The Contrasting Variants of The Populism of Hugo Cha Vez and Alberto Fujimori

J. Lat. Amer. Stud.
35, 139–162 f 2003 Cambridge University Press 139

DOI : 10.1017/S0022216X02006685 Printed in the United Kingdom
COMMENTARY
The Contrasting Variants of the

Populism of Hugo Chávez and
Alberto Fujimori*
STEVE ELLNER
During the 1990s Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Argentina’s Carlos Menem
were the two main political successes of Latin American populism. Both
completed two successive presidential terms, a unique accomplishment in
the continent, and overcame the political instability that previously beset
their nations. Scholars who analysed these and other contemporary regimes
concluded that Latin American populism was flexible and resilient enough to
adapt to a radically different environment from that of the 1930s and 1940s,
when it had emerged as a major force. Some political scientists labelled as
‘ neopopulism’ the newer variant of populism in the context of globalisation
and widespread acceptance of neoliberal policies. These scholars stressed
two salient features of neopopulism that contrasted with ‘classical populism’
of the 1930s and 1940s : its social base consisting of members of the informal
economy, as opposed to the organised working class ; and its implementation
of neoliberal policies, as against the model of import substitution and state
interventionism.1
From the perspective of the early years of the twenty-first century, however,
neopopulism appears less politically viable and less useful as an analytical
category than ten years before. Unlike classical populism of half a century
earlier, neopopulism has failed to produce leaders and movements that serve
as a point of political reference in their respective nations over a considerable
period of time. Thus the administrations of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela
Steve Ellner is Professor of History at the Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela.

* The author would like to thank Susan Berglund, Miguel Tinker Salas, Paul Drake, Richard
Hillman and Ralph Van Roy for their critical comments.
1
Kurt Weyland, ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities, ’
Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993); Kenneth Roberts,
‘ Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America : The Peruvian Case, ’
World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1 (Oct. 1995).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The New School, on 01 Aug 2019 at 20:21:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X02006685
140 Steve Ellner
and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil ended in their impeachment, while
Carlos Salinas de Gotari was forced into exile shortly after leaving office in
Mexico. Subsequently, Fujimori and Menem fell into disgrace as a result of
accusations of unethical conduct. Fujimori was ousted and his movement’s
presidential candidate received a paltry 1.3 per cent of the vote in the April
2001 elections. Menem’s popularity was also reduced to single digit percent-
ages.
Following the initial publication of literature on neopopulism, Venezuela’s
populist leader Hugo Chávez was elected president, infusing the phenomenon
of Latin American populism with new relevance. Chávez – unlike Fujimori,
Menem and other neopopulists – succeeded in creating a movement that
identified with him and with the slogans, symbols and goals he embraced.
Chávez was frequently compared to Fujimori by political analysts and actors,
ranging from ex-President Clinton to Venezuelan and US journalists.2 Most
of these non-academic comparisons were narrow in scope, if not superficial,
in that they focused on demagoguery and authoritarian tendencies. They
passed over the essential characteristics that Chávez and Fujimori (even more
than Menem) had in common and that defined them as populists: special
appeal to the marginalised sectors of the population (those belonging to the
informal economy), anti-elite discourse, status as ‘ outsiders’ and charisma.
The following article attempts to determine whether this common denomi-
nator also included policies, discourse, and contextual factors. Specifically, the
article provides a systematic comparison of the two leaders and their govern-
ments in order to identify similarities and antithetical positions that may
shed light on the applicability of the neopopulist concept to the Venezuelan
case.
In a more general sense, the article addresses itself to the proposition
formulated by political scientists beginning in the mid-1990s that novel de-
velopments in the continent have given rise to a democratic system and
society of a new type. For this purpose, scholars have developed the models
of ‘ neopopulism’, ‘delegative democracy ’,3 and ‘ neopluralism’.4 All three
models coincide in stressing the emergence of strong national executives
in a democratic framework (referred to as ‘ hyperpresidentialism’) and the
2
El Nacional, March 19, 2002. For scholarly works, see Steven Levitsky, ‘Fujimori and Post-
Party Politics in Peru, ’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 3 ( July 1999), pp. 89–90 ; Kenneth
Roberts, ‘Populism in Latin America, ’ Carter Center, Challenges to Democracy in the Americas
(Oct. 2000).
3
Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy, ’ Journal of Democracy, no. 5 ( Jan. 1994).
4
Philip D. Oxhorn, ‘Is the Century of Corporatism Over ? Neoliberalism and the Rise of
Neopluralism, ’ in Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (eds.), What Kind of Democracy ? What
Kind of Market ? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism ( University Park, PA, 1998).
The Contrasting Variants of Populism 141
concomitant weakening of institutions including the legislature, the judicial
system, political parties, organised labour, and organisations of civil society.
Each model, as well as their components, can be placed on a continuum.
At one extreme is an optimistic assessment of the efficacy of recent Latin
American heads of state and the possibility that their movements will remain
an important point of reference in a democratic setting for years to come.
These scholars highlight the ‘creativity ’ of the presidents in meeting the chal-
lenges of globalisation, the popular support for their policies, and the doc-
trines they embrace that serve as an antidote to personalism.5 Policies and
class alliances that are conducive to instability and jeopardise democratic
norms are located at the opposite extreme. According to the pessimistic evalu-
ation, the new breed of presidents are veritable caudillos who lack a solid
base of support in the country. Furthermore, their authoritarian tendencies
threaten to clash with the international community which is more committed
to the defence of democracy than in the past.
The following article will locate the positions, strategies and class backing
of the Chávez and Fujimori movements on this continuum. The overriding
objective is to ascertain whether the two regimes are predominately person-
alistic and authoritarian or, to the contrary, have pursued strategies and
policies that are consistent with their social base and represent new models
with long-term possibilities. Certainly, the credibility of the claims of Fujimori
and Chávez to represent the marginalised sectors of the population has a
bearing on whether both movements (regardless of the duration of their stay
in power) will retain the backing of that class over a significant period of time.
In addition, the novelty of the models forcefully defended by both leaders, and
their ability to convince followers that they represent a clear break with the
past, determines whether the movements will remain cohesive, and their
activists committed, over time.
The Optimistic–Pessimistic Continuum

Political scientists writing in the 1990s concurred that a new type of democracy
was emerging in Latin America, with Fujimori as a leading example. One of the
common denominators of these governments was the adoption of neoliberal
economic policies. Scholars differed widely, however, as to just how demo-
cratic and stable the democracies were. Guillermo O’Donnell and others
stressed institutional backwardness and simplicity and the national executive’s
accumulation of inordinate power. They ascribed this imbalance to structural
and cultural factors and warned that the political stagnation could last
5
Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy, ‘Introduction, ’ and ‘Conclusion, ’ in Mettenheim
and Malloy (eds.), Deepening Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1998).
142 Steve Ellner
indefinitely. Most important, regime legitimacy was undermined by the ab-
sence of a popular mandate to implement neoliberal formulae, which lacked
champions among organised sectors within the nation.6
The optimistic view of regime change was persuasively put forward by
Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy. They praised the ‘ creativity ’ of Latin
American leaders who boldly responded to the imperatives of globalisation
by accepting the political cost of neoliberal policies, in the process preserving
national sovereignty and democracy.7 Writing in the same vein, Karen Rem-
mer viewed neoliberal reforms as a viable political strategy and not one
imposed by the IMF or cabinet technocrats, nor contingent on the national
executive’s usurpation of authority. Remmer claimed that the electoral suc-
cesses of Menem, Fujimori and other neoliberals substantiated her thesis.8
Finally, David Leaman argued that leaders such as Carlos Menem went be-
yond mere personalism by developing a comprehensive doctrine that justified
neoliberalism but built on the populist tradition of radical transformation.
He went on to criticise O’Donnell for overemphasising the non-democratic
aspects of Latin America’s fledgling democracies.9
The model of neopopulism developed by Kurt Weyland, among other
political scientists, may be situated between the two extremes. On the one
hand, these scholars recognised the institutional weakness of neopopulist
regimes and the tension between neoliberal and populist imperatives. On the
other hand, Weyland commended neopopulists for their adroitness in forg-
ing alliances. He argued that by winning over a large segment of the popular
classes, neopopulists gained legitimacy for their governments and the neo-
liberal policies they implemented. He also claimed that neopopulism went
beyond rhetorical arguments and rested on a material base. The marginalised
sectors of the population, having lost out as a result of long-standing import
substitution policies, were responsive to neopopulist discourse. Weyland
concluded by praising neopopulism for having faced up to entrenched in-
terests and implementing difficult but necessary neoliberal policies, and in the
process fortifying democracy.10 The rest of this article will evaluate this thesis
in light of recent developments in Peru and Venezuela.
6
O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy ’; Oxhorn, ‘Is the Century of Corporatism Over ? ’
7
Mettenheim and Malloy ‘Introduction, ’ and ‘ Conclusion’.
8
Karen L. Remmer, ‘The Politics of Neoliberal Economic Reform in South America,
1980–1994’, Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 2 (Summer 1998) ; Re-
mmer, ‘The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980–91 ’, American Political
Science Review, vol. 87, no. 2 ( July 1993), pp. 393–407.
9
David E. Leaman, ‘Populist Liberalism as Dominant Ideology : Competing Ideas and
Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Argentina, 1989–1995’, Studies in Comparative International
Development, vol. 34, no. 3 ( Fall 1999), pp. 99–102.
10
Kurt Weyland, ‘Populism in the Age of Neoliberalism ’, in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Populism
in Latin America ( Tuscaloosa, 1999), p. 190.
Fujimori and Chávez in comparative perspective
General overview
The abortive coup staged by Hugo Chávez on February 4, 1992 catapulted
him onto the centre stage of Venezuelan politics. Subsequently, his Bolivarian
Revolutionary Movement-200 (MBR-200) pursued a policy of electoral ab-
stention until April 1997, when it changed its name to the Fifth Republic
Movement (MVR) and ran Chávez as presidential candidate for the December
1998 elections. For nearly a year, Chávez lagged behind in an open field
of candidates, but by early 1998 he unexpectedly became the front runner.
In response, Venezuela’s two major parties, Democratic Action (AD) and
Copei, dropped support for their own candidates and backed Chávez’s
principal rival. Political polarisation also manifested itself in the special
presidential elections held in July 2000 when Chávez increased his support
from 56 to 60 per cent while his main rival received 38 per cent. The polar-
isation was also evident in the unsuccessful coup of April 2002, which was
initially supported by all the parties of the opposition, and over subsequent
months when they concentrated their efforts on forcing Chávez out of office
by legal means.
Fujimori was a dark horse candidate in the 1990 elections and, like Chávez’s
first candidacy, was initially given little chance of winning. Fujimori appealed
to the popular classes by opposing the neoliberal economic platform of his
main rival, Mario Vargas Llosa. At the same time, Fujimori lashed out at the
nation’s established political parties. In order to avoid openly coming to terms
with the traditional parties that endorsed Vargas Llosa, Fujimori turned down
the renowned novelist’s offer to concede defeat by mutual accord. In 1992 top
military officers collaborated with Fujimori in carrying out an autogolpe, which
suspended congress, the courts and constitutional guarantees. In response
to international repudiation of the coup, Fujimori convoked elections for a
constituent assembly that replaced the constitution of 1979. As was the case
with Chávez in 1999 and 2000, Fujimori faced a weak opposition and tri-
umphed in a series of elections during the 1990s, including the referendum for
the constitution in 1993 and the presidential election of 1995. Both Vargas
Llosa in 1990 and presidential candidate Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1995 were
white and closely associated with the nation’s elite ; both went into exile
following defeat, thus depriving the opposition of a supra-party leader. Pol-
itical polarisation also characterised the presidential elections of April 2000,
when Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo virtually monopolised the electoral
results. In subsequent months, Toledo represented the entire opposition in
claiming that electoral fraud had been committed, in opposing the presidential
inauguration of Fujimori, and in calling for the removal of Montesinos. In
November 2000 Fujimori resigned during a trip to Japan.
144 Steve Ellner
Rise to power
Various developments in Venezuela beginning in the 1970s explain the
emergence of a group of middle-level officers headed by Chávez who were
committed to political activism and radical change. In the first place, with the
subsidence of guerrilla activity in the 1960s, the government implemented
the ‘Andrés Bello Plan’, which enrolled young officers in Venezuelan uni-
versities as an alternative to military institutions including the School of the
Americas. The experience of interacting with university students and selec-
ting courses in the social sciences politicised a large number of officers in
their formative years. A second, albeit less important, factor was the strategy
pursued by a group of guerrilla leaders in the 1960s led by Douglas Bravo, of
engaging in political work within the armed forces in order to capture young
officers for the revolutionary cause.11 A third factor explaining radicalisation
was the experience of Chávez’s group in the military of organising a clan-
destine movement between 1982, with the formation of the MBR-200, and
the coup attempt in 1992. This protracted organising effort among middle-
level officers had no precedent in Latin America and served to strengthen the
long-term commitment and determination of Chávez’s early followers.12
In the 1990 elections Fujimori also appealed to the popular classes by
stressing his status as an ‘ outsider’ and other qualities antithetical to those
of the political class, which was predominately white, wealthy, ageing and
Lima-based. Indeed, he was more of an ‘ outsider’ than other Latin American
neopopulists. Fujimori did not run as the candidate of a mass-based political
party with dominant influence in organised labour (as did Menem), enjoy the
backing of a major media group (as was the case with Collor de Mello), or
count on well-established organisations at the regional level or of powerful
business interests.
Nevertheless, Chávez had greater credentials as an ‘outsider ’ than Fujimori,
who was an outsider from an ethnic and political viewpoint, but not from a
social and economic perspective. Fujimori and his parents before him had
been successful in their respective professions, in contrast to Chávez who
had reached the middle ranks in the army shortly before the 1992 coup, only
to see his military career ended. Chávez’s physical traits, his personality and
his social standing were more akin to those of the popular classes than was
11
According to Bravo, the Communist Party first designed this strategy in the struggle
against dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez in the 1950s. Alberto Garrido, Guerrilla y conspiración
militar en Venezuela (Caracas, 1999), pp. 8–18. Chávez himself has stated that as a young
army officer, a leftist friend advised him not to abandon the armed forces since ‘you,
as a lieutenant, are worth more than a trade unionist with 20,000 workers. ’ Venezolana de
Televisión TV, 11:30 a.m., 27 Sept. 2002.
12
Hugo Chávez [interviewed by Agustı́n Blanco Muñoz], Habla el comandante (Caracas, 1998),
pp. 123–7 ; Luis Miquilena, personal interview, 29 March 2000, Caracas.
the case with populist leaders from Perón and Haya de la Torre to Fujimori,
who came from middle and upper-class backgrounds.
The presidential candidacies of Fujimori and Chávez set off political polar-
isation, but the process was more intense in Venezuela. Chávez frightened the
establishment due to his past as a military rebel and the radical thrust of his
candidacy. Many members of the Peruvian political class felt less threatened by
Fujimori. Indeed, leaders of the APRA party decided to endorse his candidacy
in the second round of the 1990 elections under the assumption that they
would be able to influence his government due to his lack of political ex-
perience.
These different trajectories at the time that Fujimori and Chávez reached
office are significant. They support the thesis that the general thrust of Fuji-
mori’s electoral movement was more personalistic than that of Chávez at the
time of their respective rise to power. The shared experiences of Chávez’s
followers over a twenty-year period, their greater commitment to far-reaching
change, and the greater polarisation in Venezuela beginning in 1998 were
conducive to the emergence of a political movement with superior staying
power and sense of self-identification. In these aspects, chavismo resembled
classical populism of the 1930s and 1940s more than it did the short-lived
neopopulist phenomenon of the 1990s.
Discourse and style

Certain common characteristics of the discourse of Chávez and Fujimori fall
under the rubric of modern-day Latin American populism. Both emphasised
their status as ‘ outsiders’ and lashed out at the ‘elite ’, specifically the political
class. Furthermore, they appealed to marginalised sectors of the population,
which traditional politicians had failed to target. Both advocated ‘ participatory
democracy ’ as a corrective to the excessive power of political party bureau-
cracies that failed to represent popular interests. Fujimori embodied certain
qualities that the popular classes in Peru, which are of overwhelming Indian
extraction, could readily identify with. This was the case with his Japanese
family origin and his apparent reticence. In addition, Fujimori played on his
image (and that of his parents) as a self-made man in order to appeal to the
members of the informal economy, who saw themselves as ‘ independents’
lacking the backing of state institutions and economic elites. Chávez, for his
part, emphasised his Indian and black features and ancestry at the same time
that he used the term ‘sovereigns ’ to refer to the vast majority of the popu-
lation in a way that conjured up images of ‘ the masses’.
In spite of common themes, aspects of the discourse that Fujimori and
Chávez embraced differed in fundamental ways. Most important, Fujimori de-
fended a technocratic vision and emphasised hard work, individual initiative,
146 Steve Ellner
honesty and competence, values that were associated with his Japanese
background. Consistent with Fujimori’s preference for technocratic notions
was his extreme anti-political rhetoric, which was reflected in his lack of in-
terest in building a political party, or promoting social movements as a sub-
stitute for the moribund party system. Another aspect of Fujimori’s discourse
that had no equivalent in the chavista movement was his determination to
extirpate terrorism and his avid support for capital punishment (which was
incorporated into the 1993 constitution). As is common among dictators in
Latin America, Fujimori extolled ambitious national projects (as did Chávez)
and stressed the role of technology and private investments.13
Chávez’s discourse, more than that of Fujimori, conveyed the notion that
the Venezuelan government was concerned with the well-being of the lower
classes above that of any other sector. Not only did he state that poor people
needed his help and attention more than other sectors, but he sometimes
viewed class relations as a zero-sum game. In addition, technocratic symbols
and slogans, which appealed mostly to the middle classes, were absent in
Chávez’s discourse. In contrast to Fujimori’s faith in the constructive role of
private investments, Chávez frequently assailed neoliberalism, the acceptance
of which in Venezuela and elsewhere correlated with income and privileged
status.14 While Fujimori emphasised the war against terrorism, Chávez gained
popular support by claiming he would never order troops to ‘ fire on the
people’. Indeed, he claimed that the 1992 coup represented a reaction to the
traumatic experience of the mass disturbances of the week of 27 February
1989, when soldiers gunned down hundreds of people. Finally, more than
Fujimori, Chávez viewed himself as one of the people, a relationship he de-
scribed in metaphorical terms as ‘a fish in water ’.15 In short, Chávez’s dis-
course was directed more at underprivileged sectors of the population, which
came to represent his exclusive social base of support.
Authoritarian tendencies and unethical behaviour

In the mid-1990s, at the time of the initial scholarly literature on neopopulism,
the Fujimori regime appeared to meet the minimum requirements to be
considered democratic. The accusations of human rights violation generally
centred on ‘low-intensity ’ repression. These ‘dirty tricks’ included the infil-
tration of rallies of opposition candidates, the threat to collect back taxes to
13
Roger Atwood, ‘Democratic Dictators : Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Leguı́a to
Fujimori, ’ SAIS Review, vol. 21, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2001), pp. 161–2.
14
Kenneth Roberts, ‘Social Polarization and Popular Resurgence in Venezuela, ’ in Steve
Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and
Conflict ( Boulder, CO, 2003), p. 64.
15
Chávez ‘ Alo Presidente ’, Venezolana de Televisión TV, 11:00 a.m., 23 June 2002.
pressure the media, and the use of sensationalist tabloids tied to the govern-
ment to discredit adversaries.16 In addition, analysts considered Fujimori less
corrupt than his neopopulist counterparts elsewhere since his greater control
of the state obviated the need to raise money to finance parallel structures
lacking in official status.17
Events leading to Fujimori’s exit from power and its aftermath demon-
strated that the abuses committed throughout the 1990s were more grave than
was previously thought. Most important, the sinister Vladimiro Montesinos
consolidated control following the removal of his rival Nicolás Hermoza as
commander-in-chief of the army in 1997, and he may in the end have wielded
more power than the president himself. Peru’s record in combating the
drug trade, which had previously represented a big advantage for the ad-
ministration, was called into question as Pablo Escobar’s brother claimed that
narco-money had financed Fujimori’s 1990 campaign. Also hundreds of
captured videos, which had been Montesinos’ modus operandi of extortion,
demonstrated that an intricate network of corruption pervaded the nation’s
major institutions. Dozens of books expose the details of this underworld.18
One publication contained the results of a congressional committee probe
into Fujimori’s previously much lauded privatisation programme.19 Such
corruption in the sale of state companies undermined Fujimori’s stated policy
of assigning half of the privatisation proceeds to programmes for under-
privileged sectors, which scholars considered basic to the neopopulist social
and electoral strategy.
In addition, reports by the Carter Center and other probes during the last
year of Fujimori’s rule pointed to the lack of autonomy of the national electoral
commission and the unreliability of the electoral process. These accounts
placed in doubt not only the voting tallies of the 2000 presidential contests, but
the electoral results during Fujimori’s entire rule, particularly in the 1993
constitutional referendum.
Finally, the Truth Commission investigating human rights violations dem-
onstrated that the vast majority of the victims of the counterinsurgency
campaign against the Sendero Luminoso (SL) were not involved in terrorism.
Throughout Fujimori’s presidency the government justified secretive and
repressive actions by alluding to the SL’s statement that ‘the Party has a
16
Guillermo Rocharbrún, ‘ Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori, ’ NACLA : Report
on the Americas, vol. 30, no. 1 ( July–Aug. 1996), pp. 17–18.
17
Weyland, ‘The Politics of Corruption in Latin America, ’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, no. 2
(April 1998), p. 121, ft. 15.
18
One bestseller was Manuel Dammert, El estado mafioso Fujimori–Montesinos : el poder imagocrático
en las sociedades globalizadas ( Lima, 2001).
19
National Congress, Comisión Investigadora sobre los delitos económicos y financieros cometidos entre 1990
y 2001 ( Lima, June 2002). Carlos Esteves (congressional commission advisor), personal
interview, 11 July 2002, Lima.
148 Steve Ellner
thousand eyes and ears ’. The assassination of secretary-general Pedro Huillca
of the Peruvian Workers General Confederation (CGTP), previously attribu-
ted to the head of SL’s Lima organisation, was now blamed on Montesinos’
infamous death squad ‘ Grupo Colina’.20 In retrospect, regardless of the de-
gree of threat from SL, the government’s anti-terrorist programme had a
secret agenda, namely the suppression of critical and autonomous centres in
civil and political society and even in the military. The repression was most
successful against social movements and organised labour, which had become
increasingly combative over the previous two decades (beginning with the rule
of General Juan Velasco Alvarado). Thus civil society in Peru was subject to
old-fashion state repression, which was at least as significant as the societal
fragmentation and other features associated with neopopulism and other
models of Latin American democracy in the age of globalisation.21
Fujimori, who at first lacked sympathy among military officers, followed
a strategy of winning them over as allies and at the same time gaining control
of the institution. The military partnership was sealed by Fujimori’s neoliberal
policies, his refusal to investigate human rights violations, and his willingness
to grant the military complete authority in highland departments where guer-
rilla activity was most pronounced. Military support during the early months of
Fujimori’s rule compensated for the president’s isolated position in the pol-
itical world, particularly in the national congress. A law passed in 1991 gave
the president carte blanche in the appointment of the commander-in-chief and
the removal of top officers. The law signalled the beginning of the effort by
Fujimori and Montesinos to penetrate the institution and eliminate dissension.
Shortly thereafter, the autogolpe facilitated the interrogation of officers in order
to identify members of several military lodges that championed institutional
concerns. These groups did not oppose Fujimori, but they criticised Mon-
tesinos and his National Intelligence Service (SIN), opposed the ‘Grupo
Colina’ and the atrocities committed in the war against the SL, and resented
the preference given to the president’s unconditional supporters in the
military.22 In short, in the early years of the regime, the armed forces were split
between ‘institutionalists ’ and Fujimori loyalists. Subsequently, Fujimori and
Montesinos relied on the SIN to gain complete control of the institution.
20
Vı́ctor Gorriti (secretary of organisation of the Confederación General de Trabajadores
del Perú), personal interview, 9 July 2002, Lima.
21
See, for instance, Frances Hagopian, ‘Democracy and Political Representation in Latin
America in the 1990s : Pause, Reorganization, or Decline ?, ’ in Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey
Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America (Coral Gables, 1998),
pp. 99–141.
22
Enrique Obando, ‘ Fujimori and the Military : A Marriage of Convenience, ’ NACLA : Report
on the Americas, vol. 30, no. 1 ( July–Aug. 1996), pp. 31–6; Confidential interview with retired
military officer, ex-member of ‘León Dormido ’ military lodge, 20 July 2002, Lima.
Chávez’s adversaries characterised his government’s efforts to revamp the
political system as steps in the direction of authoritarian rule. Indeed, the
criticisms of Chávez for assuming excessive power resembled the accusations
against Fujimori. The new constitutions sponsored by both governments
(in 1993 in Peru and 1999 in Venezuela) embraced ‘ direct democracy ’ as a
corrective to party-dominated rule. But in the process of weakening political
parties and their stronghold which was the legislative branch of government,
the constitutions buttressed the national executive, contributing to hyper-
presidentialism. Both presidents also reversed the tendency toward decen-
tralisation of previous years, thus undermining another check on executive
authority. Furthermore, according to public opinion surveys, many of the fol-
lowers of both presidents had uncertain democratic values.23 Finally, the
1999 Venezuelan Constitution provided the armed forces with a dangerous
degree of autonomy with respect to the previous 1961 Constitution. With the
appointment of a large number of military officers to top government and
party positions, Chávez ran the risk of transforming the armed forces into the
nation’s dominant institution, as occurred in Peru after the 1992 autogolpe.
Chávez’s critics stressed the government’s arbitrary actions of the ‘low
intensity ’ type as well as widespread corruption. Determining the veracity of
these accusations is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, govern-
ment repression in no way approximated that of Peru in the 1990s, as has
been documented since Fujimori’s resignation. As of the writing of this article
in September 2002, Chávez has refrained from jailing representatives of
the press, even though the media frequently carry declarations calling for the
president’s removal from office. Similarly, the government has avoided the
violent repression of street mobilisations that have also demanded Chávez’s
removal. Finally, the opposition’s claims that the government had annulled the
system of checks and balances lost much relevance when the Chavista faction
led by Luis Miquilena split off from the MVR in early 2002. Subsequently,
Miquilena’s followers in the Supreme Tribunal and the National Electoral
Council supported decisions that favoured the opposition.
At the outset of the Chávez presidency, the chavista movement definitively
rejected the military–caudillo model that was inspired by the examples of
Gamal Abdul Nasser, Muammar Qaddafy and Saddam Hussein and was
promoted by the Argentine theoretician Noberto Ceresole. At that time,
Foreign Minister José Vicente Rangel (who later became Defence Minister and
then Vice-President) virtually declared Ceresole persona non grata, after which
the latter returned to Argentina and began to criticise the Chávez government
23
Damarys Canache, Venezuela : Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democracy (Coral Gables,
Florida, 2002), pp. 146–51 ; Flavia Freidenberg, ‘Actitudes hacia la democracia de las élites
parlamentarias argentina y peruana, ’ América Latina Hoy, no. 16 (Aug. 1997), p. 80.
150 Steve Ellner
sharply.24 The origin of the Rangel–Ceresole confrontation dated back to the
early years of the MBR-200 when the organisation defined itself as a ‘ civilian-
military movement’, rather than a military lodge. In doing so, Chávez’s group
committed itself to a non-militarist approach. Referring to the decision years
later, Chávez stated that the civilian–military alliance was ‘ the best demon-
stration that we were not bent on establishing a military dictatorship’.25
The Venezuelan armed forces under Chávez were more internally divided
than its Peruvian counterparts under Fujimori. This greater complexity was
made evident during the April 2002 coup attempt when a three-way split
manifested itself in the military. Chávez’s military foes were pitted against his
followers while a third, ‘institutionalist’ current supported his overthrow on
April 11 and his return two days later. In contrast, the ‘ institutionalist’ faction
within the Peruvian military was suppressed following the autogolpe. Unlike the
apolitical Fujimori, Chávez promoted military participation in politics by
fulfilling the MBR-200’s demand, formulated at the time of the 1992 coup, in
favour of the military’s right to vote.26 In short, while the Fujimori govern-
ment resembled the caudillo–masses model in some respects, the political
dimension of the Chávez phenomenon is more complex as authoritarian and
personalistic tendencies coexist with a democratic impulse.
Class support
A fundamental component of neopopulist movements in the 1990s was the
special appeal to the marginalised class, which had failed to benefit from state
interventionist policies and felt largely ignored by traditional parties. While
both Fujimori and Chávez counted on the backing of these sectors, the latter’s
government established more solid and exclusive ties with them. Fujimori’s
class support shifted during his ten years in office, though he managed to retain
considerable lower class sympathy throughout his stay in power.
Neither leader enjoyed dominant influence among organised sectors of the
working class. The chavista worker movement failed to attract any important
veteran labour leader or to successfully challenge the control of the traditional
leadership of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV). Chávez’s
appeal to industrial sectors of organised labour was undermined by his initial
policy of maintaining the currency overvalued, which benefited the margin-
alised class, among others, at the expense of factory workers. Fujimori, for his
part, lacked any following at all in the Peruvian labour movement.
24
José Vicente Rangel, personal interview, 12 Sept. 1999, Caracas.
25
Chávez, Habla el comandante, pp. 126–7.
26
Angela Zago, La rebelión de los ángeles : reportaje (Caracas, 1998), pp. 37–47.
Fujimori triumphed in the 1990 elections as the candidate of the popular
classes. The marginalised class, unlike influential economic groups, was re-
presented in Fujimori’s Cambio-90 electoral slate. Furthermore, Fujimori
proposed the legalisation of the status of street vendors and the creation of
a special bank for them. Nevertheless, with his government’s application of
neoliberal policies which brought inflation under control, and successes in
the war against the Sendero Luminoso, Fujimori made inroads in the middle
and upper class at the same time that he lost some lower class backing.
This shift was manifested in the 1993 referendum on the nation’s new con-
stitution, which Fujimori won with a mere 52 per cent of the vote.27 The poor
showing convinced Fujimori of the need to make a concerted effort to rein
in lower class voters. With this in mind, Fujimori implemented a massive
social programme administered by the ministry of the presidency with the
proceeds from privatisation, which had exceeded expectations. These allo-
cations were designed for electoral purposes to win the vote of poor people in
those departments where the opposition parties did well in the 1993 municipal
elections. As a result, independents (but not the governing party) displaced
opposition parties throughout the country at the same time that Fujimori was
re-elected president in the 1995 national elections.28 Thus social expenditures
created personal loyalty to Fujimori, but not his party. The support continued
throughout the 2000 elections when, according to surveys, the president
retained a high degree of popularity among the poor.29
Nevertheless, during his presidency, Fujimori lacked the solid support
of the marginalised sectors that he had enjoyed at the time of his election
in 1990. Public opinion surveys showed that the poor voted for him because
of his personal qualities and his discourse, but disapproved of his neoliberal
policies and stopped short of calling themselves ‘fujimoristas’.30 The sym-
pathy of the lower classes for Fujimori was largely contingent on the failure
of the opposition to speak the language of the people or to take up popular
causes. Fujimori’s popularity among the poor also depended on state revenue
27
Kenneth Roberts and Moises Arce, ‘ Neoliberalism and Lower Class Voting Behavior in
Peru, ’ Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2 (April 1998), p. 220. Carlos Iván Degregori, La década
de la antipolı́tica : auge y huida de Alberto Fujmiori y Vladimiro Montesinos ( Lima, 2000), p. 71.
28
Carol Graham and Cheikh Kane, ‘ Opportunistic Government or Sustaining Reform ?
Electoral Trends and Public Expenditure Patterns in Peru, 1990–1995, ’ Latin American
Research Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (1998), pp. 67–104.
29
US News and World Report, 31 Jan. 2000, p. 34. Doris Sánchez (secretary of organisation of
Peru Posible party), personal interview, 10 July 2002, Lima.
30
Susan C. Stokes, ‘ Democratic Accountability and Policy Change : Economic Policy in
Fujimori’s Peru, ’ Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 2 ( Jan. 1997), p. 222; Maxwell A. Cameron,
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru : Political Coalitions and Social Change ( New York, 1994),
p. 50; Rocharbrún, ‘Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori ’, p. 24 ; Gregory D.
Schmidt, ‘ Delegative Democracy in Peru ? Fujimori’s 1995 Landslide and the Prospects for
2000,’ in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 107.
152 Steve Ellner
for social programmes. That activity, however, was by nature short-term. It
was curtailed once the money dried up with the phasing out of privatisation
and the nation’s economic contraction that set in after 1997. According to the
newspaper La República, the social programmes were designed as a ‘ quick fix ’,
a term particularly applicable to Fujimori’s electoral strategy.31
Unlike the case of Fujimori’s Peru, social polarisation characterised
Venezuelan politics from the outset of Chávez’s rise to power and steadily
deepened during his presidency. The pro- and anti-Chávez mobilisations in
2002 placed in evidence the degree to which the middle class was pitted against
the lower classes. The marches and rallies calling for Chávez’s ouster, which
became weekly occurrences before and after the 11 April coup attempt, were
held in the affluent eastern part of Caracas and attracted few slum-dwellers. In
contrast, most of the pro-government marches originated from the poorer,
western half of the city. The reaction of large numbers of slum dwellers to the
11 April coup showed that Chávez counted on considerable active support,
not just electoral or passive backing. On 13 April large numbers of poor
people, some of whom had walked ten to twenty miles due to the absence of
public transportation, surrounded the presidential palace and military bases
in Caracas and other cities to demand Chávez’s release from confinement.
The pacific nature of these mobilisations, and the personal danger that the
protesters faced because of the complete media blackout, reflect a high
degree of commitment among Chávez’s followers and a certain organisational
capacity on the part of the Chávez movement.
Chávez’s success in maintaining lower class support rested on the plausi-
bility of his anti-neoliberalism. The president’s leftist and labour critics
characterised his anti-neoliberal discourse as empty rhetoric and dema-
goguery, and pointed to his failure to design an anti-neoliberal programme.
If popularly perceived as true, this accusation would undoubtedly have un-
dermined the support of nonprivileged sectors, which according to polls
disapproved of neoliberal formulas.32 Although President Chávez undeniably
lacked a coherent economic programme, he halted nearly ten years of wide-
spread privatisation (in sharp contrast to the record of Fujimori, who some-
times claimed to be an ‘ anti-neoliberal’). Thus, the 1999 constitution prohibits
the sale of stock in the state oil company PDVSA and guarantees state control
of the social security system. Furthermore, Chávez favoured ‘ strategic as-
sociations ’ over privatisation, specifically in the case of the aluminium industry
and the shipyard company DIANCA.
31
Bruce H. Kay ‘‘‘ Fujipopulism ’’ and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990–1995, ’ Journal of Inter-
american Studies and World Affairs, vol. 38, no. 4 ( Winter 1996–1997).
32
Roberts, ‘Social Polarization and Popular Resurgence ’.
In one important aspect, the class backing of the Chávez movement may
end up resembling classical populism of the 1930s and 1940s more than
neopopulism of the 1990s. Scholars have pointed to the heyday of classical
populism and the initiation of import substitution policies in Latin America
as representing a critical juncture.33 Populist parties promoted the par-
ticipation of excluded sectors of the population, specifically peasants and
workers, in trade union, party, and state structures. The incorporation assured
that populist parties would retain the loyalty of large numbers of these fol-
lowers for an entire lifetime, and often for that of their children. The Chávez
movement has succeeded in attracting largely unincorporated members
of the marginalised class. Many of these chavista militants have overcome
their long-standing sense of exclusion by actively participating in the de-
fence of the regime and linking up with incipient structures – albeit much
more fragile than the burgeoning labour movement in the era of classical
populism.34 If the experience of classical populism is any indication, the
Chávez movement may retain the loyalty of these sectors for years to come.
Political party system

Venezuela’s near two-party system (based on AD and Copei) began to falter
in the 1990s when smaller parties made inroads, particularly at the local level.
After Chávez’s election in 1998, AD, Copei and other pro-establishment
parties receded from the political scene. Business organisations, the CTV and
the media, rather than parties of the opposition, played the major role in
articulating and channelling discontent when Chávez’s popularity plummeted
in 2001. The governing party failed to fill the vacuum created by the weakening
of traditional parties. From its inception, the MVR was conceived of as an
electoral front and not a disciplined organisation with ongoing societal links.35
Furthermore, the MVR went nearly unrepresented during Chávez’s first
presidency (1999–2000) in the cabinet and at the gubernatorial level. Con-
vinced that the MVR had succumbed to clientelistic practices and lacked
revolutionary fervour at the time of the radicalisation of the government
in 2001, Chávez announced his intentions to create parallel structures and
thus reactivated the MBR-200. In 2002 Chávez promoted the formation of
33
Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, 1991) ; Charles Bergquist, Labor in
Latin America : Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, 1986).
34
Steve Ellner, ‘ The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela : The First Year-and-a-Half
in Power, ’ Latin American Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 5 (Sept. 2001).
35
Margarita López Maya, ‘ The Movement and Presidency of Hugo Chávez Frı́as,’ in Steve
Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era : Class, Polarization and
Conflict ( Boulder, 2003), p. 82.
154 Steve Ellner
‘ Cı́rculos Bolivarianos’, although it was unclear whether they were designed
to serve as MVR cells or autonomous community organisations.
The fragility of the Peruvian political party system was put in evidence by
the sharp fluctuation in the electoral intake of major parties in the seven elec-
tions held between 1980 and 1990. After 1990, opposition parties lost further
credibility because they concentrated their efforts on disputing the legality of
Fujimori’s candidacy in 1995 and 2000, while neglecting socio-economic con-
cerns. During this period, the nation’s traditional, mass-based parties were
displaced by makeshift ones designed to further the presidential candidacies of
Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible), Luis Castañeda (Solidaridad Nacional) and
Alberto Andrade (Somos Perú), in addition to Fujimori. The weakening of
party loyalties was reflected in Congress where by 1999 the anti-government
group Union for Peru had lost ten of its seventeen members.36 As was the case
in Venezuela, the Peruvian governing party failed to fill the vacuum created
by the weakening of the parties of the opposition. Not only did Fujimori’s
party lack a presence at the local level, but it was not considered for top
presidential appointments. Indeed, Montesinos preferred to keep the party
at bay in order to avoid the emergence of a rival centre of power.37 When
Fujimori’s protégé Jaime Yoshiyama was defeated in Lima’s mayoral race of
1996, the pro-government camp had no prominent leader as candidate for
the 2000 presidential elections other than the president himself.38
Thus a weak political party system characterised both Peru and Venezuela
and explains the relative ease with which Fujimori and Chávez carried out
thoroughgoing political changes at the outset of their rule. In both nations, the
traditional parties had lost vitality over the previous decade. In subsequent
years the opposition continued to lose credibility because it failed to formulate
alternative socio-economic policies, nor did it engage in self-criticism re-
garding its past failures.
Nevertheless, the decline of the political party system during Fujimori’s ten-
year rule was more pronounced than in Venezuela under Chávez. Only the
APRA party somewhat surprisingly reemerged in Peru after Fujimori left
office. In contrast, Venezuela’s political parties gradually began to recover
following their electoral defeats of 2000. As a result of the errors committed by
36
David Scott Palmer, ‘Democracy and its Discontents in Fujimori’s Peru ’, Current History,
vol. 99, no. 634 ( Feb. 2000), p. 65 ; Rolando Ames, Enrique Bernales, Sinesio López and
Rafael Roncagliolo, Situación de la democracia en el Perú (2000–2001) ( Lima, 2001), p. 131.
37
Julio Cotler, ‘La gobernabilidad en el Perú: entre el autoritarismo y la democracia, ’ in Cotler
and Romeo Grompone, El fujimorismo : ascenso y caida de un régimen autoritario ( Lima, 2000),
p. 37.
38
Martı́n Tanaka, ‘ Perú, 1980–2000 : ¿Crónica de una muerte anunciada ? Determinismo,
voluntarismo, actores y poderes estructurales, ’ Conference ‘ Advances and Setbacks in the
Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America ’. Notre Dame University, 23–24 April
2001, p. 17.
the political independents who led the abortive April 2002 coup, the parties
insisted on playing a more central role in the struggle to oust Chávez. Three
types of political organisation played a central role : traditional parties such as
AD and MAS; new parties with new leaderships such as Union and Justice
First; and parties formed by ex-AD and Copei leaders such as Antonio
Ledezma (former mayor of Caracas), Manuel Rosales (governor of Zulia),
Carlos Navarro (former CTV secretary general), and Agustı́n Berrios (former
Copei leader). Unlike the Peruvian labour movement that was nearly deci-
mated under Fujimori, the CTV led by two AD labour leaders played a key
role in the struggle against Chávez.
Venezuela’s MVR party was more complex and institutionalised than
its Peruvian counterparts. While Chávez’s MVR had internal currents with
distinct programmatic orientations,39 Fujimori’s parties were completely per-
sonalistic and lacking in ideological debate and prominent leaders. Finally, the
pro-government mobilisations in Peru usually consisted of rallies for electoral
purposes and inaugurations of public works projects that featured the presi-
dent as speaker. This was not always the case in Venezuela, as was demon-
strated on 13 April 2002 when chavistas surrounded the presidential palace and
military bases to demand Chávez’s return to power. Other mobilisations were
tenuously linked to the MVR. Thus, for example, student takeovers of the
Central University in early 2001, violent protests against the August 2002
supreme court decision absolving military coup leaders, and diverse land
invasions were all justified or encouraged by some chavista leaders, while others
(including Chávez himself) expressed caution and outright opposition.40 In
short, the institutional barrenness of Peru under Fujimori resembled that
of traditional caudillos. In contrast, the more institutionally complex scenario
in Venezuela included diverse organised currents within the MVR and a
greater mobilisation capacity on the part of both pro and anti-government
blocs.
Relations with the United States

The USA displayed a critical and at times hostile attitude toward Chávez from
the moment he launched his presidential candidacy for the 1998 elections and
the State Department denied his request for a visa. Indeed, Washington had
39
Steve Ellner and Fred Rosen ‘ Chavismo at the Crossroads : Hardliners, Moderates and a
Regime under Attack, ’ in NACLA : Report on the Americas, vol. 35, no. 6 (May–June 2002).
40
The takeover of the Central University, for instance, was harshly criticised by Chávez’s
university spokesman Luis Fuenmayor for lacking legitimacy and community support and
representing a heavy political cost for the government. Similarly, Chávez attempted to
discourage land takeovers by excluding squatters from the benefits granted by the agrarian
reform.
156 Steve Ellner
good reason to oppose the Chávez government, and view with favour the
coup attempt of 11 April 2002. In the first place, Chávez played an activist
role in OPEC with the aim of strengthening oil prices, for which purpose
he visited Iraq, Iran and Libya on several occasions. His government also
opposed US-sponsored resolutions in international bodies and so, for ex-
ample, voted against censorship of China, Cuba and Iran for human rights
violation. Furthermore, Chávez’s rhetoric in favour of a ‘ multi-polar world ’
implied rejection of US hegemony including Washington’s proposals for a
hemispheric union. Finally, his staunch defence of national sovereignty led
him to turn down US requests to fly drug interdiction missions in Venezuelan
space as well as Washington’s offer to send the Army Corps of Engineers
following the devastating floods in the state of Vargas in December 1999.
Chávez’s discourse in favour of a multi-polar world and in opposition to
the neoliberal-based Washington Consensus coincided with the groundswell
of anti-globalisation sentiment at the international level. Indeed, his stands on
these issues represented a possible future point of reference in Latin America.
Chávez’s foreign policy would have undoubtedly had less appeal ten years
earlier at a time when world-wide acceptance of neoliberalism had reached an
apex, as did US supremacy with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet bloc.
Although Chávez’s nationalist positions were a throwback to the third-world
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, they were unique in the Latin American
setting of the 1990s. This novelty contributed to the notion that Chávez was
striking out in new directions, thus enhancing the possibility that chavismo
would retain its appeal regardless of the outcome of the Chávez presidency.
Unlike the relative consistency of its attitude toward the Chávez govern-
ment, Washington reversed itself twice in its relations with Fujimori; these
turnabouts reflected the contradictory thrust of Fujimori’s neopopulist re-
gime. As a result of his neoliberal policies, Fujimori secured the approval
of international lending agencies following the autogolpe in 1992, which was
thoroughly condemned by nations throughout the world including the USA.
Fujimori defended the coup by arguing that the USA failed to comprehend
Peru’s predicament of Sendero Luminoso-sponsored terrorism, which made
necessary the interruption of constitutional guarantees.41 Subsequently,
Fujimori authorised US-piloted surveillance missions in the Amazonian
region to combat drug trafficking (in contrast to Chávez’s rejection of DEA-
sponsored flights) and as a result coca export was largely checked. Neoliberal
policies, the all-out war on terrorism, and collaboration with the DEA all
explain the harmonious relations with the USA during the remainder of
Fujimori’s first term and most of the second.
41
Cotler, ‘ La gobernabilidad en el Perú ’, pp. 32–3.
Nevertheless, following Fujimori’s re-election in 1995, Montesinos con-
solidated his hold over the Peruvian state and cases of corruption, complicity
with drug traffickers, and human rights violations reached the public. These
incidents culminated in 2000 with the scandal over the sale of arms originating
from Jordan to Colombian guerrillas. An additional source of irritation for
the USA was Fujimori’s backtracking from his commitment to market re-
forms, and his explicit criticism of neoliberalism for electoral purposes during
the 2000 presidential campaign. Some scholars attribute Fujimori’s exit from
power to USA pressure rather than to the resistance of political parties of the
opposition or to popular mobilisations, which were in any case poorly
organised.42
The US reconsideration of its relations with Fujimori put in evidence
the contradictory components of neopopulist governments: neoliberalism,
populism, the electoral road to power, initial widespread popular support,
and hyperpresidentialism. The populist features of the Fujimori government
became increasingly salient toward the end of his rule and prompted the USA
to reverse its position. This tendency included state interventionism in the
economy and clientelism, which was conducive to corruption and duplicity
in the war against drug trafficking. Another dimension that the USA could not
ignore was the Fujimori government’s increasingly visible authoritarian orien-
tation. In short, neopopulism (even more than classical populism) was subject
to acute internal contradictions, thus explaining Washington’s reformulation
of its policy toward Fujimori and the brief duration of the movement of those
who supported his government.
Conclusion
The first scholarly writing in the mid-1990s on the resurgence of Latin
American populism set off a conceptual debate among political scientists.
Theoretical discussion centred on whether the definition of populism should
take in a wide diversity of features ranging from class following and economic
policy to leadership qualities. Writers who defended the affirmative position
argued against applying the concept of populism to contemporary govern-
ments in Latin America, which fell short of meeting these varied require-
ments.43 Although regimes such as that of Fujimori and Menem resembled
classical populism of the 1930s and 1940s in some respects, they lacked several
essential characteristics including a popularly accepted economic programme
42
Cotler, Drogas y polı́tica en el Perú: la conexión norteamericana ( Lima, 1999).
43
Anı́bal Quijano, ‘Populismo, representación y Menemismo, ’ in Felipe Burano de Lara (ed.),
El fantasma del populismo (Caracas, 1998). See also, Paul W. Drake, ‘ Conclusion: Requiem for
Populism?, ’ in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective
(Albuquerque, 1982).
158 Steve Ellner
and a mobilisation strategy. A second school, which labelled the Fujimori and
Menem governments populist, rejected this position as ‘conceptual con-
servatism ’ and as purist. Kurt Weyland, one of the school’s leading members,
proposed a ‘minimal procedural ’ definition of populism that had proved
fruitful for political scientists in describing the emergence of democratic
regimes during the previous decade. Weyland and others considered populism
a predominately ‘political strategy ’, and thus discarded socio-economic fac-
tors as extrinsic to the phenomenon’s definition.44
This article avoids such a definitional debate and has instead employed a
comparative approach in order to determine the importance of neopopulism
as a model followed by Latin American leaders. It has examined develop-
ments since the publication of the original works on neopopulism in the mid-
1990s in order to evaluate the viability not only of neopopulist governments
but also of neopopulist movements and strategies. The contrast between
Fujimori, who lacked a movement of hard-core followers, and Chávez, who
counted on such backing, is designed to shed light on the long-term prospects
of neopopulism and the continued relevance of certain aspects of classical
populism.
In the mid-1990s political scientists pointed out that neopopulist govern-
ments were not likely to be stable, but it was noted that at least the cases of
Menem and Fujimori demonstrated long-term potential.45 This article con-
cludes that the position of neopopulist leaders was even more fragile than
scholars recognised at the time. For instance, the Argentine economic crisis
of 2001–2 has been attributed to the Menem regime’s fiscal irresponsibility,
including the social programmes that represented a basic prop of the neo-
populist strategy. Furthermore, revelations about the Fujimori government
during his later years in office and since then have called its democratic
credentials sharply into question. These shortcomings and failures place in
doubt the political future of both leaders as well as the long-term impact of
neopopulism.
The real issue is not the duration of neopopulist governments but the
survival of neopopulist movements. That Fujimori, the neopopulist leader
who lasted the longest in office, failed to maintain a political presence once he
was forced out of power, suggests that the neopopulist model is less important
than previously appeared to be the case. The contrast with classical populism
could not be greater. Classical populist leaders could boast of having initiated
an economic model of major consequence, having incorporated large num-
bers of workers into the nation’s political life through the labour movement,
44
Kurt Weyland, ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept : Populism in the Study of Latin American
Politics, ’ Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. 1 (Oct. 2001), pp. 8, 9, 18.
45
Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America, ’ p. 398; Roberts, ‘Populism and
Democracy in Latin America ’.
and having created parties that also lasted for decades. Most of these parties
eventually abandoned their far-reaching goals, accepted clientelism as a modus
operandi, and became completely institutionalised, thus ceasing to be populist,
as Weyland points out.46 However, such a process was gradual, encompassing
several decades. If neopopulism cannot claim a similar set of accomplish-
ments, then it can hardly be assigned the same degree of importance as
classical populism.
Fujimori’s political decision-making and strategies invariably obeyed
short-term considerations. This proved successful in a period of economic
expansion and policy-making achievements, but backfired when economic
contraction set in.47 Some of the defects of this approach were evident in the
mid-1990s and were acknowledged by scholars writing on neopopulism, while
other shortcomings became increasingly conspicuous with Fujimori’s sub-
sequent political decline.
The short-term thrust of Fujimori’s strategies expressed itself on many
fronts. In the first place, the government’s social programme was financed
from the proceeds of privatisation, which dwindled during Fujimori’s second
presidential period. These allocations based on electoral considerations, like
the ‘targeted programmes ’ against dire poverty promoted by neoliberals,48
were by nature short-term. In the second place, Fujimori, whose actions were
invariably informed by public opinion surveys,49 used gimmicks to bolster
his popularity at key moments. This consideration may have influenced the
timing of the conflict with Ecuador in 1995 and the capture of top Sendero
guerrillas. While successful at first in boosting Fujimori’s poll ratings, a large
number of Peruvians soon began to perceive these actions as manipulative. In
the third place, Fujimori made no effort to build a political party that would
have provided neopopulism a long-term presence in Peru. As a result, the
political benefits of clientelism, which was basic to the government’s social
programmes, were minimised. The extreme personalism that substituted pol-
itical party rule was prone to generate corruption, thus eventually discrediting
Fujimori and his discourse stressing personal honesty. A cohesive political
party may have organised and incorporated members of the marginalised
sectors in order to convert tenuous sympathy for Fujimori into fervent and
long-lasting support.
Despite his similarities with traditional Latin American demagogues and
caudillos, Fujimori displayed political adroitness and originality ; his approach
46
Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America, ’ p. 14.
47
Classical populists such as Juan Domingo Perón and Rómulo Betancourt, who reached
power in the 1940s at a time when their nation counted on abundant resources, faced a
similar dynamic.
48
Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America, ’ p. 398.
49
John Crabtree and Jim Thomas (eds.), El Perú de Fujimori ( Lima, 1999), p. 63.
160 Steve Ellner
clearly distinguished him from dictators such as Pinochet, who was an un-
qualified authoritarian, pro-neoliberal and primarily backed by the middle
class. Most important, Fujimori maintained considerable lower class support
in spite of the government’s neoliberal policies. This backing explains the
massive turnout at Fujimori’s electoral gatherings during the 2000 presidential
campaign and his front-runner status according to reliable polls.50 Further-
more, Fujimori’s divergence from neoliberalism was more than nominal. His
social programmes, which reached the remote highland areas, created tensions
with multilateral lending agencies that preferred to use privatisation money
to pay off the foreign debt.51 Fujimori’s appeal to anti-neoliberal sentiment
also strained relations with technocrats such as Minister of Finance Carlos
Boloña (who compared himself with his Argentine counterpart Domingo
Cavallo – whose differences within the Menem administration led him to form
his own political party).52
In short, the strategy pursued by Fujimori diverged from traditional auth-
oritarian regimes that imposed austere economic measures on the popu-
lation. Those political scientists who write off the neopopulist phenomenon
as demagoguery fail to recognise the novel aspects of Fujimori’s approach.
Although the long-term importance of the neopopulist phenomenon should
not be overdrawn, the uniqueness of Fujimori’s political strategies cannot be
denied, nor the appropriateness of the term neopopulism.
The political movement led by Hugo Chávez, like those of the classical
populists in the 1930s and 1940s, is likely to leave an indelible mark on the
political life of the nation. Most important, large numbers of the marginalised
class consider the chavista movement to be theirs, and identify with its stated
goals and visions. If the experience of organised workers in the heyday of
classical populism is any indication, the incorporation of these excluded
sectors in activist structures, albeit rudimentary, will guarantee long-time
political loyalty. In addition, Chávez has created a political party and a coalition
that are likely to form part of the nation’s political landscape for some time
to come. Nevertheless, the high degree of polarisation in Venezuela is a
double edged-sword. It generates fervent loyalty to Chávez, with long-term
implications, at the same time as it intensifies rejection for the president
among influential sectors, limiting his options and the possibility of achieving
stability.
50
Romero Grompone, ‘ El Fujimorismo como proyecto inconcluso, ’ in Cotler and Grom-
pone, El Fujimorismo, p. 125.
51
Nelson Manrique, ‘The Two Faces of Fujimori’s Rural Policy, ’ NACLA : Report on the
Americas, vol. 30, no. 1 ( July–Aug. 1996), pp. 42–3.
52
Carlos Boloña Behr, De Paniagua a Toledo : de la confusión al caos ( Lima, 2002), p. 58; Cotler,
‘ La gobernabilidad en el Perú,’ p. 45.
Political scientists and actors have pointed to the Chávez movement’s
authoritarian and demagogic tendencies, its failure to promote institution-
alisation, and its actions depriving civil society of autonomy and an inde-
pendent mobilisation capacity. These characteristics would place in doubt
the ability of the chavistas to participate efficaciously in a democratic setting
according to the rules of the game over an extended period. Nevertheless,
when Chávez’s brand of populism is placed alongside neopopulism, and the
Fujimori regime in particular, these characteristics appear to be less severe. In
spite of a dangerous degree of military autonomy and cases of ‘ low intensity’
repression, the government generally refrained from using force against an
extremely aggressive opposition. At the same time, the chavistas drafted the
constitution of 1999 with the aim of deepening the nation’s democracy. Finally,
the chavista movement was not at all monolithic. The mobilisations conducted
in its name were not always externally controlled ; and internal factions such
as the Chavista labour branch sometimes embraced positions that the rest
of the movement did not officially endorse.53 These features indicate a degree
of complexity that is more compatible with the democratic system than is the
extreme personalism characteristic of neopopulism. In a similar vein, classical
populist movements in the 1930s and 1940s maintained close ties with fac-
tions within the military and were often accused of being demagogic, un-
democratic, and anti-institutionalist, but they also made lasting contributions
to their nation’s democracy.
The principal overlap of the Fujimori and Chávez phenomena is their
special appeal to the marginalised class. Unlike in the case of Fujimori,
Chávez’s exclusive social base was the marginalised sectors, which provided
him with active support that was crucial for his political survival. The mo-
bilisation capacity of the marginalised class, and specifically its response to
the coup of 11 April 2002, had no equivalent under Fujimori’s rule.
Political analysts need to explore in detail the relations between the mar-
ginalised sectors, on the one hand, and Chávez and Fujimori, on the other.
Specific features worthy of exploration include paternalist ties, attitudes
toward the positions upheld by both leaders, and levels of participation and
incorporation (such as the highly polemical, but little known, Cı́rculos Boli-
varianos). The ‘ bottom up ’ methodological approach of labour historians
who have explored the reaction of unionised workers to classical populist
movements of the 1930s and 1940s needs to be applied now to the margin-
alised sectors in Latin America.54 Such research focusing on the era of
53
Steve Ellner, ‘Organized Labor and the Challenge of Chavismo, ’ in Ellner and Daniel
Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict ( Boulder,
2003), pp. 169–71.
54
See, for example, Daniel James, Doña Marı́a’s Story : Life, History, Memory and Political Identity
(Durham, NC, 2000).
162 Steve Ellner
globalisation would test the accuracy of long-held stereotypes that portray the
marginalised class as susceptible to paternalistic relationships and authori-
tarianism,55 politically volatile, and revolutionary.56 Given the marginalised
class’s political independence vis-à-vis workers of the formal economy in
recent years, and the importance it has assumed under Chávez, Fujimori and
other populist governments in Latin America, such a study is of paramount
importance.
55
Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism ( New Brunswick, 1978),
pp. 153–208.
56
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1963).

The Contrasting Variants of The Populism of Hugo Cha Vez and Alberto Fujimori

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Contrasting Variants of The Populism of Hugo Cha Vez and Alberto Fujimori

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

J. Lat. Amer. Stud.

35, 139–162 f 2003 Cambridge University Press 139

The Contrasting Variants of the

Steve Ellner is Professor of History at the Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela.

The Optimistic–Pessimistic Continuum

Discourse and style

Authoritarian tendencies and unethical behaviour

Political party system

Relations with the United States

You might also like