Article IV this Constitution;

Citizenship (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
Citizenship (4) Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
 Membership in a political community which is personal and more or less
permanent in character.

A. Citizens by election
Citizenship Nationality
Membership in a political community Membership in a class or form of Procedure:
which is personal and more or less political community. 1) Expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by the party concerned
permanent in character.  Thus, nationals may be before any official authorized to administer oaths;
citizens. 2) Filed with the nearest Civil Registry;
Nationality does not necessarily include 3) Accompanied with the Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and the
the right to exercise civil or political government.
rights.
Time: Within 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
 Exception: When there is justifiable reason for the delay.
Usual Modes of acquiring citizenship: BNM
1) By birth:
a) Jus sanguinis  Applies only to legitimate children.
 By blood.  If an illegitimate child of a foreign father and Filipino mother,
 Used in the Philippines. Filipino upon birth.
b) Jus soli  The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
 Where born. exercises constitute positive act of electing Philippine citizenship.
2) By naturalization.
3) By marriage.
(1) Co v. House Electoral Tribunal - 199 SCRA 692

GR: Res judicata does not ordinarily apply to questions of citizenship.
 Exceptions:
1) When a person’s citizenship is resolved by a court or an
administrative body as a material issue in the controversy after
a full-blown hearing;
2) With the active participation of the OSC or his representative;
3) Finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the SC.
 Jose Ong, Jr. won the 2nd Congressional seat in Northern Samar.
However, an election protest filed against him.
 One of the contentions was that he was not a Filipino citizen.
 HRET declared that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
Issue: Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion

Held: No. Ong is a Filipino citizen. Ong’s father married a natural born Filipina.
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: Section 2 Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of reaching the age of majority. The grandfather of Ong is an immigrant from China

1
who resided in Samar. He was recognized as a subject of Spain under the Spanish
Civil Code. The Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided for a mass naturalization
made him a Filipino citizen.
To expect Ong to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary because he is already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only 9 years old. Election can be both a formal and
informal process. In one case, the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. Ong did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.
Also, attack on one’s citizenship may be made only through a direct, not a collateral
proceeding.
(2) In re Ching - 316 SCRA 1
D: The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citi-zenship should be made; The phrase
“reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
 In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of majority,” Ching’s
election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege.
 Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born on 11 April 1964.
 Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On 17 July 1998,
Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.
 In a Resolution of the Court, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship.
 Ching submitted the following documents: a certification showing that he
is a CPA, Voter Certification, Certification showing that Ching was elected
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
 On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees.
 However Ching was not allowed to take his oath because of the
questionable status of his citizenship.
I: Can Ching a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years
after he has reached the age of majority?
NO. Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625
which was enacted pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. The
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to
the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted
to mean that the election should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of
majority. In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen 14 years after he had reached the age of
majority.
(3) Vilando v. HRET – G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23,
2011.
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision[1] of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and
declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong(Limkaichong) to be
qualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the
First District of Negros Oriental and its Resolution dated May 17, 2010,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
 Petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as
registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate
petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These
2
 petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent.
 Ps averred that she was born to Julio Sy, Chinese whose naturalization
had not attained finality, and to a mother who became Chinese when she
married Julio Sy.
 Limkaichong contends that the naturalization of her father was regular
and had already attained the status of res judicata and collateral attack is
not allowed. HRET dismissed the petitions for lack of merit hence this
petition for certiorari.
I: Is Limkaichong disqualified as representative of the 1st district of Negros
Oriental?
Held: No she is Not disqualified. Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto
petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs
father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is
devoid of merit.
 In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground
that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to
the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father
which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack
on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised
by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens
descendant.
 Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the
subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid,
Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having
been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached majority age.
 Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship,
respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time
of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in
barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters
affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of
La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of
Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how
election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a
definite choice.
 We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January
17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens
of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the
1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3),
Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen,
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-
born status.
 Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an
indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. Thus, obtaining
an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of
her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that
an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is
not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship.[24] For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express.[25] Such express renunciation is lacking in this
case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can
transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Naturalization
 Act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him with the privileges of a citizen.
Modes:
A. Direct
 Citizenship is acquired by:
1) Individual, through judicial or administrative
proceedings;
2) Special act of legislature;
3) Collective change of nationality as a result of
cession or subjugation;
4) In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as
nationals of the State where they are born.
B. Derivative
 Citizenship conferred on:
1) Wife of naturalized husband;
3
 2) Minor children of naturalized person;
3) Alien woman upon marriage to a national.
Doctrine of indelible allegiance
 An individual may be compelled to retain his original nationality even if
he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the 2nd State
whose nationality he has acquired.
3 Ways by which an alien may become a citizen:
1) Judicial naturalization under CA 473
 Qualifications:
1) Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the
hearing of the petition;
2) Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period
of not less than 10 years;
o But may be reduced to 5 years, if he:
a) Honorably held office in
government;
b) Established a new industry or
introduced a useful invention in
the Philippines;
c) Married to a Filipino woman;
d) Been engaged as a teacher in the
Philippines for a period not less
than 2 years.
3) Good moral character
a) Believes in the principles
underlying the Constitution;
b) Conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his
residence here in his relations
with constituted government and
community.
4) Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than P5,000 or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation;
5) Speak and write English or Spanish any of the
principal Philippine languages;
6) Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of
the public or private schools recognized by the
government where Philippine history, government
and civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum during the entire period of residence
required prior to the hearing.
 Disqualifications:
1) Opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
2) Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success or predominance of their ideas;
3) Polygamists or believers in polygamy;
4) Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5) Suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease;
6) Who, during period of residence, have not mingled
socially with Filipinos or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
7) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;
8) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
 Procedure:
1) Filing of declaration of intention 1 yr prior to the
filing of petition with the OSG.
o Exempt:
a) Born in the Philippines and have
received primary and secondary
education in public or private
schools recognized by the
government and not limited to
any race or nationality;
b) Resided in the Philippines for 30
years or more before the filing of
the petition and enrolled his
children in elementary and high
schools recognized by the
4
 government and not limited to
any race or nationality;
c) Widow and minor children of an
alien who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines and dies before he
is actually naturalized.
2) Filing of the petition, accompanied by the affidavit
of 2 credible persons, citizens of the PH, who
personally know petitioner as character witnesses.
3) Publication of the petition.
o Requisites:
a) Petition and notice of hearing
must be published;
b) Publication must be made once a
week for 3 consecutive weeks in
the OG and in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province
where the applicant resides;
c) Posted in the office of the clerk of
court or in the building where
office is located;
d) Actual residence in the Philippines
during the entire proceedings;
e) Hearing of the petition;
f) Promulgation of the decision;
g) Hearing after 2 years and show
that during the 2 year probation
period, applicant has:
1. Not left the
Philippines;
2. Dedicated himself
continuously to a
lawful calling or
profession;
3. Not been convicted of
any offense or
violation of rules;
4. Not committed an act
prejudicial to the
interest of the nation
or contrary to any
government-
announced policies.
4) Oath-taking and issuance of Certificate of
Naturalization
 Effects:
1) Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be
lawfully naturalized;
2) Minor children born in the Philippines before the
naturalization shall be considered citizens of the
Philippines;
3) Minor children born outside the Philippines
residing in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization shall be considered Filipino citizen.
4) Minor children born outside the PH before parent’s
naturalization shall be considered Filipino citizens
only during minority unless he begins to
permanently reside in the Philippines;
5) Child born outside the parent’s naturalization shall
be considered a Filipino, provided that he registers
as such before any PH consulate within 1 year from
attaining majority age and takes the oath of
allegiance.
Denaturalization
 Grounds:
1) Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently
or illegally;
2) If within 5 years, he returns to his native country or
to some foreign country and establishes residence
there.
o 1 year in native country or 2years in foreign
country is prima facie evidence of intent to
take up residence there.
3) Petition made on invalid declaration of intention;
4) Minor children failed to graduate through the fault
of the parents either by neglecting to support them
or by transferring them to another school;
5) Allowed himself to be used as a dummy.
 Effects:
1) If ground affects intrinsic validity:
5
 o Also divest wife and children.
2) If ground was personal:
o Wife and children shall retain Philippine
citizenship.
2) Administrative naturalization under RA 9139
 Covers native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought
they were Filipinos, who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to Filipino customs and traditions.
 Intent: To make process of acquiring PH citizenship less tedious,
less technical, and more encouraging.
 Special Committee on Naturalization
o Composition:
1. Solicitor General as chairman;
2. Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his
representative;
3. National Security Adviser.
o Power to approve, deny, or reject applications under
RA 9139.
 Qualifications:
1) Born in the PH and residing here since birth;
2) Not less than 18 years of age at the time of filing
his petition;
3) Of good moral character and believes in the
underlying principles of the Constitution and must
have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire period of
residence in the PH in his relations with the duly
constituted government and community;
4) Received primary and secondary education in any
public school or private educational institution duly
recognized by the DECS where PH history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as
part of the school curriculum and where
enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality
provided that should he have minor children of
school age, he must have enrolled them in similar
schools;
5) Have a known trade, business, profession, or lawful
occupation from which he derives income
sufficient for his support and that of his family;
6) Able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines;
7) Mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs and
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
 Disqualifications – same as CA 473
1) Opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
2) Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success or predominance of their ideas;
3) Polygamists or believers in polygamy;
4) Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5) Suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease;
6) Who, during period of residence, have not mingled
socially with Filipinos or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
7) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;
8) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
 Procedure:
1) Filing with the Special Committee on Naturalization
of a petition;
2) Publication of pertinent portions of the petition
once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation, with copies
thereof posted in any public or conspicuous area,
furnished the DFA, Bureau of Immigration, Civil
Registrar of petitioner’s residence and NBI;
6
 3) Committee shall within 60 days from receipt of
report of agencies, consider and review all
information;
4) Approve or deny petition;
5) Within 30 days from approval of petition, applicant
shall pay to the Committee a fee of P100,000 then
take the oath of allegiance and a certificate of
naturalization shall issue;
6) Within 5 days after oath of allegiance, Bureau of
Immigration shall forward a copy of the oath to the
proper LCR and cancel alien certificate of
registration.
 Wife and children:
o After approval, wife and minor children may file a
petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration with the Committee subject to payment
of fees. But if the applicant is a married woman, her
approval does not benefit her alien husband but shall
benefit minor children.
 Grounds for Cancellation of Certificate of Naturalization:
1) Made any false statement or misrepresentation or
committed any violation of law, rules and
regulations in connection with the petition or if he
obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or
illegally;
2) If within 5 years, he shall establish permanent
residence in another country;
3) Allowed himself or his wife or child with acquired
citizenship to be used as dummy;
4) If he, his wife or child with acquired citizenship
commits any act inimical to national security.
3) Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippines citizenship to an alien.
 Discretionary.
 Alien who has made outstanding contributions to the country.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided
by law.
A. Loss of citizenship
1) Naturalization in a foreign country;
 Modified by RA 9225
a) All Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship;
b) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Philippines;
c) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their PH citizenship
upon taking the oath;
d) Unmarried child, legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below 18years old of those who acquire
PH citizenship upon the effectivity of this Act shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines;
e) Those who retain or reacquire PH citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
under existing laws of the PH and the following
conditions:
1. Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements of
Sec 1 Art V, RA 9189 Overseas Absentee
Voting Act, and other existing laws;
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.
7
 2. Those seeking elective public office shall
meet the qualifications for holding such
public office and, at the time of the filing of
certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
 Mere filing of COC is not
sufficient.
3. Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the PH and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of
office provided that they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath;
4. Those intending to practice their profession
in the PH shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice;
5. The right to vote or be elected or appointed
to any public office cannot be exercised or
extended to those who:
a. Candidates for or are occupying
any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized
citizens;
b. In active service as commissioned
or non- commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized
citizens.
2) Express renunciation of citizenship;
3) Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age.
 Provided however the a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Philippines is at
war with any country.
4) Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country. But shall not divest PH citizenship with consent of the PH
if the following circumstances are present:
a) Philippines has a defensive or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country;
b) Said foreign country maintains armed forces in
Philippine territory with consent of the Philippines.
5) Cancellation of certificate of naturalization;
6) Having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the PH armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted.
(4) Yu v. Defensor-Santiago - 169 SCRA 364
D: Petitioner’s act of applying for a Portuguese passport despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen, and his act of declaring his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization. Philippine citizenship is not a
commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
 This is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
 Petitioner was made to explain and prove why he should still be
considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his’ acquisition and use of
a Portuguese passport.
 Petitioner revealed that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before theproper Portuguese consular officer.
 Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on
21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport
by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
 Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20
July 1986.
 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, “absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain
true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared
his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed
I: Is P a Filipino citizen?
SC: No. He has renounced PH citizenship. The foregoing acts considered together
constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s PH citizenship. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to
8
mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.
(5) Frivaldo v. Comelec - 174 SCRA 245
D: Repatriation requires an express and unequivocal act.
 Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon.
 The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter and its President,
Salvador Estuye, filed with the Comelec for his annulment as he is a
naturalized US citizen.
 P contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
I: Should he be qualified to become governor of Sorsogon?
SC: No. Disqualified. If he really wanted to disavow his US citizenship and reacquire
PH citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with our law – CA 473 which
provides for
3 modes:
1. Direct act of Congress
2. Naturalization
3. Repatriation
 It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born
citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the
renewal of his loyalty and love.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
(6) Labo, Jr. v. Comelec - 176 SCRA 1
D: Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation; It does not appear that petitioner has reacquired
his Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
 Petitioner, Labo, ran for Mayor of Baguio City and won over the second
placer with a 2,100 vote-gap.
 Cases were filed against him in the Comelec and Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID), questioning his Philippine citizenship,
on the ground that he is already a naturalized Australian citizen.
 Comelec found petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines because there
was no direct proof that he was a naturalized Australian citizen. The only
proof admitted in this proceeding were the facts that he married an
Australian, obtained an Australian passport and registered as an alien
with CID upon his return to the country in 1980.
 On the other hand, the CID found petitioner to be an Australian citizen.
This was based on the official statement of the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines, stating that petitioner was still an
Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
 Petitioner also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in
a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and even sought
to avoid jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner.
I: Is P qualified to be mayor of Baguio? NO
SC: Not a citizen and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City.
Petitioner claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country
All of which are applicable to petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5 of the present Constitution, Dual
allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
9
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner to preside over the people of
Baguio as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen. Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be
easily recovered after its renunciation.
It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he had abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to the public office.
Moreover, P’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did
not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim
on finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage.
He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a
formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an
Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath
of Allegiance.
(7) Aznar v. Osmeña - 185 SCRA 703
 Private respondent Emilio Osmena filed his certificate of candidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu.
 Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose B.
Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the
USA.
o He stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates
of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958
when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship
 Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino
citizen. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not
having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
I: May Osmena be qualified to run for Governor of Cebu? YES
SC: 1) P failed to prove that R lost Filipino citizenshop, 2) R’s father is Filipino, 3) R
never expressly renounced (under oath) his Filipino citizenship unlike in the cases
of Frivaldo and Labo.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided under Commonwealth Act No. 63. Among others, there are:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent did not lose his Filipino
citizenship by any of the three mentioned or by any other mode of losing
citizenship. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. The petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean
that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships.
Renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express”
 The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193,
June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564,
August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar. Private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.—In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies
having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States . He is a holder of
a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus,
private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.
(8) Valles v. Comelec – 337 SCRA 543
D:
1) Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
10
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
2) The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is
so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when
the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
 Rosalind Lopez is born in Australia of a Filipino father and an Australian
mother in May 16, 1934.
 In 1949 she left Australia and settled in the Philippines. She married a
Filipino in 1952.
 In 1992 and 1995 Lopez ran and won for governor in Davao Oriental. On
both occasions her citizenship was questioned but COMELEC on both
cases affirmed Lopez’ citizenship. In 1998, Valles filed this petition for
disqualification on the same ground.
 Valles argues that Lopez has lost her Filipino citizenship when the latter
declared under oath on her application for alien certificate of registration
and immigrant residence that she is a subject of Australia and that she
must comply with the mandatory requirements of repatriation before
Lopez can reacquire Filipino citizenship.
SC: Lopez did not lose her PH citizenship. Valles is a Filipino since her father is a
Filipino. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it defined a Filipino citizen as those who
are Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and then resided in the Philippines and their
children born subsequent thereto. Lopez father is a Filipino citizen being a resident
and was born in Daet Camarines Norte and is thus deemed as a Filipino.
As regards loss of citizenship, CA 63, specifies how a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more
4. Accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country
5. Cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
6. Having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
Thus, in order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must
be express. No such express renunciation was made in this case. Thus, the mere
fact that private respondent Rosalind Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport
and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian
and a Filipino, as well.
Reacquisiton of Citizenship:
1) Under RA 9255, by taking the oath of allegiance required of former
natural-born Philippine citizens who may have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign
country;
2) By naturalization, provided that the applicant possess none of the
disqualifications for naturalization;
3) By repatriation (taking of oath of allegiance to PH and registration in the
LCR and BOI) of:
a) Deserters;
b) A woman who lost her citizenship by reason of
marriage to an alien may be repatriated in
accordance with this Act after termination of
marital status.
 When repatriation takes effect: Retroacts to the date of filing of
his application.
11
  Effect: Allows the person to recover or return to his original Issue: Whether or not Manzano should be disqualified?
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Ruling: No. Manzano is qualified. What the law prohibits is dual allegiance.
 Repatriation under RA 8171 for women by reason of marriage  Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.
or who lost on account of political or economic necessity
provided not:
a) Opposed to organized government or affiliated Dual citizenship Dual allegiance
with any association or group who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing organized government; Arises when, as a result of the concurrent application Situation in which a
b) Defending or reaching the necessity or propriety of of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is person simultaneously
violence, personal assault, or assassination for simultaneously considered a national by the said owes, by some positive
predominance of his ideas; states. act, loyalty to 2 or more
c) Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;  Ex: Situation when a person whose parents states.
d) Suffering from mental alienation or incurable are citizens of a state which adheres to the
contagious disease. principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Article IV
4) By direct act of Congress. o Such a person, ipso facto and
Citizenship
without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a
Sec. 5: Dual allegiance
citizen of both states.
of citizens is inimical
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, to the national
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced The following citizens of the Philippines may possess
interest and shall be
it. dual citizenship:
dealt with by law.
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/ or
mothers in foreign countries which follow
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be the principle of jus soli;
dealt with by law. 2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their father’s country such children are
citizens of that country;
(9) Mercado v. Manzano - 307 SCRA 630
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
D: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
latter’s country the former are considered
 Eduardo B. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California on Sept. 4, citizens, unless by their act or omission they
1955 , of Filipino parents.
are deemed to have renounced Philippine
 Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III were candidates for citizenship.
vice mayor of Makati.
 Manzano received the highest number of votes but his proclamation was Involuntary Result of an individual’s
suspended due to a petition for disqualification because of his citizenship. volition.
o It was claimed that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec. 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice, Subject to a strict process
disqualified from running for any elective position. if upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they with respect to
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as termination of their

12

persons with dual citizenship. status.
 In this case, when Manzano filed his certificate of candidacy, it was
sufficient renunciation of his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
o By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
 Finally, Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
(10) Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007
D:
1. What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
2. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department including this Court to
rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
 Calilung sought a writ of prohibition to stop Secretary of Justice
Datumanong from implementing RA 9255 entitled “An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent.”
 Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on
August 29, 2003.
 Petitioner Calilung argued that the RA 9255 is unconstitutional since it
violates sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution (Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law).
 Particularly, Calilung points to secs. 2 and 3 of the law.
o Sec. 2 provides that all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the Act .
o while sec. 3 provides that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.
I: Is RA 9255 valid? YES
SC: RA 9255 is valid. It does not actually provide for dual citizenship. As the
deliberations of the law clearly show, the problem of dual citizenship is transferred
from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be
taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the
foreign country. In short, in the eyes of Philippine law, the former Filipino actually
renounces his foreign citizenship in favor of Philippine citizenship. His allegiance
under the foreign law is what is actually put in question. But, according to the
Court, that is a matter best left for such foreign nation to ponder about. What RA
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
Note: Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
(11) Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita – 526 SCRA 353
D: From the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
 Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions,
and until this is done, he cannot accept an appointment to this Court as
13
 that would be a violation of the Constitution, for which reason he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so.
 Petitioners are composed of People and NGOs engaged in public and civic
causes aimed at protecting people’s rights to self-governance
 They question the appointment of Gregorio S. Ong as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on the ground that he is not a
natural born Filipino citizen that would qualify him to the appointed
position. This is in violation of the Constitution.
 Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship
o “Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.” Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines “natural-born
citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine Citizenship.”
I: Is Ong qualified to be Associate Justice? NO
SC: He is a naturalized Filipino.
 In his petition to be admitted in the Philippine bar, Ong alleged that his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1984
when he was 11 years and thus, he too, thereby became a Filipino citizen.
Ong and his mother were naturalized along w/ his father.
 This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s
new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino.It is clear that
Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
 No substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made w/o a judicial order, for under the law, a change in citizenship is a
substantial change.
o WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction
directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby
ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the
position and discharging the functions of that office, until he
shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through
the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of
his birth and citizenship.
(12) Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec – 497 SCRA 649
D: There is no provision in the dual citizenship law, RA 9225, requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote.
 This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus which resolves the the
propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in
future elections.
o Note: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered
the petition moot and academic, but petitioners’ participation
in such political exercise is of transcendental importance.
 Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of
suffrage, among others.
 Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners
sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to
be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the DFA, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution.
 Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis on the
residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote: Although RA 9225 enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality, it is the Comelec’s position that
those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage
given under the OAVL for the reason that the Overseas Absentee Voting
Law “OAVL” was not enacted for them.
 Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18
September 2003 at the earliest, they are considered regular voters who
have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section
1, Article 5 of the Constitution.
I: May dual citizens exercise the right of suffrage?
SC: "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting
scheme and as overseas absentee voters. Section 1 of Art. V prescribes residency
requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand,
Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote,
implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in
the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate,
14
Congress enacted RA 9189, the OAVL, identifying who can vote and who cannot.
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification
rule. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law, RA 9225, requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non- residents, grants the same right
of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of
an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, the Court
said in Macalintal that the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
(13) Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M.
Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424
D: All Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225.
Petitioner Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March
1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. In July 2006, pursuant to
RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice.
SC: Granted. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino
citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225. Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Before he can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
1. Updating and payment of IBP membership dues;
2. Payment of professional tax;
3. Completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
4. Retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
(14) Corodora v. COMELEC - GR No. 176947, February 19, 2008
D Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.
 Gaudencio Cordora filed a complaint against Councilor Gustavo
Tambunting for violation of the Omnibus Election Code for false
representing in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural born
Filipino citizen because of a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that in 2 instances, Tambunting claimed that he is
American upon arrival in the PH in 2000 and 2001, confirming that it
was on these trips to Hawaii, he acquire US citizenship.
 Tambunting presented his birth certificate showing that he is Filipino
born of a Filipino mother and American father, and that he did
not acquire US citizenship.
 His father petitioned him and was conferred US citizenship by the US
govt merely confirmed his US citizenship, which he already had from
birth. He also took an oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 9255.
I: Should Complaint of Cordora against Tambunting prosper?
SC: Complaint should be dismissed. Tambunting possesses dual citizenship
because of the circumstances of his birth. The petition of his father only served to
confirm his US citizenship, which he acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration only shows 2 trips where he claimed to be American. In his
other 9 trips, he claimed to be Filipino. Clearly, he had dual citizenship and this did
not disqualify him from running for public office. Some instances of dual
citizenship:
15
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
In Manzano, dual citizenship is not equivalent to dual allegiance, which is
what is prohibited. Dual allegiance, is where a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. Like any
other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein.
RA 9225 provides the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance,
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship to be able to run for
public office. Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become
a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA 9225
do not apply to him.
(15) Japzon vs. Comelec -G.R. No. 180088 , January 19, 2009
 Manula Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Jaime Ty, both Mayor
candidates of Gen. Mac Arthur, Eastern Samar, before the Comelec
on the ground of material misrepresentation for stating in certificate of
candidacy that he is a natural born citizen of the PH because he
migrated to the US and acquired US citizenship and lived there for 25
years.
 While he may have applied for reacquisition of PH citizenship, he never
actually resided in Gen. Mac Arthur, Eastern Samar for 1 year prior to
the election.
 Ty admitted acquisition of US citizenship that he was born of a Chinese
father and Filipino mother but averred that reacquired PH citizenship by
virtue of RA 9225, executed an oath of allegiance, applied for a PH
passport, and executed a duly notarized renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
 Pending this case, Ty won the election.
I: Is Ty qualified to be mayor of Mac Arthur, Samar? YES
SC: Not disqualified. Because of his acts, he has validly reacquired PH citizenship
by virtue of RA 9255. For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained
his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, to run for public office, he must:
1. Meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws;
2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
He has already complied with the 2nd requirement and had effectively
renounced his US citizenship by virtue of his validly executed renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency
requirement for running for public office is a question of fact. Its determination
requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence
presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections.
Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.
Mabini St.,Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years
2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said municipality.
(16) Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec – G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012
D: While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment
of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of
a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Hence, P is not qualified
to be vice mayor in La Union.
 Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Candon, a natural-born Filipino citizen,
became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
16
  In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to RA
9225.
 It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the PH.
 In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
 Petitioner sought elective office in Caba, La Union for Mayor in 2007 but
lost. But, in the 2010 elections, this time for the position of Vice-Mayor,
she won.
 Separate petitions for quo warranto were filed, questioning her eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought her disqualification on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
 Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a
mandatory requirement.
I: Is P qualified to be vice mayor?
SC: Not qualified. RA 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated
repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations.
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling
was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29,
2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Hence, RA 9225 demands natural-born Filipinos who reacquire their citizenship and
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing
of their certificates of candidacy in the Philippines. This is the operative act that
restores their right to run for public office. The petitioners failure to comply with
this renders makes her ineligible to run, regardless of the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian citizenship as this is diff from the oath before an
authorized officer requirement.
(17) Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC GR 221697
Facts:
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar.
 When P was 5 years old, she was adopted by the spouses Poe.
 She eventually got married to a dual citizen, and followed her husband in
the US.
 On October 18, 2001 she became a naturalized American citizen.
 After her father’s death, she and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.
 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification
of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine
schools for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to
the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As
early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S
 On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.
 On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner
as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig
City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.
 On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in
17
 the Philippines before May 13, 2013.
o She later on admitted that she mistakenly thought that her
residency should be counted from her 2006 Oath of Allegiance.
 On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.
 Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her. The petitions
against her alleged that argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling
 On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that
petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC
for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for
only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo
likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of
the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she
reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
 Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.
Issue: Is P qualified to run as president (natural born citizen, and compliant with 10
year residency requirement)?
Held: Yes.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers.
 During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the
rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
 With regard to international laws, The common thread of the UDHR,
UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
 In sum, SC said, all of the international law conventions and instruments
on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the
plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their
own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations.
 More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at
the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect"
one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there
are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated
citizens.
o The law allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents
were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her
birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
 On residence:
o The COMELEC disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it
was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that
domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does
not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned
from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May
2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
o It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence
in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no
choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition
18
 of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner
is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the
U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually
re- established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that
when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
o As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period
of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
said that she reckoned residency from April- May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by
her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25
May 2005.
o It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the
2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against
petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where
a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC
was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,
the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year.
(18) David v. Agbay 753 SCRA 526
Facts
 Petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
 Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600sqm lot in Mindoro where they
built their residential house. But, in 2004 they found out that they built
their house on public land as part of the salvage zone.
 So in 2007, P filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the
subject land with the DENR in the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office.
o In this application, P indicated that he is a Filipino citizen
 R opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification against P.
 Meanwhile P re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 on 2007.
 MTC and RTC sided with R.
Issue: May P be indicted for representing himself as Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of RA9225?
Held: YES. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application,
when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
 Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
 While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months
later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law
having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.
 The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification
of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
Note:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003,” Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
19
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
 The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-
born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and
“retain” for the second group.
Article V
Suffrage
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
A. Residence qualification
(19) Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court - 226 SCRA 408
D: In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
withanimus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
 Here, P’s sudden departure from the country to go into self-exile until
conditions favorable have been established cannot be described as
voluntary or as abandonment of residence in the context of domicile by
choice.
Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, son of Kokoy Romualdez
and nephew of Imelda Romuladez Marcos, returned to the Philippines after being
in exile in the US after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Upon his return, he had himself
reapplied for registration as a voter in Tolosa, Leyte, where before his exile, he was
a registered voter and served as a Barnagay Captain. Advincula now questions his
residence qualification contending that Philip had just recently arrived from the US.
SC: He is qualified to exercise his right to vote.
Prior to his exile, he caused the construction of his residential house in Tolosa
Leyte and soon thereafter served as a barangay captain of the place. During the
1984 Batasan Election and the 1986 Snap Presidential elections, he acted as
Campaign Manager of KBL in Leyte where he voted. During his exile, he took
special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business
finance. Further, he claims that his exile was involuntary as it was undertaken only
for his personal safety. Clearly, Romualdez has sufficiently established his domicile
and at the same time has shown that he had no intention to abandon his domicile
of origin.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: the term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in
turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality
2. An intention to remain there
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
(20) Kabataan Partylist v. COMELEC G.R. No. 221318, December 18, 2015
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
20

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to
vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
A. Right to strike
(21) Social Security System Employees v. Court of Appeals - 175 SCRA
686
D:
 Officers & members of SSS Employees Association staged a strike
and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting to work & SSS members from
transacting business w/ the SSS.
 The strike was reported to the Public sector Labor Management
Council – which ordered the strikers to return to work
o But they refused.
 SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
 Thus, SSS filed a complaint for damages against petitioner.
I: Do SSS employees have the right to strike? NO
SC: SSS employees do not have the right to strike.
 While the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to self- organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.
 Framers of the organic law intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only without the right to strike.
 At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating
the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 as implied in EO No. 180.
 The terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, and
GOCCs with original charters are governed by law.
o Employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof.
o If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
for appropriate action.
21

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
A. Agrarian Reform
(22) Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform -
175 SCRA 343
D:
1. Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No.
6657) provides for retention limits.
2. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative.
 In recognition of the imbalance in the distribution of land, as expressed in
the slogan “land for the landless”, the Constitution provided for the
formulation and implementation of an agrarian reform program.
 In compliance, several laws have been enacted exhibiting the evolution of
agrarian reform in the Philippines:
1. PD 27 provided for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for the
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention
limits for landowners;
2. EO 228 declared full land ownership in favor of beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment;
3. Presidential Proclamation 131 and EO 229 instituted the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and the mechanics for its
implementation, respectively; and
4. RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), which despite
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless
gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
 Several challenges to the constitutionality of these laws have instituted,
among the claims is that PP 131 and EO 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Art. XIII,
Sec. 4.
Issue: Whether or not PP 131 and EO 229 are unconstitutional.
Ruling: Both are constitutional. The later law, RA 6657 (CARL) provides for
retention limits.
 Sec. 6 of RA 6657 provides that no landowner shall retain more than 5
hectares.
o It further provides that each child of the landowner shall be
awarded 3 hectares provided that he is at least 15 years of age
and actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm.
 The CARL shows a mingling of police power and the power of eminent
domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former.
o To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise
of the police power for the regulation of private property.
o But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary
to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative.
 It is not mere limitation on the use of the land.
 Rather, it requires the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary.
 The manner of fixing just compensation in the CARL, wherein the DAR
will conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
22
 compensation with the landowner, Land Bank and other interested
parties to submit evidence, is valid.
o While determination just compensation is a function addressed
to the courts of justice, there is no usurpation power as the
determination by the DAR is not final and conclusive on the
landowner.
o The law provides that any party who disagrees with the DAR’s
decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of compensation.
 Finally, the provision allowing for different modes of payment, other than
cash, is also valid.
o Modes of payment include:
1. Cash payment;
 Depending on the size of the land taken, a percentage of the
payment would be in cash and the balance would be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
2. Shares of stock in government - owned or - controlled corporations, Land
Bank preferred shares, physical assets or qualified investments;
3. Tax credits;
4. Land Bank bonds.
o True, the traditional medium for payment of just compensation
is money. However, this case does not deal with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
o The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands
whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in
excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners.
This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of
a particular community or of a small segment of the population
but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society,
from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner.
o Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation, the
program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous.
 Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this
time.
o It is assumed that the framers of the Constitution were aware
of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top
priority project of the government.
 It is a part of this assumption that when they
envisioned the expropriation that would be needed,
they also intended that the just compensation would
have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method.
 There can be no doubt that they were aware of the
financial limitations of the government and had no
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in
cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be
distributed among the farmers.
 It may therefore be assumed that their intention was
to allow such manner of payment as is now provided
for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the
balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with
money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value.
(23) Maddumba v. GSIS - 182 SCRA 281
D: Agrarian Reform; R.A. 3844;Land Bank Bonds; Land Bank bonds shall be
accepted as payment of pre-existing obligations to government financial
institutions at their face or par value, not at discounted value.
 GSIS conducted a public bidding of foreclosed lands, including 1
property in Sta. Ana, Manila.
 Domingo Maddumba participated in the bidding and enclosed with
his sealed bid a manager’s check and cash to complete the
proposal bond.
 Upon receipt of the notice of award, Maddumba offered to pay
the additional amount in Land Bank bonds at their face value,
issued to him in payment for his ricelands in Isabela.
o Rejected and so he paid for cash.
 When amortizations became due, Maddumba wrote again the
GSIS Board of Trustees to allow him to pay the monthly
amortizations with his Land Bank bonds.
o Again denied.
 Hence, this petition for mandamus which seeks to compel the GSIS
to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as installment
payments.
Issue: Whether or not the GSIS, a GOCC, may be compelled to accept Land
23
Bank notes at their face value.
Ruling: Yes, it may be compelled to accept such bonds at their face value.
 A GOCC, like GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as
payment for the purchase of its assets.
 As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay Land Bank bonds
is entitled to preference.
 These bonds are fully guaranteed by the government, issued to
facilitate the speedy transfer of lands to tenant-farmers in support
of the land reform program of the government.
 Agrarian reform cannot be fully realized without the intervention
of the government as the tenant cannot afford the land.
 The petition for Mandamus is GRANTED.
(24) Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform - 192 SCRA 51
D: Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands, devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
farms" is invalid.—It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands, devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is
invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason
to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
 President Aquino approved RA 6657 (CARL), which includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
 Pursuant to this, DAR promulgated guidelines and procedures
implementing production and profit sharing.
o The production-sharing plan required 3% of the gross sales
from the production of the lands to be distributed to regular
and other farmworkers as compensation, in addition to the
compensation they currently receive.
 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, which stands to be adversely affected by this.
o Hence, praying that such be declared unconstitutional.
Issue: W h e t h e r o r n o t the inclusion by RA 6657 of land devoted to such
activities is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes, it is.
 The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
 Thus, it is unconstitutional to that extent.
(25) Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta.
G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010.
D: The objective of the procedures on land valuation provided by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as amplified by the issuances of the
Department of Agrarian Reform/Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DAR/DARAB) is to enforce the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation for the taking of private agricultural lands placed under the CARP.
 But, It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as
Special Agrarian Court—it cannot be lodged with administrative agencies
and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.
 Alicia Tan is the owner of a 37-hectare parcel of land in Davao del
Norte, who offered to the DAR the price of P2M per hectare for the
portion of the land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
 Land Bank, on the other hand, valued and offered P77,000 per
hectare for 15 hectares – P1.1M, which Land Bank deposited to
Tan’s account in cash and bonds.
 Thereafter, DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) fixed just
compensation at P686,000 per hectare or P10.3M.
 Land Bank opposed and petitioned for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Special Agrarian Court.
 Tan filed a motion for delivery of the amount decided by the DARAB
– 10.3M, which was granted.
 Special Agrarian Court ordered the deposit of
P10.3 Million (amount determined by DARAB).
24

I s s u e : What is the proper amount of provisional deposit?
SC: LBP’s determined amount of P1.1M.
 The determination of just compensation is a judicial function, vested
with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.
 EO 405 transferred the responsibility of initial land valuation from DAR
office to Land Bank, a specialized government bank, pending
determination of just compensation.
o The transfer was:
 To ensure the success of CARP; and
 To prevent further collusion between landowners
and DAR in overvaluing land.
 Over-valued land is inimical to farmers’
interest as they will not be able to afford
these lands.
 To require the deposit to be that determined by DAR, LBP will be faced
with an enormous responsibility of filing recovery suits against
thousands of landowners.
 Once deposited, the inordinately high valuation would be under the
complete disposal of the landowner, the withdrawal thereof, pending
final determination by the Court of just compensation, is only made
subject to compliance with payment release requirements of petitioner.
 Indeed, the SAC misinterpreted the law and if its erroneous order is
implemented, it will create financial havoc to the already scarce
Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF).
o Every victorious party before the RARAD/PARAD/DARAB will
surely move for a similar “order to deposit” their
compensation award even if the cases for judicial
determination of just compensation are still pending before
the SAC.
 Procedure for acquisition of lands for CARP:
1. After identifying the land, LBP determines initial value of Land.
o LBP makes an offer to the landowner through a
written notice to acquire the land, by delivery or
mail, and posting the brgy hall where 
property is
located, which contains the offer of the LBP of the
value.
2. Within 30 days from receipt of notice, landowner shall inform
LBP of rejection or acceptance of offer.
a. If he accepts, Land Bank shall pay within 30 days
after he executes 
and delivers a deed of transfer.
b. If he rejects, DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings 
to determine
compensation and require landowner to submit
evidence within 15 days from receipt of notice.
 After which, submitted for decision.
Decision within 30 days. 

3. A deposit of provisional compensation is made even before the
summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least
simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial
valuation (“offer”) by the LBP.
o Such deposit results from his rejection of the DAR
offer (based on the LBP’s initial valuation).
4. Upon receipt of payment or in case of rejection or no response,
upon deposit, DAR shall take immediate possession.
5. Recourse is to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
Section 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers'
organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of
the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate
technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and
other support services.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially
of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
25
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine
and fishing resources.
Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the
proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization,
employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial
instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprises of their choice.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform
and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and
basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to
such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners.
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without
adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be
relocated.
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
A. Health
(26) City of General Santos v. COA
D: Sec. 6 of Ordinance no. 8 is actually a separation pay and therefore does not
violate the GSIS Charter, and is consistent with Art. 13, Section 11 of the
Constitution.
 Ordinance no. 8 was enacted by the City of General Santos to entice
employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the
incentives being offered by way of early retirement package.
 The incentives would be available to:
1. Qualified employees below 60 years of age but not less than
50 years; and
2. Sickly employees below 50 years of age but not less than 40
years.
o The Ordinance provides separation benefits to employees who
have not yet reached retirement age.
 Among the provisions of Ordinance no. 8 provided:
o Sec. 6: GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives.—Upon
availment of early retirement, a qualified employee shall enjoy
the following in addition to the above incentives:
a) Cash gift of P50,000.00 for the sickly employees;
b) Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos
City Hospital;
c) Annual aid in the maximum amount of P5,000.00, if
admitted at General Santos City Hospital; and
d) 14 karat gold ring as token.
 The Commission on Audit issued an Opinion stating that Ordinance No. 8
violated the GSIS Charter because it provided supplementary retirement
benefits, which was prohibited by the said law.
I: Is Ordinance 8 constitutional ? YES
Ruling: Sec. 6 of Ordinance no. 8 is actually a separation pay and therefore does
not violate the GSIS Charter.
 Separation or severance pay
o An allowance usually based on length of service that is payable
to an employee on severance, or as compensation due an
employee upon the severance of his employment status with
the employer.”
 Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement incentives provides for
benefits that are not computed based on years of service.
o They are lump sum amounts and healthcare benefits:
 Benefits under GenSan SERVES were only given to a select few — the
26
 sickly and unproductive due to health reasons.
 Local governments are authorized by the Local Government Code to
approve ordinances that provide for care for the sick.
 This is also consistent with the constitutional mandate for a
comprehensive approach to health development, with priority for the
needs of the sick:
o Section 11 (Art. XIII): The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
WOMEN
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such
facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS
Section 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations
to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework,
their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated
capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership,
membership, and structure.
Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-
making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment
of adequate consultation mechanisms.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on
Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members
who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of
whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other
qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall
be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present
functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights
of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-
privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information
to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
27
 (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
A. Commission on Human Rights
(27) Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights - 204 SCRA 483
 This case pertains to the “mass concerted action” of some 800
public school teachers, because of the government’s failure to act on
their grievances.
 A Return to Work Order was issued by the DECS Secretary. – Ignored by
the teachers.
 The teachers were administratively charged and preventively
suspended.
 The teachers made submitted sworn statements to the Commission on
Human Rights complaining about the acts of the DECS Secretary
(Secretary Carino).
o The alleged that they were replaced, without notice, and
without being informed of the reason thereof.
 The DECS Secretary filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON the CHR may take cognizance of a particular subject-matter,
which is placed within the jurisdiction of a court or another government
agency, for purposes of hearing and adjudication.
Ruling: No, it may not. The CHR is PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving
the case of the striking teachers.
 The CHR has no power to hear and adjudicate cases involving alleged
infringement of civil and political rights.
 It was not meant by the constitution to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency; or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
 The constitution merely gave the CHR the power to investigate cases
involving all forms of human right violations involving civil and
political rights.
o The power being investigatory, the CHR does not have the
power to issue writs of injunction or restraining orders.
 It does n o t have the power of adjudication, which is a judicial
function.
(28) Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights –
208 SCRA 125
 This case involves certain parcels of land belonging to EPZA, over
which certain people took possession (and planted agricultural
products thereon) without the latter’s permission.
 To get them off the property, EPZA paid a 10k financial assistance to
those who would accept and sign a quitclaim.
 10 years later, some people who received the money went to the
CHR praying for justice, relief, and remedies in a joint complaint.
 The CHR issued a cease and desist order to stop the demolition and
destruction of what was built on the land, but to no avail.
Issue: WON the CHR may issue writs of injunction or restraining orders to
compel supposed violators of human rights to cease and desist.
Ruling: No, it may not.
 The CHR is not a court of justice; it is not even a quasi-judicial body.
o Its powers are investigatory.
 The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the CHR to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction.
o If that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so.
o The same remedies are extrajudicial and judicial remedies
which the CHR may seek from proper courts in behalf of
the victims of human rights violations.
(29) Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights - 229 SCRA 117
D: Recalling the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
28
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious.”
 While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it
is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.”
 Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia does not fall within
the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” intended by the Constitution
 A Demolition Notice issued by Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. for the
demolition of the stalls of vendors found along North EDSA.
o The stalls are to be removed to give way to a People’s
Park.
 The demolition pushed through.
 The CHR issued a cease and desist order, apart from citing Simon in
contempt.
 Simon asks the SC for a writ of injunction.
Issue: WON the CHR has the power to investigate alleged violations of
business rights of the owners of the stalls which were demolished.
Ruling: No, it does not. The writ is GRANTED.
 The rights allegedly infringed by the demolition of the stalls are not
within the purview of the powers of the CHR to investigate, which is
limited to human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
o CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the
government.
o POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.
 Not being included therein, the CHR is thus prohibited from acting
in line with complaint filed before it.
 However, it may refer the complaint to the proper agency.
Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendations.
ARTICLE XIV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE & SPORTS
EDU
CAT
ION
EDUCATION
Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
A. Quality and accessibility of educational system
 The requirement that a school must first obtain government
authorization before operating is based on the State policy that
educational programs shall be of good quality and therefore, shall
at least satisfy minimum standards
(30) Department of Education Culture and Sports v. San Diego - 180
SCRA 534
D: 3 Flunk rule in the NMAT is pursuant to police power. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
29
 employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 San Diego was a zoology graduate of UE and wanted to pursue med
school.
 However, he already failed the NMAT thrice.
 When he applied to take the exam for the 4th time, DECS did not allow
him due to the 3-flunk rule.
 He then filed a petition for mandamus to compel DECS to allow him
to take NMAT again, invoking his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection.
o He squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order
No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
SC: Not granted. 3-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.
 It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents since the profession
deals with lives of people.
o It is intended to insulate the medical profession from people
who are not qualified to be doctors.
 The right to quality education is not absolute.
 The Constitution also provides the every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements.
o A person cannot simply invoke the right to quality education
as a guarantee of the Constitution, one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
Section 2. The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the
elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of
parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all
children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to
deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the
under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well
as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs
particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training
in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Section 3.
(1) All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as
part of the curricula.
(2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in
the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative
thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
(3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion
shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public
elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors
designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to
which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government.
Section 4.
(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups
and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. The
control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and
no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment
in any school. The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools
30
 established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively
owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments,
donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Section 5.
(1) The State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and
conditions and shall encourage local planning in the development of
educational policies and programs.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional
advancement. Non-teaching academic and non-academic personnel shall
enjoy the protection of the State.
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and
ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.
A. Academic freedom of "institutions of higher learning"
1) Institution:
 Freedom of university to determine who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.
2) Members of academe:
 To investigate and discuss problems of his science, to
express his conclusions without interference from political
or ecclesiastical authority or administrative officials unless
his methods are found to be completely incompetent or
contrary to professional ethics
Limitations:
1) Dominant police power of the State;
2) Social interests of the community.
(31) Board of Medical Education v. Judge Alfonso and Philippine Muslim-
Christian College of Medicine – 176 SCRA 304
 The Board of Medical Schools, as the regulatory agency that
supervises the country’s medical colleges, ordered the closure of
the Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation,
Inc. for having failed 3 evaluation inspections.
o The inspectors found that it is short of the minimum
standards set for medical school:
 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the
College full-time;
 It shortened and irregular class hours;
 Subject overloading; and
 In general, poor quality teaching, among others.
 The school, through its chairman of the Board of Trustees disputed
these findings and filed a Civil Case questioning the decision of
Secretary Quisumbing as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and
discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation.
o The College claims its entitlement the injunction on the
ground that the closure order against which it was
directed was issued without factual basis and in violation
of the right of the College to due process of law.
 Judge Alfonso of RTC issued the writ of Injunction.
I: Is the Writ of Injunction valid? NO
31
SC: The court may not review the decision of the Secretary of Education.
 It is not the function of the Court to review the decisions and
orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an
educational institution meets the norms and standards required
for permission to operate and to continue operating as such.
 The record clearly shows that the College was given every
opportunity to improve itself and meet the requirements but
remained to be sub-standard after the inspections conducted by
the evaluating teams.
o It had admitted its failure to improve when it proposed
its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988.
 Secretary Quisumbing acted within the scope of his power when it
ordered the closure of the school.
 Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin
compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and
to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have
been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the
respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby
thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the
College to operate without the requisite government permit.
(32) Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee - 68 SCRA 277
D: It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university—to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
 The Loyola School of Theology is a religious seminary in Loyola Heights,
Quezon City.
o In collaboration with the Ateneo De Manila University, it allows
some lay students to attend its classes and/ or take courses but
the degree, if any, to be obtained is granted by Ateneo.
 Epicharis T. Garcia was allowed to take some courses for credit (leading
to an MA in Theology) during the summer of 1975 in the Loyola School.
 However when Garcia was to enroll for the 1st semester of 1975-1976,
she was given a letter informing her of the faculty’s decision to bar her
from readmission, providing:
o “That your frequent questions and difficulties were not always
pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of
the class; they (the faculty) felt you could have tried to give the
presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand
the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and
problems.”
o “It would seem to be in your best interests to work with a
faculty that is more compatible with your orientation.”
o The letter also recommended that she seek admission at the
UST Graduate School.
 Garcia now prays for a writ of mandamus to be issued for the purpose of
allowing her to enroll in the current semester.
Issue: Whether or not Loyola School may be compelled to admit Garcia?
Ruling: No. Not only does Garcia do not have a vested right to be admitted, but
Loyola School also possesses the academic freedom to determine who may be
admitted to study.
 A petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy as the Loyola School
of Theology has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner.
o The Loyola School is a seminary for the priesthood and Garcia is
admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she
being a lay person and a woman.
o Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to
study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of the
Loyola School to admit her to said studies, since the school has
clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants
due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum
classroom size and component considerations.
o At most, Garcia can claim a privilege.
 2 Aspects of Academic Freedom:
1. Right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty
and right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular
specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments.
 Freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field
of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority
except the control or authority of the rational methods by
32
 which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines.
2. Academic freedom of the university (institution of higher learning)
 4 essential freedoms of a university to determine:
1. Who may teach;
o Control over the appointment and tenure of
office of the academic staff.
2. What may be taught;
o Control over the curricula for courses of
study.
3. How it shall be taught; and
o Control over the allocation of income
among the different categories of
expenditure.
4. Who may be admitted to study.
o Control over the admission and examination
of students.
(33) Lupangco v. Court of Appeals - 160 SCRA 848
D:
 The Philippine Regulatory Commission issued Resolution No. 105 as
part of its Additional Instructions to Examinees for CPAs, which
prohibits examinees from attending any review class, briefing,
conference and the like, and from receiving tips, hand-out and review
materials from any school, college or university or any review center
three days prior to the examination dates.
 Lupanco and others file injunction case against PRC to enjoin it from
enforcing the Resolution.
I: Can PRC prohibit CPA candidates to receive review
materials etc. 3 days before the exam? NO
SC: PRC cannot prohibit the students from attending review classes 3 days
prior to their examination.
 The Court ruled that not only is Resolution No. 105 unreasonable and
arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees right to liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution.
 PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the examination.
 Furthermore, the Court ruled that under academic freedom, PRC
cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and
centers believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the
standards required before becoming a full-pledged Accountant.
(34) University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals - 166 SCRA 570
D: Principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes; of graduation.
 Jennifer Lee filed mandamus to compel USC to confer upon her cum
laude honors in her degree of BS in Commerce, Major in Accounting.
 She previously had a failing grade in her Architecture courses before
transferring to Commerce.
o According to USC rules, a failure in any subject disqualifies a
student from honors.
I: May Lee be allowed to graduate with honors? NO
SC: A University may not be compelled to grant graduation honors to any
student who, according to the university’s standards, rules and regulations,
does not qualify for such honor.
 It is an accepted principle that schools are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes
of graduation.
o This is part of academic freedom.
 Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant
of honors among the graduating students.
o Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave
abuse of discretion in its exercise.
 Even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still
within the sound discretion of USC to determine whether Lee was
entitled to graduate with honors.
(35) Reyes v. Court of Appeals - 194 SCRA 402
 Students as then applicants of the UP College of Medicine obtained
33
 scores higher than 70 percentile in the NMAT, which was the cutoff
prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in the academic year of 86-87.
o However, their scores were below the 90 percentile cutoff
prescribed by UPCM for the academic year of 87-88.
 Upon appeal by some pre-med students, UPCM reverted to the 70
percentile cutoff.
o Subsequently, Board of Regents, particularly the University
General Council, pursuant to instructions made by the
Chancellor, recommended the admission of all students
who obtained a 70-90 percentile.
 The faculty of the UPCM did not heed this directive and refused to
admit the students.
I: Can the UPCM students be admitted? YES
SC: The University General Council can validly direct the UP College of
Medicine faculty to admit the students.
 Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the college
faculty must bear the University Council’s approval.
 The powers vested on the Bureau of Regents and UC by the charter
of UP are clear.
o To the former belongs the governance and general powers
of administration and to the latter the power to fix the
admission requirements to any college in the university.
o The college faculty is given the power to determine the
entrance requirements SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL of the
University Council.
 Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a
profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
 There appears to be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling of
the UC meeting on the student’s case.
o To validate these resolutions at this point would not be
fair and equitable to the students.
(36) Miriam College v. Court of Appeals – 348 SCRA 265
D: The Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
 The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel.
 The student school editorial board of Miriam College published a
paper and magazine containing "Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent,"
"gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid
of all moral values."
 This was now some members of the Miriam College community
allegedly described the contents of the publication.
 Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the
members of the editorial board were asked to explain their
publication.
o However, their lawyer contended that it was the DECS who
had jurisdiction over the issue relying on the provisions of
the Campus Journalism Act.
 Miriam penalized the editorial board.
SC: Miriam has authority to discipline its students and has jurisdiction
over the issue.
 Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
o This institutional academic freedom includes the right of
the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint.
o The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself
on academic grounds:
1. Who may teach;
2. What may be taught;
3. How it shall be taught; and
4. Who may be admitted to study.
 The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in
the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."
o A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of
anarchy.
 Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student
discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning.
34
 o By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
o Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach."
 The Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
o The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its
power to suspend or expel.
o It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning.
o That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
(37) Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA – G.R. No. 211362, February 24,
2015
D: The PMA’s power to dismiss a cadet is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring
cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President
to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
 Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class
had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the
schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm. The next class (Eng) was
from 3:05pm-4:05pm
 However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their
OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia
complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the
English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
 In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class
was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the
matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was
dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class
late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of
said infraction.
 Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not
content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing
the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then
asked Cudia to write his appeal.
 In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control
because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started
at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the
interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss
them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not
3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his
examination paper.
 Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for
allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written
appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he
was late for his next class.
 The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior
required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to
separate a cadet from PMA.
 Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus before the
Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the
same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid
interfering with military matters.
I: May the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings?
Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet
is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In
this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the
case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he
replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When
the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to
conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of
the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to
explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to
have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review
process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge
Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A
35
separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics
Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, Language
he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued 1) The national language of the Philippines is Filipino.
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of 2) For purposes of communication and instruction, the official language are
facts by these bodies. Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.
3) The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions
Academic freedom of the PMA and shall serve as ancillary media or instruction therein.
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may 4) Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.
be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the 5) The constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be
PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish.
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner
which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a LANGUAGE
guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and
law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such other languages.
power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the
universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution. educational system.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach; Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages
b. the right to determine what may be taught; of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and
shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.
If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In
this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code. Section 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted? shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish.
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It
punishes any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is Section 9. The Congress shall establish a national language commission
the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia composed of representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall
enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development,
Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not
propagation, and preservation of Filipino and other languages.
arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that
Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

36
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Section 10. Science and technology are essential for national development and
progress. The State shall give priority to research and development, invention,
innovation, and their utilization; and to science and technology education,
training, and services. It shall support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, and their application to the country's
productive systems and national life.
Section 11. The Congress may provide for incentives, including tax deductions,
to encourage private participation in programs of basic and applied scientific
research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives shall be
provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors,
technologists, and specially gifted citizens.
Section 12. The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the adaptation of
technology from all sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the
widest participation of private groups, local governments, and community-based
organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology.
Section 13. The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists,
inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and
creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be
provided by law.
ARTS AND CULTURE
Section 14. The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic
evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity
in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.
Section 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State
shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural
heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
Section 16. All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural
treasure of the nation and shall be under the protection of the State which may
regulate its disposition.
Section 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures,
traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national plans and policies.
Section 18.
(1) The State shall ensure equal access to cultural opportunities through
the educational system, public or private cultural entities,
scholarships, grants and other incentives, and community cultural
centers, and other public venues.
(2) The State shall encourage and support researches and studies on the
arts and culture.
SPORTS
Section 19.
(1) The State shall promote physical education and encourage sports
programs, league competitions, and amateur sports, including training
for international competitions, to foster self-discipline, teamwork, and
excellence for the development of a healthy and alert citizenry.
(2) All educational institutions shall undertake regular sports activities
throughout the country in cooperation with athletic clubs and other
sectors.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
37
 religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(3) The right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State
may also do so through just programs of social security.
CASE LIST FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(38) The Province of Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission
on Audit, et al. - G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010.-MAGSUMBOL
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution
No. 720-A allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and
employees.
o After a public bidding, the Committee on Awards granted the
insurance coverage to Philam Care.
 Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group
Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000
representing the insurance premiums of its officials and employees.
o Total amount was paid on Jan. 25, 1996.
 After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of
Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of
approval from the Office of the President (OP) as provided under AO 103
dated 14 January 1994.
o The Provincial Auditor explained that the premium payment for
health care benefits violated RA 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law.
 Province of Negros Occidental complied with the directive post-facto and
sent a letter-request to the OP.
 Pres. Estrada, in a memorandum, directed the COA to lift the suspension
but only P100,000.
 The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead
issued Notice of Disallowance stating similar grounds as mentioned in
Notice of Suspension.
● Province of Negros Occidental appealed the disallowance to the COA.
● COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance
○ The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity,
including a local government unit, is exempt from securing
prior approval from the President granting additional benefits
to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of
standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758.
○ The COA added that Section 468(a)(1)(viii) of RRA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991 relied upon by petitioner does
not stand on its own but has to be harmonized with Section 12
of RA 6758.
○ Further, the COA stated that the insurance benefits from
Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a duplication of
the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare
program which is mandated by law.
 Being merely a creation of a local legislative body, the
provincial health care program should not contravene
but instead be consistent with national laws enacted
by Congress from where local legislative bodies draw
their authority.
Ruling: The prohibition in AO 103 applies only to "government offices/agencies,
including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their
respective governing boards." – Not LGUs.
 The requirement then of prior approval from the President under AO 103
is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices and government-
owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch.
 AO 103 must be observed by government offices under the President’s
control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
President’s power of President’s power of control
general supervision
Power of a superior officer Power to alter or modify or set
to see to it that aside what a subordinate officer
subordinates perform their had done in the performance of
functions according to law. his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the President over
that of the subordinate officer.
38
 o Power to revise or
reverse the acts or
decisions of a applied for by Golden Falcon.
subordinate officer
involving the exercise
of discretion.
 LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the
President.
o The President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are
followed and laws are faithfully executed.
o The President may only point out that rules have not been
followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither
does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules.
 Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of
the President to be valid.
 Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not
clearly establish that the medical care benefits given by the government
at the time under Presidential Decree No. 1519 were sufficient to cover
the needs of government employees especially those employed by LGUs.
 Finally, CSC Memorandum No. 33, recognizing the inadequate policy on
basic health and safety conditions of work experienced by government
personnel, directed all government offices including LGUs to provide a
health program for government employees which included
hospitalization services and annual mental, medical-physical
examinations.
(39) League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. DENR, GR. No. 175368, 11
April 2013-PAJA
 Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation filed an Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement covering an area in
Bulacan, with DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office.
o Denied. – Gold Falcon appealed.
 Pending the appeal, several individuals filed applications for quarry
permit which covered the same area, with the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan.
 Golden Falcon’s appeal was denied.
 Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed an Application for
Exploration Permit with the PENRO of Bulacan, covering some of the area
 The Governor of Bulacan approved the small-scale mining permits, upon
recommendation of the PENRO.
 AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary, which granted said appeal.
 Hence, the League of Provinces filed this petition.
Ruling: It is the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) that has authority over small-scale mining. – Not the local government.
 The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DENR is, subject to
law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the country’s natural resources.
o Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the
provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991,
while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that
the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned
local government agencies.
 The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art.
X, Sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.
o It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers,
but subject to limitations like following national policies or
standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code,
as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of
powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different
local government units and local officials have been placed by
the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3,
Article X of the Constitution.
 Section 17 of the LGC provides:
o “(3) For a Province:
o (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision,
control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws
limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control
law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection
39
 of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local
purposes;”
o Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to
law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization of the country’s natural
resources.
 The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in
accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in
the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application
for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course,
and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial
Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary
(40) Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame C. Villanueva
and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito - G.R. No. 171873,
July 9, 2010.-TABAG
 In NPC v. Province of Albay, NPC was held liable for unpaid real estate
taxes on its properties located in the Province of Albay.
o These properties included geothermal plants in the Municipality
of Tiwi.
 To satisfy NPC’s tax liabilities, the properties were sold in a public
auction, with Albay as the sole bidder.
 Later, the Governor of Albay and NPC entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), wherein they agreed that NPC would settle its tax
liabilities and ownership of the properties would revert back to it.
 NPC made an initial payment.
 The Municipality of Tiwi then requested for its share in the payments,
which was refused by the Governor of Albay.
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing
Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and in the recovery of
their rightful share.
 Mayor Corral then entered into a Contract of Legal Services with Atty.
Antonio B. Betito and Atty. Alberto Lawenko.
o The Contract provided, among others that the lawyers would
receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty
taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.
 Several other administrative complaints and cases occurred between Tiwi
and Albay, wherein Atty. Betito represented Tiwi.
o In the administrative case, the public officials of Albay were
held to be administratively liable.
 Atty. Betito sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services.
o However, despite repeated demands, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tiwi refused to pass the ordinance for the payment of his
attorney’s fees.
 Atty. Betito then filed a petition praying that Tiwi be ordered to pay
P11,000,000.00 in attorney’s fees and 10% of the other amounts to be
determined during trial plus interest and damages.
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi argued that the Contract of Legal Services
was not effective because it was not ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tiwi.
Ruling: The Resolution No. 15-92 constituted prior authorization and is sufficient to
authorize Mayor Corral to enter into the Contract of Legal Services. – Ratification is
not necessary.
 Sec. 44(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC provides that Upon authorization by
thesangguniang bayan, the Mayor may represent the municipality in all
its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance.
 Municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of
the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the
municipality.
o In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously
passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a
lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the
execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power
Corporation v. Province of Albay.
 The authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute
and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services.
o That the authorization did not set the terms and conditions of
the compensation signifies that the council empowered Mayor
Corral to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with the
lawyer of her choice subject, of course, to the general
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 limitation that the contract’s stipulations should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, and, considering that this is a contract of legal services,
to the added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees must
not be unreasonable and unconscionable
 The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to
the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf
of the local government unit.
(41) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C. Barriga,
G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011.- YAP
 Sonia Q. Pua, a Municipal Councilor in Carmen, Cebu, filed a complaint
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, alleging:
o That Dinah C. Barriga (Muncicipal Accountant) was involved in
several irregular and anomalous transactions in her official
capacity.
o The transaction was in relation to the handling of the trust fund
of the Municipality of Carmen in the Central Visayas Water and
Sanitation Project.
 Barriga was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and was imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension.
 The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman ordered directed the Municipal
Mayor to implement the decision.
o Barriga requested the implementation of the penalty be held in
abeyance pending the issuance of entry of judgment.
 Barriga was suspended, which she challenged with the CA.
 CA ruled in favor of Barriga, stating that the Deputy Ombudsman’s order
of implementation was premature pending resolution of Barriga’s appeal.
Ruling: Decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executory and
an appeal does not stop it from being executory.
 Office of the Ombudsman is possessed with jurisdiction to entertain an
administrative complaint against a public official.
o If found guilty, has the authority to impose a penalty and
implement the decision.
 An appeal does not stop the decision from being executory.
 When a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge
by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension
for more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be
made to the CA.
o However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a
matter of course.
 Thus, the Ombudsman’s order imposing on Barriga the penalty of
suspension from office for one year without pay is immediately
executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
(42) Vicencio v. Villar, G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012- BAUTISTA
 The City Council of Malabon enacted an Ordinance, which granted the
City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, authority to negotiate and enter
into Contracts for Consultancy Services for Consultants in
theSanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas
of Concern.
 Then acting Vice-Mayor, Hon. Benjamin Galauran entered into the 2003
Consultancy Contracts.
 In the May 2004 elections, Arnold Vicencio was elected Vice-Mayor.
o He also became the Presiding Officer of the City Council and
Head of the Sanggnian Secretariat.
 To complement the manpower requirements of the
existing SanggunianSecretariat, Vice-Mayor Vicencio deemed it
necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of
augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the effective
operation of the legislative machinery of the city.
 He inquired from the City Legal Officer inquiring as to whether it was still
necessary for the City Council to ratify a newly entered contract of
consultancy services between it and the candidate for the consultancy
position.
o To which the City Legal Officer responded that it was not
necessary provided, the services contracted are those
stipulated in the Ordinance.
 Vice-Mayor Vicencio entered into the 2005 Consultancy Agreements.
 The City Auditor’s Office disallowed a certain amount supposedly for the
consultancy services and considered it as improper disbursement.
o That it was only Former Vice-Mayor Yambao that was
authorized by the Ordinance to enter into Consultancy
Agreements.
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 o This was affirmed by the Commission on Audit.
 Vice-Mayor Vicencio now questions the ruling, arguing that the
Ordinance authorized the Office of the Vice-Mayor, no just Vice-Mayor
Yambao, to enter into consultancy agreements.

Ruling: Vice-Mayor Vicencio did not have the authority to enter into the 2005
consultancy agreements.
 Sec. 456 of the Local Government Code provides for the powers of the
Vice-Mayor:
1. Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and
sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of thesangguniang panlungsod;
2. Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all
officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except
those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in
this Code;
3. Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of
the latter in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for in
Section 44, Book I of this Code;
4. Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of
the city mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in
Section 46, Book I of this Code; and
5. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
 Tthere is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter
into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that
provided for the city mayor.
o Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance
granting it.
 The Ordinance specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into
contracts for consultancy services.
o As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office
of the Vice-Mayor, the Ordinance cannot be construed as a
“continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of
the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar,
contracts.

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