TRENCH BLASTING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO EXISTING UTILIITIES

IN ULTRA METAMORPHIC ROCK

Andrew Williams, Terra Dinamica, LLC.

Tom Treleaven, Vet’s Explosives, Inc.

Executive Summary
Several contracts were let in Greenwich, Connecticut, for the installation of a sanitary sewer.
The majority of the excavation was in rock and involved numerous challenges due to the
following conditions:

Rock Type: Rock types were all ultra metamorphic in nature, including granite gneiss, quartzite,
and migmatite. Also, the wide jointing patterns had a negative impact on the blastibility of the
rock.

Existing Utilities: There were several adjoining (existing) utilities on the project. These included
a twenty-inch (500mm) water main, an eight-inch(200mm)water main, and a six-inch (150mm)
gas main. The distance of these utilities from the nearest point of the trench varied from 5 to 10
feet (1.5m to 3m). These utilities were 6 feet (1.8m) below the surface while the trench to be
excavated was up to 14 feet (4.25m) below the surface.

Engineering Specifications: The specifications required the vibration levels not to exceed
5”(125mm)/sec. ppv over the existing utilities and 2”(50mm)/sec. at adjacent structures. The
contracted seismologist was not sufficiently experienced in necessary monitoring procedures for
tight blasting operations. Incorrect monitoring procedures and lack of data analysis produced
data that was inaccurate which resulted in slowing the project. The contractor employed an
outside consulting company to suggest improvements in seismic monitoring. They began to
develop a database using regression analysis and implemented improved monitoring procedures
to verify data from the seismographs placed over the existing utilities.

Explosive Selection: The main danger to the existing utilities was the potential rock heave during
blasting operations. The actual vibration level was not as critical so the explosive selection was
based on high energy (detonation pressure) but minimal gas generation. This resulted in
pentolite cast boosters being selected as the primary explosive. This also helped with the rock
fragmentation, as the blastibility of the rock was poor. With the requirement of low charge
weights, the boosters being of a distinct weight, it was possible to accurately determine the exact
quantity of explosive per delay.

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Overview
The town of Greenwich, CT, an exclusive suburb of New York City awarded several contracts
for the installation of sanitary sewer in the North Mianus section of town. The Valley Road
section was the most challenging from a rock excavation standpoint. The cut was up to 14 ft
(4.25m), with adjacent utilities (20”(500mm) water, 6”(150mm) water and 8”(200mm) gas)
located to within 5 feet (1.5m) of the proposed sewer trench. Rock types varied but were ultra
metamorphic in nature, ranging from quartzites, granite gneiss and various types of migmatities.

Figure 1: Typical section of project.

Drill patterns, explosive selection and initiation sequence were all evaluated. The two major
concerns were the vibration limitations on the adjacent utilities imposed by the gas and water
companies. The utility companies imposed a maximum Peak Particle Velocity limitation of 5”
(125mm) per second at the existing pipe locations. Although vibration levels in excess of 5”
(125mm) per second would not cause damage to the pipes, the main concern of the blasting
contractor, Vet’s Explosives Inc (Torrington, CT), was rock heave as this was far more critical in
terms of potential damage. Three explosive types were evaluated, NG dynamites, cap sensitive
emulsions, and pentolite cast boosters. Predicted vibration levels limited explosive quantity per

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delay in most cases to one pound, and in some cases to as little as ½ lb (0.25kg). As mentioned
earlier the rock was extremely hard, typical of ultra-metamorphic rock types. With these
considerations it was decided to use cast boosters due to the high brisance and low gas
generation of the product. Millisecond electric detonators were used as rubber blasting mats were
employed to prevent fly-rock.

The drill pattern was on a 4ft (1.2m) x 4ft (1.2m) pattern with a center hole. When the existing
utilities were within 5 ft (1.5m) of the trench line drilling was employed at the perimeter of the
trench. Initial test blasts were conducted to evaluate vibration levels, heave, and rock
fragmentation. The cast boosters produced the best results with these factors in mind. To keep
vibration levels below the 5” (1.5m) per second limits set by the utility companies, it was
necessary to use several decks per hole to keep the pounds per delay at the required amounts.
When hole depths exceeded 10 ft (3m) it was necessary to use up to 3 decks per hole. Top decks
were shot first to reduce the confinement factor in the bottom decks, with up to 100 milliseconds
being used between decks.

The town hired an outside engineering company to oversee the project, which in turn hired a
seismic contractor to monitor the blasts. Early in the project it became clear that obvious
inconsistencies were being reported in the seismic readings. In some cases readings were
reported for one seismograph that were three times higher than recorded at another seismograph
with the geophones placed at the same distance from the blast. In some instances PPV levels
were reported as exceeding 10”(250mm) per second. Vets employed an outside explosives and
vibration consultant, Terra Dinamica LLC, to evaluate the seismic data and monitoring
procedures being used.

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Vibration Monitoring Problems
The specifications for the project stated that the vibration levels could not exceed 5”(125mm)/sec
PPV over the existing utilities (generally 7 ft (2.1m) from nearest blasthole) and 2” (50mm)/sec
at adjacent structures. Furthermore the specifications stated that seismographs had to be located
directly over the utilities. At the beginning of the project the seismic monitoring involved
locating a seismograph on the road on either side of the trench over the utilities, and a 3rd
seismograph at the nearest structure. The result was that readings would be recorded in the
expected range of approximately 3” (75mm) /sec for several blasts, and then a reading of over
10”(250mm)/sec would be recorded. As the shot design for all blasts remained constant, with the
same pounds per delay and the geology remaining the same, the blasting contractor rightfully
questioned the validity of the higher readings when they occurred 10 ft (3m) further along the
trench than a previous shot with expected vibration readings. Due to the inexperience of the
technicians carrying out the seismograph setup they could not explain why the high readings
were occurring, and as no data analysis was carried out the contractor was informed that the high
readings were accurate. The result of this was that the blaster was forced to lower pounds per
delay by adding in extra decks, resulting in fewer holes being shot per blast, poor fragmentation
causing increased time to muck out the trench between shots, and an overall slow-down of the
project.

The blasting contractor then hired a 3rd party to observe the seismic monitoring procedures and
monitor a few blasts themselves and recommend improved monitoring practices. After observing
a few blasts it quickly became apparent that the high readings were false and that improved blast
monitoring practices needed to be implemented. The major areas of concern were as follows:
• Technicians were not following recommended guidelines for seismograph setup and had
limited knowledge of the necessary procedures for monitoring close-in blasting
situations.
• Due to the proximity of seismographs to the blast and the fact that only sandbags were
being used to couple the geophone to the road, decoupling was extremely likely.
• Data analysis was not being carried out to check the validity of recorded vibration levels.
• Distances from nearest blast-hole to seismograph were not being measured accurately.
(Pacing instead of using measuring tape).
• Waveforms were not being examined to identify the likelihood of errors in the recorded
reading, they were not being printed until the end of the week, and were not being
provided to the blaster.
• No assistance or suggestions were being provided to the blaster to try and help provide an
idea of the behavior of vibration in the area and how blast design could be altered to
improve blasting performance or reduce vibration levels.

Closer analysis of seismic results and video taping a few shots explained the extremely high
readings that were being recorded over the utilities. The reason for this was the fact that the
road surface that the geophone was sandbagged on flexed during the shot causing the road to
actually lift and giving a false reading. This occurred when the geophone was being placed
approximately 7 ft (2.1m) from the edge of the trench and was the cause of the readings
exceeding 10 ips. Even on occasions when the geophone was being placed far enough from
the edge of the trench that the road surface was not moving, the acceleration levels being

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 experienced were high enough that the geophone would sometimes decouple as the sandbags
were not sufficient to provide good contact with the road surface. According to geophone
setup recommendations, the geophones should have been bolted to the road surface or buried
due to the close proximity to the blast and the high acceleration levels experienced. As the
road surface itself was flexing, bolting would not improve results and the road needed to be
kept open to traffic which meant geophones could not be bolted and left in place. As the road
needed to be kept open for local traffic the contractor did not wish to dig holes in the road
both for the added expense of patching the road, and for the interruption to traffic. Holes
were dug over the utilities on a few occasions to see what results would be like when
geophones were placed beneath the road, but the road base consisted of material that would
not allow spiking of the geophone and burial did not give reliable coupling as the soil placed
back around the geophone to back-fill the hole did not pack in tightly with the existing road-
base material. It was determined that digging holes in the road did not significantly improve
the accuracy of the seismic readings and this process was abandoned.

When the procedures used for setting up geophones were observed closely it became
apparent that even seismograph results placed in the far-field could not be trusted because
units were not being correctly setup. Often geophones were being spiked into grass or into
material that did not provide good coupling to the soil and resulted in higher than true
readings. In other instances holes were being dug to bury geophones, but when rocks were
encountered loose material was placed back into the hole and the geophone was spiked into
this loose material before being buried. Because units were not being spiked into virgin soil,
the recorded readings were again often higher than true readings. This was proven when
seismographs were setup using recommended guidelines next to the seismic monitoring
companies seismographs and there were often quite large discrepancies between the 2 results
as can be seen in the following table.

Distance PPV from Correctly PPV from Incorrectly Absolute Difference

from Blast setup Geophone setup Geophone in PPV
10 ft 2.62 ips 6.96 ips 4.34 ips
8 ft 4.86 ips 10.24 ips 5.38 ips
9 ft 3.95 ips 6.56 ips 2.61 ips
17 ft 1.42 ips 2.72 ips 1.3 ips
15 ft 1.64 ips 3.84 ips 2.2 ips
10 ft 1.56 ips 3.44 ips 1.88 ips
Table 1: Examples of results from geophones located over utilities.

Another problem noticed was that when sandbags were placed over geophones, they were
often placed in a haphazard manner instead of carefully covering the geophone so that the
bag covered the geophone and was in contact with the ground to help prevent the geophone
from moving during the blast. As can be seen in the following photograph, sandbags were
often placed in such a manner that they were only just balancing and would have slipped
during the blast causing errors in the seismic readings. The following photograph
demonstrates one seismograph on which the sandbags have been carefully placed, while the

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 other shows a seismograph which has been setup quickly and without much attention to
detail.

Figure 2: Seismograph with correct sandbag placement and one with incorrect sandbag placement.

After setting up a large number of seismographs around the blasts at varying distances, the
preliminary results showed that the vibration decay for the area could be determined using
regression analysis and provide accurate predictions of PPV vs. scaled distance. Initial results
showed that the predicted vibration results from regression analysis were quite accurate but
the project was temporarily shut-down before a large number of data points could be
collected to create a regression analysis with enough data points to be considered having a
high confidence level. It was recommended that a regression analysis be carried out by the
seismic monitoring company to provide the blaster with some data on which he could alter
blast designs to improve blast results and reduce vibration levels.

Another recommendation made was that seismographs be placed directly behind those
located over the utilities, at a location where they could be spiked and buried giving more
confidence in their accuracy. The data collected from these seismographs could then be
compared to those located over the utilities to check the accuracy of the seismographs placed
on the road that were suspected to contain errors. This can be done by using the following
formula to calculate the expected vibration reading over the utilities based on the data
collected by the seismograph that is spiked and buried behind the utilities.

Expected PPV = (PPV1 ) x (D 1 / D2 )1.6

Where: PPV1 = Measured PPV at trusted seismograph.

D1 = Distance from nearest blasthole to trusted seismograph.
D2 = Distance to questionable seismograph.

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 (PPV = Peak Particle Velocity)
The following waveforms are examples of data collected from a unit placed over the utilities
that is sandbagged on the road, and the other is the data collected from a unit that is spiked
and buried behind the utilities. When the acceleration levels experienced over the utilities are
observed it is clear that sandbags would not be able to ensure that the geophone did not
decouple. Sandbags alone should not be used when acceleration levels exceed 1 gravity, in
this case acceleration exceeds 6 g’s suggesting that errors are likely. The waveforms do not
look like a typical vibration wave. The second waveform from the unit that was spiked and
buried appears much more accurate and shows a true representation of vibration behavior
during the shot. The accurate data collected can then be used to verify if the data collected
from the unit located over the watermain contains errors or is an accurate reading.

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Once all of the recommendations were implemented and monitoring practices were improved it
was discovered the pounds per delay could be raised, decreasing the number of decks required
per hole, which allowed larger shots and improved fragmentation. This resulted in an overall
improvement in productivity of the project and vibration concerns were minimized.

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Other Issues Encountered
Another phenomena occurred on the job requiring evaluation for safety reasons. It was observed
that there were some secondary ignitions during the mucking of the broken rock. These ignitions
were small at first and were only observed in certain areas. Several weeks into the job on a side
street these ignitions became substantially larger as can be seen in the following photographs.

Figure 3: Catrock Rd, Feb 11th, 2002

Figure 4: Catrock Rd, Feb 12th, 2002

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Figure 5: Catrock Rd, Feb 12th, 2002 after blast. Burning in drill hole approx 7 ft behind shot.

Figure 6: Catrock Rd, Feb 12th, 2002, burning in shot rock after blast.

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 Post explosive gases such as carbon monoxide were evaluated as a possible cause of these
ignitions, but other factors suggested looking at other sources. Some of these factors included the
fact that ignitions occurred in very distinct areas of the project. The area in which the work was
taking place was in an older section of town with houses 80+ years old, and with a relatively
high density. It was often the case that the septic leach fields were in the front of the houses,
which could have been a source of methane gases in the rock joints. One theory is that upon
detonation of the blast that the rapid expansion of explosive gases and fracturing of the rock,
followed by an extreme underpressure allowed gases to move into the trench and the muckpile.
This coupled with the heat generated by the blast within the muckpile resulted in the ignition of
gases which were witnessed to burn for up to 8 minutes after the blast. Further study and analysis
was not possible as the project was temporarily stopped approximately a week after the largest
ignitions and so far has not been re-started in the vicinity of the ignitions.

Conclusion
This case study should be taken as an example of how small errors in vibration monitoring
procedures can result in significant problems that can affect an entire project and possibly cause
blasting operations to be shut-down. These small errors in geophone set-up procedures do not
generally have a large effect when seismographs are located at significant distances from the
blast. However when seismographs are placed close to shots, these small errors can result in
dramatically higher vibration levels being reported than are actually being experienced. It is
worthwhile setting up extra seismographs to cross-check the data being collected at locations
where conditions may cause errors. Creating a regression analysis to find a site-specific formula
for predicting vibration decay is also well worth the time it takes as it allows blasting operations
to be optimized while keeping under strict vibration limitations.

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