21.
) Sarmiento vs Mison
GR L-79974
Abrogueña, Aubrey EM
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Department of Budget
from disbursing payments for Mison’s salaries. Petitioners question the
constitutionality of the appointment of Mison because it was not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Respondents
maintain constitutionality of the appointment based on Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison is constitutional
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition saying that the
President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation. Mison, therefore, is entitled the full
authority and functions of the office and receive all salaries pertaining
thereto.
The decision is based on the President’s power to appoint as
stated in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The President
can appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel to naval captain
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him; (2) all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank for whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is
clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The rest of the groups do not need confirmation. It is an
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. It
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated
in the first group require consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Legislative history can also be used if additional study of this
provision is to be done. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of Congress. Given the stated two extremes, the 1987
Constitution struck a “middle-ground” by requiring the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group and leaving to the
President without such confirmation the appointment of the other
officers.
22.) Perfecto v. Meer
(GR L-2348, 27 February 1950)
DIGAMON, Hariette
FACTS:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this
Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that
the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members
of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office". It also provides that "until Congress
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
Associate Justice, fifteen. thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice
Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by
fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution, i. e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of
Justice Perfecto in 1946 amounts to a diminution.
RULING:
The imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto
amounts to a diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no
excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution,
whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that
they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a
violation of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that unless the Legislature approves an
amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing “that salaries of
judges thereafter appointed”, salaries of judges are not included in the
word “income” taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two circumstances are
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines 13, taxable “income” did not include salaries of judicial
officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the
prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to
have been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved in 1935 the prohibition against
diminution of the judges’ compensation, the Federal principle was
known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
23.) Endencia v David
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953
Trinidad, Kevin
Facts:
This is a joint petition ordering the appellant Saturnino David as
Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia
the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his
salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, represent-ing the
income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19,
1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20,
1950 to December 31, 1950. Prior to this case, The SC in Perfecto vs Meer
ruled, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a
diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of
appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590.
Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution:
Sec. 9 The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age
of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. They shall receive such compensation as may he fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
Republic Act No. 590:
Sec. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 590 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Citing the of Bandy vs Mickelson, “Defining and interpreting
the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or
restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution." The
legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax not a
decrease of salary. Under our system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws.
The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this
au-thority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Con-stitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not,
it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law,
but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then
the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
24.) Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(GR L-78780, 23 July 1987)
DEMAFILES, Emmelie
Facts:
The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the fiscal
management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of
withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
en banc of December 4, 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualifies judges presiding
over branches 52,19, and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital
Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the
court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial
pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.
Issue:
Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
to exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935
Constitution.
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
In this case, the salaries of the members of the Judiciary are
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although,
such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the 1987 Constitution. The deliberation of the 1986
Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the
framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of
salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto vs Meer and
Endencia vs David do not apply anymore. Justices and Judges are not
only the citizen whose income has been reduced in accepting service
in government yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other members and all other employees.
What is provided for by the Constitution is the salaries of Judges
may not be decreased during their continuance of office. They have fix
salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of
Congress, but he salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general
income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
25.) GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs. JUAN RUIZ
(G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937)
ATUP, Joan
Facts:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of
Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling said postage stamps.
It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the
provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support
of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the
principle of separation of church and state.
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of
Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act
No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. The Act appropriates the sum of
sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government".
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress .
HELD:
No constitutional infraction in the case at bar.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it
gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when
the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government."
The phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the
use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter
of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people."
It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location
of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, receive[1]d by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government.
26.) Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance
System
Ferrer, Ritz Klaire
FACTS:
GSIS, pursuant to privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) offered to buy 51% of
the MHC at P41.58 per share while Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
offered to buy said shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than MPH.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as winning bidder, MPH sent
a letter to GSIS to match the bid price at P44.00 with a managers check
for P33 million. MPH, meanwhile, filed to the court for a temporary
restraining order to prohibit the sale of shares to the Malaysian firm. MPH
invokes Sec. 10 (2) of Art XII of the 1987 Constitution citing that MHC has,
to all intents and purposes, become a part of the national patrimony
and as such, MPH’s bid should be preferred over that of the Malaysian
firm. GSIS, however, contended that (1) Sec. 10 (2) Art XII of the 1987
Constitution is not a self-executing provision hence, it requires
implementing legislations for said provision to operate and (2) If it is a
self-executing provision, Manila Hotel do not fall under the term national
patrimony.
ISSUE:
1. WON Sec. 10 (2) Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision
2. If said provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel is
considered a part of the term national patrimony
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10 (2) Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision. The Court held that “unless it is expressly provided that
a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing”. Moreover, said provision is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non
self-executing. But, legislature is not precluded from enacting
laws of minor details without impairing the self-executing nature
of the constitutional provisions. Sec. 10 (2) Art XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself; it is per se judicially enforceable.
 2. Yes. Manila Hotel is considered a part of the term national
patrimony. The SC ruled that “when the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Hence, Manila Hotel, as it had become a landmark – a
living testimony of Philippine heritage – for more than 8 decades
of its existence” is considered part of the national patrimony.
65.) Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of
Customs
(G.R. No. L-30264)
Aradanas, Sittie Akima
FACTS:
Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of
wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects
from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the
bearings of the wheel. Under par. 141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909,
manufacturers of wool, not otherwise provided for are subject to 40%
ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehicles
for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are
subject to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs
classified dust shields as “manufacturers of wool, not otherwise
provided for.” Upon appeal, however, the CFI overruled the decision
and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on
railways.
ISSUE:
Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of
wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
HELD:
Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached
parts of vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation
of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear
import of the language used. In case of doubt, they should be
construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen.
And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a
general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative,
and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language as are not within the provisions of the particular
enactment.
66.) POLICARPIO ALMEDA vs JULIAN FLORENTINO
December 21, 1965 G.R. No. L-23800
ATUP, Joan
Republic Act No. Constitution and organization of the Municipal Board —
183, the charter Compensation of members thereof. — The Municipal Board shall
of Pasay (formerly be the legislative body of the city and shall be composed of one
Rizal) City Mayor, who shall be its presiding officer, the Vice-Mayor, who
(enacted June shall be ex-officio councilor when not acting as Mayor, and
21, 1947), seven councilors, who shall be elected at large by popular vote
provides in its during every election for provincial and municipal officials in
Section 12 conformity with the provisions of the Election Code. In case of
sickness, absence, suspension or temporary disability of any
member of the Board, or if necessary to maintain a quorum, the
President of the Philippines may appoint a temporary substitute
who shall possess all the rights and perform all the duties of a
member of the Board until the return to duty of the regular
incumbent.
If any member of the Municipal Board should be a candidate
for office in any election, he shall be disqualified to act with the
Board in the discharge of the duties conferred upon it relative to
election matters, and in such case the other members of the
Board shall discharge said duties without his assistance, or they
may choose some disinterested elector of the city to act with
the Board in such matters in his stead.xxx
Section 14, SEC. 14. Appointment, salary and duties of Secretary of
paragraph 1, of Board. —The Board hall have a secretary who shall be
Republic Act 183 appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the
members thereof. The compensation of the secretary shall
be fixed by ordinance approved by the Secretary of the
Interior, at not exceeding three thousand six hundred pesos
per annum. A vacancy in the office of the secretary shall be
filled temporarily for the unexpired term in like manner.
June 18, 1960, SEC. 12. Constitution and organization of the Municipal Board
Republic Act No. — Compensation of members thereof. — xxx
2709 amended The Vice-Mayor shall appoint all the employees of the Board
Section 12 par 2 who may be suspended or removed in accordance with law,
of Republic Act and shall approve the payroll of the said employees.
183 xxx

On the strength of paragraph 2 of section 12 of the Pasay City
Charter, as amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed
appellant Almeda, as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City, on
January 1, 1964. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize
appellant as its secretary, and in turn appointed respondent-appellee
Julian Florentino to the position, purportedly under section 14 of the City
Charter. Hence, the quo warranto proceeding.
Issue: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the
Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City, the amendatory
Republic Act No. 2709 or the original charter, Republic Act 183?
HELD: There is nothing in Rep. Act 2709 that indicates any intention on
the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the
provisions of section 14 of the Pasay City charter (Rep. Act No. 183)
regarding the appointment of its secretary by the Municipal Board.
67.) Laxamana vs Baltazar
(G.R. No. L-5955, 19 September 1952)
Manalac, Glanery Anne P.
Facts:
In July 1952, the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended. The
vice-mayor, Jose T. Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of
Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the
provincial governor, acting under Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election
Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed
Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the
corresponding official oath.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision in the Revised Administrative Code was
repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised Election Code.
Held:
SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of
the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-
Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the
highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. —
Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the
same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a provincial
or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the
Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180, the Revised Election
Code.
No. The Supreme Court held that the provision in the Revised
Administrative Code was not repealed by the subsequent provision of
the Revised Election Code.
Section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor,
must prevail over the general terms of Section 21 (a) as to vacancies of
municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, Section 2195 may be
deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.
"Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another
deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two
should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter
will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general
statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)
Thus, the SC held that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended,
absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the
vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
68.) Butuan Sawmill vs. City of Butuan
(GR L-21516, 29 April 1966)
BLAH, Wafirah
FACTS:
Butuan Sawmill was granted a legislative franchise under
Republic Act No. 399, for an electric light, heat and power system at
Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions
established in Act 3636. It was also issued a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission.
Ordinances No. 7, 11, 131 and 148 impose a 2% tax on the gross
sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power.
Ordinance No. 104 provides penalty of fine and imprisonment for any
person, firm or entity to cut or disconnect electric wire or wires
connecting the electric power plant for any franchise holder or
electricity supplying current with any consumer in the City of Butuan
without the consent of the said consumer except in cases of fire or when
there is a clear and positive danger to the lives and properties of the
residents in the community, or upon order by the proper authorities.
The stand of the City of Butuan is that the franchise of the Butuan
Sawmill is subject to “amendment, alteration or repeal by the National
Assembly..” as per Section 12 of Act 3636, as amended; that the City is
empowered under its charter to “provide for the levy and collection of
taxes for general and special purposes”; and that its taxing power was
enlarged and extended by the Local Autonomy Law; and that all said
statutory enactment gave the city the authority to impose the 2% tax
on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and
power of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
Butuan Sawmill disputes the constitutionality of the taxing
ordinance, as one that impairs the obligation of contract, its franchise
being a contract, and deprives it of property without due process of
law. It also maintains that the said ordinances are ultra vires and void.
Hence, the direct appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all said statutory enactment gave the city the
authority to impose the 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the
business of electric light, heat and power of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
RULING:
Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the
franchised business of Butuan Sawmill Inc by the City of Butuan within
the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad
power of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power
therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to
amend or alter the franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor
specifically provide any such power. The franchise was granted by act
of the legislature before the approval of the city’s charter.
“Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later
general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other
is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as
remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case.”
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to
tax the franchised business of the petitioner-appellee. Its pertinent
provision states:
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all
chartered cities ... shall have authority to impose municipal
license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation
or business ... Provided, however, That no city, municipality or
municipal district may levy or impose any of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks, irrigation and other
public utilities except electric light, heat and power.
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies, and
persons paying franchise tax.
The argument of the appellant city is that, under subparagraph
(d) of the above-quoted provision, the business of electric light, heat
and power, being an exception to those which it cannot tax (like
waterworks and irrigation), is within the city's taxing power. This
argument is untenable, because (1) subparagraph (j) of the same
section specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying
franchise tax (like appellee herein), and (2) the city's interpretation of
the provision would result in double taxation against the business of the
appellee because the internal revenue code already imposes a
franchise tax. The logical construction of section 2(d) of Republic Act
2264, that would not nullify section 2(j) of the same Act, is that the local
government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are not
subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes
additional taxation by cities or municipalities.

69.) Arayata vs. Joya
51 Phil 654
NERVES, Emma Concepcion P.
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased
parents the right of lease to six lots of the friar lands. When the Insular
Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease
in accordance with the provisions the law. While married to the herein
plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing,
on installments, from the Government. As the number of lots which a
purchaser could acquire under the law was limited, two were excluded
and put up for sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro
Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds.
Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio
Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of
Lands and noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio Joya conveyed his
right to Florentino Joya for a cnsideration said conveyance having
been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper
registry book. Cecilio Joya then conveyed his right Marcelina Joya and
Francisco Joya for a consideration, conveyance having been
approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry
book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lots to
Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, to the
brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla,
and Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio
Joya had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots
mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question
except 1 lot are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their
products
On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his
executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for
probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated
after the proper proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the
testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an
alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was
disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff’s opposition, who
alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a general law may prevail over a special law
embracing for the same subject matter.
Whether the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not
fully paid the purchase price may transfer and convey his rights.
RULING:
In order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of
sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal
certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law
authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a
certificate of sale of friar lands. It provides, however, that in case of the
death of said holder, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to receive
the title to the land, upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
If, as it was held in the aforecited case of Jocson vs. Soriano, the right
conferred by Act No. 1120 on the holder of a certificate of sale of friar
lands in similar to that conferred on the holder of a “homestead,” and
if the latter has no right to dispose of said certificate by will to the
prejudice of his surviving spouse and for his children then by analogy,
the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands cannot dispose of his
rights to said lands by will to the prejudice of his widow and children.
The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal property cannot
be applied in this case, as was done by the trial court, because the law
regulating the acquisition, disposition, and transmission of rights to the
friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, lays down rules in
conflict with the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code; and as the said
Code is of a general character, while Act No. 1120 is a special law, the
latter should prevail.
70.) CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA
G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
Cafe, Joshoa Emmanuel D.
Facts:
Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was trying to board a
jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur medical expenses.
Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing
the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA,
except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced
to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal
for certiorari by the City of Manila.
Issue:
WON the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident
happened on a NATIONAL highway.
Ruling:
Yes, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
The question to be determined is if the present case is governed by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila)
reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal
Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter,
or any other law or ordinance, or from the negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the
City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to
the entire Philippines.
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think,
correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or injury to
persons or property … Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by any person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.”
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to “defective streets,” in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were due to the defective
condition of a street which is “under the supervision and control” of the
City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged
that “the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept
in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers” who
“have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.“ Thus,
the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under
its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its MR of the decision
of the CA . Such an assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which
had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for
the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of
the appellate court, in a motion for reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street
or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway,
this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its “control or
supervision” by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact
Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other
public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets
and public places; . . . … the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and
drains, and all structures in and under the same …to provide for and
regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . … and regulate the
use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; … to regulate the lights used on
all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not
subject to our review.
71.) David vs COMELEC
271 SCRA 90 (1997)
Catapang, Joraine Vincent C.
Facts:
In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa
Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on December 2, 1996 a petition
for prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also
filed a petition docketed as G.R. No. 128039 to seek a judicial review by
certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160;
(2) COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the
holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities
related thereto; and,(3) The budgetary appropriation of P400 million
contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General Appropriations Act of
1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997
barangay elections.
The two above petitions were raised with their contention that
under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years.
Although the Local Government Code reduced the term of office of all
local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to
barangay officials. thus, there is a legal standing to petition the Court to
order the cancellation of the scheduled barangay election on May 12,
1997 and to reset it to the second Monday of May 1999.
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges
the Court to deny the petitions.
Issues:
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate
issue: “How long is the term of office of barangay officials?” For this
case, three issues shall be entertained in relation hereof.
1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA
7160 or RA 6679?
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that
provided under RA 7160?
Ruling:
1. RA 7160 shall govern the term of office of barangay officials in
which the term shall be for 3 years. There is a clear legislative
intent and design to limit term to three years as the RA 7160
was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
prevails as in the maxim, Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant.
On the contentions of constitutionality of the issues discussed on
the two aforesaid petitions, the Court held that, “In enacting the
general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the
amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of
barangay elections that year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189,
Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be
held “immediately after the barangay elections in 1997.” These
are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress
that barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance
with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of
office of barangay officials was fixed at three (3) years which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
 second Monday of May 1994. This provision is clearly inconsistent
with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such
term shall be for five years. Note that both laws refer to the same
officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994.
This had been supported by a judicial decision in the case of
Paras vs. COMELEC wherein the Court said “the next regular
election involving the barangay office concerned is barely 7
months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997.”
This judicial decision is “part of the legal system of the Philippines
(NCC 8)” which shall be take precedence on future construction
such as the case at bar.
Moreover, RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
applies to local government units. It specifically and definitively
provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the term of office of barangay
officials shall be for three years.” It is a special provision that
applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected
on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the
provision cannot be deemed a general law.
2. Yes. The (3) three-year term is not repugnant to the Constitution
as the Constitution itself did not expressly prohibit Congress from
fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the
determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers
full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies
of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. The petitioners have
miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
3. Yes. Petitioners are estopped from challenging their three-year
terms. In this case, however,petitioners propose to extend their
terms not by seeking the peoples vote but by faulty legal
argumentation. Nonetheless, the Court cannot and will not grant
its imprimatur to such untenable proposition as the barangay
officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that
which they ran for and were elected to, under the law
governing their very claim to such offices. Petitioners’ belated
claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to
office in 1994 is unacceptable because under New Civil Code,
Article 3, “ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.”
Wherefore, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of
merit.
77) Tac-an vs. CA
137 SCRA 803
Education, Kathleen B.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Felipe G. Tac-An, is a lawyer whose services were
engaged by the brothers Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximino Acopiado
who were accused of frustrated murder and theft of large cattle.
Tac-An caused a document entitled, "Deed of Quitclaim"
whereby for the sum of P1,200.00, his lawyer fees for criminal cases, the
Acopiado brothers' conveyed to him a parcel of land with an area of
three hectares. However, two days after the execution of the deed, the
Acopiados terminated Tac-an's services because their wives and
parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services.
The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Tac-An, however,
the Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An but held
that for his services in the criminal cases he was entitled to the agreed
upon amount of P1,200.00. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that
the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians, more specifically Subanons,
and that each is married to a Subanon; and, because they are Non-
Christians, the Court of Appeals applied Section 145 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements of Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu still required even if it was repealed on June 19,
1965 by Republic Act No, 4252 ?
HELD:
Suffice it to say that at times material to the case, i.e. when the
Deed of Quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial
Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Sections 145
and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full
force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the
repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. It should also be
stated that the land in question must be presumed to be conjugal in
nature and since the spouses of the Acopiado brothers did not consent
to its transfer to the petitioner, the transaction was at least voidable.

81.) DE CASTRO V. JBC
(G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)
BIRREY, Cherie
Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of
the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to
resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of
nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue
that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to
cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the
principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred
in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article
VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban
on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art.
VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted
from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern
either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a
provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court.
The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to
vacancies in the Supreme Court.
82.) Chavez v JBC
(G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012)
Suansing, Angel Rose
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees
for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato
Corona’s departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional
Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith,
Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the
ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially
altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established,
the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby
allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The
phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on
July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners
were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC;
that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would
deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2)
representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render
JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two
(2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against
the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress
to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution.
As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where
the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph
1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word
or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which
it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must
be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word
or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that
the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred
to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is
plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as
records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the
Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that
it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated
in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
84.) Lahom vs. Sibulo
(GR 143989, 14 July 2002)
PAGKALINAWAN, April Joy
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him
up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption,
and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas
and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior
to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a
petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998,
wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative,
whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING:
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA
8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and
repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into
force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of
the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the
right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The
concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest, which
in right reason, and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given
by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been
exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in
cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those
caught in the law have to live with.
85.) Erector’s, Inc vs. NLRC
(GR L-71177, 29 February 1988)
Mulato, John Paolo
Facts:
Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in Saudi
filed a case with the POEA in 1984 on grounds of illegal termination of
his contract of employment with the petitioner, Erector’s Inc.
The petitioner contended that the private respondent already
estopped from questioning the legality of his termination as he already
voluntarily and freely received his termination pay. But POEA ruled
adverse to the petitioner and require the latter to pay P7,166.66 to
Danilo. The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25,
1984. Fifteen (15) days later or on November 9, 1984, the petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. It is treated as an
appeal but was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner alleged that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case that during the 15-day period, only 10
are working days and 5 are non-working holidays. It cited 2 provisions
of the 1984 POEA Rules and Procedures that qualifies the petitioner to
be granted motion for reconsideration for complying the 10-working
day requirement.
Issue:
Whether of not the petitioner may invoke the 1984 POEA Rules
and Procedures to grant them to file a motion for reconsideration.
Held:
No. Section 1 of Book VII, Rule 5, of the 1984 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employees stated that “the aggrieved party
may, within 10 Calendar days from receipt of the decision, order or
resolution file a motion for reconsideration which shall specify in detail
the particular errors and objections, otherwise the decision shall be
final and executor.
The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and
precise that there is no necessity to interpret it. Not even the Secretary
of Labor has the power to amend or alter in any material sense
whatever the law itself unequivocably specifies or fixes.
It is therefore obvious that the counsels for the petitioners
deliberately tried and mislead this court if only to suit their client’s ends.
Hence, the decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
86.) LAMBINO vs COMELEC
G.R NO. 174153
Guelos, Kristen Joan P.
FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for
an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a
petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec.
5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the
petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give
it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an
amendment or revision
HELD :
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving
the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment
and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is
also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision
of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the
change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years
to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60%
is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college
degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is
an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of
sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision
being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure
of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within
the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence
of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls
the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological
basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several

provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake
only amendments and not revisions.