Philosophical assumption

Philosophy of Plant Morphology

Rolf Sattler

It is shown how morphological research is influenced by philosophical assumptions, including

worldviews, and how empirical research may affect these assumptions and worldviews. The following
nine worldviews are examined: essentialism, including phenomenology, mechanism, the fuzzy
worldview (the continuum view), the dynamic worldview (also referred to as contextualism and process
philosophy), holism or the holistic world view (also called organicism), the generating-substance
worldview, animism, mysticism, and perspectivism. Goethe, “the all-embracing Goethe” (Cusset 1982),
embraced all of these worldviews. However, in view of the results of modern morphological research,
molecular genetics and evo-devo (evolutionary developmental biology) Goethe’s essentialism, the claim
that all lateral appendages are “one and the same organ,” seems no longer generally tenable. But his
demonstration of a continuum between lateral appendages and all plant organs including the stem and
root (“Alles is Blatt,” i.e. all is leaf) remains a lasting and important contribution as well as his dynamic
approach that emphasized processes such as expansion and contraction (“Ausdehnen und
Zusammenziehen”), polarization and enhancement (“Steigerung”) in an underlying unity (wholeness). In
general, among Goethe’s great and lasting contributions are his perspectivism, his dynamic and holistic
outlook, his delicate empiricism, and his emphasis of the mysterious (“das Geheimnis,” “das
Unbeschreibliche,” “das Unbegreifbare”). Recognizing the mystery, the challenge of present day
morphology is to develop a holodynamic approach that can adequately cope with the whole diversity of
plant form and in addition to the physical body of plants will also include their subtle bodies or energies
that manifest in auras. When we try to fit all plant forms into mutually exclusive structural categories
such as root, stem, and leaf, we will encounter forms that do not fit (misfits) because they have diverged
too much from the categories. This problem or rather pseudo-problem can be overcome by the
concepts of partial homology, mixed homology, combinatorial homology and a process-morphological
version of the theory of anaphytosis according to which the diversity of plant form is understood in
terms of branching and articulation. Branching means the formation of a new growth center, which may
develop into a shoot or any other structure. It leads to articulation, the formation of articles (called
anaphytes) between the points of branching. If the articles (anaphytes) are understood in terms of
process morphology, we have a modern version of the theory of anaphytosis that can deal dynamically
with the whole diversity of plant form including algae, bryophytes, and vascular plants. There will be no
more misfits because all forms fit if they are understood in terms of branching and articulation. A
unicellular organism or a simple unbranched alga consist only of one article (anaphyte), whereas
branched plants constitute a system of articles (anaphytes). Individual articles as well as a whole system
of articles can be seen as process combinations. This modern process-morphological version of the
theory of anaphytosis may be called peaceful plant morphology because it transcends endless struggles
to force misfits into one or the other category, which entails violence and has often led to animosities
among plant morphologists. Perspectivism can also lead to peaceful reconciliation. Therefore, those
who cannot accept the modern version of the theory of anaphytosis as a satisfactory solution may at
least see it as another perspective on the diversity of plant form. Korzybski’s map analogy explained
through his structural differential, Buddhist and Jaina logic as well as fuzzy logic can be very helpful in
this respect.

Plants appear in myriad forms. Our perception and understanding of these forms (plant morphology) is
influenced by philosophical assumptions and associated worldviews that are more or less projected into
the manifoldness of plant form. On the other hand, our empirical investigations of plant forms may
affect philosophical assumptions and worldviews. Thus, the philosophy of plant morphology examines
the interrelations of philosophy and the empirical study of plant form (see, for example, Arber 1950,
1954). Before dealing with this subject matter, I would like to make a few comments on philosophy of
biology.

Philosophy of Biology

I have taught philosophy of biology for many years and published a book on that subject (Sattler 1986).
When I mention this to people – biologists and laypersons – I get a very common reaction: philosophy
and biology – is there any connection? Many think that since biology is a science it does not need any
philosophy. However, philosophy forms a basis of biology and any other sciences. It seems impossible to
carry out any scientific investigation without philosophical assumptions. These assumptions are often
taken for granted and scientists may not even be aware of them. Therefore, it is one of the tasks of
philosophy of science and biophilosophical investigations to make us aware of these assumptions that
usually are part of a worldview. Unless one is aware of these assumptions and the associated worldview
one cannot evaluate them and perhaps change them if they appear inappropriate and no longer
supported by empirical evidence..

How many worldviews can we distinguish? Different authors have conceptualized them differently. Very
roughly speaking, one might distinguish two major worldviews with regard to science in modern times:
materialistic mechanism and holism. Both have ancient roots, both have numerous versions, and thus
they may overlap. A finer and more comprehensive enumeration of worldviews can, however, be very
helpful.

Pepper (1942/1970) distinguished the following seven worldviews, which he called world hypotheses:
1. The generating-substance hypothesis

2. Animism

3. Mysticism

4. Formism (also called essentialism that plays an important role in phenomenology)

5. Mechanism

6. Contextualism (the dynamic worldview)

7. Organicism (also referred to as holism)

I consider it significant that Pepper referred to these worldviews as world hypotheses. This means that
they can be tested or evaluated by empirical evidence. Hence, they are not immune to change.
Nonetheless, they tend to be very resistant to change for at least two reasons. First, since many or most
scientists are not sufficiently aware of the philosophical assumptions of their research, it seems difficult
or impossible to change them; and second, even if they are aware of their philosophical assumptions,
they may identify so much with them that they will hold on to them even when they are contradicted by
facts. Facts can be ignored or declared erroneous, and they may be theory-laden (see, for example,
Sattler 1986, Chapters 1 and 3), which may lead to what has been called confirmation bias: we select the
facts that support our view and ignore or explain away those that contradict it. It seems that Goethe
was well aware of this problem when he wrote: “he [a scientist] will select from the data a few favorites
that flatter him, he will manage to arrange the rest so that they will not appear to contradict him, and
lastly he will complicate, obscure, and eliminate the hostile data” (Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt
und Subjekt (written 1793, published 1823), translated by Mueller 1989, p. 224).

To give you one example, let’s briefly look at mainstream biology. What is the underlying worldview of
mainstream biology? It is a materialistic mechanistic worldview, which means that a living system
consists of material components that interact in a mechanistic way. Although this worldview has been
successful in explaining many biological phenomena, it has limitations. Unfortunately, these limitations
are not sufficiently recognized by most mainstream biologists because to a great extent mechanism has
become a dogma – like a religious dogma – that is tenaciously defended. Since similar dogmatic
tendencies exist also in other sciences, Feyerabend (2011) considered science a form of religion. I would
call it a pseudo-religion. Sheldrake (2012), although he thinks that in principle science can be set free,
showed how much mainstream science has become a belief system. He provided much evidence that
contradicts this belief system, evidence that is in better agreement with the worldviews of
contextualism and holism. Fortunately, there are scientists who can see beyond the dogma of
mainstream science, who can practice science in an open-minded way.

Philosophy of Plant Morphology

I shall now examine the philosophy of plant morphology in terms of Pepper’s seven world hypotheses
(worldviews) plus two additional worldviews: perspectivism and the fuzzy worldview (the continuum
view) that could also be considered a version of organicism (the holistic worldview). I shall show how
plant form is perceived and understood differently depending on the worldview implied. And I shall
indicate how empirical morphological research affects these worldviews. Empirical research spans the
whole range from gross empiricism to Goethe’s delicate or tender empiricism, which, as Goethe put it,
“makes itself utterly identical with the object” (Goethe 1998).

Essentialism (including Phenomenology)

Essentialism and phenomenology (that implies essentialism) claim that the world, including plant
morphology, is a manifestation of essences (ideas or ideal forms). Most plant morphologists don’t talk
about it explicitly, but they often use mutually exclusive categories that may imply essences such as
root, stem (caulome), and leaf (phyllome). Then the whole morphological diversity is forced into these
categories. This becomes obvious when a structure is encountered that does not fit. Even in that case
the question is asked: Does it belong to this or that category? Which may mean: Is it essentially this or
that? For example, for hundreds of years, essentialist morphologists have asked whether phylloclades
are shoot, stem or leaf homologues, whether they are essentially shoots, stems or leaves (see Cooney-
Sovetts and Sattler 1987).

Conclusions

Looking back at Pepper’s seven worldviews, we can see that essentialism and mechanism, although in
one way very different, have in common that they fragment the world in terms of entities and
categories. In contrast, the other five worldviews emphasize wholeness: contextualism (the dynamic
worldview) and holism may be even subsumed under a holodynamic worldview; Anaximander’s
generating-substance hypothesis and mysticism point to the unnamable, and animism can be
understood in different ways most of which imply wholeness and holiness. Perspectivism seems all-
inclusive as it acknowledges the different worldviews as different perspectives on reality.

https://beyondwilber.ca/about/plant-morphology/philosophy-of-plant-morphology.html