CHAPTER 1

Statutory Construction - art of interpreting the intention of the legislature in passing the law and
applying it to the given facts.

Interpretation - confining determination of the intention of legislature by using the language of the
law (intrinsic)

- art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense with their
author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same
idea which the author intended to convey.

Construction - applying extrinsic guide (not found in the language of the law) in determining the
reason behind the law (e.i. contemporaneous situation)

- drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of
the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in
spirit, though not within the letter.

* The situs of construction and interpretation of written laws belong to the judicial department.

Judicial Prerogative - determination of the facts and applied in the law.

Requisites of Judicial Prerogative

1. Actual case filed in the court

2. Proper parties filing the case (they have the right to protect and interest to pursue)
3. There must be vagueness or ambiguity in the law.
4. Prayer for appropriate resolution of the issue or controversy

*Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation, or equivocation, there is room only for application.

*In the case of Director of Lands vs. CA, the issue was WON the land registration court can validly
confirm and register the title of private respondents in the absence of publication in a newspaper of
general circulation (publication was in official gazette only).
The SC answered this on negative. The term shall connotes a mandatory/imperative nature.
The failure of the respondents to comply with the requirements calls for the dismiss without prejudice
to refiling in the future.

*When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.

*In the case of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual vs. Esperanza Pascual Bautista et al, the
issue was WON Art 992 of CC can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
The SC ruled that the petition is devoid of merit. Art 992 provides that illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children. Clearly, illegitimate refers to both natural and spurious.

*The first and fundamental duty of the Courts is to apply the law.
 *In the case People of the Philippines vs. Mapa, the issue was WON the position of secret
agent constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution of a crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower Court stating that there is no provision made for
secret agent. As such, he is not exempt.

*The duty of the Courts is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy of pity of the
accused.

*In the case of PP. vs. Amigo, the accused convicted of murder and was sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetual appealed for sympathy stating that the penalty was harsh.
Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. DURA LEX SED LEX.

Hermeneutics - science or art of construction and interpretation.

Legal Hermeneutics - systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the
construction and interpretation of legal writings.

Different Kinds of Construction and Interpretation

1. Close interpretation (“LITERAL”)- adopted if just reasons connected with the character and
formation of the text induce as to take the words in their narrowest meaning
2. Extensive Interpretation (“LIBERAL”) - adopts a more comprehensive signification of the
words.
3. Extravagant Interpretation -substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one.
4. Free or Unrestricted Interpretation - proceeds simply on the general principles of
interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle.
5. Limited or Restricted Interpretation - when we are influenced by other principles the the
strictly hermeneutic ones.
6. Predestined Interpretation - takes place if the interpreter, labouring under a strong bias of
mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views and desires.

*Our Laws are often interpreted literally, strictly or liberally, and prospectively of retroactively.

Chapter 2 - STATUTES

*Legislative consists of Senate and House of Representatives has power to make Laws.

1. Bill - a draft of a proposed law from time of its introduction in a legislative body through all the
various stages in both houses. Starting point of Statute

2. Act - is the appropriate term for it after it has been acted on and passed by the legislature.

3. Statute - written will of legislature solely expressed according to the form necessary to
constitute it as the law of the state.

How Does a Bill Becomes a Law - STEPS

1. A member of National Assembly may introduce the proposed bill to the Secretary of National
Assembly who will calendar the same for first reading. (Proponent affix his signature)
2. In the first reading, the bill is ready by its title and number only.
3. After the first reading, the Bill is referred by the Speaker to the appropriate committee for study.
After the public hearing, the committee shall decide whether or not to report the bill favourably or
whether a substitute bill should be considered. (If no favourable report, bill is dead)
4. Upon favourable action by the appropriate committee, the bill is returned to the National Assembly
and shall be calendared for the second reading.
5. In the second reading, the bill is in its entirety.
6. Immediately after the second reading, the bill is set for open debates where members of the
assembly may propose amendments and insertions to the proposed bill.
7. After the approval of the bill in its second reading and at least three (3) calendar days before its
final passage, the bill is printed in its final form and copies thereof distributed to each members of
the assembly, unless the President certifies in writing as to the necessity of the immediate
enactment of the bill to me a public calamity or emergency.
8. Third reading. At this stage, no amendment is allowed. Only the title is read and then the National
assembly will vote on the bill. The yeas and nays are entered in the journal. It appears that only a
majority of the members present constituting a quorum is sufficient to pass the bill.
*At this stage, under the 1987 Constitution, after the third and final reading at on eHouse
where the bill originated, it will go to the other house where it will undergo the same process,
meaning three readings on separate days.
9. After the bill has been finally passes, it will be submitted to the President for his approval. If he
approves the same, he will sign it, otherwise, he will veto it and return the same with his objections
to the house where it originated, and if approved by two-thirds of all its members, shall become a
law (2/3 HOR and 2/3 Senate).

*Every bill passed by Congress shall be acted upon by the President within 30 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise,it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

Constitutional Test in the Passage of Law (Mechanical)

1. Every Bill passed by Congress hall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
*To prevent hodgepodge or log rolling legislation
*To prevent surprise or fraud upon legislature
*To Fairly apprise the people through such publications of legislative proceedings as
is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, i order that
they may have opportunity of being heard hereon by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire.

*The constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a

rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

2. No Bill passed by either house shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to each member 3 days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency.

3. Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
(mandatory requirement)
 Parts of Statute

1. Title - heading of the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually known.
Prefixed to the statute in the form of a brief summary such as An Act providing…..

2. Preamble - the part of the statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the object sought
to be accomplished. Usually starts with the word, whereas. Provides reasons in the passage of
the statute and helpful in the interpretation of any ambiguity within the statute.

3. Enacting Clause - declares it enactment and serves to identify it as an act of legislation proceeding
from the proper legislative authority. Be it enacted is the usual formula used to start this clause.

4. Body - the main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural
provisions. Provisos and exceptions included.

5. Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which have been abrogated
by reason of the enactment of the new law.

6. Saving Clause - a restriction in the repealing act, which is intended to save rights, sending
proceedings, penalties from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted appeal.

7. Separability Clause - provides that in the event that one or more provisions are declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force.

8. Effectivity Clause - announces the effective date of the law.

Kinds of Statutes

1. General Law - affects the community at large. A law that relates to a subject of a general
nature, or that affects all people all the state or all of a particular class.

2. Special Law - different from others of the same general kind or designed for a particular
purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action on
operation.

3. Local Law - relates or operates over a particular locality instated of over the whole territory of
the state.

4. Public Law - general classification of law, consisting generally of CONSTITUTIONAL,

ADMINISTRATIVE, CRIMINAL, and INTERNATIONAL law, concerned with the
organization of the state, the relations between the state and the people who
compose it, the responsibilities of public officers of the state, to each other, and to
private persons, and the relations of States to one another. Maybe general, local or
special.

5. Private Law - defines, regulates, enforces, and administers relationship among individuals,
associations, and corporations.

6. Remedial Statute - provide means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated,
wrongs redressed and relief obtained.

7. Curative Statute - form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate
upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities
 and to render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be
ineffective for the purpose intended.

8. Penal Statute - defines criminal offenses and specify corresponding fines and punishments.

9. Prospective Law - a law applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment.

10. Retrospectie Law - a law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made
to affects act or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came to force.

11. Mandatory Statutes - generic term describing statutes which require and not merely permit a
course of action. Used of shall.

*Mandatory provision in the statute is one the omission of which renders the related
proceedings void; it is the essence of the thing required to be done.

*Directory provision is one the observance of which is not necessary to the validity of the
proceedings; it relates to form and manner and when an act is incidental or acquired after
jurisdiction.

Note: A statute is vague if:

1. it violates the due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of conduct to avoid.
2. it leaves law enforces unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

In the case of Coates vs. City of Cincinnati, the US SC struck down an ordinance that made it
illegal for “three persons to assemble in any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by.

Kinds of Repeal of Statutes

1. Express Repeal - abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of a

subsequent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated.

2. Implied Repeal - happens when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to or

irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes constant in force.

2.1 Provision in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.

*The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that
of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the
prior act since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of
the old one.

2.2 The later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

*Only a Law can repeal another Law.

Ordinance - an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its law making
authority.
*Sangguniang Barangay - Barangay
*Sangguning Bayan - Municipality
*Sangguniang Panlungsod - City
*Sangguniang Panlalawigan - Province

Test of a Valid Ordinance

1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.

2. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6. It must not be unreasonable.

*In case of conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. This is
because local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national law making body.

Chapter 3 - BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

*The objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and
intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced. Legislative intent for
construction purposes does not mean the collection of subjective wishes, hopes, and prejudices of
each and every member of legislature, but rather the objective footprints left on the rail of legislative
enactment.

*Legisative intent is determined principally from the language of statute.

*In the case of Socorro Ramirez vs. Hon Court of Appeals and Ester Garcia, the issue were 1)
WON RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation and
2) WON the substance must be alleged in the information. WON RA 4200 applies to private
conversation.
The CA in answering the first issue said that the use of ANY in Section 1 of RA 4200 means all
persons who are unauthorised to make such recording thus even a privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter qualify as violator
under the provision. With regards to the second issue, CA said that nowhere in the law states that the
nature of the conversation as well as its communication to a third person should be professed. The
meaning of the communication is broad enough to include all types.

*Plain Meaning Rule or Verba Legis. (Literal interpretation)

*In the case of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. NLRC and Imelda
Salazar, the issue was WON the Labor Tribunal committed rave abuse of discretion in holding that the
suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal. (Imelda Salazar violated
company regulation by involving herself in the transactions conflicting with the company’s interest.)
The SC affirmed the decision of the Labor Tribunal because the law is clear as stated in Article
279 of the labor code on security of tenure which states that ,”An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges etc.”
*When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

*In the case of Felicity Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, the issue
was WON the term unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned and subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal refer to all kinds of accusation and conviction.
*The Court dismissed the petition because Section 3 (a) used the term unjust. The fact that his
conviction was reversed and the accused was acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction
was “unjust”. He may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless
be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages.

*In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

Because it is not presumed that the legislature has used any useless words. The omission of a
word from a sentence may easily cause it to express an idea quire different from the one actually
intended and expressed.
*In the case of JMM promotions and Management Inc. vs NLRC and Ulpiano L. Delos Santos,
the issue was WON petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of POEA to the NLRC after having been posted a total bond of P150,000.00 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000.00 as required by POEA Rules.
*The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the need to place an appeal bond as required
by Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which compliments Rule V of POEA.
The appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of monetary award in favor of the employee
if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to NLRC. Note however that appeal bond is under Section 5 Rule
V, Book VII of the POEA.

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*In the case of Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. IAC, (pg 39)

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*A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

*In the case of Manuel De Guia vs. COE, the issue was the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 of
RA 7166, Providing for synchronised National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms for May
11, 1992 elections which provides that “the number and election of elective members of the
Sangguiniang Panlungsod and sangguniang ayan in Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao and any other city
with tw or mor legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Section 2 and 3 of
the RA 6636. Provided further that the commission shall divide each of the Municipalities in Metro
Mnila into 2 districts by Barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Basing on the intent of the Legislature, the SC dismissed the petition affirming the purpose of
districting/apportioning the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted in May
11, 1992 synchronised elections and ensure the efficiency of the electoral process.

*Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.
 *In the case of Elena Salenillas & Bernardino Salenillas vs. Honorable CA, the issue was WON
petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public land
Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, WON their right to repurchase has
already prescribed.
Sps. Encase who were parents of petitioner acquired a parcel of Land thru a patent. Later on,
sold said to the petitioner by virtue of a dded of Sale. They loaned the said land with PNB and was not
able to pay. Foreclosed and auctioned with William Guera as highest bidder. Petitioner offered to
repurchase the said land and said that their right to repurchase for 5 years under Public land Act has
not yet prescribed. However, respondent said that their right to repurchase was bellied by the fact of
the date of sale thus rejecting the term heir thus prescriptive period is within 30 days from the date of
registration.
The SC decided in petitioner’s favor. Sec 119 includes in the enumeration the legal heir who
has the right to repurchase the land. The deed of sale has no bearing so as not to declare the
petitioner as heir of their parents. Therefore, the correct prescribed period should be 5 years as under
Sec 119.

*When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

*In the case of B/Gen. Jose Commendador vs. B/Gen Demetrio Camera, WON the
peremptory challenge against the President and members of CGM No. 14 was valid. Petitioners were
officers of AFP accused of participating in the failed coup d’etat. Article 18 was suspended until
President Marcos lifted the Martial Law. This case was filed 1989 while Martial Law particularly PD # 8
suspending Section 18 was issued 1981.
The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. When the martial law was lifted, Section 18 became
once again operative.

*Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as

that which is expressed.

*In the case of Lydia Chua vs. CSC, the NIA, the issue was WON the petitioner’s status as co-
terminous employee is excluded from the benefits of RA # 6683 which provided early retirement and
voluntary separation from the government in line with the streamlining. The benefits authorized under
this act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, and emergency employees regardless of age who
have rendered at least 2 consecutive government service as of the date of separation. Petitioner’s
employment is co-terminus with her project and was hired and re-hired in for successive projects
during a span of 15 years. Her application with NIA and CSC were denied.
The SC granted the petition stating that petitioners employment as co-terminus with the NIA
project was in turn contractual in nature is considered non-career civil servant like casual and
emergency. The exclusions were specific thus the intention of the legislature was to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned. If such will be considered, it
will violate the Equal protection clause.

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*In the case of City of Manila and City Treasurer vs. Judge Amador Gomez of CFI and Esso
Philippines, Inc., the issue was the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half
percent realty tax. Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, RA 409 fixes the annual realty tax at 1
1/2%. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, RA 5447 imposed an annual
additional tax of one per centrum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property
tax regularly levied. This in turn gave the municipal board of Manila the idea of fixing the realty tax at
3% thus, Ordinance number 7125 was approved.Respondent Esso complaint of the additional 1/2%.
The SC revised the ruling of the RTC in directing petitioner to refund respondent by basing on
the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction in reference to Section 4 of Special Education
Fund Law. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations.

Casus Omissus - when a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated
cases or objects but omits to make any provision for a case or object which is
analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is
therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or
object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen.

* The rule of “Casus Omissus pro Omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established.

*In the case of PP. vs Guillermo Manantan, the issue was WON a justice of the peace is
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. From the facts of the case, it
showed that respondent was charged of violation of Section 54 which identify among others, “No
justice, judge, fiscal…shall in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote…Counsel
of the respondent said that justice of the peace was not included in the enumeration which later o the
CFI accedes the dismissal. According to CFI, Section 54 was taken from Section 449 of the RAC
which enumerates among others,” No judge of First instance, justice of the peace or treasurer,
fiscal……shall in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote.
The SC said that the above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is noted that under
section 449, the word just is qualified by “of first instance” while Section 54 need not to include such
because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, “judge”. Cases
Omissus cannot be applied because the term was not omitted intentionally but what happened was
only a substitution. Order was set-aside and case was remanded for trial on merits.

*Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters
already decided on merits cannot be relitigated again and again.

*In the case of JM Tucson and Co., Inc et al vs Hon. Herminio Mariao, Manuela Aquial, Maria
Aquial, Sps. Jose and Saturnina Cordova, the issue was WON OCT no. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom can be questioned this late hour by respondents. The facts of the case showed that
sometime in 1960, petitioner had illegally entered upon the land which the respondent discovered that
it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT 735 and was registered in the name of the
petitioner. Now respondent filed a complaint which prayed that the titles derived therefrom be declared
null and void.
The Trial court directed to dismiss the case with prejudice. In turned out that the supposed
irregularities in the land registration proceedings, which led to the issuance of the decree which OCT
735 was based, are the same issues raised in CC 3621,3622,and 3623 of the lower court. On appeal
to this Court, the decision was reversed and the validity of OCT no. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom was once more upheld. Following th principle of stare decisis, it becomes evident that
respondents cannot maintain their action in civil case without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT 735 is valid and not open to attack.

CHAPTER 4 - Construction & Interpretation of Words and Phrases

*When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The rule, founded on logic,
is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general significance.
 * In the case of British Assurance vs IAC, petitioner issued a counter bond in favor of Varian
Industrial who was a respondent in another case filed by Sycwin Coating and wires. In said case, the
trial court rendered decision in favor of plaintiff thus respondent appealed. On appeal, respondent was
required to file a comment but to no avail. Petitioner then prayed for execution pending appeal against
the petitioner in this present case because the properties attached before were returned unsatisfied.
Under SECTION 5 AND 12, Rule 57, it is intended that counter bond is intended to secure
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in action. Section 17 of the same rule
also provides that when the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, it is only then that
payment of judgment shall become charged on such countermand. The SC ruled that by the word
judgment does not only refer to final and executory but as well as to those pending appeal.
*The rule is well-recognised that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish.

*In the case of Juanito Pila vs. COE, the issue was WON the petitioner can be considered a
candidate despite the withdrawal of his COC. Petitioner herein filed his candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela but later on withdrew his COC. He was fined
10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures as mandated in Section 14
of RA 7166 which states that EVERY candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30
days after the election…..Petitioner contended that he was not obliged because he was a non-
candidate having withdrawn his candidacy 3 days after filing thus he had not entered in a political
contest.
The SC ruled against petitioner stating that Section 14 of RA 7166 states that every
candidate…..Well recognised is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts shall not
distinguish. The law made no qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or
withdrew the same as the term EVERY deemed to refer to all.

*If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

*In the case of PP. Vs. Hon. Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon, the issue was
WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion in granting private respondent’s application
for probation despite the fact that he appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
The facts of the case showed that respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide and
was sentenced to 1 year and ordered to pay 5,000.00 to the offended party. On appeal, the CA
affirmed private respondents conviction but modified his sentence by imposing him an indeterminate
penalty of 2 months. Respondent applied for probation which RTC granted.
The SC ruled that indeed the Judge committed grave abuse because Probation Law was
already amended by PD 1990 in 1986 thus he was already covered by the prohibition that “no
application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction and that the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal. Having appealed from the judgment and applied for probation only after the CA had affirmed
his conviction, private responded was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

*When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

*In the case Ceclio de Villa vs. CA, the issue was WON BP 22 covers foreign bank. The facts
of the case shows that the check involved was drawn from a dollar account of petitioner with foreign
bank and therefore not covered by BP.
However, the SC dismissed the petition stating that the law does not distinguish the currency
which states that under BP 22, “foreign checks provided they are either drawn or issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the said law.
*General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language
shall be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule
is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all items in an enumeration
belong to or fall under one specific class.

In the case of Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc vs. Hon. Pedro Jimenez as Auditor General,
the issue was WON the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilisers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law
as so as to entitle it to refund under Section 2 thereof. From the facts of the case, it shows that
petitioner imported from abroad various materials such as moss extract, sodium benzoate etc for use
as stabilisers and flavouring of dental cream it manufactures. For every importation of these said
materials, petitioner pays 17% special excise tax to Central Bank as payment for the cost,
transportation and other other charges incident thereto, pursuant to RA 601.
Petitioner later applied for refund based on Section 2 of RA 601 which states that the tax
collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost incident to
importation of rice, flour. canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate,
stabiliser and flavours, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, etc. The SC upheld the ruling of Auditor General
stating that the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation of manufacture of
food and food products. In this case, the enumeration does not fall under the same class such as
poultry and fertilizers which followed the term stabilizers and flavors.

EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE - broad and comprehensive expressions in an act such as “and all
others” or “any others” are usually to be restricted to persons or things”of the same kind” or class with
those specially mentioned in the preceding words.

*Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generic, that is where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying to persons of things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

*In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Hon. Eutropiwo Migrinio and Troadio Tecson, the
issue was WON private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board
an agency of the PCGG for violation of RA Nos. 309 and 1379. The facts of the case shows that
respondent occupied the position of Finance officer of the Philippine Constabulary. Respondent in his
pleading stated that PCGG has no jurisdiction over him because he did not belong to the people
enumerated in EO No. 1 to wit:
“The recovery of ill gotten wealth accumulated by force President Ferdinand Marcos, the
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad etc…”

The term subordinate in the above would refer to the one who enjoys a close association or
relation with the former President and or his wife, similar to the immediate family and the like.
Therefore, the SC enjoined the PCGG from investigating without prejudice to an action of proper
agency.

*Rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain.

*In the case of PP vs Vicente Echavez, Jr., the issue was WON PD 772 which penalizes
squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The facts of the case shows that 5 illegal
settlers were accused under Section 1 of PD 772 which states that, “Any person who, with the use of
force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance, succeeds in occupying
or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes. The Judge dismissed the case (1)for using stealth and strategy instead of force and threat
and (2)the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
*The SC upheld the dismissal not due of the reasons above because Ejusdem Generis does
not apply in this case. It was because the intent of the decree was unmistakable as it is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.

*The familiar rule of Ejusdem Generis.

*In the case of Mesa Vera, as Commissioner of BIR and the Fair Trade Board vs. Hon. Serafin
Cueva, Judge, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc and
Consolidated Milk Company Inc and Milk Industries Inc, the issue was WON the product of private
respondent falls on the milk classified under Section 169 of the tax code. The lower court ordered the
petitioner to restrain from ordering the respondent to put label on their products as prescribed by
Section 169 to wit:
“Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk- all condensed skimmed and filled milk in whatever
form., from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly mark on its immediate containers, and in all language in which
such containers are marked, with the words, This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age or with the equivalent words.

The SC upheld the decision of the lower court stating that Section 169 has been repealed by
implication thus it merely became directory. Moreover, it is apparent that the particular section does
not apply to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the headnote and
“condensed skimmed milk” in the text of cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
“all milk” in whatever form. Moreover, skimmed milk is different from filled milk because in the former,
the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted
with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both.

*The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
“Expressio units eat exclusion alterius”

*In the case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, the issue was WON a
vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately-owned wharf or pier is liable to the
payment of the berthing charged under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
PD 34. The facts of the case shows that Litonjua Shipping used the berthing facility of Iligan Bay
Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City. The collector of customs collected berthing fees which
was paid by the former under protest. Petitioner in the said case filed an appeal with the
Commissioner of Customs who affirmed the decision.
Thus, petitioner appealed with the Court of Tax Appeal who reversed the decision stating that
the right of the government to impose berthing fees is limited to national ports only. Under EO 72
which classifies ports into national or municipal port, the port in controversy was not listed. A rule in
statutory construction that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute
had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.

*Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it
is associated.

*In the case of Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs. Sec. Juan Flavier, the issue was WON the
Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working on the offices
other than the officer of the ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints
filed against said officials and employees. The facts of the case shows that petitioner herewith is filing
prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify the order of the Ombudsman for violation of graft and
corrupt practices act. The petitioner and the Solicitor General said that Ombudsman can only
recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of the
officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office as enshrined in
Section 3 (3) of 1987 Constituton.
The SC uphold the decision of the Ombudsman and dismissed the instant petition stating that
the Constitution has vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a public
official or employees with referred to suspension as punitive in nature such as removal, demotion,
censure, fine. Section 24 of RA 6770 grants the agency the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him is a procedural, not a penal statute.
In order to recommend the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees, it has to conduct an investigation and that he may need to suspend the respondent.

*Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in affirmative are mere
directory.

*In the case of Manolo Fule vs CA, the issue was WON the unsigned stipulation of facts may
be admitted as evidence. The facts of the case shows that Petitioner was convicted of violation of BP
22. It appears that the stipulation of the facts was not signed by the petitioner nor by his counsel.
Petitioner waived his right to present evidence and in lieu thereof submitted a memorandum affirming
the stipulation of facts. CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner based on stipulation of facts.
The SC reversed the decision saying that under Section 4 of 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure to wit, “Pre-trial agreements must be signed - No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to
writing and signed by him and his counsel. The word shall connotes a mandatory character thus it is
inadmissible as evidence. A memorandum submitted did not cure the defect of the stipulation of facts
What the prosecution should have done is to present evidence upon discovering that the stipulation of
facts was not signed. Therefore, without evidence the guilt of the accused cannot be established
beyond reasonable doubt.

*The use of words “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing while the word
“shall” is imperative.

* In the case of Purita Bersabal vs. Hon Judge Serafin Salvador, the issue was WON the mere
failure of the of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph
would empower the Court of First instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute;
or WON it is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time
notwithstanding. The facts of the case shows that petitioner failed to file her memorandum on time.
Section 45 of RA 296 otherwise known as Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended by RA
6031 states that, “ Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested.” The SC reversed the decision
stating that the law is clear that memorandum submission is only optional thus, the Court cannot
dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission but rather it is mandatory that it decide the
case on the basis of available evidence and records transmitted to it.

*The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and may be consistent with
an exercise of discretion.
 *In the case of Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Inc vs. CA, the issue was WON the
non filing of LGVHAI of its corporate by-laws a ground for its dissolution. The facts of the case shows
that LGVHAI is an association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. That it was
not able to file its corporate by-laws within the period required by the Corporation code and was a non-
user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association’s activities. As
an offshoot, petitioner’s registration was granted. Upon knowing this, LGVHAI, lodged a complaint with
the HIGC praying for the cancellation of the certificate of registration of North and South association.
Section 46 of the Corporation code states, “Adoption of by-laws- Every Corporation formed
under this code, must within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its
certificate of incorporation by the SEC, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent
with this code. The SC denied the petition stating that the word “MUST” as used in here is merely
directory. Moreover, the second paragraph of the law allows the filing of by-laws even prior to
incorporation. Having these 2 option as to the filing proves the directory nature of the law and not
mandatory.

*The use of the term “AND” and the word “OR”

*”AND” means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to
be added to or to be taken along with the first. It is a joinder or unison.
“OR” is a disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among
two or more things. It is also used to clarify what has already been said, and in such cases means “in
other words”, “to wit”, or “that is to say”. The word OR is to be used as a function word to indicate an
alternative between different or unlike things.

*For purposes of determining whether or not a crime has prescribed pursuant to the provisions
of Article 90 of RPC, the term month shall be understood as a 30-day month and not a calendar
year.

*A week means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on
which it begins.

*In the case of PNB vs. CA, the issue was OWN the petitioner bank complied with the
requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. The facts of the
case shows that private respondent mortgaged his two lots with herein petitioner but was later on
foreclosed due to non-payment. PNB was able to get the lots after winning the highest bid. As required
by Section 3 of Act No. 3135, the noticed of the auction shall be published once a week for at east 3
consecutive weeks. PNB did publish on March 28 (Friday), April 11 and 12, 1969 (Saturday).
The SC dismissed the petition. It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a week. However, it turned out that PNB was not able to comply.

Proviso - is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which is either to except something
from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of its extent.

*In the case of ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and National Steel Corp., the issue was WON the
petitioners are characterized as project employees of private respondent. This issue relates to an
important consequence: the services of project employees are co-terminous with the project and may
be terminated upon the end or completion of the project for which they were hired. The facts of the
case shows that petitioner filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, and monetary benefits
with the NLRC. Petitioner are contending that they are regular employees and not project employees
after 6 years of service. NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter that the petitioner are project
employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the 5-year expansion
program.
 The SC dismissed the petition saying that the claim of the petitioner is of no legal basis. The
fact that the employment of the petitioners as project employees had gone beyond 1 year does not
detract from or legally dissolve their status as project employees. The second paragraph of Article 280
which states that, “An employment shall be deemed as casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph. Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least 1 year service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee and his employment shall
continue while such actually exists” refer to casual employees and not project employees.

*In the case of Danilo Paras vs. COE, it was decided that SK election is not a kind of regular
election, local or national which refers to an election participated by those who possess the right of
suffrage who are not disqualified by law. One requirements of exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of
Article V of the constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years old. SK election includes 15-21
years old. Thus, it is not in the purview of regular election.

Chapter V - Presumptions in Aid of Construction and Interpretation

*Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.

*In the case of ARIS (Phils) Inc vs NLRC, the issue was WON Section 12 of RA 6715 related
to Article 223 of Labor code which states that, “In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.
The Sc dismissed the petition stating that it was baseless. laws are always presumed
constitutional. Settled is the rule that between two possible construction, one avoiding a finding of
unconsntituti0nality, and the other one yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. It is a
proper exercise of police power to ensure survival from threat of danger or even the life of the
dismissed employee.

*All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the Court.

*In the case of Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon Felipe Pacquing and Associated Development
Corporation and Teofisto Guingona and Dominator Cepeda vs. Hon Vetino Reyes vs. Associated
Development Corporation, the issue was WON PD 771 which revoked all powers and authority of
Local government to grant franchise, license or permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on
horse and dog races, jai-alai or basque pelota and other forms of gambling is unconstitutional as
violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. The facts of the case
shows that private respondent tried to operate a jai-alai which the games and Amusement Board
intervened invoking PD 771.
The Court ruled in favor of the state saying that the Republic may be allowed to intervene in
exercise of its government functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare. In
addition, nowhere it can be traced that PD 771 has been repealed, altered, or amended.

*In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.

*In the case of Karen Salvation vs Central Bank of the Philippines, the issue was WON Sec
113 of Central Bank Circular 960 which states that, “Exemption from Attachment - foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of the court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever” and Section 8 of RA
6426 as amended by PD 1246 otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit act may be made
applicable to a foreign transient.
The facts of the case shows that petitioner who was 12 year old was illegally detained and
raped by Greg Bartelli. On the course, accused was able to escape from jail. The Trail court ordered
garnishment of accused accounts and eventually judgment by default was rendered against defendant
and was ordered to pay.
The SC granted the petition saying that it is unthinkable, that the questioned Sec. 113 of
Central Bank Circular 960 would be used as device by the accused fro wrongdoing and in doing so,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. The application of the law depends on the extent
of its justice.

*A Law should not be interpreted so as to cause injustice.

*In the case of Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs IAC, the issue was WON there was a
valid notice. Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice Assuming that
there was valid notice but it was not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period of
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977? The facts of the case shows that
therein petitioners bought an undivided share from the 2 Padua siblings by absolute sale and Con
Pacto de Recto (sale with right to repurchase) respectively. On February 25, 1976 one of the siblings
Mariano Padua sought to redeem the properties but was denied because he was an American citizen.
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua another co-heir filed her own complaint invoking the same
right of redemption. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the right had lapsed. In
reversing the decision, CA said that the notice required was written and the actual notice would not
suffice as substitute.
The SC granted the petition saying that they cannot accept the pretence of the Padua’s that
they were unaware of the sales made by their siblings. By strictly abiding the letter of the law will serve
injustice. The circumstances of the case such as building a fence in the are bought by the petitioner
and building a semi concrete house of petitioners son are not unusual. The prescription started to run
when Mariano Padua tried to redeem the land. Also, point worth taking is that Eustaquia Padua lived
in the same house with Tecla Padua so as not to be aware of the sale.

*In the absence of express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and
old laws.

*In the case of Achilles Berces Jr vs. Hon Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona Jr et al, the
issue was WON RA 7160 was repealed by AO No. 18. The facts of the case shows that petitioner filed
two administrative cases against Mayor Naomi Coral which the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled in his
favor. However, Mayor Coral appealed the decision with the office of the President and prayed for stay
of execution which was granted to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
Section 68 of RA 7160 reads,” Execution pending appeal - an appeal shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final and executory.The respondent shall be considered as having been
placed under preventive suspension during the tendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
Section 6. Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon the filing of the appeal within the period
prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of
the President may direct or stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable.
 The SC said that the petition is devoid of merit to base his claim on Section 68 of RA 7160. He
wrongly invoked the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), RA 7160 because it is not an express repeal
of Section 6 AO 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are
intended to be repealed. The 2 mentioned should not be repugnant but in fact should be read
together.

*Repeal of Statute by Implication not favored.

*In the case of Antonio Mecano vs COA, the issue was WON the enactment of Administrative
Code of 1987 operates to repeal the revised administrative code of 1917. The facts of the case shows
that petitioner filed this certiorari because his claim for reimbursement (when he got sick due to
service connected reason) under Section 699 of the Revised Code was not approved by COA
Chairman Domingo. The reason for the denial was because Section 699 of the RAC has been
repealed by Administrative Code of 1987.
The SC granted the petition stating that it was not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be revealed. The failure to add repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless there is an irreconcilable
inconsistency.

*In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective statute.

*In the case of Danilo Paras vs. COE, it was decided that SK election is not a kind of regular
election, local or national which refers to an election participated by those who possess the right of
suffrage who are not disqualified by law. One requirements of exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of
Article V of the constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years old. SK election includes 15-21
years old. Thus, it is not in the purview of regular election.

*Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative
intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

*In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc and The
Court of Tax Appeals, the facts of the case shows that private respondent overpaid its 1959 income
tax by 221,033 but was short of 367,994.00 by 1960. The Commissioner demanded payment for the
short with interest which respondent paid under protest. Respondent claimed that it should not have
been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax but only an amount representing
the difference between the said deficiency. Esso thus asked for refund but it was denied thus, this
petition for certiorari by the petitioner.
The court of Tax Appeal denied the petition stating that the government had the obligation to
return the excess to ESSO. Since the excess belonging to ESSO was already in the hand of the
government, it was neither legally or logically possible for ESSO thereafter to be considered a debtor
of the Government in the amount mentioned with no interest.

*Presumption against undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative

measure.

*In the case of Cesario Ursua vs CA, the issue was WON the use of different name belonging
to another isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of CA 142. The facts of the case shows that
petitioner has been complained in the Office of the Ombudsman. His counsel then advised him to get
copy of said complaint but before proceeding talk to his counsel’s messenger Oscar Office telling the
latter that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document. Perez advised him that he could just
sign his name but an acquaintance knew him and reported him to the office of ombudsman who find
him guilty of the charge.
 The SC reversed the judgment saying that petitioner had not done an offence under CA 142,
An Act regulating an Alias. An Alias is a name or names used by person or intended to be used him
publicly and habitually usually in business transaction in addition to his real name by which he is
registered by birth normally among Chinese. The case at the bar, the fictitious or different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to
be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in CA 142.

Chapter VI - Intrinsic Aids in Construction & Interpretation

Intrinsic Aids - aids within the statute especially when there is ambiguity in the statute such as Title,
Preamble, Context or Body of the Statute, Chapter and section headings, punctuation
and interpretation clause.

*Subtitle of the statute as intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.

In the case of Mirian Defender Santiago et al vs COE, Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Lorna
Pedrosa, the issue was WON RA 6735 entitle, “An Act Providing for a system of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor”, was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constituition; and if so, WON the act as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
The opinion of the majority is on the negative. While the act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle Ii) and For Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle
was provided for Initiative on the Constitution. If Congres intended to include it, they should have
provided a subtitle therefor.

*The intent of the law is culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances, and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.

*In the case of Florencio Eugenio vs. executive Secretary Franklin Drillon, Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board and Prospero Palomino, the issue was WON the failure to develop a
subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of amortisations by a buyer on instalment
under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the enactment of PD 957, The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Degree. The facts of the case shows that respondent bought 2 lots
from petitioner snd his co-owner/co developer in E & S Delta Village. While the case was pending,
respondent filed another complaint against petitioner and Sps. Relevo for selling and buying,
respectively 1 of the 2 lots in controversy. Respondent prayed that the sale be annulled. He reasoned
out that non-payment was due to the failure of the petitioner to develop the village.
but OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel contract with private
respondent due to non-payment of amortization. On Appeal, the commissioner Proper of HSRC
reversed the decision and ordered the petitioner to complete the subdivision and refund respondent on
all payments plus interest for the lot sold to Sps, Relevo. Hence, this petition.
The SC ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion and that PD 957 should
be given retroactive effect. Although PD 957 did not provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such
can be inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. As an instrument of social justice, the law
favours the weak and it was acted with no other end in view but to provide protective mantle over
helpless citizens. The preamble of PD 957 states: “Whereas, it is the policy of the state to afford its
inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and provide them with ample opportunities
for improving their quality of life. Petition dismissed.

*Preamble used as a guide in determining the intent of the lawmaker.

*Int eh case of PP vs hon. Vicente Echavez, the issue was Won PD 772, which penalises
squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. The facts of the case shows that the Fiscal has
filed a complaint against 5 individuals alleging that they violate PD 772. The case was raffled to the
private respondent and in his own dismissed the case due to 1) it was alleged that the accused
entered the the land through stealth and strategy and not by force, intimidation or threat and 2)the
decree does not apply to grazing land.
The SC dismissed the petition saying that the law applies to squatting in Urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
preamble of the Law states that:
“Whereas, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of LOI # 19 directing……to
remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and along esters and river banks, those along
railroad tracks and those built without permits public and private property squatting is still a major
problem in urban communities all over the country. It is to be noted that squatting in agricultural lands
like grazing lands is punished by RA 947.

Chapter VII - Extrinsic Aids in Construction & Interpretation

Intrinsic Aids - from outside sources or outside the four corners of the statute.

Extrinsic Guides
1. Contemporaneous Circumstances
2. Legislative History of the Statute
3. Reports and Recommendations of Legislative Committees
4. Legislative Debates
5. Statement of Individual Legislators (holding press conference which later subject to press release)
6. Public Policy (Stated in the Constitution)
7. Legislative Interpretation of the Law
8. Judicial Construction
9. Construction and Interpretation of the Bar

*It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is amigos, courts may examine not the
printed pages of the published Act as well as this extrinsic matters that may aid in
constructing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for
the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.

*In the case of Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard, the issue was WON the
exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties
granted by RA 387 or the Petroleum AT OF 1949,should embrace or include the special import tax
imposed by the Special Tax Law. The facts of the case shows that RA 387 is the holder of Refining
Concession No. 2. Under Section 103 of RA 387, it may import free from customs duty materials
related to its business but the Collector of Customs held that it was subject to the payment of special
import tax. Commissioner of Customs upheld the decision of the Collector hence this petition.
The SC denied the petition Article 102-104 of RA 397 supports the claim. Section 104 states
that it shall be exempt from levy upon petroleum produced from concession granted under this Act. It
is the intention of the legislature to encourage exploitation and development of petroleum resources of
the country.

*Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws command much respect and weight.

*In the case of Mesa Vera, as Commissioner of BIR and the Fair Trade Board vs. Hon. Serafin
Cueva, Judge, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc and
Consolidated Milk Company Inc and Milk Industries Inc, the issue was WON the product of private
respondent falls on the milk classified under Section 169 of the tax code. The lower court ordered the
petitioner to restrain from ordering the respondent to put label on their products as prescribed by
Section 169 to wit:
“Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk- all condensed skimmed and filled milk in whatever
form., from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly mark on its immediate containers, and in all language in which
such containers are marked, with the words, This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age or with the equivalent words.

The SC upheld the decision of the lower court stating that Section 169 has been repealed by
implication thus it merely became directory. Moreover, it is apparent that the particular section does
not apply to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the headnote and
“condensed skimmed milk” in the text of cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
“all milk” in whatever form. Moreover, skimmed milk is different from filled milk because in the former,
the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted
with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both.

*Contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers charged with

implementing and enforcing the provisions of the statutes should be given controlling weight,
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous.

*In the case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Union (PAFLU) vs. Bureau of Labor
relations, National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Blooming Mills, the issue was WON
the Director of Labor relations committed grave abuse of discretion. The facts of the case shows that
respondent won over petitioner in a certification election which aims to determine the exclusive
bargaining agent of all employees in the Philippines Blooming Mills Co., Inc (429 vs. 414). Petitioner
objected and relied upon the doctrine in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines that
spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. There were 17 spoiled ballots.
The SC dismissed the petition saying that the reference case invoked by the petitioner should
not be applied because this occurred when it was the Industrial Peace Act that was in effect and not
the present Labor Code. Labor code took effect February 3, 1975 but been made known to the public
February 3, 1975.

*Courts may avail themselves of actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.

*In the case Ceclio de Villa vs. CA, the issue was WON BP 22 covers foreign bank. The facts
of the case shows that the check involved was drawn from a dollar account of petitioner with foreign
bank and therefore not covered by BP.
However, the SC dismissed the petition stating that the law does not distinguish the currency
which states that under BP 22, “foreign checks provided they are either drawn or issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the said law.

*In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted.

*In the case of The National Police Commission vs.Hon. Judge Salvador De Guzman Jr., the
issue was WON RA6975 distinguishes Integrated National Police from Philippine Constabulary. The
facts of the case shows that petitioner would like to avail the compulsory retirement of PNP officers as
mandated in Sec 39, RA 6975otherwise known as “An act establishing the Philippine National Police
under a reorganised Department of the Interior and Local Government which state among others that
compulsory requirement, for officer and non-officer shall be upon the attainment of age 56. Petitioners
are members of defund PC and have reached the age of 56. Private respondent denied their request
saying that they are also covered by Section 89 which states that they are within the transition period
of 4 years as well. Private respondent claimed that they are also included in the term INP. Petitioner
disagree claiming that the use of the term INP in Sec 89 does not imply the same meaning
contemplated under PD 765 to wit:
“Section 1. Constitution of INP - this is hereby established and constituted the INP which shall
be composed of the PC as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces.”
The SC granted the petition deciding that the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it
been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of whole PNP
for the retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from PC. Based on
the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, we find that the legislature did intend to exclude
the members of the PC from the coverage of Section 89 in solar as the retirement age is concerned.

*Individual statements by members of Congress on the floor do not necessarily reflect

legislative intent.

*In the case of CASCO Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro Giminez, in his capacity
as Auditor General of the Philippines, the issue was WON urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law
from the payment of the aforesaid margin. The facts of the case shows that Petition is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues and bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the production of said glue and paid the corresponding
margin fee imposed by the Central Bank. Later, petitioner sought for refund relying on resolution No.
1529 of the monetary Board of the Central Bank declaring that separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Auditor of the bank refused to approve the application for
refund saying that importation of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the stated provision to
wit:
“The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section 1 hereof
shall not be imposed upon the same of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for exclusive use of end-users.”
The SC upheld the decision saying that, through the National Institute of Science and
technology expressed through its Commissioner, that urea formaldehyde is a finished product which is
patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde.
Chapter VII - Strict & Liberal Construction and Interpretation of Statutes

*In the case of Martin Centeno vs. Hon. Victoria Villain Pernillos and the PP, the issue was
WON the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense as to include a
religious purpose. The facts of the case shows that petitioner is the chairman of a civic organisation
known as Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay. That said organisation launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the Chapel of Barrio Tikay. Without a permit from DSWD, he with Vicente
Yco approached Judge Adoration Angeles and solicited from her a contribution of 1,500.00. By that,
Judge Angeles filed a complaint against the 2 for violating PD 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that their action did not constitute an offence under
PD1564 which only covers solicitation for charitable or public welfare purposes but not those made for
religious purpose such as construction of a chapel. The lower court found the 2 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt but recommended that they be pardoned as they acted in good faith. petitioner
appealed with RTC but the latter affirmed the decision of the lower court hence this petition.
The SC reversed and set aside and the petitioner acquitted. To subsume the religious purpose
of the solicitation within the concept of charitable purpose under PD 1564 requires a prior permit with
Department of Social Services and Development, and under pain of penal liability in the absence
thereof,would be prejudicial to the petitioner.Accordingly, the term charitable should be strictly
construed as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Penal legislations should be interpreted as
would favor the accused.
*Penal statutes should be construed strictly against the State and in favour of the accused.

*In the case of Cesario Ursua vs CA, the issue was WON the use of different name belonging
to another isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of CA 142. The facts of the case shows that
petitioner has been complained in the Office of the Ombudsman. His counsel then advised him to get
copy of said complaint but before proceeding talk to his counsel’s messenger Oscar Office telling the
latter that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document. Perez advised him that he could just
sign his name but an acquaintance knew him and reported him to the office of ombudsman who find
him guilty of the charge.
The SC reversed the judgment saying that petitioner had not done an offence under CA 142,
An Act regulating an Alias. An Alias is a name or names used by person or intended to be used him
publicly and habitually usually in business transaction in addition to his real name by which he is
registered by birth normally among Chinese. The case at the bar, the fictitious or different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to
be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in CA 142.

*In case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the government and liberally
in favour of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the
applicable statute expressly and clearly declares.

*In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. IAC and Sps. Antonio and Clara Pastor, the
facts of the case shows that the Republic of the Philippines through BIR commended an action to
collect from herein respondent spouses deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 in the
amount off P17,117.08 with a 5%surcharge and 1% monthly interest plus cost. The Pastors filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied. Later, they admitted that there was an assessment against them for
the income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they availed of the tax
amnesty under PD 213 and paid corresponding amnesty taxes. the Trial court rendered a decision in
favor pf herein respondent hence, this appeal.
The SC denied the petition. Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment against the
Pastor were correct, since the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the
Government by way of amnesty taxes under PD 213 and were granted not merely ax exemption, but
an amnesty for their past tax failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference
between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. A tax
amnesty gives evaders who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby
become a part of the new society with a clean slate.

*As a rule, any claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the taxpayer.
However, where the law is clear and unambiguous, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.

*In the case of Acting Commissioner of Customs vs. Manila Electric Company and Court of
Tax Appeals, the issue was WON the claim for exemption from the tax statute be strictly construed
against the respondent MERALCO. The facts of the case shows that MERALCo is claiming that it is
exempt from special import tax not only by virtue of Section 6 RA 1934 which exempts from the tax
requirement and spare parts for use in industries but also Paragraph 9, Part 2 of its franchise which
expressly exempts its insulators from all taxes of whatever kind in nature.
In consideration of Part 2 of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the right to build and maintain
in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for conveying and furnishing of electric current of light,
heat and power, and to charge for the same the grants shall pay to the City of Manila 2 1/2% of the
gross earnings received from the business under this franchise in the city and its suburbs; and shall be
in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon the
privileges, earnings , income, franchise, and poles, wires and transformers, and insulators of the
grantee, from which taxes and assessments of the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.
The SC affirmed the decision. It is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of
the law is clear and ambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is devoid of judicial addition and subtraction. In this case, we found
the provision of Section 186-A-whenever a tax free is utilised-all encompassing to comprehend tax-
free raw materials, even if imported.

*Tax exemption must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favour of the
state.

*In the case of Misaims Oriental Association of Coco Traders Inc vs. Department of Finance
Secretary. Commissioner of Internal revenue and Revenue District Officer, BIR, Misaims Oriental, the
issue was WON copra is an agricultural food or nonfood product. Fact of the case shows that
petitioner is a domestic corporation whose members individually or collectively, are engaged in the
buying a d selling of copra. It contends that prior to the issuance of revenue memorandum, which
implemented VAT ruling, copra was classified as agricultural food product and therefore exempt from
all stages of production and distribution. The pertinent provision of NIRC states:
Section 103. Exempt Transactions - the following shall be exempt from the value-added tax
(a)Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in their original state by the
primary producer or the owner of the land where the same are produced.
(b)Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and marine products,
livestock and putty of a kind generally used ass, or yielding or producing foods for human
consumption, and breeding stock and genetic material therefor.
The circular classified copra then as an agricultural nonfood product and declaring it vat
exempt only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to section 103(a).
The SC agrees with the respondent. Copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption.

*Tax exemption strictly construed against the taxpayer.

*In the case of Resins Inc vs. Auditor General of the Philippines and the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the issue was WON urea and formaldehyde is the same as urea formaldehyde therefore it
is exempt from paying taxes.
The SC dismissed the petition with reason similar to CASCO Philippines Chemical Co., Inc. vs.
Giminez.

Insurance Law

*Contracts of Insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against
the insurer.

*In the case of Finman General Assurance Corporation vs CA, the issue was WON death
resulting from assault or murder deemed included in the terms “accident” and “accidental”. The facts
of the case shows that deceased was insured with petitioner. While said insurance was in full force
and effect, insured died as a result of stab wound inflicted by one of the 3 unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin were waiting for a ride on their
way home. The heirs of the deceased file a notice of claim but herein petitioner denied said claim
contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
Heirs filed a complaint with Insurance Commission which the latter rendered decision in their favor.
When appealed, appellate court affirmed the decision hence this petition.
 The SC upheld the decision saying that the death of the insured was a result of his voluntary
act considering the very nature of these crimes. The insured died from an event that took place
without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause,
and therefore, not expected. neither it can be said that there was a capricious desire on the part of the
accused to expose his life to danger. Moreover, the personal accident insurance involved herein
specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances wherein no liability attached to petitioner insurance
company for injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stipulation
causes. The doctrine, “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing” applies.

Labor and Social Legislations

*In the case of Ramon Corporal vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and GSIS, the
facts of the case shows that petition is the husband of Norma Peralta Corporal who was a public
school teacher. Prior to her death after giving birth with the help of a pilot, she was assigned to
different school where she had to work from and to school. An hour later after she gave birth, she was
rushed to Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding that caused her death.
Petitioner filed a complaint with GSIS but the latter denied it. He then appealed to Employees
Compensation Commission which also denied it. Petitioner said that respondents contravene the
constitutional provision of social justice. He said that workmen’s compensation law is a social
legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favour of the employees whose rights intend
to protect.
Under OD 626, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the
claimant must show either (a) that it is a result of occupational disease listed in Annex A or (b) That
the risk contracting disease is increased by the working conditions. Since petitioner admits that his
wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by theECC but merely anchored on the
second rule, he must show the risk of contracting his wife’s illness was increased by her working
conditions which he failed to discharge. Petition denied.

*Doubts in the interpretation of Workmen’s Compensation and Labor Code should be resolved
in favour of the worker.

*In the case of Maria Manahan vs. Employee’s Compensation Commission and GSIS, the
facts of the case shows that petitioner is the widow of Nazario Manahan Jr., who died of enteric fever
while employed as a teacher. She filed a claim with GSIS under PD 626 which the latter denied finding
that typhoid fever is not an occupation disease. She then filed an MR on the ground that deceased
was in perfect health when admitted to service and his ailment was attributable to his work. She
appealed with ECC but also denied her claim.
The SC set aside the decision of EEC. The findings that the deceased was in perfect health
before he entered government service and that in the course of his employment he was treated for
epigastric pain and succumbed to enteric fever. This is likewise sustained by the medical certificate to
the effect that deceased was treated for epigastric pain probably due to hyperacidity which is a
symptom of ulcer, a common complication of typhoid fever. Applying the doctrine, in case of doubt, the
same should be resolved in favour of the worker.

*Basically, social legislation is liberally construed.

*In the case of Salvador Lazo vs ECC and GSIS, the issue was WON petitioner’s injury comes
within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment.
The facts of the case shows that petitioner was a security guard of Central Bank and his regular tour
was 2:00pm - 10:00pm. However, his reliever failed to arrive thus he rendered overtime duty up to
5:00am when he asked from his superior to leave early in order to take home his sack of rice.On his
way home, the jeepney the petitioner was riding turned turtle casing him injuries and was brought to a
hospital. He filed for reimbursement denied it for the reason that he was not at this workplace
performing his duties when the incident occurred. ECC also denied the complaint.
The SC reversed and set aside the decision. In the case at bar, petitioner left his station,
several hours after his regular time off. His overtime was because his reliever did not arrive. There is
no evidence on record that petitioner decimated from his usual, regular homeward route or that
interruptions occurred in the journey. There is no reason why employees should not be protected for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching
or after leaving the employee’s premises.

*The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own
terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.

*In the case of Domingo Vicente vs. ECC, the issue was WON the petitioner suffers from
permanent total disability as he claims, or from permanent partial disability as held by the respondent
Commission. The facts of the case shows that petitioner was formerly employed as a nursing attended
at a hospital at the age of 45 and after having rendered more than 25 years of government service, he
applied for optional retirement under the provisions of Section 12 (c) of RA 1616 giving as reason
therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. He also filed with GSIS an
income benefits claim for payment. Both applications were accompanied by necessary supporting
papers such as Physician Certification classifying him as being under permanent total disability. His
application was granted only for permanent partial disability thence this petition for certiorari.
The SC set aside the decision of ECC. Permanent total disability results in an emplyee’s loss
of work or inability to perform his usual work while permanent partial disability occurs when an
employee losses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue
with his former work. Permanent total disability if the employee is unable to perform his customary job
for more than 120 days. In his case, petitioner was only 45 when he applied for early retirement due to
this reason. The commission also approved his early retirement as proof that he was no longer fit to
continue his employment because he still had 20 years toward under good behavior.
Retirement Laws

*Well settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the retiree
because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is no
longer capable of earning his livelihood.

*In the case of Francisco tantuico vs. Hon Eufemio Domingo, the issue was WON petitioners
retirement benefits can be withheld pending investigation of his fiscal responsibility. The facts of the
case shows that petitioner was appointed chairman of COA to serve a term of 7 years expiring on
January 26, 1987. He was of service since 1975. In 1985, he applied for clearance from all money,
property and other accountabilities in preparation of his retirement. He later obtained his clearance
which covered the period 1976 to December 31,1985. After the EDSA, he submitted his courtesy
resignation to Pres. Aquino and relinquished his office to the newly appointed chairman. On that same
day, aha applied for retirement. Petitioner then sought for second clearance to cover period January 1,
1986 to March 9, 1986. All signatures where obtained except that of Guingona, the new chairman who
failed to take action. A year later, he was replaced by respondent chairman which ordered an
inventory during the tenure of its 2 predecessors. On May 7, 1987, the chairman endorsed to GSIS the
retirement application of petitioner certifying that he is already cleared. Respondent chairman created
an audit committee for a purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audit of theCOA
transactions and accounts. By this, he withheld 1/2 of the petitioners retirement benefit pending final
result of petitioners final accountability as former OCA chairman.
The SC granted the petition. It is clear that the petitioner was already issued an initial
clearance during his tenure and all required signatures were present. He also applied for second
clearance which was signed except by the chairman, Whatever infirmities in the said clearance were
already cured after it has endorsed petitioners application for retirement to GSIS which he made clear
that there was no pending administrative and criminal cases against the petitioner. Regardless of
petitioners monetary liability to the government that may be discovered from the audit concerning his
fiscal responsibility or accountability as former Chairman, respondent cannot withheld the benefits due
petitioner under the retirement laws.

Election Rules

*To be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officer
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

*In the case of Roleto Pahilan vs. Rudy Tabalba, COE and Hon. Judge Sinforoso Tabano Jr.,
the issue was WON the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal of brief. The facts of
the case shows that petitioner and respondent were candidates for Mayor in Camiguin and the
Municipal Board of Canvassers declared Tabalba as the duly elected Mayor on May 11,992 election.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an election protest which he sent via registered mail addressed to the clerk
of court of RTC in Camiguin attaching 200 for docket fees on May 23, 1992. The Cleark in return
informed petitioner that the correct fee is 620 and would not be entered in the court docket pending
payment of balance. Pahilan then paid it on June 22, 1992. Consequently, Tabalba filed his answer
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to entertain election protest for having been
filed beyond the 10 day period provided by the law. On October 22, 1992, the trial court dismissed the
petition for non-payment on time of required filling fees. Within 5 day period to appeal, petitioner filed a
verified brief which was denied.
The SC reversed the decision. The same maybe allowed It has been consistently held that the
filing or presentation and approval of the record on appeal on time necessarily implies or involves the
filing of the notice of appeal, because the act of perfecting an appeal is more expressive of the intent
to appeal than the filing of mere notice to do so. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared
not for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest which can achieved by brushing
aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.

CHAPTER 9 - Prospective and Retrospective Statutes

Prospective Statute - which operates upon acts and transactions which have not occurred when the
statute takes effect, that is, which regulates the future

Retrospective Statute - which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates new obligations and imposes new duties, or attaches new disabilities in respect
of transaction already past.

*Prospective and retrospective statute is more of application rather than interpretation and
construction.

*Penal statutes are applied prospectively except if it is favourable to the accused who is not a
habitual criminal.

*Procedural Laws are retrospective. It is construed as applicable to actions pending and

undetermined at the time of their passage.

*Curative Statutes are those which undertakes to cure errors and irregularities and
administrative proceedings, and which are designed to give effect to contracts and other
transactions between private parties which otherwise would fail of producing their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability of failure to comply with some technical
requirement.
*The question whether a statute operates retrospectively or only prospectively depends on the
legislative intent.

*In the case of The Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co.
Inc. and CTA, the issue was WON Sec 4 of RA 3843 (assuming it is valid) could be given retroactive
effect as to render uncollectible the taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment. The
facts of the case shows that petitioner assessed against and demanded from private reposndent
amount of P19,293.41 representing deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges for the years 1946-
1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Section 259 of National Internal Revenue
Code instead of the lower rates provided in the municipal franchises. Private respondent requested for
a reinvestigation and claimed that instead of deficiency, it made an overpayment of the franchise tax.
BIR regional director and commissioner n=both denied the respondents request hence this appeal
with the CTA which was granted by the latter.
While pending the hearing, RA 3843 was passed granting private respondent a legislative
franchise for the operation of electric light, heat, and power system and Section 4 thereof provides that
no other tax and/or license other than the franchise tax of 2% on the gross receipts as provided in the
original franchise shall be collected, any provision to the law contrary notwithstanding.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CTA. A tax uniform when it operates with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging
to the same class shall be taxed alike. It is true that the private respondents municipal franchises
were obtained under Act # 667 of the Philippine Commission, but these original franchises have been
replaced by new legislative franchise such as RA 3843. If read, Act # 3843 provides that
effective…upon the date of original franchise was granted, no other tax….it specifically provided for
the retroactive effect.

*As a rule, laws cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for
retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.

*In the case of Fernando Gallardo vs. Juan Borromeo, the issue was WON CA correctly gave
retroactive application to Section 7 of RA 6389. The facts of the case shows that petitioner filed a
complaint to terminate the leasehold of the respondent so he may cultivate it himself after he retired.
Respondent averred that petitioner has no knowledge of farming and his only purpose was to eject
him from the landholding. On April 21, 1971, The trial Court and CA dismissed the petition saying that
the petitioners desire to cultivate his land is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant.
The applicable law when Gallardo filed a supplementary complaint was paragraph (1) of
Section 36 of RA 3844 which provided:
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate
the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to
his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation
the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have
the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions.
 However, the above was amended September 10, 1971 by RA 6389 which eliminated the
landowners desire to personally cultivate the landholdings as a ground for ejectment. The SC granted
the petition ruling that RA 6389 failed to express an intention to make RA 6389 retroactive thus it may
not be used in the pending case. Article 4 of the NCC code provides that laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided.

*All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used.

*In the case of Pio Balatbat vs. CA and Domingo Passion, the issue was WON Sec 7 of RA
6389 should be given retroactive effect. The facts of the case shows that petitioner was a lessee of a
parcel of land owned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to private respondent who expressed
his intention to cultivate the land thus lodged a complaint ejecting petitioner. He alleged that he
notified the petitioner but despite the lapse of 1 year from receipt thereof, petitioner refused to vacate.
After trial, the agrarian court rendered a decision against the petitioner which CA affirmed. During the
pendency of the appeal in CA, Congressed passed RA 6389, Section 7 of which amended Section 36
of RA 3844 which states tat personal cultivation is no longer a ground for ejectment.
The SC dismissed the petition ruling that laws has only prospective application unless the
contrary is provided. Fernando Gallardo vs. Juan Borromeo case.

*Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to given them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.

*In the case of Erectors Inc. vs NLRC, Hon. Julio Andres Jr. and Florencio Burgos, the issue
was WON EO 797 creating the POEA be given retroactive effect. The facts of the case shows that
petitioner recruited respondent to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with
salary of $165 and allowance of $165/month. They further agreed that they are entitled to a bonus os
$1000 if after 12 month period he renews or extend his employment without vacation. The said
contract was not implemented. Thus a new contract wherein private respondent be hired for service
driver helper receiving $105. Respondent when he returned him complained with NLRC invoking the
first contract and claiming the difference in the salary plus bonuses.
While the case was pending, EO 797 was created vesting the POEA original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, employee-employer relationship out of by viture of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers. Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in
favour of the respondent. Respondent appealed with NLRC questioning the jurisdiction of the POEA
but the latter dismissed the petition.
The Sc dismissed the petition. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The prevailing laws were PD 1691
which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with original and
exclusive jurisdiction.

*Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony
who is not a habitual criminal.

*In the case of Albino Co vs. CA, the issue was WON Ministry Circular 12 dated August 8,
1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be considered as valid defense to be retroactively
applied to the case of petitioner Co. The facts of the case shows that, petitioner representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation had an agreement with Geronimo Bella representing Trans Pacific
Towage Inc to salvage and reflect a sunken vessel. In payment of his share, petitioner delivered to the
salvaging from on September 1, 1983 a check, post dated on November 30, 1983. It was deposited on
January 3, 1983 but was dishonored. A criminal complaint was then filed by the salvage company
against petitioner and he was convicted. Petitioner invoked Ministry Circular 4 (issued December 15,
1981) which he based on the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983 which does not
consider bouncing check as an offense. He averred that the RTC had erred in relying to the case of
Que vs. People where a check issued merely to guarantor the performance of an obligation is covered
under BP 22 as this happened 4 years after the promulgation of the judgment in Que vs. People. A
ministry circular 12 was issued on August 4, 1984, almost a year after petitioner delivered the bonding
check, reversing Circular 4.
The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and CA. The case of Que vs. People
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly
situated who just relied on the official opinion of Minister of Justice, though not law are entitled to great
weight and consideration,that such a check does not fall within BP 22.

*Procedural laws are retrospective

*In the case of Aniceto Ocampo vs CA, the issue was WON the motion to dismiss filed by the
accused-petitioner is a bar to present evidence. The facts of the case shows that petioner was
charged for violation of PD 772 (Anti Squatting Law) but pleaded guilty. After the prosecution rested its
case, petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the prosecution did not present the Transfer Certificate of Title to prove land ownership
that the land where petitioners house constructed belongs to UP. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Accused appealed alleging that 1)Applying
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Criminal Procedure; b)convicting appellant on the basis of evidence
which doe snot measure to the degree of proof as required by law; c)not applying the principle of
presumption of innocence in favour of appellant.
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The SC dismissed the petition. The amendment to above provision took effect only on October
1, 1988 but the same was given retroactive effect in a decided case. Well-settled is the rule that states
regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In this case, there was no record that the accused filed his
demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court. He cannot claim denial of his right to adduce his own
evidence as evident by his waiver of it.

*Procedural law have retroactive application.

*in the case of Yakut Philippines and Larry Salvado vs. CA, the issue was WON a civil action
instituted after the criminal action was filed would prosper even if there was no reservation to file a
separate civil action. The facts of the case shows that a 5-year old boy was sideswiped by a
motorcycle owned and driven by the petitioners, respectively. Salvador was charged by reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries on 1/6/1983. On 10/19/1984, the complaint of damages
was filed by the father of the victim. The trial court rendered a decision in the civil case ordering
petitioner to pay damages. Defendant who are herein petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the said case. Petitioner contents that civil action for damages for injuries arising from
alleged criminal negligence being without malice cannot be filed independently of the criminal action. It
also averred that Section 1 Rule III of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action
may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. CA dismissed the appeal hence this
petition.
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The SC dismissed the petition. Although the incident in question and the actions arising
from therefore were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, its
provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to this case. The offended party has not
waive the civil action nor reserve the right to institute separately. It is noted that the civil action was
filed prior the presentation of evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the presiding
judge on the criminal case was duly informed so that in the disposition of criminal case, no damages
was awarded. The purpose of reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering twice for
the same act or omission.

*Procedural provisions of the Local Government Code are retrospective.

*In the case of Wilson Diu and Dorcita Diu Vs. CA, the issue was WON the confrontations
before the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in PD # 1508. The facts of
the case shows that petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent. It
appears that when the matter was brought before the baranagay chairman of Naval, the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, the chairman issued a certification to file action. CA
dismissed the case on the ground that there was no compliance of PD 1508 since after the branagay
captains efforts to settle the dispute failed, the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo was not constituted for the
purpose of settling the matter.
The SC granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decision of CA and reinstated
decision of RTC. It must be noted that PD 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local
Government Code of 1991 which took effect on 1/1/1992. The complaint was filed on 7/10/1991 before
the effectivity of the former. While the pangkat was not constituted, it is not denied that the parties met
at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement though his effort was futile. PD 1508
does not require strict compliance with its procedural requirements. The failure to appear before the
pangkat cannot be said to cause prejudice as they already refused conciliation before the chairman.
Their sham insistence for a meeting before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay.
Technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system and should not be
used as obstruction thereon.

*Curative statutes are validly accepted in this jurisdiction subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights.

*In the case of Mun. of San Narciso Quezon vs. Hon. Antonio Mendez Sr., the facts of the case
shows that petitioner appeals that EO 353 issued by Pres. Carlos Garcia on 8/20/1959 creating the
municipal of San Andres, Quezon by segregating from the Municipality of Narciso of the same
province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pnasoy, Camflora and Tala along their
respective sitios. Later, Pres Diosdado Macapagal issued EO 174 recognising the Municipal Disctirc of
San Andres. On 6/5/1989, petioner filed a petition for quo warranto praying that the officials of
Municipality of San Andres refrain from performing their duties. On 11/27/1991, the municipality of San
Andres filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case has became moot and academic with the
enactment of RA 7160 stating known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 442 (d) of
which states that existing municipalities as of the date of effectivity of the code shall continue to exist
and operate….the lower court dismissed the petition saying that an action belonged to the State.
Petitioners theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought.
Although their potion for quo warranto was filed prior to the enactment of RA 7160, such action has
already prescribed. It is worth to note that it took them 30 years to file the case and challenge the
constitutionality. Should it had been filed a year within such enactment, it could have been given due
course. Petition dismissed.

*Curative statutes have retrospective effect.

*In the case of Briad Agro-development Corporation vs. Hon. Diosdado Dela Cerna, the facts
of the case shows that petitioner was complaint by TUPAS (a labor union) for alleged
underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage etc…For failure of the petitioner to submit evidence,
respondent Director of Department of Labor ruled in favor of the union. Petitioner in its appeal to
NLRC contended that Regional Director has no authority to entertain pecuniary claim of workers and
referred to a decided case that the exclusive domain is with Labor Arbiters. NLRC dismissed the
petition saying that EO 111 amended Article 128 of the Labor Code in which jurisdiction to so act on
monetary claims was supposedly granted to Regional Directors.
The SC dismissed the petition. EO 111 is a curative law that is intended to cure a defect. The
amendment states that, “The provisions of Article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding was
meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (regional directors) and labor arbiters share same
jurisdiction.

*The beneficent provisions of RA 7659 (Heinous Crimes Law) shall be given retrospective
effect.

*In the case of PP. vs Donald Ballagan, the facts of the case shows that appellant was
convicted on March 30, 1989 of Violaton Section 4 Article 2 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to suffer
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. On December 30, 1993, RA 7659 amended RA
6425 which in effect clanged the penalty to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 -
P10,000,000.00 for 750 grams or more.
The SC affirmed the judgment. Penal laws shall be applied retroactively if it is favourable to the
accused. However, the amendment is more burdensome to the accused.

Chapter X - Conflicting Statues

Pari Materia - statutes relating to the same subject matter, or to the same class of persons or things,
or have the same purpose or object.

*If statutes of theoretical application to a particular case cannot be reconciled, the state of later
date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.

*General statutes must give way to the special or particular provisions as an exception to the
general provisions even if the general statute is a latter enactment unless there is manifest
intent to repeal or alter the special law.

*If there is conflict between statute and ordinance, ordinance must give way.

*Wherever 2 statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression
of legislative will.

*In the case of PNB vs. Teresita Cruz et al, the issue was WON Art. 110 of Labor Code applies
in the present case. The facts of the case shows that in 1980, AMEX (aggregate mining exponents)
laid off 70% of its employees and the 30% retained employees was not being paid their wages until
1982 when it ceased operations. Later, it leased its equipment and machineries to another company.
Unpaid employees sought redress from Labor Arbiter who ruled in their favor. AMEX did not appeal
the decision but petitioner interfered in its capacity as mortgagee-creditor. It appealed that workers lien
is only the unpaid wages and not the termination or severance pay. It averred that Article 110 of Labor
code must be read in relation to Articles 2241-2245 of the civil code. Also, it does not purport to create
lien in favour of workers or employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any
particular property owned by their employer.
The petition is devoid of merit. Article 110-worker preference in case of bankruptcy - provides
that in the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer’s business, his workers shall enjoy first
preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding. Such be paid in full before claims of the government and other creditors may
be paid. The court must uphold the preference accorded to the private respondents. Furthermore, the
Labor code was signed into law after the civil code took effect.

*A special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage, and the special
law is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general law.

*In the case of Hon. Geminiano Lopez, Jr. CSC and Hon. Danilo Lacuna, the issue was WON
the City of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employees under RA 409,
otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether the power is now vested with the City
Mayor pursuant to RA 5185, the Decentralisation Law and BP 337, the Local Government Code. The
facts of the case shows that The vice-mayor of Manila and presiding officer of the City Council of
Manila, herein private respondent submitted to CSC through the regional director of NCR the
appointments of 19 officers and employees pursuant to Section 15 of RA 409 which reads that, “The
board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the
board. The City Budget officer of Manila later sought comment/recommendation but informed that the
proper appointing officer is the City Mayor.
The SC dismissed the petition. There is no doubt that AR 409 which provides for the
organization of the Government of City of Manila is a special law and whereas RA 5185 and BP 337
which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws.

*A special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

*In the case of NAPOCOR vs. Hpn Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch XXV, Cagayan de Oro City,
the facts of the case shows that the Province of Misaims Oriental filed a complaint with RTC against
petitioner for the collection of real property tax and special education fund tax. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the action in reference to Section 2
and 3 of PD 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government shall be
administratively settled by the Secretary of Justice. RTC dismiss the petition. Respondent in upholding
lowers court decision rely of PD 464 entitle the Rea Property Tax Code which states that delinquent
payment maybe enforced through civil cases…
The SC dismissed the petition. After examining, PD 242 is of general application while PD 464
governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces, cities
and municipalities, as well as levy, collection and administration of real property tax.

*When courts are confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, they should not declare
outright the invalidity of one against the other, but should endeavour to reconcile them.
 *In the case of Hon. Richard Gordon vs. Judge Regino Viridian and Sps Eduardo and
Rosalinda Yambao, the issue before the court is the conflict between the FDA and the Mayor of
Olonapo City over the power to grant and revoke license for the operation of drug store in the said city.
The facts of the case shows that the mayors permit of the 2 drug store of private respondent were
cancelled after a test buy operation of FDA and narcotics wherein an agent was sold 200 tablets of
valium without a doctors prescription. Acting on the same test buy report, FDA directed closure of the
drugstore for 3 days until payment of fine. FDA lifted its closure order after the fine has been settled
and issued stern warning to the Yambao.
Respondent wrote a letter to petitioner seeking consideration on the revocation of Mayors
permit and having received no reply, Mr. Yambao filed a complaint for mandamus at the RTC. He also
appealed with FDA which was granted. After learning this, petitioner disapproved and revoke the
mayors permit hence this.
The SC held that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayors permit 1954 after the FDA
had authorised the resumption of operations of the drug store following the reinforcement of the
penalties imposed upon it. As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had
the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had np authority to interpose his own findings on the
matter and substitute them for the decision already made by FDA.

*The rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a
later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of the
general act are broad enough to include the cases in the special law unless there is a manifest
intent to repeal or alter the special law.

*In the case of The Province of Misaims Oriental vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light
Company Inc., the facts of the case shows that CEPALCO was granted franchise under RA 3247,
3570 and 6020 which states that in consideration of the franchise, the grantee shall pay a franchise
tax equal to #% of the gross earnings….and the said franchise tax is in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever authority….from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby
expressly exempted. On June 28, 1973, the Local Tax Coe (PD 231) was promulgated which states
that the province may impose a tax on business enjoying franchise based on the gross
receipts…Pursuant thereto, Province of Misaims enacted Provincial Ordinance 19 for this reason
which respondent paid in protest. Respondent appealed with the provincial fiscal but was denied.
Applied to Secretary of Justice who reversed the decision hence this petition.
The SC dismissed the petition. PD 232 is a general law while RA 3247, 3570, and 6020 are
special laws intended for respondent only.