[ GR No.
103102, Mar 06, 1992 ] performing all the acts of execution which
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE v. JOB B.
MADAYAG
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, petitioner
principally seeks: (1) to nullify the order[1] of
respondent judge admitting the amended
information for murder filed in Criminal Case
No. 91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment
and the plea of not guilty entered by order of
respondent judge when petitioner refused to
be arraigned on the amended information for
lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3)
to nullify the appointment of a Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A.
counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent
petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge
from "over-speedy and preferential
scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned
criminal case;" and (5) to compel respondent
judge to order a preliminary investigation of
the crime charged in the amended
information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19,
1991 in an information[2] for the crime of
frustrated murder allegedly committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 13th day of July 1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a handgun, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which
ordinarily would have caused the death of
said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby
At the scheduled arraignment on November
would have produced the crime of Murder as
a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of her will, that is, due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which
prevented her death."
After the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner was allowed to file a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
However, before the said motion could be
filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Vinluan filed an omnibus motion[3] for leave
of court to file an amended information and
to admit said amended information. The
amended information,[4] filed on October 31,
1991, reads:
"That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Jav
ier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of
treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said handgun Maureen
Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby in
flicting mortal wounds which directly caused
the death of said Maureen Hultman."
Petitioner filed an opposition[5] thereto, as
well as a rejoinder[6] to the reply[7] of the
prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial
court issued the questioned order admitting
the amended information.
26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned
on the amended information for lack of a
preliminary investigation thereon. By reason
of such refusal, respondent judge ordered
that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for
petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence. When
petitioner's counsel manifested that he would
not take part in the proceedings because of
the legal issue raised, the trial court
appointed a counsel de oficio to represent
herein petitioner.
Petitioner now raises the following issues
before us:
"(a) Whether or not an amended information
involving a substantial amendment, without
preliminary investigation, after the
prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be
admitted;
"(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may
legally and validly be appointed to
represent an accused who is represented by
counsel of choice who refuses to participate
in the proceedings because of a perceived
denial of due process and after a plea for
appellate remedies within a short period is
denied by the trial court; and
"(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case
may legally and validly be rushed and
preferentially scheduled for trial over and at
the expense and sacrifice of other, specially
older, criminal cases."[8]
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we
required the Solicitor General to file a
comment to the basic petition. It appearing
from a further review of the record that the
operative facts and determinant issues
involved in this case are sufficiently
presented in the petition and the annexes
thereto, both in regard to the respective
positions of petitioner and respondents, the
Court has decided to dispense with the
aforesaid comment to obviate needless delay
in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional
allegation in the amended information, as
herein underscored, that the accused ". . .
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the
said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Maureen Hultman x
x x" constitutes a substantial amendment
since it involves a change in the nature of the
offense charged, that is, from frustrated to
consummated murder. Petitioner further
submits that "(t)here is a need then to
establish that the same mortal wounds,
which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely
and able medical assistance, ultimately
caused the death of the victim,
because it could have been caused by a
supervening act or fact which is not
imputable to the offender."[9] From this, he
argues that there being a substantial
amendment, the same may no longer be
allowed after arraignment and during the
trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates
that since the amended information for
murder charges an entirely different offense,
involving as it does a new fact, that is, the
fact of death whose cause has to be
established, it is essential that another
preliminary investigation on the new charge
be conducted before the new information can
be admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are
sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings
for the orders of the trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial."
The first paragraph provides the rules
for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers
to the substitution of the information or
complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both
amendment and substitution of the
information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads, but they differ in the
following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or
substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change
from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered
can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with
leave of court as the original information has
to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form,
there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed
and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the
same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for
if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not necessarily
included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there
should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a
substitution of information under
the second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information, an
amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information
charges an offense which is distinct and
different from that initially charged, a
substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses
when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, or
when the second offense is an attempt to
commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense
may be said to necessarily include another
when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged
in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form a part of those constituting the
latter.[10]
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident
that frustrated murder is but a stage in the
execution of the crime of murder, hence the
former is necessarily included in the latter. It
is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying
circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for
murder, thereby meaning and proving that
the same material allegations are essential to
the sufficiency of the informations filed for
both. This is because, except for the death of
the victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the
essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated
murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an
identity of offenses charged in both the
original and the amended information. What
is involved here is not a variance in the
nature of different offenses charged, but only
a change in the stage of execution of the
same offense from frustrated to
consummated murder. This being the case,
we hold that an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent
thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the
additional allegation on the fact of death of
the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman
constitutes a substantial amendment which
may no longer be allowed after a plea has
been entered. The proposition is erroneous
and untenable.
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110
provides that an amendment, either of form
or substance, may be made at any time
before the accused enters a plea to the
charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of
form with leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.[11] Thus, the following have been held
to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1)
new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction;[12] (2) an
amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one;[13] (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) an amendment which does not adversely
affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his right to invoke prescription.[14]
We repeat that after arraignment and during
the trial, amendments are allowed, but only
as to matters of form and provided that no
prejudice is caused to the rights of the
accused.[15] The test of whether an
amendment is only of form and an accused
is not prejudiced by such amendment has
been said to be whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood
would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any
evidence the accused might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the
one form as in the other; if the answer is in
the affirmative, the amendment is one of
form and not of substance.[16]
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended
information for murder filed against herein
petitioner will readily show that the nature of
the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the
death of the victim was merely supplied to
aid the trial court in determining the proper
penalty for the crime. That the accused
committed a felonious act with intent to kill
the victim continues to be the prosecution's
theory. There is no question that whatever
defense herein petitioner may adduce under
the original information for frustrated murder
equally applies to the amended information
for murder. Under the circumstances thus
obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even
during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since
only a formal amendment was involved and
introduced in the second information, a
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and
cannot be demanded by the accused. The
filing of the amended information without the
requisite preliminary investigation does not
violate petitioner's right to be secured
against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to be protected from an
open and public accusation of a CASTRO, J.:
crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial. The amended
information could not conceivably have come
as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and
obvious reason that it charges essentially the
same offense as that charged under the
original information. Furthermore, as we
have heretofore held, if the crime originally
charged is related to the amended charge
such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry
into the other would reveal, a new
preliminary investigation is not necessary.[17]
We find nothing irregular in the appointment
by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for
herein petitioner whose counsel of record
refused to participate in the proceedings
because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue
having been demonstrated herein as
baseless, we apprehend his refusal to
participate in the trial as causative of or
contributive to the delay in the disposition of
the case. And, finally, for as long as the
substantial rights of herein petitioner and
other persons charged in court are not
prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be
left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that
respondent judge did not commit the errors
speciously attributed to him, the
extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby
DENIED and the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. L-31665, Aug 06, 1975 ]
LEONARDO ALMEDA v. ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda
(alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together
with five others, with the crime of qualified
theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-
Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge
Onofre Villalluz. The amount of the bond
recommended for the provisional release of
Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved
by the respondent judge with a direction that
it be posted entirely in cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda
asked the trial court to allow him to post a
surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required
of him. This request was denied, and so was
an oral motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that the amended information
imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism
on the part of Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city
fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral
motion made at a previous hearing for
amendment of the information so as to
include allegations of recidivism and habitual
delinquency in the particular case of
Almeda. The latter vigorously objected,
arguing that (a) such an amendment was
premature since no copies of prior conviction
could yet be presented in court, (b) the
motion to amend should have been made in
writing in order to enable him to object
formally, and (c) the proposed amendment
would place him in double jeopardy
considering that he had already pleaded not
guilty to the information. The trial court
nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal's
motion in open court. An oral motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal
took hold of the original information and,
then and there, entered his amendment by
annotating the same on the back of the
document. The petitioner forthwith moved
for the dismissal of the charge on the ground
of double jeopardy, but this motion and a
motion for reconsideration were denied in
open court.
Hence, the present special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Two issues are posed to us for
resolution: First, whether the respondent
judge has the authority to require a strictly
cash bond and disallow the petitioner's
attempt to post a surety bond for his
provisional liberty, and second, whether the
amendment to the information, after a plea
of not guilty thereto, was properly allowed in
both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, bail is "the security required
and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance at the trial.[1]
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right,
is entitled to bail prior to conviction except
when he is charged with a capital offense and
the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is
guaranteed by the Constitution,[2] and may
not be denied even where the accused has
previously escaped detention,[3] or by reason
of his prior absconding.[4]
In order to safeguard the right of an accused
to bail, the Constitution further provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required." This is
logical because the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right
itself. We have thus held that "where
conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers
to provide the required remedy."[5]
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount
fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered
in terms of surety or property bonds, may be
excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A
surety or property bond does not require an
actual financial outlay on the part of the
bondsman or the property owner, and in the
case of the bondsman the bond may be
obtained by the accused upon the payment
of a relatively small premium. Only the
reputation or credit standing of the
bondsman or the expectancy of the price at
which the property can be sold, is placed in
the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the
various proceedings leading to his conviction
or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer
of assets into the possession of the court,
and its procurement could work untold
hardship on the part of the accused as to
have the effect of altogether denying him his
constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that
the accused may have provisional
liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond
is abhorrent to the nature of bail and
transgresses our law on the matter. The sole
purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of
the accused when required by the court, and
there should be no suggestion of penalty on
the part of the accused nor revenue on the
part of the government. The allowance of a
cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in
this jurisdiction only because our rules
expressly provide for it. Were this not the
case, the posting of bail by depositing cash
with the court cannot be countenanced
because, strictly speaking, the very nature of
bail presupposes the attendance of sureties
to whom the body of the prisoner can be
delivered.[6] And even where cash bail is
allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of
a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused. This is clearly deducible from the
language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court:
"SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. At any
time after the amount of bail is fixed by
order, the defendant, instead of giving bail,
may deposit with the nearest collector of
internal revenue, or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in
the order, and upon delivering to the court a
proper certificate of the deposit, must be
discharged from custody. Money thus
deposited, shall be applied to the payment of
the fine and costs for which judgment may
be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be
returned to the defendant."
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise
acceptable sureties and insist that the
accused obtain his provisional liberty only
thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular
measure adopted by the respondent judge,
we cannot fault the motive that caused him
to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety
bond. Based on the petitioner's past
record,[7] the range of his career in crime
weighs heavily against letting him off easily
on a middling amount of bail. The likehood
of his jumping bail or committing other harm
to the citizenry while on provisional liberty is
a consideration that simply cannot be
ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices
with which to meet the situation. First, it
could increase the amount of the bail bond to
an appropriate level. Second, as part of the
power of the court over the person of the
accused and for the purpose of discouraging
likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional
liberty, the latter could be required, as one
of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in
person periodically to the court and make an
accounting of his movements. And third, the
accused might be warned, though this
warning is not essential to the requirements
of due process, that under the 1973
Constitution[8] "Trial may proceed
notwithstanding his absence provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified."
With respect to the amount of the bail bond,
the trial court is well advised to
consider, inter alia, the following factors,
where applicable: (1) the ability of the
accused to give bail; (2) the nature of the
offense; (3) the penalty for the offense
charged; (4) the character and reputation of
the accused; (5) the health of the accused;
(6) the character and strength of the
evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's
appearance or non-appearance at the trial;
(8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether
the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) whether the accused is
under bond for appearance at trial in other
cases.[9]
It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all
courts to exercise extreme care and caution
in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in
regard to their reputation, solvency and
promptitude. Aside from the other
precautions hitherto considered useful,
courts should see to it that all surety bonds
are accompanied by corresponding
clearances from the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make
good their undertakings render inutile all
efforts at making the bail system work in this
jurisdiction.
2. Anent the second issue posed by the
petitioner, the amendment of the information
to include allegations of habitual delinquency
and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto
by the accused, is valid and in no way
violates his right to be fully apprised before
trial of the charges against him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all
matters of form after the defendant has
pleaded and during the trial when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the defendant. What are prohibited at this
stage of the proceedings are amendments in
substance. And the substantial matter in a
complaint or information is the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court. All other matters are merely of
form.[10]
Under our law, a person is considered a
habitual delinquent "if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa,
or falsification, he is found guilty of any of
said crimes a third time or oftener."[11] The
law imposes an additional penalty based on
the criminal propensity of the accused, apart
from that provided by law for the last crime
of which he is found guilty. Habitual
delinquency is not, however, a crime in itself;
it is only a factor in determining a total
penalty.[12] Article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code which treats of habitual delinquency
does not establish a new crime, but only
regulates the "effect of the attendance of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
of habitual delinquency," as its caption
indicates. In fact, the provision on habitual
delinquency is found in a section of the Code
prescribing rules for the application of
penalties, not in a section defining
offenses.[13] A recidivist, upon the other
hand, is one who, at the time of his trial for
one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code. Recidivism is likewise not a
criminal offense; it is but one of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated by
the said Code.[14]
The additional allegations of habitual
delinquency and recidivism do not have the
effect of charging another offense different
or distinct from the charge of qualified theft
(of a motor vehicle) contained in the
information. Neither do they tend to correct
any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter of the case. The
said new allegations relate only to the range
of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of the conviction. They do not alter
the prosecution's theory of the case nor
possibly prejudice the form of defense the
accused has or will assume. Consequently,
in authorizing the amendments, the
respondent judge acted with due
consideration of the petitioner's rights and
did not abuse his discretion.
Anent the petitioner's claim that the
amendment of the information by the State
places him in double jeopardy, it should be
remembered that there is double jeopardy
only when all the following requisites obtain
in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent
court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his consent.[15]
It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not
yet been convicted nor acquitted of the
charge of qualified theft of a motor vehicle
contained in the original
information. Neither has the case against
him been dismissed or otherwise
terminated. The mere amendment of the
information to include allegations of habitual
delinquency and recidivism does not have
the effect of a dismissal of the criminal action
for qualified theft alleged in the original
information.[16]
It cannot likewise be said that the accused is
being placed in jeopardy a second time for
the past crimes of which he had been
convicted. The constitutional objection, on
the ground of double jeopardy, to the statute
providing an additional penalty to be meted
out to habitual delinquents, has long been
rejected.[17]
The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal
and allowed by the respondent judge in the
amendment of the information does not,
however, merit our approbation. Under
section 2 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, "all
motions shall be made in writing except
motions for continuance made in the
presence of the adverse party, or those made
in the course of a hearing or trial." A motion
to amend the information, after the accused
has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that
should be placed in writing and properly set
for hearing. We are loath to give our
imprimatur to the kind of shortcut devised by
the respondents, especially as it relates to an
alteration in the information. Considering,
however, that the petitioner was not
deprived of his day in court and was in fact
given advance warning of the proposed
amendment, although orally, we refrain from
disturbing the said amendment.
ACCORDINGLY, the order, of respondent
judge of February 18, 1970 denying the
motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be
allowed to post a surety bond instead of a
cash bond is hereby set aside, without
prejudice, however, to increasing the
amount of the bail bond and/or the
imposition of such conditions as the
respondent judge might consider desirable
and proper for the purpose of insuring the
attendance of the petitioner at the trial,
provided they are consistent with the views
herein expressed. No costs.
[ GR No. 175602, Jan 18, 2012 ]
PEOPLE v. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ
BERSAMIN, J.:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts
and circumstances constituting the elements
of the crime charged is crucial in every
criminal prosecution because of the ever-
present obligation of the State to duly inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of
three counts of murder on January 20, 2005
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86,
in Quezon City. They were penalized
with reclusion perpetua for each count, and
ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim
P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld
the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the
modification that each accused pay to the
heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
costs of suit.[1]
The accused came to the Court to seek
acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused
Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw
appeal, which the Court granted on October
10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin's appeal
closed and terminated.[2] Hence, the Court
hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City charged the two accused in the RTC with
three counts of murder for the killing of
Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and
Joselito Sayson, alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of one FERDINAND SAYSON Y
DABOCOL by then and there shooting him
with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound
which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of one MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y
DABOCOL by then and there shooting him
several times with a gun, hitting him on his
face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of one JOSELITO SAYSON Y
DABOCOL by then and there shooting him
with a gun, hitting him on his back, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound
which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
summarized the State's evidence of guilt as
follows:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was
at the canteen (which also includes a jai
alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor
Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella
was preparing for the celebration of the
birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo
Lladones, which was held later in the
evening. Estrella's son, the deceased Moises
Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife,
Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said
canteen and managed the betting station. At
about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Estrella's
other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and
Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the
canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella's
family and other visitors ate and enjoyed
themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN,
November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February
6, 2001; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, the
celebration was interrupted with the arrival
of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton.
Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller,
Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out.
Jonathan was then attending to customers
who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises
approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to
reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and
Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent
Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo.
Moises did not heed his mother's warning. He
went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not
to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton.
Estrella then heard one of the accused-
appellants threaten Moises with the words
"Gusto mo unahin na kita?" Moises replied
"huwag." Successive shots were thereafter
heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired
upon even after he was sprawled on the
ground. Ferdinand immediately approached
the scene to help his brother Moises.
Ferdinand, however was shot on the left
temporal portion of his head and fell.
Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he
was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell
on a burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN,
November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN,
February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31,
2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo
and Edwin escaped from the scene of the
crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001).[6]
In turn, the appellant's brief filed by the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) rendered the
version of the accused, to wit:
xxx [A]t about 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel
Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused
Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter
bought P100.00 worth of barbecue from
Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was
walking along Corregidor Street when Heidi
saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a
gun, block his (Edwin's) way. Jun Sayson
poked a gun at accused Edwin, shouting,
'Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita'. The latter
raised both his hands and said 'Wag kuya
Jun, maawa ka.'
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then
carrying his 6-year old child, was walking
when his way was likewise blocked but this
time, by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand
as well as their stepfather. Joselito twisted
one of his (Eduardo's) hands at his back
while his (Joseltio's) stepfather held the
other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused
Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was
positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He
slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform
his family that he was hit. Heidi ran away.
She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin
grappling. Thereafter, she heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing.
He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped
firing. Accused Eduardo's son approached
him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his
son home, took his service firearm and on his
way back to the scene of the incident when
he met General Jesus Almadin, his
commanding officer (CO). He reported the
incident and sought for advice. He was told
to take a rest and go back on (sic) the
following day. He accompanied his CO to
Camp Crame. He surrendered his firearm to
Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused
Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN
dated 05 February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March
2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp. 2-18, 1
September 2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October
2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4;
18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004,
pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June
2004, pp. 2-25).[7]
The RTC convicted the two accused of three
counts of murder and sentenced them to
suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of
murder.[8]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.[9]
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the
credibility of the State's witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses
in their testimonies; challenges the finding of
conspiracy between the accused; and
contends that the State did not establish the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.[10]
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds
PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of
homicide due to the failure of the
informations to allege the facts and
circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the State's
witnesses (Susan Sayson, Marites Sayson
and Estrella Sayson) did not really see the
events as they transpired; and that they
wrongly identified the two accused as the
persons who had shot and killed the victims;
and that the victims were themselves the
aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdez's insistence,
holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants
desperately attempted to discredit the
testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and
Estrella. They claimed that a perusal of
Estrella's testimony would cast doubt on her
statement that she actually witnessed the
shooting incident. The accused-appellants
claimed that Estrella Sayson did not actually
see who allegedly threatened her son Moises
with the words "Gusto mo unahin na
kita?" The accused-appellants also claimed
that Estrella also failed to see who shot
Moises. They likewise assailed the
testimonies of Susan and Marites as being
incredible. They said that Susan testified
that she was in a state of shock after the
incident and that she could not speak; yet
she was still able to give her statement on
the same day the incident allegedly
happened. The accused-appellants also said
that Marites testified that she was only about
five (5) meters away from them (accused-
appellants) when they alighted from their
motorcycle; but that, "interestingly," she
only learned from her husband Joselito that
the accused-appellants were looking for a
certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony,
Estrella satisfactorily explained her
purported failure to see who between the
accused-appellants threatened Moises with
the words "Gusto mo unahin kita?" and who
shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she
was then facing Moises because she was
preventing him from approaching the
accused-appellants, who were armed with
short firearms. Estrella categorically stated
that she saw the accused-appellants alight
from their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She
could not have been mistaken about the
identity of the accused-appellants for the
simple reason that they are her neighbors
and that their (the accused-appellants')
father is her "cumpadre." When the incident
happened, the accused-appellants were
about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from
where she and her son Moises were
standing. She also saw with her own
eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard
successive bursts of gunshots
(approximately [9] shots) coming from where
the accused-appellants were standing.[11]
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the
trial court's findings of fact, its calibration of
the testimonies of witnesses and its
assessment of their probative weight, as well
as its conclusions, the Court accords high
respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CA's
findings.[12] The justification for this is that
trial court was in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its
firsthand observation of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses under
grilling examination. The only time when a
reviewing court was not bound by the trial
court's assessment of credibility arises upon
a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight
and influence that was overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the
case.[13] No such fact or circumstance has
been brought to the Court's attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling
witness is not always expected to give an
error-free testimony because of the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory;
and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may
even suggest that the witness is telling the
truth and has not been rehearsed.[14] To
properly appreciate the worth of testimony,
therefore, the courts do not resort to the
individual words or phrases alone but seek
out the whole impression or effect of what
has been said and done.[15]
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three
victims were themselves the aggressors who
had attacked to kill him and his brother. He
narrated during the trial that he dodged the
bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand (one of
the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit
Joselito (another victim); that he played
dead to avoid being shot at again, and
walked away with his terrified son only after
the way was clear for them to leave; and that
he heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the
third victim) grappled for control of a gun,
and assumed that the gunshots had hit and
killed Jun and Ferdinand.[16]
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of
factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who
between the accused and the victim was the
unlawful aggressor is a question of fact
addressed to the trial court for determination
based on the evidence on record.[17] The
records show that the version of PO2 Valdez
was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin,
then armed with short firearms, had gone to
the jai alai betting station of Moises to
confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the
betting booth then busily attending to bettors
inside the booth; that because the accused
were calling to Rubio to come out of the
booth, Moises approached to pacify them,
but one of them threatened Moises: Gusto
mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after
Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired
several shots at Moises, causing him to fall
to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued
firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand
(another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his
brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the
head, spilling his brains; that somebody
shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run;
that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the
back; and that Joselito fell on a burger
machine. The shots fired at the three victims
were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State's
witnesses entirely jibed with the physical
evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal
evidence showed that Ferdinand had a
gunshot wound in the head;[18] that two
gunshot wounds entered Joselito's back and
the right side of his neck;[19] and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and
four gunshot wounds in the chest.[20] Also,
Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal
Office opined that the presence of marginal
abrasions at the points of entry indicated that
the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close
range.[21] Given that physical evidence was
of the highest order and spoke the truth
more eloquently than all witnesses put
together,[22] the congruence between the
testimonial recollections and the physical
evidence rendered the findings adverse to
PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to
commit the felony.[23] Proof of the actual
agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or
inferred from their acts.[24] Herein, both
lower courts deduced the conspiracy
between the accused from the mode and
manner in which they perpetrated the
killings. We are satisfied that their deduction
was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot
now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal
shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito.
Both accused were convincingly shown to
have acted in concert to achieve a common
purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims
with their guns. Their acting in concert was
manifest not only from their going together
to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack
that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing
successive shots at Moises and immediately
followed by Edwin's shooting of Ferdinand
and Joselito one after the other. It was also
significant that they fled together on board
the same motorcycle as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to
participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part
performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal
acts.[25] Accordingly, the existence of the
conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin
was properly inferred and proved through
their acts that were indicative of their
common purpose and community of
interest.[26]
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court
to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on
account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of any of
the crimes against persons which tend to
directly and specially insure its execution,
without risk to the offending party arising
from the defense which the offended party
might make.[27] It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant
circumstances, the appreciation of which is
particular to a crime committed. Corollarily,
the defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is
also varied and dependent on each particular
instance. Such variety generates the actual
need for the State to specifically aver the
factual circumstances or particular acts that
constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify
or aggravate the liability for the crime in the
interest of affording the accused sufficient
notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.[28] In People v.
Dimaano,[29] the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient,
it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description
of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in
the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of
a crime in the information is to inform
the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. [emphasis
supplied]
The averments of the informations to the
effect that the two accused "with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did xxx assault, attack and employ personal
violence upon" the victims "by then and there
shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]"
on various parts of their bodies "which
[were] the direct and immediate cause of
[their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth
the facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended each of the killings. It
should not be difficult to see that merely
averring the killing of a person by shooting
him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly
and specially ensured without risk to the
accused from the defense that the victim
might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as
an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments
that could serve the same lethal purpose.
Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular
acts and circumstances constituting
treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of
the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any
circumstance that aggravates his liability for
the crime. The requirement of sufficient
factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the
charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor,
pursuant to which he is always presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with.
To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he
stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice,
for, as the Court fittingly said in United
States v. Lim San:[30]
From a legal point of view, and in a very real
sense, it is of no concern to the accused what
is the technical name of the crime of which
he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. xxx. That to which
his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should
be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein
set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter
of procedure or of substantive right,
how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In
the designation of the crime the accused
never has a real interest until the trial
has ended. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of
the crime at all. It is of no consequence
whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and
important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime
named murder." If he performed the
acts alleged, in the manner stated, the
law determines what the name of the
crime is and fixes the penalty therefor.
It is the province of the court alone to
say what the crime is or what it is
named. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-
allegation of a detail that aggravates his
liability is to prohibit the introduction or
consideration against the accused of
evidence that tends to establish that detail.
The allegations in the information are
controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus,
when there is a variance between the offense
charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged included in the offense
proved.[31] In that regard, an offense
charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.[32]
We now fix the penalty for each count of
homicide.
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal.[33] There being no circumstances
modifying criminal liability, the penalty is
applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years,
8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence is taken from prision mayor, and
the maximum from the medium period
of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum for
each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006
is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing
him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito
Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 201620, Mar 06, 2013 ]
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
May 17, 2011 Decision[1] and March 30, 2012
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952
In an Information dated August 5, 2002,
petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code,[3] viz:
That on or about the 10th day of September
2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having obtained
and received from one Cynthia
Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in
the total amount of P705,685.00 for the
purpose of selling the same on consignment
basis with express obligation to account for
and remit the entire proceeds of the sale if
sold or to return the same if unsold within an
agreed period of time and despite repeated
demands therefor, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to
remit proceeds of the sale of said items
or to return any of the items that may
have been unsold to said Cynthia
Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to his/her own use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of said Cynthia Jaime in the
aforementioned amount of
P705,685.00.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not
guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution's evidence sought to prove
the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her
daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia),
were engaged in a jewelry business.
Sometime in the first week of September
2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house
in Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing
her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that
the latter was selling. On September 10,
2000, Rita's daughter-in-law and business
partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador
several pieces of jewelry worth seven
hundred five thousand six hundred eighty
five pesos (PhP 705,685).[5]
In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement
signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter
undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered
on commission basis and, thereafter, to
remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the
unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15)
days from the delivery.[6] However, as
events turned out, Senador failed to turn
over the proceeds of the sale or return the
unsold jewelry within the given period.[7]
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita
demanded from Senador the return of the
unsold jewelry or the remittance of the
proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted
to her. The demand fell on deaf ears
prompting Rita to file the instant criminal
complaint against Senador.[8]
During the preliminary investigation,
Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check
No. 0003603 dated March 31, 2001 for the
amount of PhP 705,685,[9] as settlement of
her obligations. Nonetheless, the check was
later dishonored as it was drawn against a
closed account.[10]
Senador refused to testify and so failed to
refute any of the foregoing evidence of the
prosecution, and instead, she relied on the
defense that the facts alleged in the
Information and the facts proven and
established during the trial differ. In
particular, Senador asserted that the person
named as the offended party in the
Information is not the same person who
made the demand and filed the complaint.
According to Senador, the private
complainant in the Information went by the
name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial,
the private complainant turned out to be
"Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was
never presented as witness. Hence,
citing People v. Uba,et al. [11] (Uba)
and United States v. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),[12] Senador would
insist on her acquittal on the postulate that
her constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against her has
been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by
Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador
guilty as charged and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA
SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainants, RITA
JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA JA[I]ME, the following:
1) Actual Damages in the amount of
P695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate
from the filing of the Information until fully
paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount
of P100,000.00; and 3) the amount of
P50,000 as Attorney's fees.
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before
the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the
appellate court rendered a Decision
upholding the finding of the RTC that the
prosecution satisfactorily established the
guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA opined that the prosecution was able
to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
following undisputed facts, to wit: (1)
Senador received the pieces of jewelry in
trust under the obligation or duty to return
them; (2) Senador misappropriated or
converted the pieces of jewelry to her benefit
but to the prejudice of business partners,
Rita and Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to
return the pieces of jewelry despite demand
made by Rita.
Further, the CA finding that Uba[13] is not
applicable since Senador is charged with
estafa, a crime against property and not oral
defamation, as in Uba ruled:
WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 16010,
finding accused appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied in a Resolution dated March
30, 2012. Hence, the present petition of
Senador.
The sole issue involved in the instant case is
whether or not an error in the designation in
the Information of the offended party
violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's
constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that
variance between the allegations of the
information and the evidence offered by the
prosecution does not of itself entitle the
accused to an acquittal,[14] more so if the
variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which
does not prejudice the substantial rights of
the accused.[15]
As correctly held by the appellate court,
Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced.
In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral
defamation, a crime against honor, wherein
the identity of the person against whom the
defamatory words were directed is a material
element. Thus, an erroneous designation of
the person injured is material. On the
contrary, in the instant case, Senador was
charged with estafa, a crime against property
that does not absolutely require as
indispensable the proper designation of the
name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct
identification of the criminal act charged
in the information.[16] Thus, in case of an
error in the designation of the offended party
in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12
of the Rules of Court mandates the correction
of the information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The
complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the person against
whom or against whose property the offense
was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or
is known. If there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under
a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the
name of the offended party is unknown,
the property must be described with
such particularity as to properly identify
the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against
whom or against whose property the offense
was committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such
true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the
record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in
offenses against property, the materiality of
the erroneous designation of the offended
party would depend on whether or not the
subject matter of the offense was sufficiently
described and identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the
doctrine that if the subject matter of the
offense is generic or one which is not
described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged, then
an erroneous designation of the offended
party is material and would result in the
violation of the accused's constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her. Such
error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in
the acquittal of the accused, viz:
The second sentence of section 7 of General
Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense
shall have been described with sufficient
certainty to identify the act, an erroneous
allegation as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion
that this provision can have no
application to a case where the name of
the person injured is matter of essential
description as in the case at bar; and at
any rate, supposing the allegation of
ownership to be eliminated, the robbery
charged in this case would not be
sufficiently identified. A complaint stating,
as does the one now before us, that the
defendants "took and appropriated to
themselves with intent of gain and against
the will of the owner thereof the sum of
P100" could scarcely be sustained in any
jurisdiction as a sufficient description either
of the act of robbery or of the subject of the
robbery. There is a saying to the effect
that money has no earmarks; and
generally speaking the only way money,
which has been the subject of a robbery,
can be described or identified in a
complaint is by connecting it with the
individual who was robbed as its owner
or possessor. And clearly, when the offense
has been so identified in the complaint, the
proof must correspond upon this point with
the allegation, or there can be no
conviction.[17] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the
offense was money in the total sum of PhP
100. Since money is generic and has no
earmarks that could properly identify it, the
only way that it (money) could be described
and identified in a complaint is by connecting
it to the offended party or the individual who
was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus,
the identity of the offended party is material
and necessary for the proper identification of
the offense charged. Corollary, the
erroneous designation of the offended party
would also be material, as the subject matter
of the offense could no longer be described
with such particularity as to properly identify
the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v.
Kepner,[18] Sayson v. People,[19] and Ricarze
v. Court of Appeals[20] support the doctrine
that if the subject matter of the offense
is specific or one described with such
particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is not
material and would not result in the violation
of the accused's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her. Such error would
not result in the acquittal of the accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled
that the erroneous designation of the person
injured by a criminal act is not material for
the prosecution of the offense because the
subject matter of the offense, a warrant,
was sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly identify the
particular offense charged. We held, thus:
The allegation of the complaint that the
unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of
the warrant was to the prejudice of Aun Tan
may be disregarded by virtue of section 7 of
General Orders, No. 58, which declares
that when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with
sufficient certainty to identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial. In
any event the defect, if defect it was, was
one of form which did not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant on the
merits, and can not, therefore, under the
provisions of section 10 of the same order,
affect the present proceeding.[21] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction
of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there
was an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured because the subject matter of the
offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently
identified. We held, thus:
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down
the rule that when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with sufficient
certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous
allegation as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial as the same is a mere
formal defect which did not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant.
Accordingly, in the aforementioned case,
which had a factual backdrop similar to the
instant case, where the defendant was
charged with estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant which he had
cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the
owner of the cheque, when in reality the
bank which cashed it was the one which
suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on
the ground that the subject matter of the
estafa, the warrant, was described in the
complaint with such particularity as to
properly identify the particular offense
charged. In the instant suit for estafa
which is a crime against property under
the Revised Penal Code, since the check,
which was the subject-matter of the
offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged, it becomes immaterial,
for purposes of convicting the accused,
that it was established during the trial
that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr.
nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information." [22] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine
espousing an erroneous designation of the
person injured is not material because the
subject matter of the offense, a check, was
sufficiently identified with such particularity
as to properly identify the particular offense
charged.[23]
Interpreting the previously discussed cases,
We conclude that in offenses against
property, if the subject matter of the
offense is generic and not identifiable,
such as the money unlawfully taken as
in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation
of the offended party is fatal and would
result in the acquittal of the accused.
However, if the subject matter of the
offense is specific and identifiable, such
as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such
as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the
designation of the offended party is
immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the
offense does not refer to money or any other
generic property. Instead, the
information specified the subject of the
offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in
the total amount of P705,685.00." The
charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out
and proved by the Trust Receipt
Agreement[24] signed by Senador and
presented during trial, which enumerates
these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the
total amount of PhP 705,685," viz:
QualityDescription
#1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5
1
grams
1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.
#1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay 00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty
1
14 kt. 4.1 grams her obligations through Keppel Check No. beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
#319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 0003603, which was dishonored because it ESTAFA under par. 1(b), Art. 315 of the
1
grams was drawn against an already closed Revised Penal Code, are
#1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills account. The offer indicates her receipt of the hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
1
20.8 grams pieces of jewelry thus described and an that the award of exemplary damages
#393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. implied admission that she misappropriated be reduced to PhP 30,000.
1
14 grams the jewelries themselves or the proceeds of
#2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states: SO ORDERED.
1
blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams
#1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt.
1 [ GR No. 206632, Feb 14, 2018 ]
(oval) 14.6 grams In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those EDEN ETINO v. PEOPLE
#2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt.
1 allowed by law to be compromised, an offer DEL CASTILLO, J.:
8.8 grams
of compromise by the accused may be We resolve this Petition for Review
#206 1 set double sampaloc creolla
1 received in evidence as implied
14 kt. 14.2 grams on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.) Court, assailing the August 29, 2012
# 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6
1
grams Decision[1] and the March 11, 2013
# 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 Taken together, the CA did not err in Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1
kt. 2.0 grams affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime CA-G.R. CR No. 00896. The CA affirmed with
#2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills of estafa. modification the January 14, 2008
1
14 kt. 4.5 grams Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
#1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. In light of current jurisprudence,[25] the Branch 29, Iloilo City, which found petitioner
1
12.6 grams Court, however, finds the award of Eden Etino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
#1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. exemplary damages excessive. Art. 2229 of the crime of frustrated homicide, in that the
1
7.8 grams the Civil Code provides that exemplary CA ordered petitioner to pay the victim
# 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 damages may be imposed by way of example P25,000.00 as moral damages and
1
grams or correction for the public P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
#1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 good. Nevertheless, "exemplary damages
1
kt. 4.1 grams are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another, but to serve as a The Antecedent Facts
Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, deterrent against or as a negative incentive
Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the to curb socially deleterious actions."[26] On Petitioner was charged with the crime of
present case, not the ruling this basis, the award of exemplary damages frustrated homicide in an
in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the in the amount of PhP 100,000 is reduced to Information[4] dated June 19, 2003 which
designation of the offended party in the PhP 30,000. reads:
information is immaterial and did not violate
Senador's constitutional right to be informed WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, That on or about the 5th day of November
of the nature and cause of the accusation 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 2001, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province
against her. of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with an
unlicensed firearm of unknown caliber, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot
JESSIEREL LEYBLE with said unlicensed
firearm he was then provided at the time,
hitting and inflicting upon the victim gunshot
wounds on the different parts of ills body,
thus performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of homicide
as a consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of some cause or
causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, by the timely medical
attendance rendered to the said Jessierel
Leyble which prevented his death.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea
of not guilty.[5] Trial thereafter ensued.
The Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution's evidence consists mainly
of the testimonies of complainant Jessierel
Leyble (Leyble), Isidro Maldecir (Maldecir),
and Nida Villarete Sonza (Sonza), the
Administrative and Medical Officer of the
West Visayas State University Medical Center
(WVSUMC).
During the trial, Leyble testified that, "at
about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 5, 2001, while he and his
companions[,] Isidro Maldecir and Richard
Magno[,] were walking on their way home to
Bgy. [sic] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot
with a 12 gauge shotgun by the [petitioner,]
Eden Etino[,] hitting the back portion of his
right shoulder and other parts of his body."[6]
Leyble's testimony was corroborated by
Maldecir who categorically stated that Leyble
was shot by petitioner from behind, and was
thereafter brought to the Don Benito Lopez
Memorial Hospital (now known as the
WVSUMC) for treatment.[7]
To prove the injuries suffered by Leyble, the
prosecution presented Sonza "in her capacity
as [the officer] in-charge of the security of all
the medical records of the patients [in the
WVSUMC] for the reason that Dr. Rodney Jun
Garcia, then Chief Resident, Surgery
Department, [WVSUMC], who treated
[Leyble was] unable to testify as he is now
based in General Santos City."[8]
In compliance with the Subpoena Duces
Tecum[9] issued by the RTC on February 22,
2005, Sonza brought the medical records of
Leyble to court which included: a) Medical
Certificate[10] dated December 20, 2001, b)
Trauma Sheet[11] dated November 5, 2001,
c) Admission and [Discharge] Record[12] and
d) Operative Records[13] dated November 16,
2001, and certified the same to be true and
faithful reproductions of the original
documents.[14]
The Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of
Bautista Etino, Wenifred Besares, Joeseryl
Masiado and of petitioner himself to prove his
alibi.[15]
The witnesses testit1ed that, "at about 4:30
in the afternoon of November 5, 2001,
[petitioner] was with Bgy. [sic] Captain
Manuel Bomejan, Wenifredo Besares and
[Bautista Etino at] the house of the latter
which was situated about one kilometer away
from where they heard shots that
afternoon."[16] They also alleged that the
filing of the criminal complaint was
precipitated by a pending Comelec[17] gun-
ban case before the RTC filed against Leyble,
wherein petitioner was the witness.[18]
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In its January 14, 2008 Decision,[19] the RTC
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It
ruled that petitioner was positively identified
as the perpetrator of the crime charged
against him, especially so, when the
complainant, Leyble, was alive to tell what
actually happened.[20]
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced petitioner to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum. Notably, it did not award any
damages in favor of Leyble, as it found that
the prosecution had failed to discharge its
burden of presenting evidence on the civil
aspect of the case.[21]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
On appellate review, the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision in that, it
ordered petitioner to pay Leyble the amounts
of P25,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as temperate damages.[22]
The CA ruled that "the trial court did not err
in giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Evaluation of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses amply [showed] that
Jessierel Leyble succinctly but clearly
narrated how he was shot and he also
categorically identified [petitioner] as his
assailant."[23]
In addition, the CA held that the mere delay
in the filing of the complaint did not
necessarily undermine the credibility of
witnesses; and in this case, the fear of
reprisal explained why it took some time for
Leyble to file the complaint and to finally
reveal the identity of his assailant.[24]
TI1e CA also rejected petitioner's claim that
Leyble filed the case against him because he
testified against the latter in the Comelec
gun-ban case. It explained that "[e]ven
assuming that there was a grudge between
Leyble and [petitioner], that [did] not
automatically render the testimony of Leyble
unbelievable. Moreover, considering that
Leyble had positively identified [petitioner],
whom he [knew] from childhood, as his
assailant, motive [was] no longer essential or
relevant."[25]
Finally, the CA held that Leyble was entitled
to moral damages, as it was clear from his
testimony that he sustained gunshot wounds
on his shoulder; and to temperate damages
for the medical treatment he received but for
which no documentary evidence was
presented to prove the actual costs
thereof.[26]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
CA denied the motion in its
Resolution[27] dated March 11, 2013. As a
consequence, petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Court, assailing the CA's August 29, 2012
Decision[28] and the March 11, 2013
Resolution.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues tor the
Court's consideration:
First, whether the CA erred in holding that
his guilt for the charged crime of frustrated
homicide was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, since the physician who examined the
victim was not presented in court;
Second, whether the CA erred when it found
the testimonies of petitioner and his
witnesses to be incredible and unbelievable;
and,
Third, whether the CA erred when it
disregarded petitioner's defenses, i.e., the
lapse of unreasonable time for Leyble to file
the complaint against him, the failure of
Leyble to positively identify him as the
assailant, and Leyble's motive in filing the
case against him.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, we clarify that questions of
fact, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a
Rule 45 petition, where the Court's
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower
courts.[29] Nevertheless, when it appears
that the assailed judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts, and the findings
of the lower courts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they
are based,[30] as in this case, the Court may
probe questions of fact in a Rule 45
proceeding.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the stages of a felony as follows:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and
attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies,
as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it
is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Palaganas v. People,[31] the Court outlined
the distinctions between a frustrated and an
attempted felony:
In frustrated felony, the offender has
1.)performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a
 consequence; whereas in attempted
felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
In frustrated felony, the reason for the
non-accomplishment of the crime is some
cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in
2.)
attempted felony, the reason for the non-
fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have
ruled in several cases that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by
his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and
his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s
but did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime committed is frustrated
murder or frustrated homicide depending on
whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code are present. However, if
the wound/s sustained by the victim in such
a case were not fatal or mortal, then the
crime committed is only attempted murder
or attempted homicide. If there was no
intent to kill on the part of the accused
and the wound/s sustained by the
victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious
or slight physical injury.[32] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in order to determine whether the
crime committed is attempted or frustrated
parricide, murder or homicide, or
only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial
points to consider are: a) whether the injury
sustained by the victim was fatal, and
b) whether there was intent to kill on the part
of the accused.[33]
No proof of the extent of injury
sustained by the victim
It is settled that "where there is nothing in
the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful," and
such doubt should be resolved in favor
of the accused.[34]
In this case, we find that the prosecution
failed to present evidence to prove that the
victim would have died from his wound
without timely medical assistance, as his
Medical Certificate[35] alone, absent the
testimony of the physician who
diagnosed and treated him, or any
physician for that
matter,[36] is insufficient proof of the nature
and extent of his injury. This is especially
true, given that said Medical Certificate
merely stated the victim's period of
confinement at the hospital, the location of
the gunshot wounds, the treatments he
received, and his period of healing.[37]
Without such proof, the character of the
gunshot wounds that the victim sustained
enters the realm of doubt, which the Court
must necessarily resolve in favor of
petitioner.[38]
The intent to kill was not sufficiently
established
"The assailant's intent to kill is the main
element that distinguishes the crime of
physical injuries from the crime of homicide.
The crime can only be homicide if the intent
to kill is proven."[39] The intent to kill must be
proven "in a clear and evident manner [so
as] to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor."[40]
In Rivera v. People,[41] the Court ruled that
"[i]ntent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence",[42] which may
consist of:
[a)] the means used by the malefactors;
the nature, location and number of
[b)]
wounds sustained by the victim;
the conduct of the malefactors before,
[c)] at the time, or immediately after the
killing of the victim;
the circumstances under which the
[(d)]
crime was committed; and,
[e)] the motives of the accused.[43]
Moreover, the Court held in Rivera that
intent to kill is only presumed if the victim
dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors.[44]
Although it was sufficiently shown that
petitioner fired a 12 gauge shotgun at the
victim, there was simply no other evidence
on record that tended to prove that petitioner
had animus interficendi or intent to kill the
victim. On the contrary, none of the
prosecution's witnesses testified that
petitioner had indeed aimed and fired the
shotgun to kill the victim.
It is to be noted, likewise, that petitioner only
fired a single shot[45] at closerange,[46] but
did not hit any vital part of the victims body
- the victim's wounds, based on his Medical
Certificate, were located at the right deltoid
(through and through) and the left
shoulder[47] - and he immediately fled the
scene right after the shooting.[48] These acts
certainly do not suggest that petitioner had
intended to kill the victim; for if he did, he
could have fired multiple shots to ensure the
latter's demise.
Besides, by the victim's own narration of
events, it appears that he did not sustain any
fatal injury as a result of the shooting
considering that he and his companions even
went in pursuit of petitioner after the
incident, viz.:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]
After Eden Etino shot you, what happened
Q:
afterwards?
I shouted to my companion to help me
A:
because I have injuries.
Did they help you at that particular
Q:
instance?
A: Yes sir.
How about Eden Etino, what did he do Mr.
Q:
Witness?
When we ran to the hilly portion, they
A: were no longer there.[49] (Emphasis
supplied)
Under these circumstances, we cannot
reasonably conclude that petitioner's use of
a firearm was sufficient proof that he bad
intended to kill the victim. After all, it is
settled that "[i]ntent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that
the use of firearms is dangerous to
life."[50] Rather, "[a]nimus interficendi must
be established with the same degree of
certainty as is required of the other elements
of the crime. The inference of intent to kill
should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt."[51]
This is not to say that petitioner is without
any criminal liability. When the intent to kill
is lacking, but wounds are shown to have
been inflicted upon the victim, as in this
case, the crime is not frustrated or
attempted homicide but physical
injuries only.[52] Since the victim's period of
incapacity and healing of his injuries was
more than 30 days - he was confined at the
hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for
20 days, and his period of healing was "two
(2) to four (4) weeks barring
complications"[53] - the crime committed
is serious physical injuries under Article
263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[54]
Petitioner's Defenses
We reject petitioner's contention that the
prosecution failed to identify him as the
victim's assailant, given that he "was not
identified and never mentioned [in the police
blotter] as the one who shot the victim" even
though it was the victim himself who
personally reported the incident to the
authorities.[55]
Based on the Police Blotter dated January 18,
2002, the victim had identified petitioner and
his companions as his assailants during the
November 5, 2001 shooting incident, viz.:
9:20 AM - (Shooting Incident) Jessirel Leyble
y Subade, 25 years old, single, and a
resident of Brgy[.] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo
reported personally to this Office alleging
that last November 5, 2001 at around 4:30
P.M. while he was on their [sic] way home at
Brgy[.] Pispis, this Municipality[,] was
waylaid and shot with a firearms [sic] by the
group of Eden Etino, Bautista Etino,
Joeserel Masiado, Alfredo Jabadan,
Wiliam Besarcs and Wenefredo Besares,
all resident [sic] of the same place. As a
result, he sustained gunshot wounds on the
back portion of his body and was confined at
West Visayas State University Hospital, Jaro,
Iloilo City.[56]
In addition, the prosecution's witnesses
never wavered in their positive identification
of petitioner as the victim's assailant. The
pertinent portion of the victim's testimony is
quoted below:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]
Q:Do you know the accused Eden Etino?
A: Yes, sir.
If he is inside the courtroom[,] can you
Q:
point to him?
A: There.
Court Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a person inside the
courtroom who, when asked[,] answered
to the name Eden Etino.
PROS. BALLA
For how long have you known the accused
Q:
in this case?
A: Since childhood.
xxxx
Q:Who shot you Mr. Witness?
A: Eden Etino[.][57] (Emphasis supplied)
We also consider the following pieces of
evidence which amply support petitioner's
positive identification as the assailant in this
case: first, the manner of attack was done
at close-range,[58] and the victim was able to
turn around right after the shot was
fired;[59] second, the shooting incident
happened in broad daylight (at around 4:30
in the afternoon)[60] in an open field,[61] so
the assailant could clearly be seen;
and third, the victim could readily identify
petitioner as his assailant because they had
known each other since childhood.[62]
Given these circumstances, we find
petitioner's identification as the victim's
assailant to be positive and conclusive. As a
result, the defenses of denial and alibi raised
by petitioner must necessarily fail. After all,
"[a]libi and denial are inherently weak
defenses and must be brushed aside when
the prosecution has sufficiently and
positively ascertained the identity of the
accused. And it is only axiomatic that positive
testimony prevails over negative
testimony." [63]
We likewise reject petitioner's claim that the
delay in the filing of the complaint against
him generates doubt as to his guilt. It is
settled that the failure to file a complaint to
the proper authorities would not impair the
credibility of the complainant if such delay
was satisfactorily explained.[64] In this case,
the victim testified that he filed the case after
noticing that petitioner was still after him:
[ATTY. EDGAR SUMIDO]
This incident happened on November 5,
Q:
2001 and it was only filed March 6, 2003?
At first, I did not intend to file a case
against him because I thought they
A:
will settle the case, but later I noticed
that he was after me.
What do you mean by the word that the
Q:
accused is after you, Mr. Witness?
A: Because when I met him, he waylaid me.
xxxx
But you stated before that the reason you
Q:filed this case [was] because the accused
is after you?
The reason that you filed this case [was]
because you thought that the accused
[was] after you?
Because last month, he even intended to
A: do something against me.[65] (Emphasis
supplied)
The victim's initial reluctance to file the
complaint is not uncommon, considering "the
natural reticence of most people to get
involved in a criminal case."[66] Fear of
reprisal, too, is deemed as a valid excuse for
the temporary silence of a prosecution
witness (or in this case, the victim) and has
been judicially declared to not have any
effect on his credibility.[67]
Finally, we find no sufficient evidence on
record to support petitioner's claim that the
victim had ill motives to falsely institute the
complaint and testify against him. Even
assuming arguendo that the victim held a
grudge against petitioner for having testified
against him in another case,[68] the existence
of such grudge would not automatically
render his testimony in this case false and
unreliable.[69] "In the absence of any showing
that a witness was actuated by malice or
other improper motives, his positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand
under a solemn oath deserve full faith and
credence."[70]
The Proper Penalty
Under Article 263, par. 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, "[a]ny person who shall wound,
beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the
crime of serious physical injuries and shall
suffer" "[t]he penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum
period [which ranges from four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months], if the physical injuries inflicted shall
have caused the illness or incapacity for labor
of the injured person for more than thirty
days."[71]
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence law,
the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken, in view of the
attending circumst1nces that could be
properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code."[72]
In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be
taken within the medium period[73] of the
penalty prescribed under Article 263, par. 4,
or one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional. The minimum term shall be
taken within the range of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods[74] or from
one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months.
The Civil Liabilities
Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that
moral damages may be awarded in criminal
cases resulting in physical injuries,[75] as in
this case. Although the victim did not testily
on the moral damages that he suffered, his
Medical Certificate[76] constitutes sufficient
basis to award moral damages, since
"ordinary human experience and common
sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on
[him] would naturally cause physical
suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral
shock, and similar injury."[77] Thus, we affirm
the CA's award of moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in the victim's favor.
We also agree with the CA that the victim is
entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P10,000.00, as it is clear from the records
that the victim received medical treatment at
the WVSUMC and was, in fact, confined at
the hospital for twenty days,[78] although no
documentary evidence was presented to
prove the cost thereof.[79]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The August 29, 2012
Decision and the March 11, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00896
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that, petitioner Eden Etino is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-
year and eight (8) months of prision year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor
correccional, as maximum. and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at
about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola
SO ORDERED. Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del
Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
[ GR No. 183652, Feb 25, 2015 ] Honorable Court, and once inside said
PEOPLE v. CA lodging house, accused RAYMUND
PERALTA, J.: CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took
turns in having carnal knowledge against the
Before the Court is a Petition will of AAA while accused MOISES
for Certiorari questioning the Decision[1] of ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 against her will and consent.
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February
28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their
acquitted private respondents Raymund respective counsels, entered a plea of not
Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises guilty to the offense charged.[5]
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the
prosecution's failure to prove their guilt Following pre-trial,[6] trial on the merits
beyond reasonable doubt. ensued. Accused Christian John Lim,
however, remains at-large.
In a Second Amended Information dated
June 23, 2004, private respondents The factual antecedents follow:
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were
charged, together with Christian John Lim, On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, attended her high school graduation
Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,[3] to wit: party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission
from her mother to go to the Maranding
That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates
of March 25, 2004 at Alson's Palace, had to perform for an election
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, campaign. She went home at around 4:00
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m.,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused AAA told her father that she would be
conspiring, confederating and mutually attending a graduation dinner party with her
helping one another, did then and there friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one
Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan,
Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to
go to Alson's Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemeno's
house. Outside the Alson's Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver
Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while,
they went inside and proceeded to a
bedroom on the second floor where they
again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy,
Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a
drinking session to celebrate their
graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph
Villame who bought the drinks two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they
arranged themselves in a circle for the
drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being
passed around: one glass containing the
sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass
containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused
to drink because she had never tried hard
liquor before. During the session, they
shared their problems with each
other. When it was AAA's turn, she became
emotional and started crying. It was then
that she took her first shot. The glasses
were passed around and she consumed more
or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head
down on Oporto's lap. Oporto then started
kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told
them to stop, and simply tried to hide her
face with the cap. But they just laughed at
her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that
time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still
forced her to take another shot. They helped
her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na,"
(You make her drunk, you make her
drunk). She likewise heard someone say,
"You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on
Oporto's lap again, then she fell
asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her
the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the
remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse
but they insisted, so she drank directly from
the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy
were carrying her down the stairs, and then
she was asleep again. When she regained
consciousness, she saw that she was already
at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back
asleep and wake up again. And during one
of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse
with her. She started crying. She tried to
resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She
also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola
inside the room, watching as Oporto abused
her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her
private organ. She cried and told him to
stop. Alquizola then joined and started to
kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m.
of the next day. She was all alone. Her body
felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself
with her shirt on but without her lower
garments. The upper half of her body was
on top of the bed but her feet were on the
floor. There were also red stains on her
shirt. After dressing up, she hailed
a trisikad and went home. When AAA
reached their house, her father was waiting
for her and was already furious. When she
told them that she was raped, her mother
started hitting her. They brought her to the
Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District
Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal
laceration at 5 o'clock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior
fornices. The vaginal smear likewise
revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they
raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004,
Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemeno's house. Gemeno then
invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alson's Palace, owned
by the latter's family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they
had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m.,
Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson's
Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The
party subsequently ended, but the group
agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas,
Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one
(1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that
time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and
Lim. Also present but did not join the
drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo
Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah
Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but
the latter did not listen and instead told him
not to tell her aunt. During the drinking
session, AAA rested on Oporto's lap. She
even showed her scorpion tattoo on her
buttocks. And when her legs grazed
Batoctoy's crotch, she remarked, "What was
that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to
kiss her, and the latter kissed him
back. Oporto did the same and AAA also
kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA
kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around
9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with
his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then
requested Alquizola to accompany her to
Alson's Palace to see her friends there. They
proceeded to the second floor and there they
saw AAA lying on Oporto's lap. Fiel told AAA
to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye,
just shook her head, and said, "I just stay
here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to
the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they
went to Alson's Palace again, and saw AAA
and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was
lying on his lap while holding his
neck. Subsequently, they went back to the
lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA
home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola
Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode
a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and
told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime." Alquizola then opened Room
No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana
stayed. There were two beds inside, a single
bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down
on the single bed and looked at
Carampatana. The latter approached her
and they kissed. He then removed her shirt
and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give
way. Carampatana likewise removed her
brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the
foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also
removed her pants. AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her
underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA
and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on
the other hand, placed himself in between
AAA's legs and had intercourse with
her. When he finished, he put on his shorts
and went back to Alson's Palace to get some
sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were
still kissing. Alquizola then entered the
room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come
Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem." Alquizola thus started kissing
AAA's breasts. Oporto stood up and opened
his pants. AAA held his penis and performed
fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola
changed positions. Oporto proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. During
that time, AAA was moaning and calling his
name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and
slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto
then had intercourse with AAA two more
times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson's
Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto
and Carampatana went back to the lodging
house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she
did not move so they just left and went
home. Alquizola had gone outside but he
came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA
was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and
Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison
term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the
amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the court hereby sentences him
to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as
maximum; to pay AAA the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in
the commission of the crime charged, and
the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to
pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for
and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz,
Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of
the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally,
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigations; and the costs of
suit.
The full period of the preventive
imprisonment of accused Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to
them and deducted from their prison terms
provided they comply with the requirements
of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to the present. Accused
Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 and detained since then up to
this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who
likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March
2004 was ordered released to the custody of
the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31
March 2004, and subsequently posted cash
bond for his provisional liberty on 17
September 2004 duly approved by this court,
thus resulted to an order of even date for his
release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the
archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against
accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private
respondents brought the case to the CA. On
June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered
the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court's ruling and, consequently, acquitted
private respondents. The decretal portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors
therefrom, the Decision on appeal is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellants RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and
MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution
failed to prove private respondents' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more
credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual
congress. She was wide awake and aware of
what private respondents were doing before
the intercourse. She never showed any
physical resistance, never shouted for help,
and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied
on the medical report which showed the
presence of an old hymenal laceration on
AAA's genitalia, giving the impression that
she has had some carnal knowledge with a
man before. The CA also stressed that AAA's
mother's unusual reaction of hitting her when
she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a
parent who found out that her child just had
premarital sex rather than one who was
sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private
counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under
Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which
reversed private respondents' conviction and
ardently contending that the same was made
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her
petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.[10]
The private respondents present the
following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT
THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST
FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS
THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL
CASES.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY
APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO
THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS
NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.[12]
The Court will first resolve the procedural
issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of
procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate
a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must
not get in the way of achieving substantial
justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due
process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.[13] Liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. The
relaxation or suspension of procedural rules,
or the exemption of a case from their
operation, is warranted when compelling
reasons exist or when the purpose of justice
requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on their merits and
errors: not on sheer technicalities.[14]
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot
appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant
in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.[15] Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the
offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the
decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may
be assailed through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but
also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void.[16] If
there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioner's prayer is not tantamount to
putting private respondents in double
jeopardy.[17]
As to the party with the proper legal standing
to bring the action, the Court said in People
v. Santiago:[18]
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where
the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability.
Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case
is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by
the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may
not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed
under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant.
The complainant has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so
doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant.[19]
Private respondents argue that the action
should have been filed by the State through
the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by
the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State. This is because the authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court and the CA
is solely vested in the OSG.[20]
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private
counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA when it
acquitted private respondents. As the
aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to
bring the action in her name and maintain
the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the
case precisely because she is the subject of
the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa
v. CA,[21] where the Court sustained the
private offended party's right in a criminal
case to file a special civil action
for certiorari to question the validity of the
judgment of dismissal and ruled that the
Solicitor General's intervention was not
necessary, the recourse of the complainant
to the Court is proper since it was brought in
her own name and not in that of the People
of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG
joins petitioner's cause in its
Comment,[22] thereby fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor.[23]
Private respondents further claim that even
assuming, merely for the sake of argument,
that AAA can file the special civil action
for certiorari without violating their right
against double jeopardy, still, it must be
dismissed for petitioner's failure to
previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is
a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the
court to have an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by
re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule,
however, is not absolute and admits well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order
of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are
a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.[24]
Here, petitioner's case amply falls within the
exception. AAA raises the same questions as
those raised and passed upon in the lower
court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the
private respondents. There is also an urgent
necessity to resolve the issues, for any
further delay would prejudice the interests,
not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of
the Government. And, as will soon be
discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity
for lack of due process and for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the
respondent court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when
it is shown that the prosecution's right to due
process was violated or that the trial
conducted was a sham. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate and
establish that the respondent court blatantly
abused its authority such as to deprive itself
of its very power to dispense justice.[25]
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in
evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony
as well as the trial court's findings of fact,
thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the
private respondents' narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a
specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[26] There is grave abuse of
discretion when the disputed act of the lower
court goes beyond the limits of discretion
thus effecting an injustice.[27]
The Court finds that the petitioner has
sufficiently discharged the burden of proving
that the respondent appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the
CA merely relied on the evidence presented
by the defense and utterly disregarded that
of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that
its narration of the facts[28] of the case was
meticulously culled from the evidence of both
parties. But a more careful perusal will
reveal that it was simply lifted, if not
altogether parroted, from the testimonies of
the accused, especially that of
Oporto,[29] Carampatana,[30] and
Alquizola,[31] the accused-appellants in the
case before it. The appellate court merely
echoed the private respondents' testimonies,
particularly those as to the specific events
that transpired during the crucial period -
from the dinner at Gemeno's house to the
following morning at the Alquizola Lodging
House. As a result, it presented the private
respondents' account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of
the case, which it later conveniently utilized
to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a
decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party
who offered the same.[32] It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a
blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party's cause and brush the
other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties
tendered contradicting versions of the
incident. The victim is crying rape but the
accused are saying it was a consensual
sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA's blatant
disregard of material prosecution evidence
and outward bias in favor of that of the
defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion
resulting in violation of petitioner's right to
due process.[33]
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under
the rug the observations of the RTC and
made its own flimsy findings to justify its
decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was,
in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any
physical resistance, never cried out for help,
and never fought against the private
respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter
that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was
heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How
Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements
of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act
was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of
age.[34] Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than
she could handle. They still forced her to
drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was
clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished
her. The CA, however, readily concluded
that she agreed to the sexual act simply
because she did not shout or offer any
physical resistance, disregarding her
testimony that she was rendered weak and
dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime.[35] The appellate
court never provided any reason why AAA's
testimony should deserve scant or no weight Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked
at all, or why it cannot be accorded any you that you went asleep, when did you
credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone regain your consciousness?
testimony of the victim is and should be, by A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink
itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of the remaining wine inside the bottle of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has Emperador Brandy.
been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says x x x x
in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her Q: What do you mean that they hide you
testimony passes the test of credibility, the (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of
accused can be convicted on that basis the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
alone. This is because from the nature of the A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was
offense, the sole evidence that can usually be trying to refuse but they insisted.
offered to establish the guilt of the accused
is the complainant's testimony itself.[36] The Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you
trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not can remember?
truthful to her accusation, she would not A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
have opened herself to the rough and tumble
of a public trial. AAA was certainly not Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly
enjoying the prying eyes of those who were from the bottle?
listening as she narrated her harrowing A: Yes, sir.
experience.[37]
Q: What happened after that?
AAA positively identified the private A: I fell asleep again, sir.
respondents as the ones who violated
her. She tried to resist, but because of the Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
presence of alcohol, her assaulters still A: When somebody was carrying me down to
prevailed. The RTC found AAA's testimony the spiral stairs.
simple and candid, indicating that she was
telling the truth. The trial court likewise Q: Can you remember the person or persons
observed that her answers to the lengthy and who was or who were carrying you?
humiliating questions were simple and A: Yes, sir.
straightforward, negating the possibility of a
rehearsed testimony.[38] Thus: Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold
Batoctoy.
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen
x x x x Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic),
sir: see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir. Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
x x x x A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
Q: After that, what happened, if any? A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went answering) doing?
downstairs. A: He was beside us standing and looking at
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you me, sir.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
remember anymore? A: I was starting to cry, sir. Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: Yes, sir. A: I could not remember, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is
Q: Now, when again did you regain your (sic) your reaction? x x x x
consciousness? A: I was saying don't because I feel pain my
A: When we entered the room and the light private organ (sic). Q: After that, what happened?
was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the A: I went asleep again, sir.
flash of light. Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you
(sic) those words? Q: Then, when again did you or when again
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) did you wake up?
when you were awakened that (sic) flash of of my body then he sexually abused me. A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my
light. private part (sic), I saw Raymund
A: Yes, sir. ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on Carampatana, sir.
record, Your Honor, that the witness is
Q: Where? crying. Q: On top of you?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir. A: No, sir, because he was in between my
x x x x legs, sir.
x x x x
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Q: What was your reaction?
Q: When you regained your consciousness Honor. A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told
from the flash of light, what happened? him don't.
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir. COURT: Continue.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that
Q: So, you fell asleep again? ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel room when you found Raymund
A: Yes, sir. Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who Carampatana?
else was there inside that room? A: Only the three of them, sir.
x x x x A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund
Carampatana, sir. Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again? A: Yes, sir.
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir. Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana,
what was he doing? Q: What was he doing?
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you A: He was at my feet while looking at us. A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
 prove the relationship. Being an affirmative
Q: Where in particular? defense that needs convincing proof, it must
A: In my face, sir. be established with sufficient evidence that
the intercourse was indeed
Q: Then after that, what happened? consensual.[42] Generally, the burden of
A: I fell asleep again, sir. proof is upon the prosecution to establish
each and every element of the crime and that
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), it is the accused who is responsible for its
what did you feel when you said that you feel commission. This is because in criminal
(sic) something in your private part when cases, conviction must rest on a moral
you saw Raymund Carampatana? certainty of guilt.[43] Burden of evidence is
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, that logical necessity which rests on a party
sir. at any particular time during the trial to
create a prima facie case in his favor or to
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again? overthrow one when created against
A: Yes, sir. him. A prima facie case arises when the
party having the burden of proof has
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)? produced evidence sufficient to support a
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o'clock a.m in the finding and adjudication for him of the issue
next (sic) day, sir.[39] in litigation.[44] However, when the accused
alleges consensual sexual congress, he
needs convincing proof such as love notes,
On the other hand, the RTC was not mementos, and credible witnesses attesting
convinced with the explanation of the to the romantic or sexual relationship
defense. It noted that their account of the between the offender and his supposed
events was seemingly unusual and victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge
incredible. [40]
Besides, the defense of of the complainant, the burden now shifts to
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked the accused to prove his defense by
and seemed to have been a last ditch effort substantial evidence.[45]
to avoid culpability. The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial Here, the accused themselves admitted to
stage. The trial court only came to know having carnal knowledge of AAA but
about it when it was their turn to take the unfortunately failed to discharge the burden
witness stand, catching the court by required of them. Carampatana narrated
surprise.[41] More importantly, it must be that upon reaching the room at the lodging
emphasized that when the accused in a rape house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked
case claims that the sexual intercourse at him. He then approached her and they
between him and the complainant was kissed. He removed her shirt and
consensual, as in this case, the burden of brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed
evidence shifts to him, such that he is now AAA's lower garments and then went to kiss
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in
between AAA's legs and had intercourse with
her.[46] On the other hand, Oporto himself
testified that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA three times. While Carampatana was
removing AAA's shirt and brassiere, Oporto
was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for
him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual
intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto,
he then stood up, opened his pants, and took
out his penis so that AAA could
perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded
to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and
slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a
few minutes, he woke up and went back to
the room and again had intercourse with
AAA. He went back to sleep and after some
time, he woke up to the sound of AAA
vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love
with AAA for the third and last
time.[47] Despite said shameless admission,
however, the accused failed to sufficiently
prove that the lack of any physical resistance
on AAA's part amounts to approval or
permission. They failed to show that AAA
had sexual intercourse with them out of her
own volition, and not simply because she was
seriously intoxicated at that time, and
therefore could not have given a valid and
intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the
defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a
thumbs-up to some of the accused after her
testimony, an indication of a rehearsed
witness.[48] To be believed, the testimony
must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the attending
circumstances.[49]
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's
assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses' deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to properly
evaluate testimonial evidence.[50] Matters of
credibility are addressed basically to the trial
judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and
evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared
before him.[51] The appellate courts are far
detached from the details and drama during
trial and have to rely solely on the records of
the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses,
therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of
the trial court whose findings must be given
due deference.[52] Since the CA and the
private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the
trial court, these findings deserve great
weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding.[53]
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that
the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAA's private organ. The lack
of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is
expected to be present when the alleged
sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean
that AAA actually consented to the
fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when
sex is consensual, the vagina becomes
lubricated and the insertion of the penis will
not cause any laceration. It presumed that
complainant, therefore, was no longer
innocent considering the presence of old
hymenal laceration that could have resulted
from her previous sexual encounters. The
defense, however, failed to show that AAA
was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It
must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely
17 years old at the time of the incident,
having just graduated from high school on
that same day. In a similar case,[54] the
Court held:
x x x Indeed, no woman would have
consented to have sexual intercourse
with two men or three, according to
Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each
other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the
record before Us contains no indication that
Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high
school student, can be so characterized. On
the contrary, her testimony in court evinced
the simplicity and candor peculiar to her
youth. In fact, appellants could not even
suggest any reason why Farmacita would
falsely impute to them the commission of the
crime charged.[55]
No woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be
subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.[56] And even if she were
indeed highly promiscuous at such a young
age, the same could still not prove that no
rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose
morals could still be the victim of rape. Even
a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The
victim's moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the
victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to
enable the private respondents to have sex
with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is
the carnal knowledge of a woman against her
consent.[57] A freshly broken hymen is not
one of its essential elements. Even if the
hymen of the victim was still intact, the
possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into
the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to
justify a conviction for rape. To repeat,
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any
part of the woman's genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape.[58]
Neither does AAA's mother's act of hitting her
after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that "the workings of
the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the
people react differently."[59] Different people
react differently to a given type of situation,
and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful
experience.[60] At most, it merely indicates
the frustration and dismay of a mother upon
learning that her daughter had been defiled
after partying late the night before. It is a
settled rule that when there is no showing
that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation
against the accused, her complaint is entitled
to full faith and credence.[61] So if AAA in fact
consented to the sexual act, why did she still
need to immediately tell her parents about it
when she could have just kept it to
herself? Why did she ever have to shout
rape? She was not caught in the act of
making love with any of the private
respondents,[62] nor was she shown to have
been in a relationship with any of them of
which her family disapproved.[63] She never
became pregnant as a result of the
deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her
reputation, why would she have to drag the
private respondents into the case and
identify them as her rapists? Absent any
circumstance indicating the contrary, she
brought the charge against the private
respondents simply because she was, in fact,
violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her
zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the
CA had already acquitted the private
respondents, evinces the truth that she
merely seeks justice for her honor that has
been debased.[64] Unfortunately, the CA
chose to ignore these telling pieces of
evidence. Its findings are against the logic
and effect of the facts as presented by AAA
in support of her complaint,[65] contrary to
common human experience, and in utter
disregard of the relevant laws and
jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that
Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,[66] citing People v. Lobrigo.[67] It
found that his participation was not in
furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the
crime of rape.[68] The Court, however, finds
that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola's
liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a
mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it
is not essential that there be proof as to
previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors shall
have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that
the malefactors committed an offense in
furtherance of a common objective pursued
in concert.[69] Proof of conspiracy need not
even rest on direct evidence, as the same
may be inferred from the collective conduct
of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.[70]
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses
with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's
participation in the crime conflict on material
points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and
Dominador were carrying
weapons during the mauling and whether
they participated in the mauling by more
than just boxing the victim. Noel stated
that they did not, Domingo stated that
they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who
administered the fatal blow is not
necessary. In this case, the rule is not
applicable because conspiracy with respect
to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven.
Their exact participation in the crime is
uncertain.[71] (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,[72] the Court upheld
the findings of the lower courts that there
was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso
who actually ravished the victim based on
the testimony of the private complainant that
Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to
her private parts and that Reynaldo dela
Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her
and fondled her private parts, accused
[D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for
the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite
apparent that the three of them conspired
and mutually helped one another in raping
the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal
knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of
pulling her towards the parked
jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to
prevent the commission of the rape,
made him a co-conspirator. As such, he
was properly adjudged as a principal in the
commission of the crime.[73]
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo,
Alquizola's participation in the crime is not at
all uncertain. As the caretaker of the
Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room
so the rape could be accomplished with ease
and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the
room, intently watching, while Oporto and
Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did
not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
companions. He even admitted to kissing
AAA's lips, breasts, and other parts of her
body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy
among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola
to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any
one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the
crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC
found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice,
when he appealed from the decision of the
trial court,[74] he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw
the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the accused-appellant.[75]
Finally, the Court notes that although the
prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of
several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint
or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective.[76] The
rationale behind this rule prohibiting
duplicitous complaints or informations is to
give the accused the necessary knowledge of
the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two
or more charges which might confuse him in
his defense.[77] Non-compliance with this
rule is a ground[78] for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under
Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his
plea,[79] otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.[80] The accused herein, however,
cannot avail of this defense simply because
they did not file a motion to quash
questioning the validity of the Information
during their arraignment. Thus, they are
deemed to have waived their right to
question the same. Also, where the
allegations of the acts imputed to the
accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the
same crime, as in the instant case, there is
no duplicity to speak of.[81] There is likewise
no violation of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them
because the Information, in fact, stated that
they "took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA" on March 25,
2004.[82] Further, allegations made and the
evidence presented to support the same
reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled
several times. Here, according to the
accused themselves, after undressing AAA,
Carampatana positioned himself in between
her legs and had intercourse with her. On
the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with AAA three
times. When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.[83] Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more
than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4)
counts in all, with conspiracy extant among
the three of them during the commission of
each of the four violations. Each of the
accused shall thus be held liable for every act
of rape committed by the other. But while
Oporto himself testified that he inserted his
sexual organ into AAA's mouth, the Court
cannot convict him of rape through sexual
assault therefor because the same was not
included in the Information. This is,
however, without prejudice to the filing of a
case of rape through sexual assault as long
as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed,
rape committed by two or more persons is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view
of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
absence of an aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the lighter penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
them,[84] for each count. With regard to
Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the proper imposable penalty upon
him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty
next lower to reclusion perpetua to
death. Being a divisible penalty, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty the minimum of
which shall be within the range of prision
mayor (the penalty next lower in degree
to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of
which shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, there being
the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance.[85] With that, the
Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
count of rape committed.[86] However,
Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51, R.A. No.
9344,[87] which extends even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he committed the crime
when he was still a child,[88] and provides for
the confinement of convicted children as
follows:[89]
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted
Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict
with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment
by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the
judge in order to accord children in conflict
with the law, who have already gone beyond
twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay
AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages, in each case. Exemplary damages
of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by
way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Let the records of this case be forwarded to
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed the court of origin for the execution of
Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of judgment.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court SO ORDERED.
hereby renders judgment:
Finding accused-respondent Raymund
Carampatana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
a)
rape, and the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case;
Finding accused-respondent Joefhel
Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
b)
from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, in each case;
and
Finding accused-respondent Moises
Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the
c)
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-
respondents to pay AAA, jointly and
severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its
appropriate action in accordance with