POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
KA-POLI NOTES
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BILL OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE IV – Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
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CITIZENSHIP
What is citizenship?
Citizenship is the membership in a political community which
is more or less permanent in nature.
Who are the citizens of the Philippines?
(1.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2.) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3.) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Distinguish between citizenship and nationality
(1.) Citizenship is membership in a democratic or political
community, whereas nationality is membership in any
political community whether monarchial, autocratic, or
democratic.
(2.) Citizenship follows the exercise of civil and political
rights, whereas nationality does not necessarily carry
with it the exercise of political rights; and
(3.) A person can be a citizen of one country and a national
of another.
What are the three (3) modes of acquiring citizenship?
(1.) Jus sanguinis - Meaning, by blood, as when a child is
born of Filipino parents, wherever he may be born.
(2.) Jus soli - By place of birth. If a Filipino couple is residing
in the US and their child was born there, the child is
American from the point of view of US Laws.
(3.) Naturalization - Which is the artificial means or process
whether judicial or administrative by which a state places
the imprint of a native citizen when it adopts an alien and
gives him the imprint and endowment of a citizen of that
country.
Can there be a judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino
citizen?
No. He has to apply for naturalization and adduce evidence of
his qualifications.
Who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines?
Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(3) of this provision, shall also be
deemed a natural-born citizen.
Two sources of GAPIL
(1.) International customs (general practices accepted by
law)
(2.) General principles which are recognized by civilized
nations
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
What is the status of foundlings in international law?
Foundlings may take in the citizenship of the country where
they are found. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law for part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. This also
includes international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.
Senator Grace Poe is admittedly a founding. Is she a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines?
Yes. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either.
Are there provisions of the Constitution that discriminate
against foundlings?
No, there are none. All of these Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of laws and exhort the State to
render social justice.
There are two conventions which grant citizenship to
foundlings but they have not been ratified by the Philippines.
State the effect?
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified
by the PH, are generally accepted principles of international
law.
(1.) Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
(2.) The principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in
Article 2 of the 1961 UN Convention of the Reduction of
Statelessness.
Although the Philippines is neither a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, it does not mean that their principles are not
binding.
May the citizenship of a person be attacked in a disbarment
case?
No. It may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack
someone’s citizenship.
What are the requisites to be complied with before one can
be considered a natural-born citizen?
(1.) A person must be a Filipino citizen from birth; and
(2.) He does not have to perform an act to obtain or perfect
his PH citizenship.
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What is RA 8171 and who may validly avail of repatriation?
(1.) Filipino women who have lost their PH citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and
(2.) Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their PH citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity.
With what agency should application for repatriation be filed?
Special Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor
General with the undersecretary of DFA and the Director of
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other
members. NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
State the nature of repatriation?
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but a privilege granted
by the State. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It
has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation
meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power
of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can
reacquire citizenship once it is lost.
What happens if a foreign country cancels the passport of an
alien?
The alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. The
automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation
proceedings.
Are there exceptions?
Yes. The Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to
extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here
even if he has no valid passport or Philippine visa.
Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
States.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more States. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
If a Filipino marries an alien, will she lose her citizenship?
No, as a general rule, she remains as a Filipino citizen unless
by her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her
Philippine citizenship.
State the policy of the State on dual allegiance
The Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
State the procedure in electing Filipino citizenship
It can be expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any official who is authorized to
administer an oath. The statement must be filed with the
nearest Local Civil Registry and the Statement must be
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
accompanied by an Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines.
Within what period should the election be made?
Within 3 years from reaching the age of majority, except if
there is a justifiable reason for the delay, as when the party
thought all along that he was already a Filipino.
Can there be acquisition of citizenship by implied election of
citizenship?
Yes, under the doctrine of implied election by having
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age.
If the mother of the child gives birth to him while she is
unmarried, what is the citizenship of the child?
The child follows the citizenship of the mother.
If a child is born under the 1935 Constitution, what is his
citizenship during minority if his mother is a Filipino and his
father is a Chinese?
The child is an alien during minority because the provision
“those who elect” is prospective in nature.
What are the reasons for the prospective nature of the
Constitution?
(1.) The language is prospective;
(2.) The Constitution says “elect Philippine citizenship”,
which is prospective; and
(3.) Construction of constitutional provisions is prospective
unless retroactivity is expressly provided for.
Give instances when a citizen of the Philippines may possess
dual citizenship considering the citizenship clause
(1.) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2.) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their Fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country; and
(3.) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's
country the former is considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
What is the concept of derivative naturalization?
It is one which says that if the husband of an alien woman is
naturalized, the wife follows the Filipino citizenship of the
husband provided she does not possess any of the
disqualifications.
How may Filipino citizenship be lost?
(1.) Naturalization in a foreign country; or
(2.) Expatriation.
May a Filipino be compelled to remain as such?
No, because expatriation is a constitutional right. Nobody can
be compelled to remain a Filipino except when the Philippines
is at war, where a Filipino cannot renounce his citizenship in
order to escape liability under the treason law.
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How may citizenship be reacquired?
(1.) Direct act of Congress;
(2.) Naturalization; and
(3.) Repatriation.
What is naturalization?
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him
on her with the privileges of a citizen.
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which
an alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
(1.) Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139;
(2.) Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 473; and
(3.) Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
State the basic requirement of witnesses in a naturalization
proceeding
The witnesses should be competent to vouch for his good
moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral
character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s
conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific
facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications by law.
State the duty of an applicant for naturalization before he can
be naturalized
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant
to prove not only his own good moral character but also the
good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be
credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization law,
a “credible person” is not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character
and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or
whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the person making it.
This implies that such a person must have a good standing in
the community; that he is known to be honest and upright;
that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his
word may be taken on its face, as a good warranty of the
applicant’s worthiness.
In naturalization proceedings, may the State appeal the
decision even if it did not oppose the petition?
Yes. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary
proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not
constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact.
Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions
arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the
Government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with
more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition
before the lower court.
Is it possible for a stateless person to be naturalized?
Yes. As long as he satisfies all the qualifications and is not
suffering from any of the disqualifications prescribed by law,
he may be naturalized.
What are the effects of the naturalization of the husband on
the foreigner-wife and his children?
(1.) With respect to the wife - The naturalization of the
husband will favorably affect her since she becomes a
Filipino if she is not disqualified by law;
(2.) With respect to the children -
(a.) If the child was born abroad but was living in the
PH at the time of naturalization of parent, he shall
automatically become a Filipino citizen;
(b.) If the foreign-born minor child is not in the
Philippines at the time of naturalization of his
parents, he shall be deemed a citizen only during
his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the PH while still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Filipino even after
coming of age.
May a person acquire citizenship through estoppel?
No, because citizenship is granted as a matter of special
privilege. Estoppel will not lie to foreclose or prevent the State
from questioning the grant of Filipino citizenship. Where the
citizenship of an alien is conferred without the active
participation of the OSG, it is irregular and violative of the
State’s right to due process.
How may an alien woman married to a Filipino acquire or
embrace Philippine citizenship?
(1.) She must file a petition for cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging among other things
the following:
(a.) She is not disqualified from acquiring PH
citizenship under Sec 4. of the naturalization law;
and
(b.) The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit
of the petitioner and her husband that she does
not belong to the group of disqualified persons.
(2.) She must file the petition with the Bureau of
Immigration.
May a deaf-mute be naturalized in the Philippines?
No, because one of the requirements for naturalization is that
the alien must speak and write English or Spanish or any of
the native dialects. “To speak” means to utter words or
articulate sounds with the ordinary voice.
Is naturalization a matter of right?
No, it is a mere privilege so that the right to determine rules
on admission to citizenship by naturalization is an aspect of
sovereignty. Naturalization affects public interest. No alien
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has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory
requirements are complied with.
State the qualifications of an alien before he can be
naturalized
(1.) He must be at least 21 years of age on the date of the
election;
(2.) He must have lived in the PH for 10 years or more;
(3.) He should have conducted himself in an irreproachable
manner during his stay;
(4.) He must own a real estate in the PH worth not less than
P5,000, or he must have some lucrative trade, profession,
or calling; and
(5.) He must be able to speak, write English or Spanish and a
principal Philippine language. He must have enrolled his
children in a recognized school in the Philippines which
teaches Philippine history, civics, and government.
How may the 10-year residence requirement be reduced?
(1.) He was born in the Philippines;
(2.) He is married to a Filipino woman (or man);
(3.) He has served the government or has held an office;
(4.) He has served as a teacher in a private or public school
not limited to children of any nationality in any branch
of education for a period of not less than 2 years; and
(5.) He has made a useful investment or industry in the
Philippines.
Is the requirement that an alien must be married to a Filipino
citizen in order that the 10-year residence requirement be
reduced to 5-years, only applicable to an alien woman? Why?
No, it only applies to a man. This must be so because if an
alien woman is married to an alien who is naturalized, she
follows ipso facto the citizenship of her husband, provided
that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for
naturalization.
Before an alien files his petition for naturalization, what
requirement must he comply with?
The alien must file a declaration of intention with the OSG
stating all the addresses where he stayed during his residence
to enable the said office to conduct character investigation.
Is the requirement of filing a declaration of intention
absolute?
No, because there are exceptions:
(1.) When he was born in the PH and received his primary
and secondary education in the Philippines;
(2.) When he continuously resided in the Philippines for 30
years or more; and
(3.) When he is the widower or child of the applicant who
died before approval of the application.
If a child is adopted, will he follow the citizenship of the
adopter?
No, otherwise, that would defeat the selective policy of
naturalization. Furthermore, adoption is not one of the modes
of acquiring citizenship.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016
Facts:
➔ Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro by Edgardo Militaar.
➔ Parental care and custody over the petitioner was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his
wife.
➔ Three days after, Emiliano reported and registered Grace
Poe as a foundling and was given the name “Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.”
➔ When Grace Poe was 5 years old, FPJ and Susan Roces
(let’s call her Lola Flora) filed a petition for her adoption.
Thus, her name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.
➔ Lola Flora discovered only sometime in the second half
of 2005 that the lawyer who handled Grace’s adoption
failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating petitioner’s new name and the name
of her adoptive parents. Without delay, Lola Flora
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer’s omission
which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. OCR-Iloilo issued
a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.
➔ 1986-1991 - Registered as a voter, applied and was
issued a Philippine Passport, enrolled in UP but left for
abroad to study in Boston College.
➔ 1991 - Married in the Philippines, then thereafter left for
the US.
➔ 2001 - Became a naturalized American citizen.
➔ 2004 - Quit her job.
➔ July 2004 - Went back to the PH to help in FPJ’s
candidacy.
➔ December 2004 to February 2005 - Went back to the PH
because FPJ was dying, then FPJ died. So, she arranged
the funeral and the settlement of FPJ’s estate.
➔ First quarter of 2005 - Decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines.
➔ February 2006 - Quick trip to the US for the disposal of
the family’s remaining household belongings.
➔ March 2006 - Grace’s husband officially informed the US
Postal Service of the family’s change and abandonment
of their address in the US. The family home was
eventually sold.
➔ April 2006 - Husband resigned from his job in the US.
➔ Early 2006 - They bought a 509-sqm lot in QC where they
built their family home.
➔ July 2006 - Grace took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH
pursuant to RA 9225.
➔ August 2006 - Registered as a voter and secured a PH
passport.
➔ October 6, 2010 - Appointed as MTRCB Chairperson.
➔ October 20, 2010 - Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the US.
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➔ October 21, 2010 - Took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB.
➔ July 2011 - Executed an oath or affirmation of
renunciation of nationality of the US.
➔ December 2011 - US Vice Consul issued to Grace a
certificate of loss of nationality of the US.
➔ October 2012 - Grace filed her COC for Senator wherein
she answered 6 years and 6 months to the question of
period of residence in the PH.
➔ October 2015 - Petitioner filed her COC for the 2016
Presidential Elections. In her COC she declared that she
is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the PH
would be 10 years and 11 months.
➔ This triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her.
PETITIONS AGAINST POE-LLAMANZARES
➔ Committed material misrepresentation when she stated
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10
years and 11 months. Petitioner cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was
a foundling. Estrella Elamparo claimed that international
law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship to foundlings.
 COMELEC UPHELD THIS
 MR was filed but COMELEC en banc denied.
➔ Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez questioned her lack of
residency. Further, since the PH adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-
born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status. Also, foundlings
were not expressly included in the categories of citizens
in the 1935 Constitution; thus, indicative of the framers’
intent to exclude them.
ARGUMENTS OF POE-LLAMANZARES
➔ Tatad has no cause of action as he did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case.
➔ The petitions filed against her are petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility
for Presidency. This must be filed with PET and not
COMELEC.
➔ The burden of proof to prove that she is not a natural-
born citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise, she has a
presumption in her favor.
➔ Customary international law dictates that foundlings are
entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens
of the country where they are found. Consequently, the
petitioner is considered a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
➔ As a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under RA 9225.
➔ As early as 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile
of choice in the PH as demonstrated by her children’s
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
resettlement and schooling, the purchase of their condo,
and the construction of their family home.
➔ She could legally reestablish her domicile of choice.
➔ The period of appearing in the residency portion of her
COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.
Issue: W/N customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to
be citizens of the country where they are found.
Held: Yes. Foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is allegedly silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers.
In the Spanish Code
All children of unknown parentage, and who are born in
Spanish territory, are considered Spaniards because of the
presumption that a child of unknown parentage is the son of
a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines so that a
child of unknown parentage, and is born in the Philippines, is
deemed to be a Filipino.
Rafols Proposal
The son of a Filipina to a foreigner, although the latter does
not recognize the child, is not unknown. Their parentage is not
unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father, whom the latter does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos. Foundlings should be governed by
statutory legislation. The rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed
the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed
the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
Although the Rafols proposal was rejected, it is important to
note that it was rejected on the basis that the proposal for a
textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos,
despite its constitutional silence, Montinola and Roxas
pointed that it has been already implicitly recognized. The
Constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. According to
Chief Justice Fernando, the Constitution is not silently silent,
it is silently vocal.
LAWS WHERE THE NATIONALITY OF FOUNDLINGS ARE
IMPLIED
➔ Article II, Section 11 - The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights
➔ Article XIII, Section 1 - Congress must give the highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities
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➔ Article XV, Section 3 - The State is required to defend the
right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.
➔ Article 15 of the New Civil Code - Laws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even
though living abroad.
➔ RA 8043 - Intercountry Adoption
➔ RA 8552 - Domestic Adoption of 1998
➔ A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC - Rule on Adoption
The determination of foundling status is done not by the child,
but by the authorities. The object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. The process is certainly not analogous
to a naturalization proceeding.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation.
➔ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) - Article
15
 Everyone has the right to a nationality
 No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality
➔ UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - Article 7
 The child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a name,
the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his
or her parents.
 States Parties shall ensure the implementation of
these rights in accordance with their national law
and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this eld, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.
➔ 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) - Article 24
 Every child shall have, without any discrimination
as to race, color, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such
measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, society
and the State
 Every child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have a name.
 Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must
be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139,
both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen
years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified
by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have
the "nationality of the country of birth.”
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not
binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which 131
effectively arms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15
(1) of the UDHR. Generally accepted principles of international
law are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as
the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the
ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying
the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems
generally," 136 support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign
judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted
principles of international law" under the incorporation
clause.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis
regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that
their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical
data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Doctrine: Although the Philippines may not be a signatory to
two international treaties, it does not mean that it cannot
effectively take into account the generally accepted principles
of international law.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538. September 20, 2016
“The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as
to callously exclude all foundlings from public service.”
Facts:
➔ (Background ng life ni Grace Poe, same ng sa Poe-
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)
➔ Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013
Elections.
➔ On September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of
Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on
Elections on October 2, 2012. She won and was declared
as Senator-elect.
➔ David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He
contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to
"comply with the citizenship and residency requirements
mandated by the 1987 Constitution."
➔ Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a
Motion to Subpoena the Record of Application of
Citizenship Re-acquisition and other related documents
from the Bureau of Immigration. The documents
requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and
NSO-kept Birth Certificate.
➔ After a number of procedural challenges, SET
promulgated its decision, finding Poe to be a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
Senator.
➔ Now, David assailed this decision to this court.
Issue: W/N a foundling, such as Sen. Poe, be considered a
natural-born citizen.
Held: Yes. Kunwari di pa natin alam.
Maraming layers itong kaso na ito, so let’s just slowly unfold them one by one
tapos turn on your Spotify and listen to “Look At Me Now” ni Chris Brown, Lil
Wayne, and Busta Rhymes cause Grace Poe be like look at me now look at me now
I am getting paper charroz caldo.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening private respondent
with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short
months, the one thing that she has never been in a position
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously
appreciated the implications of all other facts known about
her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in
keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings
before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but
"substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all
children with the misfortune of having been abandoned by
their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior,
second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice
to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the
well-being of children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access
to opportunities for public service.
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
requirement that "no person shall be a Senator unless he [or
she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
DAVID’S ASSERTION
Here, the petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as
Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds: First, he
argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle:
that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line,"
which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner
insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born
citizen, she could never have reverted to natural-born status
despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Petitioner's case
hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino
citizens, more specifically on Section 1 (2), which identifies as
citizens "those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines."
HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND THE WORD OF THE LAW?
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both
of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents.
Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where
parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy
hinges on constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in
discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to identify which
among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction.
• Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are
situated within the whole document — context —
govern.
• Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain
text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous
construction may settle what is more viable.
Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already
sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear
textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision
must necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the
provision being interpreted is the principal source from which
this Court determines constitutional intent. To the extent
possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.
The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was
ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising
their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite.
The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular,
rather than technical-legal, understanding.
The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read
as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each
provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives
life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational
principles to its finest fixings.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument.
A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static. The
more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus,
holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the
interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of
social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock
of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the
word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution —
saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.
NOW MGA MAMSH LET US CONNECT THIS UNDERSTANDING
TO GRACE POE’S CITIZENSHIP
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement
in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but
the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its
own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the
specific provision, which principally governs: the
Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of
"natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized
with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts,
and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the
conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings
are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions
on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the
well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and
respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is
a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'
commencement from birth means that private respondent
never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.
Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who
are citizens of the Philippines:
(1.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3.) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
(4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition
of the term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from
Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against
Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
those who may count themselves as natural-born.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are
better appreciated when supplemented with an
understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and
natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the
term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily
defined, foreign concept.
WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is
the "right to have rights." It is one's "personal and permanent
membership in a political community. The core of citizenship
is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to
participate in government principally through the right to
vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to petition
the government for redress of grievance." Citizenship also
entails obligations to the political community of which one is
part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion
that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these
benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment
of the citizen's birth.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
(pweds niyo naman i-skip tong part na ito, maganda lang kasi siya talaga i-discuss)
Tecson v. Commission on Elections (kaso naman to ng papa
niya, I swear this family owns Article IV charot) reckoned with
the historical development of our concept of citizenship,
beginning under Spanish colonial rule.
Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish
subjects." Church records show that native inhabitants were
referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial
master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior. Natives were,
thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within
Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered
Spaniards. This classification, however, did not extend to the
Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the
archipelago was to be governed by special laws. t was only on
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of
the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens, thus:
(1.) Persons born in Spanish territory, Children of a Spanish
father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(2.) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine
Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States of America
under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on
December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
convert the native inhabitants to American citizens. Instead, it
left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the
Congress of the United States. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality
of the territory in which they may reside.
Thus, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by Congress. Pending legislation
by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had
ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States."
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in
legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as
the Philippine Bill of 1902. This bill explicitly covered the
status of children born in the Philippine Islands to its
inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899.
However, it did not account for the status of children born in
the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view
was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or
citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the
United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include
a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on
acquiring citizenship.
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the
Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It
restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
as amended.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant
of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject
of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on
said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a
mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution
that made sole reference to parentage vis-à-vis the
determination of citizenship.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this
jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating
the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines. While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the
1935 Constitution did not define the term (madami naging
problem here, i-explain nalang sa case ni Mo Ya Lim Yao).
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Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a
"foreign" concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction
as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:
natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one
who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is
one who is not natural-born.
Yung elaborated discussion ng natural-born and naturalized,
mas na-emphasize sa Bengzon vs. HRET.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an
enumeration as to who are natural-born citizens, and
categorically defines such.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the
need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately
selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration
but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's
unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1 (2), which petitioner harps on,
and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine
whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her
citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into
whether she underwent the naturalization process to become
a Filipino. She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent
went through the actual naturalization process. There is no
more straightforward and more effective way to terminate this
inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.
The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children,
individuals whose capacity to act is restricted. It is a glaring
mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the relevant
authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the
grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must
himself or herself adduce.
Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not
determinative of citizenship. Section 1 (2) does not require
one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not
even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of
what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both
parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign. Section 1 (2)
requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage.
The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant.
There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino
bloodline. Section 1 (2) requires citizenship, not identity. A
conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially
proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced
in these proceedings attests to how at least one — if not both
— of her biological parents were Filipino citizens. Proving
private respondent's biological parentage is now practically
impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn
infant. Even the identification of individuals against whom
DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
economic cost, prohibitive. However, our evidentiary rules
admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish
her parentage.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an
inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent
with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The
absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father,
swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just
to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of
ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless
attest to it.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission
on Elections, the Solicitor General underscored how it is
statistically more probable that private respondent was born
a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner (please read the
above digest, complete naman yon).
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in
1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This
translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen. Given the sheer
difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her
parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is
available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private
respondent's parentage.
To require proof from private respondent borders on the
absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy — the identity of her biological parents — is
simply not known. "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;
that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue."
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of
doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence
establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of
evidence to private respondent.
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
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father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise.
The presumption arises when one reads the Constitution as a
whole, so as to "effectuate its whole purpose."
As much as we have previously harmonized, constitutional
provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They
must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend
the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of
the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
and to respect human rights. They must also be read in
conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this
presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino
citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. It is also tantamount to excluding them
from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their
aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the
Constitution, not least of all through the present politically
charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely
to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior
class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority
through no fault of their own. If that is not discrimination, we
do not know what is.
Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens. Specifically,
regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs
have recognized her natural-born status. This status was never
questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances
made it appear that she was a viable candidate for President
of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the
related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's
natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through
various official public acts.
ON THE ISSUE OF POE’S REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP
As it is settled that Poe’s being a foundling is not a bar to
natural born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her
inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles.
Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-
acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her
naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied
with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 stated that "a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine
citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen.
However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition
for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after,
this Petition was granted.
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63
and Republic Act No. 8171 243 specifically "to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries."
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or
reacquisition of natural born citizenship. It also facilitates the
enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities."
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
comply with all of the following requirements:
(1.) First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This
effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a
natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of
full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws,
provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9225 are satisfied.
(2.) Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other
existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right
of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
(3.) Third, making a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under
relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public
office. This required sworn renunciation is intended to
complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in
that "public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law." It is also in
view of this that Section 5 (5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are
serving in the armed forces of other countries from being
appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
Private respondent has complied with all of these
requirements.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had
to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a
naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is
wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No.
9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
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permanence and is to erroneously assume that a natural-born
Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible
termination of his or her natural-born status. In status quo
ante that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a
reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225
intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it
should not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act
No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens
whose citizenship commences only from the moment of
compliance with its requirements.
Repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the
recovery of one's original nationality. Repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
FINALLY, to hold that private respondent is stateless is not
only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make
this Court an accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual,
and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order.
By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright
irresponsibility of those who gave them life, foundlings are
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly
remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then
we can never tolerate an interpretation that condemns
foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their
being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be
deployed against other reasonable interpretations of our
basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but
always with justice in mind. It is the empowering and
ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must
always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation
edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a
humane and civilized people.
Doctrine: When the names of the parents of a foundling
cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient
evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that
satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at
least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this
should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-
born citizen.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings
are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions
on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the
well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and
respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices.
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is
the "right to have rights." It is one's "personal and permanent
membership in a political community. The core of citizenship
is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to
participate in government principally through the right to
vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to petition
the government for redress of grievance." Citizenship also
entails obligations to the political community of which one is
part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion
that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these
benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment
of the citizen's birth.
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino
citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to
the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot
be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the
present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective
of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens
creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that
inferiority through no fault of their own.
Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized elsewhere
and wish to run for elective public office, must comply with all
of the following requirements:
(1.) First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This
effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a
natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of
full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws,
provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9225 are satisfied.
(2.) Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other
existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right
of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
(3.) Third, making a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
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authorized to administer an oath. This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under
relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public
office. Third, making a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under
relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public
office. This required sworn renunciation is intended to
complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in
that "public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law." It is also in
view of this that Section 5 (5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are
serving in the armed forces of other countries from being
appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
Tecson vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004
Facts:
➔ On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President in the forthcoming national elections,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
➔ Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and
to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural- born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
➔ Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
of respondent on two assertions — first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue: W/N FPJ is a natural born citizen, thus, allowed to run
for the office of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20
August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship — (1)
naturalization, (2) jus soli, (3) res judicata and (4) jus sanguinis
— had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last
long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ
was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta
Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San
Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of
FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to
an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español
mother, Marta Reyes.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September
1940. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the
only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that —
(1.) 1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
(2.) 2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
(3.) 3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
(4.) 4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
(5.) 5.At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by
both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
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But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly incorporated the definition of
natural-born citizen into the text, as does the present 1987
Constitution: Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The second paragraph of the provision was intended to
equalize the status of those born of Filipina parents before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973 with
that of those born after that date. Hence, by express
Constitutional at, legitimate children of Filipino mothers born
before the 1973 Constitution who elect Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable time after reaching their majority age are
deemed natural-born citizens even though they had to
perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
It may be noted that, with the singular exception of those
covered by the second sentence of Section 2, as discussed
above, the essential features of natural-born citizenship is that
it is (1) established at birth, and (2) involuntary in character —
that is, a natural-born citizen has no choice in his being a
Filipino.
That more high-ranking public officials are required to be
natural-born Philippine citizens under the present 1987
Constitution than in previous Constitutions may be
interpreted to be further measures taken by the Constitutional
Commissioners to ensure that the nationalist provisions of the
Constitution, political, social and economic, are carried out by
men and women who are of unquestionable loyalty to the
Philippines, whether in war or in peace.
Therefore, that the citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Doctrine: Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child
as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption
that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It
was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against
him.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
What is the distinction between a natural-born and a
naturalized citizen?
(1.) “Natural-born citizens” is defined to those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.
(2.) A “naturalized citizen” is a former alien who become a
Filipino citizen through naturalization.
Is there any exception to the distinction?
YES. Under the third category:
“Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.” are deemed as natural-born citizens.
Is the enumeration under Section 1 exclusive?
NO. Under international law, foundlings are considered
citizens of the place where they are
Found. It may be said that foundlings fall under the 2 nd
category, but this is just a presumption. The legal basis shall
still be international laws.
As regard to the 1st and 2nd group, the 1st group refers to
Filipino citizens under previous Constitutions and under
judicial decisions as well. The 2nd group requires that either
one of the parents is a citizen of the Philippines. In this case,
the SC distinguished the children born under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions born to Filipino mothers. What is the
difference?
• Under the 1935 Constitution, children born to Filipino
mothers only acquire an inchoate right to citizenship to
be elected upon reaching the age of majority. They only
acquire a right of expectancy.
• Under the 1973 Constitution, a child born to Filipino
mothers become a Filipino citizen without performing
any act to acquire or perfect that citizenship.
• Under the 1987 Constitution, aside from adopting the
principle under the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution even bent backward the 1935 Constitution
by giving them the status of natural born Filipino citizen
in order to cure the male chauvinistic principle applied
under the 1935 Constitution, according to Father Bernas.
Why there is a cutoff on January 17, 1973?
Effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
The SC said that illegitimate children follow the citizenship of
their only known parent, who is the mother. This is a generally
accepted principle of international law. Do we apply this rule
absolutely? That illegitimate children follow the citizenship of
the mother?
No. In this case, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) was born to an
American mother, his parents were not married, making him
an illegitimate child. The rule that illegitimate children follow
the citizenship of their mother was not applied in the case of
FPJ.
Why?
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The parentage of FPJ was traced back to his grandfather,
Lorenzo Pou, who, based on his death certificate (he was 84
years old when he died on September 11, 1954), was already
alive on April 11, 1899. The place of death of the grandfather
was in Pangasinan, hence, it is presumed that it is the place of
his residence at the time that he is alive. It is presumed that
the grandfather is already in Pangasinan when the en masse
Filipinization of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was implemented.
In that regard, it was presumed that the grandfather
benefitted from the en masse Filipinization.
The SC applied presumption in order to grant Filipino
citizenship to the grandfather of FPJ. Since the grandfather is
presumed to be a Filipino citizen, then the father of FPJ is also
a Filipino citizen. FPJ is then considered as a Filipino citizen
under the 3rd category of the 1935 Constitution: those born
to Filipino fathers, without any qualification. We shall only
apply rules of international law in order to accommodate a
child to become a Filipino citizen. We cannot apply this rule
in order to deprive/prejudice/discriminate a child of its
Filipino citizenship.
Co vs. House of Representatives
G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991
Facts:
➔ In 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
➔ As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration. The father of the private respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
➔ Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
➔ As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-
Filipina, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
➔ The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the
private respondent who was born in 1948.
➔ The private respondent's father never emigrated from
this country. He decided to put up a hardware store in
Samar.
➔ In the meantime, the father of the private respondent,
unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.LibLex
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
➔ On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955
as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
➔ Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
➔ At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
➔ After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila. He graduated from college, and thereafter took
and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
➔ Since employment opportunities were better in Manila,
the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in
the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his
family in Manila.
➔ In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a
natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on
the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and
solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother,
as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention
had to be aware of the meaning of natural born
citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
➔ The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang,
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days,
and married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
➔ For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
registered as a voter of Laoang, Samar and voted there
during those elections.
➔ The private respondent ran for public office as
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even
if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined,
Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
➔ The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET
declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
for voting purposes.
➔ Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
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➔ Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
➔ The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
 Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
 Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
Issue: W/N Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: Yes, the petitions are dismissed.
Article IV read: "SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution;
(2.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3.) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
(4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural born citizens."
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying
not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after
February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair
position which discriminates against Filipino women.
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers.
To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to
give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable
situation. It must also be retroactive.
The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were
placed on equal footing. They were both considered as
natural-born citizens.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot
be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result
in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same
similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that
is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore,
treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative
in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable
and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it
not been for the curative provisions.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this
case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or
chose to be a Filipino citizen.
FORMAL ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE
WHO HAVE YET TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND
NOT TO THOSE WHO ARE ALREADY FILIPINOS WHEN THE
TIME TO ELECT COMES.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution accords natural born status to children born
of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since
he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement
of the Court, we held: Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.” The private respondent did
more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
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For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in the rural town of Samar where
there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. His
profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations
and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises
as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does
not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during
election time, running for public office, and other categorical
acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of
choice for these persons.
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr.
Ong elected citizenship.
It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age,
his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies
its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
RESIDENCE IN ELECTION LAW IS EQUIVALENT TO DOMICILE.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under
the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood
as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that
of domicile, to wit: The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IS NOT MATERIAL IN DETERMINING
THE RESIDENCE.
To require the private respondent to own property in order to
be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meets the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that
the candidate should also own property in order to be
qualified to run.
Doctrine: Formal election of citizenship applies only to those
who have yet to acquire Philippine citizenship and not to
those who are already Filipinos when the time to elect comes.
Republic vs. Lim
G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004
Facts:
➔ This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of
entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by
respondent Chule Y. Lim.
➔ Respondent claimed that she was born on October 29,
1954 in Buru- an, Iligan City.
➔ Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan
transferred her record of birth to Iligan City.
➔ She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City
records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays
that they be corrected.
➔ The trial court issued an Order finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance and set the hearing on
December 27, 1999.
➔ During the hearing, respondent testified the following:
 She claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as
"Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school
records and in her marriage certificate. She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency
in her use of the surname "Yu".
 She claims that her father's name in her birth record
was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should
have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
 That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it
should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter
attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
 Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth
certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
➔ Placida Anto, respondent's mother, testified that she is a
Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from
Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter's father
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were never married because the latter had a prior
subsisting marriage contracted in China.
➔ Respondent presented a certification attested by officials
of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
➔ The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City,
did not present any evidence although it actively
participated in the proceedings by attending hearings
and cross- examining respondent and her witnesses.
➔ On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted
respondent's petition.
➔ The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
decision
Issue: Whether or not the respondent complied with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority.
Held: Yes. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the
Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements
of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who
was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her
Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As
such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional
and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently,
she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, citing In re
Florencio Mallare, we held: no other act would be necessary
to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship. Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship edges to which he is rightfully entitled.
Notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
NOTE: Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be
made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that
the Republic's failure to cite this error amounts to a
recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can
be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Doctrine: By being an illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having
to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority.
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
In re: Vicente Ching
B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999
Facts:
➔ Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat
Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964.
➔ Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
➔ On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
➔ In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, Ching
submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
 Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the
Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
 Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of
the said place; and
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 Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued
by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was
elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
➔ On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations
were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees.
➔ The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was
scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath.
➔ Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April
1999, he was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship.
➔ In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition
for admission to the bar and on the documents
evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
➔ On 8 July 1999, the OSG filed its comment,, stating that
Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was
a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen."
➔ The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only
an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect
by election upon reaching the age of majority."
➔ In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of
the person making the election must be a citizen of the
Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon
reaching the age of majority.'"
➔ The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority”
➔ In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence.
➔ However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the
standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625
prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
➔ On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching
therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15
July 1999.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Issue: Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within
a "reasonable time"? or whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
Held: No. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing
charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty- five" are citizens
of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative
effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for
those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election
of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing
the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the
age of majority.
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The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority.
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true
that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may
be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However,
we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the
foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty- eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after
he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born 11 April 1964,
was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the
age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his
being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements
for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching
has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Doctrine: Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.
What is the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority"?
(1.) It has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted
by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years.
(2.) Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino.
The ruling of the Court in the case of Mallare, In re: Florencio
Mallare is NOT applicable in the case at bar:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925
(when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference
for Philippine citizenship.
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those
in the present case, thus, negating its applicability.
First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence,
the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine
citizenship would not be applicable to him.
Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly
pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban
Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as
they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.
For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving
in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
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An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because
he is a national of two countries.
Cabiling vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 183133. July 26, 2010
Facts:
➔ Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., Valeriano, Lechi Ann, Arceli, Nicolas,
and Isidro are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a
Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
➔ Petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all
born under the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
➔ They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided
in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their
whole lives, studied and received their primary and
secondary education in the country; they do not speak
nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot
in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father;
they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
➔ Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they
claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section
1 (4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides
that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines.
➔ Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as
required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625
(An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to
Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person
whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July
2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected
Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.
On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement.
➔ Individual certifications show that all of them are
registered voters of Barangay Washington, since June
1997, and that records on previous registrations are no
longer available because of the mandatory general
registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from
exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the
incumbent Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington,
Surigao City.
➔ The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a Certification
showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27
January 1986. However, no other supporting documents
appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR
nor that she subsequently elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no
document exists that will provide information on the
citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.
➔ Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit
alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7)
children are undesirable and overstaying aliens.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public
respondents, rendered a Judgment finding that Felix Ma
and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613
supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to
prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election
proceedings, public respondents concluded that they are
undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.
Issue: W/N children born under the 1935 Constitution of a
Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of
allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of
majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign
nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for
failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Held: No. The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. In
accordance thereto, the statutory formalities of electing
Philippine citizenship are:
(1.) a statement of election under oath;
(2.) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and
(3.) registration of the statement of election and of the oath
with the nearest civil registry.
In Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente
D. Ching, it was pronounced: The 1935 Constitution and C.A.
No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said that it
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
The instant case presents a different factual setting.
Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements
upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration
of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts’ peculiar to the petitioners, the
right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for
such election. We are not prepared to state that the mere
exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the
place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that
where, as in petitioners' case, the election of citizenship has in
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fact been done and documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the
meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise
of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
For what purpose is registration? Registration is the
confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It
is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a
means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
Doctrine: What we now say is that where, as in petitioners'
case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory
timeframe, the registration of the documents of election
beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile
positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and
continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is
actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
Facts:
➔ Petitioner Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for
the same period upon presentment before the proper
Portuguese consular officer.
➔ Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen,
petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still
a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong.
Issue: W/N there was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship
Held: YES. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts
considered together constitute an express renunciation of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization.
In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano,
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference
or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal
of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity
or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
Doctrine: Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication. Philippine citizenship, it
must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013
Facts:
➔ Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
However, when he decided to be a naturalized American
citizen, he lost his Filipino citizenship as a consequence.
➔ Later, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008.
➔ On the same day, an order of approval of his Citizenship
retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
➔ On April 3, 2009, Arnado, again, took his Oath of
Allegiance to the RP and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
➔ On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
➔ On April 28, 2010, Linog Balua, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor.
Balua contended that Arnaldo is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner—
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnaldo as
“USA-American”.
➔ Further, Balua presented in his memorandum a
computer-generated travel record indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines. Likewise, a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration, certifying that the name
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“Arnado, Rommel Cagoco” appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on
file.
➔ The COMELEC first division issued an order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within 3 days from the receipt. After
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
However, neither motion was acted upon.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. Balua's contention that Arnado is
a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding
that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention," whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code." In the matter
of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division
disagreed with Arnado's claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
The COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the
proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office
is questioned." The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the
treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and
set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado's
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
(1.) By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No.
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of
another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again
(2.) The use of a US passport [. . .] does not operate to revert
back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation
as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use
of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce"
what he has earlier on renounced.
THE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF COMELEC
CHAIRMAIN SIXTO BRILLANTES
"The application of the more assimilative principle of
continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either
by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he
voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the
instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino
despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
THE DISSENTING OPINION OF COMELEC COMMISSIONER
RENE V. SARMIENTO
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States. The latter's continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs
contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his
Philippine citizenship. Respondent's submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified
to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the
latter's failure to comply with the qualification requirements
regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes
of the law, his having received the highest number of votes
does not validate his election. His ouster from office does not
violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to
breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who
expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when
they elected their representatives who enacted the law.
WHO IS CASAN MACODE MAQUILING?
(Kasi baka siyempre magwonder kayo bakit siya ang petitioner pero bakit di siya
namemention—hindi siya important sa issue ng Citizenship. But, lagay na rin natin)
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc
a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently,
he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
A rnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
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Thus, Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that
Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty
race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Issue: W/N the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
Held: Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position.
Section 5 (2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 provides: Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions: Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run
for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once
but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines
in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced
his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility
to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship,
he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing
his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter
to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position. Arnado's category of dual citizenship
is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere
filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
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Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position. In effect, Arnado
was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period
of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on
which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."
This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was
after complying with the requirements that he performed
positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running
for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991. The purpose of the Local
Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to
allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a
foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's flag and
country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the
Republic and to no other.
Doctrine: The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to
be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. The citizenship
requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It
must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of
the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue
to attack.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's flag and
country.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989
Facts:
➔ Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province
of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
➔ The league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter filed with
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States in 1983.
➔ Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized, but pleaded
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against the Marcos dictatorship. He further
contended that it was a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s
agents abroad. He added that he had returned after the
EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy.
➔ Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his
affirmative defenses, but COMELEC decided to set the
case for hearing on the merits.
➔ Frivaldo, then, filed for a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to ask the said orders to be set aside on the
ground that it has been rendered with GADALEJ.
➔ However, the petitioners continued to assert that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election. Therefore, disqualifying him to run for and be
elected as Governor.
➔ Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines
because his naturalization as an American citizen was not
"impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the
Nottebohm Case, “where a German national's
naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized
because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience
only. He said he could not have repatriated himself
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before the 1988 elections because the Special
Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by
LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized then.”
➔ His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the
1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the United States,
thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by
reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to
disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: W/N Frivaldo could not continue as governor since his
candidacy and election is null and void due to his alienage.
Held: Yes. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article
XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at
all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the
Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective
office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy, he filed on November 19, 1987,
Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner
was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it
cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced
into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion
that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to
have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared
"on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been
a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their
Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to
the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the
Conflict of Nationality Laws. Nottebohm was a German by
birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied
for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his
family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground
that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed
suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The
International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a
national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it
dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states
as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the
case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national.
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case
Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods,
he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of
the United States.
The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States
as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he
did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of
the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a
stateless individual.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical
acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of
candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration
the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special
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Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant
simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done,
or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken.
The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
The status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must
show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his
loyalty and love.
Doctrine: Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Concurring Opinion (Justice Guttierez Jr.)
The public good should supersede any procedural infirmities.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to
a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And
perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly. The
pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court
found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC.
This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any
serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained
his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the
procedure pro hac vice.
Republic vs. De La Rosa
G.R. No. 104654. June 6, 1994
Facts:
➔ On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of
Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the
Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63.
➔ On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion
to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested
his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the
certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the
scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on
March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24.
➔ Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of
governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992
elections. Private respondent was the official candidate
of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
(Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
➔ Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22,
1992.
➔ On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
to annul the proclamation of private respondent as
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the
grounds: (1) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and (2) that private respondent
is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed
that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be
considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the
remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
➔ Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino
citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive
because the case is still on appeal.
➔ On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to
decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all
petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a
certi􏰃cate of candidacy must be decided "not later than
fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.
Commission on Elections, which ruled that all pre-
proclamation controversies should be summarily
decided.
➔ The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not
yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the
decision granting him the same is not yet final and
executory. However, it submits that the issue of
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disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds
allowed in a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover,
the said petition was filed out of time.
Issue: W/N Frivaldo was duly readmitted to his citizenship as
a Filipino
Held: No. Private respondent is declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon.
THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE NATURALIZATION LAW IS
JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE. Private respondent, having
opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow
the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an
applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements
which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or
merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and
one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman
who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition
for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance
taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the
publication and posting requirements under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional. Moreover, the
publication and posting of the petition and the order must be
in its full text for the
court to acquire jurisdiction.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations
required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, particularly:
(1.) that the petitioner is of good moral character;
(2.) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at
least ten years;
(3.) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of
the principal dialects;
(4.) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from
the date of the filing of the petition until his admission
to Philippine citizenship; and
(5.) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is
excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
(6.) The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral
character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of
the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed
to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as
required by Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court were marred by the
following irregularities:
(1.) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself;
(2.) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition;
(3.) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the 185 judgment; and
(4.) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing
the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only
after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the
Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the
date of his receipt of the copy of the decision.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting
citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory
until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able
to observe if:
(1.) the applicant has left the country;
(2.) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession;
(3.) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of government promulgated rules; and
(4.) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government
announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts
cannot implement any decision granting the petition for
naturalization before its finality.
Doctrine: The requirements under the naturalization law is
jurisdictional in nature.
Labo vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989
Facts:
➔ The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission
on Elections from looking into the question of his
citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of
Baguio City.
➔ Going over the record, we find that there are two
administrative decisions on the question of the
petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the
petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. The second
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was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
➔ It is important to observe that in the proceeding before
the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein
petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of
Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected,
was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and
registered as en alien with the CID upon his return to this
country in 1980.
➔ On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into
account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul
in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an
Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976.
➔ The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the
above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained
Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming
back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and
registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration.
He later asked for the change of his status from
immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and
was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence. He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia
in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by
him and even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.
➔ The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no
claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a
formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen.
➔ As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took
the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen
of Australia, and to fulfill his duties as an Australian
citizen."
Issue: W/N Labo can retain his public office.
Held: NO. Forfeiture of foreign citizenship does not restore
Philippine citizenship formerly lost.
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia
made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him
of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot
stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. Among these are:
(1.) naturalization in a foreign country;
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
(2.) express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3.) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning
in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that
his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship. What we must consider is the fact that
he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO QUESTIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP. There is also the claim that the decision can no
longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but
this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several
cases. Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and
seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer,
having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply
to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not
present in this case.
The probability that many of those who voted for the
petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified
only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election
cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him.
These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of
them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is
deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election.
The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after
the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by
default.
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Doctrine: Forfeiture of foreign citizenship does not restore
Philippine citizenship formerly lost.
Aznar vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990
Facts:
➔ On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
➔ On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial
Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.
➔ On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal
Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago certifying that the private respondent
is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
➔ The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of
Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until
the final resolution of the main petition.
➔ On January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend
the proclamation.
➔ Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino
citizen, alleging:
 that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr.;
 that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987;
 that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and
 that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965.
➔ On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the
Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
Having obtained the highest number of votes, private
respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of
Cebu.
➔ on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the
petition for disqualification for not having been timely
filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Issue:
(1.) Whether or not the petition questioning the qualification
of Emilio Osmena was not timely filed?
(2.) Whether or not Osmena is not a Filiipino Citizen?
Held:
(1.) YES.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office
for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881:
 Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof, xxx
the petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. xxx
 After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, xxx
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results
of the election." xxx
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner
filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent
on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was
filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was
filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent
cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3,
1988.
However, we deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain
the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the
public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There
is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case,
as the COMELEC did below.
(2.) NO.
Petitioner's contention that the private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for
and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu,
is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these
are:
(1.) by naturalization in a foreign country;
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(2.) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3.) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña
did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized
as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner
merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued
alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and
permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that
because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and
"being an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws."
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private
respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier
stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish
this fact.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies
having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is
a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed.
Furthermore, in the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation
of said citizenship.
Doctrine: The renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".
Separate Opinions:
Melencio-Herrera (dissenting)
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from
accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life,
involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958,
at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificate of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past
regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for
the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his
alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that
"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That
statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared
by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for
one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Cruz (dissenting)
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an
alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms
"citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint
of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at
bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local
state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of
its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no
naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United
States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as
an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
in 1958 and in 1979?.
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No.
83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in
a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do
not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest
such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that
Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as
an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to
simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts
could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation
of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did
more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did
was register with the Philippine government as an alien within
its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from
the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a
voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not
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required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do
so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked
the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American
and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that
was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 DOES NOT necessarily require that the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection
with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign
country. Renunciation may be made independently of
naturalization proceedings.
Padilla (dissenting)
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio
Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual citizenship,
i.e., Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother.
However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 filed with the Philippine immigration
authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration
Commissioners vs. Go Callano, express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual
citizenship holder — like the private respondent of age, and
with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath
applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an
alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the
Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No.
015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D)
and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated
3 January 1980.
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine
immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu CityNative
Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November
1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a
duly- registered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.
Sarmiento (concurring)
If the private respondent became an American by
naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship. If he, however,
became one by the application of the principle of jus soli, it is
by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not
lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of
Filipino parents.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had
ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is,
at the same time, a citizen of the United States. There must be
a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The
fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration,
standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."
Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
Facts:
➔ Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati.
➔ The proclamation of private respondent was suspended
in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by
a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.
➔ In its resolution, COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he
is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
➔ On May 8, 1998, private respondent led a motion for
reconsideration. The motion remained pending even
until after the election held.
➔ Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044,
the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice
mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of
the winner.
➔ On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the
case for disqualification. Petitioner's motion was
opposed by private respondent.
➔ The motion was not resolved. Instead, the COMELEC en
➔ banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, reversed the ruling of its
Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati.
➔ Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
board of canvassers, proclaimed private respondent as
vice mayor.
➔ This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
aforesaid resolution of the
➔ COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.
Issue: W/N Manzano is qualified to be Vice Mayor.
Held: Yes. The record shows that private respondent was born
in the US with Filipino parents, and since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that,
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at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and
of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held
that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and
1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking
part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged
renunciation was made when private respondent was already
37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority. In holding that by voting
in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his
American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind
Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall
lose his nationality by voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory."
To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power
given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations.
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the
oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without
merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.
Muh is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that
he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States
on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of
his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered
simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the
Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends
that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress
has "commanded in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who
allegiance. are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be
bound by a second allegiance. DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL
Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
Arises when, as a result of Dual allegiance, on the LAW.”
the concurrent application other hand, refers to the
of the different laws of two situation in which a person Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
or more states, a person is simultaneously owes, by allegiance, thus: A significant number of Commissioners
simultaneously considered some positive act, loyalty expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense
a national by said states. to two or more states. that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
Such a person, ipso facto which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate
and without any voluntary thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which
act on his part, is pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which
concurrently considered a implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution
citizen of both states. is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
It is possible for the citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
following classes of defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
citizens of the Philippines Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
to possess dual citizenship: security. I have detected a genuine and deep concern about
(1.) Those born of Filipino double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance
fathers and/or which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
mothers in foreign appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to
countries, which allow the determination of a future legislature. But considering the
the principle of jus scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this
soli; country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
(2.) Those born in the double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
The result of an individual's Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper
Philippines of Filipino
volition. time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws citizenship?”
of their fathers'
country such children In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
are citizens of that Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se
country; and but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
(3.) Those who marry their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
aliens if by the laws of the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in
the latter's country R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
the former are allegiance."
considered citizens,
unless by their act or Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
omission they are under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
deemed to have who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect
renounced Philippine to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship. citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt considering that their condition is the unavoidable
with by law." consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity: “I want
to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I
reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening
than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a
function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at
all. When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of
As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "Dual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for
naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" of which
at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a
certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In
Parado v. Republic, it was held that when a person applying
for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied
and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of
our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the
law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application. It would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.
Doctrine: In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect
to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "Dual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
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Bengzon III vs. HRET
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001
Facts:
➔ The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue
in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
"no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."
➔ Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
➔ On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country."
➔ Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as
a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
➔ On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won.
➔ Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held: YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1.) desertion of the armed forces;
(2.) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
(3.) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;
(4.) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5.) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when
he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides: “SECTION 1. Any person
who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.”
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Doctrine: Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of
a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic
necessity.
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As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971
Facts:
➔ On 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application
for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Hongkong, and
that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines
to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for one
month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a
period of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Cheng filed a bond
in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country.
➔ After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13,
1962.
➔ On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen.
➔ Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action before the CFI for injunction with
preliminary injunction against the Commissioner of
Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to
leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and
deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her
failure to do so.'
Issue: W/N mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
automatically confers on the latter Philippine citizenship
Held: NO.
For ready reference, we requote Section 15: "Sec. 15. Effect of
the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. "Minor children
of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippines shall be consider citizens thereof. "A foreign-
born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not
in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall
be deemed a Philippines citizen only during his minority,
unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. "A child born
outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within
one year after reaching the age of minority, he fails to register
himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of
the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath
of allegiance."
We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman who married an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.
The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those
who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1 [5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization,
under this provision, include not only those who are
naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire
citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of
law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife
through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of
an alien woman to a citizen.
The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer
Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes
of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood
or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the
Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons
enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is
for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all
alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens,
from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such
citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What
it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the
Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
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acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it
also determines the point of time at which such citizenship
commences.
The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife
should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she
proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from
it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition
precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only
a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established
and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that
phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to
Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to
become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand.
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition,
which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition."
Doctrine: An alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4
of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those
who are naturalized in accordance with law". Citizens by
naturalization, under this provision, include not only those
who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for
the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of
law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife
through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of
an alien woman to a citizen.
The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife
should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she
proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from
it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition
precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only
a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum. The word "might," as used
in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her
marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had the
power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then
in force.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand.
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of
the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported
by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband
to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the
groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its
order or decision granting or denying the petition.
Altajeros vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004
Facts:
➔ Altajeros was a candidate for mayor.
➔ Altiche and Versoza, however, filed with the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Altajeros on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and that he made false representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent
resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
➔ Altiche and Versoza alleged that based on a letter from
the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), Altajeros was a holder
of a permanent US resident visa, an Alien Certificate of
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Registration, and an Immigration Certificate of
Residence.
➔ Petitioner filed an answer, stating that he did not commit
false representation because he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation after he filed a petition for
repatriation. Thus, he claimed that his Filipino citizenship
was already restored, qualifying him to run as mayor.
Hence, he sought the dismissal of the petition.
➔ Atty. Zaragoza Jr., regional election direction,
recommended that Altajeros be disqualified.
Subsequently, the COMELEC first division and en banc
promulgated a resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: W/N the registration of Altajeros’ repatriation with the
civil registry and BOI a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
Held: Yes. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171 states that
repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration
of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry
and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on
December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was
registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six
years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of
Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore,
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he
filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but
before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an
elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that
the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying
to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term."
The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed,
thus: Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "an
elective local official must be:
(1.) A citizen of the Philippines;
(2.) A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province where he intends to be elected;
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
(3.) A resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election’
(4.) Able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect."
In addition, "candidates for the position of governor must be
at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."

From this, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence, which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election and age at least twenty-three years of age on election
day.

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for

holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof.

Doctrine: In addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate
of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a
citizen.

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Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva