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Southeast Asia Can Resist China’s Gray Zone Aggression in the South China Sea
. . . with Help
By Collin Koh
May 2023
The perception that Southeast Asian nations tend to yield to Chinese coercion at sea
overlooks the brave efforts of regional navies and coast guards to assert their national
sovereignty. Those efforts can and should be bolstered and amplified.
The ScanEagle unmanned aerial system has been sold or given to a number of
Southeast Asian navies and coast guards to assist their maritime domain awareness.
Finding and tracking Chinese fishing, maritime militia, coast guard, and navy ships is
the first step in defending exclusive economic zones and territorial seas. RMN
Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea confront a stark reality. They must
contend with the ever-present economic imperative of not “rocking the boat” in
diplomatic and trade relations with China. For some of these countries, the South China
Sea issue does not hold the same weight as maintaining a buoyant, economically
beneficial relationship with Beijing. Yet, while some Southeast Asian capitals may avoid
openly calling out China’s aggression, they continue to push back against Beijing’s
maritime coercion via other, less visible, actions, including fielding a counterpresence
using limited maritime capacities and engaging extraregional parties as a
counterweight. While these actions may not have rolled back Beijing’s gray zone
activities, they constrain China’s freedom of action.
Going forward, Southeast Asian nations with South China Sea claims are likely to
continue their two-tracked approach to countering Beijing’s maritime coercion: beefing
up their maritime forces as funding allows and engaging friendly extraregional presence.
The present postpandemic recovery notwithstanding, uncertainties about emerging viral
subvariants and current global inflationary pressures may limit sustained long-term
spending on maritime forces. This means concerned countries are likely to put greater
emphasis on gaining outside support. In this regard, extraregional assistance in
maritime capacity building will be crucial. However, this assistance must go beyond
improving maritime domain awareness. While MDA capabilities are undeniably helpful
in plugging detection and surveillance gaps, regional South China Sea parties require
more physical assets that can put up a viable counterpresence against China’s forces in
disputed waters and act against transgressors at sea.
Extraregional powers have gradually scaled up assistance to regional navies and coast
guards. Examples include the transfers of former U.S. Coast Guard cutters to Vietnam
and the Philippines and Japan’s provision of used and new offshore patrol vessels to
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Yet these efforts are insufficient to help
Southeast Asian nations fill their capacity gaps. Absent a more significant U.S. and
allied intervention, the asymmetry in maritime force levels between Southeast Asian
countries and China will persist. Measures to help these countries increase their
indigenous shipbuilding capacities will help them build their own offshore patrol vessels.
Economies of scale could be achieved if regional navies and coast guards adopted
common platforms that could be built in quantity. For example, an offshore patrol vessel
might be built in a Malaysian shipyard for multiple regional navies, while a smaller
coastal patrol vessel design might be built in the Philippines. Such common designs
would lead to lower per-unit procurement and maintenance costs and greater
interoperability.
Providing physical capabilities to push back against China’s maritime coercion is
necessary. But simply gifting equipment to partners will be insufficient if not
accompanied by efforts to bolster key intangible factors such as national political will
and interagency cooperation. Given the blurring nexus between the PLAN, CCG, and
PAFMM in the South China Sea, it will be imperative for Southeast Asian countries to
reexamine and enhance their interagency maritime efforts. It is also crucial not to lose
sight of the overarching need to ensure a coherent and consistent whole-of-
government, whole-of-nation, multinational approach to China’s gray zone aggression
that goes beyond maritime forces to include measures such as economic diversification.
1. Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika
Binnendijk, and Marta Keep, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone:
Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 8.
2. James J. Wirtz, “Life in the ‘Gray Zone’: Observations for Contemporary
Strategists,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017): 106–14.
3. Wataru Okada, “China’s Coast Guard Law Challenges Rule-Based Order,” The
Diplomat, 28 April 2021.
4. Nick Danby, “China’s False Promise: Gunboat Diplomacy, Not Win-Win Outcomes,
Will Shape the South China Sea,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: Air University Press, 28 September 2022).
5. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas,
“Counter-Coercion Series: China-Vietnam Oil Rig Stand-Off,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, CSIS, 12 June 2017.
6. “Malaysia Picks a Three-Way Fight in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 21 February 2020.
7. “Nervous Energy: China Targets New Indonesian, Malaysian Drilling,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 12 November 2021.
8. Jairo Bolledo, “More Ships Sent to West PH Sea Amid Continuous Chinese
Incursion,” Rappler, 13 April 2021.
9. Glee Jalea, “How the Philippine Coast Guard Challenged Chinese Vessels in Sabina
Shoal,” CNN Philippines, 6 May 2021.
10. Raymond Carl Dela Cruz, “PCG Drives Away Chinese Navy Ship from Marie Louise
Bank in WPS,” Philippine News Agency, 19 July 2021; and Frances Mangosing, “PH
Coast Guard Stops China Navy Incursion Near Palawan Resort Town,” Inquirer.net, 19
July 2021. Pictures of the close encounter at Marie Louise Bank can be found in
this Manila Bulletin report: Richa Noriega, “PH Coast Guard’s Radio Challenge Drives
Away Chinese Navy Warship in WPS,” Manila Bulletin, 19 July 2021.
11. For example, see 宋志伟 [Song Zhiwei], “中国海警在南海有争议海区执 法的几点思
考 ” [Some Points for Consideration Regarding China Coast Guard’s Law Enforcement
in the South China Sea Disputed Areas], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of the Chinese
Maritime Police Academy] 12, no. 4 (May 2013): 48–50; and 潘志煊 [Pan Zhixuan], 何忠
龙 [He Zhonglong], and 王河 [Wang He], “ 论 南海局势下中国海警的机遇与挑战 ” [A
Discussion on the Opportunities and Challenges Facing China Coast Guard under the
Current South China Sea Situation], 公 安 海 警 学 院 学 报 [Journal of the Chinese
Maritime Police Academy] 10, no. 4 (October 2013): 48–51.
12. This arrangement provided for a graduated response at sea: If the flotilla were to
encounter a foreign naval vessel, the PLAN ship would respond; the CCG ship would
deal with foreign fishing vessels, while the local authorities focus on Chinese nationals
(such as fishermen and smugglers) who violate domestic maritime laws. “军警民联合编
队 首 次 巡 逻 西 沙 岛 礁 , 历 时 5 天 4 夜 ” [Military-Coast Guard-Civilian Joint Flotilla
Conducts Maiden Paracel Islands Patrol, Lasting Five Days and Four Nights], 中国军网
[81.cn], 20 May 2018.
13. The National Task Force on the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) spotted a pair of
Type-022 Houbei-class missile fast-attack craft and a “corvette-class warship”— most
likely the Type-056. “Four Chinese Navy Ships, 254 Maritime Militia Vessels ‘Swarm’
Spratlys, West Philippine Sea–NTF-WPS,” Manila Standard, 31 March 2021; and
“Patrols Reveal 6 China Navy Ships, 240 Militia in West Philippine Sea,” GMA News, 13
April 2021.
14. For instance, a PLAN ship exhibited “hostile intent” in February 2020 by pointing a
“radar gun” at the Philippine Navy corvette Conrado Yap close to Commodore Reef.
The Filipino warship did not have the electronic support measures to confirm
electromagnetic emissions, but by “radar gun” it was actually referring to the PLAN
ship’s fire control radar system for the main gun mounted on the forecastle, and the
pointing was observed visually. In April 2021, a pair of PLAN Houbei-class missile fast-
attack craft worked with a CCG patrol vessel to pursue a Filipino television crew
conducting investigative journalism in the Philippine EEZ, close to the Second Thomas
Shoal, where a Filipino military garrison is stationed. The Filipino vessel was chartered
by the ABS-CBN News agency and was first chased by the CCG patrol vessel CCG-
5101, which was then joined by the pair of PLAN Houbei craft. See Priam Nepomuceno,
“Wescom Confirms Chinese Vessel’s Hostile Act vs. PH Navy Ship,” Philippine News
Agency, 23 April 2020.
15. See Joviland Rita, “Philippine Naval Ships, Other Assets Deployed in West
Philippine Sea Not Enough—Sobejana,” GMA News, 22 April 2021; and Farik Zolkepli,
“Navy’s Transformation Plan Needs to Be Tweaked Due to Recent Events, says Navy
Chief,” The Star (Malaysia), 27 April 2022.
16. Bernama, “MMEA Hoping to Receive OPV This Year,” Astro Awani, 6 June 2022.