values
and traditional knowledge
Consultation (ILO 169)
-
With traditional Environmental and social
3 riverine impacts created by human Economic and cultural Yes
communities activity survival and autonomy
Labour migration
-
On regional socio-
4 – Lack of infrastructure No
economic impacts
-
Increase in crime, diseases,
living costs etc.
Who will benefit from the
5 On energy policy – No
project and from the
generated electricity?
IoV: Incommensurability of Values.
5.1. Directly affected communities
The directly affected communities are those who will suffer physical displacement by the project. According
to the EIA this will affect an estimated 1400 inhabitants (CNEC 2014b: 74). They are the most recognized
affected group and a set of compensation measures is aimed at them. However, many inhabitants may see
their economic survival and autonomy threatened, because the capture and commercialization of ornamental
fish is an important economic activity (CNEC 2014a: Volume 3, 88). It may furthermore include a strong
emotional component (relation with the territory, Poma, 2013) and also an element of incommensurability of
values: How can the social cohesion of a grown community be compensated? Nevertheless, the conflict can
be approached with negotiation, and the conditions are favourable compared to other large hydropower
projects, given the relatively low number of directly affected people.
The first dimension of the conflict with the Munduruku is on the environmental impacts of the dam, as many
of them depend on fishery, the hunting of other animals and drinking water from the Tapajós or tributaries,
and see their economic and cultural survival threatened. Its second dimension is about the perception,
interpretation and valorisation of the nature and rivers. Acuña (2015: 86) calls attention that the cosmology of
Amazonian indigenous tribes and their relationship with nature is fundamentally different than in Western
cultures. This implies also a conflict about the valorisation of knowledge and the perception of risk. Thirdly,
the conflict is on the recognition of land rights and religious values, as the reservoir would flood indigenous
land, including three Munduruku villages (Fearnside 2015c: 375). In May 2016, the Munduruku land “Sawré
Muyby” was officially recognized after a delayed process, and the licensing process of SLT was subsequently
cancelled. Most interviewees who oppose the project argued that SLT was the reason for the delay, as Art.
231 of the Brazilian constitution forbids the removal of indigenous groups from their land. The villages would
be removed by the reservoir, but as long as they were not officially demarcated this did not constitute a legal
obstacle.
The conflict with the Munduruku is to a large extent carried out over the consultation process. The ILO
convention 169, of which Brazil is signatory, foresees a “free, prior and informed” consultation of indigenous
people in projects affecting their lands. This consultation can be understood as a negotiation process in order
to prevent or resolve conflicts. The Munduruku claim that no such process has been realized, whereas the
government argues that it had undertaken many efforts. However, the analysis of the underlying conflict
causes reveals that the main issue for the Munduruku is not the consultation process itself, but the conflict is
articulated in its scope as indigenous people have recognized rights here which they can reclaim.
This conflict is similar to the conflict with the Munduruku, but the cultural and values dimension is weaker.
As fishery is an important food source for many riverine settlers, they are one of the most vulnerable
stakeholders throughout the whole river basin, which is aggravated by the fact that the settlers outside of the
defined areas of impact (the municipalities Itaituba and Trairão, CNEC 2014a: Volume 2, 247–250) are not
recognized as affected. It also calls attention that this stands in sharp contrast to the state supported attempts
to develop ecosystembased comanagement systems with their communities as outlined by McGrath et al.
(2008). The conflict also contains elements of incommensurability of values, albeit weaker than in the case of
the Munduruku. As they do not possess a developed organisational structure, the conflict with the riverine
communities was not very articulated at the time of this study. It may even not break out, although the
problems pertain, or break out later when negative impacts after the construction get visible.
The conflict on regional socioeconomic impacts is of high importance, because: (i) it affects the majority of
the local population, including the traditional but also the urban population; (ii) the effect is aggravated by
other projects in the area; (iii) the conflict cause cannot be tackled by established mitigation measures in
hydropower projects. It is not directly an environmental conflict, but rather about urban infrastructure,
increasing living costs, increase of crime and prostitution etc. Given the local situation, it will however very
likely be a trigger for future socioenvironmental conflicts of the category Control over the use of natural
resources, as the pressure on land, forests, environmental and indigenous protection areas and natural
resources in general increases as a result of largescale migration and the lack of income opportunities.
This conflict is very present in the discourses of the opponents, but also of the local proponents (categorized
in the group “pro with demands”). For the opponents, the regional socioeconomic impacts will be negative,
and they do not see the possibility how this could be mitigated or compensated. The local proponents, on the
other hand, agree that many negative social impacts can be expected, however they think that the problem can
be tackled by improving the planning and taking the regional necessities better into account.
Importantly, this conflict does not contain an element of incommensurability of values, but is a conflict within
one system of valorisation. The local proponents would likely be the primary negotiation partner of the
consortium and the government, because they show a strong willingness and even desire of negotiation. A
negotiation with the opponents on this topic is more difficult because of their fundamental opposition. Hence
an element of confrontation (demonstrations, public campaign etc.) is likely to occur. The scale of this
confrontation will be influenced by the success or failure of the negotiation process with the local proponents.
A fifth conflict identified in the discourse of stakeholders is the conflict on energy policy. It is raised by most
opponents arguing that the present energy policy in Brazil serves only or mainly the interests of privileged
groups. The social movements put most emphasis on it. Their general argument can be situated within the
context of extractivism in the Amazon (see Section 3): The hydropower plant would not serve the local
population, but instead megaprojects for resources extraction and/or the cities far away in the southeast of
Brazil.
The representative of the MAB outlined most clearly the political dimension of this conflict, arguing for a
“new popular energy model”:
This is one of the alternatives. You have to take the dams out of this capitalist model and include them into a
model which serves the workers, which actually serves the countrýs sovereignty, and not the international
capital. This is what has happened here. They build dams to send energy to mining and aluminium companies.
And this energy is exported, in the form of commodities, iron, aluminium, which needs a lot of energy, and
we here stay with the problems.
In sharp contrast to this stands the position of the government, represented by the MME, who answered to the
question who will benefit from the project:
The whole Brazilian population, due to the increase of energy production, which will provide security for the
economic development by more competitive energy prices. The local population will also benefit, through
measures by the entrepreneur pertaining to the environmental licensing, and through governmental programs
which will improve their living conditions.
The conflict on energy policy is not primarily an environmental, but rather a political conflict, transcending
the scope of single projects. It contains a strong ideological component and is not resolvable within the scope
of SLT. Conflicts on specific projects, like SLT, may however be triggers for discussions and modification of
the energy policy.
6. Conclusions
The present study shows the complexity of the socioenvironmental conflicts originated by the SLT
hydropower project, which are aggravated by the presence of traditional populations, implying clashes over
productive systems, and by the fact that the project does not reflect the endogenous development of the area
but is implemented from outside. As discussed in section 3, this kind of development inducement is coherent
with the past decades of policies aimed at the Amazon, and SLT and other hydropower projects can be
understood as a continuation of the cycle of megaprojects and extractivism, as their energy production is
primarily destined to be exported to other regions of Brazil or, as some stakeholder representatives suggest, to
large mining projects.
While the overall conflict when compared with the nine levels of escalation proposed by Glasl (1999) is only
on the lower levels, its complexity and the power disequilibrium make negotiations without mediation highly
unlikely to be successful. The challenge is further aggravated by the fact that different stakeholders’ needs in
regard to the project are distributed throughout very different levels of Maslow (1943)’s hierarchy of needs
and an incommensurability of values is present in three out of five identified subconflicts. While basic needs
like food supply or economic needs in general may be relatively easily compensated, needs linked to a
group’s place or spiritual identity might make compensation possibilities as a basis for negotiation
improbable. The current conflict treatment strategy followed by the state and the involved companies, relying
on compensation as its central element, falls therefore short for two reasons: First, in a project of the size of
SLT, it is unlikely that all negative impacts can be compensated, at least without casting doubt on its
profitability. And second, compensation as such is not able to account for the needs at stake.
Solution must be sought, instead, looking at the underlying conflict causes. Here, the dispute over energy
policy and the recognition of the economic, cultural and spiritual rights of traditional populations are central
aspects. There is no minimal consensus on the energy policy between the proponents and the opponents of the
project. For the latter, the current energy policy serves the interest of economic and political elites, whereas
the local population suffers the impacts. This issue is therefore about a structural, unequal distribution of
benefits and impacts related to energy production in Brazil. The analysis of the historic context in the Amazon
validates the worries of the opponents. As long as the government and the involved companies cannot
convincingly argue that their energy policy has substantially changed and aims now at a fair distribution of
benefits and impacts, negotiations and/or mediations of the conflicts within the project remain necessarily
superficial. The same counts for the recognition of the economic, cultural and spiritual rights of the traditional
populations – especially the Munduruku, but also the riverine settlers. The hitherto behaviour of the
government and associated companies towards this issue suggests rather a repetition of past exclusion
patterns.
Only if these underlying causes are tackled, a robust and comprehensive conflict solution can be found by
negotiation on the different conflicts. That this happens within the suggested project is unlikely. At the time
of this study, the only possible negotiation partner for the government and the consortium were the local
proponents. Although they were not satisfied with the project, they expressed clear demands and their
willingness to negotiate. Regarding the opponents, elements of confrontation are probable if the project
should be carried on in the current or a similar form in the future. As a consequence, political manipulation
and repression would likely be applied.
A restructuring of the energy policy and the approach to traditional populations is therefore a necessary
precondition if robust and comprehensive solutions on the current socioenvironmental conflicts on
hydropower in the Amazon were to be found. This will not solve the existing conflicts, but rather lay the
foundation for possibly fruitful and fair negotiations on the distribution of benefits and impacts. On this basis,
differentiated treatment strategies for the identified conflicts could be approached. The existence of
incommensurabilities of values, however, is likely to persist and has to be taken into account from the
beginning in any conflict treatment strategy.
Disclosure statement
The researcher Christoph Hess received a grant by the Hans Böckler Foundation (HBS) during his master
studies. The HBS did not at any moment in any way influence the research, including the collection, analysis
and interpretation of data, the writing of the report or the decision to submit the article for publication.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Hans Böckler Foundation for the grant during the Master studies. We also
acknowledge Professor Wagner Costa Ribeiro from the University of São Paulo and Professor Silke
Wieprecht from the University of Stuttgart for their support in the research design and analysis. Furthermore,
we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very valuable comments.
The following are Supplementary data to this article:
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1
The term Amazon refers in this article to the Brazilian Amazon region (Legal Amazon), which
includes the territories of the federal states Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia,
Roraima, Tocantins and part of Maranhão.
Large hydropower plants in Brazil are defined as plants with more than 30 MW installed capacity or
a reservoir area greater than 3 km2 (ANEEL 2008: 56).
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis
The applied interview questions as well as a list of the interviewed stakeholder groups can be
consulted in the supplement material.
The complete results of the coding can be consulted in the supplement material.
Naturally, the involvement of stakeholder groups may change over time.