Cases For Nat Res

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v.
PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS

ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders,

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series
of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by
all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two
of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police
power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of
property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to
Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13]
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the
ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear
showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the

judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void
and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting
the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying,
on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms
of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and
equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid
exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section
5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its

corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section
16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the
enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces
of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid
license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its
mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations
from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108]
In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply
with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to
have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first
requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due
process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for
the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the
local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact
the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying
alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the
topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the
conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months.
Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty
like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under
Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that
the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of
the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just
compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking

only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial
use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly
constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands
that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate
governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or

things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting
the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121]
The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification
must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern
the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and
degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy
the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results
from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying
or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm
that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers
from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143]
A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on

certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January
9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
Principles:
Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under
Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.
Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the

owner of the beneficial use of its propert
G.R. No. 209271
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH

APPLICATIONS, INC., Petitioner
vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT
SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP.
TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG,
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA,
JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR.
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE., JR., FORMER SEN.
ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN,
and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209276
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY
AND THE FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES),
MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA
GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ
LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR.
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209301
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BANOS FOUNDATION,

INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZLUNA,
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209430
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA,
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are nine (9) Motions for Reconsideration1 assailing the
Decision2 dated December 8, 2015 of the Court (December 8, 2015 Decision),
which upheld with modification the Decision3 dated May 17, 2013 and the
Resolution4 dated September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00013.
The Facts
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered
eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt
talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) 5
entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños

Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the Philippines
Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others. Bt talong contains the
crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces
the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said
to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer,
the most destructive insect pest to eggplants.6
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB),
the implementing institution of the field trials, conducted a contained
experiment on Bt talong under the supervision of the National Committee on
Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP).7 The NCBP, created under Executive Order
No. (EO) 430,8 is the regulatory body tasked to: (a) "identify and evaluate
potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the
introduction of new species and genetically engineered organisms and
recommend measures to minimize risks"; and (b) ''formulate and review
national policies and guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work
on genetic engineering, pests and their genetic materials for the protection of
public health, environment[,] and personnel[,] and supervise the
implementation thereof."9 Upon the completion of the contained experiment, the
NCBP issued a Certificate10 therefor stating that all biosafety measures were
complied with, and no untoward incident had occurred.11
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI)
issued two (2)-year Biosafety Permits12for field testing of Bt talong13after UPLB's
field test proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety risk assessment for field
testing pursuant to the Department of Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order
No. 8, series of 200214 (DAO 08-2002),15 which provides for the rules and
regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.16 Consequently,
field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in North Cotabato, Pangasinan,
Camarines Sur, Davao City, and Laguna.17
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)

(Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura
(MASIPAG), and others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)18 (petition for Writ
of Kalikasan) against herein petitioners the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), the BPI and the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the DA,
UPLBFI, and ISAAA, and UPMFI, alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated
their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering, among
others, that: (a) the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), as required
by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151,19 was not secured prior to the field
trials;20 (b) the required public consultations under the Local Government Code
(LGC) were not complied with;21 and (c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-
2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to human health and the environment,
and that there is no independent, peer-reviewed study showing its safety for
human consumption and the environment.22 Further, they contended that
since the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient
or uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable
grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and,
thereby, the field trials be enjoined.23
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued24 a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners

(except UPLB25) and UPMFI, ordering them to make a verified return within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days, as provided for in Section 8, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.26 Thus, in compliance
therewith, ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI, and UPMFI 27 filed their respective
verified returns,28 and therein maintained that: (a) all environmental laws were
complied with, including the required public consultations in the affected
communities; (b) an ECC was not required for the field trials as it will not
significantly affect the environment nor pose a hazard to human health; (c) there
is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption; (d) at any rate, the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption is irrelevant because none of the eggplants will be consumed by
humans or animals and all materials not used for analyses will be chopped,
boiled, and buried following the conditions of the Biosafety Permits; and (e) the
precautionary principle could not be applied as the field testing was only a part
of a continuing study to ensure that such trials have no significant and negative
impact on the environment.29
On July 10, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution30 referring the case to the
Court of Appeals for acceptance of the return of the writ and for hearing,
reception of evidence, and rendition of judgment.31 In a hearing before the CA
on August 14, 2012, UPLB was impleaded as a party to the case and was
furnished by respondents a copy of their petition. Consequently the CA directed
UPLB to file its comment to the petition32 and, on August 24, 2012, UPLB filed
its Answer33 adopting the arguments and allegations in the verified return filed
by UPLBFI. On the other hand, in a Resolution34 dated February 13, 2013, the
CA discharged UPMFI as a party to the case pursuant to the Manifestation and
Motion filed by respondents in order to expedite the proceedings and resolution
of the latter's petition.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and
directed petitioners to pem1anently cease and desist from conducting the Bt
talong field trials.36 At the outset, it did not find merit in petitioners' contention
that the case should be dismissed on the ground of mootness, noting that the
issues raised by the latter were "capable of repetition yet evading review" since
the Bt talong field trial was just one of the phases or stages of an overall and
bigger study that is being conducted in relation to the said genetically-modified
organism.37 It then held that the precautionary principle set forth under Section
1,38 Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 39 is relevant,
considering the Philippines' rich biodiversity and uncertainty surrounding the
safety of Bt talong. It noted the possible irreversible effects of the field trials and
the introduction of Bt talong to the market, and found the existing regulations
issued by the DA and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and the health of the
people.40
Aggrieved, petitioners separately moved for reconsideration.41 However, in a

Resolution42 dated September 20, 2013, the CA denied the same and remarked
that introducing genetically modified plant into the ecosystem is an ecologically
imbalancing act.43 Anent UPLB 's argument that the Writ of Kalikasan violated
its right to academic freedom, the CA emphasized that the writ did not stop the
research on Bt talong but only the procedure employed in conducting the field
trials, and only at this time when there is yet no law ensuring its safety when
introduced to the environment.44
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review

on certiorari before this Court.
The Proceedings Before the Court
In a Decision45 dated December 8, 2015, the Court denied the petitions and
accordingly, affinned with modification the ruling of the CA.46 Agreeing with the
CA, the Court held that the precautionar; principle applies in this case since
the risk of harm from the field trials of Bt talong remains uncertain and there
exists a possibility of serious and irreversible harm. The Court observed that
eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country that is mostly grown by small-
scale farmers who are poor and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich
biodiversity, the consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be
disastrous and irreversible.47
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot
and academic despite the completion and termination of the Bt talong field
trials, on account of the following exceptions to the mootness principle: (a) the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; and (b) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.48
Further, the Court noted that while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were
observed, the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) established under EO 514,
series of 200649 which requires public participation in all stages of biosafety
decision-making, pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety50 which was
acceded to by the Philippines in 2000 and became effective locally in 2003, was
not complied with.51 Moreover, the field testing should have been subjected to
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), considering that it involved new
technologies with uncertain results.52
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition,
it declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to consider the provisions of
the NBF. The Court also temporarily enjoined any application for contained use,
field testing, propagation, commercialization, and importation of genetically
modified organisms until a new administrative order is promulgated in
accordance with law.53
The Issues Presented in the Motions for Reconsideration
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,54 arguing, among others,

that: (a) the case should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the
completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of the
Biosafety Permits;55 (b) the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO
08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue;56 and (c) the Court erred in relying on
the studies cited in the December 8, 2015 Decision which were not offered in
evidence and involved Bt corn, not Bt talong.57
In their Consolidated Comments,58 respondents maintain, in essence,

that: (a) the case is not mooted by the completion of the field trials since field
testing is part of the process of commercialization and will eventually lead to
propagation, commercialization, and consumption of Bt talong as a consumer
product;59 (b) the validity of DAO 08-2002 was raised by respondents when they
argued in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan that such administrative issuance
is not enough to adequately protect the Constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology;60 and (c) the Court correctly took judicial notice
of the scientific studies showing the negative effects of Bt technology and
applied the precautionary principle.61
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.62 The
requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper
exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the comis of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case
is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.63
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable

controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled
to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.64
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.65 Thus,
jurisprudence recognizes these four instances as exceptions to the mootness
principle.
In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was held that (a) the present
case is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved, and
(b) it is likewise capable of repetition yet evading review. Hence, it was excepted
from the mootness principle.66 However, upon a closer scrutiny of the parties'
arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling and now finds merit in petitioners'
assertion that the case should have been dismissed for being moot and
academic, and that the aforesaid exceptions to the said rule should not have
been applied.
I. On the paramount public interest exception.
Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining

whether a case involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness
principle. However, a survey of cases would show that, as a common guidepost
for application, there should be some perceivable benefit to the public which
demands the Court to proceed with the resolution of otherwise moot questions.
In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,67an action for declaratory judgment

assailing the validity of Republic Act No. (RA) 4880,68 which prohibits the early
nomination of candidates for elective offices and early election campaigns or
partisan political activities became moot by reason of the holding of the 1967
elections before the case could be decided. Nonetheless, the Court treated the
petition as one for prohibition and rendered judgment in view of "the paramount
public interest and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections
[of 1969] being barely six months away."69
In De Castro v. Commission on Elections,70 the Court proceeded to resolve the

election protest subject of that case notwithstanding the supervening death of
one of the contestants. According to the Court, in an election contest, there is a
paramount need to dispel the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the
electorate.71
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,72the Court ruled on the constitutionality of

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, s. 2006,73 which declared a state of
National Emergency, even though the same was lifted before a decision could
be rendered. The Court explained that the case was one of exceptional character
and involved paramount public interest, because the people's basic rights to
expression, assembly, and of the press were at issue.74
In Constantino v. S'andiganbayan,75 both of the accused were found guilty of

graft and corrupt practices under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.76 One of the accused
appealed the conviction, while the other filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court. While the appellant died during the pendency of his appeal, the Court
still ruled on the merits thereof considering the exceptional character of the
appeals in relation to each other, i.e., the two petitions were so intertwined that
the absolution of the deceased was determinative of the absolution of the other
accused.77
More recently, in Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO),78the

petitioner prayed that the Commission on Audit (COA) be ordered to audit the
MECO which is based in Taiwan, on the premise that it is a government-owned
and controlled corporation.79 The COA argued that the case is already moot and
should be dismissed, since it had already directed a team of auditors to proceed
to Taiwan to audit the accounts of MECO.80 Ruling on the merits, the Court
explained that the case was of paramount public interest because it involved
the COA's performance of its constitutional duty and because the case concerns
the legal status of MECO, i.e., whether it may be considered as a government
agency or not, which has a direct bearing on the country's commitment to the
One China Policy of the People's Republic of China.81
In contrast to the foregoing cases, no perceivable benefit to the public - whether

rational or practical - may be gained by resolving respondents' petition for Writ
of Kalikasan on the merits.
To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for
Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety
Permits issued by the BPI and the completion and termination of the Bt
talong field trials subject of the same.82 These incidents effectively negated the
necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their petition for Writ
of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin. Hence, at the time
the CA rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner sought
and granted by the CA were no longer capable of execution.
At this juncture, it is important to understand that the completion and

termination of the field tests do not mean that herein petitioners may inevitably
proceed to commercially propagate Bt talong.83 There are three (3) stages before
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially available
under DAO 08-200284 and each stage is distinct, such that "[s]ubsequent stages
can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is given
to engage in the next regulatory stage."85 Specifically, before a genetically
modified organism is allowed to be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit
for propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be shown that based
on the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not
pose any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety studies
show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and
animal health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its
transformation event has been duly registered with the FPA.86
As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing
tasks related to propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor
complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-effects to the already
concluded Bt talong field trials that demand an adjudication from which the
public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the right ,of herein
respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is
therefore more imagined than real.
In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on

the safeness of Bt talong - or GMOs, for that matter - until an actual and
justiciable case properly presents itself before the Court. In his Concurring
Opinion87 on the main, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen)
had aptly pointed out that "the findings [resulting from the Bt talong field trials]
should be the material to provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the various
claims made in relation to Bt talong."88 True enough, the concluded field tests ·-
like those in these cases – would yield data that may prove useful for future
studies and analyses. If at all, resolving the petition for Writ of Kalikasan would
unnecessarily arrest the results of further research and testing on Et
talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to hinder scientific
advancement on the subject matter.
More significantly, it is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in
assessing the merits of field trials whose parameters are not only unique to the
specific type of Bt talong tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the
supervening change in the regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing.
To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by Joint Department
Circular No. 1, series of 201689 (JDC 01-2016), issued by the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR, the Department of Health
(DOH), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which
provides a substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO
08-2002 as will be detailed below. Thus, to resolve respondents' petition for Writ
of Kalikasan on its merits, would be tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly
exercise for the Court to assess alleged violations of health and environmental
rights that arose from a past test case whose bearings do not find any - if not
minimal -- relevance to cases operating under today's regulatory framework.
Therefore, the paramount public interest exception to the mootness rule should
not have been applied.1âwphi1
II. The case is not one capable of repetition vet evading review.
Likewise, contrary to the Court's earlier ruling,90 these cases do not fall under
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception.
The Court notes that the petition for Writ of Kalikasan specifically raised issues
only against the field testing of Bt talong under the premises 'of DAO
08,..2002,91 i.e., that herein petitioners failed to: (a) fully inform the eople
regarding the health, environment, and other hazards involved;92 and (b)
conduct any valid risk assessment before conducting the field trial.93 As further
pointed out by Justice Leonen, the reliefs sought did not extend far enough to
enjoin the use of the results of the field trials that have been completed. Hence,
the petition's specificity prevented it from falling under the above exception to
the mootness rule.94
More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly

prevents this case from being one capable of repetition so as to warrant review
despite its mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that:
Section 1. Applicability. This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the

research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release
into the environment, and management of genetically-modified plant and plant
products derived from the use of modern technology, included under "regulated
articles."
As earlier adverted to, with the issuance of JDC 01-2016, a new regulatory
framework in the conduct of field testing now applies.
Notably, the new framework under JDC 01-2016 is substantially different from
that under DAO 08-2002. In fact, the new parameters in JDC 01-2016 pertain
to provisions which prompted the Court to invalidate D'AO 08-2002. In the
December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was observed that: (a) DAO 08-2002
has no mechanism to mandate compliance with inten1ational biosafety
protocols;95 (b) DAO 08-2002 does not comply with the transparency and public
participation requirements under the NBF;96 and (c) risk assessment is
conducted by an informal group, called the Biosafety Advisory Team of the DA,
composed of representatives from the BPI, Bureau of Animal Industry, FPA,
DENR, DOH, and DOST.97
Under DAO 08-2002, no specific guidelines were used in the conduct of risk
assessment, and the DA was allowed to consider the expert advice of, and
guidelines developed by, relevant inteniational organizations and regulatory
authorities of countries with significant experience in the regulatory supervision
of the regulated article.98 However, under JDC 01-2016, the
CODEX Alimentarius Guidelines was adopted to govern the risk assessment of
activities involving the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the environment, and management of
genetically modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem
biotechnology.99Also, whereas DAO 08-2002 was limited to the DA's authority
in regulating the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology,100 under JDC 01-
2016, various relevant government agencies such as the DOST, DOH, DENR,
and the DILG now participate in all stages of the biosafety decision-making
process, with the DOST being the central and lead agency.101
JDC 01-2016 also provides for a more comprehensive avenue for public
participation in cases involving field trials and requires applications for permits
and permits already issued to be made public by posting them online in the
websites of the NCBP and the BPI.102 The composition of the Institutional
Biosafety Committee (IBC) has also been modified to include an elected local
official in the locality where the field testing will be conducted as one of the
community representatives.103 Previously, under DAO 08-2002, the only
requirement for the community representatives is that they shall not be
affiliated with the applicant and shall be in a position to represent the interests
of the communities where the field testing is to be conducted.104
JDC 01-2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the members of the
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists that
evaluates the risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial,
commercial propagation, or direct use of regulated articles. Aside from not being
an official, staff or employee of the DA or any of its attached agencies, JDC 01-
2016 requires that members of the STRP: (a) must not be directly or indirectly
employed or engaged by a company or institution with pending applications for
pennits under JDC 01-2016; (b) must possess technical expertise in food and
nutrition, toxicology, ecology, crop protection, environmental science, molecular
biology and biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding, or animal nutrition; and (c)
must be well-respected in the scientific community.105
Below is a tabular presentation of the differences between the relevant portions

of DAO 08-2002 and JDC 01-2016:
DAO 08-2002 JDC 01-2016

1. As to coverage and government participation
WHEREAS, under Title IV, ARTICLE I. GENERAL
Chapter 4, Section 19 of the PROVISIONS
Administrative Code of 1987,
the Department of Agriculture, Section 1. Applicability. This
through the Bureau of Plant Joint Department Circular shall
Industry, is responsible for the apply to the research,
production of improved development, handling and use,
planting materials and transboundary movement,
protection of agricultural crops release into the environment,
from pests and diseases; and and management of genetically-
modified plant and plant
xxxx products derived from the use
of modern biotechnology,
PART I included under "regulated
GENERAL PROVISIONS articles."
xxxx xxxx
PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE

GENERAL PROVISIONS
FRAMEWORK
xxxx
Section 4. Role of National
Section 2 Government
Coverage Agencies Consistent with the
NBF and the laws granting their
A. Scope - This Order covers the powers and functions, national
importation or release into the
environment of: 1. Any plant
which has been altered or government agencies shall have
produced through the use of the following roles:
modem biotechnology if the
donor organism, host organism, A. [DA]. As the principal agency
or vector or vector agent of the Philippine Government
belongs to any of the genera or responsible for the promotion of
taxa classified by BPI as agricultural and rural growth
meeting the definition of plant and development so as to
pest or is a medium for the ensure food security and to
introduction of noxious weeds; contribute to poverty
or
alleviation, the DA shall take
2. Any plant or plant product the lead in addressing biosafety
altered or produced through the issues related to the country's
use of modern biotechnology agricultural productivity and
which may pose significant food security.x x x.
risks to human health and the
environment based on available B. [DOST]. As the premier
scientific and technical science and technology body in
information. the country, the DOST shall
take the lead in ensuring that
B. Exceptions. - This Order the best available science is
shall not apply to the contained utilized and applied in adopting
use of a regulated article, which biosafety policies, measures
is within the regulatory and guidelines, and in making
supervision of NCBP. biosafety decision.
x xx.
C. [DENR]. As the primary

government agency responsible
for the conservation
management, development and
proper use of the country's
environment and natural
resources, the DENR shall
ensure that environmental
assessments are done and
impacts identified in biosafety
decisions. x x x.
D. [DOH]. The DOH, as the

principal authority on health,
shall formulate guidelines in
assessing the health impacts
posed by modern biotechnology
and its applications. x x x.
E. [DILG]. The DILG shall

coordinate with the DA, DOST,
DENR and DOH in overseeing
the implementation of this
Circular in relation to the
activities that are to be
implemented in specific LGUs,
particulady in relation to the
conduct of public consultations
as required under the Local
Government Code. x x x.
2. As to guidelines in risk assessment
PART I ARTICLE II. BIOSAFETY
DECISIONS
GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 3. Guidelines in Making
Biosafety Decisions
xxxx
The principles under the NBF
Section 3 shall guide concerned agencies
Risk Assessment in making biosafety decisions,
including:
A. Principles of Risk
Assessment - No regulated x x x x
article shall be allowed to be
imported or released into the B. Risk Assessment. Risk
environment without the assessment shall be mandatory
conduct of a risk assessment and central in making biosafety
performed in accordance with decisions, consistent with
this Order. The following policies and standards on risk
principles shall be followed assessment issued by the
when performing a risk NCBP; and guided by Annex III
assessment to determine of the Cartagena Protocol on
whether a regulated article Biosafety. Pursuant to the NBF,
poses significant risks to the following principles shall be
human health and the followed when performing a risk
environment: assessment to determine
whether a regulated article
poses significant risks to
1. The risk assessment shall be human health and the
carried out in a scientifically environment.
sound and transparent manner
based on available scientific 1. The risk assessment shall be
and technical information. The carried out in a scientifically
expert advice of, and guidelines sound and transparent manner
developed by, relevant based on available scientific
international organizations and and technical information. The
regulatory authorities of expert advice of and guidelines
countries with significant developed by, relevant
experience in the regulatory international organizations,
supervision of the regulated including intergovernmental
article shall be taken into bodies, and regulatory
account in the conduct of risk authorities of countries with
assessment. significant experience in the
regulatory supervision of the
x x xx regulated article shall be taken
into account. In the conduct of
risk assessment, CODEX
Alimentarius Guidelines on the
Food Safety Assessment of
Foods Derived from the
Recombinant-DNA Plants shall
internationally adopted as well
as other internationally
accepted consensus
documents.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
3. As to public participation
PART III ARTICLE V. FIELD TRIAL OF
APPROVAL PROCESS FOR REGULATED ARTICLES
FIELD TESTING OF REGULATE
ARTICLES Section 12. Public Participation
for Field Trial
xxxx
A. The BPI shall make public all
Section 8 applications and Biosafety
Permits for Field Trial through
Requirements for Field Testing posting on the NCBP and BPI
websites, and in the offices of
xxxx the DA and DOST in the
G. Public Consultation. - The province, city, or municipality
applicant, acting through its where the field trial will be
IBC, shall notity and invite conducted.
comments on the field testing
proposal from the barangays x x xx
and city/municipal
governments with jurisdiction
over the field test sites. The IBC
shall post for three (3)
consecutive weeks copies of
the Public Information Sheet for
Field Testing approved by the
BPI in at least three (3)
conspicuous places in each of
the concerned barangay and
city/municipal halls. The Public
Information Sheet for Field
Testing shall, among others,
invite interested parties to send
their comments on the
proposed field testing to BPI
within a period of thirty (30)
days from the date of posting. It
shall be m a language
understood in the community.
During the comment period,
any interested person may
submit to BPI written
comments regarding the
application. The applicant shall
submit proof of posting in the
form of certifications from the
concerned barangay captains
and city/municipal mayors or
an affidavit stating the dates
and places of posting duly
executed by the responsible
officer or his duly authorized
representative.
4. As to membership in the Institutional Biosafety Committee
GENERAL PROVISIONS
FRAMEWORK
Section 1
xxxx
Definition of Terms
Section 6. Institutional
xxxx Biosafety Committee
L. "IBC" means the Institutional The company or institution

Biosafety Committee applying for and granted
established by an applicant in permits under this Circular
preparation for the field testing shall constitute an IBC prior to
of a regulated article and whose the contained use, confined
membership has been approved test, or field trial of a regulated
by BPI. The JBC shall be article. The membership of the
responsible for the initial IBC shall be approved by the
evaluation of the risk DOST-BC for contained use or
assessment and risk confined test, or by the DA-BC
management strategies of the for field trial. The IBC is
applicant for field testing. It responsible for the conduct of
shall be composed of at least the risk assessment and
five (5) members, three (3) of preparation of risk
whom shall be designated as management strategies of the
"scientist-members" who shall applicant for contained use,
possess scientific and confined test, or field trial. It
technological knowledge and shall make sure that the
expertise sufficient to enable environment and human health
them to evaluate and monitor are safeguarded in the conduct
properly any work of the of any activity involving
applicant relating to the field regulated articles.
testing of a regulated
article. The other members, The IBC shall be composed of at
who shall be designated as least five (5) members, three (3)
"community representatives", of whom shall be designated, as
shall not be affiliated with the scientist-members and two (2)
applicant apart from being members shall be community
members of its IBC and shall be representatives. All scientist-
in a position to represent the members must possess
interests of the communities scientific or technological
where the field testing is to be knowledge and expertise
conducted. For the avoidance of sufficient to enable them to
doubt, NCBP shall be property evaluate and monitor
responsible for approving the any work involving regulated
membership of the IBC for articles conducted by the
contained use of a regulated applicant.
article.
The community regresentative
x x x x (Underscoring supplied) must not be affiliated with the
applicant, and must be in a
position to regresent the
interests of the communities
where the activities are to be
conducted. One of the
community regresentatives
shall be an elected official of the
LGU. The other community
representative shall be selected
from the residents who are
members of the Civil Society
Organizations represented in
the Local Poverty Reduction
Action Team, pursuant to DILG
Memorandum Circular No.
2015-45. For multi-location
trials, community
representatives of the IBC shall
be designated per site. x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
5. As to the composition and qualifications of the members of the
Scientific and Technical Review
Panel
GENERAL PROVISIONS FRAMEWORK
Section 1 xxxx
Definition of Terms Section 7. Scientific and

Technical Review Panel
xxxx (STRP) The DA shall create a
Scientific and Technical Review
EE. "STRP" means the Scientific Panel composed of a pool of
and Technical Review Panel non-DA scientists with
created by BPI as an advisory expertise in the evaluation of
body, composed of at least three the potential risks of regulated
(3) reputable and independent articles to the environment and
scientists who shall not be health. x x x
employees of the Department
and who have the relevant xxxx
professional background
necessary to evaluate the The DA shall select
potential risks of the proposed scientists/experts in the STRP,
activity to human health and who shall meet the following
the environment based on qualifications:
available scientific and
A. Must not be an official, staff
technical information.
or employee of the DA or any of
x x x x (Underscoring supplied) its attached agencies;
B. Must not be directly or
indirectly employed or engaged
by a company or institution
with pending applications for
permits covered by this
Circular;
C. Possess technical expertise

in at least one of the following
fields: food and nutrition;
toxicology, ecology, crop
protection, environmental
science, molecular biology and
biotechnology, genetics, plant
breeding, animal nutrition; and
D. Well-respected in the
scientific community as
evidenced by positions held in
science-based organizations,
awards and recognitions,
publications in local and
international peer-reviewed
scientific journals.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory framework now

applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters involving the research,
development, handling, movement, and release into the environment of
genetically modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem
biotechnology is substantially different from that which was applied to the
subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot be said that the present case is one
capable of repetition yet evading review.
The essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading review was succinctly
explained by the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,106 where the constitutionality of
the Executive Department's lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013
General Appropriations Act, known as the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF), was assailed. In that case, the Court rejected the view that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by the Executive Department and former President Benigno Simeon
S. Aquino III's declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF." Citing the
historical evolution of the ubiquitous Pork Barrel System, which was the source
of the PDAF, and the fact that it has always been incorporated in the national
budget which is enacted annually, the Court ruled that it is one capable of
repetition yet evading review, thus:
Finally, the application of the fourth exception [to the rule on mootness] is called
for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget
is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The relevance
of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF-free
budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious
iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to
petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different
collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already
backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of
repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar questions
from re-emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent,
if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence;
must not evade judicial review.107 (Emphases supplied)
Evidently, the "frequent" and "routinary" nature of the Pork Barrel Funds and
the PDAF are wanting herein. To reiterate, the issues in these cases involve
factual considerations which are peculiar only to the controversy at hand since
the petition for Writ of Kalikasan is specific to the field testing of Bt talong and
does not involve other GMOs.
At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered
before a case is deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was
too short to be fully litigated. It must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits
for the subject field tests were issued on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010,
and were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice
Leonen, respondents filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26,
2012 - just a few months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the
field testing activities were already over.108 Obviously, therefore, the cessation
of the subject field tests before the case could be resolved was due to
respondents' own inaction.
Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible' to

repetition. As discussed above, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by
JDC 01-2016. Hence, future applications for field testing will be governed by
JDC 01-2016 which, as illustrated, adopts a regulatory framework that is
substantially different from that of DAO 08-2002.
Therefore, it was improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which
had become moot in view of the absence of any valid exceptions to the rule on
mootness, and to thereupon rule on the objections against the validity and
consequently nullify DAO 08-2002 under the premises of the precautionary
principle.
In fact, in relation to the latter, it is observed that the Court should not have
even delved into the constitutionality of DAO 08-2002 as it was
merely collaterally challenged by respondents, based on the constitutional
precepts of the people's rights to infonnation on matters of public concern, to
public participation, to a balanced and healthful ecology, and to health. 109 A
cursory perusal of the petition for Writ of Kalikasan filed by respondents on
April 26, 2012 before the Court shows that they essentially assail herein
petitioners' failure to: (a) fully infom1 the people regarding the health,
environment, and other hazards involved;110 and (b) conduct any valid risk
assessment before conducting the field trial.111 However, while the provisions of
DAO 08-2002 were averred to be inadequate to protect (a) the constitutional
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology since "said regulation
failed, among others, to anticipate 'the public implications caused by the
importation of GMOs in the Philippines"';112and (b) "the people from the potential
harm these genetically modified plants and genetically modified organisms may
cause human health and the environment, [and] thus, x x x fall short of
Constitutional compliance,"113 respondents merely prayed for
its amendment, as well as that of the NBF, to define or incorporate "an
independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and socio-economic
risk assessment, public information, consultation, and participation, and
providing for their effective implementation, in accord with international safety
standards[.]"114 This attempt to assail the constitutionality of the public
info1mation and consultation requirements under DAO 08-2002 and the NBF
constitutes a collateral attack on the said provisions of law that runs afoul of
the wdlsettled rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally
attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally.115 Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid,
absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, in deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been
carefuliy studied by the executive department and found to be in accord with
the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.116
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the
expiration of the Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject
of these cases, and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle
properly attending, the Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration
and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this pronouncement, no
discussion on the substantive merits of the same should be made.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision

dated December 8, 2015 of the Court, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 20, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the
reasons above-explained. A new one is ENTERED DISMISSING the Petition for
Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) filed by
respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), Magsasaka at
Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura, and others on the ground of
mootness.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan,
RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA.
MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is
the center of this controversy.
The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
as follows:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and

export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989
from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant
Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor
on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit;
c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution Permit; and of other document.
At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its

representative, undertook to comply with respondent's request for the
production of the required documents. In compliance with said
undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although
among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's
plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued
by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental
Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental
Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-
pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the
renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but
were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner,

respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to
padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the
stoppage of its operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the respondent
judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it alleged therein that the closure order was issued in grave
abuse of discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their
respective evidences. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found that
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:
In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the

amount of P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that respondents
may sustain should petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the
injunctive relief hereby issued, let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION issue ordering the respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and
other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately revoke his
closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its
normal business operations until after the instant case shall have
been adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent
power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any
given time.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28,

1989, upon petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 1989.
Said motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989. Petitioner's
counsel failed to appear and the hearing proceeded with the Provincial
Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following documents were
submitted:
a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc.,
prepared by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and recommendation
read:
Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used,

the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters
which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the
company should cease operating until such a time that the proper
air pollution device is installed and operational.
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing
signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan Governor

of the Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988, complaining about
the smoke coming out of the chimney of the company while in operation.
Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14, 1989,
issued an order (a) setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, which
granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b) dissolving the
writ consequently issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner.

Said motion drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private
respondent.
Resolving the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge

issued an order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion for
reconsideration.1
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a) the
order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order dated
April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9, 1989, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due course the petition was
denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in a decision dated January 26,
1990.2 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on
August 10, 1990.
Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. Six errors
are alleged to have been committed by the appellate court which may be
synthesized into the singular issue of whether or not the appellate court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its question decision and
resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of
its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief
may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the
maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must
be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power,
he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention
of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the
health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop
its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Anti-Pollution permit.3
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels.4 The alleged NBI finding that some
of the signatures in the four-page petition were written by one
person,5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as among
members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures
appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio
captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the
matter6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor
through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December
8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of

Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of
Makati on March 6,1987.8
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by

the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987,
the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted
any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device
to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the
residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by
the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower
court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in
this dollar-earning industry.1âwphi1 It must be stressed however, that
concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth
of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay
the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the
environment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982
DONALD MEAD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez, Jr.,
Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for
respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a Provincial
Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of Republic Act No.
3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission."
On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were
charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9, in relation
to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time
prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon,
province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
president and the general manager, respectively, of the Insular Oil
Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly organized in accordance
with existing laws, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the
highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to
seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters
discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co.
so managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such
waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the living
plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in
the same vicinity.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was
subsequently assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Caloocan City) presided over by the respondent Judge.
On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal
case, filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court has no
jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file
the above-quoted information. The motion to quash was denied by the
respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5, 1975. A Motion For
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied by the respondent Judge
in his Order of November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the respondent Judge who
allegedly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in issuing the same.
In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were required to
comment on the petition and a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin
the respondent Judge from enforcing his questioned orders until otherwise
directed by this Court.
It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air
Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") as
created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine
the existence of "pollution" before a criminal case can be filed for a violation of
the said law; and that it has the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of
the same. Petitioner further avers that the Commission not having finally ruled
that the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the petitioner for a violation of said law.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931
grants the power and duty to the Commission to investigate and prosecute
violations of Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not
exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other public prosecutors of their
authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the said law committed
within their respective jurisdictions.
Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to resolve
a procedural question raised by the respondents in support of their prayer that
the instant petition should not be entertained. Respondents advert to the rule
that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be
denied, the remedy of the accused- movant is not to file a petition for certiorari
or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without
prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if
an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;
Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.)
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the
respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations,
recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in
the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared
in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969, 105 Phil. 3007:
However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at

bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through
the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of
submitting himself to trial on the merits in Case No. 16443, apart
from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial
and conviction therein would violate one of this constitutional rights,
and that, an appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set
aside the judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would,
obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by
petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more
enlightened and substantial justice.
To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing

Co., vs. Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil., 930938, expressed as follows:
While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was held

not to be a proper basis for a petition for certiorari [Nico vs. Blanco,
46 Off. Gaz., Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131, or an appeal not certiorari
is the proper remedy for correcting an error which a lower court may
commit in denying a motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting
aside an order of dismissal, [Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3),
1265; 79 Phil. 243; Santos vs. Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1278; 79
Phil.754] however, in some instances, the Supreme Court has
departed from the general rule and has entertained the writ
notwithstanding the existence of an appeal. Thus, in one case the
Supreme Court took cognizance of a petition for certiorari
notwithstanding the fact that the accused could have appealed in due
time when it found that the action was necessary to promote public
welfare and public policy (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 880). In
another case, a petition for certiorari to annul an order of the trial
judge admitting an amended information was entertained although
the accused had an adequate remedy by appeal "inasmuch as the
Surplus Property cases have attracted nationwide attention, making
it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.
(People vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil.,
627.) And still in another case, the writ was entertained where the
appeal was found not to be adequate remedy, as where the order
which is sought to be reviewed is merely of interlocutory or
peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom can be interposed
only after final judgment and may therefore be of no avail. (Rocha vs.
Crossfield, 6 Phil., 355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182. See also
Mendoza vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First Instance,
51 Phil., 36).
For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for certiorari
interposed by the accused against the order of the court a quo
denying the motion to quash may be entertained, not only because it
was rendered in a criminal case, but because it was rendered, as
claimed, with grave abuse of discretion, as found by the Court of
Appeals, it would be indeed unfair and unjust, if not derogatory of
their constitutional right, to force the accused to go to trial under an
information which, in their opinion, as was found, accuses them of
multiple offenses in contravention of law. And so, in our opinion, the
respondent court did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari
instead of dismissing it, as claimed.
The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the ground
of double jeopardy. In Pineda vs. Bartolome, the ground invoked was duplicity
of offenses charged in the information. In the case at bar, the petitioner assails
the very jurisdiction of the court wherein the criminal case was filed, Certainly,
there is a more compelling reason that such issue be resolved soonest, in order
to avoid the court's spending precious time and energy unnecessarily in trying
and deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety
and embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in
undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in which could possibly be annuled
for want of jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the
court's jurisdiction is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the court
to resolve the same as soon as possible in order to avoid the unwholesome
consequences mentioned above.
It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since

respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss,
nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The
motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's lack of
jurisdiction to entertain the action, and the rulings of this Court are
that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a
denial or deferment of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this
petition for review by certiorari, it would be premature because it
seeks to have a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be
useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below
had no jurisdiction this petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs.
CIA 51 O.G. 6636, 5638).
While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred

until the trial and an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where
it clearly appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess
or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since
it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et
al, 50 Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et all 47 Off. Gaz. 1207;
see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of
Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, L-13748, 30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs.
Reyes, 39 SCRA, pp. 315-316.)
An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the

obvious merit We find in the same. Our reading of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3931 has convinced Us that the clear legislative intention is to vest in
the Commission the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution"
penalized thereunder and to prosecute violations of said law.
The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a violation
of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931. More specifically,
it alleges that the petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac Arivas, "willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal
and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway
the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of the
said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing
pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the
arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in
the same vicinity."
Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed to
the petitioner, reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Prohibitions. — No person shall throw, run, drain, or

otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the
Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow
to see or otherwise dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, any
organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid
form that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.
It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is to
throw, run, drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric
air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or substance "that shall
cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air." Stated in simpler terms, the
offense allegedly committed by the petitioner was the act of causing pollution of
a waterway (highway canal).
The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary
signification. In Section 2, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3931, "pollution"
is defined in these words:
(a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical, chemical and/or

biological properties of any water and/or atmospheric air of the
Philippines, or any such discharge of any liquid, gaseous or solid
substance into any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the
country as will or is likely to create or render such waters and/or
atmospheric air harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health,
safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild animals,
birds, fish or of her aquatic life.
The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the
Commission. Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the authority to
"determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric
air of the Philippines." (Section 6(a), No. 1); to "hold public hearings, ... make
findings of facts and determinations all with respect to the violations of this Act
or orders issued by the Commission." (Ibid., No. 3); to "institute or cause to be
instituted in the court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel
compliance with the provisions of this Act" (Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice
and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act
whenever modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8 contains
explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to determine the
existence of pollution and to take appropriate court actions to abate or prevent
the same. It provides:
SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . — The Commission

may, on its own motion, or upon the request of any person,
investigate or may inquire, in a manner to be determined by it, as to
any alleged act of pollution or the omission or failure to comply with
any provisions of this Act or any order of this Commission.
Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation, that

there has been a violation of any of the provisions of this Act or any
order of the Commission, it may order whoever causes such violation
to show cause before said Commission why such discharge of
industrial wastes or any waste should not be discontinued. A notice
shall be served on the offending party directing him or it to show
cause before the Commission, on a date specified in such notice, why
an order should not be made directing the discontinuance of such
violation. Such notice shall specify the time and the place where a
public hearing will be held by the Commission or its authorized
representatives, and notice of such hearing shall be served personally
or by registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and in the
case of a municipality or corporation such notice shall be served
upon the major or president thereof. The Commission shall take
evidence with reference to said matter and may issue an order to the
party responsible for such violation, directing that within a specified
period of time thereafter, such violation be discontinued unless
adequate sewage works or industrial wastes disposal system be
properly operated to prevent further damage or pollution.
No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission

shall prejudice any action which may be filed in court by any person
in accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code on nuisance.
On matters, however, not related to nuisance, no court action shall
be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and
no order of the Commission discontinuing the discharge of waste
shall be stayed by the filing of said court action, unless the court
issues an injunction as provided for in the Rules of Court.
The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority to be

exercised by the Commission and by the ordinary courts in respect of preventing
or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines.
The provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only the
determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations of the New
Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on matters not related to
nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have
finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court
action involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be
initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the existence of
what in the law is considered pollution.
It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the filing of
civil actions, and not to criminal cases as is the one herein involved, there being
no basis either in the context in law nor from a consideration of the purpose
behind the enactment of the same upon which such a distinction may be made.
Indeed, respondents do not seriously question that the court action
contemplated in the last paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal proceedings.
Respondents merely aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the
Commission is not exclusive of the power of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931.
We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give
concurrent authority to the Commission and Fiscals to prosecute violations of
Republic Act No. 3931. It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring
that the authority vested in the Commission to prosecute violations of Republic
Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same logic, there is neither a provision
declaring such authority to be concurrent or may be exercised jointly with
Fiscals. The absence of an explicit declaration as to the exclusive authority of
the Commission to prosecute violations of the subject law does not detract from
the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law
itself and as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible
from the provision of Section 8 expressly declaring that no court action shall be
initiated, except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall have
finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution; and also from Section 6(a), No. 5,
which authorizes the Commission to "initiate or cause to be instituted in a court
of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Act."
As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution
requires investigation, public hearings and the collection of various information
relating to water and atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The
definition of the term "pollution" in itself connotes that the determination of its
existence requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters
which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in
a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4
of the law, it is provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and
other technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the
Commission shall be the Chairman of the National Science Development Board,
one of the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of the Philippine
Council of Science and Technology, and one of the two full-time commissioner
shall be a sanitary engineer.
The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to

institute a criminal action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for
administration or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecution
service of the government, is not new in this jurisdiction. It is recognized in Yao
Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the exclusive authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate and impose administrative fines
upon violators of the provisions of Republic Act No. 751 for the reason that said
official "has better facilities than the prosecuting officials to carry out the
provisions of the said Act, the former official being the keeper of the records
pertaining to aliens." The same principle has been recognized with respect to
the prosecutions of violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic Act No. 1131.)
In holding that the City Fiscal of Manila has no authority to prosecute such
violations independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, it was said:
Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the power or
right to prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to
prosecute violations of the Anti- Dummy Board, there would be no
order, concert, cooperation, and coordination between the said
agencies of the government. The function of coordination which is
entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the above-
quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no
coordination as envisioned in the law unless the Anti-Dummy Board
be given the power to direct and control the city fiscal in the
prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo, p. 118;
5 SCRA 428,433.)
In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365) involving the
authority of the Bureau of Forestry over the management and use of public
forests and the transfer of licenses for the taking of forest products, this Court
has made this pronouncement:
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an

administrative office the power to determine particular questions or
matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office
shall prevail over the courts. (p. 124, Rollo.)
It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority
to file the information charging the petitioner with a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding or determination by the
Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused pollution in any water or
atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not to be understood, however, that a
fiscal or public prosecutor may not file an information for a violation of the said
law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding or determination
that the law or any of its orders had been violated. In the criminal case presently
considered, there had been no prior determination by the Commission that the
supposed acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the
Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law
is, therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent
Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of the
respondent Judge are hereby annuled and set aside. The respondent Judge is
ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.

Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision

and Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990,
respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision
and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private
respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing

Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into
a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by
Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of

business at 999 General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is
involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about
30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on
findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15
November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the
final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result
of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's
Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined
wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute
and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and
the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater
Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from
the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of
Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of
respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are
clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section
103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent
Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its

Implementing Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation
and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and
until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and
until further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of
Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by

the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of
the Board ;2 and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment
plant was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per
minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of
the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational
wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents
showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible
under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ
of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay
of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the
Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation
of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed
the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection
and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against
the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two
(2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the
Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered
Solar's petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision
here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded
the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of
Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the
appellee [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and
evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities.3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy
since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury
to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved
for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution
were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the
requirements of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects
of a petition for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due
process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment
when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board
contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar
into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by
Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose
an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and
plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before
the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a
threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984
authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the
following circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds

prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or
exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or
person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and
shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates
the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified
by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984,
an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the
wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On
the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before
an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds
that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the
[NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have
been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist
order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such
allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet
been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the
Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that
the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable
standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover
every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general
standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life" remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable
standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid
or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum

permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from
domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed
"when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC
in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of
Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section
68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in part provides that:
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters
shall be maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their
best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the
following beneficial usages:
(a) Fresh Surface Water

Classification Best usage
xxx xxx xxx

Class D For agriculture, irrigation,
livestock watering and industrial
cooling and processing.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities

on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following
Identical finding:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D.
No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.6
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent

Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986 and
September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:
"Inland November September

Waters 1986 1988
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9
Station 1 Station 1
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125
platinum (Apparent
cobalt Color)
units
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature
ture in °C (°C)
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1 mg./1.
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
solids in solids in
mg./1. mg./1.
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
mg./1. mg./1
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
in mg./1. mg./1.
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
mg./1." mg./1. MBAS
i) Dissolved 0
oxygen, mg./1.
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
Matter, mg./1.
k) Total Dis 800 610
solved Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner,
Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20
December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing
operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed
and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the
Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic).
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986

based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test
conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a
re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an
appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously
violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation
without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of
results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from
the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended
that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. .
. .10
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations

during the inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said
operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of
the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal
leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The
remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater
treatment plant (WTP).
2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not
yet installed.1âwphi1 Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank
are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary
treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory

analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is
polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others.
(Please see attached laboratory resul .)11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima
facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant
exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances
set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting
the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note
that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation
had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease
and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant
was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of
the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC
to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test
conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from
issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and
September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable
standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis
Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued
discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River,
presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of

appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered
by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing
establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must
be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he
may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emission in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention
of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the
health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop
its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December
8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx xxx xxx
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by

the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987,
the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition).
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much
less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard
to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a
local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very
agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous
discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute
and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare
and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through
the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution
would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations,
a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the
bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial
establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs
and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the
public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by
disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their
implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the
correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested
by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected
by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima
facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such
establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
parteorder. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that
is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that
we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then
be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with
Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have
sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and
Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be
recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue
operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities
and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the
questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent
nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were
entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not
err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper
remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did
in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May
1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner
Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without
prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

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WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v.

PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders,

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on

Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH

G.R. No. 209276

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

G.R. No. 209301

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BANOS FOUNDATION,

G.R. No. 209430

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, Petitioner,

entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños

On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)

On May 2, 2012, the Court issued24 a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners

Aggrieved, petitioners separately moved for reconsideration.41 However, in a

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review

The Proceedings Before the Court

The Issues Presented in the Motions for Reconsideration

Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,54 arguing, among others,

In their Consolidated Comments,58 respondents maintain, in essence,

The Court's Ruling

Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable

I. On the paramount public interest exception.

Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining

In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,67an action for declaratory judgment

In De Castro v. Commission on Elections,70 the Court proceeded to resolve the

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,72the Court ruled on the constitutionality of

In Constantino v. S'andiganbayan,75 both of the accused were found guilty of

More recently, in Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO),78the

In contrast to the foregoing cases, no perceivable benefit to the public - whether

At this juncture, it is important to understand that the completion and

In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on

More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly

Section 1. Applicability. This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the

Below is a tabular presentation of the differences between the relevant portions

DAO 08-2002 JDC 01-2016

PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE

C. [DENR]. As the primary

D. [DOH]. The DOH, as the

E. [DILG]. The DILG shall

L. "IBC" means the Institutional The company or institution

Definition of Terms Section 7. Scientific and

C. Possess technical expertise

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory framework now

Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible' to

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and

At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner,

Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari,

During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of

In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the