China’s territorial claim
loom larger. In 1988 the South China
Territorial claim
Chinese claim to the islands and other land
features in the South China Sea, which is based
on historical surveying expeditions, fishing
activities, and naval patrols as far back as the
15th century.
As early as 1914, modern Chinese cartographers
included within maps of Chinese territory most
of the area of the South China Sea, delimited by
the so called nine-dash line.
The area was included in an official map drawn
in 1947 by the republic of china under the
Kuomintang government, and the nine-dash
line continued to be included in official maps
published by the People’s Republic of China
China’s claim in the South China Sea, which has
for many years been a thorn in china’s bilateral
relations with those countries with counter-
claims.
 Vietnam entire area of the South China
Sea and the islands within it,
With overlapping claim
 Philippines,
 Malaysia,
 Indonesia,
 Brunei
But in spite of the many overlapping claims, the
South China Sea disputes only became a more
serious issue:
 early 1970s when it was discovered that
the region may contain significant
deposits of oil and gas
 1972 that the Marcos government
officially incorporated Kalayaan into
Palawan.
 The fishing opportunities also started to
Sea was believed to account for 8% of
world fishing catches
 But it was the United Nations
convention on Law of the Sea, which
came into effect in November 1994,
which sparked more intense conflict in
that it set a deadline for the submission
of claims.
Is China getting more assertive?
Beijing’s recent actions are seen by some
countries in the region and beyond as a
departure from its previous approach. The
Philippines and Vietnam have been the most
vocal and shrill in decrying what they consider
to be Chinese assertiveness.
A prominent Filipino intellectual and legislator,
Walden Bello stated “we are entering a ‘post-
Deng Xiaoping’ era of greater assertiveness,
whereby you have a big neighbour that is laying
claim to the whole South China Sea”
Tokyo’s 2011 Defence White Paper also states
that “China is widely and rapidly modernising its
military force, and it has been intensifying its
maritime activities in the surrounding waters”,
and China is “expanding and increasing its
activities in waters close to japan.”
Pentagon also found that “in recent years China
has demonstrated occasional signs of
assertiveness in Asia, particularly in the
maritime domain.”
And why?
For China, energy is the main consideration.
 The recent Arab Awakening in North
Africa and the Middle East has affected
China’s overseas energy strategy,
posing potential constraints and raising
 costs. China was propelled to further
implement an energy diversification
strategy, and shift its oil and gas
development focus to the ocean,
particularly to the South China Sea,
which is believed to be a reservoir
energy, with estimates of 130 billion
barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet
of gas.
Domestically, the Chinese government faces
increasing nationalism and pressure.
 They believe that while China abides by
the maxim of “shelving territorial
differences and engaging in joint
development”, Vietnam and the
Philippines do not follow this principle.
This gives rise to statements like “in
the face of big exploration of oil and gas
in the south china sea by those
concerned countries, china must
accelerate the speed of its development
in the South China Sea”, “If China has
achieved has achieved effective
development and management of the
maritime resources within the
traditional intermittent line, the
possibility of the increase in the
frequency and deterioration of the
South China Sea dispute would likely
have been much lower.”
 Under such circumstances, it was
perhaps inevitable that china would
step up the search for energy resources
in those waters and increase support
for the participation of its oil companies
in the development of offshore oil and
gas projects. The importance which the
relevant ministries and oil companies in
china attach to the development and
utilisation of oil and gas resources in the
south china sea suggests that the South
China Sea will undoubtedly become a
main source of China’s oil and gas
supply in the future, particularly if
environmental awareness and energy
diversification cause natural gas to
gradually replace coal in china.
In arbitration case
On January 22 2013, the Philippines by a Note
Verbale with the Notification and Statement of
claim on West Philippines Sea in order to
achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the
dispute.
China indirectly expressed its opposition the
next day stating that “we hope that relevant
country would keep its word… and refrain
from taking actions that could complicate and
aggravate the issue.”
One week later, china declared its disapproval
of the Philippines initiative. China did not
participate in the proceedings. China’s
uncommon responses in the practice of the
Annex VII arbitrations raise a number of
questions. Does China’s nonacceptance of the
notification and statement of Claim mean that
the Philippines is required to obtain China’s
consent to initiate the arbitral procedure? If
not, does China’s non participation prevent the
arbitral proceedings from going forward?
Does China’s nonacceptance of the notification
and statement of Claim mean that the
Philippines is required to obtain China’s
consent to initiate the arbitral procedure?
China’s action of refusing to accept the present
arbitration is understandable. China has
consistently maintained that negotiations and
consultations should be used to settle the
insular and maritime disputes in the South
China Sea, rather than engagement of any form
of compulsory third party settlement
procedure. As early as 1997, the member states
including the Philippines, of the ASEAN and
China “agreed to resolve their disputes in the
south china sea through friendly consultations
and negotiations in accordance with universally
recognized international law, including the 1982
UN convention on the law of the Sea”
Nevertheless, China’s usual position of
avoidance of arbitration or compulsory
adjudication is not directly applicable to the
Philippines’ arbitration since, as a result China’s
ratification of UNCLOS and article 287, China
has given its advance consent to the possibility
of an annex VII arbitration. Consequently, the
Philippines has access to the procedures and
can commence them without China’s new
consent. This is the meaning of the compulsory
jurisdiction. Barbados Trinidad and Tobago
annex VII arbitral tribunal.
The unilateral right to invoke the UNCLOS
arbitration procedure is expressly conferred by
article 287 which allows the unsettled dispute to
be referred to arbitration “at the request of any
party to the dispute”; it is reflected also in
Article 1 annex VII’
of the expiration of the 30-day or 60-day period,
request the president or the next senior
member of ITLOS who is available and is not a
national of one of the parties to make the
necessary appointments. Such appointments
are to be made within a period of 30 days of the
receipt of the request
Even if china does not participate in the written
or oral proceedings of the arbitral tribunal, this
cannot affect the process of proceedings and
the validity of the arbitral award. No matter
whether China appears before the arbitral
tribunal or not, as long as the tribunal satisfies
itself that it has jurisdiction over the dispute
and that the Philippines’ claim is well founded
in facts and law, the award rendered will be
final and binding and is to be complied with by
both parties.

Article 286 confers a unilateral right and its

exercise unilaterally and without discussion or
agreement with the other party is a
straightforward exercise of the right conferred
by the treaty, in the manner there envisaged.

If not, does China’s non participation prevent

the arbitral proceedings from going forward?

It is the case that China’s actions (or inaction)

cannot impair the progress of the arbitration.
Article 3 of Annex VII provides that when a
respondent fails to appoint an arbitrator within
a 30-day period or when the parties are unable
to reach agreement on the appointment of the
three other arbitrators or the president of the
tribunal within 60 days of receipt of the
notification, unless the parties agree that any
appointment be made by a person or a third
state chosen by the parties, the applicant
instituting the proceedings may, within 2 weeks