Absolute Community of Property (ACP)

Sunga-Chan v. CA GR 164401
Doctrine:
Petitioners’ husband and father died. They continued his business without the consent of his
business partner. The partner on the other hand, claimed that the partnership was dissolved
due to the death of the other partner and ordered the liquidation of the assets of said
partner.

The Supreme Court held that the community property is liable for the spouses' solidary
obligation because the loan was obtained during the marriage.

Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the properties of the property regime ACP is liable for
debts acquired during the marriage for the benefit of the family with the consent of the
spouse.

The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may
be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not vitiate the levy and the consequent sale
of the property. The use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite
even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to
have been used for her and her husband’s benefit.

>CAN THE DEBT OF THE DEAD HUSBAND BE LEVIED AGAINST THE PROPERTIES OF THE
WIFE. THE SC SAID YES. CONSIDERED AS DEBT REDOUNDED TO THE FAMILY

Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, GR 143016

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the Rule on
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as only one of the petitioners signed the certification.

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review
on certiorari and mandamus for failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping.

The Supreme Court reasoned that, under the system of absolute community of property,
either spouse can act on behalf of the other spouse in matters involving the common
rights and interests of the spouses.

Since the right of abode in the conjugal dwelling is a common right and interest of the
spouses, Ronnie Dar was able to sign the petition for review on certiorari and mandamus on
behalf of his wife and the other petitioners.
Nobleza v Nuega, GR193038
Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent

RTC The respondent is thus hereby enjoined from selling, encumbering or in any way
disposing or alienating any of their community property including the subject house and lot
before the required liquidation. Moreover, he, being the guilty spouse, must forfeit the net
profits of the community property in favor of the petitioner who is the innocent spouse
pursuant to Art. 43 of the aforesaid law.

Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and
without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 - or during the subsistence of a valid contract of
marriage.

Doctrine:
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendant-
appellant Josefina on 29 December 1992 or during the existence of Rogelio's marriage to
plaintiff-appellee Shirley, without the consent of the latter

Under the system of absolute community of property, all property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage belongs to the community property. This includes the right to
dispose of community property.

However, the consent of both spouses is required for the sale of community property.
Without the consent of both spouses, the sale is void. In this case, Rogelio Nuega sold the
subject property to Josefina Nobleza without the consent of his wife, Shirley Nuega.
Therefore, the deed of sale is void.

Santos v Santos, GR250774

Doctrine:
ISSUE 3: Whether Jose acquired the subject property from the Gaspar family by gratuitous
title?
Ruling: No, Jose did not acquire the subject property from the Gaspar family by gratuitous
title.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court held that the subject property was acquired by Jose by onerous title
during his marriage to Maria. Jose acquired the subject property through disturbance
compensation. Disturbance compensation is a form of payment made to a person who is
displaced from their land due to a government project. Since Jose acquired the subject
property through disturbance compensation, he acquired it by onerous title. This means
that he paid for the property.

>If property onerous, it is considered as part of the conjugal property. On the other hand,
if it is gratuitous, it is considered exclusive separate property of the spouse.

ISSUE 4: Whether the subject property is excluded from the community property of Jose and
Maria?
Ruling: No, the subject property is not excluded from the community property of Jose and
Maria.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court held that the subject property is part of the
community property of Jose and Maria because it was acquired by Jose during the
marriage.

The Supreme Court held that the subject property is part of the community property of
Jose and Maria and that the children of Ruben, Bettina and Reuben Joseph, should not be
excluded from the partition of the property.

Zapanta v RCC, GR 248063

Doctrine: As a general rule, the husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly as they are
co-administrators of the community property under the system of absolute community of
property regime, as well as the conjugal partnership regime under the Family Code. In this
case, impleading German was proper as RCC prayed for the attachment of properties that
may form part of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of Nilda and
German. However, this does not mean that they are equally liable for the obligation that
may arise out of the collection suit.
Art 94

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (CPG)

De Ugalde v De Ysasi, GR130623 (29February2008)

Short facts: The absence of a marriage license is fatal and made the marriage between
petitioner and respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the trial court did not err in finding
that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent. The
Court of Appeals further ruled that the compromise agreement is a valid contract between
the parties Since the compromise agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with
the full understanding of its consequences, it is conclusive and binding on the parties.
-The existence of conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage.
-The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and
respondent's marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent's
marriage was the subject of another action
-Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement
which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed
dissolved as of 15 April 1957 (Compromise Agreement).

Doctrine: The marriage was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, hence
the property regime governing the marriage without a prior marriage settlement would be
CPG. The existence of conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Since
the marriage was declared void, the CPG would be dissolved. Under Article 175 of the Civil
Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Lavadia v Heirs of Luna, GR171914
Short Facts: agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
-obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic,
-Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement
prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations.

Doctrine: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the
first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of
the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code

Ravina v. Abrille, GR 160708 (2009)

Short Facts: In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was
forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her
children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners,
Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Mary Ann did not sign such document.
1. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money
2. Issue: Is Pedro’s sale of the lot valid. In addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine:
(1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of
Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the
absence of Mary Ann’s consent.

Doctrine: Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the
exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. They
allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of
his exclusive properties.
HOWEVER, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an
exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann.
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through
exchange or barter.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family
Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void.
Such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date
the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Mary Ann filed
such action within 5 years from the date of the sale.
Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the
subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence,
petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.

Buado v. CA, GR 145222

Short Facts: Spouses filed an action against Erlinda. Said action originated from Erlinda
Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
petitioners. Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment,
the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property .
1. Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners
and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now
petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without
exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.

Doctrine: There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

>Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in
the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-
spouse.

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted
by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.

Sarmiento v. IAC, GR L-75410 (1987)

Short Facts: Private respondent Norma Sarmiento sued her husband, the petitioner Cesar
Sarmiento, for support. The private respondent brought another action against the
petitioner for a declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner from the PNB
were conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private respondent as her share

Doctrine: The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private
respondent makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have
been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and
should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary
benefits are given gratis by the government because of previous work, this is a gratuity
and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code) (Art. 115, Family Code).
Note Art. 115 of the FC: If the benefit is simply an accumulation or deductions from money
earned during the marriage or from salaries of either spouse- CPG; If the benefit out of pure
liberality of the grantor, apply rule in case of acquisition by gratuitous title, the benefit is
exclusive property of the grantee-spouse.

PNB v Reyes, GR212483 (5October2016)

Short Facts: During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land. The properties were
mortgaged to Philippine National Bank on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan worth
P1,100,000.00. When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, Philippine
National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real properties. In assailing the validity of the real
estate mortgage, Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the mortgage
without his consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the
mortgage.
Since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal properties, he argued that the mortgage
constituted over them was void.
1. Petitioner claims that respondent and his wife both duly consented to the loan and the
mortgage.
2. Petitioner further claims that it is impossible for respondent to have no
knowledge of the transaction since the Reyes’ spouses live together in the same
house where the notices and demand letters were sent
3. alleges that his wife hid the transaction from him. Even if they lived under the
same roof, he was not aware of everything happening in their home because as a
practicing lawyer, he was always away at work from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. He likewise
points out that since both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals made a
factual finding of forgery, this Court should respect this finding.

Doctrine: A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal

properties. Under the Family Code, their property regime is Conjugal Partnership of Gains;
thus, Article 124 is the applicable provision regarding the administration of their conjugal
property which provides that the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. Any disposition or encumbrance of a
conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by the other; otherwise, it is void.

Issue on w/n the cpg can be held liable for the loan
The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the principal obligation is not
affected. It remains valid.
Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made liable to the extent that it
redounded to the benefit of the family under Article 122 of the Family Code.
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the
benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's wife Lilia
contracted, but not to the mortgage.

What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage attached to the conjugal
property of the Reyes Spouses. Since the real estate mortgage was an encumbrance
attached to a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse, it is void and
legally inexistent. Although petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal
property in question, it can still recover the loan amount from the conjugal partnership.
Hapitan v Lagradilla, GR170004 (13January2016)
WALA KO KASABOT ANI SO GOOD LUCK NLNG TA DILI MATAWAG ANI NGA CASE
Short Facts:

Doctrine: The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the subsequent waiver of
Warlily. The Court has explained the nature of a waiver: Waiver is defined as "a voluntary
and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed.
The general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he
is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his
sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the
right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy. Warlily's
Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the Spouses
Terosa since the property is neither a right nor a benefit she is entitled to. Moreover, the
declaration of nullity due to the existence of fraud was both a finding of fact and of law by
the lower courts, and the parties cannot agree amongst themselves and decide otherwise.

Anastacio v Heirs of Coloma, GR224572 (27August2020)

Short Facts: According to [respondents], the subject property is under the possession of
[petitioners] by mere tolerance of their parents. Thus, upon the demise of their parents,
[respondents] demanded the surrender of its possession. However, [petitioners] refused,
which led to the filing of a case for Recovery of Possession and Title against them.
In their Answer before the MCTC, [petitioners] claimed right of ownership over the subject
property by virtue of an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale.
[respondents] filed the Complaint before the [RTC], this time for Annulment of Document,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary injunction,
claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by their father in favor of
[petitioners] is void on two x x x grounds. First, that the signature of their father, Juan, as
appearing thereon is a forgery; and second, that there is no conformity or consent given by
their mother, Juliana, to the alleged sale.

Doctrine: The SC found no merit on the claim of the petitioners that the position that TCT
No. 56899 presents a conclusive presumption that the land described therein was the
capital of, and owned exclusively by Juan and that Juan is stated in the said TCT to have
been married to Juliana is merely descriptive of his civil status. Article 105 of the Family
Code provides that the provisions of Chapter 4, Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG), shall
also apply to CPG already established before the effectivity of the Family Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The subject property was acquired in 1965 during the lifetime of Juan and Juliana while
they were married, and it was registered in the name of Juan married to Juliana.

Therefore, petitioners' postulation that the certificate of title having been registered in the
name of Juan married to Juliana establishes a conclusive presumption that the land
described therein was owned exclusively by Juan is incorrect because it directly runs
counter to Article 116 of the Family Code.
Given that the subject property was the conjugal property of Juan and Juliana, the CA
correctly ruled that the sale of the subject property by Juan without the consent of Juliana
in favor of petitioners contemplated in the DAS is void.