Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement is the use of military force to compel peace in a conflict, generally against
the will of those combatants.[1] To do this, it generally requires more military force than
peacekeeping operations. The United Nations, through its Security Council per Chapter VII of its
charter, has the ability to authorize force to enforce its resolutions and ceasefires already
created.[2][3]

Peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping as peace enforcement activities are generally used
to create a peace from a broken ceasefire or to enforce a peace demanded by the United
Nations.[1][2] Compared to peacekeeping, peace enforcement requires more military force and
is thereby best done by heavily armed forces.[1] However, it is generally unable to create lasting
peace, as it does nothing to deal with the underlying problems which caused the conflict itself.
[4]

One of the most famous examples of peace enforcement was the UN intervention during the
Gulf War to force Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait. The United Nations was thereby
able to compel Iraq's compliance with the UN Resolutions which demanded its withdrawal from
the region.[2]

A report on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the 1990s for the United States Army
established this difference between peace enforcement and peacekeeping:

Peacekeeping, a role the U.N. has played over the years, is relatively straightforward and, despite
its difficulties, comparatively easy. Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire
agreed to by two or more former combatants. It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists
and where the former combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war. Peace-
enforcement, as it is used by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, entails the physical
interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does
not exist. Boutros-Ghali, on the other hand, uses the term to refer to actions to keep a cease-fire
from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. It is a subtle difference, but it does imply
the existence of some will for peace. The American version more realistically portrays another,
far more difficult matter. By definition, in a situation for which peace-enforcement is a
potentially appropriate response, war and not peace describes the situation, and one or more of
the combatants prefer it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are
often not welcomed by one or either side(s). Rather, they are active fighters who must impose a
cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, the neutrality that
distinguishes peacekeepers will most likely be lost.[5]
An Agenda for Peace
Boutros Ghali was the prime minister of Egypt from 1908 to 1910.

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, more commonly
known simply as An Agenda for Peace, is a report written for the United Nations by Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. In it, Boutros-Ghali responds to a request by the UN
Security Council for an "analysis and recommendations" to strengthen peacemaking and
peace-keeping. The document outlines the way Boutros-Ghali felt the UN should respond to
conflict in the post-Cold War world.

Recognizing the limitations of peacekeeping, especially as such efforts were becoming prevalent
in the early 1990s, the UN Security Council convened in 1992 in a first-time meeting of heads of
state. The 15 members finished the conference by issuing a statement calling on then-Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to write a report recommending future reforms. In their
statement, the heads-of-state recognized that,

“The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic,
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The
United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give
the highest priority to the solution of these matters.”[1]

The Security Council saw what many critics of peacekeeping have suggested, and some recent
failures had made obvious: peacekeeping alone, as then practiced, was not enough to ensure
lasting peace.

Boutros-Ghali submitted his response some months later, in the form of An Agenda for Peace. In
it, he outlined a number of additional processes of preventative diplomacy the international
community could use before peacekeeping, or simultaneously. He also suggested distinct
definitions for peacemaking and peacekeeping, and referenced Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter to justify military involvement without the consent of both parties.[2] Previously, these
concepts had not been formally addressed by the UN's leadership. However, An Agenda for
Peace’s most significant contribution to the modern understanding of peace is its introduction of
the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding.” Boutros-Ghali defines “post-conflict peace-
building” as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” [3]

The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has been especially important in the academic
discipline of peace and conflict studies. It has been adopted by a number of scholars to suggest a
framework for peace that addresses not only the latent forms of physical violence, but also
aspects of a society that are structurally violent, and could lead to a re-emergence of fighting
(see the discussion of positive peace in the article on peace and conflict studies).
Resolution 836 (1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant
resolutions,

Reaffirming in particular its resolutions 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 and 824 (1993) of 6 May
1993, which demanded that certain towns and their surrounding areas in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina should be treated as safe areas,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard,

Condemning military attacks, and actions that do not respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a State
Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations,

Reiterating its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing"
is unlawful and totally unacceptable,

Commending the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat
party for having signed the Vance-Owen Plan,
Gravely concerned at the persistent refusal of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the Vance-Owen
Plan and calling upon that party to accept the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in full,

Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina which run totally counter to the Peace Plan,

Alarmed by the resulting plight of the civilian population in the territory of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular in Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica. Gorazde, Tuzla and Zepa,

Condemning the obstruction, primarily by the Bosnian Serb party, of the delivery of
humanitarian assistance,

Determined to ensure the protection of the civilian population in safe areas and to promote a
lasting political solution,

Confirming the ban on military flights in the airpspace of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, established by resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 786 (1992) of 10
November 1992, and 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993,

Affirming that the concept of safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained
in resolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993) was adopted to respond to an emergency situation,
and noting that the concept proposed by France in document S/25800 and by others could make
a valuable contribution and should not in any way be taken as an end in itself, but as part of the
Vance-Owen process and as a first step towards a just and lasting political solution,

Convinced that treating the towns and surrounding areas referred to above as safe areas will
contribute to the early implementation of that objective,

Stressing that the lasting solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must
be based on the following principles: immediate and complete cessation of hostilities;
withdrawal from territories seized by the use of force and "ethnic cleansing"; reversal of the
consequences of "ethnic cleansing" and recognition of the right of all refugees to return to
their homes; and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Noting also the crucial work being done throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and the importance of such work continuing,

Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a
threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Calls for the full and immediate implementation of all its relevant resolutions;

Commends the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained in document
S/25479);

Reaffirms the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by the use of force and the need to
restore the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Decides to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993);

Decides to extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas
referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the
cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the
ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as
provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992,
Affirms that these safe areas are a temporary measure and that the primary objective remains to
reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from their
homes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace, beginning,
inter-alia, with the prompt implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan in areas
where those have been agreed by the parties directly concerned;

Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation, inter alia, with the Governments of the Member
States contributing forces to UNPROFOR:

To make the adjustments or reinforcement of UNPROFOR which might be required by the

implementation of the present resolution, and to consider assigning UNPROFOR elements in
support of the elements entrusted with protection of safe areas, with the agreement of the
Governments contributing forces;

To direct the UNPROFOR Force Commander to redeploy to the the extent possible the forces
under his command in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support, to facilitate the
implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas, expresses its gratitude to Members
States already providing forces for that purpose and invites the Secretary-General to seek
additional contingents from other Member States;

Authorizes UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13

August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in
self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to
bambardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in
the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys;

Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993), Member States, acting
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of
the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its
mandate set out in paragraph 5 and 9 above;

Request the Members States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate
closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 10 above and to report to the
Council through the Secretary-General;

Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council, for decision, if possible within seven days
of the adoption of the present resolution, on the modalities of its implementation, including its
financial implications;

Further invites the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, not later than two months after
the adoption of the present resolution, a report on the implementation of and compliance with
the present resolution;

Emphasizes that it will keep open other options for new and tougher measures, none of which is
prejudged or excluded from consideration;

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and undertakes to take prompt action, as
required.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbo-Croatian: Republika Bosna i
Hercegovina / Република Босна и Херцеговина) was the direct legal
predecessor to the modern-day state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[2]

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina existed legally until co-signing the
Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, containing the Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina on 14 December 1995, but official documents reveal that
the state existed until the end of 1997 when the implementation of the
Dayton Agreement was finished and only then it fully came into effect.[3]
Most of this period is taken up by the Bosnian War, in which majority of
population of two of three main ethnicities of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
namely Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, established entities of
Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia respectively, which were unlawful and
secessionist in nature hence unrecognized by international community.[4]
Informally these events were considered by nationalists as evidence that
republic was left to be representative primarily of its Bosniak population,
formally presidency and government of the republic was still composed of
Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats along with Bosniaks.[5][6][7] By the
Washington Agreement of 1994, however, Bosniaks were joined by Bosnian
Croats of Herzeg-Bosnia, which was abolished by this agreement, in support
for the Republic by the formation of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a sub-state joint entity. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords
joined the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Serb entity, the
Republika Srpska, from that point onward recognized formally as political
sub-state entity without a right on secession, into the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Bosnian War (1992–1995)

On 18 November 1990, multi-party parliamentary elections were held throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina. A second round followed on 25 November, resulting in a
national assembly where communist power was replaced by a coalition of three
ethnically-based parties.[64] Following Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of
independence from Yugoslavia, a significant split developed among the residents of
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the issue of whether to remain within Yugoslavia
(overwhelmingly favored by Serbs) or seek independence (overwhelmingly favored by
Bosniaks and Croats).[citation needed]

The Serb members of parliament, consisting mainly of the Serb Democratic Party
members, abandoned the central parliament in Sarajevo, and formed the Assembly of
the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 October 1991, which marked the end
of the tri-ethnic coalition that governed after the elections in 1990. This Assembly
established the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992, which
was renamed Republika Srpska in August 1992. On 18 November 1991, the party branch
in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the ruling party in the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ), proclaimed the existence of the Croatian Community of
Herzeg-Bosnia, with the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) as its military branch.[65] It
went unrecognized by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which declared it
illegal.[66][67]

A declaration of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15 October 1991 was

followed by a referendum for independence on 29 February/1 March 1992, which was
boycotted by the great majority of Serbs. The turnout in the independence referendum
was 63.4 percent and 99.7 percent of voters voted for independence.[68] Bosnia and
Herzegovina declared independence on 3 March 1992 and received international
recognition the following month on 6 April 1992.[69] The Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was subsequently admitted as a member state of the United Nations on 22
May 1992.[70] Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman
are believed to have agreed on a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1991,
with the aim of establishing Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.[71]

Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, Bosnian Serb militias

mobilized in different parts of the country. Government forces were poorly equipped
and unprepared for the war.[72] International recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina
increased diplomatic pressure for the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to withdraw from
the republic's territory, which they officially did in June 1992. The Bosnian Serb members
of the JNA simply changed insignia, formed the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and
continued fighting. Armed and equipped from JNA stockpiles in Bosnia, supported by
volunteers and various paramilitary forces from Serbia, and receiving extensive
humanitarian, logistical and financial support from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Republika Srpska's offensives in 1992 managed to place much of the country under its
control.[17] The Bosnian Serb advance was accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats from VRS-controlled areas. Dozens of concentration camps
were established in which inmates were subjected to violence and abuse, including rape.
[73] The ethnic cleansing culminated in the Srebrenica massacre of more than 8,000
Bosniak men and boys in July 1995, which was ruled to have been a genocide by the
ICTY.[74] Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces also committed war crimes against civilians
from different ethnic groups, though on a smaller scale.[75][76][77][78] Most of the
Bosniak and Croat atrocities were committed during the Bosniak-Croat war, a sub-
conflict of the Bosnian War that pitted the ARBiH against the HVO. The Bosniak-Croat
conflict ended in March 1994, with the signing of the Washington Agreement, leading to
the creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
amalgamated HVO-held territory with that held by the ARBiH.[citation needed]

Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement

Following the Srebrenica massacre, NATO launched a bombing campaign against
Republika Srpska in August 1995. The bombing, together with a joint HV/HVO/ARBiH
ground offensive in western Bosnia, convinced the Bosnian Serb leadership to consider a
negotiated settlement, which manifested itself in the Dayton Agreement of December
1995. It brought an end to active combat and roughly established the basic political
structure of the present-day state. A NATO-led peacekeeping force was immediately
dispatched to the country to enforce the agreement. An estimated 100,000 people were
killed in the war, about two-thirds of whom were Bosniak.[79] An additional 2.2 million
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina of all ethnicities were displaced.[80] The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has ruled the conflict
involved the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (subsequently Serbia and Montenegro),[81]
as well as Croatia.[82] Dozens of Bosnian Serb officials and soldiers have been convicted
for their role in war crimes and crimes against humanity during the conflict, as well as
for the genocide in Srebrenica. Several high-ranking Croat and Bosniak officials have also
been convicted.[83] Victims' remains continue to be unearthed.[84] After the war, the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought a lawsuit against Serbia before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing the country of genocide. In 2007, the ICJ
exonerated Serbia of direct responsibility for the genocide committed by Bosnian Serb
forces in Srebrenica, but concluded the country had not done enough to prevent the
massacre.[8