[G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989.

]
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
(SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING.
— While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, they
are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. — Government employees may, therefore, through their
unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of those which are not fixed by law.
3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ARE PART THEREOF AND COVERED BY
MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. — SSS employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180; ALLOWS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO
NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY
LAW. — E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees,
allows negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law.
5. ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT ARE GOVERNED BY LAW;
EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE CHANGES. — Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by
law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
6. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; STRIKES; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE STAGED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES; REASONS. — An injunction may be issued to restrain it. It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the
subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that
terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with
jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN SAID
STRIKE; REASON. — The Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue
writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has
jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT PROPER WHERE COURT CANNOT BE
ACCUSED OF IMPRUDENCE OR OVERZEALOUSNESS AS IT PROCEEDED WITH CAUTION. — The lower Court
cannot be accused of imprudence or zealousness, for after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the
parties to refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.
9. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; WHEN REMEDY OF PETITIONER. — Petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the order of the Merit Systems Promotion
Board if it has already become final.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security
System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work.
Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of
the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-24].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition,
reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22, 1987, in a four-page order,
the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a
bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83-86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on
March 9, 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court
of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29, 1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No.
97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied
in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-143]. Hence, the instant petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6, 1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners
from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners,
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS
and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of
Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered
by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.
Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may
be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing
with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred is
finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
case and enjoined the strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from
continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim.
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public
sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil
Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[t]he right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this amendment providing for
self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they also
have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to
form associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of
the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that could be done
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that
provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned
and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-
President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.
That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice
because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow
anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike?
What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social
Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (PAD. 442) in
1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental
functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of employment in the
Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to
be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not
impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of employees of
government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in
the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg.
70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service
Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the
President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress."
The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees . . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the
absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as
implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at
issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS
was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403,
August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private
sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in the Government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace
Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor
unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars,
rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar
character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the
private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting
interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom
they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134
SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, while
clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions
of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may
be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the
public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly
refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers
in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction
may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC
and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees
[Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ
prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law
authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the
NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. LibLex
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution.
Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of
public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for
appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and
supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual
petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to restrain
the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental
reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers
of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the
administrative cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and
affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become
final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13, 1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, [July 28, 1989], 256 PHIL
1079-1091)

[G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.]

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J p:
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As
such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement."
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee
presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his
resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union
security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d)
and (e). 2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its
decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to
pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action." 3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law, assigning the following
errors:
"I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
"II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees
and the cost thereof."
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the Act
infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350,
that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation
with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if
such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts
in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop
provision," the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives
the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act
unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that "no religious test shall
be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for
purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that
conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor
organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws" clause of the
Constitution, it being a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of closed shop
agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow
workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same
time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the
employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12 and
that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor
organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form
lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right
by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the obligation
of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that
the Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in
enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members
from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an
individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has
primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate
the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their
religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies to all the
members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said
Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their
religious beliefs. 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to premise that there are some
thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains
in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does
not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects
that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording
of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising,
therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to
the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of
the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article n of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories
propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely
said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or
freedom, i e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he
choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he
still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. 20 It is
clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what
both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to
join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the
employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however,
limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the
duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to
keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said
employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when
it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic
Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit
the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and
the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them
from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,
does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract,
specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by
virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees
workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted of June 18, 1961,
and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment,
Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a
member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his
disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security
clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing
only Union members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of
said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract, or its legal
construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the
change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its
obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by
law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts,
derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The
prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must
be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which
otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not
only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to
safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a
contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate
exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This
has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual,
and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state
involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the
obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been
enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of
the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick,
applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or
determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation
impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the
people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted
must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the
constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of
belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of
religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory
and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their
own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group
strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is
confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the
individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights,
and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third
aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining
relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859,
which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his religious beliefs and
convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job.
This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. The
law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any
labor organization, Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest
means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief." 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the
members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has
also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a
preferred position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental
personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore,
must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that
said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1(7) of Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without. discrimination and preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has
been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is
invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded from pursuing
valid objectives secular ID character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has
likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these
criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of
religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal.
It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by
averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work
and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its
citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a
valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and
regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is
mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and
employers." 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate
force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the
exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The
"establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been
interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional
provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union
security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is
certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict
with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to,
and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights
to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.
As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the
validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain members of a union to
keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions. Congress has seen
it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a labor union -
assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a
religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a
qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits Its members from joining a labor union
as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union
requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage
of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the
right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A
conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union
— he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How
then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was
legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition
to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants
to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III
of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be made
with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and
workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious
beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in
labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is
such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same
religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and canons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and
practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond
imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are
diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the
country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are
important and should not be ignored.
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important differences. Religious
beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and
are the motives of certain rules of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a
man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive-character, its tone, its
happiness, or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a
religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion,
or their not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may
consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the
one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the
inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large
extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic
Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid
those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and
from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an
employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor
unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision.
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act
unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed
shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by
their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently
situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed
by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply
because in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent
from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be
obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals
beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice is
also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes
that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor
unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any
particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is
sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-
relations of the members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a
religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer.
The Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot
join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements, and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership
in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply social
equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective
proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily
premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of
opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for - in
other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is
not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the
courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do
inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand
and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by
appellant that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious sects
that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The
threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the
demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot
judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis
for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the
validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued that the decision of the trial
court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for
the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the
exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company;
that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually
dismissed by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all. 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was really no industrial
dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal,
and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute
an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and
2208 of the Civil Code.73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by appellant provides that:
"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a labor organization or any officer or
member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which
it is a party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it
is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of
some other person to dispose of his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent
by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of
employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself.
It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be
"an act done . . . in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not
necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot
invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case
existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article provides that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff . . . to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid
that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being
dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.
It is so ordered.
||| (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-25246, [September 12, 1974], 158 PHIL 60-99)

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD - 1).
SYNOPSIS
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the
latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent's
name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions
the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing
that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the
police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for
non-payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held
as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A
VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress in
enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a
desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil.
218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING
ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of
law.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of
the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is
indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME
COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. The power
of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and
a lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due
notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J p:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove
cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil
"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar
of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526
and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on
Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable' . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is
the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act ( Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, " it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said:
The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here,
the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
||| (In re: Edillon, A.C. No. 1928 (Resolution), [August 3, 1978], 174 PHIL 55-68)