THE ECONOMIC W E E K L Y
Land Reform in Uttar Pradesh
IN t h e present struggle for econo-
mic development it has become
a x i o m a t i c t h a t l a n d r e f o r m is a
prerequisite to any advance. The
reforms w h i c h are considered es-
sential are the a b o l i t i o n of landlords
a n d other intermediaries between
the state and the a c t u a l cultivator.
The concept of l a n d r e f o r m is a
legal one a m a t t e r of titles
a n d l a n d r e f o r m legislation i n I n -
d i a since independence has general-
ly been directed towards the aboli-
t i o n of certain titles to l a n d a n d the
t r a n s f e r of t i t l e from landlords to
tenants. It is certainly believed
t h a t such reforms are necessary be-
fore progress can be achieved, and
there also seems to be a. widespread
feeling t h a t the reforms w i l l lead
to progress.
The h i s t o r y of l a n d tenure and an
analysis of modern a g r i c u l t u r a l
conditions in U t t a r Pradesh lend
l i t t l e support to proponents of re-
f o r m ; insecurity of tenure, harshness
of legal a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and exploita-
t i o n of the c u l t i v a t o r were a l l well
on the w a y to being t a k e n care of
fifty years ago.* Present r e f o r m
p r o g r a m m e s , despite their r e v o l u t i o n -
a r y phrasing, continue the policies de-
veloped by the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
Pre-British System
Before the B r i t i s h came to I n d i a
the economy was organized in self-
sufficient villages, w h i c h in t u r n
*So f a r as law is concerned, there
is in a d d i t i o n to the content of the
legislation the question of how
effectively the l a w is enforced. It
was probably true t h a t m a n y r i g h t s
Were never properly enforced; but
t h i s was a result of the f a m i l y ,
caste, a n d social system e x i s t i n g in
UP( a n d n o t a result of the legis-
l a t i o n Itself. It was a case where
the h i e r a r c h i c a l and f a m i l y oriented
social s t r u c t u r e often served to defeat
the aims of legislation The point
here is t h a t , in so far as legislation
can g r a n t r i g h t s , the legislation on
the books in UP before the F i r s t W a r
h a d g r a n t e d n e a r l y a l l the rights
w h i c h are considered essential for
g o o d tenancy conditions. The read-
e r i s i n v i t e d t o compare 1 9 t h century
l e g i s l a t i o n i n U P w i t h post-independ-
ence legislation i n P u n j a b a n d B o m -
bay. I t h i n k he w i l l find the UP
l e g i s l a t i o n more t h o r o u g h g o i n g a n d
progressive t h a n t h a t i n the P u n j a b
a n d as advanced as t h a t In B o m b a y .
J u l y 28, 1056
Walter C Neale
were groupings of large families. were l a c k i n g a n d the m o s t i m p o r t a n t
Economic relations were governed m a r k e t f o r economic progress, the
by caste a n d custom. Above the capital m a r k e t , did not exist i n a n y
village, but not essential to its life, useful f o r m . The nature of the e r r o r
were Kingdoms a n d empires t a k i n g has never been appreciated by the
a share f r o m the g r a i n heap a n d reformers w h o believed a n d s t i l l be-
t r y i n g as best they could to m a i n - lieve t h a t the e r r o r l a y in some
t a i n law and order. There was no m i s t a k e in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r i g h t s
b u y i n g and selling; the order of a m o n g the various c l a i m a n t s . A n
economic life h a d no place f o r a analysis of the problem shows t h a t
price mechanism. The great change true r e f o r m lies in another d i r e c t i o n .
in I n d i a n economic organization The h i s t o r y of ownership in U P
occurred when the B r i t i s h introduced d u r i n g the first h a l f of the nineteenth
the concepts of ownership, sale, and century shows the B r i t i s h m o v i n g
the r e n t a l m a r k e t . The o l d I n d i a n i n t o a society disrupted by rajas,
system d i d n o t clearly differentiate t a l u k d a r s , a n d zamindars competing
between economic and p o l i t i c a l power, f o r power. F o r each piece of l a n d
nor between such power and social the B r i t i s h recognized one person or
status. Everyone h a d r i g h t s in the group as "owner/ 1 and m u c h l a n d
produce of the land, obligations to was given to the w r o n g persons.
the village, and a greater or lesser W h e n the " r i g h t " person g o t the
a b i l i t y to enforce his w i l l upon land he received w i t h his t i t l e more
others. The z a m i n d a r was o r g i n a l l y power t h a n he h a d ever enjoyed,
a collector of taxes, b u t this stat- w h i l e the sale of l a n d for arrears of
ment is misleading by itself. U n l i k e revenue created a new class of o w n -
the t a x collector of today the z a m i n - ers. A b o u t 1820 the B r i t i s h realized
dar m i g h t also be the leader of the t h a t m a n y c u l t i v a t i n g tenants had
highest, caste in the village, headman justifiable claims to a special posi-
of the village, and senior member t i o n on the l a n d and the revenue
of clan w i t h h e r e d i t a r y r i g h t s over officers set about r e c o r d i n g these
the village. W h o can say h o w m a n y c u s t o m a r y r i g h t s . Cultivators of
of these characteristics m a k e a m a n twelve year's s t a n d i n g were g i v e n
an owner in our sense? The ques- an inalienable b u t heritable interest
t i o n never arose. in the land, i n c l u d i n g permission to
The c o m p l e x i t y of r i g h t s in l a n d b o l d at a reduced rent. So began
a n d to the produce of l a n d was so the g r a d u a l encroachment of tenants
g r e a t as to make reasonable a n y upon the r i g h t s of owners. The
one of several different d i s t r i b u t i o n s policy of increasing tenant r i g h t s at
the expense of landlords received a
of titles and r i g h t s . E v e r y member
set-back w i t h the a n n e x a t i o n of
of I n d i a n society h a d some sort of
Oudh and the " M u t i n y " , for v i r t u a l l y
c l a i m upon the l a n d f r o m the raja's
absolute ownership was g i v e n to re-
r i g h t to l a n d revenue down to the
bellious t a l u k d a r s w h o w o u l d sub-
ploughmen's r i g h t to a share in the
m i t peacefully. I n the seventies a n d
village g r a i n heap.
eighties L a n d Revenue a n d R e n t
Assumption of Market Economy A c t s transferred more of the powers
The B r i t i s h t h o u g h t t h a t the m a x i - a n d profits of ownership to the ten-
m u m of m a t e r i a l welfare and econo- ants. In the e a r l y p a r t of this cen-
mic progress w o u l d be achieved by t u r y tenants were guaranteed seven
l e a v i n g decisions to those who pro- years at the same rent, a n d t w e n t y
duced for sale on the m a r k e t . T h i s years later a l l tenants received a l i f e
was a m i s t a k e of c r u c i a l importance: interest i n t h e i r l a n d w i t h rents f i x e d
a f a i l u r e to realize t h a t r a t i o n a l by a R e n t Officer. In 1939 these
m a r k e t behaviour occurs only when tenancies were made heritable. The
the owner of l a n d is producing f o r t w o o u t s t a n d i n g characteristics of
a m a r k e t . In U P neither the l a n d - l a n d policy in U P were the t r a n s -
l o r d n o r the c u l t i v a t o r were d o i n g ference o f the a t t r i b u t e s o f owner-
so. M a r k e t s o n l y allocate resources s h i p to tenants, a n d the persistence
to their m o s t productive uses w h e n of a l a n d m a r k e t as the f r a m e w o r k
the factors of l a n d , labour, a n d f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . W h i l e
c a p i t a l are i n t i m a t e l y connected i t I s t r u e t h a t the owners l o s t r i g h t s
t h r o u g h w o r k i n g mechanisms. Pres- w h i c h w e associate w i t h ownership,
l a n d l o r d s a n d tenants could j o i n t l y
sures in one sector m u s t set up self-
exercise a l l the r i g h t s o f ownership
c o r r e c t i n g changes In other sectors.
by combining.
R e a l connections between m a r k e t s
888
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY July 28, 1956

889
 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
Limitations on the Market
L i m i t a t i o n s on the market did
exist in a number of cases. Special
legislation for the Bundelkhand area
prohibited non-agriculturists from
holding land, and other acts limited
mortgagees-in-possession to twenty
years and created procedures for
m a k i n g some lands inalienable at
the option of the owner. Debt reduc-
t i o n and stay of execution legislation
prevented the m a r k e t from operating
in the o r d i n a r y fashion in the t h i r -
ties. The B r i t i s h were w i l l i n g to
t i n k e r w i t h the sale market, but they
never gave it up.
W h i l e the B r i t i s h were increasing-
ly r e g u l a t i n g the market, Indians
were changing their attitudes. Where-
as Indians at first simply did not
play the market game, the landlords
after a time began to seek ways
around the regulations, and in the
end we find the population t r y i n g to
maximize on a market while the
originators of the market were t r y i n g
to prevent this behaviour because
they had found that under Indian
conditions it did not b r i n g desirable
results.
Criterion of Past Collections
In the course of these develop-
ments, the revenue officers became
the focus of an artificial market. In
the beginning they tried to levy the
revenue upon the economic rent, hut,
as markets did not exist, it was i m -
possible to compute either the value
of produce or the costs of produc-
tion. Then the officers began w i t h
a " f a i r " sum for a district and ap-
portioned the total among the v i l -
lages and then among the landlords.
A l t h o u g h not recognized as such,
this change was in tact a very signi-
ficant one, for the system replaced
the concept of economic rent by the
criterion of past collections. The
system was gradually modified to
t a k e account of the rents which
tenants actually paid, but it was al-
ways necessary to adjust the record-
ed rents to allow for fraud and
peculiarities of local custom. A lord would use the increase in retain-
series of circulars instructed reve-
nue officers to use as a basis for cor-
rections, and computations of value
and rents, the prices of a g r i c u l t u r a l
produce, of s i m i l a r l a n d recently sold,
rents freely a r r i v e d at elsewhere in
the district, and, in effect, all of the
elements w h i c h r a t i o n a l men on a
m a r k e t w o u l d take into account.
The revenue officers were t r y i n g to
arrive at those rents and values
which a properly functioning market
w o u l d reach automatically, but which
the I n d i a n m a r k e t d i d n o t achieve.
The m a r k e t for land was a failure.
Contrary to expectations the m a r k e t
system did not b r i n g w i t h it a huge
increase in material wellbeing. It
is often said that there has even
been a decline under B r i t i s h rule, but
the evidence points to a rise in l i v i n g
standards during the nineteenth cen-
tury, although stagnation and per-
haps some decline has since occur-
red. But in fact I n d i a n progress has
been insufficient to satisfy anyone.
Causes of Stagnation
The arguments that are commonly
put forward to explain the stagna-
t i o n of agriculture in UP are that
the laws were harsh and " t r i c k y " ;
the laws were evaded; the adminis-
t r a t i o n was biased against the pea-
sants; the assessments of revenue
were too high; the level of rents was
too high; and that price fluctuations
destroyed incentive and ruined the
peasantry. Do any of these stand
up to the evidence?
The procedural provisions of the
law were straightforward, there were
ample opportunities to protect, one's
rights, the n u l l i f y i n g effect of pub-
lic attitudes are beyond the scope of
legislation, and from the middle of
the nineteenth century onward sales
for arrears of revenue were rare.
While there were abuses and eva-
sions of the law. the figures for
acreage and numbers of tenants
protected by the laws increased
steadily, as did the figures for owner-
cultivated land. U n f a i r treatment.
of cultivators occurred in the early
thirties, but the cause agitation by
the Congress Party—-was political.
D u r i n g the earlier period of B r i t i s h
rule, the bias was in favour of the
tenant.
The charge that revenue assess-
ments were too high does not fit the
evidence, for agricultural stagnation
and reductions in the revenue bur-
den coincide. Furthermore, a reduc-
tion in the revenue burden would
lead to development only on the un-
likely assumption t h a t the poor land-
ed income for capital Improvements.
These same criticisms apply to the
popular charge that, rents were too
high. Also, the h i g h rent argument
puts the cart before the horse. In
a market system the returns to a
factor tend to approximate the mar-
g i n a l productivity of t h a t factor, and
in I n d i a n agriculture the m a r g i n a l
productivity of labour is close to
zero. Rent and interest eat up the
earnings of agriculture because the
productivity of, land and capital is
h i g h relative to the p r o d u c t i v i t y of
890
July 28, 1056
labour. In evidence submitted to the
Royal Commission on Agriculture,
the UP Government said that a re-
duction of five per cent in rents
would increase the tenants' standard
of l i v i n g by two or three per cent,
while an increase of five per cent in
acreage or output (e.g. from better
seeds) would make the peasant
twelve to forty per cent better off.
There can be no doubt that fluctua-
tions in price were a cause of dis-
tress during the depression of the
thirties, but prior to this time the
trend of prices was upward. In UP
prices did not show a downward trend
before 1920 although agricultural
prices in world markets did. The
cultivators were hard hit by the fall
in prices. They were immune in so
far as they produced for their own
consumption, but the amounts to
be paid for rent and interest on loans
had to be raised by selling their
produce. However, rents were short-
ly reduced to the 1900 level by gov-
ernment order. Landlords were less
affected except by the f a l l in rents.
Sale values of land were m a i n t a i n -
ed during the thirties and so could
meet their obligations in the last
resort. While the depression of the
thirties was a disaster, it cannot
explain the failure over the preced-
ing hundred years.
Why the Market failed
The market failed because the
market organization was not com-
plete. Changes in relative values
should shift factors from less to more
productive employment. In UP there
was little accumulation of capital
and consequently labour had no place
to go but to the land. D u r i n g the
thirties the standard of l i v i n g in the
urban centres rose, but there were
not nearly enough industrial estab-
lishments to absorb the excess
labour. Such savings as there were
tended to go into higher land values
for reasons of security and prestige.
I n addition, much agricultural pro-
duction was consumed on the hold-
i n g and so m a r k e t prices had no
effect on output. Price and produc-
tion series clearly show that relative
prices had no effect on the manage-
ment of land. W i t h o u t real choice,
the m a r k e t system cannot achieve
o p t i m u m allocation.
On the other hand l i v i n g stand-
ards failed to rise because there was
a failure of capital accumulation.
Under any system the ratio of l a n d
and capital to men must be raised
if I n d i a is to progress economically.
This is a matter of technology. No
change In titles to l a n d can solve
THE ECONOMIC W E E K L Y
i t , but the places where more capi-
t a l w o u l d revolutionize a g r i c u l t u r e
are legion.
F o r instance, " o v e r p o p u l a t i o n " is
not a shortage of land, for c a p i t a l
can a l w a y s substitute f o r land, b r i n g
new land into cultivation, and in-
crease the p r o d u c t i v i t y of o l d l a n d .
T h e a b i l i t y of l a n d to support popu-
l a t i o n depends upon i r r i g a t i o n , re-
clamation, fertilizers, seeds and
breeds, education, equipment, b u i l d -
ings, f a r m layout, drainage, a n d
choice of crops a n d rotations.
Change a n d i m p r o v e m e n t i n a l l these
require c a p i t a l a n d there w i l l be no
m a j o r increase in the output of a g r i -
culture u n t i l measures such as these
are t a k e n , no m a t t e r w h o owns the
l a n d or receives the r e t u r n f r o m the
p r o d u c t i v i t y of the soil.
Capital Alone Can Raise
Productivity
The uses of c a p i t a l to raise the
productivity of Indian agriculture and
a n d the standards of l i v i n g of the
The importance of banking to the
COFFEE INDUSTRY
r y o t s are not l i m i t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e .
Increased p r o d u c t i v i t y in other fields
w i l l improve the p u r c h a s i n g power
of the r y o t , but even m o r e i m p o r t -
ant, there must be c a p i t a l invest-
m e n t i n i n d u s t r y a n d services t o p r o -
vide the materials and power f o r the
improvements in a g r i c u l t u r e . The
technological i m p r o v e m e n t o f a g r i -
culture rests as m u c h on the c a p i t a l
development in other spheres as it
does on the capital development in
a g r i c u l t u r e itself.
Beyond the technological consi-
derations, there are m a t t e r s of orga-
nization. I f the m a r k e t i s t o b e
used to regulate the economy a n d
d i s t r i b u t e its produce—and f o r the
t i m e being such w i l l be the case i n
I n d i a — t h e n the m a r k e t m u s t be so
organized as to f u l f i l l its functions.
We have already seen t h a t d u r i n g
the period of B r i t i s h occupation the
various m a r k e t s were not i n t e -
grated, a n d t h a t i n p a r t i c u l a r the
c a p i t a l m a r k e t was underdeveloped.
891
J u l y 28, 1956
If this difficulty is to be overcome,
there must be a g r e a t increase in the
capital resources of the n a t i o n . I
am speaking here n o t of the obvious
technological need f o r capital, b u t
of the need f o r c a p i t a l in order to
develop a m a r k e t w h i c h provides a
real alternative to l a n d as a f o r m
of investment a n d a field of econo-
mic effort.
The Real Issues
Discussion of the future of I n d i a n
a g r i c u l t u r e has centred on the ques-
tions of large mechanized vs s m a l l
peasant f a r m s ; a n d of co-operative
vs collective vs State f a r m s . B u t
these are n o t real questions. T h e
o n l y alternatives w h i c h are possible
at present are s m a l l peasant f a r m s
a n d peasant co-operative f a r m s , a n d
here the Government's desire f o r
co-operatives comes up a g a i n s t the
c u l t i v a t o r ' s desire f o r his o w n plot.
The real problems of development
are c a p i t a l a c c u m u l a t i o n a n d the size
of holdings. It is foolish to cast the
 THE ECONOMIC W E E K L Y
problem o f capital development i n
terms of large mechanized f a r m s .
C a p i t a l improvements are divisible
d o w n to the spadeful of manure.
S m a l l peasant holdings need steel
tipped ploughs, i r o n h a r r o w s and
w a t e r rather t h a n tractors. The
only source of capital is a g r i c u l t u r e :
i n d u s t r y and commerce need a l l the
resources they can raise and then
more. Thus the conclusion is that
the burden of revenue a n d rent, far
.from being decreased, should be in-
creased in order to finance capital
improvements.
The f a i l u r e of the Inn I market and
the z a m i n d a r i system of the nine-
teenth a n d first hair of the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y can be a t t r i b u t e d to the r u d i -
m e n t a r y or p a r t i a l state of develop-
m e n t o f complementary m a r k e t s and
the lack of capital development to
support those m a r k e t s and to provide
the w h e r e w i t h a l of a g r i c u l t u r a l i m -
provement. It remains to be seen
w h a t the l a n d r e f o r m legislation o f
UP has done towards remedying the
situation.
T h e zamindars have been abolish-
ed. In the process the wealthier
ones suffered an appreciable degree
of expropriation. Alongside of the
general objective of e l i m i n a t i n g "an
Obstacle to economic development,"
the zamindars were abolished in
order to equalize w e a l t h . So far as
t h i s secondary objective goes, there
can be no objection to the z a m i n d a r i
abolition. Expropriation, total or
p a r t i a l , direct or t h r o u g h the mecha-
n i s m of low compensation a n d differ-
e n t i a l rates of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n g r a n t .
Is as good a w a y as any to equalize
wealth. ( A l t h o u g h w h y the same
results could not have been achieved
by a c a p i t a l levy and estate duties
t h i s w r i t e r does not understand,)
No Direct Assault
It is on the major count, the sti-
m u l u s to development, that the merits
Of the l a n d r e f o r m legislation looks
SO questionable. At no point does
the r e f o r m legislation m a k e a direct
assault upon the basic problem.
L a n d r e f o r m gave a l l titles t o l a n d
to the state, w h i c h in t u r n has made
t h e village governments trustees.
However, the s i t u a t i o n of those on
t h e l a n d has not changed apprecia-
b l y . L a n d l o r d s have lost the l a n d
w h i c h t h e y f o r m e r l y rented, and have
received i n exchange o n l y p a r t i a l
compensation, but they h o l d the rest
of their old land as bhumidars w i t h
m o s t of the r i g h t s of ownership.
M o s t tenants have become sirdars,
w h i c h is merely to say t h a t they are
n o w privileged tenants of the state
rather t h a n of a l a n d l o r d , a n d they
continue to pay the same rent.
F a r f r o m a small m i n o r i t y of
zamindars exploiting the vast majo-
r i t y of tenants, perhaps a quarter of
the agriculturalists were zamindars.
A l l but one or t w o thousand were
middle or small zamindars, so the
expropriatory measures did not. affect
m a n y landholders. I n addition t o
e x p r o p r i a t i n g the larger zamindars,
l a n d r e f o r m abolished the r e n t a l
m a r k e t , dealt a death blow to the
mortgage m a r k e t , gave occupancy
r i g h t s to a few more of the fringe of
unprotected tenants, and allowed the
tenant to m a k e any desired i m -
provement o n the land. A l l four
changes could have been achieved by
four amendments to existing legis-
l a t i o n at much less cost and w i t h
m u c h less social upheaval.
Strongest Case for Legislation
Perhaps the strongest case for
legislative r e f o r m of the r u r a l areas
can be made in the fields of f r a g -
m e n t a t i o n and subdivision of hold-
ings. It is here t h a t the organiza-
t i o n a l structure of agriculture needs
to be changed, and it is here t h a t
matters of r i g h t and t i t l e stand in
the w a y of change, or r a t h e r t h a t
people h o l d t i t l e to the w r o n g plots
of land. B u t the trouble is not at
the level of the landlords. The f r a g -
m e n t a t i o n problem occurs at the
level of the tenants. Changes in
the possession of rights and titles
as between landlords, state, and
tenant do not affect the actual dis-
t r i b u t i o n of plots. W h a t is import-
ant is to change the layout of the
operating farms. It has been ar-
gued t h a t change in the system of
titles is necessary before consolida-
tion of holdings can be undertaken,
but this seems doubtful since the
Punjab has gone m u c h farther in
consolidating holdings than U P a l -
though its tenancy laws are by UP
standurds very b a c k w a r d .
Since the passage of the land re-
f o r m b i l l the government has under-
taken to force the consolidation of
fragmented holdings. T h i s Is all to
the good, but even w i t h consolida-
tion, holdings w i l l be too small.
W h a t is needed is a movement f r o m
the l a n d i n t o industry. To achieve
economic size for each f o l d i n g more
t h a n six m i l l i o n cultivators w i l l have
to move a staggering prospect. B u t
m u c h can be done If o n l y a m i l l i o n
to a m i l l i o n and a h a l f w o u l d move,
provided those t h a t move are the
" r i g h t " ones. The " r i g h t " ones are
those w i t h holdings o f t w o t o f o u r
acres a n d of more t h a n ten acres.
892
J u l y 28, 1956
People w i t h less t h a n t w o acres are
r e a l l y labourers w i t h garden plots,
a n d n o t dependent on their land.
People w i t h more t h a n four acres can
m a k e ends meet, and even achieve
economic holdings if they acquire
the l a n d of those who have left. The
crisis group is made up of those
h o l d i n g t w o to four acres, w h i c h is
not enough l a n d to be c u l t i v a t e d effi-
ciently, a n d requires a doubling in
size to reach efficiency. C u l t i v a t o r s
w i t h more t h a n ten acres are efficient,
but i f they move they w i l l release
f a r more l a n d for others t h a n depart-
i n g s m a l l holders. If a m i l l i o n or
more of the groups w i t h t w o to four
acres and those w i t h more t h a n ten
acres left the land, there w o u l d be
enough to b r i n g the r e m a i n i n g c u l t i -
vators over the six acre m i n i m u m
needed for economic efficiency. A
labour d r a f t system m i g h t be avoid-
ed by the use of subsidies a n d penal-
ties.
Ratio of Capital to Men
Because there were no a l t e r n a t i v e
uses for the factors of production,
the m a r k e t mechanism failed to
achieve the rapid progress w h i c h was
hoped for. The solution to present
poverty must then *lie either in
m a k i n g the m a r k e t function pro-
perly or in s u b s t i t u t i n g another
system w h i c h w i l l increase the r a t i o
of capital to men. L a n d r e f o r m in
UP did neither. The m a r k e t remains,
but so do the gaps between the land
m a r k e t and the other factor m a r k e t s .
Since n o t h i n g was done to correct
the basic faults of the old z a m i n -
d a r i system, there is no reason to
expect t h a t the new b h u m i d a r i - s i r d a r i
system w i l l be any more effective
I n a l l e v i a t i n g poverty i n r u r a l U P .
Under the stimulus of the F i v e
Year Plan and w i t h the development
of resources undertaken by the
States, the lot of the c u l t i v a t o r
should improve. I f this happens i t
w i l l not be because the z a m i n d a r i
system was bad or because the new
system is good, but because capital
resources have been developed a n d
alternate employments w i t h higher
productivities have been provided.
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY July 28, 1956

893