Republic v. Molina, G.R. No.

108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3) he
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. When Reynaldo was relieved from his job, Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of
her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference. RTC declared the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established

HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics
that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel
merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not
shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition,
the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity)

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.

Republic v. Manalo G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed
a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and
Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate
as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.
Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce
proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such
interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that
even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not
be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection
clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is
shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one
undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection
from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that
the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, GR NO. 141528, 2006-10-31

Facts:
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order
No.
209... the RTC denied the petition in a decision[2] dated November 11, 1997... upon the
finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the
relief he is seeking."
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12,
1999 another petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City,
this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and... void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Issues:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family
Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the
ground... of a party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause
of action.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had... been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason,
the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
lack of... marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC,
Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Principles:
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. I
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity,
which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)...
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and
prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the... preservation of
the public tranquility and happiness
On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness
of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that
issues actually and... directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the... merits; and (4) there is -- between the
first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same,
and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action