ANTONIO MEDINA, petitioner, vs.

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COURT

OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-15113 | 1961-01-28
FACTS:

 The records show that on or about May 20, 1944, petitioning taxpayer Antonio Medina
married Antonia Rodriguez. Before 1946, the spouses had neither property nor business of
their own.
 Subsequent to marriage, petitioners engaged in concessions with the government, while his
wife started to engage in business as a lumber dealer.
 From 1949 to 1952, petitioner sold logs to his wife.
 On the thesis that the sales made by petitioner to his wife were null and void pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 CIR considered the sales by Mrs. Medina as the petitioner’s original sales taxable under the
NIRC. Petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration, revealing for the first time the alleged
premarital agreement of complete separation of property.
 Petitioner argues that Article 1490 of the Civil Code has no application to the sales made by
said petitioner to his wife, because said transactions are contemplated and allowed by the
provisions of Articles 7 and 10 of the Code of Commerce.
ISSUE: WoN the sale of logs by Mr. Medina to his wife is void because they cannot be parties to
a sale pursuant to Art. 1490 of NCC and, thus could be considered as his original taxable sales.
RULING: YES.
The wife is authorized to engage in business and for the incidents that flow therefrom when she
so engages therein. But the transactions permitted are those entered into with strangers, and do
not constitute exceptions to the prohibitory provisions of Article 1490 against sales between
spouses
Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void. Being
void transactions, the sales made by the petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the
Collector in his tax assessments that considered as the taxable sales those made by the wife
through the spouses' common agent, Mariano Osorio. In upholding that stand, the Court below
committed no error.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-28771 | 1971-03-31
FACTS:

 Cornelia Matabuena, the appellant, had a brother, Felix Matabuena, who donated a piece of
lot in 1956 to his common-law spouse, appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got
married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months
later, or on September 1962, Felix died.
 Cornelia, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased,
filed a claim over the property, by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her.
She thereafter had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon.
 The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made
at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering the prohibition in the
Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
RULING:

 While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during
the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
 A.s stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials.
 The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result
in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
 Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

(NOTE: Walang about parties of sale dito. Feeling ko ang point ng case na to is since ang
prohibition on donation in Art. 133 applies even to common-law spouses, the prohibition of sale
in Art 1490 is likewise applicable kahit common-law spouses din.)
GLORIA R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMY V. SUZARA and MANUEL
R. VIZCONDE, respondents.
G.R. No. 120122 | 1997-11-06

FACTS:

 Petitioner owned a lot in QC. In 1977, she lived-in with Romy Suzara without benefit of
marriage.In 1982, solely out of love and affection, she executed a deed of sale in Romy’s
favor without monetary consideration.
 Romy registered the document in his favor and used the property as collateral for a bank
loan. Romy failed to pay off the loan, thus the mortgage was foreclosed. Petitioner paid the
bank to restructure the loan, resulting in the extension of the redemption period to 2 years.
 But without petitioner’s knowledge, Romy redeemed the property and thereafter avoided
petitioner.
 Thus petitioner filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the RD of QC, asserting that the sale
to Romy was void for lack of consideration and for being contrary to law and public policy.
Petitioner then sued before the RTC for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents,
etc
 RTC: Sale was valid. The “love, affection, and accommodation” being the considerations
 CA; Affirmed. Hence this petition.
 Petitioner argues that there being a factual finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that she and respondent Suzara were common-law husband and wife, the sale between
them was void and inexistent, citing Art. 1490 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner can seek for the reconveyance of the property.
RULING: No.
The provision on prohibition on sales between spouses applies to Common-law husband and
wife. Thus, sale was void.
However, although under Art. 1490, a husband and wife cannot sell property to one another as
a rule which, for policy considerations requires that the prohibition apply to common-law
relationships, petitioner can no longer seek reconveyance of the property as it has already been
acquired by Vizconde in good faith and for value. Both lower courts found that on 22 December
1989, when Romy executed the deed of sale in favor of Vizconde, Romy was the registered
owner and nothing was annotated in the certificate to indicate a flaw in Romy’s title. It was only
on 22 January 1990 that petitioner filed her adverse claim with the RD. This is without prejudice
to any appropriate remedy petitioner may take against Romy.

(Dito naconfirm na Art 1490 applies to common-law spouses din)