Professional Documents
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Law:
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated
in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.”177 It must be clarified, however, that since
the restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function
which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post– enactment–measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget”
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced
to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would
be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed]
state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.”
Conclusion:
YES it is unconstitutional.