2.

Constitutional Law: Stonehill v Diokno

Stonehill v Diokno

Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations of which they were
officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is because
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and
the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed in
connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if based upon probable cause determined
personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with
particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses
committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of probable cause.
Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid search warrant.
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants.

The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and void.

3. Lopez v. Comm. Of Customs CASE DIGEST

JOSEG. LOPEZ v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, REPARATIONS COMMISSION, DIRECTOR OF THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY OF THEIR AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a conditional contract, subject to the
condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the Commission until full payment. Later on,
petitioner entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the latter to supervise and manage the M/V JOLO
LEMA. The vessel however was however apprehended, searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs. A Seizure
Identification proceeding was instituted against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian
copra and 86 sacks of Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines.

This appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law would be taken up
therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the Seizure Identification
proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the Commissioner of Customs, on account of the Indonesian agricultural products
smuggles into the Philippines through the use of M/V JOLO LEMA

HELD:

Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto, over seizure identification
proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The Supreme Court said that this pretense is
manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512 merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission the powers, functions and duties of the Bureau of Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine
Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters. Such transfer should be construed in the light of section 1 of said
Republic Act No. 3512, reading.
It is clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512 are limited to
those relating to the "development, improvement, management and conservation of our fishery resources." All other
matters, such as those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural products, into the Philippines, are absolutely
foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not have been and were not transferred to the aforementioned
Commission. Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66 for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the
Philippines is certainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

The M/V JOLO LEMA is not subject to forfeiture, inasmuch as Davao is a port of entry. This is neither the time nor the
place to pass upon the merits of this contention. Suffice it to say that, if petitioner feels it is a good defense, the proper
place to set it up is in Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66. If the Commissioner of Customs overrules such defense
and decrees the forfeiture of the vessel, Lopez may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, whose decision may, in turn, be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Reparations Commission may not unilaterally rescind its conditional contract of
purchase and sale in his favor and that the Commission must first seek a judicial declaration of rescission of said contract.
Well-settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.

4.People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992

"Maid allowed entry into the house"

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right.

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City.
They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed LuzvimindaMorados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias
BasilioDamaso, the appellant.
Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then
allowed the group to enter inside the house.
The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. They
requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which
they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and the
persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated.
Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure. None of these
exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this case.
Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the
authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was
true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence.
Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer.
Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible.

5. Waterouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:
Antonia MelodiaCatolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren
Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a
total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a ―refund‖ for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope
addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640
for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence
of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC
ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among
the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

6.

7. The Checkpoints Case :Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection
of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize
the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police
and military men by NPA ―sparrow units,‖ not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
8. Gil V. Manlavi, complainant,vs.Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, City of
Puerto Princesa, respondent, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293, May 9, 1995

Facts:
On January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, PuretoPrincesa City, the accused dis then willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess illegally caught assorted fish with the use of explosives weighing more or less eight thousand (8,000)
kilos. The complainant filed thereafter Criminal Cases No. 9210(Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended for Fishing)
and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The cases were consolidated for trial at the sala
of the Honorable respondent. The accused then moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence
of the prosecution was a product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure and also moved to quash Criminal Case
Criminal case 9211 on the ground that the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish caught by
explosives for its failure to allege the element of profit.
The respondent granted both the motion to quash the criminal cases filed. The prosecution moved for the reconsideration
of the order but was denied. The complainant then charged the respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice and
knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge erred in dismissing the case due to warrantless arrest and search and seizure.

Ruling:
The complaint is dismissed. As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210, complainant himself admitted that the
search and seizure was conducted in the absence of a warrant and that the search warrant was only produced by the
complainant after the search and seizure took place. The complainant invoked Circular No. 130(s.1967) of the Office of the
President to justify the warrantless search. The said circular pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught by
the use of explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of Fisheries or his representatives
who can only take a sample of the fish caught (not to exceed one kilo) for testing if the fish were indeed caught through the
use of explosives. It is only upon the determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives when the
seizure of the entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the fish caught shall be made, which
shall be paid to the accused should he be subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed against him. The arresting
officer failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoked.
As to the dismissal of the Criminal Case 9211, though the respondent erred in holding that the information was
defective that the information was defective in not alleging that the offense was committed ―knowingly‖ because the
element of knowledge was encompassed within the word ―willfully‖; however, the information failed to allege the element
of profit. Though it is true that the prohibits Presidential Decree No. 704 prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing
in, selling or disposing of illegally caught fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done ―knowingly‖ but
also ―for profit‖, as essential element of the offense.

9. People v Codilla; G.R Nos. 100720-23; 30 Jun 1993; 224 SCRA 104

FACTS:
Four separate complaints for rape were instituted against the accused-appellants. All three were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and were meted with the sentence of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify
each of their victims.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not appellant Putulin may still challenge the validity of his warrantless arrest and detention.

HELD:
NO. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. This issue is being
raised for the _rst time by appellant before this Court. He
did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Hence, any irregularity attendant to
his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of
not guilty and participating in the trial.
Assailed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the civil indemnity.

Case Digest # 10
PEOPLE vs. PENAFLORIDA

Facts: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation Division of the
PNP station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being
transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante,
chief of police in Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Callo, SPO1 Portugal, PO3
Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to SitioNasulan in Barangay Huyon-
huyon. They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in
appellant’s possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then
brought to the headquarters where he was booked.

Major Lorlie Arroyo, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was presented as an expert
witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative sample from the 928-gram
confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana.

Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home, they met BoyetObias (Obias) who requested
appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the basket in front of his bicycle
and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited
to go with them to the headquarters.

TC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.

In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had freely and consciously possessed marijuana.
One of the issues raised is that, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers should have first
investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?

Ruling: No. The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon.
Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime.
The arrest as effected after appellant as caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him
the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the
police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.

Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No 7659, states: Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as broker in any of such transactions. x xx.

Jurisprudence defines ―transport‖ as ―to carry or convey from one place to another.‖ In the instant case, appellant was
riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package, which
contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.

Appellant, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. But TC rejected his contention,
noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package because ―marijuana has a distinct
sweet and unmistakable aroma which would have alarmed him.‖

Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime under RA
No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or knowledge thereof is not
necessary

Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one
million pesos by virtue of the amendment to Section 4, RA No. 6425 by RA No. 7659. TC’s decision is affirmed.

11.G.R. No. 16234. April 26, 1961

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,vs.MARIANITO FETALVERO and FILADELFO

CACHOLA, defendants-applellants.

Facts:

On December 28, 1999 at around 6 pm., in Bauang, La Union, two armed men entered the house of Jessie Barnachea. The
12 year old boy, Jessie was able to hide under a bed. The two armed men then shot Carmelita Barnachea (mother of
Jessie), Felix Barnachea (brother of Jessie), RubensonAbance (cousin of Jessie), and VictorinoLolarga (uncle of Jessie).
After being shot, Victorino’s penis was also cut by the malefactors.

Witnesses say that after the commotion inside the house, the two armed men boarded a get away jeep which was earlier
guarded by masked lookouts. The neighbors immediately radioed the police and the get away jeep was later apprehended.
On board the said jeep were the two armed men (DominadorCachola and Ernesto Amay) and six other identified men
namely: Nestor Marquez, Benjamin Laegen, Rodolfo Sagun, RodemirGuerzo, Mellke Ignacio, and Nelson Echabaria.
 Two hours after the incident, Jessie identified Cachola and Amay as the shooters. He said he recognized them because the
two were unmasked when they entered the house. The next day, Jessie again identified Cachola and Amay in a police line-
up. And on another day, Jessie again identified Cachola and Amay through photographs.

Eventually, Cachola and Amay were convicted for murder. The other 6 were convicted as accomplices to the crime. The
court, in convicting the accused for murder, reasoned that treachery is present and that on the killing of Victorino,
ignominy is present because his penis was cut off.

Issue:
1. Whether or not ignominy was properly appreciated by the trial court as an aggravating circumstance.

2. Whether or not the 6 other co-accused are accomplices.

RULING:
1. No. The fact that Victorino’s penis was cut off does not immediately give rise to the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy. In the first placed, it must be so alleged in the Information (this was not so in this case). Secondly, for ignominy
to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating,
thus adding to the victim’s moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was
dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. Here, Victorino’s penis was cut off after he was already
dead.

2. No. The 6 other accused are not proven to be accomplices to the crime. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must concur:

(1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation; and

(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.

In the present case, neither element was proven. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants
Cachola and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the
massacre. That they were found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two hours after the commission of the
crime does not constitute previous or simultaneous act.

Note that witnesses testified that the men guarding the get away jeep were masked. There is no solid proof that the 6
other accused found to be with Cachola and Amay were the same masked men at the time of the incident. No one
identified them in court hence there is reasonable doubt in their favor.

12.
Larranaga vs CA, G.R. No. 130644 ,March 13, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City.
He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner
alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However pending the resolution of the
Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.

Issue:
1. Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
2. Whether petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation.

Held:
1. Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that
the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering
a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary
investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment
because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation.
Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of
procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2. No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect.The original
warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against
 him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless
legal.

13. G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of
the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials,
she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged
lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait
accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public
interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in
the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

14.Republic (PCGG) v Sandiganbayan; G.R. Nos. 112708-09; 29 Mar 1996; 255 SCRA

FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay
Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to expect their sequestration. PCGG also issued a ―Search and
Seizure Order‖ against Allied Banking Corporation.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.

HELD:

NO. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a ―judge‖ and ―such other responsible cer as may
be authorized by law‖ were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is either. It is not a
judge, as clari�ed by the Court in ―Baseco,‖ and the PCGG cannot be considered as ―such other responsible o�cer as may
be authorized by law‖ because Executive Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue
search warrants/orders.
Petition is DISMISSED.

15.Morano Vs. Vivo, GR No. L-22196, June 30, 1967

Chan SauWah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted to visit the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for
two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. To prolong their stay, they’ve obtained several extensions.
Until the Commissioner of Immigration ordered them to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a
warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country, they submit petition-prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their
arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing
warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case.
Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III
[Bill of Rights] of the Constitution. They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest
and that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.

Court held, Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution
of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest
in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal
order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The following from American Jurisprudence, is illuminating: “It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to
order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding,
the deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair
though summary hearing, are made conclusive. xxx The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a
prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the
decision may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to
harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of Congress is purely
accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are
separate and independent.” In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the
Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings. Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the
"accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions."

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged as
unconstitutional, because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution,"
this Court declared — This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is subject
to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of breach the
Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner
did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for
his deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power
nugatory to the detriment of the State.

16. Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 78596 July
13, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national temporarily in Manila. Respondent Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G.
Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for ―committing acts inimical
to public safety and progress.‖ A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner. Nghia now alleges that he was
arrested without warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation and
his agents.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrant

RULING: YES. The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.’ What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted. Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been
initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID.10 The restraint (if any) against petitioner’s
person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

17. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, G.R. NOS. 95122-23, 31 May 1991
FACTS
 July 1960 - Santiago Gatchalian, an illegitimate child to a Chinese father (Pablo Pacheco) and a Filipino mother
(Mariana Gatchalian), was recognized as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his mother. He
also declared that he has 5 children with his Chinese wife Chu Gin Tee. One of them was Francisco, William
Gatchalian’s father.
 27 June 1961 – 12-year old William, together with his father Francisco, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong. They
had with them certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong and they
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
 6 July 1961 – Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 (BSI1) admitted William and his companions as Filipino citizens.
 24 January 1962 – Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have
been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on appeal or on review. The Secretary of Justice asked the
BOC to review all the cases where entry was allowed on the grounds of the entrant being a Filipino citizen. Among
those cases was that of William.
 6 July 1962 – The BOC reversed the initial decision of the BSI1 and ordered the exclusion of William Gatchalian. A
warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that the BOC decision was final and executory.
 1973 – Respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 filed a motion for re-hearing with
the BSI.
  15 March 1973 – Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda issued an order reaffirming the 6 July 1961 decision to admit
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. The warrant of arrest was also recalled.
 7 June 1990 – Acting NBI Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of Justice recommending that William be charged
with violation of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act. No. 613).
 15 August 1990 – order to arrest Gatchalian was issued. He later was released upon posting a Php 200,000 bond.
 BOC contends that William’s arrest follows as a matter of consequence the Warrant of Exclusion issued on 6 July
1962.
 On the other hand, William argues that the Mission Order of Warrant of Arrest does mention that it is issued
pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

ISSUES

 W/N William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen based on the validity of his parents’ marriage abroad. (i.e. w/n he has
been an alien the whole time he has been residing in the Philippines)
 W/N the warrant of arrest by the Board of Commissioners and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
was valid.
 W/N the prescriptive period to deport Gatchalian, assuming he was an alien, has elapsed.

HELD

 YES. His grandfather, Santiago Gatchalian, was born of a Filipina mother, despite being an illegitimate child. His
father, Francisco Gatchalian, and he were certified as Filipinos by the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong.
However, this was contested by the BOC after the review.

Petitioners claimed that William Gatchalian is an alien, despite the certification signed by the Secretary of Foreign
affairs and despite his having lived in the country for 28 yrs. thereafter. They held that the state could use police
power in order to arrest and then deport him. They pointed out that both his grandfather and his father married
Chinese women in China and that no evidence was produced regarding the authenticity nor the existence of
claimed marriages. There was no actual proof that these marriages in China were valid or even real; and if the
contrary is true, Francisco Gatchalian and William Gatchalian were never Filipino citizens because they would
have taken the citizenship of the land (if jus soli applies in China) or the citizenship of their mothers, Chinese (if
jus sanguinis applies in China). The lack of evidence of the validity of these marriages in China is the focal point of
the petitioners’ arguments.

The court holds that it is not the respondent’s fault that they weren’t able to produce any documentation regarding
the validity of the marriages in China. The Citizenship Investigations Board, upon asking of proof of said
marriages, were satisfied with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of China. Much more can this deficiency be blamed on William Gatchalian, who was only
a minor during his migration to the Philippines. Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian’s testimonies were admissible
in evidence as declarations regarding their family’s reputation. Any doubt to these declarations is cast aside by
Art. 226, which leans toward the validity of the marriage. Therefore, the testimonies are considered competent
proof. Therefore, the marriages are considered valid and Francisco follows the nationality of his father, as a
legitimate child of the latter.
 NO. Pursuant to Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613, a warrant of arrest may only be issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (then the Commission on Immigration and Deportation) if the sole purpose of the arrest is to execute
a final order of deportation.

 YES. BOC’s argument that the arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of deportation arose cannot be
sustained because section 37 (b) of Commonwealth Act 613 states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises. In this
case, the alleged cause of action and deportation against William arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest
was issued only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed.

Petition of BOC to pursue the arrest and deportation of Gatchalian is DISMISSED.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Feliciano, J. Dissenting:

 Respondent William Gatchalian’s claim to Philippine citizenship rests upon a fragile web constructed out
of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of official documentation, of negative facts and of invocation of
presumptions without proof of essential factual premises.
 The premises of his citizenship are open to very serious doubt.
 The certification of their citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration does not close the issue for
investigation by the Supreme Court. The citizenship of their line must be examined more closely.
DOCTRINES and PROVISIONS:

Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of Family Code) – lex loci celebrationis – a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere.

- “…all marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country…”

Art 220 of the Civil Code

- “… in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of the children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents
over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.”

Res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship if the claim to citizenship is not satisfactorily proven.

In order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

(1) A person’s citizenship must not be raised as material evidence in a controversy where said person is a party;
(2) The Solicitor General or his authorized representatives or citizenship took active part in the resolution thereof;
and
(3) The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.

Deportation shall not be affected unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within 5 years after the
cause of deportation arises.

Whether or not the parents were admitted into the country and their children accepted as Filipino citizens illegally, it
is too late to deport the children after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally.

18. Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840

Facts:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American Nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John
Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna. Respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
comprehend petitioners at their residences. The ―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was found together with
two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after
Mission Report‖ read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
some time now. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Poster and other literature advertising the
child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended
February 17, 1988, after close surveillance for 3 months of the CID in Pagsanjan., Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted
for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, no other charge but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose
to face deportation proceedings. On March 4, 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Section 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of arrest were issued on March 7, 1988
against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial
by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for Bail was filed on March 11, 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. April 4, 1988, Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on April 20, 1988.

Issue: Whether the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of
probable cause.

Ruling: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based in
the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest
and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the article
are admissible evidences (Rule 126 Section 12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

18. Republic v. Santiago

HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and
Jonh Sherman 72.Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The ―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was found together with
two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after
Mission Report‖ read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
sometime now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown
in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 27 February1988 after close
surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One
released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable
aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7 March 1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and
Sec 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date.

On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being
seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy.

On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by
the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID
detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to
and from the CID where trial was on-going.

Petition for bail was filed 11 March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988
Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence
of probable cause.

(2) Whether or Not there were unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote
and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the
probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles
are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in
plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and stops them from
questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special
Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall
be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are
administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of
a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and tranquility of the people.

DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry;

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of
entry;

(3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year
or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry to the Philippines, or who, at any
time after such entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;

(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

(5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with the management of
a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

(6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
subsequent to entry;

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
nonimmigrant;

(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government or who
advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or
otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines.

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, and 8, of paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall
not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the
cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when
sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported.

(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

(d) In any deportation proceeding involving the entry of an alien the burden of proof shall be upon the alien to show that
he entered the Philippines lawfully, and the time, place, and manner of such entry, and for this purpose he shall be
entitled to a statement of the facts in connection with his arrival as shown by any record in the custody of the Bureau of
Immigration.

(e) Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may
be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

SEC. 45. Any individual who–

(a) When applying for an immigration document, personates another individual, or falsely appears in the name of
deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name; or

(b) issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document to any person not authorized by law to receive such
document; or

(c) obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry
into the Philippines by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact; or

(e) being an alien shall, for any fraudulent purpose, represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any
requirement of the immigration laws: or

(f) in any immigration matter, shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or

(g) attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts–
shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, or imprisoned
for not more than two years, or both.
SEC. 46. Any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien not duly admitted by
any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the terms of the
immigration laws, or attempts, conspires with, or aids another to commit any such act, shall be guilty of an offense, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than one thousand pesos, or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.

Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such
action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he
shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself
or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

19.People v. Syjuco G.R. No. L-41957 August 28, 1937

Facts:

NarcisoMendiola, agent of BIR, filed for a search warrant based on the information from a reliable source alleging that
certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the building No. 482 in Binondo, Manila occupied
by Santiago SyJuco. CFI Manila through Judge Albert issued a search warrant directing peace officers to seize the above-
stated articles to deliver them to the court, for the proper action to be taken in due time. After making the required search
the officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his
and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients.

Remo filed a petition in CFI Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from
opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said
property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is null and void, being
illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition was later filed in the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the
same agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-
mentioned search warrant.

CFI Manila through Judge Jaranilla overrule both petitions, declaring that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and
papers claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company,
respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an examination thereof to be made in the presence of the interested
parties, that they contain nothing showing that they have been used to commit fraud against the Government. Remo
appealed.

Issue: WON the search warrant was valid.

Ruling:
No.

The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the appellant attorney on the ground that he is
not the person against whom it had been sought. It is Santiago SyJuco alone against whom the search warrant could be
used, because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much so that NarcisoMendiola, who applied for it, mentioned
him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue and at
the trial of this case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the premises occupied by Santiago
SyJuco because an investigation was then pending against him, for having defrauded the Government in its public
revenue. The doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio (57 Phil., 384), invoked against the appellant, is not
applicable to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither books nor record indicating fraud were found
in his possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant was issued.

The court could not and cannot order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet in question because, it having been proven
that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it he keeps the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be
in violation of his right as such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose or divulge facts or
things belonging to his clients, which should be kept secret, unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it
being a duty imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him.

20.Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No L-64261, December 26, 1984

Facts:

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants to search the premises of of the ―Metropolitan Mail‖ and
―We Forum‖. Various equipment, paraphernalia and written documents were searched. Written literature alleged to be in
the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of ―We Forum‖ newspaper were seized.

The validity of these warrants were questioned through a petition for certiorari and so that the articles and equipment may
be returned to the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items.
Supreme Court Ruling:

The law provides that ―…no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.‖

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. In the case, the reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the
particularities of the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere conclusion of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they are in the
nature of general warrants.

The search warrants were declared null and void.

21.Asian Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Herrera, G.R. No. 25232 December 20, 1973

Facts

Respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr., issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case of estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian
Surety and Insurance Co.

Asian Surety and Insurance Co. filed a petition to quash and annul the search warrant issued, assailing the validity of the
search warrant. Herein petitioner claimed that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 2, of Article VI of the New Constitution, and Sections, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule
126 of The Rules of Court.

Asian Surety and Insurance Co. contended that the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense,
vaguely describing and not particularizing the properties to be search and seized, and not providing the ―time‖ for making
search is clearly violative of the Rules of Court, not to mention the failure of the NBI agents to provide a detailed receipt of
the things to be seized.

Issue

Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD

Petition to quash and annul the search warrant was granted. It was ruled that the search warrant was indeed issued for
four separate and distinct offenses of :estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, and is clearly in contravention
of the explicit command of Section 3 of Rule 126, of the Rules providing that : ―no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense.‖ To prohibit the so-called general warrants is the evil sought to be remedied by such provision.

The search warrant herein involved reads in part: ―…property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.‖ It is plain and clear that there are three classes of properties intended for such search warrant and
respondent Judge was not able to specifically state which properties were to be searched and seized. The Court had
occasion to explain the purpose of the requiring that a warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, to make sure that the things to be seized would be limited to those particularly described in the
search warrant, to avoid ―unreasonable searches and seizures‖. And thus, a detailed receipt must also be given to do away
with those conducting the search a field day for having been issued such a broad and unlimited search warrant.

22. Castro vs Pabalan

Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant
itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with
particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to
answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and
Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the
particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned
out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: WON the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was tainted by illegality because it does not comply with the
constitutional requirements

Held: The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a
mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when
in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining
barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to
call for its invalidation. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching party felt
it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge
himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision, the
elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed
to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with.

Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics
and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes.

23.People vs. Dichoso, GR No. 101216-18 June 4.1993

Facts:

RedentorDichoso y Dagdag , the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC of San Pablo City where he
has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and Sec. 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay fine of P20, 000 and the cost of
suit. Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was also charged with illegal possession of regulated drug violating Sec.16 , Art. III of the
Dangerous Drug Act . However, Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial
court “she cannot be located”. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch 30 of the RTC San Pablo City.
According to the accused-appellant RedentorDichoso, the said accusation of illegal possession of dangerous has
been framed up or planted evidence. Aside from that, he contends that the search warrant is a general warrant which
does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the search conducted was unconstitutional and the items
obtained inadmissible.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible?

2. Whether or not the search warrant against them is valid?
3. Whether or not the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act?

Rulings:

In the first issue, no, because the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it particularizes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the offense involved. Items seized are admissible. For the
second one, the search warrant has been examined and found out that it was valid. Lastly, the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City is hereby modified that RedentorDichoso y Dagdag was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 16, Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight years as minimum to
twelve years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.

24.PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]

Facts: Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination
had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set
the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of theinformation to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the
findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to
issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal’s certification in the information of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to
submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.

Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is
not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he maydisregard the fiscal’s
certification and require submission of the affidavitsof witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of
probable cause.

Petition dismissed.

25. Case Digest

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners, vs HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge
against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I,
Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of
search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search
warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two
houses referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places were being used as storage
centers for unlicensed firearms and ―chop-chop‖ vehicles. On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the
necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-
13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI conducted the simultaneous searches on the said residences of the
petitioner (Kho) and they were able to confiscate the above mention objects stated in the warrant and the simultaneous
searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and telecommunication equipment. The confiscated items were
verified in Camp Crame and were proven that all of them are unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) question the validity of the warrant and filed a Motion to Quash the previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issuance of the search warrant by the respondent Judge valid?
2. Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner (Kho) alleging that there was an abuse enforcement of
the challenge search warrant valid?
3. Whether or not the Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using
the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return
immediately the said items valid.
RULING:
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element
of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the
warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challanged search warrants is not within the
scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant. The
manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled
by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem
at hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in relation to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted against the
petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to
restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the petition at bar is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
27. MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON AREOLA (D), G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

FACTS:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President sued for
libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.

President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran.

Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

RULING:

Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether
to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

SOLIVEN VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although
the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently
by the President
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
clause
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:

Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the
Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

RATIO:

Background of the first issue

 MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
 APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice
 MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice
 MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a ―Motion to Declare Proceedings
Closed‖, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Second issue

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the
basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.

-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also
says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a ―chilling effect‖ on press freedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the ―chilling effect‖ point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard to whether or not
the libel case would produce a ―chilling effect‖ on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most
important and should be resolved now rather than later.

Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience.” –United States v. Bustos

“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak
of him only with bated breath.” –People v. Perfecto

28. Case Digest - CRUZ VS AREOLA

FACTS:

On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of theOffice of the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the
Land Transportation Office, based on thecomplaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found
no cogent reasonto reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended thatthe case
be set for trial.Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his BranchClerk of Court
with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that althoughrespondent Judge already issued a warrant of
arrest, he still deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused. They
believe that there is nolonger any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of
arrestconsidering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there existsprobable cause to indict the
accused.

In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial
function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent
Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand,claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders,
resolutions anddecisions of the presiding judge of her branch.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of the warrant of arrest?

HELD:

NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except uponprobable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.

Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a

sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution’s job. The second kind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying onthe evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judge’s sound
discretion. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in
order not to frustratethe ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the
challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his
sound discretion in notimmediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending
reinvestigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a ministerial
function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.

Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals

GR No.126859, September 4, 2001

Facts:
Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125,
Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at
154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City accusing them with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested
and detained.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described
with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one
witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial.

ISSUE:

W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with particularity.

HELD:

As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that
constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to
declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in
evidence against petitioners.

Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question
specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of
objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same
kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from
Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized
did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those
articles described as a class or species would suffice.

The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to
determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the
enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential
Decree No.1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

People v. Tiu Won Chua 405 scra 280

Facts:

Accused Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua were charged and convicted by
the lower court for violation of Section 16, Article III of the dangerous drug act of 1972, for their illegal possession of a
regulated drug, shabu.

They appealed the decision of the lower court questioning the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest
conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC. Accused contends
that the defect in the issuance of the search warrant, for it was issued in the name of Timothy Tiu and did not include
appellant Qui Yaling, would make the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, illegal. That the evidence presented
cannot be serve as basis for their conviction being fruits of an illegal search.

Issues:

1. Whether or not their was a valid search warrant.

2. Whether or not the court correctly imposed judgment of conviction to the accused.

Ruling:
 1. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not
invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related
activities of the accused by virtue of the surveillance and test-buy operations of the said authorities. In fact, a
"John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused. Moreover, a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not
invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. However, the court affirms the
illegality of the search conducted on the car for it was not part of the description of the place to be searched
mentioned in the warrant.

2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession
of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Since the crime is
malumprohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability.
Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the
case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside a room in the unit
subject of the search warrant, more particularly inside the man’s handbag and ladies’ handbag owned respectively
by the accused. As to the penalties imposed, the court did not sustain the trial court’s decision attributing to both
appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. Since no conspiracy was proven, the amount of the
shabu from each accused was made the basis of the penalty imposed. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were
found inside the man’s handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, while Qui Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating
Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in connection with Section 20 (1 st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of
shabu involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender
with the penalty ranging from prisioncorreccional to reclusion perpetua.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or

SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was
taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search
warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize
―finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.‖ No fake Revicon was however found;
instead, sealed boxes were seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox,
both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the
search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of
Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid
under the plain view doctrine.

Held:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not
described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for
the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough
that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were
present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such
boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers
had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they
were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized
items.

Ty vs. People G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004 B.P. 22, Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear,
Justifying Circumstance of State of Necessity

November 20, 2017

FACTS:

Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor’s Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos was made to be
paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of
which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal
actions against Ty for violation of BP22.

In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened to commit suicide due
to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration
was obtained by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability.

RULING:

For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to
that committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat
of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear
must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will
but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to
issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged for fear that her
mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the
hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it
is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her
mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of
all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage
of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the
collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of post-dated checks or
jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity
to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P.
22.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.

G.R. No. 89373. March 9, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YOLANDA GESMUNDO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo M. Alcantara for accused-appellant.

Facts: According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his
civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana
to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant.

About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain for them to be
accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The police was allowed to enter the house upon
the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The
police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of
died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native
―uway‖ cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper.

According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt.
Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside the house Yte
showed the accused something he claimed as asearch warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered ―etona‖
They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the
accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that she doesn’t know
anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She was brought to the police station and was detained.

The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.

Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.

Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a hole at
the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot
was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot
in any of their testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and
where, the trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the marijuana
was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt ofappellant and his culpability to the crime charged.

The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides
no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.

The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her right not to sign
the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be
used as evidence against her. It was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the
presence of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to
issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are
mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties.

The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.

DEL ROSARIO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 142295

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellantwas in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP
Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a
certification stating that per records, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.
Armed with the said certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant.

Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray, Bulacan to serve the warrant.
Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Brgy. Chairman Rogelio de Silva and
Brgy. Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house
of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp.
Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant
gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a
caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellant's
daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce
any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the
other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers.
Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into
his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police
already had finished the search. However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

W/N the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

RULING/HELD:

YES.

With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen
of petitioner's house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for
the search of petitioner's house. "Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search

and seizure becomes 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision.""Supporting jurisprudence thus
outlined the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of even one will cause" its downright
nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized." Seizure is limited to those items
particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the
proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in
the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is
illegal. True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for
that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object." Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioner's daughter. The seizure was
invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,the "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law if enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of
a particular area or alias prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain
view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is, immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure."

With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in the bedroom of petitioner's
daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The if radios were not contraband perse. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion. The burden is on the prosecution to show
that the two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized to
seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in the search
warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizen's right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged
with illegal possession of the two-way radios.

Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such radios is not even
included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the
Information.

The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and ACQUITS of the charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.

SPS. VEROY vs. LAYAGUE

210 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero, acting upon a directive, raided the Davao City residence of petitioner spouses, who were already
residing in Quezon City, on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. The team
did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. When contacted by
Obrero to ask permission to search the house, Ma. Luisa Veroy relented if the search would be conducted in the presence
of a longtime family friend, a ranking military officer. The team gained entry into the yard and the kitchen. With the help
of a locksmith, the team entered the children’s room and conducted the search which resulted in the recovery of several
articles which include a firearm and jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP.

ISSUE:

W/N the officers violated the petitioners’ constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

RULING/HELD:

YES.

Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to
room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.

The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless search. The reason for searching the
house is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was
able to enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not
present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the
house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to
enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.Under the circumstances the police officers had time to
procure a search warrant but they did not.

The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malumprohibitum, it does not follow
that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.

The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal
action against them for illegal possession of firearms.

CORRO VS. LISING

GR NO. L - 69899, July 15, 1985

137 SCRA 541

FACTS:

Respondent Judge issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of printed copies of P Times;
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the PH Times; newspaper dummies of the PH Times, subversive docs,
articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners; typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of
committing the crime inciting to sedition.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
HELD:

No, an application for search warrant must state with particularity the alleged subversive materials published or intended
to be published by the petitioner publisher and editor of the PH Times. Mere generalizations will not suffice. The
statements of private respondents Col. Castillo and Lt. Ignacio in their affidavits are mere conclusions of law and will not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

Prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is granted and all properties seized
thereunder are ordered released to petitioner. Respondent officers are ordered to re-open the padlocked office premises.

Crespo vs. Mogul G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

FACTS:

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.

In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977
to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the
Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.

In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15,
1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally
resolved the petition for review.

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.

A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court,
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor
was given time to file an opposition thereto.

On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that ―the motion’s trust being to
induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s
independence and integrity.‖

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary
writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.

On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of
the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.

A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. Hence
this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed
and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

ISSUE:

WhetheR OR NOT the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist
on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

YES.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicialdiscretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may
feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal
to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive
at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this
is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Bache & Co Inc vs. RuizGR L-32409, 27 February 1971

Facts:

On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation
of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already
filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.

After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath
and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.

The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then
signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the
corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.

The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents.

On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction
be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay
the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees.

After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant.
In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the
total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.

The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue:

Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.

Held:

The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al.
vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the
corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various
corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the
latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner.

On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein,
the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).

The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining
whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination.

Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of
income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at
source).

The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of
Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax
due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73
are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to
defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so
all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business
inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.

COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA

Facts:

The National Bureau of Investigation has engaged in an anti-film piracy drive by investigating various video
establishments in Metro Manila involving cases violating PD No. 49, as amended, including Sunshine Home Video Inc.
(―Sunshine‖), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center,

Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila. On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant
with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films, which
the court granted.

In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video
tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by Columbia Pictures, Inc. et al
(Columbia et al.) Thereafter, the court has lifted the search warrant which it had therefore issued after a series of motions,
up until the CA. In the SC, Sunshine challenged Columbia et al’s legal standing in our courts, they being foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Issue:Whether or not Columbia et al were ―doing business‖ in the Philippines, thus, needs to be licensed before having a
legal standing in Philippine courts.

Sunshine’s contention:

Columbia et al, being foreign corporations, should have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts.

Sunshine point to the fact that Columbia et al are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the
Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their
attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of ―doing business in the Philippines‖ under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the
Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts
in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.
Columbia et al’s contention:

Columbia et al denied that they are doing business in the Philippines and contend that Sunshine have not adduced
evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively prove
the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business.

Ruling:No, foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be
licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.

As acts constitutive of ―doing business,‖ the fact that Columbia et al are admittedly copyright owners or owners of
exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an
indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in
local courts.

Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of Columbiaet al., with express authority pursuant
to a special power of attorney

Held:

Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, Columbia et al are not barred from
maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, Columbia et al are doing,
transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can
seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.

Article 125 and Article 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, as interpreted, says that any foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject
matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but ―doing
business‖ in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other
words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it
has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes ―doing‖ or ―engaging in‖ or ―transacting‖
business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. The true tests, however,
seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it
was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.

Authorities agrees that a foreign corporation is ―doing,‖ ―transacting,‖ ―engaging in,‖ or ―carrying on‖ business in the State
when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting
through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be
distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts.

The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the
Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.

As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply because it enters into
contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State. In fact, a view is taken that
a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state merely because sales of its product are made there or other
business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where
such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as
an independent business.

It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has purchased and obtained
title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by the corporation. Likewise, a foreign
corporation which sells its products to persons styled ―distributing agents‖ in the State, for distribution by them, is not
doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers
is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade
prices established by it.

Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the
respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) ―John Does‖ transgressing the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No.

Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) ―John Does‖ not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as ―totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.‖[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners.
Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) ―John Does.‖ The respondent Judge is directed to
forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal
Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MO LINA

FACTS:Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As
to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the
morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-
a, DavaoCity. He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait
for the alleged pusher to pass by.At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a ―trisikad‖ carrying the accused-
appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police
officers then ordered the ―trisikad‖ to stop. SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-
appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, ―Boss, if possible we will settle this.‖ SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.

Accused-appellantscontended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE:W/NTHE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF

APPELLANTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

HELD:The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion. The
Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.i

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures;ii[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations.

As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however,
recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).In the case at bar, accused-appellants
manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. The response of Molina that ―Boss,
if possible we will settle this‖ is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an
inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise.SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mula’s name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see
Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances
could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then
driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.

The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not
be admitted as evidence. WHEREFORE accusedare ACQUITTED.

PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of
Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject
of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and
bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued
the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a ―Motion to Quash‖ before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a ―Supplemental Pleading to the
Motion to Quash‖ and a ―Motion to SuppressEvidence.‖ On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order
which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by
the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing
and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant
is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3
Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.CHIONG, petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional TrialCourt, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan,
AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED

FACTS:A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant
issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.

An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. BagonBuhay Avenue, SarangPalay, San Jose
Del Monte, Bulacan.

The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of
different explosives and firearms.

ISSUE:WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

HELD:In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at
the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search.The same was not, however, what
the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE
SEARCH WARRANT.As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the
search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.The ambiguity lies outside the
instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the
warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done.

It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they
applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a
search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.

It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to
be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.

People v. De lara

F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, as a consequence of which,
accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the police when he
sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He
tried to escape by running inside his house. The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. The accused
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing
prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused, proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. During the
investigation, accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.
When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. Accused
contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void. He also contends that
he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked
money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid.

RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of
a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of
the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.

ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence.

RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
(The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other
evidence establishing his guilt.)

Uy vs. BIR

G.R. No. 129651

October 20, 2000Kapunan, J.

Facts: On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC) reported to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy, manager of UPC, were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993, the BIR requested
and successfully secured, before the RTC of Cebu, a search warrant. On the same day, a second warrant was issued with
contents almost identical to that of the first warrant but consisted of only one page. These warrants were issued for the
alleged violation by Uy of Section 253. A third warrant, however, was issued on that same day for Uy’s alleged violation
of Section 238 in relation to Section 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by
members of the PNP searched the premises of the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on the said
warrant. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. Uy and UPC filed a motion to quash the
warrants before the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE: Whether the search warrant issued was valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and comprehensively
discussed each and every defect alleged by petitioners.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions. One
of which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated on said warrants, the
Court ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. It was
not established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation, hence,
inconsistency in identifying the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s
invalidation in this case.

The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched—one warrant was directed only against Uy while
the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled that where the warrant was issued not for search of the
persons occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared
unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of the
inconsistencies in stating their name. Furthermore, the Court said that where the apparent intent in issuing another
warrant was to supersede an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.

Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge as she used generic terms. As a rule, the use of a
generic term or a generic description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. But where, however, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must rather be
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean no warrant could issue. As regards
the terms “unregistered delivery receipts” and “unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the Solicitor General
correctly argued that these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.

Lastly, general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void—
the search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of “unregistered delivery receipts” and
“unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the warrants remain valid.

G.R. No. 140946 September 13, 2004

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for alleged violation of Section 29 of
Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair competition).
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the
description stated in the search warrants.

Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and
that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied
their motion for reconsideration.

According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining the NBI agent and the computer
technician who visited Maxicorp.

Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive
evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales
receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a
certain "Joel Diaz."

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the search warrants issued by RTC

2. Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of the petitioner.

RULING:

According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair
competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent
Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate
several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related
to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief
that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are
sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full-blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it
was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software
occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer
unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software.
The Supreme Court held:
“xxx No provision of the law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to
be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant
remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not
sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.”

In addition the Highest Court stated:

“xxx The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding
all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, all items seized under paragraph © after
search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, should be returned to Maxico

Katz v. United States

Citation. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967)

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the “petitioner”), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over
telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner’s end of telephone
conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner
used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner’s contention that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”),
against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and
Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the
telephone booth and recorded the petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence
against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is
inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone
booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a
constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the
petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out
the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A
person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as
he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it
is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s telephone
conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated
upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (“J. Black”) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient
practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution (“Constitution”).
Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such
language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that
language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy,
be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.

Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a
person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door
behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other
hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of
privacy would not be reasonable.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to
particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited
an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.

Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place
in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back
up all the files in the computers found in the MamamayanMuna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over
to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by
the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order,
requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition”
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing
the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the
absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived
his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground
that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which
was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a
violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his
constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions
involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”

O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “*i+ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.” In O’Connor the Court
recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons.
The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570
SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there
may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at
bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued
computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.