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1. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700, 8 March 2016
Ponente: AJ Jose Portugal Perez
2. Pimentel Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to
Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-
President in the 10 May 2004 Elections
G.R. No. 163783, 22 June 2004
Ponente: AJ Reynato Serrano Puno
3. Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
P.E.T. Case No. 001
SYLLABI:
1. Election Law; Statutes; B.P. Blg. 881; Section 67
of B.P. Blg. 881 applies exclusively to an incumbent
elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for
any office “other than the one he is holding in a
permanent capacity.”-
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that
by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator
Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the
office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg.
881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an
incumbent elective official who files a certificate of
candidacy for any office “other than the one he is
holding in a permanent capacity.” Even more plain is
that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy for
Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding
in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
2. Election Law; Election Contests; Protestant, in
filing her certificate of candidacy for the Senate
without any qualification, condition, or res-ervation,
entered into a political contract with the electorate that
if elected, she would assume the office of Senator,
discharge its functions and serve her constituency as
such for the term for which she was elected.-
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the
protestant pursued the new position through a popular
election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed
a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May
1995 election, campaigned for such office, and
submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the
term of office of the Senators who would then be
elected would be six years, to commence at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election
and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that
during her campaign, she promised to serve the
electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this
protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy
for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or
reservation. In so doing, she entered into a political
contract with the electorate that if elected, she would
assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions
and serve her constituency as such for the term for
which she was elected. These are givens which are in
full accord with the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that public office is a public trust, and
public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people and serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
3. Election Law; Election
Contests; Abandonment; In assuming the office of
Senator, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or
withdrawn her protest, or at the very least, abandoned
her, “determination to protect and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice
of the electorate,” such abandonment or withdrawal
operating to render moot the protest.-
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May
1995 election is six years, the first three of which
coincides with the last three years of the term of the
President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s
term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest that she was the true winner in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this
protest, or at the very least, in the language of
Moraleja, abandoned her “determination to protect and
pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate.” Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot
the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this
protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the
1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all—
too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
4. Election Law; Election Contests; Grounds for the
Dismissal of Election Protests Before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.-
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It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may
be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public
policy and public interest implications thereof, on the
following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in
form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond
the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3)
The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided
for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first
P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after
the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies
thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal
are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to
dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court
which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be
pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After
which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a
preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an
election protest may be dismissed on technical
grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger
reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment
by the Protestant.
5. Election Law; Election Contests; The failure of
the Protestant to inform the PET whether, after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot
areas, she still intends to present evidence in
connection therewith is nothing short of a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.-
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not
informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of
the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still
intends to present evidence in connection therewith.
This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so. It is
entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that
the Protestant’s revisors discovered in the course of the
revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the
17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and have
objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the
Protestee.
6. Election Law; Election Contests; Words and
Phrases; Revision of Ballots, Explained; Revision is
merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of
an election contest.-
Revision is merely the first stage, and not the alpha
and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain
terms then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of
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18 March 1993 that: Protestant knows only too well,
being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the
revision phase of her protest is but the first stage in the
resolution of her electoral protest and that the function
of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February 1993
Comment on Protestee’s 5 February 1993 Urgent
Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter
alia, would clarify that revisors may observe the
objections and/or claims made by the revisors of the
other party as well as the ballots subject thereof, and
record such observations in a form to be provided for
that purpose. x x x Indeed, revisors do not have any
judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in
nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]).
In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or
critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or not
does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza,
52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168
[1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to
the revision phase of an election contest. It can never
serve as a logical or an acceptable basis for the
conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were
committed during an election or that a Protestant had
won in said election.
7. Election Law; Election Contests; The protest “has
been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment
or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of
her election and assumption of office as Senator and
her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.”-
The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no
room for any doubt or miscomprehension that the
dismissal is based on the ground that the protest “has
been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment
or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of
her election and assumption of office as Senator and
her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.”
There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why
the protest has been rendered moot and academic, i.e.,
it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very
issue upon which the parties were required, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their
respective memoranda.
8. Election Law; Election Contests; Protestant’s
candidacy for Senator, her election to said office and
her actual assumption and discharge of the office,
combined to constitute a supervening fact that
rendered moot and academic her present protest.-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Protestant’s candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995
elections, her election to said office and her actual
assumption and discharge of the office, com- bined to
constitute, in my view, a supervening fact that
rendered moot and academic her present protest
because, if she were to pursue her present protest
(without such supervening fact) and, if she were to win
the protest, her term of office as President of the
Philippines would in any case expire on 30 June 1998.
When she, however, chose to run for Senator in the 8
May 1995 elections, which was after her filing of the
present protest, she knew that, if elected, her term of
office as Senator would expire only on 30 June 2001.
Therefore, as a successful protestant in this case, she
could be President only up to 30 June 1998. What
happens then to the last three (3) years of her term as
Senator, i.e., 30 June 1998 to 30 June 2001? There
would be a void, a hiatus or vacuum because after
serving as President up to 30 June 1998, she can no
longer assume the office of Senator from 30 June 1998
to 30 June 2001. There would likewise be a void, a
hiatus or vacuum in her term of office as Senator from
the time she assumes the presidency to 30 June 1998
(assuming she was to win the present protest). Thus,
by continuing this protest, there could result an
ensuing vacuum in the office of Senator, to which
position protestant has been duly elected subsequent to
the filing of her present protest. And yet, natura
vacuum abhorret. (Nature abhors a vacuum).
9. Election Law; Election Contests; I make no
adverse inference from the alleged failure of the
protestant to inform the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
whether she would still be presenting evidence to
support the allegations of fraud and irregularities made
by her revisors.-
Nor will I make any adverse inference from the
alleged failure of the protestant to inform this Tribunal
whether she would still be presenting evidence to
support the allegations of fraud and irregularities made
by her revisors. The records show that in a motion
dated August 16, 1995, she prayed that the revision of
ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
deemed completed. The Tribunal has not acted on this
motion, hence, the process of revision of ballots is not
formally finished. Since the Tribunal has not formally
declared the termination of the process of revision, it is
not timely for protestant to manifest whether or not she
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would adduce further evidence to prove her claim of
fraud and irregularities. In any event, if the Tribunal
entertains any doubt on the matter it should issue an
Order requiring the protestant to make clear whether or
not she intends to exercise her right to present further
evidence. Valuable rights need not be lost on the basis
of equivocal acts and omissions.
10. Election Law; Election Contests; Certain types of
fraud and irregularities can be proved without the
testimonies of handwriting experts or the testimonies
of voters, watchers, inspectors and others who
witnessed the same; Until the Tribunal examines and
appreciates the protested ballots it cannot dismiss the
protest.-
It can be assumed arguendo that the protestant has lost
her right to present additional evidence by her failure
to invoke it within a reasonable time. Even then, I
submit that the non-presentation of further evidence is
not necessarily fatal. Certain types of fraud and
irregularities can be proved without the testimonies of
handwriting experts or the testimonies of voters,
watchers, inspectors and others who witnessed the
same. There are fraud and irregularities which are
patent on the face of the ballots and other election
documents and paraphernalia. Ballots that are marked,
ballots that are spurious, ballots written by the same
hand, a ballot written by different hands, tampered
tally sheets, false list of voters, falsified election
returns, and other election documents can be
appreciated without need of evidence aliunde. For this
reason, the Tribunal cannot evade the duty to examine
the protested ballots for the ballots are the best
evidence to enable the court to determine the votes
obtained by the protestant and the protestee. Needless
to state, until the Tribunal examines and appreciates
the protested ballots it cannot dismiss the protest.
11. Election Law; Election
Contests; Abandonment; In ascertaining
abandonment, whether in election, property, or
criminal litigations, intention is the first and paramount
object of inquiry for there can be no abandonment
without the intent to abandon.-
I do not also subscribe to the ruling of the majority that
the protestant abandoned her protest when she ran for
Senator and discharged her duties. Abandonment in
law means “voluntary relinquishment of all right, title,
claim x x x with the intention of not reclaiming it.” In
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ascertaining abandonment, whether in election,
property, or criminal litigations, “x x x intention is the
first and paramount object of inquiry for there can be
no abandonment without the intent to abandon.”
Intention is subjective and can be inferred from the
acts and conduct of a person. It is a question of fact.
12. Election Law; Election
Contests; Abandonment; The majority ruling on
abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an
election contest is concerned less with the private
interest of the candidates but more with public
interest.-
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining
the majority. With due respect, I submit that the
majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with
the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less
with the private interest of the candidates but more
with public interest. Under a republican regime of
government, the overarching object of an election
contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the
people on who should govern them. It is not a
happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our
Constitution underlines in bright that “sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.” The first duty of a citizen as a
particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise
his sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning
government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people
at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, we
emphatically held that “x x x once the court has
acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the
public interest involved demands that the true winner
be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the
parties so much so that there can be no default,
compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of
cases.” Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently
demurred from dismissing election contests even on
the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.
13. Election Law; Election Contests; It is better
stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest
on the merit and vindicate the political judgment of the
people which far surpasses in significance all other
considerations.-
I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to
decide this election contest on the merit and vindicate
the political judgment of the people which far
surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
duty to tell the people who have the right to govern
them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of
politics of the litigants as often times they are directed
by the wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the
public.
14. Election Law; Election
Contests; Abandonment; Abandonment is personal
and it must be manifested in unequivocal terms by the
person charged with it.-
The submission that the protestant is deemed to have
abandoned her protest because she ran in the May
1995 elections for the position of, and was proclaimed
and so eventually took office as, Senator of the
Republic is a conclusion, I fear, I am unable to share.
Abandonment is personal, and it must be manifested in
unequivocal terms by the person charged with it.
15. Election Law; Election Contests; Expecting
candidates to sit out and wait during the entire period
in which a protest is resolved is unrealistic, and
consigns our most promising men and women in this
country to limbo.-
Moreover, expecting candidates to sit out and wait
during the entire period in which a protest is resolved
is unrealistic, and consigns our most promising men
and women in this country to limbo. In many cases,
election protests have not been decided promptly for
reasons not necessarily attributable to the electoral
bodies. In some instances, the protest had remained
undecided before the term of the disputed office had
run out. Given these circumstances, it would be utterly
unjust for protestants to do nothing, not accept or run
for public office, and simply wait for the protests to be
decided, lest they be deemed to have abandoned them.
This would be tantamount to a denial of the right to
run for public office.
16. Election Law; Election Contests; Since the
phases or stages in the electoral protest are laid down
in the rules, the parties are supposed to act in
accordance with the sequential order of the
proceedings without being required to manifest
formally at each stage if they are willing to proceed to
the next one.-
With regard to the protestant’s failure to inform the
Tribunal whether she still intends to present additional
evidence after the completion of the revision of the
ballots from the pilot areas (as embodied in the
resolution dated 21 October 1993), her “omission,”
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likewise, does not amount to a waiver or abandonment
of her election protest. Resolution of election cases, it
must be stressed, is a continuous process albeit divided
into various stages. These stages—revision, technical
examination, presentation of evidence and submission
of memoranda—are but parts of one whole procedure.
Except for the technical examination of the ballots,
wherein the parties are expressly given discretion
whether or not to move for one after completion of
each stage, the proceedings necessarily move to the
next step. The procedure will run its natural course
pursuant to the rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET). Since the phases or stages in the
electoral protest are laid down in the rules, the parties
are supposed to act in accordance with the sequential
order of the proceedings without being required to
manifest formally at each stage if they are willing to
proceed to the next one. Hence, waiver of one stage or
the remaining stages cannot be impliedly imputed to a
party unless there is a manifest intentional and
unequivocal statement or action to this effect. The
least the Tribunal should have done was to direct the
protestant to show cause why her protest should not be
dismissed for failure to file the required information,
which liberal process the Tribunal customarily accords
the parties to find out the reasons for the omission.
FACTS:
In her motion of 16 August 1995, protestant prayed for
that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts
of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
The PET required the protestant and the protestee to
submit their respective memoran
ISSUES:
RULING:
4. Pormento v. Estrada
G.R. No. 191988, 31 August 2010
Ponente: CJ Renato Antonio Coronado Corona
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SYLLABI:
1. Courts; Judicial Review; Moot and Academic
Issues; While the novelty and complexity of the
constitutional issue involved in this case present a
temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and
law students alike would find hard to resist, prudence
dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where
the issue before it has already been mooted by
subsequent events.
The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue
involved in this case present a temptation that
magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students
alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence
dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where
the issue before it has already been mooted by
subsequent events. More importantly, the
constitutional requirement of the existence of a “case”
or an “actual controversy” for the proper exercise of
the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the
allure of making a grand pro-nouncement that, in the
end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion.
2. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; When a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable; An action is
considered “moot” when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is
likely to be raised again between the parties.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable. An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved
and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
DISPOSITIVE POSITION:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is
hereby DISMISSED.
5. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618, 23 November 2010
Ponente: AJ Antonio Eduardo Bermejo Nachura
SYLLABI:
1. Remedial Law; Constitutional Law; Locus
Standi; Parties; On more than one occasion we have
characterized a proper party as one who has sustained
or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of.
—On more than one occasion we have characterized a
proper party as one who has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
the act complained of. The dust has long settled on the
test laid down in Baker v. Carr: “whether the party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult questions.” Until and unless such actual or
threatened injury is established, the complainant is not
clothed with legal personality to raise the
constitutional question.
2. Same; Pleadings and Practice; Baseless Petitions.-
—One final note. Although this Court has no control
over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate a
word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions
which only clog the Court’s docket. The petition in the
instant case belongs to that classification.
3. Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be
an institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
—We have previously declared that the PET is not
simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v.
State of Maryland proclaimed that “[a] power without
the means to use it, is a nullity.” The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution
and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of
power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic
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view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an
absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
4. Same; Same; The power wielded by Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly
provided in the Constitution.
—With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all
courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
5. Same; Same; Electoral Contests.
—The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes
characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.
6. Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is
not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal.
—By the same token, the PET is not a separate and
distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious
that the PET was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies—not unlawfully defies—the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate
seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman
and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special
electoral court.
7. Senate Electoral Tribunal; House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal; The different
electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court
functioning as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), are constitutional bodies.
—Particularly cogent are the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions
of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the
inevitable conclusion that the different electoral
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tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the
PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the
three departments of government—Executive,
Legislative, and Judiciary—but not separate therefrom.
8. Constitutional Law; Courts; Supreme
Court; The conferment of additional jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
“awesome” task, includes the means necessary to carry
it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication.
—The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
“awesome” task, includes the means necessary to carry
it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power
to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience,
is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof.
The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate its
rules for the purpose.”
9. Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET); Powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is plenary; Unmistakable from the
foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is
plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would
interpret it.
—Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise
of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidenti
al election contests, as well as the rule-making power
adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as
petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the
insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to
exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado
forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole
power ought to be without intervention by the
legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature
cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential
and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-
making power connected thereto.
10. Same; Same; Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat.
—Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat—the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the
landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991): It is a well-
established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to
be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize
them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.
11. Same; Statutory Construction; Ratio Legis Et
Anima; A doubtful provision must be examined in
light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances surrounding the framing of the
Constitution.
12. Same; Words and Phrases; Verba Legis; Verba
legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
—Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
(1970), instructs: As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of
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law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus these are cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
13. Same; Statutory Construction; Presidential
Electoral Tribunal; The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential
election protests while concurrently acting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.-
—Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has
filed several cases before this Court involving
constitutional and election law issues, including,
among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim
ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and
(2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably,
the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v.
Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
decide presidential and vice-presidential election
protests while concurrently acting as an independent
Electoral Tribunal.
14. Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; His failure
to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that
time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending,
translates to the clear absence of an indispensable
requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s
power of judicial review.
—Although there are recognized exceptions to this
requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is
unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in
2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional
challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional
acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he
was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of
this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this
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score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed
outright.
FACTS:
While Petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is
“authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,” he
chafes at the creation of a purportedly “separate
tribunal” to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the
provisions of the 2005 PET Rules, specifically:
(1) Rule 3 which provides for the membership of the
PET wherein the CJ and the AJs are designated as
“Chairman and Members,” respectively;
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the
PET to appoint employees and confidential employees
of every member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate
“Administrative Staff of Tribunal” with the
appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the
Tribunal who may designate the Clerk of Court as the
Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a “seal” separate and
distinct from the SC seal.
Grudgingly, petitioner acknowledged that the invoked
constitutional provision does allow the “appointment
of additional personnel.”
Further, petitioner highlighted the case of Buac v.
COMELEC which peripherally declared that “contests
involving the Pres. and the VP fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power.” On this point, petitioner
reiterates that the constitution of the PET (Rule 3)
contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of the
Members of the SC and of other courts established by
law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The OSG filed a Comment, pointing out that the
petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is unspecified and
without statutory basis, “the liberal approach in its
preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of
practice and pleading in this jurisdiction.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ISSUES:
The OSG crystallizes the following issues for the
resolution of the Court:
1. Whether petitioner has locus standi (legal
standing) to file the instant petition.
2. Whether the creation of the PET is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Paragraph
7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
3. Whether the designation of members of the SC as
members of the PET is unconstitutional for being
a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
1. YES. Since the creation and continued operation
of the PET involves the use of public funds and
the issue raised herein is of transcendental
importance, it is petitioner’s submission that, as a
citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the Bar, he
has the legal standing to file this petition.
6. Soliven v. Makasiar
7. Nixon v. Fitzgerald
8. Clinton v. Jones
9. Estrada v. Desierto
10. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
11. Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma
12. Funa v. Agra
1. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Limitations
to the Power of Judicial Review.-
—The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to assail the validity of the subject act or
issuance, that is, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
2. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court holds that
all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
4 NOVEMBER 2019
Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid, binding and
effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and
qualified for the office.-
—In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that
all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid, binding and
effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and
qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary
in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions
covered by this clarification extend to but are not
limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions
for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the
issuance of department orders, memoranda and
circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.
3. Same; Public Officers; De Facto Officers; Words
and Phrases; A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer.-
—A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who
are interested therein are concerned.
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4. Same; Same; The primary functions of the Office
of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to
the primary functions of the Department of Justice.-
—Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the
primary functions of the Department of Justice.
Considering that the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to
retain both, an incompatibility between the offices
exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s
designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of
the express provisions of the Constitution.
5. Same; Office of the Solicitor General; The powers
and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are
neither required by the primary functions nor included
by the powers of the Department of Justice, and vice
versa.-
—Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are
neither required by the primary functions nor included
by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG,
while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of
the latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the
Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank,
and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and
privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals. Moreover, the magnitude of the scope of
work of the Solicitor General, if added to the equally
demanding tasks of the Secretary of Justice, is
obviously too much for any one official to bear. Apart
from the sure peril of political pressure, the concurrent
holding of the two positions, even if they are not
entirely incompatible, may affect sound government
operations and the proper performance of duties.
6. Same; Multiple Offices; The only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
provided for under the Constitution, such as
Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice
President to become a member of the Cabinet; and
(2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in
Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials’ offices.-
—According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,
494 SCRA 53 (2006), the only two exceptions against
the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided
for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in ex officio
capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the officials’ offices. In this
regard, the decision in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), adverted to the resolution
issued on August 1, 1991 in Civil Liberties Union v.
The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991),
whereby the Court held that the phrase “the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants” found
in Section 13, 1987 Constitution, referred only to the
heads of the various executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and did not
extend to other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
Hence, in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494
SCRA 53 (2006), the Court opined that the prohibition
under Section 13 did not cover Elma, a Presidential
Assistant with the rank of Undersecretary.
7. Administrative Law; To Hold an Office; Words
and Phrases; To hold an office means to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and
administration of the office, which implies nothing less
than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.-
—It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in
an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section
4 NOVEMBER 2019
13, 1987 Constitution, plainly indicates that the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and the Members
of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-
owned or government controlled-corporations was
concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession
and administration of the office, which implies nothing
less than the actual discharge of the functions and
duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section
13 itself, 1987 Constitution, the Constitution makes no
reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that
the avowed objective of Section 13, 1987 Constitution,
is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe
differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the President’s
power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporations.”
8. Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Words and
Phrases; A moot and academic case is one that ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.-
—A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Although the
controversy could have ceased due to the intervening
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appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the
Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and
such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered
moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the
constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two
positions by Agra, the Court should still go forward
and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising
its power of judicial review because this case comes
under several of the well-recognized exceptions
established in jurisprudence. Verily, the Court did not
desist from resolving an issue that a supervening event
meanwhile rendered moot and academic if any of the
following recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1)
there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
case involved a situation of exceptional character and
was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional
issue raised required the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public;
and (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
9. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus
Standi; To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor
must show that he has sustained or will sustain a
“direct injury” as a result of a government action, or
have a “material interest” in the issue affected by the
challenged official act.-
—The OSG does not dispute the justiciability and
ripeness for consideration and resolution by the Court
of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus
standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has
already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court
on several other public law litigations he brought. In
Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579 (2012), for one, the
Court has held: To have legal standing, therefore, a
suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a
“direct injury” as a result of a government action, or
have a “material interest” in the issue affected by the
challenged official act. However, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
otherwise directly injured, or with material interest
affected, by a Government act, standing to sue
provided a constitutional issue of critical significance
is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere
procedural technicality in relation to which the Court,
in a catena of cases involving a subject of
transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. In David, the Court laid out the
bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-
traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue,
thusly: 1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; 2.) For voters, there must
be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question; 3.) For concerned citizens,
there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and 4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators. This case before Us is of
transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-
reaching implications,” and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the
public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a
liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the
instant petition.
13. Flores v. Drilon
14. Sarmiento III v. Mison
1. Statutory Construction; Constitution; Intent of
the framers of the constitution and of the people
adopting it must be given effect.-
The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give ef fect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
4 NOVEMBER 2019
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves. The Court will thus construe
the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.
2. Statutory Construction; Constitution; 1935
Constitution requires confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of all presidential appointments,
under the 1973 constitution the president has absolute
power of appointment while under the 1987
Constitution, only the first group of appointments
requires confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.-
In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments, It is now a sad part
of our political history that the power of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
Constitution, transformed that commission, many
times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar
malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973
Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern
in which it was molded and re-molded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on
the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2)
extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other,
in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court
to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by
requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers,
i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as
those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
3. Statutory Construction; Constitution; Under the
1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers is to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation on the Commission on Appointments
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except appointments to offices mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.-
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed
out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently,
there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word
"President" in providing that Congress may by law
vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers
whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint is already vested in the President, without need
of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article
VII.
4. Statutory Construction; Constitution; The word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16 Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution is a redundancy in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.-
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In
short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import
from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of
the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
that presidential appointments, except those mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
5. Commission on Appointments; Confirmation of
the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Customs by the Commission on Appointments not
required.-
Coming now to the immediate question before the
Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments
need the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.
6. Commission on Appointments; Appointment of
respondent Savlador Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination
to the Commission on Appointments is within the
constitutional authority of the President of the
Philippines.-
Consequently, we rule that the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the of fice
and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
15. Matibag v. Benipayo
1. Courts; Judicial Review; An employee’s personal
and substantial injury, if a particular appointee is not
the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the
requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue
regarding the ad interim appointment of said
COMELEC Chairman.-
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where
she was Acting Director, to the Law Department,
where she was placed on detail service. Respondents
claim that the reassignment was “pursuant to x x x
4 NOVEMBER 2019
Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections, and as the Commission’s Chief
Executive Officer.” Evidently, respondents anchor the
legality of petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s
authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real
issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the
lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner
is only an Acting Director of the EID, her
reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not
the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by
the Constitution. On the other hand, if Benipayo is the
lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed
office in accordance with the Constitution, then
petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause
to complain provided the reassignment is in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly,
petitioner has a personal and material stake in the
resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s
assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal and
substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful
COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite
locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this
petition.
2. Courts; Judicial Review; The earliest opportunity
to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the
same.-
Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of
questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason.
Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3,
2001, when the first ad interim appointments were
issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not
the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the
earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before
a competent court that can resolve the same, such that,
“if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” Petitioner
questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when
she filed her petition before this Court, which is the
earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional
issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this
Court may determine, in the exercise of sound
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discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be
passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
3. Courts; Judicial Review; In keeping with the
Supreme Court’s duty to determine whether other
agencies of government have remained within the
limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Supreme Court may even
brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any
constitutional issue raised.-
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of
paramount importance to the public. The legality of
the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC
in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections
may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this
Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of
government have remained within the limits of the
Constitution and have not abused the discretion given
them, this Court may even brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised.
Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite
technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
4. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office—the fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character.-
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The
President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval
or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that
the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and
for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly
without basis.
5. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; The
Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of
an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately; In case of an
appointment made by the President when Congress is
in session, the President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the
person thus named assume office, while with reference
to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect at once,
and the individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function without loss of time.-
The Constitution imposes no condition on the
effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an
ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a
de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.
In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of
an ad interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is
thus made between the exercise of such presidential
prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments when Congress is in session and
when it is in recess. In the former, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the
Commission on Appointments may the person thus
named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad
interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The
individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is
complete. In the language of the Constitution, the
appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.’ ”
6. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; The
term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of
4 NOVEMBER 2019
appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess.-
The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters
of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean
a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in
the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite
legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The
Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an ad
interim appointment in the more recent case of
Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court
stated: “We have already mentioned that an ad interim
appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the
appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity,
rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment
was made. In the instant case, the appointment
extended to private respondent by then MSU President
Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation
as to tenure. The permanent status of private
respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II
was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s
submission that private respondent’s ad interim
appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any
time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are
permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them.” (Emphasis supplied)
7. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad
interim appointment becomes complete and
irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office, and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad
interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the moment he
qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office.-
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and
assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He
enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an
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ad interim appointment becomes complete and
irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim
appointment is possible only if it is communicated to
the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified,
he acquires a legal right to the office which is
protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after
notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of
due process.
8. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; An ad interim appointment
can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution—first, by the disapproval of his ad
interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of
Congress without the Commission on Appointments
acting on his appointment.-
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two
causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is
the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments. The second cause is
the adjournment of Congress without the Commission
on Appointments acting on his appointment. These
two causes are resolu- tory conditions expressly
imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim
appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute,
in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad
interim appointees. No one, however, can complain
because it is the Constitution itself that places the
Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim
appointees.
9. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Security of Tenure; An
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
capacity is the kind of appointment that the
Constitution prohibits the President from making to
the three independent constitutional commissions.-
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and
irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy
any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is
the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
10. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Constitutional
Commissions; Commission on Elections; Statutory
Construction; To hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees
before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments.-
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC
“shall be independent,” this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees
before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law.
It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.
11. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and Balance; An
ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments can no longer be extended a new
appointment—the disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointing authority of the
President.-
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can
no longer be extended a new appointment. The
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on
the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal
by the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for
any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final
and binding on the appointee as well as on the
appointing power. In this instance, the President can
no longer renew the appointment not because of the
constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but
because of a final decision by the Commission on
4 NOVEMBER 2019
Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment.
12. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and Balance; A
by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.-
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because
of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-
passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, which provides as
follows: “Section 17. Unacted Nominations or
Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations
or appointments submitted by the President of the
Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the
close of the session of Congress shall be returned to
the President and, unless new nominations or
appointments are made, shall not again be considered
by the Commission.” (Emphasis supplied) Hence,
under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments,
a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the
President renews the appointment.
13. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; Statutory Construction; The jurisprudence
under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim
appointments by the President is doubtless applicable
to the present Constitution.-
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution
from where the second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the present Constitution on ad interim
appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence
under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim
appointments by the President is doubtless applicable
to the present Constitution. The established practice
under the present Constitution is that the President can
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renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim
appointees. This is a continuation of the well-
recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution,
interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did
not provide for a Commission on Appointments but
vested sole appointing power in the President.
14. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; The prohibition on reappointment in Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither
to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim appointments.-
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A
disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived
by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is
prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can
be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment
will not result in the appointee serving beyond the
fixed term of seven years.
15. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; The framers of the Constitution made it quite
clear that any person who has served any term of
office as COMELEC member—whether for a full term
of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years,
or even for an unexpired term of any length of time—
can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.-
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that
any person who has served any term of office as
COMELEC member—whether for a full term of seven
years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even
for an unexpired term of any length of time—can no
longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.
Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in
this manner: “MR. FOZ. But there is the argument
made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo
Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the
effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies
only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cases where the appointee serves only for less than
seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment.
Unless we put the qualifying words “without
reappointment” in the case of those appointed, then it
is possible that an interpretation could be made later
on their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for
a total of seven years. Precisely, we are foreclosing
that possibility by making it clear that even in the case
of those first appointed under the Constitution, no
reappointment can be made.” (Emphasis supplied)
16. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and Balance; An
ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of
the Commission on Appointments does not constitute
a term of office—the period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.-
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by
inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of office. The period from the time
the ad interim appointment is made to the time it
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.
To hold otherwise would mean that the President by
his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This
interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of
the Commission on Appointments.
17. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; Words and Phrases; The phrase “without
reappointment” applies only to one who has been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such
person completes his term of office.-
The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to
one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
whether or not such person completes his term of
office. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment
can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities
and negate the President’s power to make ad interim
appointments.
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18. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; The Supreme Court will not subscribe to a
proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government
services.-
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on
Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on
the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees.
If such ad interim appointments can no longer be
renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make
ad interim appointments because most of her
appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere
inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This
will nullify the constitutional power of the President to
make ad interim appointments, a power intended to
avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak
havoc on vital government services.
19. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; The framers of the present Constitution
prohibited reappointments for two reasons—first, to
prevent a second appointment for those who have been
previously appointed and confirmed even if they
served for less than seven years, and, second, to insure
that the members of the three constitutional
commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of
seven years.-
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the
three constitutional commissions. The framers of the
present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two
reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment
for those who have been previously appointed and
confirmed even if they served for less than seven
years. The second is to insure that the members of the
three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond
the fixed term of seven years.
20. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; One who has been given an ad interim
appointment as COMELEC Chairman is a de jure
officer, and consequently, he has full authority to
exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his
ad interim appointment remains effective; The
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Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC,
is expressly empowered on his own authority, without
having to secure the approval of the COMELEC en
banc, to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with Civil Service Law.-
Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does
not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman
of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that
Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and
consequently he has full authority to exercise all the
powers of that office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4),
Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC
is vested with the following power: “Section 7.
Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties.
The Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive
Officer of the Commission, shall: x x x (4) Make
temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service
Law.” (Emphasis supplied) The Chairman, as the
Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly
empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the
Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval
of the COMELEC en banc.
21. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; Transfers; Security of Tenure; Career
Executive Service; One who is not a Career Executive
Service (CES) officer, nor a holder of a Career
Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary
qualifications for holding the position of Director IV
as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised
1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission, does
not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.-
Petitioner’s appointment papers dated February 2,
1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001,
attached as Annexes “X”, “Y” and “Z” to her Petition,
indisputably show that she held her Director IV
position in the EID only in an acting or temporary
capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service
(CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career
Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary
qualifications for holding the position of Director IV
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised
1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission.
Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure
as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas
vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal, this Court held that: “As
respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to
that position cannot be considered permanent, and she
can claim no security of tenure in respect of that
position.
22. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; Transfers; The COMELEC Chairman is the
sole officer specifically vested with the power to
transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel, the
COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this
power because that will mean amending the Revised
Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc
cannot legally do.-
The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300,
requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to
election day, refers only to COMELEC field personnel
and not to head office personnel like the petitioner.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically
vested with the power to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will
logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot
arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean
amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the
COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.
23. Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Appointments; Commission on
Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; Transfers; Election Period; COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every
transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel,
should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a
collegial body.-
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that
every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the
COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting
4 NOVEMBER 2019
Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will
render the resolution meaningless since the
COMELEC en banc will have to approve every
personnel transfer or reassignment, making the
resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should
be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect
transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need
of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en
banc to actually implement such transfer or
reassignment.
16. Pimentel Jr. v. Ermita
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prohibition; As
a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts
already done.-
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin
acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does
not bar its resolution. The question of the
constitutionality of the President’s appointment of
department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session will arise in every such
appointment.
2. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive
Department; Congress; The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may
not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere.-
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise
of this executive power except in those instances when
the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of
the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
3. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission
on Appointments; Even if the Commission on
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Appointments is composed of members of Congress,
the exercise of its powers is executive and not
legislative.-
Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed
of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments. Thus: x x x The Commission on
Appointments is a creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of
Congress, said Commission is independent of
Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come
from Congress, but emanate directly from the
Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In
fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely
executive in nature. x x x
4. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission
on Appointments; Considering the independence of
the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is
error for petitioners to claim standing in the present
case as members of Congress.-
Considering the independence of the Commission on
Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners
to claim standing in the present case as members of
Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting
appointments while Congress is in session impairs no
power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the
following are members of the Commission on
Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as
Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator
Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmeña as members.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of
members of the Commission on Appointments, only
Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and
Osmeña have standing in the present petition. This is
in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and
Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their
perceived prerogatives as members of Congress,
possess no standing in the present petition.
5. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission
on Appointments; Congress, through a law, cannot
impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter
ego.-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of
her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress,
through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary
as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
6. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission
on Appointments; Statutes; Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch.”-
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
7. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission
on Appointments; Ad interim appointments are
extended only during recess of Congress and are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection, whereas appointments in an
acting capacity may be extended any time there is a
vacancy and are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments.-
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from
appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook
writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad interim
appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad interim
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appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused,
they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
17. Rufino v. Endriga
18. Aguinaldo v. Aquino III
1. Same; Same; Same; View that the vetting by the
Supreme Court (SC) of the Judicial and Bar Council’s
(JBC’s) internal rules do not fall under the power of
judicial review as there is no justiciable controversy in
the absence of clashing legal rights.-
—Thus, the vetting by this Court of the Judicial and
Bar Council’s internal rules do not fall under the
power of judicial review as there is no justiciable
controversy in the absence of clashing legal rights.
2. Quo Warranto; Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of
Court particularly identifies who can file a special civil
action of Quo Warranto.-
— The Petition at bar is for (a) Quo Warranto under
Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (b)
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the same
Rules. Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court
particularly identifies who can file a special civil
action of Quo Warranto.
3. Same; Petitioners, as nominees for the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a clear
right to said position, and therefore not proper parties
to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the
list of nominees had given them only the possibility,
but not the certainty, of being appointed to the
position, given the discretionary power of the
President in making judicial appointments.-
—Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a
clear right to said position, and therefore not proper
parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included
in the list of nominees had given them only the
possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed to
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the position, given the discretionary power of the
President in making judicial appointments. It is for this
same reason that respondents Jorge-Wagan, et al.,
nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice, may not be impleaded as respondents or
unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding.
Neither can the IBP initiate a quo warranto proceeding
to oust respondents Musngi and Econg from their
currents posts as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices for
the IBP does not qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court as an individual claiming
to be entitled to the positions in question.
4. Presidential Immunity; The President is granted
the privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention.”-
—The Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino
as respondent taking into account that when this
Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then
the incumbent President who enjoyed immunity from
suit. The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved in the system of government of this country,
even though not expressly reserved in the 1987
Constitution. The President is granted the privilege of
immunity from suit “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention.”
5. Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; “Legal
standing” means a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged; while “interest” refers to
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.-
—The Court will exercise its power of judicial review
only if the case is brought before it by a party who has
the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. “Legal standing” means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged; while
“interest” refers to material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree or act assailed, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest.
6. Certiorari; Exceptions to the strict observance of
the sixty (60)-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari.-
—Just like any rule, however, there are recognized
exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari, viz.: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith
of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided
by all the attendant circumstances.
7. Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar
Council; Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Members of the
Supreme Court (SC) and judges of lower courts shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three (3) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) for every vacancy.-
—Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “[t]he Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.”
8. Judicial and Bar Council; The Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) is a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
intended to rid the process of appointments to the
4 NOVEMBER 2019
Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities.-
—The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution
with the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative
of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, intended to rid the process of appointments to
the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and
partisan activities.
9. Same; The power to recommend of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) cannot be used to restrict or limit
the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers
worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount.-
—It should be stressed that the power to recommend
of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative
to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as in the end, the President
appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.
10. Same; Sandiganbayan; President Aquino was not
obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice from each of the six (6) shortlists submitted by
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).-
—The Court finds herein that President Aquino was
not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists
submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering
of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on
President Aquino’s power to appoint members of the
Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered
to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
11. Presidential Appointments; The President’s
power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such
as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the
seniority or order of preference of such newly
appointed members by controlling the date and order
of issuance of said members’ appointment or
commission papers.-
—It bears to point out that part of the President’s
power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such
as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the
seniority or order of preference of such newly
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appointed members by controlling the date and order
of issuance of said members’ appointment or
commission papers.
12. Same; Judicial and Bar Council; By designating
the numerical order of the vacancies, the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) would be establishing the seniority
or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices even before their appointment by
the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a
vital part of the President’s power of appointment.-
—By already designating the numerical order of the
vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority
or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices even before their appointment by
the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a
vital part of the President’s power of appointment.
13. Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),
in sorting the qualified nominees into six (6) clusters,
one (1) for every vacancy, could influence the
appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
of recommending qualified nominees to the President.-
—Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified
nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy,
could influence the appointment process beyond its
constitutional mandate of recommending qualified
nominees to the President.
14. Same; Same; Clustering impinges upon the
President’s power of appointment, as well as restricts
the chances for appointment of the qualified
nominees.-
—Clustering impinges upon the President’s power of
appointment, as well as restricts the chances for
appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the
President’s option for every vacancy is limited to the
five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the
President has appointed from one cluster, then he is
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the
same cluster for the other vacancies.
15. Same; Same; The clustering by the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) of the qualified nominees for the
six (6) vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
appears to have been done arbitrarily, there being no
clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the same.-
—There is no explanation for the shift in practice by
the JBC, which impaired the power of the President to
appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory
authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The clustering by the JBC of the qualified nominees
for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice appears to have been done arbitrarily, there
being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the
same. The number of nominees was not even equally
distributed among the clusters.
16. Same; President Aquino validly exercised his
discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six (6) separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.-
—In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly
exercised his discretionary power to appoint members
of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies
for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino
merely maintained the well-established practice,
consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.
17. Same; Judicial and Bar Council; The President
is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and may consider as
one the separate shortlists of nominees concurrently
submitted by the JBC.-
—The President is not bound by the clustering of
nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the
separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted
by the JBC. As the Court already ratiocinated herein,
the requirements and qualifications, as well as the
power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all
the vacant posts in a collegiate court; and if an
individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy,
then he/she is also qualified for all the other vacancies.
It is worthy of note that the JBC, in previous instances
of closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts,
such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
faithfully observed the practice of submitting only a
single list of nominees for all the available vacancies,
with at least three nominees for every vacancy, from
which the President made his appointments on the
same occasion.
18. Intervention; The allowance or disallowance of a
motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of
4 NOVEMBER 2019
the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. It is not an absolute right.-
—Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of
sound discretion of the Court. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances. It is not an absolute right.
The statutory rules or conditions for the right of
intervention must be shown.
19. Judicial Review; Judicial and Bar
Council; View that the independent character of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) as a constitutional
body does not remove it from the Court’s jurisdiction
when the assailed acts involve grave abuse of
discretion.-
—Nonetheless, the independent character of the
Judicial and Bar Council as a constitutional body does
not remove it from the Court’s jurisdiction when the
assailed acts involve grave abuse of discretion.
20. Same; Same; View that the expanded power of
judicial review gives the court the authority to strike
down acts of all government instrumentalities that are
contrary to the Constitution.-
—Judicial review is the mechanism provided by the
Constitution to settle actual controversies and to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The expanded power of judicial
review gives the court the authority to strike down acts
of all government instrumentalities that are contrary to
the Constitution.
21. Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) may have acted in excess of its
constitutional mandate to recommend nominees to the
President when it clustered the Sandiganbayan
applicants, in six (6) separate groups, purportedly to
account for each newly created division.-
—The Judicial and Bar Council may have acted in
excess of its constitutional mandate to recommend
nominees to the President when it clustered the
Sandiganbayan applicants, in six separate groups,
purportedly to account for each newly created division.
There seems to be no rational basis in the positioning
of the applicants in their respective clusters, with some
of the shortlists containing five names, while others
having six, and two clusters even containing as many
as seven names.
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PRESIDENCY 4 NOVEMBER 2019
22. Same; Same; Presidential Appointments; View
that President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of 19. Aytona v. Castillo
discretion in disregarding the shortlists submitted to 20. In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
him by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and treating Placido B. Vallarta
all six (6) shortlists as one (1) shortlist from which he 21. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
can choose the new Sandiganbayan justices.- 22. Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President
—President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of 23. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano
discretion in disregarding the shortlists submitted to 24. Roque v. Director of Lands
him by the Judicial and Bar Council and treating all six 25. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited v. Subic
shortlists as one shortlist from which he can choose the Bay Metropolitan Authority
new Sandiganbayan justices. 26. Ang Angco v. Castillo
23. Same; Same; Same; View that the Judicial and 27. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Bar Council (JBC) is not mandated to submit its Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes
revised internal rules to the Supreme Court (SC) for 28. Manalang-Demigillo v. TIDCORP
approval.- 29. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita
—The Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to 30. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
submit its revised internal rules to the Supreme Court 31. Almario v. Executive Secretary
for approval. The question as to whether the Judicial 32. De Leon v. Carpio
and Bar Council must submit its existing rules to the 33. Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
Supreme Court was not raised as an issue in this case. 34. Vera v. People
24. Same; Same; Same; View that exercise of the 35. Monsanto v. Factoran Jr.
Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power of judicial review over 36. Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) must always be 37. People v. Salle Jr.
balanced with the JBC’s independent nature.- 38. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
—The exercise of this Court’s power of judicial 39. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
review over the Judicial and Bar Council must always 40. Tiu v. Dizon
be balanced with the Judicial and Bar Council’s 41. IBP v. Zamora
independent nature. The Court’s authority over the 42. Kulayan v. Tan
Judicial and Bar Council should, thus, be considered as 43. Ampatuan v. Puno
primarily administrative, with the Chief Justice, as the 44. Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo
ex officio Chair, exercising overall administrative 45. Lagman v. Medialdea
authority in the execution of the Judicial and Bar 46. Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines
Council’s mandate. 47. Lagman v. Pimentel III
25. Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court 48. Tenet v. Doe
(SC) cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council’s 49. Gudani v. Senga
(JBC’s) internal rules and policies precisely because 50. Gonzales v. Hechanova
doing so would be an unconstitutional affront to the 51. Akbayan v. Aquino
JBC’s independence.- 52. Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary
—The Constitution has provided the qualifications of 53. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board
the members of the judiciary, but has given the 54. Bayan v. Zamora
Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its 55. Vinuya v. Romulo
own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure 56. Constantino Jr. v. Cuisia
its mandate. This Court cannot meddle in the Judicial 57. Marcos v. Manglapus
and Bar Council’s internal rules and policies precisely 58. Laurel v. Garcia
because doing so would be an unconstitutional affront 59. Train v. City of New York
to the Judicial and Bar Council’s independence. 60. Fortich v. Corona

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17 | MOJICA