ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v.

SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas

City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her
husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to

investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted

by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such

conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising
her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is
specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore,
a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres

the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that
the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of
religion.
Lesaca vs Lesaca

Facts:
Baldomaro J. Lesaca died and was survived by his second wife,
Juana Felix, 2 minor children by the latter, 2 children by his first
marriage, and 3 acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In
his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his
children by his first marriage, co-executrices.
The deceased and his second wife had been living-in since 1924
and on 1930, before he married Juana, he bought 3 parcels of land
from Ramon Garcia for 2,500. When he died on 1946, however, just
after a year he finally wed Juana, his children from his first wife sold
the 3 parcels of land back to Ramon Garcia for the same price of
2,500 php. Now, claiming that this sum was conjugal property,
Juana, the second wife petitioned the court to order the co-
executrices to give her one-half thereof, which the RTC declared in
her favor thus, the appeal to the CA, and, subsequently, this case

Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8,

1946. He was survived by his second wife (Juana Felix), two minor
children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three
acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In his will he named
Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first
marriage, coexecutrices. It appears that the deceased and his
widow, Juana Felix, had lived together maritally since 1924 but were
not married until December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his
death.

Issues and Holdings:

Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a

retrovendendo before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes
conjugal property o r n o t ?

In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer. Whether a

standing crop of palay planted during covertures, and harvested after the
death of the one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the
purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-half of such crop
should be delivered to the surviving spouse. I t s h o u l d b e l o n g t o
t h e c o n j u g a l partnership
 According to the briefs Garcia sold the land for P2,500 to Lesaca
before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix and repurchased it to
for the same amount after said marriage. If the money paid by
Lesaca was his own exclusively, surely the mere fact that it was
returned or repaid after marriage cannot convert it to conjugal
property. It is true that under Art. 1401 of the Civil Code of 1889
property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses
or of either of them belongs to the conjugal partnership.