SAMUEL JULIAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CITY SHERIFF, Respondents.

Facts:

The case is all about failure of petitioner to pay required docket fees despite lapse of time. RTC on its decision
denied an order for submission of parties of joint motion to dismiss the case but two years passed but failed
to follow the order, therefore RTC dismissed the order for unreasonable time of compliance of such order.
When moved to appeal, petitioner, failed to pay necessary fees, an instant order of dismissal of the appeal
was rendered.

Petitioner acknowledges the mandatory nature of the rule that docket and other lawful fees must be paid in
full within the prescribed period for an appeal to be perfected. However, he asserts that the broader interest
of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the merits call for leniency in the application of
the rules. Hence, he must be given an opportunity to air his cause without the constraints of technicalities.
Petitioner contends that the CA should apply the pronouncement of this Court in Yambao v. Court of
Appeals40 relaxing the policy of strict adherence to the rule regarding appeal fees if justifiable reason for the
non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is shown. He further
contends that his act of attaching the payment for the fees to his Motion for Reconsideration shows his
intention and willingness to comply with the rules.

ISSUE: was the dismissal of ca proper?

HELD: YES.

The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be
disregarded without the most compelling of reasons.

Now petitioner comes before the Court praying for leniency in the interest of justice. It must be stressed,
however, that it is only when persuasive reasons exist that the Rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Here, the Court finds
that petitioner is under no threat of suffering an injustice. On the contrary, it will be the height of injustice if
the Court accords petitioner leniency and reinstates his appeal as this would mean further waiting on the
part of the respondent which has long been deprived of its right to possess the property it owns.

Galang Jr. vs Gernonimo

Facts:
1. Petitioner Galang was proclaimed winner as mayor during the May 2010 Automated
Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Romblon.
2. The proclamation was based on the COC, but without the official signed Certificateof Canvas
for Proclamation (COCP). This was done with the approval of theProvincial Board of Canvassers
Chairman.
3. Respondent Ramos, who was also a candidate requested COMELEC to conduct amanual
reconciliation of the votes cast Granted
4. The manual reconciliation was done on May 20, 2010 after which, the 8 winning Sangguniang
Bayan Members were also proclaimed.
5. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan
Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation.
6. As for the COCP for the previously proclaimed mayor and vice mayor candidates, the total
number of votes for each of the candidates remained the same even after the manual
reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to read May 20,2010 to
correspond with the date of manual reconciliation.
7. Respondent Ramos filed an election protest case against petitioner Galang beforeRTC.8.
The court sheriff went to petitioner Galang’s residence to serve summons with a
copy of the petition the Sheriff’s Return of Summons states that the sheriff was
able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of
the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner’s residence
9. Petitioner Galang appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of
the election protest. During hearing, respondent Judge directed Galang to file the proper
pleading and Galang subsequently filed a Motion to Admit answer.
10. Trial court found the service of Summons on petitioner Galang as valid (the assailed order),
and declaring the Answer filed was filed out of time hence, was DENIED.
11. Petitioner Galang filed an Omnibus Motion to restore protestee’s standing in court,
an MR for the assailed order, and to suspend proceedings pending resolution of the
Falsification case DENIED12. Petitioner Galang filed this present petition for certiorari and
prohibition underR65, alleging that respondent judge Geronimo acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with GADALEJ in considering the Sheriff’s Service of Summons on a
person not residing in petitioner’s residence
13. Respondents argued that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with the SC but
with COMELEC

Issue/s:
1.
WON petitioner Galang’s petition for certiorari should be filed with
COMELEC

Held: YES
1. Section 4, Rule 65 provides that in election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal
or regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.

2. Interpreting the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or juridical tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal has jurisdiction
to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
3. Section 8, Rule 14 of 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before CourtsInvolving
Elective Municipal Officers:
“
An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within 5 days after
promulgation, filing notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy
served on adverse counsel or on adverse party not represented by counsel”.

4. Since it is COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal fromthe decision
of the RTC in election contests involving elective municipal officials, thenit is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of itsappellate jurisdiction.

5. Therefore, petitioner Galang erred in invoking the SC’s power to issue said
extraordinary writ.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED. Winner: Respondent Geronimo.

G.R. No. 180687 October 6, 2010

ESMERALDO C. ROMULLO, PEDRO MANGUNDAYAO, MAXIMO ANES, ELVIRA BONZA, ROBERTO BELARMINO,
TELESPORO GARCIA, BETH ZAIDA GIMENEZ, CELSO LIBRANDO, MICHAEL DELA CRUZ, and ROBERTO
ARAWAG, Petitioners,
vs.
SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG BAYANIHAN COMPOUND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its President, PAQUITO QUITALIG, Respondent.

Facts: An ejectment case was filed against the petitioners when they failed to pay monthly
amortization of the lot they acquired from the respondent association. It went to settlement
proceedings but to no avail and so it reached to MeTC. Said court give more weight to the
contentions of the petitioners that respondent neither informed them of the status of the housing
project and its scheduled meetings, nor were they notified of respondent’s registration with the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), wherein some of them were excluded in the master list of
members/beneficiaries. Petitioners further argued that the board resolutions expelling them as members
and disqualifying them as beneficiaries of the respondent’s housing project were null and void as the terms
of office of the members of the Board of Directors who passed the said resolutions had already expired at the
time the meeting was held. Moreover, they maintained that the case should have been suspended due to a
prejudicial question brought about by the filing of another suit by some of them with the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) entitled "Esmeraldo C. Romul[l]o, et al. v. Paquito Quitalig, et al." As
counterclaims, petitioners sought awards of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.

RTC and CA reversed Metc decision and ruled that respondent has a cause of action to file ejectment case
against the petitioners.

ISSUE: wether or not CA erred on its decision that respondent has cause of action

HELD: The court ruled in favor of respondent conforming with RTC and CA’s decision.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction of which lies with the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought within one year from the date of last demand; and the issue in said case is the right to physical
possession.13

Based on the foregoing, we have held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.14

Excellent Quality Apparel v. Win Multi Rich Builders (G.R. No. 175048)

Facts:
In 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders, a
registered sole proprietorship, for the construction of a garment factory. In 1997, herein
respondent Win Multi Rich Builders was incorporated with the SEC. It then filed a complaint for
sum of money against petitioner. In a hearing held, the counsel of respondent Win moved that
that its name in the case be changed to that of Multi Rich Builders. Petitioner noticing the
variance in the name moved to dismiss the case asserting Win was not the contractor neither a
party to the contract, thus it cannot institute the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Win has legal personality to institute the case.

Ruling: NO.
Win admitted that the contract was executed between Multi-Rich and petitioner. It further
admitted that Multi-Rich was a sole proprietorship with a business permit issued by the Office
of the Mayor of Manila. A sole proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form
of business enterprise. It is an unorganized business owned by one person. The sole proprietor
is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business. A sole proprietorship does
not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of
the enterprise. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or
empower it to file or defend an action in court.
The original petition was instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a
collection of sum of money suit which involved a construction contract entered into by
petitioner and Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship. The counsel of Win wanted to change the
name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The change cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff
in the collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of a sole
proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not vested with juridical personality to file or
defend an action.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit and claim the receivables of its predecessor in
business, in this case a sole proprietorship, it must show proof that the corporation had
acquired the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship. Win could have easily presented or
attached any document e.g., deed of assignment which will show whether the assets, liabilities
and receivables of Multi-Rich were acquired by Win. Having been given the opportunity to
rebut the allegations made by petitioner, Win failed to use that opportunity. Thus, we cannot
presume that Multi-Rich is the predecessor-in-business of Win and hold that the latter has
standing to institute the collection suit.

Domingo vs CARAGUE
FACTS:
This case was a petition for certiorari is the legality of a resolution No. of the Commission on
Audit(COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged therein that
this Plan isintrinsically void for want of an enabling law which gives that COA to undertake the
same and providingfor the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines,
and parameters. Petitionersfurther alleged COA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), countered that petitioners have no legalstanding to file the present petition
since they have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome of thecase" or an actual or
potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. In essence, it isalleged that the
petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim otherwise by reason that
thematter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere
reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon its audit
performance. This will havean impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its
audit supervision, thus, should be treatedas a matter of transcendental importance.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.

HELD:
The Supreme Court decided, NO.It stated that:(Locus Standi)There was no showing that they
had any
 direct and personal interest

in the COA OrganizationalRestructuring Plan. There was also of an admission that "they do not
seek any affirmative relief norimpute any improper or improvident act against the
respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire toseek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal benefit orgain." Hence, the petitioners do
not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. This case was
decided by the Supreme Court En Banc.He who is directly affected and whose interest is immed
iate andsubstantial has the standing to sue. A party must show a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or aninjury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to
warrant an invocation of thecourt

Cerezo v. Tuazon
0
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004

o TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious Liability v. Subsidiary Liability

FACTS:

Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in
Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo,
the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There
was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons
was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because
there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-
delict under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or
may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from
the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict
and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or
a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable

party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom
no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in
action for quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where
there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the
entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no
merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the
parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary
party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is
not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as
contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation
rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that
the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for his
own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it
implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in
the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in
itself a principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer
for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer
liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action
where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present
action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and
independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of
a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent action based on
quasi-delict against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.

LIMOS V SPOUSES ODONES

Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued.
Facts:
Private respondents Sps Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages
against petitioners Limos, Rosa delos Reyes and Sps Delos Reyes before Tarlac RTC.
The complaint alleged that they are the owners of a 940 sq m land by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated Jan 29, 2004, executed by the surviving heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, in whom the original title was vested.
After registering the document of conveyance, they found out that the OCT was cancelled and
replaced by a TCT in the petitioners’ name.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT by virtue of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Donata
and husband on April 18, 1972. Respondents sought the cancellation of said TCTs on the
ground that the Sps Lardizabal’s signatures were forgeries.
In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, which was denied, and in their
answer pleaded affirmative defenses: (a) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the
respondents’ alleged title is void & are not real parties-in-interest (b) non-joinder of the other
heirs of Donata as indispensable parties (c) respondents’ claim is barred by laches. In reply,
respondents maintained their standing and appended a sworn statement of heir Amadeo
Razalan. *
Petitioners also served upon respondents a Request for Admission, which respondents failed to
respond to, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special
and Affirmative Defenses. RTC & CA denied said motion because respondents had already
replied*, hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N respondents’ failure to respond to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied
admission & a preliminary hearing should therefore be conducted
W/N the affirmative defense of non-joinder of indispensable parties is a ground for dismissal of
action
Held:
No. The application of the rules and determination of sanction to be imposed upon failure to
comply with modes of discovery rests on sound judicial discretion. Matters set forth in the
petitioners’ Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses in their answer which
respondents already traversed in their Reply.
No. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was
issued.

[G.R. NO. 157065 : July 11, 2006]

ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT &
CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the HERITAGE PARK
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (HPMC), Respondents

FACTS:

The Heritage Memorial Park is a flagship project of the Bases

Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) in Fort Bonifacio. the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) designated as the floor manager of
the pool project, contracted petitioner for landscaping and
construction of terrasoleum of the heritage park, this was approved
by the holders of the project, herein respondent Heritage Park
Management Corporation (HPMC).

Alleging delay in the construction of the projects and huge

discrepancy between the Accomplishment Report and the actual
physical accomplishment of petitioner's construction firm, the
Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the two construction
contracts namely, the landscaping and nursery works, and the
construction of the terrasoleum.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the PEA before the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) where it sought to recover
payment for its progress billings on the said projects. The
commission ruled in favor of the petitioner. Now, respondent then
filed a petition for Injunction/Prohibition before the Court of Appeals
on the ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
since HPMC was not impleaded as a party thereby depriving it of its
right to be heard. CA granted former’s petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Is HPMC a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party? (2)

Does CIAC have jurisdiction over the dispute?

1. YES. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected

by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.

According to the provisions of the PFTA, upon the formation of the

HPMC, the PEA would turn over to the HPMC all the contracts
relating to the Heritage Park. PEA ceased to be the Project Manager
of the Heritage Park Project, and now HMPC stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit. In HPMC’s absence, there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
which is effective, complete or equitable.

Indispensable parties must be joined either as plaintiffs or

defendants.23Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a
proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the
duty of the court to stop the trial and to order the inclusion of such
party.24 The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present.25
2. The CIAC should have dismissed the same on the ground that the
private respondent was not impleaded, it being an indispensable
party to the case. The petition was denied, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the case against the proper party in interest.

CaseDig: Heirs of Hinog vs. Melicor

G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005
FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog.
Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998, while trial was still pending, Bertuldo died without
completing his evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services was
terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as
new counsel for Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the
amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that non-payment of the
correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from
the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court reinstated the case after private
respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee.

On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for certiorari and
prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency docket fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
is proper.
HELD:

No, it is not proper.

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared
with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for extraordinary writs.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve issues because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme
Court will not entertain direct resort to certiorari unless redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.