Planning and Design For Fire and Smoke Incidents in Underground Passenger Rail Systems

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Planning and Design for Fire and Smoke Incidents in Underground Passenger Rail Systems
TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
TCRP SYNTHESIs 124

Planning and Design for
Fire and Smoke Incidents
in Underground Passenger
Rail Systems
A Synthesis of Transit Practice
Consultant
Daniel K. Boyle
Dan Boyle & Associates, Inc.
San Diego, California
S ubject A reas
Policy • Safety and Human Factors • Society
Research Sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration in Cooperation with

the Transit Development Corporation
2017
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TCRP SYNTHESIS 124
The nation’s growth and the need to meet mobility, environmen- Project J-7, Topic SA-40
tal, and energy objectives place demands on public transit systems. ISSN 1073-4880
Current systems, some of which are old and in need of upgrading, ISBN 978-0-309-38982-2
must expand service area, increase service frequency, and improve Library of Congress Control Number 2016957898
efficiency to serve these demands. Research is necessary to solve © 2017 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
operating problems, adapt appropriate new technologies from other
industries, and introduce innovations into the transit industry. The
Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) serves as one of the COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
principal means by which the transit industry can develop innovative Authors herein are responsible for the authenticity of their materials and
near-term solutions to meet demands placed on it. for obtaining written permissions from publishers or persons who own the
The need for TCRP was originally identified in TRB Special Report copyright to any previously published or copyrighted material used herein.
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and based on a study sponsored by the Urban Mass Transportation material in this publication for classroom and not-for-profit purposes.
Administration—now the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). A Permission is given with the understanding that none of the material will
be used to imply TRB, AASHTO, FAA, FHWA, FMCSA, FRA, FTA,
report by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA),
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, PHMSA,
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The opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this report are
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governing board, designated as the TCRP Oversight and Project
essential to the object of the report.
Selection (TOPS) Committee.
Research problem statements for TCRP are solicited periodically
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sibility of the TOPS Committee to formulate the research program
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other TRB activities, TCRP project panels serve voluntarily without
compensation.
Because research cannot have the desired effect if products fail to Published reports of the
reach the intended audience, special emphasis is placed on dissemi-
TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
nating TCRP results to the intended users of the research: transit
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Washington, DC 20001
that results are implemented by urban and rural transit industry
practitioners. and can be ordered through the Internet by going to
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address common operational problems. TCRP results support and and then searching for TRB
complement other ongoing transit research and training programs. Printed in the United States of America

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Topic Panel SA-40

TIMOTHY DePAEPE, NTSB, West Dundee, IL
GARY ENGLISH, City of Seattle—Assistant Fire Marshal
THOMAS E. JONES, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washington, DC
HAROLD LEVITT, PATH-WTCC Design & Construction Liaison, Jersey City, NJ
PAUL O’BRIEN, Sandy, UT
ALAN L. RAO, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA
JAMAL ROSTAMI, Director Earth Mechanics Institute, Golden, CO
SCOTT A. SAUER, SEPTA, Philadelphia, PA
ERIK STOOTHOFF, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Boston, MA
TROY A. LLOYD, Safety Assurance and Risk Management (TSO-11) Accident Investigation Branch,
U.S.DOT (Liaison)
Synthesis Studies Staff

STEPHEN R. GODWIN, Director for Studies and Special Programs
JON M. WILLIAMS, Program Director, IDEA and Synthesis Studies
MARIELA GARCIA-COLBERG, Senior Program Officer
JO ALLEN GAUSE, Senior Program Officer
GAIL R. STABA, Senior Program Officer
TANYA M. ZWAHLEN, Consultant
DON TIPPMAN, Senior Editor
CHERYL KEITH, Senior Program Assistant
DEMISHA WILLIAMS, Senior Program Assistant
DEBBIE IRVIN, Program Associate
Cooperative Research Programs Staff

CHRISTOPHER J. HEDGES, Director, Cooperative Research Programs
LORI L. SUNDSTROM, Deputy Director, Cooperative Research Programs
GWEN CHISHOLM SMITH, Senior Program Officer
EILEEN P. DELANEY, Director of Publications
TCRP Committee for Project J-7
CHAIR
BRAD J. MILLER, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, St. Petersburg, FL
Members
DONNA DeMARTINO, San Joaquin Regional Transit District, Stockton, CA
MICHAEL FORD, The Regional Transit Authority of Southeast Michigan, Detroit
BOBBY J. GRIFFIN, Griffin and Associates, Flower Mound, TX
ROBERT H. IRWIN, Consultant, Sooke, BC, Canada
JEANNE KRIEG, Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority, Antioch, CA
PAUL J. LARROUSSE, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick
DAVID A. LEE, Connecticut Transit, Hartford
ELIZABETH PRESUTTI, Des Moines Area Regional Transit Authority–DART
ROBERT H. PRINCE, JR., AECOM Consulting Transportation Group, Inc., Boston, MA
JARRETT W. STOLTZFUS, Foothill Transit, West Covina, CA
FTA Liaison
FAITH HALL
APTA Liaison
PAMELA BOSWELL
TRB Liaison
STEPHEN J. ANDRLE
Cover figure: Fire test in the Brunsberg Tunnel, Sweden. Source: Per Rohlén, the METRO Project.

FOREWORD Transit administrators, engineers, and researchers often face problems for which infor-
mation already exists, either in documented form or as undocumented experience and prac-
tice. This information may be fragmented, scattered, and unevaluated. As a consequence,
full knowledge of what has been learned about a problem may not be brought to bear on its
solution. Costly research findings may go unused, valuable experience may be overlooked,
and due consideration may not be given to recommended practices for solving or alleviat-
ing the problem.
There is information on nearly every subject of concern to the transit industry. Much
of it derives from research or from the work of practitioners faced with problems in their
day-to-day work. To provide a systematic means for assembling and evaluating such useful
information and to make it available to the entire transit community, the Transit Coopera-
tive Research Program Oversight and Project Selection (TOPS) Committee authorized the
Transportation Research Board to undertake a continuing study. This study, TCRP Proj-
ect J-7, “Synthesis of Information Related to Transit Problems,” searches out and synthe-
sizes useful knowledge from all available sources and prepares concise, documented reports
on specific topics. Reports from this endeavor constitute a TCRP report series, Synthesis of
Transit Practice.
This synthesis series reports on current knowledge and practice, in a compact format,
without the detailed directions usually found in handbooks or design manuals. Each report
in the series provides a compendium of the best knowledge available on those measures
found to be the most successful in resolving specific problems.
PREFACE Recently there have been a number of fire and smoke incidents in underground pas-
By Mariela Garcia-Colberg senger rail systems. Fires in underground passenger rail tunnels require implementation of
Senior Program Officer different measures in order to provide safety for the passengers and ensure structural and
Transportation system integrity of the facilities and operating infrastructure.
Research Board The synthesis documents state-of-the-practice information for the planning, design, and
operations for fire and smoke incidents in underground or enclosed conditions of passenger
rail systems. The report identifies current practices including lessons learned, challenges,
and gaps in information. Case examples provide additional details on procedures, evacua-
tion, and what agencies perceive as keys to success.
Twenty-five transit agencies responded to the electronic survey sent to 30 rail transit
agencies, yielding an 83% (25/30) response rate. Additional information is offered in a
literature review and analysis of survey results.
Daniel K. Boyle, Dan Boyle & Associates, Inc., San Diego, California, collected and
synthesized the information and wrote the report, under the guidance of a panel of experts
in the subject area. The members of the topic panel are acknowledged on the preceding
page. This synthesis is an immediately useful document that records the practices that were
acceptable within the limitations of the knowledge available at the time of its preparation.
As progress in research and practice continues, new knowledge will be added to that now
at hand.

CONTENTS
1 SUMMARY
3 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
Project Background and Objectives, 3
Technical Approach, 4
Organization of This Report, 6
7 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction, 7
Rail Fire and Smoke Standards, 7
Railway and Rail Car Studies, 8
Passenger Behavior, 10
European Studies, 12
The METRO Project, 13
Related Tunnel Studies, 16
Summary, 18
19 CHAPTER THREE SURVEY RESULTS PART ONE:

INFORMATION FROM AGENCIES
Introduction, 19
Sources of Information, 19
Definitions, 20
Incidents and Causes, 21
Fire and Smoke Detection, Prevention, Protection, and Ventilation Systems, 22
Managing Incidents, 25
Training, 27
Summary, 29
31 CHAPTER FOUR SURVEY RESULTS PART TWO: AGENCY ASSESSMENT

Introduction, 31
Challenges, 31
Next-Generation Tools, 33
Lessons Learned, 34
The Ideal System, 36
Summary, 37
38 CHAPTER FIVE CASE EXAMPLES

Introduction, 38
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Atlanta, Georgia, 38
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Boston, Massachusetts, 41
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, Cleveland, Ohio, 42
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, Jersey City, New Jersey, 45
Sound Transit, Seattle, Washington, 47
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA, Metro),
Washington, D.C., 49

52 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS
Introduction, 52
Findings from the Survey and Literature Review, 52
Agency Assessments, 53
Lessons Learned and Keys to Success from Case Examples, 54
Gaps in Information, 54
Conclusions and Areas of Future Study, 55
58 ACRONYMS
59 REFERENCES
61 APPENDIX A List of Participating Transit Agencies
62 APPENDIX B Survey Questionnaire
78 APPENDIX C Summary of Survey Results

Planning and Design for Fire and

Smoke Incidents in Underground
Passenger Rail Systems
SUMMARY Fire and smoke incidents in passenger rail tunnels are not like incidents elsewhere because of the
confined environment of tunnels and the potential presence of large numbers of passengers inside rail
vehicles. In the past decade, many research studies have addressed fire and smoke incidents in road
tunnels but did not include the implementation of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130
and other recent developments because NFPA 130 is specific to passenger rail systems. Underground
fires in passenger rail tunnels require implementation of different measures to provide safety for the
passengers and assure structural and system integrity of the facilities and operating infrastructure.
The purposes of this synthesis are to explore these issues; document effective practices in the
planning, design, and operations for response to fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail
systems; and identify gaps in knowledge. What are the challenges faced by rail agencies in designing
or upgrading protocols or systems for fire and smoke detection and incident management, and what
lessons have transit agencies learned in addressing these challenges? The study identifies effective
strategies and solutions to achieve agency goals.
Results of a survey of North American rail transit agencies that operate in tunnels document
the current state of the practice of planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground
passenger rail systems. Twenty-five completed surveys were received from the 30 rail transit agencies
in the sample, a response rate of 83%. In addition, three partially completed surveys were received,
and responses from those are included in this analysis. Survey results include transit agency assess-
ments of the challenges in planning and design for response to underground fire and smoke incidents,
lessons learned, new technologies, promising approaches, and what an “ideal” fire prevention and
response system might look like.
Case examples provide additional details on procedures, evacuation (not fully addressed in the
survey), challenges, lessons learned, and what agencies perceive as keys to success. Selection of case
examples sought agencies that (1) adopted innovative approaches or faced significant challenges and
(2) provided detailed survey responses and relevant observations, with a balance of agencies by size
and location. Six agencies were selected as case examples:
• Atlanta, Georgia: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

• Boston, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
• Cleveland, Ohio: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
• Jersey City, New Jersey: Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
• Seattle, Washington: Sound Transit
• Washington, D.C.: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA, Metro).
This study’s findings address prevention, procedures, training, communication, response, chal-
lenges, and trends and include the following key points:
• An understanding of the combination of physical elements and human interaction in responding

to fire and smoke incidents;
• Thorough assessments of the current state of the detection/response system as a starting point;
• The central role of the ventilation system;

2
• Testing system components individually and together;

• Ongoing training through emergency drills with first responders;
• Use of the Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a clear chain of command;
• Use of standard operating procedures (SOPs) in ongoing training and during incidents;
• Updates to SOPs;
• Basic preventive measures, such as removing and minimizing the presence of combustible
materials, monitoring tunnels, and training agency personnel and first responders;
• The difficulty of retrofitting legacy systems to meet current standards because of physical or fiscal
restrictions;
• Use of major rehabilitation projects undertaken for other purposes to make needed safety changes;
• The importance of early detection and precise location of incidents;
• A move toward automated and integrated systems coupled with the continuing need for attention
to the basics;
• The value of early and clear communication with passengers during fire and smoke incidents; and
• A concern that recent full-scale tests of rail vehicle fires indicate that the fire size may be much
larger than most systems are designed to address.
During the course of conducting this synthesis, the NTSB released a synopsis of its report on the
2015 WMATA electrical arcing and smoke accident. The NTSB recommendations are similar to
the findings in this synthesis in their emphasis on inspection, preventive maintenance, emergency
egress, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) ICS, tunnel ventilation systems, SOPs,
and ongoing training exercises, and NFPA 130. NTSB recommendations that apply to all rail transit
agencies are noted in chapter six of this synthesis.
Survey responses to a question about what the “ideal” fire detection and suppression system would
look like and how it would differ from those available today describe a system that incorporates auto-
mated detection, ventilation, and notification. Even with the “ideal” system, basic approaches, such
as minimizing the presence of combustible material, are crucial components of an agency’s strategy.
Routine maintenance, SOPs, and ongoing training on these procedures can prevent fires and ensure a
coordinated response to fire and smoke incidents. All agencies use NFPA 130, and most are familiar
with NIMS and conduct regular training and inspections.
The study identified several research needs and prepared four research needs statements to address
identified gaps and encourage research in areas of future study. After deliberation, two problem
statements were submitted to TCRP for potential funding: Operation of Underground Passenger Rail
Ventilation Systems and Safety Culture in Transit Agencies.

3
chapter one
Introduction
Project Background and Objectives
A number of fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems have occurred recently.
NCHRP Synthesis 415: Design Fires in Road Tunnels, published in 2011, did not address fires in
underground passenger rail systems. There are many differences between fires in road tunnels and
those in underground passenger rail tunnels. Such differences require implementation of different
measures to provide safety for passengers and assure structural and system integrity of the facilities
and operating infrastructure.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) publishes NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guide-
way Transit and Passenger Rail Systems. Every update incorporates the latest technologies. However,
many legacy systems designed to code existing at the time of construction do not meet the current
standards provided in NFPA 130.
The purposes of this synthesis are to explore these issues and document effective practices in the
planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. What are
the challenges faced by rail agencies in the design and upgrade of protocols or systems for fire
and smoke detection and incident management, and what lessons have transit agencies learned in
addressing these challenges? The study identifies effective strategies for achieving agency goals and
best practice solutions. The synthesis report includes a review of relevant literature. Results of a sur-
vey of North American rail transit agencies that operate in tunnels document policies and procedures
currently in place. The survey examined the following factors:
• Definition of underground/enclosed (tunnel) asset;

• Definition of a fire and smoke scenario, causes, and response;
• Protocol, procedures, and systems for fire and smoke incident management;
• Fire and smoke detection, prevention, protection, and ventilation systems;
• Passenger and employee evacuation and egress;
• The impact of active and passive fire protection systems;
• Training and familiarization for employees and responders; and
• Codes and standards used in the planning and design of new and upgraded assets.
Survey results include transit agency assessments of the challenges in planning and design for
underground fire and smoke incidents, lessons learned, new technologies, promising approaches, and
the “ideal” fire prevention and response system.
An important element of this synthesis is chapter five, which contains case examples that go into
greater detail on specific aspects of individual agencies’ policies and procedures related to under-
ground fire and smoke incidents. The case examples profile innovative and successful practices
based on interviews with key personnel at selected agencies. Findings from all of these efforts are
combined to report on the state of the practice, including lessons learned, challenges, and gaps in
information. A summary of research needs also is included. This synthesis will aid rail transit agencies
by identifying solutions that work in the real world.

4
Technical Approach
The approach to this synthesis included:
1. A literature review. A Transportation Research Information Database search using several key
words was conducted to aid the literature review.
2. A survey of transit agencies, described in the following paragraphs.
3. Telephone interviews with six agencies selected as case examples, to examine policies and
procedures related to fire and smoke incidents in greater detail.
The survey on planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail
systems was designed to solicit information on detection and prevention, incident management,
training, effective strategies, issues specific to legacy systems, and next-generation technologies.
Once finalized by the panel, the survey was posted and pretested. The pretest resulted in only minor
changes to survey logic and flow.
The sampling plan involved all North American rail transit agencies that operate in underground
tunnels. The sample included 30 transit agencies (29 local transit agencies plus Amtrak). An e-mail
with an attachment from the TCRP program manager explaining the importance of the survey and a
link to the online survey site was sent to a known contact at each agency.
Twenty-five completed surveys were received from the 30 rail transit agencies in the sample, a
response rate of 83%. In addition, three partially completed surveys were received, and responses
from the partially completed surveys are included in this analysis. Table 1 presents the distribution
of all responding agencies by size. Table 2 shows rail modes operated by responding agencies. Seven
agencies operate multiple modes.
Table 3 presents the distribution of responding agencies by FTA region. There is reasonably balanced
geographical representation among survey respondents. Figure 1 is a map of FTA regions.
Figure 2 shows the location of the 25 responding agencies that fully completed the survey.
Amtrak is not shown because it is a national rail agency. Case example locations also are shown
in Figure 2.
Table 1
Responding Transit Agencies by Size
No. of Rail Vehicles No. of
% Agencies
Operated in Maximum Agencies
Responding
Service Responding
Less than 100 6 21
100 to 499 12 43
500 and more 10 36
Total responses 28 100
Table 2
Rail Modes Operated by
Responding Agencies
No. of
% Agencies
Rail Mode Agencies
Responding
Responding
Heavy rail only 10 36
Light rail only 6 21
Commuter rail only 5 18
All three modes 3 11
Heavy rail plus light rail 2 7
Commuter rail plus light
2 7
rail

5
Table 3
Survey Respondents by FTA Region
No. of
% Agencies
FTA Region Agencies
Responding
Responding
1 1 4
2 7 25
3 5 18
4 1 4
5 3 11
6 1 4
7 0 0
8 0 0
9 4 14
10 1 4
Non-U.S.
4 14
(Canada)
National
1 4
(Amtrak)
Total 28 100
NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding.
SOURCES: FTA, survey results.
FIGURE 1 Map of FTA regions (Source: FTA).

6
FIGURE 2 Location of survey respondents and case examples (Source: GIS Workshop).
Organization of this Report
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two summarizes the findings of the literature review.
Chapter three, the first of two chapters to present the results of the survey, examines definitions,
incidents and causes, incident management, communication with local jurisdictions, and training.
Chapter four discusses the responding agencies’ assessment of actions taken. The chapter sum-
marizes agency assessment of barriers to success, lessons learned, new technologies, promising
strategies and approaches, and elements of the “ideal” fire prevention and response system.
Chapter five reports detailed findings from each of the six case examples. The selection process
for case examples had the following criteria: (1) include transit agencies of various sizes in different
parts of North America; (2) include agencies operating different rail modes; and (3) include agencies
that reported detailed observations in the survey that would add value to the synthesis.
Chapter six summarizes the findings, presents conclusions from this synthesis project, and offers
items for future study. Findings from the surveys and particularly the case examples provide an
appraisal of the current state of the practice and likely future directions.
Appendix A identifies all transit agencies that participated in the survey. Appendix B includes the
online survey. Appendix C provides verbatim survey responses.

7
chapter two
Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter summarizes findings from a literature review related to planning and design for fire
and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. A Transportation Research Infor
mation Database search was conducted to aid the literature review, using key words such as “rail
tunnel fires,” “rail fires,” “transit fires,” and “tunnel fires.” Reports are grouped under the following
headings:
• Rail Fire and Smoke Standards,

• Railway and Rail Car Studies,
• Passenger Behavior,
• European Studies,
• The METRO Project, and
• Related Tunnel Studies.
Rail Fire and Smoke Standards
NFPA usually publishes an updated version of a standard for the fixed guideway transit and passenger
rail systems every 3 years (NFPA 2014). The current version of NFPA 130 was published in 2014.
The purpose of NFPA 130 is to establish minimum requirements that will provide a reasonable
degree of safety from fire and its related hazards in fixed guideway transit and passenger rail system
environments. The scope of NFPA 130 is defined in Section 1.1.1 of the standard:
This standard shall cover life safety from fire and fire protection requirements for fixed guideway transit and
passenger rail systems, including, but not limited to, stations, trainways, emergency ventilation systems, vehicles,
emergency procedures, communications, and control systems.
The scope of the technical committee responsible for the preparation of NFPA 130 is:
This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents pertaining to fire safety requirements for under
ground, surface, and elevated fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems including stations, trainways,
emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures, communications and control systems and for
life safety from fire and fire protection in stations, trainways, and vehicles. Stations shall pertain to stations
accommodating occupants of the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems and incidental occupancies
in the stations.
The goal is to provide an environment for occupants of fixed guideway and passenger rail system
elements that is safe from fire and similar emergencies to a practical extent based on the following
measures: (1) protection of occupants not intimate with the initial fire development; and (2) maxi
mizing the survivability of occupants intimate with the initial fire development. Individual chapters of
NFPA 130 address stations, train ways, emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures,
communications, control systems, and wire and cable requirements.
Enhancements anticipated for the 2017 version of NFPA 130 (Levitt 2016) include a requirement
that closed stations be protected by a fire alarm system, new considerations on acoustics, sound level
requirements revolving around emergency communications for first responders, protection of enclosed
combustible insulation at stations, inclusion of additional electronic equipment in heat load analyses,

8
and testing of adhesive and sealants with respect to fire heat release rates (HRRs). Additional needs
to be addressed in the next edition include:
• Standardized methodology for calculating fire HRR;

• Incorporation of onboard fire suppression systems;
• Issues associated with high-speed rail;
• Additional methods for safe egress from deep stations; and
• Acoustical measures associated with emergency communications by first responders.
The International Code Council has developed a model building code (the International Building
Code or IBC) and the International Fire Code (IFC), which have been adopted throughout most of
the United States (International Code Council 2015). These codes establish minimum regulations for
building systems as well as fire protection and life safety systems using prescriptive and performance-
related provisions. The codes establish provisions that adequately protect public health, safety, and
welfare and do not unnecessarily increase construction costs; restrict use of new materials, products,
or methods of construction; or give preferential treatment to particular classes of materials, products,
or methods of construction. IBC/IFC and NFPA 130 are not always in agreement, and when they
conflict, the international code usually supersedes the NFPA standard.
APTA (2010) prepared a white paper that establishes guidelines for emergency ventilation of
tunnels in the event of a fire. During emergency operation, ventilation is needed to influence the
flow of smoke and combustion products to create a safer environment for tunnel users to escape and
emergency services to intervene. The emergency ventilation system design requires the identification
of the potential fire and smoke threat in terms of visibility, temperature, and toxicity effects. The
design must consider characteristics of rail traffic (flow, type of vehicles, and combustible load);
means to safeguard tunnel users and support responding emergency services; other safety facilities,
such as egress routes, doors, passageways, and various equipment; and meteorological conditions
between the portals that may create pressure differences and affect air flow velocities inside the
tunnel. The white paper provides an overview of ventilation system types and the objectives for
control, strategies for smoke management, and how they are affected by the design of the tunnel
and its ventilation system. Finally, operational strategies for rail and road tunnels are described. The
document is intended for use by transit agencies and emergency responders.
Railway and Rail Car Studies
The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center developed recommendations for improving
practices for selecting vehicle interior materials during the procurement of new vehicles and the
retrofit of existing rapid rail transit (RRT) and light rail transit (LRT) vehicles (Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center 1984, 1998). The document provides recommended fire safety prac
tices for testing the flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials used in the con
struction of RRT and LRT vehicles.
The Volpe Center also analyzed transit system fire statistics to learn how often fire and smoke
incidents occur on rail transit systems (Hathaway et al. 1992). Although fire accounts for only a small
percentage of all rail incidents, the potential exists for loss of life and significant damage to property.
The report identifies the countermeasures needed to prevent and reduce the severity of transit fires.
The system safety approach was used to identify the necessary countermeasures. This method used
(1) fault trees that graphically represented in a sequence of events how a fire develops, (2) an expert
in transit safety who examined each sequence of events, and (3) another expert who examined the
countermeasures for reducing and preventing transit fires. The system safety approach allowed
an examination of the relationships between the various physical components and operating pro
cedures of the entire transit system. In addition, potential problems relating to the construction and
operating stages of the transit system could be identified. The report identifies five major areas of
countermeasures: vehicle/equipment, procedures, human factors/training, environment, and infor
mation management/data analysis.
Subway tunnel fires often result in catastrophes with heavy casualties. Gao et al. (2012) described
an opposite-double air curtain ventilation-assisted tunnel evacuation system (OTES) to help people

9
evacuate from a tunnel fire. It can be used to create a safe evacuation passageway that is free of
smoke throughout the length of the tunnel. The performance of the OTES is compared with that of
traditional ventilation systems: longitudinal ventilation and natural ventilation. The effect of the HRR,
fire source location, and fire detection time are also discussed. The study also shows that compared
with natural ventilation and longitudinal ventilation, the carbon monoxide (CO) concentration with
OTES is significantly lower. Given the same HRR, the CO concentration values with OTES are only
0.58% to 2.41% of natural ventilation or 0.52% to 3.12% of longitudinal ventilation at the back end
of the tunnel. OTES creates an obviously clear evacuation passageway. The effects of changes in fire
source location and fire detection time on tunnel ventilation were tested and the effect of these changes
on the formation of an evacuation passageway by OTES reported.
Y. Z. Li et al. (2012) studied the provision of rescue stations in long railway tunnels. In the report,
the stations already constructed or under construction worldwide are reviewed, and the basic pattern
of smoke control during a rescue station fire is identified. Fifty-four model scale tests were carried
out to investigate smoke control issues in rescue station fires. The effects of HRR, train obstruction,
fire source location, and ventilation condition on smoke control in the cross passages of a rescue
station were tested and analyzed. For the study, a critical smoke layer temperature near the fireproof
door protecting the rescue station was investigated theoretically and experimentally, and a simple
equation for the temperature obtained. A height of 2.2 m (7.2 ft) is proposed for the fireproof doors
in cross passages of rescue stations.
A number of serious tunnel accidents have put tunnel safety on the public agenda. Concerns have
been directed toward the safety of road and rail tunnels. The choice of tunnel concept for double-
tracked rail lines has been given much attention. Anderson and Paaske (2003) discuss two alternative
tunnel concepts from a safety perspective: single-bored tunnels and parallel twin-bored tunnels. The
risk and safety arguments for various concepts are examined, and advantages and disadvantages
for each of the concepts are discussed. An investigation of known tunnel and metro fires is used to
assess how the choice of tunnel concept may have influenced the outcome of the accidents. In addi
tion, typical results of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) calculations of tunnel fires and risk analy
sis results are presented.
Lupton (2001) considered the safety of long railway tunnels in light of current attitudes toward
tunnel safety, with special regard to tunnel fires. Risk assessment should be considered an integral
part of operating and constructing a railway. The primary safety protection function of a long tunnel
is that of ventilation, correct use of which provides an area within the tunnel that will not be polluted
and can sustain life. Another fundamental issue is evacuating passengers from the site of a fire, the
length of time required to do so, and the capacity of the tunnel to accommodate passengers in walk
ways and places of safety. Effective tunnel protection provides the chance of survival and gives the
operator the ability to take control of the incident. In the report, reasons for not providing protection
(probability, strategy, and cost) are not seen as sufficient. Social and economic issues are considered:
acceptable safety is a variable dependent on the individual situation.
Fire development inside a train car is a topic that has not been studied extensively owing to the
complexity of the problem and the need for a real train car and the appropriate facilities to conduct
such tests in a controlled environment. Lee et al. (2015) present detailed experimental data on fire
development inside an intercity train car. The facility used for the tests provides an environment for
conducting such large-scale fires, and one at which the HRR can be measured using oxygen con
sumption calorimetry. Thermocouples and plate thermometers were installed inside the train car to
provide insight into fire development. Cameras were placed inside the car and tunnel, providing live
videos during the test. The peak HRR was 32 MW at 1,081 s after ignition, and the fire burned 83%
of the initial fire load. Flame spread data and recordings of window breaking events are discussed
and compared with the HRR data. A local flashover-type phenomenon, in which the fire involved all
combustibles at the rear of the car, was found to occur.
Lee et al. (2013) presented curve estimations of the HRR of an intercity rail car fire. Three estimation
approaches were used, which were compared with a full-scale fire test of the car. Two of the estima
tion approaches were based on the assumption of a specific burning rate of materials with the HRR

10
per unit area and burning area decision. The curve of the HRR of an actual rail car fire was measured
by using the ignition scenario in the British Standards Institute report EN 45545-1 (British Standards
Institute 2013). In the fire test, the surface temperature of every part of the interior was measured by
using the burning area decision for summation method estimation. The third approach used combus
tion and reaction heat to analyze microscopic-material pyrolysis. The pyrolysis model requires more
sophisticated material property inputs to achieve the same degree of curve accuracy. The differences
and similarities between the experimental fire curves and estimations were analyzed.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, FRA funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop a systematic approach to quantifying fire hazards in passenger trains that could form the
basis for regulatory reform. An extensive literature review (Peacock et al. 1994) documented U.S.
and European approaches to passenger train fire safety that rely primarily on individual small-scale
test methods to evaluate material fire performance. This was followed by a three-phase research
program. Phase I focused on the evaluation of passenger rail car interior furnishing materials using
data from existing FRA-cited, small-scale test methods and from an alternative test method using the
cone calorimeter (Peacock and Braun 1999). In Phase II, full-scale tests were conducted of selected
interior material component assemblies using a larger scale furniture calorimeter; fire hazard analyses
were then conducted for three types of intercity passenger rail cars using data from both types of tests
(Peacock et al. 2002). Phase III compared the results of Phases I and II of the research program, with
a series of full-scale fire tests conducted in an Amtrak coach rail car (Peacock et al. 2004).
From the fire hazard analyses conducted, conditions in all three passenger rail car designs
studied remain tenable long enough to allow safe passenger and crew egress for all but the most
severe ignition sources. Comparison of times to untenable conditions for a range of fire sizes deter
mined from the full-scale experimental measurements with those calculated by the Consolidated
Model of Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST) showed agreement that averaged approximately 13%.
The range of ignition source strengths indicated that an ignition source size between 25 kW and
approximately 200 kW is necessary to promote significant fire spread, which is consistent with con
clusions from earlier research that the ignition source strength of passenger rail car materials is 2 to
10 times greater than that of typical office furnishings.
Park et al. (2008) conducted a study to determine the optimum smoke-control ventilation mode
in underground stations in South Korea. Numerical analysis was performed for the underground
platform where the train with the fire was stopped. Three smoke-control modes were considered.
Distributions of temperature, smoke, and visible range on the platform were analyzed for different
smoke-control modes. The flow characteristics of smoke and heat on the platform of the underground
station were also studied numerically.
Passenger Behavior
Capote et al. (2012) presented a stochastic approach for modeling passenger performance during the
evacuation process in passenger trains. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part describes
the identification of variables and data collection. This process allows obtaining statistical samples
of predefined random variables (personal responses, nonemergency actions, walking speeds, etc.).
Statistical methods to determine the input and outputs for a stochastic analysis are proposed. In the
second part, results from a stochastic model for passenger trains were compared with other evacu
ation models and an announced evacuation drill. Results suggest that predicted evacuation times
can be strongly dependent on the activities of individuals whose actions interrupt the continuous
movement of other passengers within the aisle and the time spent by each passenger to negotiate
the train steps. The advantages of using a stochastic approach for modeling passenger behaviors are
discussed.
Under the sponsorship of the FRA, the Volpe Center conducted a series of 12 commuter rail car
passenger egress tests involving 86 passenger subjects, in cooperation with the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, at North Station in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 25, 2005 (Federal
Railroad Administration 2006). The egress experiment time data are intended to be used as an input

11
to a computer egress model to predict emergency evacuation times for various car configurations.
Preliminary egress experiment results indicated consistent egress times by subjects for all trials
with small learning effects and no fatigue effect. In addition, subject flow rates were less than those
at previous train egress trials because no incentives were given and subjects were instructed not to
push. No significant difference was observed between normal and emergency lighting conditions.
The egress times for 84 passengers averaged 58 s using two side doors to a high platform, and 1 min
40 s using either a single side door to a high platform or an end door to the adjacent car.
Fridolf (2010) reviewed and summarized literature related to fire evacuation in underground
transportation systems as part of the METRO Project (described later in this chapter), and suggested
areas for future research in the field. The literature can be roughly divided into three categories:
(1) past accidents in underground transportation systems, (2) theories and models on human behavior
in fire, and (3) empirical research related to evacuation in underground transportation systems. It was
concluded that human behavior in fire is complex and sometimes can appear irrational in retrospect.
However, instead of using “panic” to describe human behavior and the outcome of an accident, the
adoption of a clear theoretical framework could aid the understanding of human behavior in under
ground transportation systems.
One of the major issues related to fire evacuation in underground transportation systems is that
people often are reluctant to initiate an evacuation. This is explained by a number of factors:
• That people tend to maintain their roles (e.g., as passengers);

• The lack of fast, clear, and coherent information;
• The ambiguity of the cues from the source of danger (e.g., a fire); and
• The presence of others: that is, social influence.
When an evacuation has been initiated, other factors affect the efficiency of the evacuation. Some
of the problems identified are:
• Door-opening mechanisms on trains;

• The vertical distance between the train and the tunnel floor;
• Tendency of people to evacuate through familiar exits;
• Lack of lighting; and
• Uneven surfaces inside the tunnels.
It is suggested that occupants be provided with fast, clear, and coherent information. This infor
mation could help people to initiate evacuation, find the way to safe locations without having to
evacuate by means of familiar routes, and reduce the negative effects of social influence. However,
providing users of underground transportation systems with this type of information demands an
emergency organization in which staff members are educated and have clear areas of responsibility.
When an evacuation has been initiated, technical installations are required if the evacuation is to
proceed with efficiency. For instance, adding affordances (such as green flashing lights) that guide
passengers to emergency exits inside a tunnel or station could help overcome the human desire to exit
by a familiar route. Good lighting conditions and an escape path free of obstacles also are prerequisites
for a smooth evacuation. The Fridolf report concludes with several suggestions for future research to
improve safety for users of underground transportation systems.
Nilsson et al. (2009) conducted an evacuation experiment in a road tunnel to investigate how
motorists behave and emotionally respond when exposed to a fire emergency, how information and
way-finding systems are perceived, and whether green flashing lights can influence exit choice. The
participants believed that they were taking part in a study about driving behavior. Approximately
1 km inside the tunnel, participants encountered an accident: that is, cars and smoke. The fire alarm,
which consists of a prerecorded alarm and information signs, was activated, as were green flashing
lights at emergency exits. The results show that it was difficult to make out what was said in the
prerecorded alarm. However, the use of an acoustic signal was a positive approach because it alerted
motorists and made them look for additional information. The information signs were important in

12
the participants’ decision to leave their vehicles. Social influence was found to be essential in regard
to the decision to leave the vehicle and the choice of exit. The results suggest that arousal level influ
ences the amount of information noticed by motorists, which implies that technical installations,
such as way-finding systems, should be tested under stressful conditions before they are relied upon
in a real tunnel fire.
European Studies
Several major tunnel fires in Europe in the 1990s prompted extensive research efforts, many of which
specifically addressed passenger rail tunnels. These are summarized here. One difference between
Europe and the United States is that few transportation tunnels in the United States have firefighting
sprinklers in the tunnels. There are reports of two cities with sprinklers in passenger rail tunnels
and less than a dozen U.S. road tunnels with sprinklers. In Europe the numbers are similar. How
ever, the European tunnels often use a water mist system versus a deluge system. The efficacy of
the two systems has not been directly compared. The U.S. deluge type system uses standard, readily
available components, whereas the European mist systems use “proprietary” systems for which all
of the components, design, and so forth are controlled by the mist system manufacturer.
Cafaro et al. (2005) describe an automatically operated fire suppression system for protection
against road and rail tunnel fires and fires in enclosed or underground spaces. The Indoor Protection
System does not employ water mist: it controls and suppresses fire by using an additive called Tun
nel Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (T-AFFF). It is a film-forming foam, based on fluorosurfactant,
and suitable for use in Class B fires. In the presence of special wetting additives for enhancing
its effectiveness, it is suitable for use in Class A fires. Cafaro et al. report the results of testing to
demonstrate that the Indoor Protection System is able to limit the growth phase of the fire, extinguish
and prevent reflashing pool fires, provide a restriction of the fire source, obtain an active protection
for structures and equipment, mitigate and control a fire event generated by solid materials, and
extinguish fires of flammable or combustible liquids.
Haack et al. (1995) report results of a German initiative to identify the safety problems of tunnel
fires. Full scale tunnel fire tests, dealing mostly with rail tunnel fires, were performed in Norway and
the information gathered into a database. Calculations were made to evaluate the HRR associated
with specific vehicle fires. A video camera network recorded the behavior of the smoke. Data analysis
provided computer models of thermal fields. Various methods were used to control the database. The
influence of longitudinal motion was evaluated. These tests are regarded as valuable because real
vehicles were used as fire loads. Measurements related to these fire tests allow correct characterization
of the physical phenomena.
Following the spate of tunnel fires that occurred in Europe at the turn of the century, the safety
of European tunnels was assessed and found to be generally poor. Tunnel safety can be improved
only if the lessons of past incidents are learned properly. Carvel (2008) identifies some of the lessons
learned from the Kaprun funicular tunnel fire of 2000, the King’s Cross underground station fire of
1987, the Baku subway fire of 1995, and the Channel Tunnel fire of 1996. Some recent advances in
technology, specifically state-of-the-art ventilation and water suppression systems, are discussed.
The 2007 fire in the Burnley tunnel in Australia is highlighted as an example of an incident in which
technology prevented the initial fire from growing into a catastrophe.
Fire safety in tunnels has become a major international issue after the catastrophic tunnel fires
that have occurred worldwide. The fundamental principles that emerge from this research form the
bedrock for decision making on how tunnels can be designed or upgraded and operated in an accept
able way. Beard and Carvel (2005) bring together contributions from international experts in all areas
of the field of tunnel fire investigation and firefighting. Their book spans the spectrum of current
knowledge available in the field of tunnel fire safety, covering a diverse range of topics, including
(1) fire safety management and human behavior, (2) fire prevention and protection, (3) tunnel ventila
tion, (4) tunnel fire dynamics and fire investigation, (5) emergency services and emergency procedures,
and (6) tunnel fire safety and the law.

13
Hohnecker (2000) describes the history of tunnel safety, German legislation, fire progression in
tunnels, the development of safety plans, tunnel construction and operation (including emergency
exits, lighting, routes and plans), and the transport of hazardous goods in tunnels. A list of tunnel
incidents is provided.
Van Weyenberge et al. (2015) describe the development of a risk assessment methodology to
quantify the life safety risk for people present in a rail tunnel fire; the risk assessment methodology
was produced in the context of the creation of a fire safety design. A bow-tie structure represents the
risk assessment model, starting from major contributing factors leading to disastrous events. Using
past accidents for the construction of the event tree part of the bow-tie, the most important factors
are determined to be human behavior, fire growth, ventilation conditions, safety system (e.g., smoke
and heat exhaust, detection, and voice communication), and population density. These factors are
incorporated into the event tree using pathway factors. Frequencies are calculated for each branch
outcome based on data from research projects, fault tree analysis, and engineering judgment. For the
determination of the consequences, the method makes use of three integrated models: the smoke
spread, the evacuation, and the consequence model. The models can take into account all types of
geometry and materials, human behavior, and different susceptibilities of people to smoke. Together,
they determine the possible number of fatalities, by means of a fractional incapacitation dose value,
in the event of a fire in a rail tunnel. The final risk is presented by the expected number of fatalities,
the individual risk, and the societal risk. The societal risk is demonstrated by means of a frequency/
number of casualties curve.
Ferrazzini et al. (2011) focus on the main fire safety objectives and the concept for smoke
control in the stations for the future rail link Cornavin-Eaux-Vives-Annemasse (CEVA), which will
connect the Swiss to the French railway system in the urban area of Geneva. The total length of the
project is approximately 16.5 km (14.7 km of which is in Switzerland) and includes a single-tube,
double-track, 10-km long tunnel with four underground stations (Carouge-Bachet, Champel-Hôpital,
Genève-Eaux-Vives, and Chêne-Bourg) and two bridges. The CEVA project is an example of an
urban-suburban, heavy-rail underground system. For fire safety, the stations are equipped with
ventilation systems. These are based on simple concepts to reduce the complexity and increase the
robustness of the systems. During the design phase, one- and three-dimensional numerical analyses of
the ventilation concepts for each individual station were carried out to confirm the required performance
during an emergency. Fulfillment of design objectives is shown by results from CFD simulations.
The ventilation concepts of CEVA are compared with other contemporary projects with stations of
similar size in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe.
In 2002, Markos and Shurland conducted a comparison study between U.S. and European approaches
to passenger train fire safety. This led to FRA’s regulation for new and existing equipment on fire safety
to now require passenger railroads to (1) conduct fire hazard analyses to assess and resolve hazards
and (2) comply with flammability, smoke emission, and fire endurance criteria for certain interior
materials (seats, walls, and curtains).
The Metro Project
METRO is a Swedish research project related to infrastructure protection. The focus of the proj
ect is on the protection of underground rail mass transport systems, such as tunnels and subway
stations. Both fire and explosion hazards are studied, and such aspects as evacuation, rescue
operations, and smoke control are important parts of the project. The project involves everything
from human behavior during evacuation to fire and explosion tests and simulations, and is closely
linked to practitioners, such as Stockholm Public Transport, to ensure that research results will be
directly applied and tested in real underground rail mass transport systems, namely the Stockholm
Metro.
The METRO Project website (http://www.metroproject.se/index.html) includes specific subject

reports. Summaries of a few of the relevant reports are included here. The website https://www.
youtube.com/user/METROprojectSE has videos produced as part of the METRO Project.

14
The final report for the METRO Project compiles the results (Ingason et al. 2012). The project
included six parts:
• Design fires,
• Evacuation,
• Integrated fire control,
• Smoke control,
• Extraordinary strain on constructions, and
• Fire and rescue operations.
The most complicated and expensive part of the project was the performance of the large-scale
fire and explosion tests in the Brunsberg tunnel. The maximum HRR measured from the metro
carriage was 77 MW. The maximum ceiling gas temperature was 1,118°C. These values are high and
should be put into a perspective of the situation and the type of carriages used. Figure 3 shows the
interior of the train carriage. Figure 4 shows the fire in the Brunsberg tunnel.
Figure 5 reproduces a figure from the METRO Project final report that shows a greater fire
size during the Brunsberg tunnel test. Because one of the aims of the fire tests was to study the
effects (condition in the tunnel, radiation, etc.) of a fully developed fire, it was decided to assist the
fire development by igniting some additional pieces of luggage. However, when the first of these
pieces of luggage (close to door 1) was ignited approximately 110 min after the original ignition, the
firefighter igniting the luggage saw flames on the ceiling and had to exit the carriage without igniting
the other prepared pieces of luggage. The fire had spontaneously spread to the driver’s cabin. The
flashover of the driver’s compartment did not occur until the time 105 min: that is, after the temperature
had started to increase in the passenger compartment but before the passenger compartment was fully
involved in the fire. The maximum HRR in test 2 was calculated to be 76.7 MW (12.7 min after ignition),
whereas the corresponding value for test 3 was 77.4 MW (117.9 min after ignition): that is, in both
tests the maximum HRR was calculated to be approximately 77 MW.
The egress study conducted as part of the METRO Project confirmed that one of the major issues
related to fire evacuation in underground transportation systems is that people often are reluctant to
FIGURE 3 Interior of converted C20 carriage

(Source: Per Rohlén, the METRO Project).

15
FIGURE 4 Fire test in the Brunsberg Tunnel. Fire took longer to reach
flashover (Source: Per Rohlén, the METRO Project).
initiate an evacuation. New data show that participants moved an average of 0.9 m/s in the smoke-filled
environment (average visibility of 1.5–3.5 m). A way-finding installation at the emergency exit, which
consisted of a loudspeaker, was found to perform particularly well in terms of attracting people to the
door. Other installations consisting of light combinations were not as good, and some even repelled
the participants because they were perceived as trains, gearshifts, or other track-related installations.
Two smoke control systems were simulated for a single-exit metro station. The systems con
sisted of a pressurizing supply air system and mechanical exhaust ventilation system with and with
out platform screen doors. The results show that both the pressurizing supply air system and the
mechanical exhaust air system provide effective smoke control for a one-exit metro station. The
significance of the platform screen doors was shown to be important in relation to smoke control.
Study recommendations include:
• A design fire of 60 MW with a fast fire growth rate is proposed for use in the design of the
ventilation system at metro stations. If the fire resistance of the interior lining material, seats,
FIGURE 5 HRR in Brunsberg Tunnel test (Source: The METRO Project Final Report, Figure 9, p. 30).

16
and windows is proven to be high, the designer can consider the use of a lower value, such as
20 MW. The definition of high quality resistance is left to regulators to define. No effects of fixed
firefighting systems are assumed.
• A design fire of 20 MW with a medium fire growth rate is proposed for use in the design of a
tunnel system connected to a metro station.
• In a performance-based design, a method presented by L. Li et al. (2012) is recommended.
As an alternative to that method in a prescriptive fashion, a time temperature curve using the
European thermally stimulated depolarization curve is proposed.
• A walking speed of 0.9 m/s (for a visibility of 1.5–3.5 m) is proposed as an average value.
Design values below 0.9 m/s are to be chosen for this visibility range.
• A positive-pressure supply air system or a mechanical exhaust system is recommended as a
smoke control solution for single-exit metro stations.
• Platform screen doors are recommended in one-tube underground stations as a part of a technical
fire safety solution.
• High fire resistance of interior lining materials and windows in passenger and driver’s cabins
is recommended.
• New guidance for risk assessment before rescue operations in tunnels should be developed.
• In metro tunnel systems, it is important that station personnel have routines to ease access for
fire and rescue services, for example, through ticket gates.
• Stations or the fire and rescue services should be equipped with trolleys or similar vehicles to
transport equipment or injured persons in the event of fires or explosions inside the tunnel.
• Robots or remotely operated vehicles for scouting and searching beyond the fire scene are useful
and should be developed further.
• There is need for the development and evaluation of different types of search patterns for tunnels.
Normal infrared image search methods used in compartment fires are not applicable, so other
search options need to be developed and evaluated.
Several reports provided additional details on aspects of the METRO Project. Selected reports are
summarized here.
Claesson et al. (2012) present and discuss the results of six fire tests that were conducted in a
mock-up of a subway carriage that is about one-third of a full wagon length. The tests were carried
out in a laboratory environment with the use of a large-scale calorimeter. The aim of the tests was to
investigate the initial fire growth in a corner scenario using different types of ignition sources that
could lead to a flashover situation. The ignition sources used were a wooden crib placed on a corner
seat or 1 L of petrol poured on the corner seat and the neighboring floor with a backpack nearby. The
pieces of luggage and wooden cribs in the neighborhood of the ignition source were continuously
increased to identify the limits for flashover in the test setup. The tests showed that the combustible
boards on parts of the walls had a significant effect on the fire spread. In the cases where the initial
fire did not exceed a range of 400 to 600 kW, no flashover was observed. If the initial fire grew to
700 to 900 kW, a flashover was observed. The maximum HRR during a short flashover period for
this test setup was about 3.5 MW. The time to reach flashover was highly dependent on the ignition
type, wooden cribs, or backpack and petrol.
Related Tunnel Studies
Two recent or ongoing NCHRP studies addressed ventilation issues and design fires in road tunnels.
This section also includes a study focused on the behavior of highway users when confronted by
a tunnel fire. Other studies on tunnel fires that may have application to rail tunnels are summarized
at the end of this section.
Currently, the design and operation of emergency smoke control varies from project to project in
the absence of consistent and standardized practices. There is a need to identify the most effective
operational practices for emergency ventilation smoke control in roadway tunnels. NCHRP Project
20-07/363 (Maevski 2016) developed recommended AASHTO guidelines for emergency ventilation

17
smoke control in roadway tunnels, to improve human evacuation and emergency responder safety.
The guidelines consider:
1. Relevant conditions for application of various tunnel ventilation systems and configurations
(e.g., full transverse, partial transverse, and longitudinal systems);
2. Fan utilization or placement based on tunnel geometrics and gradient;
3. Tunnel length and directional traffic flow (i.e., unidirectional or bi-directional flow);
4. The relationship between vehicle types and heat release and ventilation requirements;
5. Effects of ventilation on tunnel fires and fire size;
6. Fire detection and warning systems;
7. Actual fire smoke stratification duration and length of stratification in tunnel;
8. The interaction between firefighting operation and ventilation systems;
9. Applicability of tunnel vehicle fire suppression system and its applicable conditions;
10. Practicality of one-button or error-proof emergency ventilation (i.e., closed loop ventilation
control); and
11. Applicable regulatory standards and guidelines (national and international).
A 2011 NCHRP Synthesis by Maevski reviews the state of the practice of design fires in road
tunnels, focusing on tunnel fire dynamics and the means of fire management for design guidance.
Basic information is provided for tunnel operators, first responders, and tunnel agencies to better
understand their tunnels and train their personnel. It includes statistical data for fire incidents in road
tunnels since 1949 through the last decade, as well as statistical data documents for several tunnel fire
safety projects in the United States and Europe. Extensive appendices offer more details about tunnel
safety projects, fire tests, and national and international standards requirements, as well as descrip
tions of past tunnel fires. The report does not address fires in underground passenger rail systems.
Caroly et al. (2013) show that risk-management behaviors of highway users in tunnel fire situa
tions depend on their knowledge of safety devices and their danger-handling behavior. The authors
hypothesized that the unpredictability of the circumstances in which fires start, as well as drivers’
lack of knowledge about safety devices, are likely to have an impact on their behavior. The study is a
detailed analysis of actual fires that have occurred in tunnels, with a close examination of users’
evacuation strategies and procedures. In the analysis of 11 tunnel fires, driver behaviors and the
strategies they use to cope with a fire were studied. The tunnel users in the fires encountered dif
ficulties in perceiving signs of danger and receiving warnings of the danger. The analysis showed
that they engaged in a variety of evacuation behaviors and implemented few collective strategies to
protect themselves. The problems were related to poor design or equipment, difficulty using safety
devices or processing information, or a lack of emergency signals. Some recommendations are made
regarding ways to modify existing prevention and warning devices to promote safer choices among
the available options.
The ratio of the cross-sectional area of the fire source to that of a tunnel is defined as tunnel block
age ratio. These fire sources correspond to those that have considerable cross-sectional area, such
as trains or heavy goods vehicles, which are common. Li et al. (2013) analyze the effect of tunnel
blockage ratio on the maximum temperature under the ceiling in tunnel fires using experimental
data from three previous studies. Results indicate that the maximum temperature decreases with the
increase in the blockage ratio for small fires but does not vary with the blockage ratio for large fires.
Previous models are modified based on the previous analysis by introducing a factor that accounts
for the blockage effect. The modified models are more generally applicable.
L. Li et al. (2012) studied the effect of tunnel blockage ratio on critical velocity in tunnel fires.
A proposed empirical consideration that accounts for the blockage ratio effect has been verified.
Based on the previous consideration, a new formula for predicting the critical velocity in blocked
tunnels has been presented. To examine this formula, data from current numerical simulations and
previous full-scale and reduced-scale tunnel fire experiments that have considerable tunnel blockage
ratios are used. The formula shows good agreement with these data, which can be used appropriately
to calculate the critical velocity for tunnels with blockage.

18
In the past decade more than 400 people worldwide have died as a result of fires in road, rail,
and metro tunnels. Colella et al. (2011) apply a novel and fast modeling approach to simulate tunnel
ventilation flows during fires. The complexity and high cost of full CFD models and the inaccuracies
of simplistic zone or analytical models are avoided by efficiently combining mono-dimensional
and CFD three-dimensional modeling techniques. A simple one-dimensional network approach
is used to model tunnel regions in which the flow is fully developed (far field), and a detailed CFD
representation is used where flow conditions require three-dimensional resolution (near field). This
multiscale method previously has been applied to simulate tunnel ventilation systems, including
jet fans, vertical shafts, and portals, and it is applied in the study to include the effect of fire. Both
direct and indirect coupling strategies are investigated and compared for steady state conditions.
The methodology has been applied to a modern tunnel with a diameter of 7 m and length of 1.2 km.
Different fire scenarios are investigated with a variable number of operating jet fans. Comparison of
cold flow cases with fire cases provides a quantification of the fire throttling effect, which is seen to
be large and reduce the flow by more than 30%. The article places emphasis on the discussion of the
different coupling procedures and the control of the numerical error. Compared with the full CFD
solution, the maximum flow field error can be reduced to less than a few percent and can provide a
reduction of two orders of magnitude in computational time. The much lower computational cost is
of great engineering value, especially for the parametric and sensitivity studies required in the design
or assessment of ventilation and fire safety systems.
Summary
The literature review has summarized a number of studies related to planning and design for fire and
smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. The studies focusing on planning and design
for fire and smoke incidents in rail tunnels are a small subset of the literature on tunnel fires. Many
of the studies presented in this chapter are highly technical in nature. Others review past incidents or
focus on passenger behavior.
The literature review has informed the survey instrument used to gather input from transit agencies.
An early question on the survey asks about sources used in planning and design for response to fire
and smoke incidents in underground portions of the rail system. The conclusions in chapter six reflect
the literature review as well as the survey and case examples. Additional research needs have been
developed where unclear or conflicting information is identified.
The next two chapters present the results of a survey of transit agencies. The results provide a
snapshot of the state of the practice as it exists today.

19
chapter three
Survey Results Part One: Information from agencies
Introduction
This is the first of two chapters presenting the results of a survey of transit agencies regarding
planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. The survey
was designed to elicit information on:
1. Sources of information;
2. Definitions;
3. Incidents and causes;
4. Fire and smoke detection, prevention, protection, and ventilation systems;
5. Protocol, procedures, and systems for fire and smoke incident management;
6. Training and familiarization for employees and first responders;
7. Challenges;
8. Next generation; and
9. Lessons learned.
This chapter presents responses by category for the first six categories listed. The remaining
categories are addressed in chapter four. Twenty-five completed surveys were received from the
30 rail transit agencies in the sample, a response rate of 83%. All agencies did not answer all questions.
Three partially completed surveys were also received, and responses from the partially completed
surveys are included in this analysis. Chapter four discusses survey results related to the responding
agencies’ assessment of challenges, lessons learned, and elements of the “ideal” fire prevention and
response system.
Sources of Information
Table 4 shows sources used by transit agencies in planning and designing for response to incidents
of fire and smoke in underground portions of the rail system. All respondents use NFPA 130. Slightly
more than half of the respondents use the National Incident Management System (NIMS), locally
developed standards and guidelines, or both, and just less than half use the APTA Recommended
Practice Report. Other responses include best practices culled from a variety of sources, agency-
developed specifications and practices, FRA regulations, host railroad design standards, and other
documents, including:
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Requirements;

• Uniform Building Code;
• APTA RT-S-VIM-020-10, Emergency Lighting System Design for Rail Transit Vehicles;
• FRA 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 238.103 (Appendix B: Test Methods and Perfor-
mance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs);
• FRA 49 CFR 238 (Passenger Equipment Safety Standards);
• FRA 49 CFR Subpart D [includes 38.71–38.97 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)]; and
• Major test standards, including American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E-119
(Floor Fire Test), ASTM E-648 (Critical Radiant Flux), ASTM E-162 (Flame Spread), ASTM
E-662 (Smoke Density), Boeing Specification Support Standard BSS 7239 (Toxic Gas Generation),
and Fire and Life Safety Analysis (Contract Data Requirements List 48).

20
Table 4
Sources of Information
No. of
% Agencies
Source Agencies
Responding
Responding
NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway
Transit and Passenger Rail Systems 28 100
National Incident Management System
15 54
(NIMS)
Local standards and guidelines 14 50
APTA RP PS-005-01a, Recommended
Practice for Fire Safety Analysis 14 50
of Existing Passenger Rail Equipment
APTA SS-E-013-99, Rev 1, Standard
for Emergency Lighting Design for 11 39
Passenger Cars
Presidential Directive No. 5 7 25
Other 7 25
NOTE: Totals do not add to 100% because of multiple responses.
One agency noted that it uses NFPA 130 on all new projects but some parts of its system predate the
standard.
Table 5 shows how agencies use NFPA 130. Most responding agencies use this standard in the
design of transit facilities. Several agencies treat NFPA 130 as a best practices document and use it
for guidance when practical or when it does not conflict with other code. Several agencies noted that
they rely on it for specific purposes, including inspection and certification, emergency planning and
response, ventilation, and new construction.
Definitions
Agencies define “underground” in different ways, as shown in Table 6. The most frequently mentioned
definitions are “below grade” or “subterranean,” followed by “consistent with NFPA 130.” Several
agencies use a minimum length of tunnel to define underground, with the minimum ranging from
150 to 1,000 ft.
Respondents also reported how their agencies define a fire and smoke incident. This was a multiple-
choice question with multiple responses allowed. Table 7 shows that obvious signs of fire and/or
smoke most often define an incident. Other responses include:
• Passengers or operators calling in to report fire or smoke (noted by two agencies);

• Any of these signs triggering response procedures;
• Not categorizing the incident as an emergency if the cause is immediately known; and
• Categorizing the incident as reportable if an extinguishable flame is present and as recordable
in the absence of an extinguishable flame.
Table 5
Agency Use of NFPA 130
No. of
% Agencies
Use Agencies
Responding
Responding
Design 10 53
Guidance 5 26
Inspection/certification 3 16
Emergency planning and response 3 16
Ventilation 2 11
New construction 1 5

21
Table 6
Definition of “Underground”
No. of
% Agencies
Definition Agencies
Responding
Responding
Below grade/subterranean 5 21
Consistent with NFPA 130 4 17
On the underground side of portal 3 13
No formal definition 3 13
Not elevated, embankment, surface,
2 8
or cut
Enclosed or covered structure longer
2 8
than 200 ft
Fully enclosed; more than 150 ft 1 4
At least 800 ft 1 4
At least 1,000 ft 1 4
Covered on all four sides 1 4
Where cannot freely vent to
1 4
atmosphere
Floor level 30 ft or more below
1 4
lowest exit discharge (city code)
Entire subway is underground 1 4
Table 7
Definition of “Fire and Smoke Incident”
No. of
% Agencies
Definition Agencies
Responding
Responding
Visible flames 23 88
Sight or smell of smoke 21 81
Automatic alarm triggered 9 35
Manual alarm triggered by the operator 9 35
Other 5 19
Incidents and Causes
Minor underground fire and smoke incidents are not uncommon, but major incidents occur less often.
The survey defined a “major” incident as causing a service disruption of 2 h or more. Table 8 shows
that only four agencies reported a major incident in the past 12 months. Sixteen agencies reported a
minor incident.
Table 8
Number of Underground Fire and Smoke Incidents
within the Past 12 Months
No. of
No. of % Agencies
Type of Incident Agencies
Incidents Responding
Responding
0 19 83
Major (causing a service disruption of
1 2 9
more than 2 h)
2 2 9
Total responses—Major — 23 100
0 8 32
1-2 6 24
Minor (no service disruption or less 3-5 4 16
than 2 h) 6-10 2 8
10+ 4 16
Unknown 1 4
Total responses—Minor — 25 100
NOTE: Totals do not add to 100% because of rounding.

22
Table 9
Primary Causes of Underground Fire
and Smoke Incidents
No. of
% Agencies
Cause of Incident Agencies
Responding
Responding
Arcing—traction power 13 59
Trash fire in tunnel 12 55
Vehicle or vehicle equipment 8 36
Trash fire in underground station 7 32
Insulator 7 32
Electric cable feeder 6 27
Trash fire on vehicle 0 0
Other 8 36
Table 9 shows the primary causes of underground fire and smoke incidents. This was a multiple
choice question with multiple responses accepted. Arcing and trash fires in tunnels were noted by
more than half of all respondents. Figure 6 shows the damage that electrical arcing can cause. Other
causes included tie fires, a spark near the attendant’s booth, trash fire outside the tunnel portal with
intrusion into the tunnel, miscellaneous equipment, overhead messenger wire snagged by light rail
vehicle (LRV) pantograph after a tunnel ceiling mount casting failed on a hanger arm.
Fire and Smoke Detection, Prevention, Protection, and Ventilation Systems
More than half of all respondents (15 of 27; 56%) reported that their agencies have an early under-
ground fire detection system. Table 10 shows the responses to a multiple choice question regarding
the elements included in the early detection system. Closed circuit television (CCTV), station smoke
or heat detectors, and closed-head sprinklers (heat sensitive) in the station are the most common
elements. Other responses include station heat detectors in nonpublic areas and ventilation shafts and
observations of employees or passengers.
More than two-thirds of respondents (18 of 26; 69%) report that their agency has adopted
design standards or codes related to underground fire and smoke prevention and detection. As
noted in Table 11, these standards or codes are used primarily in the design phase or in design
review on new construction and rehabilitation projects. Several agencies have adopted NFPA
standards as their own. Standards and codes are also incorporated into standard operating
procedures (SOPs).
FIGURE 6 Damage from electrical arcing incident at WMATA

(Source: NTSB).

23
Table 10
Elements of Early Detection System
No. of
% Agencies
Element Agencies
Responding
Responding
CCTV 13 93
Station smoke or heat detector 11 79
Closed head sprinkler in station (heat sensitive) 9 64
Tunnel smoke detector 6 43
Inside vehicle detection (smoke or heat) 3 21
Linear heat detector 2 14
Video analytics 0 0
Other 3 21
Table 11
Application of Design Standards or Codes
No. of
% Agencies
How Applied Agencies
Responding
Responding
NFPA standards adopted 4 24
On new construction and
4 24
rehabilitation projects
In the design phase of projects or in
4 24
design review
Incorporated in SOPs 3 18
In CFD analyses leading to
1 6
ventilation system designs
Minimum requirements 1 6
Most respondents (24 of 26; 92%) report that their agency does not have a fire suppression system
onboard transit vehicles that operate in tunnels. Sprinkler systems in tunnels are also relatively rare,
with 19% of respondents (5 of 27) reporting sprinkler systems in some tunnels and only 4% reporting
sprinkler systems in all tunnels. Sprinkler systems are more common in underground stations, as
shown in Figure 7.
Most respondents indicate that their agency’s ventilation control system is designed to remove
smoke and provide fresh air and/or cooling, as shown in Table 12. Other responses include the use of
In no In all
underground underground
stations stations
33% 41%
In some but not

all underground
stations
26% n = 27
FIGURE 7 Sprinkler systems in underground stations.

24
Table 12
Types of Ventilation Systems
No. of
% Agencies
Ventilation System Agencies
Responding
Responding
Remove smoke and provide fresh air
17 71
and/or cooling
Used to remove smoke, although not
3 13
designed for that purpose
Provide fresh air and/or cooling, not
2 8
to remove smoke
Tunnels are naturally ventilated 2 8
Remove smoke only 1 4
Other 2 8
ventilation to produce an evacuation path free of smoke and a maintenance mode to remove by-products
of combustion from maintenance vehicles during nonrevenue hours.
Table 13 indicates that ventilation fans typically are controlled remotely. Other responses indicate
an ability to control fans manually in an emergency, either by the fire department or from another
location.
Almost all respondents (23 of 25; 92%) report that their agency regularly tests fan operation.
Table 14 shows how often fan operation is tested. More than half of respondents test fan operation
weekly or monthly.
Table 13
Control of Ventilation Fans
No. of
% Agencies
Means of Control Agencies
Responding
Responding
All are controlled remotely at the
operations center or other centralized 10 46
location
Some or all can be controlled either
9 41
remotely or manually
All are controlled manually by on-site
0 0
fan controls
Some are controlled remotely, others
0 0
manually
Other 3 14
Table 14
Frequency of Testing Fan Operation
No. of
% Agencies
Frequency Agencies
Responding
Responding
Weekly 4 18
Monthly 8 36
Every 45 days 1 5
Quarterly 2 9
Semiannually 1 5
Annually 2 9
As needed because of maintenance
3 14
issues
Unsure 1 5

25
Table 15
How Agencies Change Protocols and Procedures
No. of
% Agencies
Means of Change Agencies
Responding
Responding
Internal evaluation 7 32
Capital improvements as opportunity
6 27
to retrofit
No specific triggers 5 23
Formal analysis 3 14
Regulatory compliance (if not
3 14
grandfathered)
Industry incidents/benchmarking at
2 6
other agencies
A final set of questions in this section asked about if and how agencies change their protocols and
procedures as new techniques and regulations emerge, if there are “triggers” to retrofit the system,
and if there are work-arounds for legacy systems to meet new requirements. Table 15 indicates that
agencies take several different approaches. Internal cross-departmental evaluations are common,
and these include debriefings after an event. Respondents use formal quantitative techniques (risk,
cost-benefit, and engineering analyses). Regulatory compliance is essential, although older systems
may be “grandfathered.” Respondents also pay close attention to industry incidents and actions taken
by other rail agencies. Capital improvements are a trigger for retrofitting the system; although each
system was built to code at the time of construction, all elements may or may not meet current codes.
The need to replace system components at the end of their useful life affects the need for capital
improvements. Several agencies, including newer rail systems, report no specific triggers for retrofitting
the system.
Table 16 shows responses to the question regarding work-arounds for legacy systems to meet
new requirements. The response provided most frequently was that needed changes were made
during repairs.
Managing Incidents
Every agency has established procedures for responding to and managing underground fire and smoke
incidents. Respondents went into varying levels of detail in describing these procedures. One of the
more detailed responses is provided verbatim here, addressing internal and external notification,
command structure, power shutoff, evacuation, and unified command structure at the scene.
Upon initial notification to the Control Center, a call is made to the local fire department. Transit Police,
Supervision and other agency personnel are dispatched. Power is removed. Train traffic will be prevented from
Table 16
Work-Arounds for Legacy Systems to Meet
New Requirements
No. of
% Agencies
Approach Agencies
Responding
Responding
Changes during repairs or whenever possible 5 42
No work-arounds 3 25
Dry standpipe system installed in tunnels 2 17
Yes, but not specified 2 17
Manned stations to assist with evacuation 1 8
Risk assessment when grandfathered 1 8
New capital projects as needed 1 8

26
Table 17
Actions Taken by Transit Agency for Fires
to Which Others Also Respond
No. of
% Agencies
Action Agencies
Responding
Responding
Send staff to meet responder command
25 96
staff at the scene
Set up multiagency command center
20 77
or similar function on your property
Send staff to a central command center
13 50
not on your property
entering the affected area. If the incident is deemed serious enough, passengers will be evacuated. The first
agency responder is deemed the incident commander until emergency response personnel arrive. Upon their
arrival, a unified command structure is established. The incident is managed by responders until completion.
After the response agencies have finished, the agency will make repairs where needed and service will be
restored.
Another response describes variations based on fire location:
When Fire and Smoke Plans A (vehicle), B (track level or platform) or C (stations) are invoked, ventilation
protocols are activated based on location of incident and evacuation direction, based on information provided
by site personnel. Protocols are activated by Power Control staff, based on direction of Transit Control. For an
incident in a station there is one protocol available, which is based on an all-exhaust scenario (with fans at end of
platforms), using the next 3 or 4 adjacent stations as support. For an incident in a tunnel there are two protocols
available, based on a push-pull scenario, depending on the evacuation direction, using the next 3 or 4 adjacent
stations as support. Equipment sequence activation is done manually from Power Control, although plans are to
move to automatic sequence activation of the equipment (with protocol being manually activated).
Table 17 shows actions taken for fires where first responders and other agencies respond.
NIMS is used by nearly every responding agency when an underground fire and smoke incident
occurs. A major element of NIMS is an on-site incident command to establish a chain of command
and facilitate communication at the scene. Figure 8 indicates that most agencies always, and all but
one usually, use NIMS.
The survey asked what fire size agencies plan for in establishing their protocols and procedures.
Table 18 presents the broad range of answers.
Not used
4%
Usually used Always used

40% 56%
n = 25
FIGURE 8 Use of NIMS to establish a chain

of command at the scene.

27
Table 18
Fire Size Planned for in Protocols and Procedures
No. of
% Agencies
Fire Size Agencies
Responding
Responding
More than 30 MW 5 24
10–30 MW 5 24
0–10 MW 4 19
Defined in agency policies and procedures
4 19
but not available at the moment
All sizes and types 1 5
Based on operating experience 1 5
NFPA 130 standard 1 5
Most agencies (16 of 24; 67%) are not aware of recent full-scale tests in which fire size was
measured at 52 to 72 MW in existing vehicles (roughly four times larger than most systems are
designed to handle). Only one agency that was aware of the tests reported a change in protocols and
procedures as a result of these tests. This agency installed a fire protection and ventilation system to
address the higher HRR from certain vehicles. No respondent reported changes in the planning of
new tunnels; however, the survey did not ask if the agency is currently planning new tunnels.
Almost one-third of respondents (8 of 25; 32%) indicated that their agency has made changes to
its standard operating procedures for managing underground fire and smoke incidents within the past
2 years. Changes typically fell into one of three categories:
1. Enhanced clarity (e.g., procedures to meet first responders at certain high-risk stations and
locations, transit police defined as the first responders);
2. Improved training (more frequent drills, changes in training for control center personnel); and
3. Improved safety (new ventilation modes as a result of the operation of longer trains; updated
procedures to address smoke in tunnels).
The reasons for changes to SOPs included FTA safety advisories, NTSB and APTA publications,
incidents at other transit agencies, installation of new controls, and changes to rail operation.
Training
Training is an integral component in planning and design for fire and smoke incidents. Table 19 shows
the extent to which certain elements are included in transit agency training programs.
Table 19
Elements Included in Transit Agency
Training Programs
No. of
% Agencies
Element Agencies
Responding
Responding
Review of SOPs for fire and smoke incidents
23 96
on tracks, on vehicles, and in stations
ICS training 22 92
Hands-on training for use of portable
17 71
fire extinguishers
Review of how smoke management
10 42
system is designed to operate
Field tests of SOPs for fire and smoke
10 42
incidents (in transit yard or elsewhere)
Field tests of smoke management with
9 38
live or artificial smoke
Training on options if one or more
8 33
fans fail to operate correctly

28
Table 20
Training with First Responders from
Local Jurisdictions
No. of
% Agencies
Element Agencies
Responding
Responding
Joint training exercises in the field 22 92
Tabletop exercises 21 88
Classroom training exercises 14 58
Regular meetings to discuss fire
14 58
response
Ad hoc meetings to discuss fire
10 42
response
Online training exercises 5 21
Other/varies by jurisdiction 4 17
A follow-up question revealed additional elements of agencies’ training programs. Ten agencies
responded. Training in tunnels and coordination with first responders were most often mentioned
(coordination with first responders is the subject of subsequent questions). Training specific to each
group of employees was also mentioned; an example is the safe movement of passengers and the
decision to evacuate or shelter in place for train engineers and crew. One agency cited communication
with passengers as an element of agency training.
Respondents described components of ongoing training with first responders from local jurisdic-
tions, as shown in Table 20. Field and tabletop exercises are the most common elements of training
with first responders. Other responses include:
• We have developed a first guidance training manual that includes a compact disc (CD) and book and train the
trainers for all jurisdictional responders.
• Periodic drills.
• All front line firefighters along the rail line get rail familiarization training every few years. All new firefighters
get the same training during the academy training.
• The transit agency meets with all jurisdictional Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) stakeholders once
a month through the Council of Government committee.
Eighty-eight percent of survey respondents (21 of 24) report that their agency serves multiple
jurisdictions with multiple first-response teams. Table 21 shows the frequency of training for each
local first-response team. Annual training is the most common response.
Table 21
Frequency of Training each Local First-Response Team
No. of
% Agencies
Frequency Agencies
Responding
Responding
Almost on a weekly basis throughout our service area 1 5
Every 6 months 1 5
Annually 8 38
We reach out to all agencies annually and issue training
certificates that expire after 1 year as a reminder to
retrain. Response rate from agencies is about half with 1 5
between 1,000 and 2,000 individual responders trained
annually.
Annually with two major cities; ad hoc basis with other
1 5
cities
Every 2 years 1 5
Every 2 years or as requested 1 5
Ad hoc 5 24
Frequently 1 5
Unsure 1 5

29
Table 22
Familiarity of Responding Agency Personnel
with NIMS ICS
No. of
% Agencies
Familiarity/Comfort Agencies
Responding
Responding
All are familiar/comfortable with
10 42
NIMS
Most are familiar/comfortable with
10 42
NIMS
Some are, some are not 3 13
Most or all are not familiar and
1 4
comfortable with NIMS
As noted, many agencies rely on NIMS and its Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a
chain of command in the field when responding to fire and smoke incidents. Table 22 indicates that
84% of respondents report that all of most transit agency personnel who respond to fire and smoke
incidents are familiar and comfortable with NIMS. Table 23 shows greater familiarity and comfort
with NIMS among first responders, with 96% of respondents reporting that all or most first responders
are familiar and comfortable with NIMS.
Summary
Twenty-eight transit agencies responded (at least in part) to the survey regarding planning and design
for fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. More than half of respondents
operate heavy rail, 46% operate light rail, and 36% operate commuter rail. Twenty-five percent of
responding agencies operate multiple modes. Findings are organized by the following topic areas.
• Sources of information. All respondents use NFPA 130, often in the design of transit facilities
and as a best practices document. Several agencies noted that they rely on it for specific purposes,
including inspection and certification, emergency planning and response, ventilation, and new
construction. Respondents also use NIMS, locally developed standards and guidelines, and/or
the APTA Recommended Practice Report.
• Definitions. Agencies typically define “underground” as “below grade” or “subterranean.” Several
agencies use a minimum length of tunnel (ranging from 150 to 1,000 ft) to define underground.
Obvious signs of fire and/or smoke most often define a fire and smoke incident.
• Incidents and causes. Minor underground fire and smoke incidents are not uncommon, but
major incidents (defined as causing a service disruption of at least 2 h) occur less often. Arcing
and trash fires in tunnels were noted by more than half of all respondents as primary causes of
underground fire and smoke incidents.
• Fire and smoke detection, prevention, protection, and ventilation systems. More than half of
all respondents report that their agencies have an early underground fire detection system.
CCTV, station smoke or heat detectors, and closed-head sprinklers (heat sensitive) in station
Table 23
Familiarity of First Responders with NIMS ICS
No. of
% Agencies
Familiarity/Comfort Agencies
Responding
Responding
All are familiar/comfortable with
19 83
NIMS
Most are familiar/comfortable with
3 13
NIMS
Some are, some are not 1 4
Most or all are not familiar and
0 0
comfortable with NIMS

30
are the most common elements. More than two-thirds of respondents report that their agency
has adopted design standards or codes related to underground fire and smoke prevention and
detection. Several agencies have adopted NFPA standards as their own.
Most respondents indicated that their agency’s ventilation control system is designed to
remove smoke and provide fresh air and/or cooling. Ventilation fans typically are controlled
remotely. Almost all respondents reported that their agency regularly tests fan operation. More
than half of respondents test fan operation weekly or monthly.
Agencies take several different approaches to changing protocols and procedures as new
techniques and regulations emerge. Internal cross-departmental evaluations are common, includ-
ing debriefings after an event. Respondents also use formal quantitative analyses. Regulatory
compliance is essential, although older systems may be grandfathered. Legacy systems often
meet new requirements by making needed changes during repairs. Respondents also pay close
attention to industry incidents and actions taken by other rail agencies. Capital improvements and
the need to replace system components at the end of their useful life are triggers for retrofitting
the system.
• Managing incidents. Procedures for responding to and managing underground fire and smoke
incidents typically involve internal and external notification, command structure, power shutoff,
and evacuation. Nearly every agency uses the ICS, a major component of NIMS, to establish a
unified command structure at the scene. Most agencies are not aware of recent full-scale tests
in which fire size was measured at 52 to 72 MW in existing vehicles (roughly four times larger
than most systems are designed to handle). Almost one-third of respondents indicated that their
agency has made changes to its SOPs for managing underground fire and smoke incidents within
the past 2 years. Changes typically fell into one of three categories: enhanced clarity, improved
training, or improved safety. Reasons for changes to SOPs included FTA safety advisories, NTSB
and APTA publications, incidents at other transit agencies, installation of new controls, and
changes to rail operation.
• Training. At least half of all respondents report the review of SOPs, hands-on training in the use
of portable fire extinguishers, and knowledge of ICS as components of their training programs.
On-site training in tunnels and coordination with first responders were cited as additional
training measures. Ongoing training with first responders from local jurisdictions typically
takes the form of field and tabletop exercises. Among the 88% of respondents whose agency
serves multiple jurisdictions, annual training with each first-response team is the typical sched-
ule but is not always possible to achieve for agencies with large service areas. Survey responses
indicate a high level of familiarity and comfort with NIMS among transit agency personnel who
respond to fire and smoke incidents as well as among first responders.

31
chapter four
Survey Results Part Two: Agency Assessment
Introduction
This is the second of two chapters presenting the results of a survey of transit agencies regarding
planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems. The previ-
ous chapter addressed survey results related to sources of information; definitions; incidents and
causes; detection, prevention, protection, and ventilation; protocol and procedures for fire and smoke
incident management; and training. This chapter’s focus is on agencies’ evaluations of their planning
for and management of fire and smoke incidents. Specific topics include challenges, next-generation
tools, lessons learned that would be of interest to other transit agencies, and elements of the “ideal”
fire prevention and response system and how it would differ from those in use today.
Challenges
Respondents rated various potential challenges related to underground fire and smoke incidents. Table 24
displays the results. Major challenges were defined as having a significant actual or potential effect on
an agency’s ability to respond to and resolve the situation; minor challenges were defined as being of
concern but not rising to the level of life-and-death issues. No element was rated as a major challenge
by more than 25% of the respondents. Intensity of the fire and difficulty in gaining access to the site
were mentioned most often as a major challenge.
Respondents elaborated on various challenges. Access to older sections of the rail system often
is difficult and sometimes requires a long walk or taking a train to perform reconnaissance with
fire department personnel on board. An intense fire (e.g., in a power substation) can prevent first
responders from gaining immediate access because of the need to shut down the power supply.
Early detection is an issue, but clear SOPs for the different disciplines within the transit agency once
a fire alarm has been activated may be even more important. The challenges can vary from major
to minor depending on the specific incident and the exact location. Training is variable and can be
difficult to arrange because of other commitments among first responders, staff turnover, and remote
locations of rail maintenance and storage facilities. If transit equipment is not in the yards during the
business day, training is relegated to special midday circumstances, weekends, and some evenings.
Respondents also answered an open-ended question to describe the major challenge related to
underground fire and smoke incidents. Incorporation of new technologies in legacy systems, ventila-
tion issues, and cost/funding were the three challenges mentioned most often. Table 25 summarizes
the responses. Examples of specific responses are provided here.
Old infrastructures built pre-NFPA-130, constructed with equipment designed only for general ventilation, as
well as some stations with limited egress capacity, some with only one egress from each platform.
There are so many ventilation scenarios to design, depending o[n] so many factors, that it can be really difficult
to manage the entire system and keep it up to date. I believe that the principal difficulty is to validate your
theoretical scenarios with real life. It takes a lot of experience to analyze the situation.
One major challenge during the design of our underground system was being able to provide a train detection
system that would indicate the zones w[h]ere a smoke event was occurring. We solved this problem by posting
reflectorized signs indicating the zone numbers and by positioning cameras at each zone that send the video
data back to the control center.

32
Table 24
Ratings Of Potential Challenges
Major Minor Not a No. of
Potential Challenge Challenge Challenge Challenge Agencies
(%) (%) (%) Responding
Intensity of fire 25 55 20 20
Difficulty in accessing the
20 50 30 20
site
Passenger evacuation 15 65 20 20
Timely detection 15 40 45 20
Sufficient number of
trained and proficient
transit staff to support 15 35 50 20
training of emergency
responders
Confusion at the scene of
10 60 30 20
the fire
Training of agency
10 35 55 20
personnel
Inadequate ventilation 10 30 60 20
Establishing chain of
5 50 45 20
command at the scene
Training of first
5 45 50 20
responders
Some of the challenges during planning and design are that many times in the industry the safety engineers are
not on board during this stage and are brought in later. I find this happens in many cases. When this happens
hazards are not designed out during the planning and development stages of the project. It is really important to
have your safety team involved very early in the design. Some other challenges are locations, high water tables
and spacing. These variables can make the evacuations challenging. Even choosing fire suppression systems,
placement of steps/escalators and elevators. Having more than one emergency evacuation route from a tunnel
or station. The proximity of other buildings and structures that could be affected by fire/smoke incidents. Ensur-
ing that all of your exhaust fans are working and you have replacement parts and that you are managing your
assets and identifying those that are critical. Of course ensuring that your agency is in a state of good repair
and that you have defined it based on your operating environment. Long term maintenance plans, budgets and
testing procedures must be addressed. Having an independent QA [quality assurance] of your system is critical.
Table 25
One Major Challenge
No. of
% Agencies
Challenge Agencies
Responding
Responding
Incorporating new technologies/retrofits
7 25
within the limitations of a legacy system
Managing/designing ventilation systems 5 18
Cost and funding 3 11
Determining the exact location where a
2 7
fire/smoke incident is occurring
Coordinating with other agencies sharing
2 7
the tunnel
Limited amount of references or standards
regarding design for underground train
2 7
fires affecting tunnel and platform
environments (e.g., fire/HRR)
Evacuation route considerations 1 4
Midcar train fire in tunnel 1 4
Awareness of SOPs 1 4
Ensuring a customized approach based on
1 4
specifics of the location
24/7 operation 1 4
Involving safety engineers during
1 4
planning/design
None 1 4
NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding.

33
Table 26
Exploration of New Technologies
No. of
% Agencies
New Technology Agencies
Responding
Responding
None 10 38
Yes, but not specified 3 12
Ventilation systems 3 12
New fire alarm notification systems 2 8
Use of new components that do not add
2 8
to fire load
New supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system tied to the 1 4
OCC
Early detection such as video analytics 1 4
Review of new fire life safety systems
1 4
and response protocols
Test prototype/installation of onboard fire
1 4
suppression system
Onboard mist suppression 1 4
Infrared detectors to scan tunnel roadway
1 4
for heat signatures
Very early smoke detection apparatus
(VESDA) system for smoke detection to
1 4
activate ventilation in the most favorable
way
New types of chemical agents 1 4
Next-Generation Tools
Transit agencies are exploring new technologies to prevent or minimize the impact of underground
fires, although many prefer to rely on tried-and-true methods. Table 26 presents survey responses.
The survey also asked about any promising approaches undertaken or planned that would be of
interest to other rail agencies for managing underground fire and smoke incidents. Table 27 summarizes
the responses. Ventilation-related approaches include:
• Automated scenarios to coordinate response between jet fans and supply/exhaust louvers that
reduce the possibility of forcing air in competing directions;
• Computer models that simulate smoke and heat flow to optimize design of ventilation systems;
Table 27
Promising Approaches of Possible Interest
to Other Transit Agencies
No. of
% Agencies
Approach Agencies
Responding
Responding
Ventilation-related 5 22
Training/emergency drills 5 22
None 5 22
Detection/suppression systems for
3 13
rail cars
Emphasis on preventive maintenance 2 9
Linear heat detection 1 4
Use of ICS in all responses 1 4
Not specified 1 4
Site-specific planning 1 4
Use of mode tables that control center
1 4
is trained to use

34
• Mechanical door assists on egress doors to overcome forces created by emergency ventilation
systems;
• Test of each emergency ventilation sequence at least once per quarter; and
• Ongoing ventilation studies.
Lessons Learned
Lessons learned that would be helpful for other transit agencies are shown in Table 28. Frequent
emergency drills and strong working relationships with first responders were emphasized.
Selected responses are presented by category. All comments are reported as expressed by agency
respondents.
Frequent Emergency Training Exercises (as stated)
• Drill, drill, drill is the name of the game to stay current and prepared.
• Need to test ventilation equipment and keep control staff trained.
• Having the local fire department serve as part of the tunnel rescue team during the construction of the under-
ground workings.
• Our Underground Fire Prevention Training Centre, used to train our staff and local police and fire department.
• Train your employees. Ensure all employees receive NIMS training as appropriate. Test the system frequently.
• We provide rail familiarization training for the fire units that would respond to our system.
• Hold frequent emergency training exercises.
Strong Working Relationships with First Responders (as stated)
• Train all of your jurisdictional fire departments and police or any agencies you interact with frequently, and
update emergency telephone list for control centers.
• Training first responders frequently. Document the training—both transit and Fire Department need to
document.
• Maintaining a very good working relationship with the local fire department through all phases of the project
leading up to the certificate of occupancy.
• With regard to planning, we utilize designated command post locations for emergency forces to respond to as
a regular practice, which we incorporate life safety monitoring and control equipment in. It also benefits us to
establish a forward operating command post which aides in providing real time information and a better coor-
dinated response to incidents.
• Timely notification to first responders is critical of any fire/smoke incident. Keep first responders aware of the
environment through training is also important. A clear line of communication between the transit agency and first
responders is important especially during the initial response in order to orient the first responders as they arrive.
Table 28
Lessons Learned
No. of
% Agencies
Lessons Learned Agencies
Responding
Responding
Frequent emergency training
10 45
exercises
Strong working relationships with
7 32
first responders
SOPs and regular updates 4 18
Communication with other transit
3 14
agencies
Design and testing of ventilation
3 14
system
Planning for the future 3 14
Adequate budgeting for safety 3 14
Focus on overall safety system
2 9
along with individual components
Communication with passengers 2 9
Prevention 1 5
NOTE: Multiple responses allowed; percentages do not add to 100%.

35
• The City Fire Department is the primary response group and all fire houses along the rail system get refresher
training on a regular basis. The Fire Training Academy has also made this training a part of their curriculum
and all new firefighters get it. This has been the case for more than 10 years.
Standard Operating Procedures and Regular Updates (as stated)
• Review SOPs/EOPs [emergency operations plans] annually or post an event.

• Lessons from previous incidents—hot wash with all responders. What went well, what did not.
• Simulations to guide your approach to design.
Communications with Other Transit Agencies (as stated)
• There was an incident in which two work crews, one from our agency and another with our sister agency working
near the same local had ventilation fans configured in a way which would have been appropriate for each on its
own, however in combination ended up unintentionally discharging smoke into our subway. It demonstrated the
importance of communicating and coordinating actions between our respective organizations.
• Develop a tunnel standard. Install only primary response and then include IOP channels.
Design and Testing of Ventilation Systems (as stated)
• Need to test ventilation equipment and keep control staff trained.

• Consider potential impacts of ventilation fan directed air flow on passenger evacuation route selection. For
example, the most effective route may be against the wind and Venturi effect when passing cars in the tunnel
may be significant.
• Provide jet type fans in tunnels that are capable of evacuating smoke in a predetermined direction through
use of pre-programmed scenarios. During a smoke/fire event the controllers are able to select the zone and
event location and activate a preset scenario that automatically sets fans and louvers to the correct position
exhausting smoke and providing a safe evacuation path for passengers.
Planning for the Future (as stated)
• Update technology.
• Ensure you have long term maintenance plans.
• Retrofitting existing system to meet new ridership demand is needed from time to time and is very difficult.
Suggest to leave sufficient real estate for future use particularly for life safety system.
Adequate Budgeting for Safety (as stated)
• Budget for future repairs, inspections and testing.

• Planning a budget for safety.
• Funding for equipment for first responders.
Focus on Overall Safety System along with Individual Components (as stated)
• Performing an exhaustive test of the integrated systems and controls to ensure it all works in concert and as
designed before closure of any project regardless of sign-off by AHJs [authorities having jurisdiction].
• Engineers and Contractors are great for designing complex systems and installing them (e.g., emergency
ventilation), but do not appear to provide much in the way of operations manuals or monthly tests designed
to test operation of the system as a whole. Our experience appears to indicate that you get plenty of manuals
on individual pieces of the system and how to maintain it or test that piece.
Communication with Passengers (as stated)
• Communications with passengers is the biggest lesson learned. Keeping them informed during an incident
is paramount.
• Customer safety awareness campaigns.
Prevention (as stated)
• As close as possible, maintain a debris free right-of-way. Especially around third rail transitions.

36
The Ideal System
The final question in the assessment section of the survey was:
Based upon your experience, do you have any recommendations for specifications or design features for inclusion
in the design of new tunnels or retrofit of legacy tunnels? What would the “ideal” fire prevention and response
system look like to you? How would it be different from today?
Many respondents took a systemic approach, whereas others focused on specific critical elements,
especially the ventilation system. Two respondents offered no recommendations. Responses are pre-
sented by category. All comments are reported as expressed by agency respondents.
System Approach
• You have to consider every aspects in order to design an ideal system. NFPA 130 surely define the ideal
system but for me, ventilation system have to be the critical one.
• As designed to NFPA standards, our tunnel system with evacuation routes, Tunnel Ventilation System . . . and
fire suppression connections appear to be ideal.
• System detection/event location presents one of our biggest challenges. A hardened system not subject to the
elements with some sort of graphical user interface integrated with a pre-populated SCADA [supervisory
control and data acquisition] system would be ideal.
• The ideal system would be able to detect an issue, eliminate a false alarm, instruct the control center on how
to manage other vehicles, and finally direct first responders.
• Considering the limited resources, it’s important for any system to be practical and as “automatic” as possible. As
we’ve learned from recent events, a system may not be effective when it is controlled by people. The basic human
error factors are always in play but when you also place those controls with an already overtaxed rail operations
controller you increase your risk of error. Automation in detection and activation are key to any modern system.
• At this time no, but I would recommend reviewing any national incident reports related to fire prevention and
evacuation and researching new technology on fire prevention in tunnels.
• We are fully implemented with new detection and communication system. No fire life-safety system though
is without potential problems and on-going routine testing to ensure adequacy is a must.
• Analytical camera in every room to double check room for hazards and smoke/fire. A drop down list from
the fire zone for every station’s room with contents, mean of access (key) purpose and known hazards within
room. A way to bring up the fire zone remotely and wireless access and to examine the room thru the use of
a lap-top viewing the analytical cameras. Tunnel ventilation control at or near the kiosk. In-house telephone
at street level for FD access if not able to access station phone/controls.
• Tunnel systems need segregation of the tubes, SCADA [supervisory control and data acquisition] for ventila-
tion control, according to ventilation modeling.
Ventilation System
• Ideal would be a transverse ventilation system that isolates the smoke and extracts it near the source of the
fire, instead of a longitudinal system that sends the smoke along the tunnel (where passengers may be located).
• Would recommend having the ventilation placed at the top of the tunnel.
• At-grade HMI [human–machine interface] panels are one thing we added on a recent project (2012 year
completion). These allow remote operation of emergency ventilation in case communication is lost with the
control center, and allows control by a local Supervisor or Incident Commander if that be needed or desired.
• Positioning and sizing ventilation facilities is critical. Rehabilitation of existent facilities is sometime hard to
do because you cannot build your ventilation system as exactly as you want to.
• Our ventilation system is a result of existing tunnel retrofits as we are a legacy system. When there is an oppor-
tunity to modify station, tunnels, etc. updating the vent system, etc. characteristics is made part of any analysis.
Non-combustible Materials
• Material linings that don’t burn, smoke or retain heat are products we reviewed and trialed but were never
able to receive funding.
• I would also recommend looking at any materials used in your tunnels for flammability and on your vehicles.
• Reduce or eliminate to the extent possible combustible material.
Other Elements
• Cameras are critical to early response.

• Increasing the number of emergency exits.

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Table 29
Responses to the “Ideal” Fire Prevention/
Response System Question
No. of
% Agencies
Category Agencies
Responding
Responding
Holistic system approach 9 47
Focus on ventilation system 6 32
Focus on noncombustible
3 16
materials
Focus on other elements 4 21
No recommendations 2 11
NOTE: Multiple responses allowed; percentages do not add to 100%.
• Based on our experience with “wet” standpipe systems in running, we recommend “dry” standpipes in our
new tunnels going forward. This allows for cost for maintenance (including heat trace elements) and the on-
going electrical costs for heat trace systems.
• As a recommendation, prior to startup, the disabled community lobbied for and were granted a change associated
with operation of the elevators in the tunnel stations. During a fire and smoke evacuation scenario, the elevators
remain operational to allow for disabled self-evacuation. The Tunnel Ventilation System pumps air through the
elevator shafts to maintain air flow.
Table 29 summarizes responses about the ideal system by category.
Summary
This chapter describes agency assessments of their planning for and management of fire and smoke
incidents. Findings include:
• Intensity of the fire and difficulty in gaining access to the site were most often rated as a major
challenge related to fire and smoke incidents. No element was rated as a major challenge by
more than 25% of the respondents.
• Incorporation of new technologies in legacy systems, ventilation issues, and cost/funding were
the three responses mentioned most often in replay to an open-ended question regarding the
single biggest challenge faced by the transit agency.
• Transit agencies are exploring new technologies to prevent or minimize the impact of underground
fires, although many prefer to rely on tried-and-true methods. Automated means of early detection,
fire suppression, ventilation, and notification are among new technologies under consideration or
being installed.
• Respondents also reported on promising approaches undertaken or planned that would be of
interest to other rail agencies for managing underground fire and smoke incidents. These include
optimized ventilation systems, onboard fire suppression, and linear heat detection.
• Frequent emergency drills and strong working relationships with first responders were reported
among lessons learned that would be helpful for other transit agencies. Review of training exer-
cises and incidents yield valuable lessons.
• Many respondents took a systemic approach in defining the “ideal” fire prevention and response
system, emphasizing the various elements of the ideal system (detection, ventilation, notifica-
tion, use of noncombustible materials, etc.) and the need for all elements to function as part of
the overall system. Automation is part of the ideal system.
• Respondents emphasize the importance of testing the entire system (not only its individual
components) before acceptance and of frequent emergency training exercises for agency staff
and first responders.

38
chapter five
Case Examples
Introduction
Synthesis survey results provide an overview of transit agencies’ evaluations of their planning for
and management of fire and smoke incidents. Following a review of these results, six agencies were
chosen as case example sites. Personnel directly involved with fire and smoke incidents were
interviewed by telephone. The case examples provide additional details on evacuation procedures
(which were not fully addressed in the survey), challenges, lessons learned, and keys.
The selection process for case examples had several criteria: (1) transit agencies of various sizes
in different parts of North America; (2) agencies that have taken innovative approaches or faced
significant challenges; and (3) agencies that provided detailed survey responses and interesting
observations. Two-thirds of responding agencies offered to serve as a case example. The six agen-
cies chosen provide an overview of planning and design for fire and smoke incidents in underground
passenger rail systems.
Figure 2 (in chapter one) shows the location of the case example cities. The six case example cities
and agencies are:
• Atlanta, Georgia: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority;

• Boston, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
• Cleveland, Ohio: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority;
• Jersey City, New Jersey: Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
• Seattle, Washington: Sound Transit; and
• Washington, D.C.: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA, Metro).
Table 30 provides a basic description of the transit agencies included in the case examples, including
ridership, service area population, and peak bus requirements. Sources are the FY 2014 National
Transit Database (NTD) reports and/or data provided by the agency.
The case examples summarize survey responses and interview observations from each agency.
The interviews explored issues raised by the survey responses in greater depth.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Atlanta, Georgia
The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) operates heavy rail throughout the Atlanta
metropolitan area. The service area population is 1.70 million. In the NTD 2014 profile, MARTA
operated 210 heavy rail vehicles (HRVs) in maximum service. Annual ridership was 38.8 million on
heavy rail. MARTA has 21.1 mi of rail trackway underground.
Process and Major Themes
MARTA is embarking on a rehabilitation of its tunnel ventilation system. The agency chose to issue a
request for proposals because ventilation systems are so specialized. MARTA has awarded a contract

39
Table 30
Characteristics of Case Example Agencies
Service
Annual Number of
Area
Agency Ridership Peak
Population
(million) Vehicles
(million)
MARTA 38.8 1.7 210
MBTA 286.3 4.2 902
GCRTA 9.0 1.4 34
PATH 83.1 18.4 299
Sound Transit 10.9 2.9 26
Metro 269.5 3.7 878
SOURCE: FY 2014 NTD reports and agency data.
for a design-build system after receiving several good proposals. MARTA has contracted separately
with a technical expert on ventilation to have an independent subject matter expert at its disposal
throughout the project.
The project is under way, with visual inspection of legacy system components as a first step.
The project will seek to maintain and rehabilitate the legacy system (based on air flow and standards
dating to 1979) to the extent possible. The consultant will identify deficiencies in ventilation and other
systems and develop strategies to address and correct these deficiencies. The consultant will also
explore innovative ways to make heat calculations more appropriate for the MARTA environment and
design suppression systems to bring the system to a state of good repair while seeking opportunities
to modernize the system within limited capital funds.
The project places responsibility on the consultant to:
• Evaluate the legacy system;

• Conduct extensive modeling;
• Develop an appropriate heat release factor (after gathering information on MARTA train vehicles,
the consultant will run heat release tests);
• Identify optimal scenarios; and
• After concurrence by MARTA, build the rehabilitated system.
MARTA recently upgraded its fire protection system, also through a design-build contract. This
project encompassed a complete overhaul of 103 facilities (including stations, switch gear rooms,
traction power substations, electric rooms, rail and bus maintenance facilities, train controller room,
and the agency’s headquarters) to upgrade all fire detection systems. MARTA worked with between
15 and 20 AHJs, generally matching the requirements of the most stringent code or standard among
the AHJs, designing the fire protection system, obtaining approval from each AHJ, and implementing
the design. Fire, smoke, and heat detectors and dry and wet suppression systems were included in the
design. All components are tied to the head end system with features such as self-health monitoring
and troubleshooting to the individual component level. Because the project was funded through the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Federal oversight was required. FTA was a member of
the project management oversight committee, along with at least one other rail transit agency.
Evacuation
The tunnel ventilation systems are designed with automated scenarios providing tenable evacuation
paths free of smoke. When a train operator in a tunnel notifies the Rail Service Control Center (RSCC),
tunnel scenarios are enacted to move smoke away from the egress route. MARTA police conduct the
evacuation and assist first responders from the local jurisdiction.
The tunnel lighting project will improve the fixtures and signage to permit better visual evacuation
routes for patrons in the event of an emergency.

40
MARTA has its own 911 call center. The state fire marshal requires that when an alarm is activated,
first responders are called immediately without investigating the incident.
Challenges
One of the major challenges is determining the exact location of incidents. The operator and RSCC
can identify the circuit, but some circuits are as long as 2,500 ft. If MARTA knows the exact location,
it can make a better judgment call on what action to take. The tunnel lighting project addresses this
challenge by providing proper signage for the operator to identify train location more accurately and
to locate emergency exits.
MARTA is a legacy system built in 1979. Many components are at the end of their useful life.
The agency has dedicated capital funds to holistic improvements that produce more proactive data
and can track and estimate when new components might fail. A full baseline assessment of legacy
components takes time and energy but is necessary, as are a robust asset management program and
accurate information on the expected end of life of components.
All components are not prone to failure. The system has industrial-grade equipment (such as sheet
metal in the ventilation system) that was built to last, as long as it is not corroding. Rebuilds are
effective in bringing the system up to a state of good repair. The approach for the tunnel ventilation
project is to first inspect and test, then identify options so MARTA can make an informed business
decision given the capital funds available. New vent shafts and rebuilt tunnels are expensive and
do not necessarily yield immediate benefits.
Rehabilitation of ventilation and fire suppression systems is less visible and offers fewer ribbon-
cutting ceremonies, but it is vital. The function of such systems is to perform as designed when the
need arises.
Lessons Learned
The agency reported the following lessons learned.
• A stabilization program is the best start for a legacy system. Determine a baseline of the system to
understand current conditions. Establishing what the gaps are is the first step toward subsequent
business decisions.
• Get buy-in from all stakeholders, especially operations. MARTA has a lot of internal stakeholders.
All the components for emergency response can fail for a thousand reasons. Know who “owns”
these reasons, and make sure they are involved. Are SOPs upgraded? Is the agency making full
use of institutional knowledge? Having the right people at the table and executive committee
support sets the foundation for achieving what needs to be done.
• Share knowledge and learn from other transit agencies. MARTA is discussing its tunnel ventilation
with APTA in the context of current and potential new standards.
• If an agency is undertaking a major capital project, it needs subject matter experts on its side.
MARTA contracted separately with a technical expert on ventilation to prevent expensive
unnecessary work.
• MARTA compiled a detailed list of 32 lessons learned from the fire protection systems upgrade
process. Most are associated with procedural issues related to the conduct and timing of individual
tasks within the project.
Keys to Success
In retrospect, the key to MARTA’s success is that the agency did not stick its head in the sand. It made
a conscious decision 4 or 5 years ago to assess the state of its system and what needed to be done to
bring it into a state of good repair.

41
Executive support is imperative. Having the top executives champion and understand the projects
is critical to success. This paves the way to funding commitments and a commitment to “get it right.”
MARTA is aware that it is creating the legacy system of the future and pays close attention to
consistent availability of spare parts and robust training plans. If there is an internal gap in needed
skills, the preferred option is to outsource the specific function until agency personnel are fully trained.
A robust asset management plan is a necessity.
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Boston, Massachusetts
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) operates heavy rail, light rail, and commuter
rail throughout the Boston metropolitan area. The service area population is 4.18 million. In the NTD
2014 profile, MBTA directly operated 336 HRVs and 150 LRVs. Annual ridership was 178.5 million
on heavy rail and 72.5 million on light rail. MBTA is one of the oldest rail systems in the United States.
The underground portion of the system operates in Boston, Cambridge, and Somerville, Massachusetts.
MBTA has 38 mi of heavy rail track way and 14 mi of light rail track way underground.
MBTA’s operations control center (OCC), maintenance control center, and power dispatch are all
linked. If OCC receives a report of a fire, the others are notified automatically, as is the local fire
department and MBTA’s transit police department and safety department. MBTA will initiate ventilation
when and as needed by means of its push–pull ventilation system.
Evacuation
MBTA is an old system with many different upgrades and changes over the years. A unique plan is
needed for each location, depending on type of station and configurations of city streets. All responses to
transit system fire reports are coordinated by OCC. Trains are evacuated at the nearest station if the train
can safely advance to that station. Otherwise, power dispatch shuts off the power and MBTA employees
and the local fire department or other emergency responders assist in evacuation. MBTA typically sets up
bus bridges or directs passengers to alternate services when service is affected by a fire or report of fire;
there are plenty of choices in downtown Boston. MBTA’s transit police assist in directing passengers.
Challenges
The major challenge is that MBTA is a legacy system. Installing new facilities, such as additional
ventilation shafts, is a challenge because there is not a lot of room in the densely developed corridors
where the underground portions of the MBTA transit system are located. There are sections of the
system that are not accessible, and evacuation of persons with disabilities is sometimes a challenge,
which MBTA is working to correct. Compliance with all elements of NFPA is difficult owing to
the age and configuration of the system. The agency works collaboratively with the Massachusetts
Department of Public Safety, the AHJ of MBTA facilities, and local fire departments to request waivers
and alternate solutions when compliance is physically impossible.
Efforts are ongoing to improve the rail fleet and eliminate combustibles (trash cleanup). On warm,
breezy days in the spring, dried leaves sometimes cause fires in the open air areas, and trash can catch
on fire in the tunnels. Trash cleanup is an ever-present necessity.
Vigilant maintenance is an absolute requirement. Maintenance of the catenary systems and third
rails to prevent arcing receives special attention.

42
Lessons Learned
• A primary lesson learned from MBTA’s experience is to do the basics every day. Everyone who
works in tunnels picks up every piece of trash he or she sees. Workers collect more than 10 bags
of trash underground every day.
• Close monitoring of the conditions related to the root causes of fire is necessary. The cause of
the problem or fire must be identified; it is not enough to just remediate the issue at hand.
Keys to Success
The push–pull ventilation system enables an effective response. Cameras are also important. MBTA
spent a lot of money installing cameras. The ability to understand the facts of the situation quickly is
critical to a proper and early response.
MBTA advises not to declare victory but to look closely for root causes. An after-action review is
conducted for most incidents.
MBTA has a training facility where the agency trains first responders from Boston and Cambridge
annually and others on an ad hoc basis (such as when they have new employees or requests for
refresher training). As noted, the rail system is subgrade only in Boston, Cambridge, and Somerville.
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, Cleveland, Ohio
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) operates multiple modes, including light
rail and heavy rail in and around the city of Cleveland. According to the 2014 NTD data, its service
area population is 1.41 million. GCRTA operates 40 HRVs and 34 LRVs. Annual ridership in 2014
was 6.2 million on heavy rail and 2.8 million on light rail. GCRTA has 0.6 mi of heavy rail trackway
underground.
GCRTA’s approach has been proactive, including the performance of hazard assessments and audits
to reveal opportunities for improvement and develop corrective action plans to address findings. The
transit agency had concerns about its 1,584-ft tunnel at the airport: track conditions were deteriorating
as a result of airport drainage issues that affected the state of good repair, and the existing ventilation
system needed improvements and upgrades.
Supporting material for ventilation-related projects includes Fatal Effects of Fire, an NFPA report
issued in March 2011; the report trended information on burns versus smoke inhalation as fatal
effects of fire, including numbers and shares of fire deaths, with analysis of fire incident reporting
versus death certificate reporting on the same topic (Hall 2011). Death certificates showed a 2:1 ratio
of smoke inhalation to burns for fire deaths between 2003 and 2007, emphasizing the critical role of
ventilation. A review of the National Transit Database revealed that heavy rail systems reported
41 major fires in the years 2011 through 2013.
As a result, GCRTA commissioned an engineering study by a professional ventilation company

that examined the specific characteristics of the subterranean area, conducted computer modeling

43
based on the types of fires expected to be encountered, and analyzed the temperatures and smoke that
could be expected from such fires. The study recommended improved and faster detection of smoke
and fire; an improved ventilation system, including additional fans that together prevent the back
layering of smoke and excess temperatures in the egress paths; and quick notification of agency and
airport fire department personnel.
The Ohio Department of Transportation supported efforts to rehabilitate the tracks, ventilation,
and drainage all in one project. A vital component included the installation of a new system called
Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus. The system provides continuous monitoring of air quality
in three segments (west zone, central zone, and east zone) of the tunnel. When smoke is detected, the
system goes into emergency response and automatically triggers the ventilation system and notifies
transit police dispatch and the airport fire department. An anomaly in any one of the three zones will
trigger one of three scenarios for the ventilation system to supply air or operate in exhaust mode,
moving smoke and heat away from the people. The response is automated and can be only overridden
by responding GCRTA maintenance personnel or the fire department. This enables the GCRTA control
center to focus on the evacuation of passengers and employees and facilitate communications inter-
nally and with the fire department and any other responding mutual aid.
Evacuation
Heavy rail cars require the use of wooden ladders that must be deployed by the operator for evacuation
from the train to the track level. This procedure can take time, and operators are trained to communicate
the plan of action to passengers. The message must be clear and concise to help reduce panic by provid-
ing a description of the steps that will be taken. Once at track level, passengers are directed either east
or west toward the platform or the portal, depending on the location of the fire.
The goal is to put passengers at ease as much as possible and enable the operator to maintain
control of passenger egress movements. To aid operators, GCRTA stores a script (see Figure 9) in the
operator’s cab to be broadcast on the train public announcement system in the event of an emergency
that requires evacuation.
In addition, vital information must be conveyed by the operator to the control center through onboard
or portable radio. To supplement such communications, GCRTA has six blue light communication
stations within the tunnel that also denote directions and distances to exits. These communication
stations are equipped with the following:
• An airport firefighter communication radio with direct communication to the incident commander;
• 911 call box to transit police dispatch; and
• House phone—GCRTA operator or others can communicate with the control center, transit police
dispatch, the safety department or the general manager’s emergency operations center as needed.
Challenges
Reducing the amount of combustible material is important. The tunnel must be clean and free from
litter. The only combustible contents in the tunnel are portions of the train itself. GCRTA installed a
15-in. structural slab made of epoxy-coated, rebar-reinforced concrete and hung a system of boots
and blocks from a poured-in-place structure surrounded by 6 to 12 in. of plain concrete in creating the
new low-vibration track, thus eliminating combustible wood ties throughout the tunnel. Most fires
anticipated to occur are electrical in origin, and result from the overhead catenary.
Lessons Learned
• Every space will behave differently based on air flow—a thorough ventilation study has to be
the starting point.

44
Light Rail
Evacuation Procedure
1. Initiate the “Three Emergency Broadcast”
2. Assess The Situation
3. Lower Pantograph
4. Make announcement to passengers of intent

to evacuate using the following script:
Attention, Attention all passengers.

We will be evacuating the train.
Remain Calm. Proceed with caution.
5. Assist Passengers
6. Instruct Passengers to move 30 to 50 feet

down the track in front of the train (if safe to
do so) and remain in that location.
7. When all passengers have been evacuated,

update Control Center Supervisor.
8. Return to passengers and assist passengers,

distribute accident packs, Hand out and
collect Customer Information Cards.
(Form 71-43B)
9. Control the scene until Emergency

Responders arrive to provide additional
assistance.
FIGURE 9 Operator script for emergency

evacuation (Used with permission from
GCRTA).
• Authorities with jurisdiction do not necessarily have the expertise to understand more complex
systems and may not perform adequate acceptance tests. When performing quality acceptance
testing, ensure that the systems are tested together using various scenarios to ensure all com-
ponents are communicating and functioning according to design, rather than independently
testing all of the alarms, ventilation systems, and smoke detection systems. GCRTA received
various reports and test data from individual contractors involved in the project and from the
local fire department relative to changes to the fire alarm, but no one vendor or contractor tested
the improvements as a system until the GCRTA Safety and Engineering Department did and
discovered a fan control logic issue in the programming that needed correcting.
• During testing of the smoke detection apparatus and ventilation systems, it was discovered that
all ventilation systems operated in exhaust mode regardless of where the smoke was detected in
the tunnel. In an integrated system, testing has to address each component in the context of the
system, not only individually. In this case, the fans activated, seemingly meeting the program
requirements, but when the fan results were compared with design parameters, the fans were
found to not be functioning per the standard. Trust but verify using a good quality assurance
process.
• Ongoing testing is also critical. A comprehensive asset inspection was conducted, and all devices,
including those related to communication, were placed into a maintenance management system
with Office of Emergency Management manuals and other reference materials along with a
schedule of preventive maintenance tasks and tests. The installation of visual aids on the control
panels also is crucial so testing is can be performed easily and incorrect modes or settings on
the equipment can be recognized quickly.

45
• Joint exercises, such as tabletop drills, with first responders (the airport fire department in
this case) are essential, as is equipment familiarization. The airport fire department worked in
conjunction with the GCRTA Safety and Training Departments to develop a PowerPoint pre-
sentation for training all new staff members and refresher training. Equipment (heavy rail cars)
familiarization training is also performed with the fire department.
• GCRTA has a sprinkler system to protect heated areas adjacent to the platform and tunnel (break
room, communications room, and utility areas), but there is no dry sprinkler system or fire
suppression system on the platform or in the tunnel. Detection is critical so that the airport fire
department can respond quickly and begin manual firefighting operations.
Keys to Success
GCRTA has identified two keys to success:
• Performing a thorough hazard assessment and sharing the results with the transit executive
management team.
• Budgeting for safety and security recommendations and corrective action plans. GCRTA has
an internal group that meets periodically to set priorities for projects that include those related
to safety and security.
All properties with a similar exposure could benefit from a comparison of their current mechanical
emergency ventilation systems with the current NFPA 130 Standard to identify conditions that no
longer meet current requirements and hazard controls to improve life-safety conditions should an
incident occur.
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, Jersey City, New Jersey
The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH) was established in 1962 as a subsidiary of
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The heavy rail rapid transit system serves as the
primary transit link between Manhattan and neighboring New Jersey urban communities and suburban
commuter railroads. PATH currently provides approximately 266,000 passenger trips each weekday.
This volume is expected to continue to increase with the anticipated growth in regional residential,
commercial, and business development. PATH has 16.9 mi of heavy rail track way underground.
PATH conducts frequent drills with first responders from both states, which can and will help PATH
in the event of an emergency situation. The responder organizations include, but are not limited to,
the New York City Fire Department and the various townships and cities that surround PATH to
assist in a unified emergency response. In addition, there is a mutual aid agreement with each first
responder entity.
The long-standing relationship between PATH and its first responders is professional, allowing
all parties to work together to resolve disputes. At one time, the New York City Fire Department
policy was that emergency ventilation systems should not be activated until fire department personnel
arrived on scene. The concern was that the ventilation system would spread the fire, but fires in tunnels
are somewhat different from those in high rise buildings, where the smoke and heat travel up in a
stack effect. With a properly designed tunnel emergency ventilation system, the oxygen is actually
removed from the event. PATH has demonstrated this using high-capacity smoke generators in its
tunnels; with the ventilation system off for the first 2 to 3 min (simulating response time), the area in
the vicinity of the smoke generator was engulfed in smoke. Then using the same smoke generators,
the ventilation system began operation immediately after the smoke was noticed, and the area was

46
clear of smoke in seconds. This demonstration of the smoke generators led fire department personnel
to decide that immediate activation is the correct option. Some incidental fires have occurred over the
years, and by using the ventilation system properly, smoke has been cleared.
PATH is a legacy system with 13.8 mi of track, approximately 60% of which is underground.
PATH implemented a safety program in 1983 that installed standpipes, ventilation systems, and
tunnel lighting. Ventilation sites were selected where structures existed so that new structures did not
have to be cut into tunnels; fan capacities were based on these locations. There are six emergency
ventilation sites, with two additional sites planned at the World Trade Center. Emergency egress
shafts generally are located at these sites. Communication command posts are also set up at the surface
and bottom of each egress location, with plug-ins for multi-type communications connections.
Evacuation
PATH relies on fully tested scenarios to respond to incidents. The first option, standard to the industry
as much as possible, is to bring the train to the nearest station to platform the train. If the train cannot
move, the train operator deploys ladders, which weigh no more than 40 pounds and are stored in each
vehicle, to bring passengers to the track and then walks them along the evacuation path; fans are on,
and the direction is established based on the location of the fire. The key goal is to have fresh air in pas-
sengers’ faces as they walk along the track to the nearest egress location and to bring passengers to the
platforms from the tracks. Each platform for each station where permanent stairs do not exist is outfitted
with track-to-platform stairs that are stored in all stations (locked in full view on the station platforms).
Fortunately, there have been only a few incidents requiring evacuation over the years. In all cases,
the train could be moved so that at least one car was platformed to better facilitate quick egress.
Challenges
Getting people that are not aware of procedures and policies to understand what has to be followed is
critical. As noted earlier, fire and smoke incidents in tunnels are different from incidents in high-rise
buildings and should be treated differently. PATH and its first responders share their knowledge as
they discuss a situation before deciding on a best course of action to implement.
PATH has a strong safety and security group, and its members are capable of dealing with
each issue.
Lessons Learned
• There is nothing more important than learning from your experience and that of others. The
PATH safety program was approved in 1983. It arose from two incidents that led the agency
to ask: what do we have to do to protect the railroad? The answer was to incorporate a new
tunnel emergency ventilation system into the railroad, install a fire-standpipe system through-
out, install emergency lighting in the tunnels, add train-to-track and track-to-platform ladders,
add new fire-resistive egress stairs, add intercoms at each landing within the stairwell, and add
communications command posts at the bottom and top of the stairs to ensure that first responders
can talk with others who are on a different level.
• The relationship with first responders is critical. PATH helps them to understand the unique nature
of fires in tunnels.
Keys to Success
• Maintain a clean environment, free of combustibles. Over the years, PATH has removed all
garbage cans from its platforms. Newspapers and coffee cups are blown onto the tracks and

47
always end up in places where they should not be. As a result, PATH track walkers walk through
all tunnels every day picking up debris, and during terminal layovers crews remove trash from
vehicles. As time permits, PATH is removing wood ties and replacing them with concrete ties
and is beginning to install direct fixation where possible.
• Monitor tunnels constantly. PATH teams walk through the tunnels inspecting tracks, bolts, third
rail power, and joints of continuous welded rail. Electrical staff check if cabling is exposed and
its conditions. The operation of the signal system is checked daily by signal staff.
• To maintain the highest level of safety for the tunnel system, PATH staff continue to have crew
and first responder familiarization sessions and frequently conduct drills with first responders.
Sound Transit, Seattle, Washington
Sound Transit operates light rail between the SeaTac Airport through downtown Seattle to the
University of Washington, commuter rail service in three counties (Pierce, King, and Snohomish)
of Washington State, and commuter bus service. The service area population is 2.87 million. In the
NTD 2014 profile, Sound Transit operated 26 LRVs in maximum service, and annual light rail rider-
ship was 10.9 million. This case example addresses light rail service only. Sound Transit has 5.1 mi
of light rail trackway underground.
The light rail tunnels have a push–pull ventilation system that moves smoke away from the train to
allow passengers to evacuate safely in the event of a fire. The cross-section where the fire or smoke
event occurs is isolated and pressurized to push fresh air into the tunnel.
Sound Transit does extensive modeling and works closely with the city of Seattle’s knowledgeable
fire department personnel in the design of its tunnels. The downtown Seattle tunnel (known as the
Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel or DSTT) has four stations and has been operational since 1990;
the Beacon Hill tunnel opened in 2009; and a new 3-mi tunnel extension opened in March 2016.
Sound Transit has a close working relationship with the fire department and invites the department
to review models and observe scenario tests. Joint emergency drills are conducted every 6 months.
Sound Transit has used “wet” tunnel standpipes with fire hose valves located every 200 ft in tunnels.
The agency plans to have dry systems in the future, with a 10-min charge time.
One unique situation for Sound Transit is joint operation of hybrid bus and light rail in the DSTT.
The fire growth rate with fully fueled diesel buses (testing the worst case scenario) is much greater than
with LRVs. Eventually, only light rail will operate in the downtown tunnel.
In addition to the DSTT, the operating segment includes the Beacon Hill Tunnel (approximately
1 mi in length), which has a deep midline station. The deep station includes reversible fans in com-
bination with jet fans at both tunnel portals. The new University Link Extension, which opened in
March 2016, includes 3.15 mi of new twin tunnels with two subway stations 2 mi apart. Sound Transit,
working with the fire department, was able to eliminate a planned ventilation structure in the middle
of the zone in the segment between stations. The tunnel design allows for future modifications in
terms of service frequency and the size of train consists.
Sound Transit follows NFPA 130 plus a city of Seattle amendment that requires the agency to
meet the capacity required to operate the push–pull system even if it loses a whole ventilation fan.
This requirement increases the speed of air moving through down tunnel to between 25 and 28 mph.
Sound Transit has installed mechanical door assists on egress doors to overcome forces created
by the emergency ventilation system and has taken other steps to mitigate stairwell pressurization
buildup that has been observed in field tests.

48
Evacuation
The primary means of egress from the deep mine station at Beacon Hill (described in the next section)
is elevators. The station design included isolation of the elevator shafts and ventilation in the shafts
to pressurize as needed.
Challenges
Most of the light rail stations were built using cut-and-cover techniques. The deep mine station at
Beacon Hill, 167 ft below ground level, required different approaches in terms of fire safety. The
agency learned a great deal about stairwell pressurization at this station, most notably the need for
mechanical door assists on egress doors to counteract the pressure created by the ventilation system
and allow people to open and close doors.
The joint operation of hybrid bus and rail in the DSTT is a unique situation in North America.
The fire safety system in the downtown tunnel was designed to address the faster fire growth rate
under the worst-case scenario involving diesel buses, even though all buses currently operated in the
DSTT are hybrid vehicles.
In response to requests by control center personnel, Sound Transit reconfigured the control center’s
computer system so that the system showed three separate screens for each station: one for train control,
one for fire life safety, and one for building management. This required a more robust computer network.
As the light rail system expands, the current terminus station will be a terminus for only 5 years.
This requires a separation between current operations in the tunnel and ongoing construction. It also
means that, for the first 5 years, fan operations will be different. The agency needed to build capacity
into the ventilation system, but not too much with a hard block at north end. Achieving the correct
balance was challenging.
Lessons Learned
• Develop a strong positive relationship with the local fire department. The Seattle Fire Department
has been part of the fire rescue team starting with initial construction.
• Work closely with the operating group in developing SOPs and maintenance procedures. Sound
Transit’s fire life safety engineer works closely with the operations department in training and
developing procedures.
• Install dry standpipes instead of wet. The heat trace is not reliable for more than 5 years. The
geometry of the tunnels requires higher pressure over long periods and pressure-reducing valves
need to be more closely spaced. Moving away from wet standpipes allows quicker restoration
of service. Water can be as damaging to electrical equipment as heat. In future tunnels, Sound
Transit will install dry standpipes instead of wet ones.
• Fire command centers provide the ability to fight fires along the light rail line. These mirror the
Link Control Center (the local name for the operations command and control center). Following
NFPA 130 and 72 standards creates complete redundancy in the control panels and the ability to
identify remotely the location of each panel. This in turn provides the agency with greater control
over the decision to call the fire department. Sound Transit removed most smoke detectors from
stations because of vandalism and replaced them with emergency phones that activate a camera
so that the Link Control Center can see the person and scan the area to determine if there is a fire.
• Test all scenarios for the emergency ventilation system to make sure that individual components
(including communication and the public address system) work. Conduct individual component
and systemwide tests. How emergencies are addressed must be clearly communicated to staff
and contractors. The doors, public address system, elevators, and fans are all synchronized and
need to be tested together. It takes time to ensure that everything works as expected in the process
of commissioning a subway station.

49
Keys to Success
• Talent, experience, and chemistry are all important, but chemistry is especially important between
the safety department and two groups: the jurisdiction having authority and its personnel who
inspect and commission the tunnels and stations and the agency’s operations department.
• Training is paramount to get the operations department to understand what equipment they have,
how valuable it is, and how to use it. Drill consistently so operations personnel know what to do.
The goal is that they know the procedures well enough to train the fire department.
• There is usually a “best” direction for ventilation, but making sure smoke blows away from
passengers is more important than picking the best direction.
• A full-time, in-house, fire life safety person makes a big difference.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA, Metro), Washington, D.C.
Metro is the regional transit provider in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, which has a service
area population of 3.72 million. In the FTA’s NTD 2014 profile, Metro operated 878 heavy rail cars
in maximum service. Annual ridership was 269.5 million on heavy rail. Metro has 111.2 mi of rail
trackway underground.
Metro maintains smoke and heat sensors in stations throughout the system and receives alarms in
a couple of different ways. All fire alarms are transmitted to the station kiosk, Metro Rail Opera-
tions Control Center (ROCC), the Metro Maintenance Operations Center, and Metro Transit Police
Communications simultaneously. When the ROCC receives notification, personnel initiate calls to
the fire department in the appropriate jurisdiction, dispatch maintenance personnel, and notify the
Metro Transit Police.
Each rail station is equipped with an emergency voice/alarm public address communication system
so that appropriate announcements can be made from the station kiosk or from the ROCC regarding
fire alarms, including provisions for giving necessary evacuation information and directions to the
public upon receipt of any manual or automatic fire alarm signal.
A delay is factored in to the activation of the affected station fire alarm system’s audible and visual
fire signals. This is intended to minimize potential mass panic of customers (perhaps as many as 1,000)
in the rail station in the event of a fire alarm activation and the automatic audible public address
announcement message announcing a mandatory emergency evacuation in the station.
Delaying the audible and visual alarms in the station allows time for the station manager to investi-
gate, verify, and confirm that an actual fire condition is present that requires evacuation of the station.
The agency is updating its SOPs to address smoke in tunnels and enhanced training for the con-
trollers in the ROCC. These were recommendations made by a peer group review immediately after
a major incident.
Evacuation
There are SOPs for evacuation of stations and trains. For example, if the fire is on a train in a tunnel,
the train operator first attempts to move passengers between cars to remove them from the immediate
area of danger, with the rationale being that passengers generally are safer in a rail car than in a tunnel
with high voltage equipment and other hazards. If the train is disabled or unable to move to the next safe
station, a rescue train is brought to the scene to push or pull the disabled train or transfer passengers and

50
take them to the next safe station for evacuation. Conversely, if the train operator decides remaining
on a train and sheltering in place is not a safer alternative, the last resort is to evacuate passengers to
the tunnel/track bed after the operator obtains permission from the ROCC. The train operator then
executes the evacuation SOP and directs passengers to exit the side of the train where lights exist in
the tunnel. This is generally the side of the tunnel where a safe walkway exists and is opposite the
side of the third rail. From this point, the operator leads passengers to the nearest station, safe area,
or emergency exit. Emergency train evacuation carts are also available at each station to allow first
responders to manually evacuate passengers from the tunnel (the carts are used for injured or disabled
patrons who are unable to walk to a point of safety).
If the fire is in a station, an alarm-activated audible public address alerts patrons to evacuate the
station, while the station manager assists with evacuation and directs passengers to a point of safety.
Evacuation of passengers to the track level is a last resort and is done only if the ROCC delivers
such direction. In such cases, there generally would be an emergency exit beyond the platform end
gates that leads to a point of safety (either exit to ground level or area of rescue assistance). Other
evacuation options include having patrons shelter in place while first responders assist with evacuation
and bringing to the scene a rescue train that evacuates the passengers to the nearest safe station.
Public address announcements to keep passengers informed regarding the reason for the delay and
the action to be taken if necessary are an important component of the process.
Challenges
Training is a major challenge. Training may not have occurred recently or been appropriate for the
environment of the incident. In addition, station familiarization can be a challenge. Station Managers
often serve stations not typically assigned to them (i.e., filling in for staff on leave). These staff
generally are not familiar with the specific configurations and emergency evacuation requirements
of the stations they are temporarily serving. It is difficult to train staff on the nuances of each station
they may serve.
Metro is a legacy system predating the current Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger
Rail Systems (NFPA 130). The system was built to applicable codes 40 years ago, but many loca-
tions are not in compliance with modern safety requirements. The physical design constraints and
infrastructure often are a major limiting factor to what can be accomplished to bring areas closer to
modern safety standards.
In addition, in many locations, fire and smoke detection and alarm and suppression systems are
antiquated and in a state of poor repair. Turnover of staff who are knowledgeable about the configu-
rations and years of modifications and changes makes troubleshooting difficult. Improvements are
required to ensure reliable fire protection systems are in place that have been tested and maintained
according to code.
Testing fire alarms is not always done on an end-to-end system basis because different depart-
ments are responsible for various systems components. For example, fire alarm activation is also
supposed to trigger response by certain means of egress systems, such as escalators stopping in the
inbound direction, elevators assuming emergency mode, and fare gates opening. One department is
responsible for elevators and escalators, another department is responsible for the alarm systems,
and another department is responsible for the suppression systems. The different departments do not
always communicate with each other to make sure all components respond accordingly. Certified
and knowledgeable testing and maintenance personnel, whether directly employed or contracted, are
a critical need for proper maintenance.
System maintenance may require limited hours of service. This is a difficult trade-off, keeping in
mind that many customers rely on Metro daily. Metro generally stays open late at night and opens
early in the morning. This leaves few hours of available maintenance time to access track and other
critical systems.
Gaining the trust of customers is important: once lost, it is hard to recoup.

51
Lessons Learned
• Follow applicable codes and standards and go through proper permitting processes in each
jurisdiction in which the agency operates. This affords maximum protection for the agency and
its customers.
• If they are not currently established, develop and incorporate agency-based design criteria that
incorporate all applicable local and national level codes and standards. In addition, special or
unique fire life safety requirements can be accounted for in the agency-based design criteria,
especially if a local code or standard does not adequately address this type of condition.
• Work closely with jurisdictions and learn from them. The agency’s designers may not have the
best methods.
• All parties involved need to be realistic in their expectations.
• Take steps to bring together all departments that have an impact on critical safety systems (i.e.,
fire detection, alarm, suppression, and egress) for system end-to-end testing and maintenance.
• Reinforce the importance of safety at every opportunity. Being too busy is not an excuse to skip
training exercises.
• Create a tracking system for first responders to know how much and what types of training each
first responder has received. Fire departments that train frequently work well with Metro staff at
incidents. At Metro, the Office of Emergency Management tracks and publishes monthly a list
of fire departments and law enforcement agencies that have been trained at Metro’s designated
emergency management training facility.
Keys to Success
• Learn from experience. Critical incident debriefing sessions and after-action reviews conducted
after an incident are proven ways the agency can learn from these types of events. These sessions
are to be proctored by the appropriate knowledgeable staff with a primary purpose of assigning
corrective actions to responsible departments and following through to ensure that such actions
are appropriately implemented.
• Applicable familiarization and recurrent and specialized training are needed for all emergency
response personnel internal and external to the agency.
• In the future, the ability to call up a three-dimensional profile of the station at the station kiosk
to learn where the fire alarm originated will save time. The profile also will familiarize first
responders and agency personnel with the station layout. The ability to see the fan controls and
location from the station kiosk and tell at a glance whether they are in operation and in what
mode can ensure that the proper scenario is in operation.

52
chapter six
Conclusions
Introduction
This chapter summarizes key findings, presents conclusions from this synthesis project, and offers
areas for future study. Findings identify and assess the factors contributing to the success. The chapter
is organized in five sections:
• Findings from the survey and literature review;

• Agency assessments;
• Lessons learned—survey respondents;
• Lessons learned—case examples; and
• Conclusions and areas for future study.
The future study areas address the need for upgraded standards and dissemination, a culture of
safety at transit agencies, continued research on rail vehicles and passenger rail tunnels, evaluation of
next-generation systems as they are implemented, effective training, and gaps between National Fire
Protection Association’s (NFPA) NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail
Systems (2014), and the International Building Code (IBC). Two problem statements were submitted
to TCRP for consideration as future studies.
Findings from the Survey and Literature Review
• Sources of information. All respondents use NFPA 130, often in the design of transit facilities
and as a best practices document. Respondents also use the National Incident Management
System (NIMS), locally developed standards and guidelines, and/or the APTA Recommended
Practice Report.
• Definitions. Agencies typically define “underground” as “below grade” or “subterranean.” Several
agencies use a minimum length of tunnel (ranging from 150 to 1,000 ft) to define underground.
Obvious signs of fire and/or smoke most often define a fire and smoke incident.
• Incidents and causes. Minor underground fire and smoke incidents are not uncommon, but
major incidents (defined as causing a service disruption of at least 2 h) occur less often. Arcing
and trash fires in tunnels were noted by more than half of all respondents as primary causes of
underground fire and smoke incidents.
• Fire and smoke detection, prevention, protection, and ventilation systems. More than half of all
respondents report that their agencies have an early underground fire detection system. Closed
circuit television (CCTV), station smoke or heat detectors, and closed-head sprinklers (heat
sensitive) in stations are the most common elements. More than two-thirds of respondents
report that their agency has adopted design standards or codes related to underground fire and
smoke prevention and detection. Several agencies have adopted NFPA standards as their own.
Most respondents indicate that their agency’s ventilation control system is designed to
remove smoke and provide fresh air and/or cooling. Ventilation fans typically are controlled
remotely. Almost all respondents report that their agency regularly tests fan operation. More
than half of respondents test fan operation weekly or monthly.
Agencies take several different approaches to changing protocols and procedures as new tech-
niques and regulations emerge. Internal cross-departmental evaluations are common, including
debriefings after an event. Respondents also use formal quantitative analyses. Regulatory com-
pliance is essential, although older systems may be grandfathered. Legacy systems often meet

53
new requirements by making needed changes during repairs. Respondents also pay close atten-
tion to industry incidents and actions taken by other rail agencies. Capital improvements and the
need to replace system components at the end of their useful life offer opportunities to retrofit
the system.
• Managing incidents. Procedures for responding to and managing underground fire and smoke
incidents typically involve internal and external notification, command structure, power shutoff,
and evacuation. Nearly every agency uses the Incident Command System (ICS), a major compo-
nent of NIMS, to establish a unified command structure at the scene. Most agencies are not aware
of recent full-scale tests in which fire size was measured at 52 to 72 MW in existing vehicles (a fire
roughly four times larger than most systems are designed to handle). Almost one-third of respon-
dents indicated that their agency has made changes to its standard operating procedures (SOPs)
for managing underground fire and smoke incidents within the past 2 years. Changes typically
fell into one of three categories: enhanced clarity, improved training, or improved safety. Reasons
for changes to SOPs included FTA safety advisories, NTSB and APTA publications, incidents at
other transit agencies, installation of new controls, and changes to rail operation.
• Training. At least half of all respondents report the review of SOPs, hands-on training in the use
of portable fire extinguishers, and knowledge of ICS as components of their training programs.
On-site training in tunnels and coordination with first responders were cited as additional train-
ing measures. Ongoing training with first responders from local jurisdictions typically takes
the form of field and tabletop exercises. Among agencies serving multiple jurisdictions, annual
training with each first-response team is the typical schedule although not always possible to
achieve for agencies with large service areas. Survey responses indicate a high level of famil-
iarity and comfort with NIMS among transit agency personnel who respond to fire and smoke
incidents as well as among first responders.
• The literature review revealed that studies focusing on planning and design for fire and smoke
incidents in rail tunnels make up a small subset of the literature on tunnel fires. The reluctance of
passengers to initiate an evacuation, attributable in part to lack of clear information and the ambigu-
ity of cues, is a major finding from behavioral studies. Recent studies suggest that the fire size for
rail vehicle fires in tunnels may be much larger than most systems are designed to handle.
Agency Assessments
Survey respondents assessed their agency’s planning for and management of fire and smoke inci-
dents. Topics included challenges, next-generation tools, lessons learned that would be of interest to
other transit agencies, and what an “ideal” fire prevention and response system might look like and
how it would be different from the systems in use today.
• Intensity of the fire and difficulty in gaining access to the site were most often rated as a major
challenge related to fire and smoke incidents.
• Incorporation of new technologies in legacy systems, ventilation issues, and cost/funding were
the three answers mentioned most often in response to an open-ended question regarding the
single biggest challenge faced by the transit agency.
• Transit agencies are exploring new technologies to prevent or minimize the impact of under-
ground fires, although many prefer to rely on tried-and-true methods. Automated means of early
detection, fire suppression, ventilation, and notification are among new technologies under
consideration or being installed.
• Promising approaches undertaken or planned that would be of interest to other rail agencies
for managing underground fire and smoke incidents include optimized ventilation systems,
onboard fire suppression, and linear heat detection.
• Frequent emergency drills and strong working relationships with first responders were key les-
sons learned that would be helpful for other transit agencies. Reviews of training exercises and
incidents yield valuable lessons.
• Many respondents took a systemic approach to defining the “ideal” fire prevention and response
system, emphasizing the various elements of the ideal system (detection, ventilation, notification,
use of noncombustible materials, etc.) and the need for all elements to function as part of the
overall system. Automation is part of the ideal system. Respondents emphasize the importance of

54
testing the entire system (not only its individual components) before acceptance and frequent
emergency training exercises for agency staff and first responders.
Lessons Learned and Keys to Success from Case Examples
Each case example illustrated certain themes running through the survey responses and literature
review. These include:
• Emphasis on the basics. Regardless of technological improvements, actions such as ensur-

ing a trash-free environment to reduce the presence of combustible material in tunnels are
integral to a fire prevention strategy. Several case examples highlight the importance of basic
prevention.
• The importance of safety, with safety being reinforced at every opportunity.
• Assessment of current conditions as the starting point. In legacy systems, rehabilitation of critical
systems often is more feasible than installation of completely new systems. A thorough under-
standing of what works well and what needs to be upgraded is an important first step.
• A means to determine the exact location of the fire and smoke incident. Knowledge of the exact
location enables making a better decision about the appropriate action.
• Ventilation. A well-designed push–pull ventilation system is essential for an effective response
to a fire and smoke incident. If an evacuation is necessary, the ventilation system will clear a
smoke-free path to the nearest exit.
• Buy-in from stakeholders. The operations department can be seen as the “customer” of the safety
department. Cooperation and buy-in are vital because operations personnel are the agency’s
front line in fire detection and initial response. First responders are also key stakeholders.
• Executive support. This is especially important when budgets are being developed.
• Subject matter experts in-house, either as agency employees or contractors. The transit agency
needs its own expert assessment of proposed actions, particularly when large sums of money
are involved.
• Testing of the entire integrated system. The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
(GCRTA) case example is particularly instructive in the need to ensure that all components
work together as planned.
• Ongoing testing and maintenance. The consensus of the case examples is that an agency can
never have too much testing.
• Constant monitoring of tunnels. Some agencies do this remotely, whereas others rely on their
train operators or on track walkers to look for anomalies.
• Frequent training, including joint exercises with first responders. The transit agency and first
responders can learn from each other. A tracking system for first responders can record how
much and what types of training each first responder has received.
• Communication with passengers. This is essential during smoke and fire incidents. The goal of
communication is to put passengers at ease as much as possible or the train operator will lose
control quickly, with passenger panic ensuing. For this reason, one agency reports that it stores
a script in the operator’s cab to be used in the event of emergency.
• Analysis of incidents to improve SOPs. Put simply, agencies need to learn from experience.
Gaps in Information
A synthesis report describes the state of the practice, which includes gaps in information. In this
synthesis, gaps are described in the following three areas: legacy systems, rail agency processes, and
technical knowledge. Gaps in information for legacy systems include:
• Most effective practices in overcoming obstacles to incorporating new technologies in legacy

systems.
• Actions taken if an agency cannot follow the standards in NFPA 130 (many respondents indi-
cate that a request for a waiver is made).
• The role of natural ventilation in fire and smoke incidents (assuming there is no mechanical
ventilation system).

55
Gaps in information for rail agency processes include:
• Most effective practices in development and dissemination of SOPs for agency personnel and
first responders in the event of a fire and smoke incident.
• What do first responders need to know? There often is no training manual for first responders.
• Most effective practices in testing and maintenance of fire and smoke detection systems and
individual components.
• Benefits and potential disadvantages of automated, integrated systems for detection, fire suppres-
sion, optimized ventilation, and notification.
Gaps in technical knowledge include:
• Most effective practices in passenger rail tunnel design and construction.

• The appropriate design fire level.
Conclusions and Areas of Future Study
This synthesis offers the following conclusions related to the planning and design for dealing with
fire and smoke incidents in underground passenger rail systems.
• A fire and smoke detection and response system combines integrated physical components and
human interaction. The system is as strong as its weakest link because all parts of the system
work together.
• Thorough assessment of the current state of the system is the first step. The rail agency needs
to understand what works well, what needs to be improved, and which system components are
nearing or at the end of their useful life. A thorough assessment will reveal gaps in the system
and identify actions to be taken.
• Early detection of fire and smoke incidents is critical. Deployment of new technologies, includ-
ing cameras, throughout the system helps to identify the exact location of the incident.
• Ventilation systems are an essential element of the response to fire and smoke incidents. A
push–pull system moves smoke away from the train and/or station platforms and clears a safe
path of egress. One case example noted that although there is often an optimal direction for
ventilation in a specific incident, blowing smoke away from passengers is more important than
selecting the “best” direction.
• Agencies are moving toward integrated systems with automated means of early detection,
fire suppression, ventilation, and notification of first responders. These integrated systems can
choose the best response scenario based on the specifics of the fire and smoke incident.
• Attention to the basics is always important, even with automated systems. Minimizing the
presence of combustible materials in the underground environment is effective in preventing or
minimizing the extent of fires and smoke.
• Equipment tests are vital. Periodic tests of the entire detection and response system as well as
each component can ensure that the system will work as designed in an emergency.
• Personnel training is equally vital. Frequent emergency drills involving agency personnel and
first responders increase familiarity with SOPs and the rail system. Drills can also reveal where
SOPs may need to be updated.
• Regular reviews of and upgrades to SOPs are necessary. New regulations and directives and
after-incident reviews often trigger upgrades to SOPs.
• A clear chain of command at the incident site is vital. Most agencies use the NIMS ICS, which
establishes an incident commander in charge of the scene and a clear organizational structure.
• Retrofit of legacy systems is a challenge on several levels. Availability of physical space,
changed conditions at street level, nonstandard designs of stations and tunnels, and the need
or desire to maintain daily operations are some of the difficult issues faced in legacy systems.
Legacy systems often meet new requirements by making needed changes during major reha-
bilitation projects undertaken for other purposes. Agencies will request waivers if a tunnel or
station cannot be brought up to code.
• Communication with passengers is especially important during fire and smoke incidents.
Informing passengers about the plan of action to get and keep them safely out of harm’s way

56
can put them at ease and prevent panic. Storing a script in the operator’s cab to be read in
the event of emergency is another example of attention to the basics.
• NFPA 130 continues to serve as the primary resource regarding standards and recommended
practices. Many agencies have adopted NFPA 130 standards as their own.
• Results of recent full-scale tests of rail fires have not been widely disseminated. These tests
suggest that fire size in existing vehicles may be much larger than most systems are designed
to handle.
• The “ideal” fire detection and suppression system, as defined by survey respondents, incorpo-
rates and automates detection, ventilation, and notification. A need for commonsense preventive
measures, such as picking up trash, still exists.
The NTSB Accident Report on the 2015 electrical arcing and smoke accident in the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) system included recommendations applicable to all
agencies (NTSB 2016). These recommendations are similar to the findings of the current synthesis
in their emphasis on inspection, preventive maintenance, emergency egress, the NIMS ICS, tunnel
ventilation systems, SOPs, ongoing training exercises, and NFPA 130.
Findings from the current synthesis suggest six areas of future study:
• Quantification of appropriate standards for fire design of rail vehicles in light of the latest
research and development of dissemination plans for informing transit agencies. Agencies pro-
viding case examples noted that higher standards are at least being investigated, but there is lit-
tle guidance on this issue. Transit agencies tend to rely on the most recent published documents,
including NFPA 130, and most are unaware of new research. Existing mechanical ventilation
systems may not work. There is a real need to validate recent studies and provide guidance to
rail agencies.
• Safety culture in transit agencies. Although every transit agency lists safety as a primary goal,
safety and operations departments may at times have different priorities that can conflict. Some
agencies appear to have developed a harmonious relationship between the two departments,
whereas others have not. How have successful agencies addressed conflicting priorities? Does
the agency’s “culture” have an effect, and if so, how can the culture be changed? Does the organi-
zation of the agency affect its ability to promote coordination?
• Continued research focused on rail vehicles and passenger rail tunnels. TCRP recently released
a request for proposals for TCRP C-23, Assessing and Mitigating Electrical Fires on Rail Vehi-
cles, with a focus on arcing fire events and vehicles. There are other relevant studies that can
advance the state of knowledge.
• Gaps between NFPA 130 and the IBC. The current synthesis has confirmed that rail transit
agencies operating in underground tunnels in North America rely on NFPA 130 for standards
and recommended practices. First responders who work for local governments are often more
familiar with regulations established in the IBC, a model building code that has been adopted
throughout the United States. NFPA 130 and IBC are not always in agreement. A research effort
to undertake a close comparison between the provisions of these two standards, identify areas
of conflict or nonagreement, and propose language to bridge the gaps would be extremely use-
ful and would alleviate the potential for conflicts between rail transit agencies and first respond-
ers. Many survey respondents in this synthesis noted that when local building codes differ from
NFPA 130 standards, the rail agency adopts the more stringent standard. However, this is not
a universal practice.
• Experience in implementation of next-generation automated systems. Automation in detection
and activation offers the promise of eliminating human error by overtaxed operations center
personnel, but how does this work in the real world of rail transit? Can the event be located pre-
cisely? Can false alarms be recognized? How are vagaries in station or tunnel design addressed?
Will the system always select a feasible scenario? Unexpected issues arise with the implementa-
tion of any new technology; how can they be anticipated and/or resolved? What is the role for
human intervention in an automated system?
• First responder training. Although several agencies reported the emergency responders who
work with their agencies are familiar with the federally required NIMS and specifically the
ICS, there were also reports of emergency responders not being aware of the potential fire size;

57
associated risks to emergency responders and the riders; how to ascertain if the tunnel systems
(notably ventilation) were operating correctly; and most importantly methods for setting priori-
ties that ensure rider safety in an incident. Professional emergency responders routinely receive
training and respond to aboveground fires, mass casualty incidents, hazardous material inci-
dents, and technical rescues and thus are proficient in such areas. This is not true in underground
passenger rail emergencies, for which the frequency of large-scale incidents is rare, yet all of
the previously mentioned types of incident can occur. Although there are emergency responder
books, guidelines, and training for aboveground emergencies, there are no nationally recognized
training guides or publications on underground passenger rail emergencies. Specific guidance on
best practices for training and responding to these emergencies could be developed.
The current study identified several research needs and prepared four research needs statements to
address identified gaps and encourage research in areas of future study. After deliberation, two prob-
lem statements were submitted to TCRP for potential funding: Operation of Underground Passenger
Rail Ventilation Systems and Safety Culture in Transit Agencies.

58
Acronyms
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act

AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction
BSI British Standards Institute
CCTV Closed circuit television
CD/CD-ROM Compact disc
CDRL Contract Data Requirements List
CEVA Cornavin-Eaux-Vives-Annemasse
CFAST Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CO Carbon monoxide
DSTT Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel
EMS Emergency Medical Services
FD Fire department
GCRTA Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
HMI Human–machine interface
HRR Heat release rate
HRV Heavy rail vehicle
IBC International Building Code
ICS Incident Command System
IFC International Fire Code
IOP Input/output processor
kW Kilowatt
LRT Light rail transit
LRV Light rail vehicle
MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
MW Megawatt
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIMS National Incident Management System
NTD National Transit Database
OCC Operations Control Center
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTES Opposite-double air curtain ventilation-assisted tunnel evacuation system
PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
QA Quality assurance
ROCC Rail Operations Control Center
RRT Rapid rail transit
RSCC Rail Service Control Center
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition
SOP Standard operating procedure
WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

59
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Appendix A
List of Participating Transit Agencies
1. Atlanta, Georgia Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

2. Baltimore, Maryland Maryland Transit Administration
3. Boston, Massachusetts Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
4. Buffalo, New York Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority
5. Chicago, Illinois Chicago Transit Authority
6. Cleveland, Ohio Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
7. Dallas, Texas Dallas Area Rapid Transit
8. Jersey City, New Jersey Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
9. Lindenwold, New Jersey Port Authority Transit Corporation
10. Los Angeles, California Metro
11. Minneapolis, Minnesota Metro Transit
12. Montréal, Québec, Canada Agence métropolitaine de transport
13. Montréal, Québec, Canada Société de transport de Montréal
14. Newark, New Jersey New Jersey Transit
15. New York, New York MTA-New York City Transit
16. New York, New York MTA-Long Island Railroad
17. New York, New York Metro North Railroad
18. Oakland, California Bay Area Rapid Transit
19. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
20. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Port Authority of Allegheny County
21. San Diego, California Metropolitan Transit System
22. San Francisco, California San Francisco Municipal Transit Agency (Muni)
23. Seattle, Washington Sound Transit
24. Toronto, Ontario, Canada Toronto Transit Commission
25. Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada TransLink
26. Washington, D.C. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
27. Woodbridge, Virginia Virginia Railway Express
28. United States nationwide Amtrak

62
Appendix B
Survey Questionnaire
PLANNING AND DESIGN FOR FIRE/SMOKE INCIDENTS IN

UNDERGROUND PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS
1. WELCOME
Project purpose: The purpose of this synthesis is provide state-of-the-practice information for the planning, design, and management
for fire/smoke incidents in underground or enclosed conditions of passenger rail systems. The study explores related issues including
sources of information, detection and prevention, incident management, and training. The synthesis will identify successful strategies
and document best-practice solutions.
The survey questions try to address as many situations as possible, but given the variety of circumstances and rail systems, not all
questions may be appropriate for all agencies. We encourage you to obtain input from others in your agency as needed. If any question
does not apply to your system, simply answer “N/A.”
We also ask for recommendations for other agencies to be included in our sample and for your willingness to participate in a telephone
interview if your agency is selected for a more detailed case example.
The final report, to be published by the Transportation Research Board, will document the current state of the practice and provide an
overview to help transit agencies address the challenges presented. This report will be extremely useful to all rail transit agencies that
operate underground in assessing current policies and identifying actions that have been successful elsewhere. All survey responses
will be confidential and will be edited to remove information regarding individual agencies.
Please complete the survey by February 12, 2016. Thank you for taking the time to participate.
2. Respondent Information
1. Today's Date
MM DD YYYY
MM/DD/YYYY / /
* 2. Please list your name, agency, and contact information
Name:
Title
Company
City/Town:
State/Province:

63
Email Address:
Phone Number:
3. System Size
<100 rail vehicles operated in maximum service
100 to 499 rail vehicles operated in maximum service
500+ rail vehicles operated in maximum service
3. SOURCES
4. What sources does your agency use in planning and design for fire/smoke incidents in underground
portions of the rail system? (Check all that apply)
NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
APTA RP PS-005-01a, Recommended Practice for Fire Safety Analysis of Existing Passenger Rail Equipment
APTA SS-E-013-99, Rev 1, Standard for Emergency Lighting Design for Passenger Cars
National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Presidential Directive No. 5
Local standards and guidelines
Other (please specify)

64
4. SOURCES 2
5. If you do not use NFPA 130, why not?
Not familiar with this standard
Other sources are adequate for our needs
We do use NFPA 130
5. SOURCES 3
6. Briefly describe how your agency implements NFPA 130

65
6. ASSESSMENT
7. Please characterize the following elements as major challenges, minor challenges, or not an issue
related to underground fire/smoke incidents at your agency. Major challenges have a significant actual or
potential effect on your agency’s ability to respond to and resolve the situation; minor challenges are a
concern but do not rise to the level of life-and-death issues.
Major Challenge Minor Challenge Not an Issue
Difficulty in accessing
the site
Timely detection
Inadequate ventilation
Intensity of fire
Training of agency
personnel
Training of first
responders
Confusion at the scene

of the fire
Establishing chain of
command at the scene
Passenger evacuation
Sufficient number of
trained and proficient
transit staff to support
training of emergency
responders

66
7. ASSESSMENT 2
8. Please describe the one major challenge in planning and design for underground fire/smoke incidents.
9. Please describe any “lessons learned” that would benefit other transit agencies.
8. NEXT GENERATION
10. Has your agency explored new technologies to prevent or minimize the impact of underground fires on
your system?

67
11. Are there any promising approaches that your agency has undertaken or is planning that would be of
interest to other rail agencies for managing underground fire/smoke incidents?
12. Based upon your experience, do you have any recommendations for specifications or design features
for inclusion in the design of new tunnels or retrofit of legacy tunnels? What would the “ideal” fire prevention
and response system look like to you? How would it be different from today?
9. DEFINITIONS
13. How does your agency define “underground” for a station or asset? Is there a minimum length of tunnel
used in the definition?

68
14. How does your agency define a “fire/smoke” incident? (Check all that apply)
Visible flames
Sight or smell of smoke
Automatic alarm triggered
Manual alarm triggered by the operator
10. INCIDENTS AND CAUSES
15. Approximately how many underground fire/smoke incidents has your agency experienced in the past 12
months? A “major” incident is defined as causing a service disruption of 2 or more hours.
Number of major
incidents:
Number of minor
incidents:
16. What were the primary causes of major underground fire/smoke incidents? (Check all that apply)
Vehicle or vehicle equipment
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in tunnel
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in vehicle
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in underground station
Arcing -Traction power
Electric Cable Feeder
Insulator

69
11. DETECTION/PREVENTION
17. Does your agency have an early detection system for fire detection underground?
Yes
No
12. DETECTION/PREVENTION 2
18. Please check all elements that are included in the early detection system.
Inside vehicle detection (smoke or heat)
Linear Heat Detector
Tunnel smoke detector
Station smoke or heat detector
Closed head sprinkler in station (heat)
CCTV
Video Analytics
19. Has your agency adopted design standards or codes related to underground fire/smoke prevention and
detection?
Yes
No

70
20. How are these design codes and standards applied?
21. Does your agency have a fire suppression system on-board the vehicles that operate in tunnels?
Yes
No
22. Does your agency have a sprinkler system in tunnels?
Yes, in all tunnels
Yes, in some but not all tunnels
No
23. Does your agency have a sprinkler system in underground stations?
Yes, in all underground stations
Yes, in some but not all underground stations
No
24. As new techniques and regulations emerge, how does your agency change or augment its protocol and
procedures to augment its response to underground fires? Are there “triggers” to retrofit the system?

71
25. Are there workarounds for legacy systems to meet new requirements?
17. MANAGING INCIDENTS
26. Briefly describe your agency’s protocol and procedures for responding to and managing underground
fire/smoke incidents.
27. For fires where other agencies also respond, check all the actions that your agency takes:
Send staff to meet responder command staff at scene
Set up multi agency command center or similar on your property
Send staff to a central command center (not on your property)
28. Does your agency use NIMS (National Incident Management System, i.e., Incident Command) to
establish a chain of command and facilitate communication in responding to underground fire/smoke
incidents?
Yes, always
Yes, usually
No

72
29. What fire size do you plan for in your protocol and procedures?
System not designed to handle smoke
0-10 MW
10-30 MW
Greater than 30 MW
30. Is your agency aware of recent full scale tests where fire size was measured at 52-72 MW in existing
vehicles (roughly four times larger than most systems are designed to handle)?
Yes
No
18. MANAGING INCIDENTS 2
31. Did these tests result in changes to protocol and procedures in existing tunnels?
No
Yes (please describe below)
32. Did these tests result in changes in planning new tunnels?
No
Yes (please describe below)

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33. Within the past two years, has your agency made any changes to its standard operating procedures for
managing underground fire/smoke incidents?
Yes
No
34. Please describe briefly the changes to standard operating procedures and the reasons for the changes.
35. Briefly describe your agency’s ventilation control system and how it is used/managed in underground
fire/smoke incidents. Check all elements that apply.
Ventilation control is designed to provide fresh air and/or cooling, not to remove smoke
Ventilation control is designed to remove smoke only
Ventilation control is designed to remove smoke and provide fresh air and/or cooling
Ventilation control is used to remove smoke, although it is not designed for that purpose

74
36. How are ventilation fans controlled?
All are controlled remotely by the operations center or other centralized location
All are controlled manually at on-site fan controls
Some are controlled remotely, others manually
Some or all can be controlled either remotely or manually
37. Does your agency regularly and periodically test fan operation?
Yes
No
38. How often does your agency test fan operation?
Weekly
Monthly
Annually
As needed due to maintenance issues

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24. TRAINING
39. Does your agency’s training programs for its employees in responding to underground fire/smoke
incidents include the following elements? (Check all that apply)
Incident Command System (ICS) training
Hands-on training for use of portable fire extinguishers
Review of Standard Operating Procedures for fire/smoke incidents on tracks, on vehicles, and in stations
Field tests of Standard Operating Procedures for fire/smoke incidents (in transit yard or elsewhere)
Review of how smoke management system is designed to operate
Field tests of smoke management with live or artificial smoke
Training on options if one or more fans fail to operate correctly
40. Briefly describe any other elements of your agency’s training programs for its employees in responding
to underground fire/smoke incidents.
41. How would you describe ongoing training with first responders from local jurisdictions? (Check all that
apply)
Conduct on-line training exercises
Conduct classroom training exercises
Conduct table-top training exercises
Conduct joint training exercises in the field
Meet on a regular basis to discuss fire response
Meet on an ad hoc basis to discuss fire response
Other/varies by jurisdiction (please describe)

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42. Does your agency serve multiple jurisdictions with multiple first response teams?
Yes
No
25. TRAINING 2
43. How often do you train each local first response team?
Annually
Every two years
Ad hoc
Other (please specity)
26. TRAINING 3
44. Are your agency’s personnel who respond to fire/smoke incidents familiar and comfortable with NIMS –
Incident Command System?
Yes, all are familiar and comfortable with NIMS
Yes, most are familiar and comfortable with NIMS
Some are, some are not
No, most or all are not familiar and comfortable with NIMS
45. Are first responders in your city or service area familiar and comfortable with NIMS – Incident
Command System?
Yes, all are familiar and comfortable with NIMS
Yes, most are familiar and comfortable with NIMS
Some are, some are not
No, most or all are not familiar and comfortable with NIMS

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46. What actions would be most useful in improving coordination with local jurisdictions in responding to
underground fires?
27. CASE STUDY
47. Would you be willing to participate further as a case study, involving a telephone interview going into
further detail on your agency’s experience, if selected by the TCRP panel for this project?
Yes
No
28. OTHER AGENCIES
48. Is there another rail transit system that you suggest we include in this synthesis project? Please provide
the agency name and a contact.
29. THANK YOU!
Thank you for participating! This survey is now complete. Please contact Dan Boyle at dan@danboyleandassociates.com or at 858-
259-6515 if you would like any additional information about this study.

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Appendix C
Summary of Survey Results
Planning and Design for Fire and Smoke Incidents

in Underground Passenger Rail Systems
RESPONDENT INFORMATION
1. Date:
2. Contact Information
Name of Respondent:
Agency Name:
Title of Respondent:
Agency Address:
3. Agency Size

Small (<100 peak rail vehicles) 6 21.4%
Medium (100–499 peak rail vehicles) 12 42.9%
Large (500+ peak rail vehicles) 10 35.7%
Respondent e-mail address:
Respondent Telephone Number:
Sources
4. What sources does your agency use in planning and design for fire/smoke incidents in underground
portions of the rail system? (Check all that apply.)
NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems 100.0% 28
APTA RP PS-005-01a, Recommended Practice for Fire Safety Analysis 50.0% 14
of Existing Passenger Rail Equipment
APTA SS-E-013-99, Rev 1, Standard for Emergency Lighting Design 39.3% 11
for Passenger Cars
National Incident Management System (NIMS) 53.6% 15
Presidential Directive No. 5 25.0% 7
Local standards and guidelines 50.0% 14
Other 28.6% 8
Other includes: (1) Best practices information from FRA, NTSB, FTA and/or Industry peers.
We also use information from emergency exercises and drills. (2) Previous experiences, site spe-
cific applications. (3) We have developed our own Engineering Design Guidelines and Standard
Practices for the Design and Construction of Fire and Life Safety fixed assets. (4) OSHA Require-
ments Uniform Building Code APTA RT-S-VIM-020-08 NFPA 130 (Chapter 8 – Vehicles) FRA 49
CFR 238.103 (Appendix B – Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and
Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs) z FRA 49
CFR 238 (Passenger Equipment Safety Standards) z FRA 49 CFR Subpart D (includes 38.71–
38.97 ADA) Major Test Standards which are referenced in the CDRL 24 and RTM 21. ASTM E-119
(Floor Fire Test) z ASTM E-648 (Critical Radiant Flux) z ASTM E-162 (Flame Spread) z ASTM E-662
(Smoke Density) z BSS 7239 (Toxic Gas Generation) Fire and Life Safety Analysis (CDRL 48).
(5) The agency does not have any significant infrastructure underground. However all of the
checked items are used in planning and design as well as host railroad (CSX, NS) design standards.
(6) I would recommend you review our APTA Rail Safety Award submission for 2015 which has a lot
of good information in it regarding this subject. (7) FRA regulations.
5. If you do not use NFPA 130, why not?

Not familiar with this standard 0.0% 0
Other sources are adequate for our needs 0.0% 0
We do use NFPA 130 95.0% 19
Other 5.0% 1
Other includes: (1) We use NFPA 130 for all new projects. Some parts of our system may pre-date
this consensus standard.

79
6. Briefly describe how your agency implements NFPA 130

Responses summarized in Table 34, Chapter 3 of report. Verbatim responses are provided here.
New construction and emergency planning
Guidance
Use the local municipalities Fire Department as incident commanders, performs drills and table top
exercises, and generally follow the spirit of the regulation.
NFPA 130 is used in our design criteria for underground stations and guideways
We utilize NFPA 130 as a Reference Standard to our internal guidelines
Coordination between different players to respond seamlessly
During the design of our facilities we follow NFPA 130 Guide Lines. During Construction and
maintenance of life safety systems we utilize licensed contractors to install and test these systems.
Planning and design of revenue and non-revenue structures
Incorporated at design stage
We strive to use NFPA 130 standards whenever it is practical to do so.
We are following NFPA 130 very closely, but the main system is our Emergency Ventilation System
with up to 4000 different ventilation scenarios.
Inspection and design
We incorporate, by reference, into our Design Criteria Manual
Design of tunnels civil and ventilation
Use that as baseline for the design criteria
NFPA was utilized in the design and buildout of our system and is still utilized whenever any
modifications are made.
It is integral to our Design Criteria Standards in Engineering and used in the Safety & Security
Certification Process
NFPA 130 is a “best practice” so efforts are made to comply but it is not mandatory.
Use as a standard, but other code may conflict with this. So an agreement and understanding must
be met
Assessment
7. Please characterize the following elements as major challenges, minor challenges, or not an issue
related to underground fire/smoke incidents at your agency. Major challenges have a significant actual
or potential effect on your agency’s ability to respond to and resolve the situation; minor challenges
are a concern but do not rise to the level of life-and-death issues.
Major Minor Not a
challenge challenge challenge
Difficulty in accessing the site 20% 50% 30%
Timely detection 15% 40% 45%
Inadequate ventilation 10% 30% 60%
Intensity of fire 25% 55% 20%
Training of agency personnel 10% 35% 55%
Training of first responders 5% 45% 50%
Confusion at the scene of the fire 10% 60% 30%
Establishing chain of command at the scene 5% 50% 45%
Passenger evacuation 15% 65% 20%
Sufficient number of trained and proficient transit 15% 35% 50%
staff to support training of emergency responders
Comments include: (1) Our infrastructure is vintage to the turn of the century and often access is
restricted. (2) The chief issues we have are getting the first responders (FRs) to commit to regular and
routine training. The agency has heavily emphasized its commitment to training throughout our area,
and has made significant progress and conducted extensive training, however, the level of commit-
ment among the FRs seems to hinge on budget money and where a few hours can be pulled out of
other training arrangements. In addition, training often occurs with in-service units who frequently
get called out of training and return after a significant portion of the training has occurred. The sec-
ond major challenge is the location of our facility relative to the locations of training events. While
our route might transect a “first-due” area for FRs, our maintenance and storage facilities are often
located several dozen miles from the agencies requesting training and hands-on visits to the yards is
not always possible. Especially when our equipment isn’t in the yards during the business day, train-
ing is relegated to special mid-day circumstances, weekends and some evenings. (3) All of these are
challenges. Don’t have much more to say since we haven’t had a fire to date in the tunnel. (4) The
above listed topics can vary from MAJOR to MINOR depending on the specific incident and the exact
location. Training also is a variable although we feel we do well most of the time, and work closely
with the City Fire Department. (5) We have not had any fires in the tunnel that I am aware of. There
was one incident where a car had penetrated the portal and was stuck on the track, while attempting to
get free the tires of the car spun and created smoke so we did have smoke but no fire. That was cleared

80
almost immediately. There have been trash can fires in the stations but those have been at the surface
and were incipient stage only. (6) Difficulty in accessing the site—there are some areas within the
transit tunnel that requires walking several thousand feet, or taking a train to perform a recon w/ FD
on board > Early detection, but also what are the SOPs to be followed upon a fire alarm activation for
the different disciplines w/ in the transit agency? > Intensity of fire—there has only been one large fire
in one of our power-substations that prevented first responders quick access into the building due to
the need to secure/shut down the power supply coming from the power company
8. Please describe the one major challenge in planning and design for underground fire/smoke incidents.
The limited amount of references or standards regarding design for underground train fires affecting
tunnel and platform environments.
Some of the challenges during planning and design are that many times in the industry the safety
engineers are not on board during this stage and are brought in later. I find this happens in many
cases. When this happens hazards are not designed out during the planning and development stages
of the project. It is really important to have your safety team involved very early in the design.
Some other challenges are locations, high water tables and spacing. These variables can make the
evacuations challenging. Even choosing fire suppression systems, placement of steps/escalators
and elevators. Having more than one emergency evacuation route from a tunnel or station. The
proximity of other buildings and structures that could be affected by fire/smoke incidents. Ensuring
that all of your exhaust fans are working and you have replacement parts and that you are managing
your assets and identifying those that are critical. Of course ensuring that your agency is in a state of
good repair and that you have defined it based on your operating environment. Long term main-
tenance plans, budgets and testing procedures must be addressed. Having an independent QA of
your system is critical.
Ensuring that all personnel involved in the process are aware of the applicable standards and their
purpose.
Regulation VS. responder wants VS budget radio communications—too many agencies wanting
antennas in the tunnel
There are inherent challenges to any tunnel environment and we seek to rectify those during the
planning and design phase. One challenge would be in dealing with multiple shafts.
One major challenge for this agency during the design of our underground system was being able to
provide a train detection system that would indicate the zones where a smoke event was occurring.
We solved this problem by posting reflectorized signs indicating the zone numbers and by posi-
tioning cameras at each zone that send the video data back to the control center.
Due to the length of our tunnel and the presence of only one shaft we had to figure out what should
be our best options. Moreover the end portal of our tunnel leads to an underground facility which
is our central station.
A portion of our subway system is joined with a sister transportation agency. The joint subway system
was designed and built over 40 years ago. Although from a life fire safety system perspective our
two systems should be analyzed as one system, it has been difficult coordinating projects such as
new SCADA systems that help integrate the two systems.
Fire heat release rates is always a challenge for the many types of equipment operated on the system.
Determining the exact location of the fire/smoke condition.
Our biggest challenge is the age of our system and city and how new designs for fire/smoke incidents
can meet the standards with the limitations of a legacy system. Project scope and cost requirements
increase greatly.
Our agency has limited to no experience with this as all of our critical facilities are above ground,
however, we do operate through a tunnel owned by Amtrak and the chief challenge from this
experience would be managing the ventilation. Our equipment is diesel powered and regardless of
the force of the air moving through the tunnel by natural and mechanical means, the train occupy-
ing much of the bore diameter slows the air speed and smoke can congregate depending upon the
incident circumstances.
Evacuation route considerations
Pre-existing infrastructure space constraints
There is so many ventilation scenarios to design, depending on so many factors, that it can be really
difficult to manage the entire system and keep it up to date. I believe that the principal difficulty
is to validate your theoretical scenarios with real life. It takes a lot of experience to analyze the
situation.
Mid car train fire in tunnel
The age of the system and incorporating new technology
Old infrastructures built pre-NFPA-130, constructed with equipment designed only for general ven-
tilation, as well as some stations with limited egress capacity, some with only one egress from
each platform.
3-D Ventilation modeling during final design, given the different configurations of each subway station.
24/7 operation
$

81
Real Estate and Right of Way for emergency access

None
Design and planning are limited somewhat by funds available, and by the existing physical “room”
to build the system and its appurtenances.
Our emergency fans and system work extremely well when removing smoke. I filled up a section of
the tunnel with smoke many years ago utilizing smoke machines for an exercise/drill. The intent
was to have the fire department attempt to travel through the smoke to the accident scene but as
soon as the emergency fans were turned on the smoke was completely cleared within 30 seconds
and we were not able to get it to build up any more. The only challenge I can think of is the cost
of running the fans for an extended period of time during a full scale drill.
Ensuring a customized approach based on engineering analysis of ventilation, heat, smoke, loading
and other considerations based on the specifics of the location.
Existing infrastructure built nearly 100 years ago so stations and tunnels are not up to 21st century codes.
Very difficult for older stations/tunnel to be retrofitted to comply with current code I am not familiar
with a “GOOD” smoke detection system on the market that would work in a dirty transit tunnel
environment
9. Please describe any “lessons learned” that would benefit other transit agencies.
Responses summarized in Table 28, Chapter 4 of the report. Verbatim responses are provided here.
Training first responders frequently. Document the training—both transit document and FD needs to
document. Lessons from previous incidents—hot wash with all responders. What went well, what
did not. Funding for equipment for first responders. Control Center FD liaison. Every incident is
a lesson learned.
Timely notification to first responders is critical of any fire/smoke incident. Keep first responders
aware of the environment via training is also important. A clear line of communication between
the transit agency and first responders is important especially during the initial response in order
to orient the first responders as they arrive.
Performing an exhaustive test of the integrated systems and controls to ensure it all works in concert
and as designed before closure of any project regardless of sign-off by AHJs.
We provide rail familiarization training for the fire units that would respond to our system. The
City Fire Department is the primary response group and all fire houses along the rail system get
refresher training on a regular basis. The Fire Training Academy has also made this training a part
of their curriculum and all new firefighters get it. This has been the case for over 10 years.
Engineers and Contractors are great for designing complex systems and installing them (e.g., emer-
gency ventilation), but don’t seem to provide much in the way of operations manuals or monthly
tests designed to test operation of the system as a whole. Our experience seems to indicate that you
get plenty of manuals on individual pieces of the system and how to maintain it or test that piece.
Proper use of the ventilation system thru training in field as well as desk top exercises
Retrofitting existing system to meet new ridership demand is a needed from time to time and is very
difficult. Suggest to leave sufficient real estate for future use particularly for life safety system.
Interagency cooperation and operations support.
Not having ongoing training. Not having a companywide SOP. Not updating technology. Not planning
a budget for safety.
Maintaining a very good working relationship with the local fire department through all phases of the
project leading up to the certificate of occupancy. This includes having the local fire department
serve as part of the tunnel rescue team during the construction of the underground workings.
Need to test ventilation equipment and keep control staff trained.
Beside our Underground Fire Prevention Training Center, used to train our staff and local police and
fire department, we are not a “model” for other agencies so it’s hard to pinpoint a “lessons learned.”
Consider potential impacts of ventilation fan directed air flow on passenger evacuation route selection.
For example, the best route may be against the wind and venturi effect when passing cars in the
tunnel may be significant.
Hold frequent emergency training exercises and simulations to guide your approach to design.
As close as possible, maintain a debris free right-of-way. Especially around third rail transitions.
Be realistic in your planning. Clearly identify the difference between a nuisance fire and a fully engulfed
scenario. Understand your risks affording you the best system possible.
There was an incident in which two work crews, one from our agency and another with our sister
agency working near the same local had ventilation fans configured in a way which would have
been appropriate for each subway on its own, however in combination ended up unintentionally
discharging smoke into our subway. It demonstrated the importance of communicating and
coordinating actions between our respective organizations.
Provide jet type fans in tunnels that are capable of evacuating smoke in a predetermined direction
through use of preprogrammed scenarios. During a smoke/fire event the controllers are able to
select the zone and event location and activate a preset scenario that automatically sets fans and
louvers to the correct position exhausting smoke and providing a safe evacuation path for passengers.
Drill, drill, drill is the name of the game to stay current and prepared. Also, communications with
passengers is the biggest lesson learned. Keeping them informed during an incident is paramount.

82
Develop a tunnel standard. Install only primary response and then include IOP channels
1. Ensure you have long term maintenance plans. 2. Budget for future repairs, inspections and testing.
3. Follow through on emergency response exercises and drills. 4. Train your employees. 5. Review
SOPs/EOPs annually or post an event. 6. Ensure all employees receive NIMS training as appropriate.
7. Customers’ safety awareness campaigns. 8. Train all of your jurisdictional fire departments and
police or any agencies you interact with frequently. 9. Update emergency telephone list for control
centers. 10. Test the system frequently.
In regard to planning, we utilize designated command post locations for emergency forces to respond
to as a regular practice, which we incorporate life safety monitoring and control equipment in.
It also benefits us to establish a forward operating command post which aides in providing real
time information and a better coordinated response to incidents.
Next Generation
10. Has your agency explored new technologies to prevent or minimize the impact of underground fires
on your system?
No
We have heat detection in our vent shafts. The fans come on and remove smoke, but that is not new
technologies. We are looking at new types of chemical fire agents in various locations.
A local agency commissioned a study to determine if retrofitting naturally ventilated tunnels with a
fan system was affordable, practical, and necessary. The study concluded that, with few exceptions,
tenability times can be achieved with natural ventilation.
No, we have not.
We have stayed current but not necessarily explored new technologies
No new technologies have been implemented since construction in 2005.
We have recently installed a new SCADA system that is tied into our Operations Control Center.
This system will have the capability of configuring standardized responses to incidents depend-
ing on the location of an incident inside the subway. We are also implementing a new blue light
emergency phone system and new radio systems, which shall greatly improve the capacity and
reliability of our emergency communications systems.
Yes
Yes, early detection such as video analytics
None
N/A
Yes. For example, our agency is working with the State DOT to install infrared detectors to continuously
scan the tunnel roadway for heat signatures providing early response for fires.
The company has commissioned studies in the past and we are currently commissioning an updated
study on tunnel egress and fire life safety to identify new and existing technologies to assist in the
design of fire life safety systems and response protocols.
Beside ventilation system, we didn’t look at something else, like water mist or onboard fire suppression
system or so on.
Looking at onboard fire suppression as a test prototype install
Yes
Currently considering onboard mist suppression
Yes, we constantly review new technologies.
We use tried and true—SCADA, ICS, NFPA 130.
Not lately
By removing/eliminating elements from stations, tunnels and vehicles that could add to the fire load.
No
Not that I am aware of
Yes. We implemented a new VESDA system for smoke detection rather than relying on emergency
responders to activate ventilation in the most favorable way depending on location of the fire.
As we upgrade our system we install materials that minimize smoke generation and place non-flammable
and non-combustible materials wherever possible. We have upgraded most of our underground
stations with new fire and alarm systems and notification systems to the Control Center.
Continue to learn about new technology Look at other transit properties’ alarm systems. Gather intel
on other’s SOPs on emergencies and tunnel ventilation.
11. Are there any promising approaches that your agency has undertaken or is planning that would be of
interest to other rail agencies for managing underground fire/smoke incidents?
Still crawling, nothing promising yet
We are in the process of a consultant study for ventilation in our tunnels. The results of that study are
due late this year.

83
Yes. Again, consult APTA Award Application for details. Should be public knowledge/document.
Operations, training and constant maintenance of all systems
Not that I am aware of, other than the use of ICS in all responses.
We have developed a monthly run test of emergency ventilation sequences in our subway system.
Three sequences are tested each week, so therefore each of 39 sequences is run at least once each
quarter. This was a “historic” development for us and seems to be working well.
Preventative maintenance is the key factor to reduce risk from fire. Effective training . . . yielding
a good positive result will reduce human error which will have significant impact on overall
risk control.
Consistent maintenance and debris removal
Addition of onboard fire suppression could allow consideration of reduced design fire size, allowing
reduced requirements for retrofit of ventilation equipment.
Linear heat detection. Using mode tables that the control center is trained to use
See above
Using computer models to simulate smoke and heat flow in order of designing an optimized ventilation
system.
In the event of fire incident in the station, the agency has installed mechanical door-assists on egress
doors to overcome forces created by the emergency ventilation system.
Train, train, train—with staff, first responders, management, etc.
None
Yes, for the rail cars there is a detection/suppression system
We undertake site-specific planning.
Although they are expensive and time consuming, we need to perform more emergency drills. This
will improve emergency responses.
Automated preset scenarios that are in use at our agency provide a more coordinated response between
Jet fans and supply/exhaust louvers thus reducing the possibility of forcing air in competing
directions.
None
No
The most important approach currently is to train your staff, maintenance, operators, Supervisors,
control rooms and first responders. The key is the drill and exercise to determine any weaknesses
in your system.
No
12. Based upon your experience, do you have any recommendations for specifications or design features
for inclusion in the design of new tunnels or retrofit of legacy tunnels? What would the “ideal” fire
prevention and response system look like to you? How would it be different from today?
As designed to NFPA standards, our tunnel system with evacuation routes, Tunnel Ventilation System
(TVS) and fire suppression connections appear to be ideal. As a recommendation, prior to startup,
the disabled community in our main city lobbied for and were granted a change associated with
operation of the elevators in the tunnel station. During a fire/smoke evacuation scenario, the elevators
remain operational to allow for disabled self-evacuation. The TVS pumps air through the elevator
shafts to maintain air flow.
At this time no, but I would recommend reviewing any national incident reports related to fire
prevention and evacuation and researching new technology on fire prevention in tunnels.
I would also recommend looking at any materials used in your tunnels for flammability and
on your vehicles.
Material linings that don’t burn, smoke or retain heat are products we reviewed and trialed but were
never able to receive funding.
System detection/event location presents one of our biggest challenges. A hardened system not sub-
ject to the elements with some sort of graphical user interface integrated with a pre-populated
SCADA system would be ideal.
None
Cameras are critical to early response. Multi-directional ventilation.
N/A
Based on our experience with “wet” standpipe systems in running, we recommend “dry” standpipes in
our new tunnels going forward. This allows for cost for maintenance (including heat trace elements)
and the on-going electrical costs for heat trace systems.
You have to consider every aspect in order to design an ideal system. NFPA 130 surely define[s]
the ideal system but for me, ventilation system have to be the critical one. Positioning and sizing
ventilation facilities is critical. Rehabilitation of existent facilities is sometime hard to do because
you cannot build your ventilation system as exactly as you want to.
Ideal would be a transverse ventilation system that isolates the smoke and extracts it near the source of
the fire, instead of a longitudinal system that sends the smoke along the tunnel (where passengers
may be located).

84
Would recommend having the ventilation placed at the top of the tunnel. Also increasing the amount
of emergency exits. The ideal system would be able to detect an issue, eliminate a false alarm,
instruct the control center on how to manage other vehicles and finally direct first responders
No
Tunnel systems need segregation of the tubes, SCADA for ventilation control, according to ventilation
modeling.
Reduce or eliminate to the extent possible any combustible material
Our ventilation system is a result of existing tunnel retrofits as we are a legacy system. When there
is an opportunity to modify station, tunnels, etc., updating the vent system, etc. characteristics is
made part of any analysis.
At grade HMI panels are one thing we added on a recent project (2012 year completion). These allow
remote operation of emergency ventilation in case communication is lost with the control center,
and allows control by a local Supervisor or Incident Commander should that be needed or desired.
We are fully implemented with new detection and communication system. No fire life-safety system
though is without potential problems and on-going routine testing to ensure adequacy is a must.
Considering the limited resources, it’s important for any system to be practical and as “automatic” as
possible. As we’ve learned from recent events, a system may not be effective when it is controlled
by people. The basic human error factors are always in play but when you also place those controls
with an already overtaxed rail operations controller you increase your risk of error. Automation in
detection and activation are key to any modern system.
Analytical camera in every room to double check room for hazards and smoke/fire A drop down list
from the fire zone for every station’s room with contents, mean of access (key) purpose and known
hazards within room A way to bring up the fire zone remotely and wireless access and to examine
the room thru the use of a lap-top viewing the analytical cameras. Tunnel ventilation control at or
near the kiosk. In-house telephone at street level for FD access if not able to access station phone/
controls
Definitions
13. How does your agency define “underground” for a station or asset? Is there a minimum length of
tunnel used in the definition?
Underground, surface, and elevated
“Underground” is simply defined by the limits of the tunnel. Our tunnels are all actually underground
so it’s an easy definition for us.
Subterranean
We have both underground and above ground stations and track. They are defined fairly simply, and
is self-explanatory. There is no minimum length of tunnel that is used. They are either physically
underground or not. Anything inside of our portal is underground; anything outside of it is above
ground. Our system is pretty much a straight line.
I do not know of an official definition of underground used by our agency.
For our agency it’s quite simple, when you go through our tunnel portal (only one place in the system)
you are either outdoors or in an underground tunnel, there is a clear demarcation point.
Any cover structure longer than 200 ft.
We use NFPA 130
Below grade (street level or under river, etc.). No—Length of tunnels
Same as NFPA-130
Underground-anything below grade Tunnel—over 1,000 ft.
Any alignment where we cannot freely vent to the atmosphere
Our subway is entirely underground so it’s easy for us to define the word “underground.” I think that
the criteria of the 1,000 ft in length, as defined in NFPA 130, is good.
Our agency defines our subway stations as “enclosed” in-line underground facilities as opposed to a
“cut-and-cover” in-line station. The minimum length for the Agency is 200 feet.
N/A
“Underground” is not formally defined internally.
800 feet
We are generally consistent with NFPA 130
Any fully enclosed area that is over 150 ft in length.
Any right-of-way that is below grade. No minimum is used.
No minimum length covered on all 4 sides
Underground would be properties with floor levels 30¢ below the lowest level of exit discharge as
referred to in the City Building Code
There is no minimum tunnel length. Underground is underground as opposed to elevated, embankment,
or cut.
A tunnel, portal or a closed in station that is below grade. No definition for length.
I’m not aware of a minimum length definition for our systems.

85
14. How does your agency define a “fire/smoke” incident? (Check all that apply.)
Visible flames 88.5% 23
Sight of smell of smoke 80.8% 21
Automatic alarm triggered 34.6% 9
Manual alarm triggered by operator 34.6% 9
Other (please specify) 23.1% 6
Other includes: (1) We view any of the above as a real time incident until we prove otherwise.
Our procedures begin to go into effect once we receive any of the above triggers. (2) I am not privy
to the definition of an incident. Operations staff can better answer this question. (3) Reportable =
extinguishable flame Recordable = all other types. (4) Operators calling the OCC to report smoke
or fire in the trainway. (5) By patrons or operations personnel advising our trainmaster by phone
(in stations—house phones clearly marked, passenger assistance phones clearly marked) or by radio.
(6) Any of the above list generate a “fire/smoke” incident. If the cause is immediately known, we would
not necessarily deem it an emergency depending on location and cause.
Incidents and Causes

15. Approximately how many underground fire/smoke incidents has your agency experienced in the past
12 months? A “major” incident is defined as causing a service disruption of 2 or more hours.
Major Incidents
None 82.6% 21
One 8.7% 2
Two 8.7% 2
Minor Incidents
None 32.0% 8
Negligible-trash fires 4.0% 1
One 16.0% 4
Two 8.0% 2
Three 4.0% 1
Four 4.0% 1
Five 8.0% 2
Seven 4.0% 1
Less than 10 4.0% 1
11 4.0% 1
12+ 4.0% 1
89 4.0% 1
1,049 4.0% 1
16. What were the primary causes of major underground fire/smoke incidents? (Check all that apply.)
Arcing-traction power 59.1% 13
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in tunnel 54.6% 12
Vehicle or vehicle equipment 36.4% 8
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in underground station 31.8% 7
Insulator 31.8% 7
Electric cable feeder 27.3% 6
Trash fire (accidental or deliberate) in vehicle 0.0% 0
Other includes: (1) Overhead messenger wire was snagged by LRV pantograph, apparently after a
tunnel ceiling mount casting failed on a hanger arm. This caused some arcing and smoke but power
was shut down expediently. (2) Miscellaneous equipment. (3) Trash fire outside the tunnel portal
with smoke intrusion into the tunnel bores. (4) N/A. (5) For question 13 above: we define major
as resulting in delays greater than 60 minutes. (6) Other categories may apply but I cannot speak
further on cause. I believe we may have feeder fires as well as electrical arcing. (7) Station a small
spark near the attendant’s booth. Contacted facilities maintenance for repairs and corrective action.
(8) Tie fires.
Detection/Prevention
17. Does your agency have an early detection system for fire detection underground?
Yes 55.6% 15
No 44.4% 12

86
18. Please check all elements that are included in the early detection system.
CCTV 92.9% 13
Station smoke or heat detector 78.6% 11
Closed head sprinkler in station (heat) 64.3% 9
Tunnel smoke detector 42.9% 6
Inside vehicle detection (smoke or heat) 21.4% 3
Linear heat detector 14.3% 2
Video analytics 0.0% 0
Other 21.4% 3
Other includes: (1) Station heats in non-public areas and vent shafts. (2) Observations of collectors,
janitors, operators and supervisory staff in the system. (3) Operations personnel or patrons input.
19. Has your agency adopted design standards or codes related to underground fire/smoke prevention
and detection?
Yes 69.2% 18
No 30.8% 8
20. How are these design codes and standards applied?

Previously answered
NFPA 130
NFPA 130 and FRA regulations for vehicles
Design!
New construction and rehabilitation project specifications
Through SOPs
Via design reviews
NFPA 130 is applied for new or rehab construction
NFPA 13, 14 and 130 is wholly adopted by the Agency and our standard. NFPA 72 is referenced in
our Design Criteria Manual and the basis for the Supervisory Monitoring Station at our Operation
Control Center.
As part of system upgrades
We have developed heat release values and work with consultants to perform CFD Analyses and from
there design ventilation systems.
They are part of our design criteria that dictates their use
In accordance with local regulations and supported SOPs
Minimal requirements as per law or guidance
Fire detection and suppression is included in new projects as well as included in the program of capital
improvements.
These standards are applied through our emergency actions plans and equipment updates and training.
And through the use of systems modifications and upgrade when we can.
During design phase (NFPA 130, etc.).
In station not tunnels. Fire detection, suppression and ventilation are included into design.
21. Does your agency have a fire suppression system on-board the vehicles that operate in tunnels?
Yes 7.7% 2
No 92.3% 24
22. Does your agency have a sprinkler system in tunnels?

Yes, in all tunnels 3.7% 1
Yes, in some but not all tunnels 14.8% 4
No 81.5% 22
23. Does your agency have a sprinkler system in underground stations?

Yes, in all underground stations 40.7% 11
Yes, in some but not all underground stations 25.9% 7
No 33.3% 9
24. As new techniques and regulations emerge, how does your agency change or augment its protocol and
procedures to augment its response to underground fires? Are there “triggers” to retrofit the system?
When new construction is planned
We stay abreast of current and best practices, and incorporate into upgrades when deemed appropriate
by risk and cost-benefit.

87
We committee with operations, maintenance, safety and facilities maintenance and develop checklist
and processes and procedures to response to fires. We continue to review and access our system
using our lifecycle management plan.
Decisions are based on an engineering analysis.
Mandatory or regulatory compliance is the driver
Periodic review of our working systems and policies
Not at this time due to the relative newness of our underground system.
Relevant systems may or may not be evaluated for adaptation.
Triggered upgrades are initiated during capital improvements to the system.
The chief trigger is through a debrief of a training exercise. Secondary would be benchmarking at
other properties.
Our Design Criteria Manual is reviewed and updated for every new Project design
Beside end of life of equipment, we do not have any other triggers
Learn from industry incidents to determine if any changes are needed to protocols.
Task force review. Updates to protocols and procedures. Changes reflected in training manuals and
training curricula. Rule Book updates and sign-off of insert reception by all qualified staff. Operator
counselling. “Red Top” notices at all work locations.
As codes change or systems become obsolete
Ours is a contemporary system.
All new addition will meet latest codes
We investigate them, establish a round table discussion and systems and techniques are implemented
as necessary.
We can change and update procedures in our accident/incident manual, and do same in our Emergency
Management manual. There are no triggers to retrofit that I am aware of.
The city Fire Department has used ICS as a response protocol since the system was built. Rail Control
utilizes the pre-established emergency ventilation system settings that were programmed into our
SCADA system if a fire occurs within the tunnel and/or stations. This was established when the
system was designed.
Regarding previous response, our sprinkler systems do not protect the platform as it is unheated.
It does protect heated space beyond a vestibule.
No. As regulations change the agency must comply in some cases; it may be “grandfathered” in others;
or it may be granted variances by local authorities. Changing out components within stations is an
easier task than renovating an entire stations or tunnel.
The NFPA 130 standard was first published in 1983 and adopted by some jurisdictions several years
later. Many rail stations were approved and built prior to the publication and adoption of NPFA 130
codes. While all rail stations satisfied codes at the time of their construction, they may not meet
the current codes outlined in NFPA 130.
25. Are there workarounds for legacy systems to meet new requirements?
The agency has improved or updated the stations over time, the work in the stations has not triggered
any requirement to upgrade the stations to meet the current code, but the agency tries to incorporate
or improve code compliance whenever possible
Sometimes. Whether the agency is “grandfathered” or granted a variance, a risk assessment must be
done to ensure we’re operating in the safest way possible. Sometimes those assessments result in
changes to procedures or infrastructure.
N/A
No legacy systems
All of our tunnels have ventilation, and most all of them have at least dry standpipes for water supply.
We do have the ability to launch capital projects to address concerns on condition of existing systems,
and we strive to meet new requirements anytime we undertake a rebuild or repair.
None here
Yes
Yes
No
No
We currently do not have any legacy systems
N/A
We have dry stand-pipe system installed in our tunnels. We have manned stations to assist with
evacuations in the event of a fire.
If possible—yes. What is meant by “work-arounds”
No
None
Only during major overhaul or retrofit
No
We always try to modify our system to meet any new requirements to keep current to ensure the safety
of our operating environment.
No
Not at this time.

88
Managing Incidents
26. Briefly describe your agency’s protocol and procedures for responding to and managing underground
fire/smoke incidents.
Responses discussed in Chapter 3 of report. Verbatim responses are provided here.
They are outlined in our emergency action plans
Bring trains to stations and hold with doors open. Investigate by CCTV and staff on scene, and dispatch
emergency responders for confirmed fire/smoke events as appropriate. Initiate ventilation fans as
necessary.
We notification the operator responses based the emergency operating procedures for smoke in tunnels.
OCC contacts that appropriate responders. And we work together with jurisdictional first responders
and internal responders.
Whenever possible trains are moved to a station platform before evacuation. Most fires subside when
the power is removed with no other action needed. The Incident Commander from the local Fire
Department is charged with directing the response.
Notification to Rail Ops, Police and local FD, responders respond to portal and shaft locations. The
Unified Command maintains direct contact with the control center to confirm operational plan. If
the plan requires de-energizing of power and electrical systems, no entry is made until confirmation
has been received.
We follow our agency’s policies and procedures as well as drill on these requirements regularly.
Identify the location. Deploy personnel to assess. Set up an incident command.
We have standard operating procedures that are coordinated with local first responders.
Smoke/fire monitoring equipment will also automatically notify the fire department and control center.
Controller will assess the location and zone then select the EVOP scenario. A joint meet between
agency personal and Fire will take place at the underground station (our station has 24 hour
agency security coverage). The fire department will take command of the scene and direct agency
[personnel].
N/A
Our operations department has developed and utilizes a FTA-compliant Emergency Preparedness Plan.
The agency conducts drills twice-a-year with our local fire departments.
OCC apply a ventilation scenario chosen by our computerized system. If this system is down, we do
have a manual system, where a scenario is apply based on fire and train position. A Chief of incident
is named in the station where or near the fire.
Train operator identifies train fire location and evacuation direction. Ventilation is provided to train
operator and passengers.
Call control. Call 911 Monitor situation and report
When Fire and Smoke Plans A (vehicle), B (track level or platform) or C (stations) are invoked,
ventilation protocols are activated based on location of incident and evacuation direction, based
on information provided by site personnel.—Protocols activated by Power Control staff, based on
direction of Transit Control.—For an incident in a station there is one protocol available, which
is based on an all-exhaust scenario (with fans at end of platforms), using the next 3 or 4 adjacent
stations as support.—For an incident in a tunnel there are two protocols available, based on a push-
pull scenario, depending on the evacuation direction, using the next 3 or 4 adjacent stations as
support.—Equipment sequence activation is done manually from Power Control, although plans
are to move to automatic sequence activation of the equipment (with protocol being manually
activated).
Internal policy instructions dictate response by department and escalate as required
ICS supported by internal procedures and trained/familiarized emergency responders.
Contact local fire and agency staff will support
Small incipient trash fires, train crews can put out with fire extinguisher. If fire is larger than incipient,
then local Fire Departments are called for response. Also power removal may extinguish arcing.
System alarms to Transit Police Dispatch simultaneous with local Fire Dept. The Fire Dept. would
assume I.C. and would maintain it until the incident has been controlled and turned over to the
agency.
City Fire Department has used ICS as a response protocol since the system was built. Rail Control
utilizes the pre-established emergency ventilation system settings that were programmed into our
SCADA system if a fire occurs within the tunnel and/or stations. This was established when the
system was designed. We have drilled with City Fire Department on our part of the response to
incidents within our system, we will be a resource for them and be assigned to different sections
of the ICS structure based on the incident.
Upon initial notification to the Control Center, a call is made to the local fire department. Transit Police,
Supervision and other agency personnel are dispatched. Power is removed. Train traffic will be
prevented from entering the affected area. If the incident is deemed serious enough, passengers
will be evacuated. The first agency responder is deemed the incident commander until emergency
response personnel arrive. Upon their arrival, a unified command structure is established. The
incident is managed by responders until completion. After the response agencies have finished, the
agency will make repairs where needed and service will be restored.
This is addressed and several SOPs and is currently being updated

89
27. For fires where other agencies also respond, check all the actions that your agency takes:
Send staff to meet responder command staff at scene 96.2% 25
Set up multi agency command center or similar on your property 76.9% 20
Send staff to a central command center (not on your property) 50.0% 13
28. Does your agency use NIMS (National Incident Management System, i.e., Incident Command) to
establish a chain of command and facilitate communication in responding to underground fire/smoke
incidents?
Yes, always 56.0% 14
Yes, usually 40.0% 10
No 4.0% 1
29. What fire size do you plan for in your protocol and procedures?
System not designed to handle smoke 0.0% 0
0–10 MW 19.0% 4
10–30 MW 23.8% 5
Greater than 30 MW 23.8% 5
Other 33.3% 7
Other responses include: (1) We have defined specifically. (2) Plans are based on operating experi-
ence. (3) I would have to refer to our design criteria. I can’t say offhand. It would serve no purpose
for me to check a box above. (4) NFPA 130 Standards as are applicable. (5) No answer provided.
(6) Info not available to me at this moment. (7) All sizes and types.
30. Is your agency aware of recent full scale tests where fire size was measured at 52–72 MW in existing
vehicles (roughly four times larger than most systems are designed to handle)?
Yes 33.3% 8
No 66.7% 16
31. Did these tests result in changes to protocol and procedures in existing tunnels?
Yes 12.5% 1
No 87.5% 7
32. Did these tests result in changes in planning new tunnels?

Yes (please describe below) 0.0% 0
No 100.0% 9
33. Within the past two years, has your agency made any changes to its standard operating procedures for
managing underground fire/smoke incidents?
Yes 32.0% 8
No 68.0% 17
34. Please describe briefly the changes to standard operating procedures and the reasons for the changes.
Updating procedures to address smoke in tunnels and better training for the controllers in OCC
We’ve codified our procedures and added additional steps to meet responders at certain high-risk
stations and locations.
Modified to reflect the new controls in place
Given the Agency is extending the train length (e.g., three- and four-car consists from the current
two-car consist) we employed new ventilation modes to address rear of train fires.
The principle change has been regarding drill frequencies
Update SOPs as a result of FTA Safety Advisories
Transit Police became the first responders
We added additional information and modified the tunnel ventilation procedures due to fires at other
transit agencies. We also used information from the NTSB and APTA.
35. Briefly describe your agency’s ventilation control system and how it is used/managed in underground
fire/smoke incidents. Check all elements that apply.
Ventilation control is designed to provide fresh air and/or cooling, 8.3% 2
not to remove smoke
Ventilation control is designed to remove smoke only 4.2% 1

90
Ventilation control is designed to remove smoke and provide 70.8% 17

fresh air and/or cooling
Ventilation control is used to remove smoke, although it is not designed 12.5% 3
for that purpose
Other 16.7% 4
Other responses include: (1) Has a maintenance mode for removal of by-products of combustion
from maintenance vehicles during non-revenue service hours. (2) Our tunnels are naturally ventilated,
no ventilation control. (3) Ventilation is used to give an evacuation path free of smoke. (4) There are
on a few locations that have mechanical ventilation. The systems were largely not designed for fire
situations. They were designed for temperature control. Our tunnels are relatively shallow and rely
on natural ventilation though vent wells placed throughout the tunnel.
36. How are ventilation fans controlled?

All are controlled remotely by the operations center 45.5% 10
or other centralized location
All are controlled manually at on-site fan controls 0.0% 0
Some are controlled remotely, others manually 0.0% 0
Some or all can be controlled either remotely or manually 40.9% 9
Other 13.6% 3
Other responses include: (1) All fans can be controlled from the central control room or at a panel
at the station. There is also a maintenance mode of operation from the Electronics Equipment Room.
(2) They can be controlled manually or by the operations center using procedures. (3) All are controlled
automatically based on location of smoke detected and can be controlled by the Fire Department on
scene remotely if needed.
37. Does your agency regularly and periodically test fan operation?
Yes 92.0% 23
No 8.0% 2
38. How often does your agency test fan operation?

Weekly 18.2% 4
Monthly 36.4% 8
Annually 9.1% 2
As needed due to maintenance issues 13.6% 3
Other 22.7% 5
Other responses include: (1) Quarterly during fire alarm testing. (2) I would have to look into this
frequency. I don’t know offhand. (3) Every 45 calendar days. (4) 3–4 times a year. (5) Semiannually.
Training
39. Does your agency’s training programs for its employees in responding to underground fire/smoke
incidents include the following elements? (Check all that apply.)
Review of Standard Operating Procedures for fire/smoke incidents 95.8% 23
on tracks, on vehicles, and in stations
Incident Command System (ICS) training 91.7% 22
Hands-on training for use of portable fire extinguishers 70.8% 17
Field tests of Standard Operating Procedures for fire/smoke incidents 41.7% 10
(in transit yard or elsewhere)
Review of how smoke management system is designed to operate 41.7% 10
Field tests of smoke management with live or artificial smoke 37.9% 9
Training on options if one or more fans fail to operate correctly 33.3% 8
40. Briefly describe any other elements of your agency’s training programs for its employees in responding
to underground fire/smoke incidents.
Train special instructions PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness training
This training is done during emergency exercises and drills and annual elevator testing we use canned
smoke. We have used be shift toolbox or briefing to go over new procedures or scenarios.
Each group within the agency receives training in accordance to their responsibility in an incident.
IE—engineers and crew safe movement of passengers, decision to evacuate or shelter in place
awaiting assistance.
None

91
I cannot say. This is performed by others.

Drills in tunnels
Coordinate our training with local fire departments.
How to manage firefighter in our facilities.
Initial and recertification training for subway operation includes tunnel evacuation simulation with
employees setting up evacuation ladders and power cut procedures
N/A
Crew refresher and 1st responder familiarizations
Tabletop and full scale exercises.
Our training dept. work in collaboration with the local Fire Dept. and does equipment familiarization
training with them to ensure their staff is current and they in turn train themselves on procedures
and use of equipment such as the dry standpipe and the special communications system present
for them along the tunnel wall identified with special blue light. The train control center receives
training on their procedures so they communicate properly with train operators and others until
professional fire fighters arrive.
Communicating with passengers and evacuation procedures.
41. How would you describe ongoing training with first responders from local jurisdictions? (Check all
that apply.)
Conduct joint training exercises in the field 91.7% 22
Conduct table-top training exercises 87.5% 21
Conduct classroom training exercises 58.3% 14
Meet on a regular basis to discuss fire response 58.3% 14
Meet on an ad hoc basis to discuss fire response 41.7% 10
Conduct on-line training exercises 20.8% 5
Other/varies by jurisdiction (please describe) 16.7% 4
Other responses include: (1) We have developed a first guidance training manual that includes a CD
and Book and train the trainers for all jurisdictional responders. (2) Periodic drills. (3) All front line
fire fighters along the rail line get rail familiarization training every few years. All new firefighters get
the same training during the academy training. (4) The agency meets with all jurisdictional Fire/EMS
stakeholders once a month thru the Council of Government committee.
42. Does your agency serve multiple jurisdictions with multiple first response teams?
Yes 87.5% 21
No 12.5% 3
43. How often do you train each local first response team?
Annually 38.1% 8
Every two years 4.8% 1
Ad hoc 23.8% 5
Other responses include: (1) Frequently with multiple jurisdictions. (2) Every two years or if
they request it due to new employees or trainees. (3) I don’t know. (4) We train first response teams
at our major cities annually. Other municipalities that are connected via our network are trained on
an ad hoc basis. (5) We reach out to all agencies annually and issue training certificates that expire
after one year as a reminder to retrain. Response rate from agencies is on or about half with between
1,000–2,000 individual responders trained annually. (6) Every six months. (7) Almost on a weekly
basis throughout the metropolitan area
44. Are your agency’s personnel who respond to fire/smoke incidents familiar and comfortable with
NIMS – Incident Command System?
Yes, all are familiar and comfortable with NIMS 41.7% 10
Yes, most are familiar and comfortable with NIMS 41.7% 10
Some are, some are not 12.5% 3
No, most or all are not familiar and comfortable with NIMS 4.2% 1
45. Are first responders in your city or service area familiar and comfortable with NIMS – Incident
Command System?
Yes, all are familiar and comfortable with NIMS 82.6% 19
Yes, most are familiar and comfortable with NIMS 13.0% 3
Some are, some are not 4.4% 1
No, most or all are not familiar and comfortable with NIMS 0.0% 0

92
46. What actions would be most useful in improving coordination with local jurisdictions in responding
to underground fires?
The most important action is training your jurisdictional responders and developing relationships with
them. Ensuring that you give familiarization training on facilities and in your vehicles. Inviting
them to discuss industry issues related to events in transit emergencies.
A dedicated training staff to provide more frequent training for first responders.
Staffing and cost limitations to physically present training has led to e-Learning objectives for both
initial and refresher training.
Continuous interface and communications.
Increased drills between local fire and agency personnel.
I answered any question having to do with NIMS to move this survey along. I am not familiar with
the process.
More training and exercises. Contact lists distributed to dispatchers
A high-level commitment from the fire and police departments to emphasize rail training in their
programs. In addition, a complex e-learning based training interface that retains email addresses
and contact information of agencies and personnel trained and continues to provide bulletins of
updated information and training announcements. . . . we’re working on that right now.
More training and more drills.
Training firefighters in our Underground Fire Prevention Training Center.
More drills.
To identify the location of the incident
Multiple agency committees to review past incidents for areas of improvement, as well as combination
of meetings ahead of large public events, including but not limited to staff exchange in OCC centers
N/A
We are still having problem with radio communication. Some jurisdictions are required to carry two
radios when responding to underground. It is also required to switch mode when entering into
tunnel and at-grade.
None. That is because we train 1st responders and other crews as new facilities are placed into service,
we feel that we have adequately updated personnel appropriately.
More frequent training and discussions, particularly of Operations personnel with Emergency response
personnel.
Coordination is good at the present time. We are in the process of putting together a Fire Life Safety
Committee with the City Fire Department. When this is finalized the coordination should get even
better.
Annual training and orientation to the underground environment.
Training between the transit agency and the first responder on one classroom setting
47. Would you be willing to participate further as a case study, involving a telephone interview going into
further detail on your agency’s experience, if selected by the TCRP panel for this project?
Yes 66.7% 16
No 33.3% 8
48. Is there another transit system that you suggest we contact for this synthesis project? If you know of
a contact at that system, please list the name also.
Various responses.

Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications:

A4A Airlines for America
AAAE American Association of Airport Executives
AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America
ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATA American Trucking Associations
CTAA Community Transportation Association of America
CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (2015)
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers
MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials
NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program
NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users (2005)
TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program
TDC Transit Development Corporation
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998)
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S.DOT United States Department of Transportation

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NON-PROFIT ORG.
ISBN 978-0-309-38982-2
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Planning and Design For Fire and Smoke Incidents in Underground Passenger Rail Systems

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TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

TCRP SYNTHESIs 124

A Synthesis of Transit Practice

Research Sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration in Cooperation with

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TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TCRP SYNTHESIS 124

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Learn more about the Transportation Research Board at www.TRB.org.

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Topic Panel SA-40

Synthesis Studies Staff

Cooperative Research Programs Staff

TCRP Committee for Project J-7

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Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

7 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

19 CHAPTER THREE SURVEY RESULTS PART ONE:

31 CHAPTER FOUR SURVEY RESULTS PART TWO: AGENCY ASSESSMENT

38 CHAPTER FIVE CASE EXAMPLES

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61 APPENDIX A List of Participating Transit Agencies

62 APPENDIX B Survey Questionnaire

78 APPENDIX C Summary of Survey Results

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Planning and Design for Fire and

• Atlanta, Georgia: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

• An understanding of the combination of physical elements and human interaction in responding

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• Testing system components individually and together;

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Project Background and Objectives

• Definition of underground/enclosed (tunnel) asset;

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The approach to this synthesis included:

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FIGURE 1 Map of FTA regions (Source: FTA).

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Organization of this Report

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• Rail Fire and Smoke Standards,

Rail Fire and Smoke Standards

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• Standardized methodology for calculating fire HRR;

Railway and Rail Car Studies

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• That people tend to maintain their roles (e.g., as passengers);

• Door-opening mechanisms on trains;

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The Metro Project

The METRO Project website (http://www.metroproject.se/index.html) includes specific subject

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FIGURE 3 Interior of converted C20 carriage

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Study recommendations include:

19 CHAPTER THREE SURVEY RESULTS PART ONE:

• Review SOPs/EOPs [emergency operations plans] annually or post an event.

• Need to test ventilation equipment and keep control staff trained.

• Budget for future repairs, inspections and testing.

• Cameras are critical to early response.