CIVREV DIGESTS – MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)
When laws become effective
Tanada v. Tuvera
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern
(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek
a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant
to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when
it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication
is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken
so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the
mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa — and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records — no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement
of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative
fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out.They allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.
On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a
privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by
respondent House Committees. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia
and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House
Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on
the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played
in the chambers of the House.
On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless, they
decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.
Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for a TRO
(the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He also asked that they
be stricken off the record of and that the House desist from further using the
recordings. The House discussion and debates on the Garci case then stopped.
Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue. The
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.The
following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
42001(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a
legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the
Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
1[8]An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal
wiretapping of public officials.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired
justices of the Court of Appeals, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
The Court didn’t issue the injunctive writ and Senate hearings took place.
Issues: 1. WON Garcillano’s petition for prohibition should be granted.
2. WON The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Held: 1. NO.
2. NO! (It’s obvious with the way it’s phrased)
Ratio: 1. It’s already moot and academic. The recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the Hello Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees.
2. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication
is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect
th
to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they first opened their session.
The Senate Rules simply state said Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. They
don’texplicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. It cannot be presumed that the Rules would continue
into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they
are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficient to comply with
the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK
G.R. No. 164026
FACTS
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic
corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange
Commission, (SEC). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change
in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to
"GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty
(50) years from and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been
assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the
application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized
capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26,
1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and
propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to
approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being
deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The
following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to
P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. The following year,
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the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation,
specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well
as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was
formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity
and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C.
Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned
assessment. Thusly, GMA appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Court of Appeals
(CA), on the ground that ground that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioner’s
application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
ISSUE
Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for
computing the filing fee relative to GMA’s application for the amendment of its articles
of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term?
RULING
The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the
basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.’s (GMA’s) application
for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term. The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an
extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as
a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such,
it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of
incorporation. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the
appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in
general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity. Rate-fixing is a legislative
function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and
other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to
determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a
person’s right to property. The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
Exceptions to irretroactivity of laws
LIAM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL
FACTS:
Liam Law loaned 10k to Olympic Sawmill Corporation and Ellino Lee Chi. The loan
became due but the debtors failed to pay and asked for an extension of 3 months
instead. Law agreed but added an additional obligation of 6k to the principal amount.
The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case
against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law.
ISSUE:
WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest???
RULING:
NO.
Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and
borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury,
procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.
Judicial Decisions
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS v. CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting
in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA. On the last day of the 15-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the CA. Petitioners filed their motion
for reconsideration but this was also denied.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
motion for extention to file a Motion for Reconsideration –NO!
Ratio: The CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the CA was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
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published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Computation of Time
Quiqui vs Boncaros
Facts: (won’t name who private respondents and petitioners are coz there are a lot)
Private respondents obtained a free patent over a parcel of land. Petitioners contest
this alleging that the land belongs to them because their late father purchased the
same and that they continuously and actually possessed it.
Petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against respondents on the ground
that the patent was obtained through fraud. Answer was filed, pre trial commenced
but no amicable settlement until trial was set. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On July 16, 1979 the trial court dismissed the complaint. Counsel for
petitioners received copy of the decision on July 17, 1989. A motion for
reconsideration was filed on August 17, 1979. Trial court denied the MR because it
was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period.
Issue: Whether MR was filed beyond the reglementary period?
Held: YES!
Under the rules enforced at the time of this case, an appeal may be taken
within 30days from notice of the judgment of the trial court. In relation thereto, the
st
New Civil Code states that in computing period, the 1 day shall be excluded and the
last day included.
In this case, counting 30days from July 17 (day petitioner’s counsel
st th
received copy of the judgment) – excluding 1 day – the 30 day would be August 16.
Petitioners filed their MR one day late or on August 17. Because of this, the order of
the trial court dismissing the complaint has become final and executor.
Nationality Principle – Conflicts Rules
Llorente vs. CA
Nationality Principle: Conflicts Rules
FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo left for the US Navy while Paula
stayed in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was admitted to US
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor. When Lorenzo
was allowed to visit his wife in the Philippines, he discovered his wife was pregnant
and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and the two drew a written agreement
which essentially shows that Paula admitted her adulterous acts and that the couple
agreed to separate.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned
to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and produced
3 children.
Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before the probate court,
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. After Lorenzo died, Paula
filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over his estate in his
favor. Alicia filed as well.
RTC found that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia is void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid.
HELD: YES.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to the concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Furthermore, in the case of Quita v. CA, that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the CA must be reversed. The
divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. (The SC remand the case to the TC for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will is left to the TC.)
Application of Chapter 2: Human Relations
De Tavera vs PTS
Petitioner is a doctor, specializing in treating tuberculosis. She was appointed as
member of the Board Directors of defendant Phil. Tuberculosis Society. However,
she was alleging that she was removed from her post without informing her of the
lawful cause and thereafter, Romulo was appointed as her replacement. She was
claiming that 4 members of the Board were not members of the Society and hence,
they did not have the power to be appointed in the Board and to vote. She filed a
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case against them, claiming that they violated the Human Rights provisions of the
Civil Code. Defendants were claiming that the position of petitioner is held at the
pleasure of the Board and hence, she may be removed at anytime.
ISSUE: Can she invoke the human relations provisions of the CC?
SC: NO
Petitioner cannot seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on
Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on
preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the
stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of
specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the
Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of
office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code
and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
Moreover, the act of the Board in declaring her position as vacant is not only in
accordance with the Code of By-Laws of the Society but also meets the exacting
standards of honesty and good faith.
9. Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
RA 7654 was passed in June 10, 1993. Prior to its enactment, cigarette brands
Champion, Hope and More were considered local brands subjected to a lower ad
valorem tax rate. 2 days before RA 7654 took effect, Chato issued RMC 37-93 which
reclassified the same cigarette brands resulting to the imposition of a higher ad
valorem rate. In effect, the RMC subjected the cigarette brands to the RA even before
it took effect. In a separate case (CIR v. CA), RMC 37-93 was held to be not valid for
having fallen short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.
Fortune (the cigarette manufacturer) filed a complaint for damages against Chato in
her private capacity. It contended that Chato violated Art. 32 of the CC by depriving it
of its property without due process of the law and in violation of equal protection. To
this, Chato argued that she issued the RMC in the performance of her official
functions and within the scope of her authority so she can’t be liable. She filed motion
to dismiss.
Via petition for certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss reached the SC. In its
June 19, 2007 decision it ordered the trial court to proceed with the case. Chato
moved for the reconsideration of that decision.
Issue: w/n Chato can be held liable in her personal capacity for having issued the
RMC – NO
Ruling: To determine whether a public officer is liable for improper or non-
performance of duty, it must be first determined what kind of duty is involved. There
are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers. One is the “duty owing to the public
collectively” and “duty owing to particular individuals”. The former pertains to officers
who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex.
Governor’s duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that
competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to
pass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single
himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind covers
those who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by a
particular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receive
their compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil process
for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a
private individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc.
When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can have
no cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is if
the individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer’s
improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that an
individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act
or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or
injury to the former.
A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a
duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of
valid admin regulations. It’s a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire
public who would be affected by such rule.
Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional for violating the
due process requirement or the equal protection clause. Court only said that the RMC
did not meet the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily on
that case as its cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of action
for failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32. Fortune failed to show that
it incurred some particular wrong or injury.
Finally, Sec. 227 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 provides: “Satisfaction of Judgment
Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. – When an action is brought against
any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the
performance of official duty…any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such
action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner…. No such judgment, damages or
costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or
in bad faith, or with willful oppression.” Because the respondent’s complaint does not
impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court
against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.
Duty to act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan
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Facts: Llorente, then municipal mayor of Zamboanga del Norte was charged with
violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. According to the information: he “did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the payrolls
and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of
Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby
causing undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.” While admitting some delays in
the payment of the complainant’s claims, petitioner sought to prove the defense of
good faith -- that the withholding of payment was due to her failure to submit the
required money and property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayan’s delayed
enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims. He adds that such delays
did not result in “undue injury” to complainant.
Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainant’s
salaries and emoluments was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury.
Being then the sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused
her difficulties in meeting her family’s financial obligations like paying for the tuition
fees of her four children.
ISSUE Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers
and implement the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted
the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the
Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte? NO. PETITION IS GRANTED.
HELD Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the
complainant who failed to submit the required clearance. This requirement, which the
complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to
be approved. As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is a
condition for the payment of her claims. Also, given the lack of corresponding
appropriation ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such purpose,
petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers.
As chief executive of the municipality Llorente could not have approved the
voucher for the payment of complainant’s salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government
Code of 1991. The petitioner’s failure to approve the complainant’s vouchers was due
to some legal obstacles, and not entirely without reason. Thus, evident bad faith
cannot be completely imputed to him.
“Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes
a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.”
Actions for Breach of promise to marry
Bunag v. CA
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag brought Cirilo to the house of his
grandmother in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and
wife for 21 days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite.
However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed
was a suit for damages based on a breach of a promise to marry. The trial court
decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry?
Decision: No.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except
where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the
Civil Code which states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to
Cirilo were proper.
12. Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115)
Facts: Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent Gonzales. She accepted his
love on the condition that they will get married, so he promised her that he will marry
her. Gonzales’ parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without getting married, Baksh and
Gonzales lived together. Gonzales’ ‘cherry got popped.’ Thereafter, Baksh began
maltreating Gonzales and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her
and that he was already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a complaint for
damages.
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Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may
be awarded?
Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral
wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
Where a man’s promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter become
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21
not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Unjust Enrichment at the expense of others
13. GARCIA V PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are employees of PAL who
have been dismissed after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom.
Garcia et al filed an illegal dismissal case against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The LA ruled in favor of Garcia et al and ordered PAL to immediately reinstate
petitioners. On appeal to the NLRC by PAL, the decision of the LA was reversed.
Meanwhile, the LA issued a Notice of Garnishment the Writ of Execution for the
reinstatement aspect of its decision. When PAL tried to enjoin the reinstatement and
garnishment, NLRC affirmed such Notice and Writ but suspended and referred the
action to the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL which at that time was undergoing
rehabilitation receivership. However, when PAL manifested that SEC had approved
its exit from the rehabilitation, SC resolved to entertain the issue of whether PAL
should pay backwages to the Garcia et al from the time the LA ordered their
reinstatement up to the time the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA
ISSUE: Whether or not compelling PAL to pay backwages despite the fact that the
NLRC ruled in its favor on appeal constitutes unjust enrichment
HELD: NO. the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable
the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to article 223 of the Labor Code,
the order of reinstatement of the labor arbiter is immediately executor even pending
appeal. The reinstatement may be actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the
employer. HOWEVER, in this case, PAL is excused from complying with the
obligation to reinstate Garcia et al either actually or otherwise because while the case
was before the LA and the NLRC, it was under rehabilitation. It is basic in corporate
rehabilitation that all actions against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation is ipso
jure suspended. This includes labor actions. True, the implementation of the
reinstatement order is a ministerial duty of the LA unless it is restrained by a higher
court. In this case, the injunction partook the nature of suspension of action by
legislative fiat i.e. law on corporate rehabilitation. This is equally effective as when the
injunction was issued by a higher court.
Liability of public officers
14. Aberca v Ver (1988)
Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They conducted raids
against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca, etc), claiming that they were
communists. In doing so, Ver, et al, used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al,
took the personal belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them
without warrants.
Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are immune from suit.
Issue: Can Aberca recover damages?
Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private citizens can be
held liable for damages for infringing upon the rights of others.
Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In
times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to
remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule
of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties
of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
15. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 17 1997
Facts: Tabuena, Gen. Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
was instructed by Pres. Marcos to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash
what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. (PNCC) in the amount of
P55 million. The order was done both through phone and through a Presidential
Memorandum, received through Gimenez, Marcos’ private secretary. With the help of
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the Asst. Gen. Manager, Dabao, and Acting Manager of the Financial Services
Department, Peralta (they were the ones authorized to make withdrawals), Tabuena
was able to release the amount of P55 million by means of 3 withdrawals. The money
was delivered to the president’s office through Gimenez.
Cases were filed against Tabuena and Peralta in the Sandiganbayan,
charging them of malversation (Dabao was still at large). SB convicted them, saying
that MIAA did not have any outstanding obligations to the PNCC. Tabuena and
Peralta appealed to the SC, alleging the defense of good faith.
Issue: Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta criminally liable?
Held: NO. The withdrawals were ordered by Pres. Marcos himself, first through
phone, and then through a Pres. Memorandum. Even though Tabuena and Peralta
had both thought that the disbursements were “out of the ordinary” and “not based on
normal procedures”, they both had no choice but to follow such order. Marcos was
undeniably their superior, being President of the Phil. who exercised control over
government agencies like the MIAA and PNCC. Marcos has a say in matters
involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as directing
payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. As a recipient of such kind of directive coming from the highest official of
the land, good faith should be read on their compliance, without hesitation nor any
question, with the Marcos Memorandum. They are entitled to the justifying
circumstance of “Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose.”
However, Tabuena though acting in good faith, should still be
administratively or civilly liable. The disbursements were made out of the ordinary and
not based on normal procedures. True, the deviation was inevitable under the
circumstances that Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all
auditing procedures considering the fact that the Memorandum called for his
“immediate compliance.” Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape
responsibility for such omission.
Sandiganbayan decision REVERSED.
Independent Civil Actions and Prejudicial Questions
Abunado v. People
FACTS: This case involves BIGAMY
September, 1967 – Abunado marries Narcisa
1988 – Narcisa leaves for work in Japan
1992 – Narcisa returns to the Philippines upon finding out that her husband is having
an extra-marital affair and has left her conjugal home. She found out that her husband
had contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas on January 1989.
1995 – A bigamy case was filed against Abunado
Abunados defense: petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of
nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy
case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Narcisa on October 29, 1999.
ISSUE: Is the petition for annulment or declaration of nullity a prejudicial question?
HELD: NO it is not. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
COJUANGCO vs. PALMA
FACTS: The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, w h o
a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y . P a l m a , t h e respondent. The
f o r m e r h i r e d t h e l a t t e r a s h i s p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business.
Atty. Palma becomes very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he
dines and goes with them abroad. He even tutored, complainant’s 22-
year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the
knowledge of the complainant and despite the facts that the former is
already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n . C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s
h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did.
In the celebration of respondent’s marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself
as a bachelor. On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance,
a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage and which was
granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on the
ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
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Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he
contends that complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t ’ s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t , m a l p r a c t i c e ,
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer that would warrant his disbarment. YES!
RULING:
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in the law, fully well
that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent
betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part
of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa. For the foregoing reasons, it
is submitted that respondent committed g r o s s l y i m m o r a l c o n d u c t
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year. According to
IBP:“At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as
to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in
his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional
activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts,
may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.”P r o f e s s i o n a l c o m p e t e n c y a l o n e d o e s n o t m a k e
a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement. T h e
interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code
of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i s t h a t t h e y s h a l l n o t
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities - July 30, 2008
Facts: Reyes is the Vice-President of Wincorp, a corporation that arranges and
brokers loans of its clients, one of whom is Pearlbank Securities.
Sometime before this case, investors or lenders made demands on
Pearlbank to pay several loans that were brokered by Wincorp. The investors alleged
that they weren’t able to collect on their outstanding credits with Wincorp because
Pearlbank didn’t pay. Apparently, Pearlbank alleges that it did not have any
outstanding loans that WINCORP brokered. Thus Pearlbank investigated on these
alleged debts.
Pearlbank demanded from Wincorp a full and accurate accounting of the
identities and investments of the lenders and the alleged debts of Pearlbank with
supporting records and documents. Wincorp did not respond to this demand.
Pearlbank instituted a case with the SEC, now pending with the RTC (bec. of
that law which transferred jurisdiction with the RTCs, for “full and accurate accounting
of investments and alleged loan obligations of Pearlbank.”
Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with the DOJ against
officers of Wincorp, one of them was Reyes, for falsification of commercial and private
documents.
The DOJ filed the criminal case with the MTC. Later, however, DOJ uSec
Merciditas Gutierrez ordered the withdrawal of the Informations. This decision was
reversed by the DOJ Sec., thus the case proceeded.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, where he raised, among
others, that the SEC case is a prejudicial question to the criminal case for falsification.
CA denied certiorari thus criminal case proceeds.
Issue: Is the SEC case a prejudicial question that has to be resolved before the
criminal case for falsification may proceed? NO.
Ruling: SC affirms CA. Case proceeds.
A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
It comes into play generally in a situation in which a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there
is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there
a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
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One of the issues taken in the SEC case is whether Pearlbank has
outstanding loans with Wincorp. However, a finding that Pearlbank indeed has
outstanding debts will not totally absolve Reyes of any criminal liability, in other
words, its not an absolute defense. Since, what is determinative in the Falsification
case is whether there really were falsified documents.
PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL
FACTS
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC QC.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of the case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC QC.
The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question. Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
ISSUE
W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner?
HELD
The petition has no merit. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in
Criminal Case for Parricide.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim.
In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. Thus, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled by RTC Antipolo, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable, since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect
of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.
Concept of Marriage
In re: Bucana (ACTUAL CASE – NO DIGEST KASI)
FACTS: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of
Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, dated February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public
Rufillo D. Bucana was required by this Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for having notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement
executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-
mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both
parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and
that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement
to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...",
which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized
the afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public
policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by
his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge; that when said
document was presented to him for signature after it was signed by the parties, he
vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was
immoral; that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than
a week later, he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of
destroying it, but to his surprise he found that the same was notarized by him as per
his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the
parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective
residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the
numerous documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as
his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of
respondent were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his
1
clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20, 1976.
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There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family
2
and of society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress.
The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband
and the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous
relations with another man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it
3
induces each party to commit bigamy. This is not only immoral but in effect abets
the commission of a crime. A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is
required to exercise his duties with due care and with due regard to the provisions of
existing law.
4
As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, "it is for the notary to
inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal
enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the
practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must
be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who
performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held
to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment."
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency, claiming that the
notarization of the questioned document was due to his negligence. We find,
however, that the aforementioned document could not have been notarized if the
respondent had only exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of
his duties as notary public.
WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is guilty of malpractice
and is hereby suspended from the office of not try public for a period of six (6)
months, with the admonition that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Legal Capacity – Sex
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007.
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Rommel Silverio filed a petition to change his first
name (to Mely) and sex (to female) in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. He alleges to be a male transsexual and that he has always identified more
with girls since childhood. After undergoing breast augmentation, hormone treatment
and psychological examination, on January 27, 2001, he finally underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok.
The petition was granted by the trial court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, and Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court allow petitioner to change his name and sex in his birth certificate. –
NO.
RATIO: A person’s first name cannot be changed because of sex reassignment. The
State has an interest in the names carried by individuals and entities for the purpose
of identification. Change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are thus controlled by statute. Art. 376 of the Civil Code2 was amended by R.A.
9048.3 Section 1 of the said law provides:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar, assuming it could be legally done, instead of the trial
court.
Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and official name worked no
prejudice towards him.
R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a change of first name may be
allowed:
1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
2. First name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
petitioner and has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. Change will avoid confusion.4
Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true name. His basis in praying for the change of his first name was the sex
reassignment to make his name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into. A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. The
law does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, granting the petition may only create complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries correctable under Rule 108 and Art. 412
2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority
3 Clerical Error Law
4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048.
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of the Civil Code are found in Articles 407 and 408 of the same Code.5 No
reasonable interpretation of the provisions can justify a conclusion that they cover
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error. To change
means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute. The birth certificate of Silverio contained no error. No
correction is necessary.
22. Republic v. Cagandahan
Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of Gender not a mere
typographical or clerical error, hence subject to judicial order.
Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and
was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Petitioner
further alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both male and female organs!) Court granted
petition, to which the OSG countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male, and that the local civil
registrar should be impleaded as an indispensable party .
Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to
"Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins.
Ratio: Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
RA 9048 clerical or typographical errors-no need for judicial order
Rule 108 substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by R.A. 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. In short, a
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has this unique condition
which makes her feel and appear like a man. In other words, the Court respects her
congenital condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for
the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with her
unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes
his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in her birth certificate from female to male.
Prior existing marriage
Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy
143 SCRA 499 (1986)
Facts:
• Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on the ground of LILIA’s previous existing
marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
• LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion but claimed that
their marriage was null and void because she and Maxion were allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.
• During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl Wiegel was the
status of the first marriage (void or voidable?).
• LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an
st
opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1 marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their
marriage, was already married to someone else.
• Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence because the
existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion had already been agreed
upon.
• LILIA assailed Sempio-Dy’s Orders (compelling to submit the case for
resolution based on “agreed facts” and denying motion to present evidence
in her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging GADALEJ.
Issue: Sempio-Dy guilty of GADALEJ?
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Held: No. Petition dismissed.
st
There is no need for LILIA to prove that her 1 marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties, because even assuming this to be so, marriage WILL
NOT BE VOID but merely voidable, and therefore VALID until annulled. Since there
was no annulment yet, it is clear that when she married Karl Wiegel, she was still
validly married to Maxion. Thus, her marriage to Karl is VOID.
There is likewise no need to introduce evidence about the existing prior marriage of
Maxion at the time he and LILIA were married, because even if their marriage was
void, a judicial declaration of such fact is necessary. Without the judicial declaration,
LILIA (for all legal intents and purposes) was still regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with Karl Wiegel. Thus, marriage to Karl would still
be regarded as VOID under the law.
24. TY v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August
27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies
officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was
still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his
civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as
Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void
his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977,
and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents
were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private
respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that
private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage before a subsequent marriage can be contracted is not applicable in the
present case. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless
there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared
to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s “deceit
and perfidy” in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence
on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years
earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that
he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory
of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense
during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was
used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for
we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
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appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the
defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was
not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we
cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from
what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000
when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls,
as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at
Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early
in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When
he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to
Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and
hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw
respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New
Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the
disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey
the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral
turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334
of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of
ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct
runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Beso v. Daguman
FACTS: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing
marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Judge Daguman is a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar. He solemnized the
marriage of Beso in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daguman is liable for solemnizing marriage outside his area
of jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities
under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction.
There are only 3 instances, as provided by Article 8 of the FC, wherein a marriage
may be solemnized by a judge outside of his chambers or at a place other than his
sala, to wit:
1.when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
2.when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
3.where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either Beso or his fiancé Yman was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request
made by the contracting parties to the Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside
his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage
because Beso was an overseas worker.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in weddings
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only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisites laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
27 Aranes v Occiano
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in
a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with
Dominador Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the ‘marriage’ lived together as husband
and wife for many years but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him
because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobia’s
pension from the navy.
In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo asked him to
solemnize the marriage between the parties on the assurance that all the necessary
documents were complete.He agreed to conduct the wedding at Nabua because
Orobia suffered from a stroke and couldn’t travel to Balatan. On the day of the
wedding, he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he informed the
parties that their marriage will be a nullity and had wanted to move the date of the
wedding but out of human compassion decided to continue because the visitors were
already coming in, the delivery of provisions for the reception, the possibility of further
aggravating Orobia’s condition (nastroke) and the parties assured him that they will
give him the license the afternoon of the same day. No license was ever delivered.
Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault BUT the Office of the Court
Administrator still found the judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction and was
fined 5K.
ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct?
HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court. Judge Occiano only had jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in
Balatan and not Nabua and he should be held administratively liable for violating the
law on marriage. He should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license because that’s considered a gross ignorance of the law.
The fact of desistance of Aranes doesn’t exculpate him from liability. Disciplinary
actions like this aren’t private matters, the Court has the power to discipline judges.
28. NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY
Facts:
Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. Second, he performed another marriage
ceremony outside his court’s jurisdiction. His jurisdiction was Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at his residence in Dapa.
Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of
a married man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge
confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years.
Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage
may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: “The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church…and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places…or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement…”
Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married man on the basis of
an affidavit of presumptive death? – NO
Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding outside his court’s
jurisdiction? – NO
Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the FC for the declaration of the death
of the absentee. Absent this judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his
first wife. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage
under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not falling under Art. 41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided under Art. 7. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Marriage License
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were blessed with 2
children. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition, which was later
on affirmed by the CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
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Petitioner, for the first time, is raising the issue that there is an absence of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate is September 14, 1974, while the date of the celebration of the
marriage is on November 15, 1973.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony
Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took
place. Therefore, the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Article 80 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, he purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Article 72-79 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is VOID from the beginning.
The issue on psychological incapacity is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage
is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was
solemnized.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE
CASTRO, Respondent.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went
back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date,
with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband
and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void
ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state;
and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that
he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis
of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the
latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Marriages exempt from marriage license
Ninal v. Badayog
Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine. Case is also
discussed under declaration of nullity.
Ninal
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as
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Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE & PEPITO NIAL, JR.)
. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and
8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepito’s death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
their successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code was silent, obscure and
inefficient in resolving: a) petitioner’s cause of action, b) WON Pepito’s second
marriage was null and void and c) WON the plaintiffs are stopped from assailing the
nd
validity of the 2 marriage considering it was dissolved by Pepito’s death. He ruled
that the action should have been filed before Pepito’s death.
Issue: WON they Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog were exempt from a marriage
license.
Held: No. Not having met the marriagle license requirement, their marriage is null and
void.
Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution."
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.
There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma Badayog was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayog’s marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
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BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966.
They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque
Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and
David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with
them. They have lived together as husband and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to
solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against
Sanchez.
ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzano’s marriage with Payao is valid?
RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of marital cohabitation)
to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for
at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other];
and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were “separated.” Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that
a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge
of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other,
but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in
the case at bar. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to
the marriage was secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was
false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise affirmed. But then it
changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage
void ab initio???
RULING: YES.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement
of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated
under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court
also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.
-end- 2nd assigned cases
Non-Essential Requirements: Marriage Certificate
DELGADO V.RUSTIA
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Anonuevo vs Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni
Facts: Rodolfo Jaladoni died intestate. Bernadino Jalandoni (Rodolfo’s brother) filed a
petitioner for issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners and their siblings filed a
manifestation that they were the children of Sylvia who in turn was the child of Isabel
Blee with one John Desantis. Note however that Isabel Blee was allegedly legally
married to Rodolfo Jalandoni at the time of the latter’s death (hence, petitioners are
supposedly Rodolfo’s grandchildren).
Petitioners presented 2 marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo
and Sylvia’s birth certificate. Petitioners assert that these pieces of evidence are
enough to establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo and as such, they are the
lawful representatives. However, Bernardino begged to differ. Notably, the birth
certificate of Sylvia stated that she was the legitimate child of Isabel and John
Desantis which would negate the claim that Isabel was legally married to Rodolfo.
The intestate court allowed the petitioners to intervene because it was
convinced that the evidence adequately established Isabel’s status as Rodolfo’s wife.
CA reversed this ruling of the trial court.
Issue: whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo?
NO!
Held: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage of one’s parents.
Here, the birth certificate of Sylvia serves as the competent evidence to
prove Isabel’s marriage to John Desantis and not Rodolfo. The entry of being a
legitimate child of Sylvia and John in the birth certificate is accorded prima facie
weight and will be presumed to be true unless rebutted. Petitioners did not rebut this.
They merely tried to explain that these were untruthful statements.
This birth certificate shows that Isabel was previously married to John
Desantis. Consequently, absent any proof that that such marriage was dissolved
leads to the inescapable conclusion that Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo was void ab
initio.
Note: important consideration in this case is the fact that the marriage certificate
showed the marriage between Isabel and Rodolfo to have taken place in 1953while
Sylvia was born in 1946. Thus, it would really appear that Isabel was originally
married to John Desantis. No evidence was shown to prove that such marriage was
terminated before the marriage to Rodolfo in 1953.
Foreign Divorce
Van Dorn v. Romillo
Foreign Divorce
FACTS: Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while private respondent,
Richard Upton is a citizen of the U.S. They were married in Hongkong in 1972, but
established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in
Nevada, U.S. and the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in RTC, stating that Alice’s business (the
Galleon Shop) is a conjugal property. He is asking for an accounting of the business
to be rendered, and seeking to be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Alice moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court where
Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property.
The Court below denied the MTD on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is the
subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. The decree is therefore
binding upon Richard, being a citizen of the U.S.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized here in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves marriage.
An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped
from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal
property. Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alice’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own
country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard
and still subject to a wife’s obligation cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
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 CIVREV DIGESTS – MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)
Petition is granted.
Garcia vs Recio
Recio, a Filipino, married Samson, an Australian, here in the Philippines. They lived
as husband and wife in Australia. A few years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
After a few years, Recio became an Australian citizen. He married a Garcia in
Cabanatuan. However, they separated without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of bigamy. She contends that Recio’s marriage with Samson was still subsisting when
they got married.
Garcia: based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the FC, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show
the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
Issue:
SC: case REMANDED in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, so
that respondent can present evidence that he had the legal capacity to marry
petitioner
- Before a foreign judgment is given preseumptive evidentiary value, the
st
document must be 1 presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. In this case, the
divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the pertinent rules on evidence must be
demonstrated6. But since Garcia’s counsel did not object to its admissibility,
then the LC was correct in admitting the evidence of the divorce decree
issued by the Australian court.
- Burden of Proving Australian Law: The burden of proof lies with “the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.”
- The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. But here, Recio has not
presented any evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry Garcia.
- The divorce decree did not ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
38. Amor-Catalan v. CA
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They
migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in
1988.
2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had
a subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that
the marriage brought her embarrassment.
RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for
being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed.
Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope
marriage?
Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and
Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been divorced.
Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their
naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired
American citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the kind of
divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii)
which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the
bond in full force.
Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were
married, and even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
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Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now provides that only the husband
or the wife may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of damages. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare
nullity of marriage on the ground that Felicitas lacks legal personality to file the same.
39. BAYOT V. COURT OF APPEALS
Foreign Divorce
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in the Philippines. The
marriage certificate stated that Rebecca was an American citizen. Later on, Rebecca
initiated divorce proceedings against her husband in the Dominican Republic. The
Dominican Court issued a decree ordering the dissolution of their marriage and joint
custody and guardianship over their child. Over a year later, the court issued another
decree settling the couple’s property relations.
Less than a month from the issuance of said decrees, Rebecca filed with the
Makati RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She later on withdrew said
petition and filed another for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground
of Vicente’s psychological incapacity. She also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix (child).
Vicente filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca insists on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ and that therefore, there is no valid
divorce to speak of.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca’s application for
support pendente lite.
ISSUE Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects? YES, REBECCA WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME DIVORCE
WAS RENDERED. SAID JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS VALID.
HELD There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. At the time of the divorce,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an
American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on
February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact
that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
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The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a
suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage. With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in
fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport
was expiring. Her passport stated her name as “Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza” (her
given name, middle name, and husband’s last name). Remo, whose marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
replacement passport.
This was denied by the DFA on the ground that the use of one’s maiden
name is allowed in passport applications only if the married name has not been used
in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine
Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly define the conditions when a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband.
Remo contends that Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that the use of a
husband’s surname is permissive and thus she should be able to use her maiden
name in her passport. The Office of the President, then the CA, however did not
agree with her.
Issue: Can Remo revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport,
despite the subsistence of her marriage?
Decision: No.
In its decision, the SC stated that a woman is not prevented from using their
maiden name in their passport. In fact, one may opt to use her maiden name in
initially obtaining a passport. However, once a married woman opts to adopt her
husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances
are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
In this case, Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists and she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married
woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.
In justifying such strict requirements, the SC said that the issuance of
passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of
identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign
countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other
governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give
him/her aid and protection
41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship. He
married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Shortly after the wedding,
Corpuz went back to Canada for business. When he returned to the Philippines he
found out that Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talaga…tsk, tsk, tsk).
Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry another Filipina so he
registered the divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless,
he was informed by a NSO official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and
that for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by
Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to
institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
nd
the remedy provided in the 2 paragraph of Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Issue: Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article 26?
Held: No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision – to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse – only the Filipino
nd
spouse can invoke the 2 paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no
rights in favor of aliens.
nd
However, the unavailability of the 2 paragraph of Article 26 does not
necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to the rules
of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
nd
In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the 2 paragraph of
Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule 39.
Void and Voidable Marriages
42. CARLOS v SANDOVAL
FACTS: The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving 6 parcels
of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes, Felix, during his lifetime, transferred to
his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and 3 with the condition that Teofilo will transfer petitioner
Carlos’ (another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of Carlos.
Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the name of the heirs
of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad Sandoval who was his surviving
spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner sues claiming that the marriage between
Teofilo and Felicidad was null and void for lack of marriage license. Furthermore,
petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was neither an adoptive or natural son of
Teofilo Carlos.
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Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized
marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo Carlos II wherein it was stated that
Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval are the parents. By virtue of these documents,
respondents move for summary judgment. Petitioner also moved for summary
judgment and presented as evidence the certificate of the civil registrar attesting to
the fact there is no birth certificate of Teofilo II on record.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment on nullity of marriage may be handed down in a
summary judgment and without conducting a full dress trial
Whether or not a person who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity
of marriage
HELD:
1. According to AM 02-11-10-SC also known as the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
summary judgments and judgments on pleadings are not applicable in nullity
or annulment cases. The reason behind this is that without a full dress trial,
the state is deprived the opportunity to appear before the courts. The role of
the prosecutor does not stop by the simple declaration that there was no
collusion. The prosecutor must be given opportunity to appear before the
trial in order to make sure that no evidence is fabricated.
2. For marriages solemnized under the Old Civil Code, testate and intestate
heirs may sue for nullity or annulment. However, AM 02-11-10-SC now vests
this right exclusively on the spouses on the theory that since the spouses
alone are the builders of marital life, they alone have the right put an end to
it. However, the heirs are not entirely deprived of their right to sue for nullity
or annulment. They can do so not on a proceeding for the nullity or marriage
but on settlement of estate. In the case at bar, since the marriage between
Teofilo and Felicidad was celebrated in 1962, the old civil code applies but
since the old civil code does not specifically provide for who can sue, then
we apply the “real party in interest” rule. In this case, petitioner is a real party
in interest because as a collateral relative of Teofilo, he stands to succeed
intestate when Teofilo II is declared not to be either a legitimate, illegitimate
and adoptive son of Teofilo. Remember that the presence of legitimate,
illegitimate ascendants/descedants preclude the succession of collaterals.
43. Ablaza v Republic
Can a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code?
Facts: The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated is void because there was no a marriage license at the
time the marriage was celebrated (the license was given a week later). The marriage
was in 1949. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He also
claims that he can impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if
after the death of his brother.
Issue: Does he have standing?
Held: Yes.
The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an action for the nullity
of the marriage. However, in Carlos v Sandoval, the Court said that this won’t apply
to:
1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the rules came out)
2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003
The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil Code. It was way
back in 1949. The AM has no application to them.
The old Civil Code does not specify who can bring actions. However, this does not
mean that anyone can just bring actions to declare absolute nullity. The plaintiff must
still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party in interest.Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving
heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in the Rules of Succession.
However, petitioner must implead Leonila since there are some cases under the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license was not needed for a valid marriage. She must be
given a chance to say her side.
44. Bolos v. Bolos, Oct. 20, 2010
Facts: Danilo and Cynthia Bolos were married on Feb. 14, 1980. On July 2003,
Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. 36 of
the FC (psychological incapacity). RTC granted the petition. Danilo filed a Notice of
Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Sec. 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
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(The RULE) (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Danilo then filed for certiorari (Rule 65) in the
CA seeking to annul the orders of the RTC. CA granted the petition and reversed the
RTC’s decision. CA stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in this case as the
Bolos marriage was solemnized before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia then filed
a petition (Rule 45) in the SC.
Issue: Whether or not The RULE is applicable to the case?
Held: NO. The Court ruled in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli that the coverage of
the RULE extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FC
which took effect on Aug. 3, 1988. The Bolos marriage took place on Feb. 1980. The
RULE, which was promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Sec. 1 of
the same reads:
Sec. 1. Scope – This Rule govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of the RULE leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FC. The RULE
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the FC and those solemnized
under the Civil Code.
CA decision AFFIRMED.
DINO V. DINO
Difference of Void and Voidable: Necessity of Court Declaration
46. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy
Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting
marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first
marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is
not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to
someone else at that time.
ISSUE: WON Lilia’s first marriage is void?
HELD: No. It’s voidable. Petition dismissed.
RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs of Eulogio B. Medinaceli - September 28, 2007
Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were
married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogio’s
first wife died on May 2004.
On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died.
The respondents are Eulogio’s heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception
could not apply since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months.
Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as
husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner
contended that it is only the contracting parties while living can file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case.
Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC.
Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity? NO.
Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed
by the heirs.
First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by
the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3,
1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that “a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.” It is clear. Thus, the
heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed!
Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition
for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code.
What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can
be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek to protect their property rights
they can always impugn the legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in
the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased faither.
Void Marriages: Grounds – Lack of essential/formal requirements
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REPUBLIC V CA
FACTS Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasay City and was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Cardenas personally attended the
procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license. Their marriage contract states that a marriage
license was issued in the name of the contracting parties in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. They decided to
live together only when Castro discovered she was pregnant. Their cohabitation
lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. The baby was
adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued
to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar
of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever
issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied her petition holding that the certification as inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage
license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE Is the marriage valid?
HELD NO.
The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”,
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was
solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license
first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. There
was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Republic vs. Nolasco (220 SCRA 20)
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Parker, a British, in a bar in
Liverpool, England. Thereafter, she lived together with Nolasco on his ship for 6
months. When Nolasco’s contract expired, they returned to his hometown in Antique.
In 1982, the couple got married. His contract was then renewed, thus, he had to leave
his wife. In 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco got a letter from his mother
informing him that Janet gave birth to their son and that she had left Antique. He
asked permission from his employer to return home so that he can look for Janet. In
1988, Nolasco filed a petition to declare Janet presumptively dead. He testified that
he exerted every effort to look for her, but it proved to be fruitless. He even sent
letters to the address of the bar where the couple first met, but they were all returned
to him. He also inquired from their friends, but they had no news about Janet. He also
alleged that he had no knowledge of Janet’s family background and that even after
they were married, she still refused to disclose such information. Nolasco also
testified that he did not report the incident to Philippine authorities. The RTC granted
the petition. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the declaration of Janet’s presumptive death is
REVERSED, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Art. 41 of the Family Code provides for 4 requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death, namely:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The SC, in reversing the CA, held that Nolasco did not comply with the third
requirement as he failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence
as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. The investigation allegedly
conducted by Nolasco in his attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Janet is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. For instance, when he arrived in Antique, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London. His testimony showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this
casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. There is no analogy
between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool,
on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around 350 km apart.
We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a
simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views Nolasco's claim that Janet declined to give any information as to
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her personal background even after marrying Nolasco as too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. Neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony.
Psychological Incapacity of Parties
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. (COURT OF APPEALS AND) MOLINA
268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997.
FACTS: On August 16, 1990, Roridel Molina filed a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. She alleges that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo
presented signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as both husband and father as
Reynaldo: preferred to spend time with, and spend money on, his friends; was
dependent on his parents for aid, and; was always dishonest with her about the
family’s finances.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986 and Rorida had
been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987, she resigned from her job and went
to stay with her parents. Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre,
and had since abandoned their family.
The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated – NO. The marriage subsists.
RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is
more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. Roridel’s evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get
along.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities are not
tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rather than merely failing to meet marital
obligations, it is necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so because
of a psychological illness.
Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most serious of psychological
disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity,
judicial antecedence, and incurability.
(Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court)
1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the plaintiff. Doubt is
resolved in favor of the continuation of the marriage.
2. The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.)
alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.) clearly explained in
the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the
parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have known the
obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly
assume them.
3. Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of
a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the celebration, but the illness
must be proven to exist at such moment.
4. Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent.
5. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family
Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as regards parents and
their children.
7. Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be given great respect
by the courts.
8. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed
down without the Solicitor General’s issuance of a certificate, stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will
be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days
from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay
Topic under Psychological Incapacity/ Doctrine: Unsatisfactory marriage is not
a null and void marriage per se, must clearly establish true incapability to
perform basic marital covenants.
Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November
1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately
wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with
Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel
remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would
just come and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the
family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to
have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being
pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her!
Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which
the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital
obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called
Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition.
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Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological incapacity? (in short,
will the personality disorder and no sexy-time merit the nullity of marriage?)
Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I.
Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law
has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Second, Republic v. CA laid down the guidelines to determine P.I.
a) Burden of Proof on petitioner/ Resolved in favor of validity and continuity of
marriage
b) Must be alleged in complaint that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
c) Medically proven to be permanently incurable in terms of marital obligations
(INCURABILITY)
d) Grave enough illness to not assume the essential obligations of marriage
(GRAVITY)
e) the obligations are those expressly enumerated by law/ Interpretation of NAMT
Church should be given great respect/ TC must order fiscal and Sol-Gen to appear as
counsel for the State
Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As
correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that
Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.
Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador
G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
Facts:
• PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a
beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at that time, was a
24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while RESPONDENT
was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT eventually
became sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law relationship.
• In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated
by Reverend Reyes at a church in Tondo. PETITIONER’s family was
apprehensive because of the nature of RESPONDENT’s work and because
she comes from a broken family.
• Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and
Eymarey.
• In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged
that RESPONDENT was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and
refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from
their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didn’t take
care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad
fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
• PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in
their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes to each other, and
caught them inside his room several times).
• RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause
of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied
motion.
• In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and
maintained that PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER
allegedly wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to
marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER
maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually died).
• RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed
between the parties.
• Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy
of their Marriage Contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan
Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1) PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible maladaptive behavior
even at the time before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from
a Personality Disorder.
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
Held: No. Petition denied.
1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENT’s
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not
vitiation of consent; it does not affect the consent to the marriage.
2. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
a. Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity is a mental
incapacity (not physical capacity) that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Thus, it is must
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It is characterized by:
i. Gravity;
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ii. Juridical antecedence; and
iii. Incurability.
b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals): Guidelines in
interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code:
i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should be resolved
in favor of existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently
proven by the experts; and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (exchanged I do’s).
iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolute against everyone of the
same sex.
v. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of the marriage; it should
not be merely a refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will. Ergo, the
natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to the marriage.
vi. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife & Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the
Family Code w/ respect to the children
vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling,
should be given great respect by the courts.
viii. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
SolGen to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the SolGen issues a certification stating his
reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall
discharge the equivalent function of defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
c. Marcos v. Marcos: clarified that there is no requirement that
defendant/respondent should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of marriage
based on psychologically incapacity. Introduction of expert opinion in a
petition under Art. 36 of the Family Code no longer necessary if the
totality of evidence shows psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
d. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: rigid rules are in appropriate in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity (PI) such as those set out it Molina. This case
put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in
Manila.
e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI.
3. Summary of Evidence
a. Petitioner’s testimony: Petitioner’s theory that the respondent’s
psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to
perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant
personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect,” in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.
Petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition
is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all,
the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality
defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his
testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the
respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s
condition; neither did he mention that the respondent’s malady
was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
respondent’s means to undertake. The petitioner’s declarations that the
respondent “does not accept her fault,” “does not want to change,” and
“refused to reform” are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code.
b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the
respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the
respondent to “undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]
underwent.”
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
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independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been
gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical
antecedence of the respondent’s condition by stating that the
respondent manifested “inflexible maladaptive behavior” before
marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage
– the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for
herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived
behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the
incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the
marriage. This is an area where independent evidence, such as
information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could
prove useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why
the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the
respondent’s so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already
present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove
the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s condition. He simply
made an enumeration of the respondent’s purported behavioral defects
(as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. At best, the
personality flaws mentioned in the Report, even if true, could only
amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain
how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondent’s personality
disorder had “no definite treatment.” It did not discuss the concept of
mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to what extent
the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary
inference that the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or is
incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report’s failure to support its findings and conclusions
with any factual basis.
The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of psychological
reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the
principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011
Soldier love story
FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-
out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual
marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts.
Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming
her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas
of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed
coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with
other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort
Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of
their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a
security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear
these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No.
97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of
psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent (Bona)was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder. The RTC granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA
reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD: NO.
After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on
several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose.
Likewise, Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same
conviction to Jose’s thesis that the totality of Bona’s acts constituted psychological
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incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate
credible evidence that her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence.”
Also, the psychiatric report of Dr. RondainregardingBona’s psychological condition
was gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses.
Contrary to Jose’s assertion, Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal
home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration.
A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were
known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose
would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in
Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e.,
her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period
of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Declaration of Nullity
Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122
March 14, 2000
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974. On April 24,
1985, he shot and killed her. 20 months thereafter, he remarried Norma Badayog, the
respondent herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition
for declaration of nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the
ground of lack of marriage license. Norma Badayog contends that the ground have no
legal basis for her marriage to Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no
marriage license is necessary for person who have cohabited for atl east five years.
The respondent also contends that petitioners are not among those allowed by the
law to file a suit for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Pepito.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that indeed the
Family Code is silent as to situation. The Petition should have been filed before the
death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage
license was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for at least five
years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he
and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by
exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to
marry. Pepito’s previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him
to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have a
marriage license to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking
the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void.
Cojuango v. Palma
FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as grounds “deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.’
Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70’s . Cojjuangco was a client of ACCRA
and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Consequently, Palma’s
relationship with Cojuangco’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined with
them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangco’s 22-year old
daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent.
Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It was only the next
day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma assured him that everything is legal.
Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3
children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable.
HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palma’s act constitute grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangco’s resources by securing a plane ticket
from Cojuangco’s office in order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent.
Palma’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.
Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.
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56 De Castro v De Castro
Declaration of Nullity
FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage license which
however expired so instead they executed an affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a
judge. They in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging in sex
in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995.
Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from Reilen as his wife
and for their child. He says that their marriage was void ab initio because they
executed a fake affidavit; that he was just asked to sign the marriage contract
because she wanted to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant
and he didn’t obtain the necessary parental advice. He avers that they never lived as
husband and wife and he never acknowledged the child.
Trial Court: No valid marriage because no marriage license but as father of child need
to give support.
CA: Since the presumption is marriage is valid until declared null and void then child
is presumed his and he must give support and TC is wrong in declaring the marriage
a nullity when the action was for support.
ISSUE: 1. W/N TC had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage?
2. W/N child is the daughter of Reilen?
HELD:
1. YES! The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked. In Ninal v Bayadog, the Court said that “other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes … the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.” However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.
In this case, they had no marriage license and had a false affidavit. The falsity of
which Annabelle admitted upon cross-examination so under the Family Code the
absence of any of the essential and formal requisites renders the marriage void.
2. Yes! Reinna is his illegitimate daughter and is entitled to support, he
admitted so in his affidavit for tax exemption.
Declaration of Nullity and Bigamy
57. JARILLO v. PEOPLE (MR)
Facts: Victoria Jarillo was convicted for bigamy, which was affirmed by the CA and
SC. She is now moving for reconsideration arguing that since her marriages were
entered into before the FC took effect, the applicable law is Sec. 29 of the Marriage
Law (Act 3613) instead of Art. 40 of the FC, which requires a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
Background: In the original case kase, she got married twice to two different guys.
Her second husband filed an annulment case against her which ended up with her
conviction of bigamy. But during the proceedings, she instituted an annulment case
against her first husband. The RTC declared her first marriage null and void because
of psychological incapacity. She filed an MR with the CA on her bigamy case using
this subsequent declaration as a defense. But the CA and the SC did not allow it
because a judicial declaration of nullity is needed before a person can enter into a
subsequent marriage (Art. 40).
Issue: Should the FC apply? - YES
Ratio:
As far back as 1995, the SC made the declaration that Art. 40, which is a rule of
procedure, should be applied retroactively because Art. 256 of the FC itself provides
that the Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does nor prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general law, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws.
In the case at bar, Victoria’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
her first marriage and thereafter to invoke the very same judgment to prevent her
prosecution for bigamy. She cannot have her cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Art. 40 of the FC, contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy (the original case said that for bigamy to exist, it is enough that
the first marriage subsisted when the second marriage was entered into).
Antone v. Beronilla
Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her
marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the
information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC.
Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the
information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information
Held: Yes
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 CIVREV DIGESTS – MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)
A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point
of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information.
The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage
The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for
the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the
established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information. It
considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding
the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated
in the information, and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under
exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.
Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Voidable Marriages: Grounds
MANUEL G. ALMELOR versus THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS
PINAS CITY
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida)
were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their union bore three
children.Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and
a pediatrician. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the
RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida averred that
Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was
the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life.
At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that
this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother.
Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making
were incomprehensible to Leonida.
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her
suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar closeness to his
male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this
point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative
interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child). She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable.
ISSUE: Whether not the marriage could be annulled based on homosexuality? NO.
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage.
Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty,
and doubted masculinity thrown at him. The trial court declared that Leonidas petition
for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing
Republic v. Molina: “Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity.” If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality
rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even assuming, ex
gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as
a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent
party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party
in giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid
marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has
enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per
se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
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Procedure and Effects of Termination of Marriage
Tuason v. CA
Facts: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason (Maria) filed a
petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R.
Tuason (Tuason) on the ground of psychological incapacity. Tuason’s defense was
that he and Maria initially had a normal relationship but that this changed in 1982
when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but
treated him like a persona non grata.
After Maria rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of Tuason’s
evidence. Two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for
a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and
due to return on the first week of June. The court reset the hearing. But on the new
date, Tuason failed to appear. On Maria’s oral motion, the court declared Tuason to
have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void and awarded custody of the children to
Maria on the ground of Tuason’s psychological incapacity.
The judgment was said to be without prejudice to the application of the other effects
of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
While his counsel received a copy of the decision, Tuason did not file any appeal.
Afterwards, Tuason filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." Maria opposed the motion.
Also on the same day, Tuason, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment of the decision of nullity.
The RTC denied the relief from judgment. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
order.
Issues: 1. WON the relief of judgment should be granted.
2. WON the prosecurtor is required to intervene in all cases for annulment or
declaration of nullity.
Held:1. No!
2. No!
Ratio:1. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, a final and executory judgment or order of the
Regional Trial Court may be set aside, and relief from judgment granted, on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner
must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
In the case at bar, the decision had already become final and executory when Tuason
failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Tuason however contends he was
denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered
judgment on the basis of the evidence for Maria. He justifies his absence at the
hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reasons." The records, however, show that the former counsel of Tuason did not
inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision,
the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final
and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to
counsel of record is binding upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of
his former counsel to inform the trial court of Tuason’s confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Tuason
has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did
not inform the court of this fact.
2. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity
of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, Tuason was not declared in default by the trial court for
failure to answer. Tuason filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause
of action alleged by Maria. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private Respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred
contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Tuason’s
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Tuason that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court.
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
424 SCRA 725
FACTS
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March
5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the
respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through
a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a
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 CIVREV DIGESTS – MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)
resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his
petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that
summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their
son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to
answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the
petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio
her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real
address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving
her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now
comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
HELD NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family
Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered
to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between
the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” “If the
defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her
in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.” Here, the
trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”
YU VS. YU
FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging
that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the
custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to
him of the custody of Bianca.
Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of
absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The petition also included a
prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by
the CA of his petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue???
RULING: YES.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and
17
underscoring supplied)
Art. 50. x x x x
The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings." (Emphasis and underscoring added)
By Eric’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC
he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.
After the CA subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for
Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family
Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Legal separation: Procedure
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE,
EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V.
CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation
of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete in 1938 in
Cotabato. In 1948, Pacete contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which Alanis only learned of in 1979.
During Alanis’ marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and
other dummies.
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The defendants were each served with summons on November 15, 1979.
They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The
court granted the motion. The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of
another 30 days which was granted but reduced to 20 days. The Order of the court
(reducing the extension) was mailed to defendants' counsel but it appears that the
defendants were unaware of this so they again filed another motion for an
extension of “15 days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously
sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, the court denied this last
motion on the ground that it was filed after the 20-day extension had expired. The
plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation,
and declared the properties as conjugal properties of the plaintiff and defendant half-
and-half. The subsequent marriage between Pacete and Conception was also
declared void ab initio. Defendants filed a special civil action of certiorari.
Issue: WON defendants were improperly placed in default –YES!
Ruling: Art. 101 of the Civil Code provides: No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation, is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the
state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made to
depend upon the parties themselves. (Brown v. Yambao)
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a
"cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
Also, Sec.6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to
it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That
other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the
same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory
requirements.
Liquidation: Effect of Death of One of the Parties
Carmen Lapuz Sy (represented by Macario Lapuz) vs Eufemio S. Eufemio (alias
Eufemio Sy Uy)
Facts: Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio.
It was alleged that they were married, they had no child and that they acquired
properties during their marriage. She discovered that Eufemio was cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok.
Eufemio counter-claimed that his marriage with Carmen Lapuz was void ab
initio on the ground that he had a prior and subsisting marriage under Chinese laws
and customes with one Go Hiok.
Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their evidence. However, before
the trial could be completed, Carmen Lapuz died in a vehicular accident. The court
was notified. Counsel for Carmen also moved that Macario Lapuz substitute his
daughter Carmen.
Eufemio then moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the
ground that the death of Carmen abated the action. The court issued an order
dismissing the case. Notably, even if Eufemio filed counterclaims (for nullity of the
marriage), he no longer pursued this after the case was dismissed.
Issue: Does the death of a plaintiff (before final decree) in an action for legal
separation abate the action?
Held: An action for legal separation which involves just a physical separation of the
spouses is purely personal. Thus, being purely personal in character it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
The resulting property relations would also appear to be the sole effect of the
decree of legal separation issued. Thus, the property rights cannot also survive the
death of the plaintiff.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of
the decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence.
As to the action of Eufemio to declare his marriage with Carmen as void ab
initio, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic after Carmen died
because such death automatically dissolved the union. Their property rights should
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition.
Antionio Macadangdang vs. CA, Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang
Effect of death of one of the parties
Antonio and Filomena got married in 1946 after living together for 2 years. Their
business grew from a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill businesses, abaca
stripping, real estate, and others. They have 6 children. While their financial
stabilized, their marriage became shaky up to 1965 when they split up and the wife,
Filomena, left for Cebu. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit
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affairs of her estranged husband and she decided to file a complaint for legal
separation.
The judgment was rendered ordering the legal separation of the spouses. Since there
is no complete list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the
dissolution of the conjugal property, Antonio was ordered to pay P10k as support for
the wife and the children.
Filomena filed a motion for the appointment of an administrator and urging favorable
action to impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine
transfers by Antonio. Several motions objecting to this were filed by Antonio but were
denied by the court. Antonio then appealed to CA, which dismissed the case. Hence,
the case was brought to SC. Pending appeal, Antonio died. Counsel for Antonio
informed the court and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case is already
moot and academic as a consequence of the death of petitioner. Filomena agreed.
ISSUE: WON the death of the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic?
HELD: No. Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies and
in view of the significant issues raised, this Court resolved to meet said issues
frontally.
In this case, Antonio had averred that the CA gravely erred in holding that respondent
Judge’s incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 (which declared them legally
separated) had become final and executor; and that the same Court committed an
error in holding that the appointment of an administrator in the case was proper.
It is important to note that the TC had resolved only the issue of legal separation and
reserved for supplemental decision the division of the conjugal properties. A
supplement decision on the division of property is a mere incident of the decree of
legal separation the latter being the main judgment.
We do not find merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community
of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
A decree of legal separation, which does not yet include an order of division of
property is not an incomplete judgment and if not appealed, becomes final and
executory. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final
decree and are mandated by Art. 106 of the Old Civil Code. Moreover, American
jurisprudence held that the provisions of the decree of legal separation should
definitely and finally determine the property rights and interests of the parties.
Considering that the decree of legal separation of the parties had long become final
and executory, the only issue left is the division of the conjugal property. By reason of
the final decree of legal separation, however, conjugal partnership of gains had been
automatically dissolved. The law clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of gains under the provisions of the Civil Code would be
applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became final.
Side note..
Due to the death of the petitioner, the law on intestate succession should take over in
the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner.
Petition is dismissed.
Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Lerma vs CA
Lerma and Diaz were married. However, Lerma filed a case against his wife Diaz
and a certain Ramirez for adultery. While this case was pending, Diaz likewise filed a
complaint for legal separation against Lerma based on 2 grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life. During the pendency of the legal separation case, Diaz
moved for and was granted support pendente lite. Lerma opposed, saying that the
pending adultery case against her is a sufficient basis to deny the motion for support
pendente lite. (it must be noted that later on, Diaz was found guilty of adultery by the
trial court)
ISSUE: Is the pending adultery case valid ground to deny the other spouse support
pendente lite?
SC: YES
Jurisprudence provides that “adultery is a good defense”.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by
one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same
Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced
heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has
given cause for legal separation."
67. Sabalones v. CA
Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein
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respondent Remedios, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15
years.
When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and
building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he
was 68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He needed his share
of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs.
Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property in
Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids and that they merely depended
on support from the rentals earned by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She
also alleged that Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids.
She wanted a decree of legal separation and to order the liquidation of their
properties, and that her husband’s share be forfeited because of his adultery.
It was found out in trial that Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma.
Court granted legal separation and forfeiture of Samson’s shares in the conjugal
properties.
On appeal to the CA by Samson, Remedios filed for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties.
She alleged that he harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property and that he
disposed of their valuable conjugal property in U.S in favor of his paramour. CA
granted the preliminary injunction.
Samson now assails the order of the CA arguing that the law provides no injunctive
relief in such a case, since the law provides for joint administration of conjugal
properties. He cites Art 124 of the FC.
Issue: w/n it was proper for the CA to issue injunctive relief –YES
Ruling: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as provided in Art. 124. However, Art. 61 states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to
act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, it was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That
designation was approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife
the preliminary injunction.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. It may issue to
prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated.
The Court noted that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost 19 years now without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
In her motion for the preliminary injunction, the wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her
and her children of the income therefrom. She also testified the numerous properties
they owned - dollar accounts, houses in QC and Cebu and a Benz. Remedios also
complained that Samson executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in
California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to
the prejudice of his legitimate family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by
the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the
private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal
assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied
that as the petitioner's legitimate wife, Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said
estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his
wife and children. Inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the
meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent
wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed
her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from
the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance
with Article 61 of the Family Code.
68. SIOCHI V. GOZON
Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite/After Finality
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the
name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case
was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the
land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife
Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo.
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However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply
with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment
of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As
regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of
donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating
the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for
P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of
Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her
acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredo’s share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of
their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.
HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the
disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that
the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the ½ share of Alfredo in the
conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the
effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits
which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is
not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI
is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals,
IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the
property.
Exercise of Profession
Go v CA
Facts: The Ong spouses contracted the services of Alex and Nancy Go to provide
video coverage of their (Ong spouses) wedding. Three times thereafter, the Ongs
tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their
relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then
agreed that the tape would be ready upon the return of the Ong spouses.
When the Ongs came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out
that the tape had been erased and therefore, could no longer be delivered. They sued
the Go spouses for damages. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of the Ongs.
The SC ruled in favor of the Ongs and held that the Gos are solidarily liable.
However, Alex Go contended that his wife, Nancy Go should be the only one liable as
when his wife entered into the contract with the Ongs, she was acting alone for her
sole interest.
Issue: Are the Go spouses solidarily liable to the Ong spouses?
Decision: No, only Nancy is liable.
Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
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In this case, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract with the
Ongs. Thus, she is solely liable for the damages awarded, pursuant to the principle
that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them
CPG: Exclusive Properties
70. Sarmiento vs. IAC (153 SCRA 104)
Facts: 2 cases. First was an action for support filed by Norma Sarmiento against
Cesar Sarmiento. Court granted, awarding P500/month support in favor of Norma.
Second case was an action filed by Norma asking for a declaration from the court that
the retirement benefits of Cesar from PNB is part of the conjugal property, 50% of
which should be given to her. Cesar failed to appear during the pre-trial. Eventually,
the court ruled in favor of Norma and ordered PNB to refrain from releasing to Cesar
all his retirement benefits and to deliver ½ thereof to Norma.
Issue: Is Norma entitled to ½ of the retirement benefits of Cesar?
Held: No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of CA186 (GSIS
Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment or freezing of any benefit
granted by the Act. The order was in effect, a freeze order.
The directive to deliver ½ of the retirement benefits to Norma makes the
default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as
gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be
treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are
given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the retirement pay of a
provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice
of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity
and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code).
NB. See the comment in page 144 of the reviewer, differentiating contributory and
non-contributory retirement plans. The latter forms part of the separate property while
the former, which is given by most private companies where EEs contribute to their
own retirement plans, should form part of the conjugal partnership.
Charges upon the Obligations of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership
71. WONG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda were married. During their marriage
Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money borrowed from an
officemate. Most of the time, the spouses were living separately; Romarico stayed in
Angeles while Katrina was in Manila. One time, while Katrina was in Hong Kong,
pieces of jewelry were consigned to her by Anita Chan. Katrina issued a check for
55,000 as payment for the jewelry but was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Thereafter, Anitan Chan, assisted by her husband Ricky Wong , filed a complaint for
estafa. However the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that estafa
cannot be committed when the issuance of the check was for the payment of a pre-
existing obligation. Hence, the liability was only civil.
Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money. The
lower court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that the property of the spouses
Romarico and Katrina be levied upon. Take note that during the hearing only Katrina
was represented by counsel.
Romarico assails the levy of the parcel of lands belonging to him saying that
(1) he was deprived of his day in court and (2) he had nothing to do with the
transaction. Lower court sustained this contention.
The CA sustained the decision of the lower court saying that the parcel of
lands levied were not conjugal properties but was exclusive capital of Romarico
bought using his own funds; that even assuming it was conjugal property, it cannot be
proceeded against because the debt of Katrina was not consented to by Romarico
neither was it for the daily expenses of the family nor did it redound to the benefit of
the family. In fact, there was no evidence to the effect that administration of the
property was transferred to Katrina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land levied upon form part of the conjugal
property – YES
Whether or not the obligation incurred by Katrina is chargeable against the
conjugal property - NO
HELD:
1. The presumption is that a property is conjugal unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence. In this case, while it may be true that the
money used to buy the land was loaned from an officemate by
Romarico, no evidence was shown as to where the repayment of that
loan came. If it came from Romarico’s salary, the land is conjugal
property
2. Under the old civil code only the following are chargeable to the
conjugal property: (1) debts incurred for the necessary support of the
family (2) when the administration of the conjugal property was
transferred to the wife by the court or by the husband (3) when
moderate gifts of charity are given. There was not showing that the
instant case falls in any of these.
72. Ayala Investments v CA
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” which are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an
accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within
the contemplation of the said provision?
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50.3M loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation. As added security for the credit line
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extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM,
executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan, Ayala sued, and the court
rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly
and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Spouses filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the court to enjoin the
auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. Ayala won the auction. HOWEVER,
the trial court declared the sale on execution null and void. On appeal to the CA, the
court stated that the debt incurred by husband Ching did not incur to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, hence, it could not be levied upon. Ayala claims that the
provisions of Civil Code and the Family Code are different and that jurisprudence is
on their side.
Issue: Did it redound to the benefit of the spouses?
SC: We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms
“redounded to the benefit of” or “benefited from” on the one hand; and “for the benefit
of” on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil
Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the
term “for the benefit of.” On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides
that “The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.” As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further claim that the husband as head of the family and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations
for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership (Cobb-Perez). They are wrong.
The court derived the following rules from jurisprudence:
a. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
b. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when
a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Here, Ching signed as surety. Ayala should have adduced evidence to prove that
Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
But it could be argued that even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit
for the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husband’s
employer. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the
Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. There must be the requisite
showing x x x of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses” or “benefits to his family” or “that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family.” Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show:
(a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many
months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its
shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of
the Ching family.
The CA correctly applied the provisions of the Family Code to this case. These
provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husband’s duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment,
not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations
entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnership’s liability is to “the extent that the
family is benefited.”
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the
Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any
part of the conjugal property. Thus, when Ching entered into a surety agreement he,
from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the
family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of
donation.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the
signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a
surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted
for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of
an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
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73. Ching v. CA, Feb. 23, 2004
Facts: The Phil. Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9M from
the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC). By virtue of the loan, PBMCI executed a promissory
note through Alfredo Ching (Alfredo), its EVP. As added security, Alfredo, together
with 2 others, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly
and severally guarantee the payment of all PBMCI’s obligations owing to ABC to the
extent of P38M. After a year, PBMCI contracted another loan with ABC for P13M.
Thereafter, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans. ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
PBMCI to collect the amounts due to it, impleading as co-defendants Alfredo and the
2 others in their capacity as sureties of PBMCI. The court granted ABC’s application
for a writ of preliminary attachment. In this regard, the deputy sheriff of the trial court
levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of
Alfredo.
Encarnacion Ching (Encarnacion), assisted by Alfredo, her husband, filed a
motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied by the deputy sheriff were acquired by her and Alfredo during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the
continuing guaranty contract executed by Alfredo for the account of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, she alleged that being
the wife of Alfredo, she was third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release
of the properties. ABC filed a comment alleging mainly that Encarnacion has no
personality to file any motion, not a being a party to the case. RTC granted the
motion, lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks. CA reversed
such order, citing the same reasons given by ABC.
Issue: Whether or not Encarnacion has the right to file the motion to quash the levy
on attachment on shares of stocks?
Held: YES. In Ong v. Tating, Court held that the sheriff may attach only those
properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the
court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a
third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior
authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the
aggrieved third person in the same case.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides that all properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, although
the shares of stocks appeared in the books of Citycorp as belonging only to the
husband, the fact that these were acquired during the marriage makes them
presumably conjugal property. ABC failed to adduce evidence that Alfredo acquired
the stocks with his exclusive money. He who claims that property acquired by the
spouses during their marriage is exclusive property of one of the spouses is burdened
to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same.
In addition, the Court held that by executing a continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with ABC for the payment of PBMCI’s loans, Alfredo was not in
the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The conjugal
partnership is not liable for the account of PBMCI under Art. 161 (1) of the NCC which
states:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. CA, the Court held that the signing as
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a
business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as
surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby
embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
Munoz v. Ramirez, G.R. 156125, August 23, 2010.
Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a parcel of land between
Munoz and the spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos.
1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and constructed a 2 story
residential house over the subject parcel of land. This was secured by a real estate
mortgage over the land.
1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute sale for the total
consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that under the said sale, the spouses were
given a chance to repurchase the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so.
The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being falsified because
what they entered into was a mortgage contract and not a deed of sale. They claim
that they asked Munoz for a loan of P602,000 pesos. Munoz agreed but gave them
P200,000 only and promised to give the P402,000 after they cancel the GSIS
mortgage. The spouses cancelled the GSIS mortgage and turned the TCT over to
Munoz but he refused to give the balance. He also had the TCT of the spouses
cancelled and a new one issued for himself depriving the spouses of their property.
The spouses claim that the results of an NBI examination show that the
signatures of Eliseo on the purported deed of sale are all forgeries.
Munoz claims that even though these signatures are forged, they would be
immaterial because the property was the parphernal property of Erlinda and
therefore, the consent of Eliseo, manifested by his signature, was immaterial.
The CA applied art. 158 of the CIVIL CODE, and ruled that since
improvements were made over the parcel of land using conjugal funds, the parcel of
land was converted from paraphernal to conjugal therefore the consent of Eliseo was
needed in order to validate the sale.
Issue:
W/N the parcel of land is conjugal?
W/N the sale with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage?
1. The land is paraphernal. The CA erred in applying the Civil Code because
what properly applies in this case is art. 120 of the FAMILY CODE that
states that if the improvements made with conjugal funds have a higher
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value than the paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become
part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in favor of the
spouse who lost property. In this case, the house had a value less than the
lot. Because of this, the property remained parphernal. The signatures of
Eliseo are therefore immaterial.
2. It was an equitable mortgage.
Ownership, Administration and Disposition of ACP/CPG: Presumption of
Ownership/Effect of Registration in name of one of the spouses
MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals – 266 SCRA 627 – January 27, 1997
Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named
Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose.
Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and
was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9
children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents
here.
Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia.
The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the
TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo
Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her
husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that
Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.
Both parties appealed.
The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or
10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.
Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased
Santiago
What’s the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.
Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued
during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the
property.
Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts.
Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and
when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what
the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of
Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.
CRUZ V LEIS
FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April 1923.
On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of land in Marikina.
The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was
issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow.
On 2 December 1973, Adriano died.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Cruz, in
the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The
loan was secured by a mortgage over the property.
On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding obligation when the
debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of the
petitioners. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same
property. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was
consolidated in favor of the petitioners.
On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private
respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new
owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing an action before the
RTC of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by Gertrudes
Isidro.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that the land was conjugal
property, no fraud attended the execution of the contracts, and that the petitioners
failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a
judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be
recorded in the Registry of Property.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE W/N the petitioners acquired ownership over the land?
HELD It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose
of her share in the property owned in common.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered solely in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the
undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto,
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issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land
even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a
person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens
on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To
require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system."
It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of
Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua
non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property
since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year
period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title
and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the
stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory
condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over
the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to
consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or
ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.
Anno v. Anno
G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419)
Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno
(Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they
acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was
declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert.
Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed two documents of
transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of Waiver where Albert waived and
quitclaimed in favor of Dolores’ first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights
over a portion of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the
remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents, Albert declared that
he is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. Thus, the documents of transfer did
not bear the signature and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The
land was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo
Bested.
Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of the Waiver of
Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages. She alleged the
land belongs to their conjugal partnership and thus could not have been validly
conveyed by Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding
testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the
land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his
marriage to petitioner.
MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the
consent of the other.
Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. However, a careful examination of the records shows that Dolores’
evidence (their marriage contract and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the
property) failed to prove that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership.
Moreover, since it is Dolores’ allegation that the land belongs to their conjugal
partnership of gains, then she has the burden of proof to substantiate, by
preponderance of evidence, that the land was conjugal in nature. This she failed to do
(i.e. Dolores failed to identify when she and Albert, first occupied and possessed the
land). While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974, it cannot be
automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of the subject land was likewise
done in the same year. To so conclude will amount to speculation or conjecture on
the part of the court. Declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated
with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land
usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the
1974 tax declaration presented by Dolores cannot be made a basis to prove its
conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her
husband, Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive property. Tax declarations,
especially of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
Since the circumstances do not show when the property was acquired by spouses
Anno, the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property allegedly acquired by
the spouses Anno during the subsistence of their marriage cannot be
applied. Consequently, the land is the exclusive property of Albert which he could
validly dispose of without the consent of his wife.
Sole/Transfer of Administration
REYES v. ALEJANDRO (RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE)
141 SCRA 65, G.R. No. L-32026. January 16, 1986.
Doctrine: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding
separate from and prior to a petition for administration
FACTS: On October 25, 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition praying for the
declaration of her husband, Roberto L. Reyes, as an absentee.
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Erlinda and Roberto were married on March 2, 1960. In April 1962, Roberto left due
to a misunderstanding, and Erlinda alleges that: (1) she has not heard from him since;
(2) they have not acquired property during the marriage; (3) they have no outstanding
obligations; and (4) her purpose for filing the petition is to establish the absence of
Roberto.
She invokes Article 384 of the Civil Code and Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court.
The lower court dismissed the petition because Roberto left no properties, stating that
the sole purpose for the declaration of absence is to enable the taking of necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of absentee.
ISSUE: W/N a judicial declaration of absence is proper when the absentee spouse
left no properties – NO.
RATIO: The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is: (1) when he
has properties which have to be taken care of or administered by a Court-appointed
representative; (2) the spouse present is seeking a separation of property, or the
spouse is asking that the administration of the conjugal property be transferred to her.
The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the
management of the conjugal property in the hands of the wife may be combined and
heard in the same proceeding.
Uy v. CA
Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration
Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of
Court, not under the Family Code.
Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a petition for
guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a need for a court-appointed
guardian to save his father’s properties and assets, and further added that in the
meantime, no properties shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons.
Ernesto’s wife then filed petition declaring Ernesto’s incapacity and assumption of
powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties, and prayed to Court that she be
granted permission to dispose of a land for the medical expenses of her husband.
Court granted.
Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in effect a petition
for guardianship over person and properties of Ernesto, and should be covered by
Special Proceedings under the ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as
a conjugal partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also averred that
the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical expenses! Nonetheless, Ernesto’s
wife still sold land to her daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering
sale of land void.
Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of sole power of
administration over properties and dispose of land with court approval?
Held: Petition denied.
Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of CC inapplicable
(covers only absence, separation in fact, abandonment, or withheld consent). And so
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse
due to incapacity or incompetence to give consent.
As such, ernesto’s wife should observe procedure for sale of ward’s estate required of
judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings under the
Family Code. In the case at bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC,
and even FC (no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition
should not be granted).
Dispositions/Donations
SIOCHI V. GOZON
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the
name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case
was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the
land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife
Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply
with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment
of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As
regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of
donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating
the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for
P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of
Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her
acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredo’s share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of
their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.
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HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the
disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that
the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the ½ share of Alfredo in the
conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the
effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits
which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is
not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI
is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals,
IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the
property.
Fuentes v. Roca
Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a
deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell
prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly
stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down
payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of
his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of
the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether
or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable
to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.
As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid
him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued
in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with
the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.
RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed
Held: No, the action has not yet prescribed.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the
wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It
simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code
governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the
very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
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spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely
wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without
their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right
to bring such an action.
Ownership, Administration and Disposition of Separate/Exclusive Properties
Manotoc Realty Inc. v. CA
FACTS: Felipe Madlangawa had been occupying a part of the land owned by Clara
Tambunting as the latter’s paraphernal property, with the understanding that he would
eventually buy the lot. Clara died and her estate was placed under custodia legis.
Felipe then made a downpayment to the husband of Clara, Vicente Legarda, as part
of the purchase price of the property he occupied. Around 3 months later, the court
appointed Vicente as a special administrator of the estate.
ISSUE: WON the sale by Vicente to Felipe was valid.
HELD: NO. Under Arts. 136-137 of the old CC, the wife retains ownership of
paraphernal property, and the only way that the husband shall have administration
over it is if the wife delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument,
recorded in the Registry of Property, empowering the latter to administer such
property. There is nothing in the records that will show that Vicente was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara during the lifetime of the latter.
Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by Felipe and Vicente
had its inception before the death of Clara and was entered into by the former for and
on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Vicente, therefore,
could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of
the paraphernal properties of Clara.
It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente as administrator of the
estate only 3 months after the sale had taken place. The inevitable conclusion is,
therefore, that the sale between Vicente and Felipe is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.
Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, after the appointment of Vicente as
administrator of the estate of Clara, he should have applied before the probate court
for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of Felipe. If the probate court
approved the request, then Vicente would have been able to execute a valid deed of
sale in favor of the Felipe. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the
administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure, nor on that of Felipe
to protect his interests.
Dissolution of ACP/CPG: Grounds
85 Partosa-jo v C.A.
FACTS: Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow)
Prima Jo is allegedly the legal wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for
separation of conjugal property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the
support case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property. Jose
appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a
cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property
sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no
such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became
final sorry nalang si Prima
HELD: The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the
decision of the TC failed to state the separation the Court can’t let technicality prevail
over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment
even after the judgment have become final.
On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the
parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an
agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil
Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its
conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will
result in the termination of the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil
Code. She says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended
in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave
the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's
family although able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home
to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968
constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution
of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but
the Court said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses
half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the
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conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
Separation with Dissolution – Effects
86. TODA v. CA
Facts:
Benigno Toda and Rose Marie Tuason were married in 1951 and were married and
blessed with 2 children. But because of individual differences and the alleged
infidelity of Benigno, Rose Marie filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership
for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds.
To avoid further disagreeable proceedings, the parties filed a joint petition for judicial
approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Art. 191 of the CC. This petition
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares
in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the civil case filed by
Rose Marie. The compromise agreement was incorporated in the petition for
dissolution, which was approved by the court.
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable
settlement of all the disputes. Instead of terminating a litigation, it spawned two new
petitions. The parties are now arguing on the award of cash dividends, which
depends on the date of the effectivity of the compromise agreement. Rose Marie said
that it became effective only after judicial approval and not upon its execution.
Issue: Whether the compromise agreement became effective only after judicial
approval - YES
Ratio:
Under Art. 190 of the CC, in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Hence, the separation of property is
not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by
the decree of the court approving the same. Furthermore, Art. 192 explicitly provides
that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of
separation of property.
Other issue: Benigno deducted P360k from the P2M supposed to be paid to Rose
Marie. It is not clear from the records where it came from. The CA presumed it to be
in the nature of cash dividends declared prior to the approval of the compromise
agreement and held that it is conjugal and therefore, belongs to Benigno. While no
sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the
legal presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
absent any proof that it is the exclusive property of either spouse. Since Rose Marie
failed to prove that the amount forms pat of the paraphernal property, it is presumed
to be conjugal property.
Liquidation of ACP/CPG Assets and Liabilities: Two or more marriages
Dael v. IAC
Facts:
• Cabutihan married Bienvenida Durana, their marriage produced 5 children
• Less than a year after Bienvenida’s death, Cabutihan married Vitorina
Durana, the sister of his first wife (no kids)
• Cesario Cabutihan died
• 5 years later, Victorina died as well
• The brother and sister of Victorina are claiming 2/3 of the estate, while the
mother of Bienvenida and the other sister of Victorina are claiming 1/3
Issue: How should the estate of Victorina be partitioned?
Held:
When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership. It was also at this point of time that the inheritance was transmitted to the
heirs of Bienvenida (5 children). The heirs will receive ½ of the conjugal partnership
property which pertained to Binevenida. The other half belongs to Cesario.
Due to the marriage of Cesario and Victorina, the fruits and income of
Cesario’s share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the
property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership of
properties of he second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through
these properties would also be conjugal in nature.
The problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two
conjugal partnerships. According to the Civil Code, whenever the liquidation of the
partnership of 2 or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried
out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal
property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the
partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion
to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.
Property Relations of Union without Marriage: Either not Capacitated to marry
or not living together exclusively
TUMLOS V. TUMLOS
Homeowners Bank v. Miguela Dailo
Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San
Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only
in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife,
Miguel.
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On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house
and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the
amount of P300,000.00 from Homeowners. The house and lot served as the security
for the Real Estate Mortgage. Miguela had no knowledge of the SPA and of the REM.
The loan was not paid and the house and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
followed. At the sale, Homeowners ended up being the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was issued to Homeowners. A year passed and the property wasn’t redeemed
so Homeowners consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that Homeowners had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to
clean its premises and that her Ford sedan was razed because Brion allowed a boy to
play with fire in the compound
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela filed a case with the RTC for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage and its subsequent sale, and for reconveyance.
The RTC nullified the mortgage and the sale. It also instructed Homeowners to pay
Miguela 40,000 for her Ford Sedan.
The CA affirmed.
Issues: 1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino on the subject property as co-
owner is valid as to his undivided share.
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan, because it
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Held: 1. NO! Co-ownership doesn’t even apply here. Without the other spouse’s
consent any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
2. NO! This assertion wasn’t proven.
Ratio: 1. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies
to the instant case. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 (co-ownership
provision) of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Miguela and the late Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership
of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already
been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of Miguela and
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains
is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply
only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, '[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
. . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The burden of proof
that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Homeowner's sweeping conclusion
that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner's bare allegation,
there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
Abing vs. Waeyan
Facts: Petitioner John Abing and respondent Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential
house. Later on, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. While there, she would
still send money to John who deposited the same in their joint account
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it
was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store.
In 1995, she went back from Korea and lived with John. She also managed
the sari-sari store.
However, their relationship did not last. They decided to partition their
properties. In the Memorandum of Agreement, they both settled that while John
should leave his share of the properties, Juliet should pay him the amount of
P428,870.00 which she failed to pay fully. Hence, John demanded that Juliet vacate
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the annex structure. When she refused, John instituted an ejectment case. The two
lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that the construction of the said
structure solely came from his exclusive funds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
decided on the contrary stating that the property is owned in common by both of
them.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive
ownership of petitioner, John.
Ruling: No. Art 147 of the Family Code reads:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any
property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is
presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.”
John and Juliet lived together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995
without the benefit of marriage, and it was within this period that they acquired the
property and constructed the annex structure.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to prove that the property came from his
exclusive funds. Hence, the property is owned by the parties in common. Being co-
owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be
ejected therefrom.
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages. Felicisimo married Virginia Sulit but she died [6
children]. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin but divorced later on [one son].
Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis but this time, Felicisimo died [no children].
Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate before the RTC. However, one of the children of
Felicisimo in the first marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress of
Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled in favor of
Rodolfo. However, CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration???
RULING: YES.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
the affirmative.
52
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine
law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by
the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
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To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be
equal.
Co-ownership
MAXEY V. CA
Cariño vs Cariño
st
Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime. The 1 was with
nd
Susan Nicdao and the 2 was with Susan Yee (hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh
noh? Haha). When Santiago died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago worked
for (he was a police).
Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Susan
Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao did not file her answer and was
declared in default. Susan Yee admits that her marriage to Santiago took place
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of Santiago to
st
Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1 marriage was void ab initio
because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented the
marriage certificate of Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license
number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar showed that they had
no record of the marriage license.
Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is claiming from
Susan Nicdao?
Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Despite this however, the
records reveal that their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As
such, their marriage is void ab initio.
nd
However, this does not automatically mean that the 2 marriage is already
valid. Under art40 of the family code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
st
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1
nd
marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the declaration otherwise the 2
marriage will also be void. Hence, since Susan Yee’s marriage to Santiago was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void,
theirs is also void ab initio.
2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the separation of property
of the spouses. Considering that the 2 marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime won’t be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The
marriages are governed by Art147 and 148 of the FC on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.
Under art. 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships...etc. Under this regime, the property acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago is bigamous
having been solemnized during the subsistence of another marriage which is
presumed to be valid, article 148 applies.
The disputed claims in this case are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
proof to the contrary is shown, it cannot be said that Susan Yee contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common – they belong to the deceased alone and Susan Yee has no right
to claim them.
By intestate succession, these death benefits shall pass to the legal heirs.
But since Susan yee is not legal wife, she is not a legal heir.
st
3) Article 147 govern the property regime of Santiago and Susan Nicdao (1
null marriage). This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to marry but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons.
Under this article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
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contribute. Thus, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by Santiago alone,
art147 creates a co-ownership entitling Susan Nicdao to ½ share thereof.

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