CASE 1: CAYETANO V.
MONSOD As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991}
FACTS:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of
the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by
Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to
meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman
of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at
least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for
one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in
economics and held various positions in various foreign
corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs
for various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the
COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as
business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day
the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes,
legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means
will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the
following criteria in determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term “practice of law” implies customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term “practice of law” (ErnaniPaño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People
v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term “practice
of law”. (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he
performed activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting
legal documents and giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated
incidents.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his
father’s law office. The Chairman of the COMELEC should have
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for ten years
requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and
attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past,
they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsod’s track record which will show that
he Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead
of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one
adviced and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
CASE 2: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. AGRAVA
G.R No. L-12426
FACTS:
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to
cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. The Philippine Lawyers Association, on the contrary, contends
that while they are already equipped with the necessary legal skills and
training, they are no longer required to take an examination to qualify
practice before the Patent Office.
In his answer, he said, that patent cases “does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a
matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled
not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office x xx”. Further he contends
that because RA 165 otherwise known as our ‘Patent Law’ is similar to
that of the United States’ which allows the Director to formulate
examinations, then the same should be granted to his position.
ISSUE:
W/N Lawyers of good repute and standing are qualified to
practice patent cases
W/N the Patent Director is legally authorized to hold
examinations under RA 165
RULING:
On the first issue, yes. Lawyers are qualified to practice before
patent courts. The court ruled, although the transaction of business in
the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
conducted and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents have
to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office
in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. Also, Sec. 61 of RA
165 states that any ruling of the office may be appealed to the Supreme
Court. This gives the intention that ifthe transaction of business in the
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
On the second issue, no. The Patent Director is not legally
authorized. He is gravely mistaken in contending that the Patent Law of
the Philippines is patterned and similar as that of the United States.
Section 78 of RA 165 reads:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise
and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form
of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point.Nowhere in such provision
can we logically infer that the same allows the Patent Director to hold
examinations to determine eligibility to practice, other than what is
mandated, to promulgate rules and regulations.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of
the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in
good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.|||
CASE 3: PP VS SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the
municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended
party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case.
Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the
opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he
said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
RULING:
No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it
for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given
credence.
CASE 4 CUI V. CUI
FACTS: The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution
established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for
the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate existence by
legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management
to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed
to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent
administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant
to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a
notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the
“convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his
brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him.
When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower
court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE: Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD: Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the
test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among
the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer
(titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio
Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although
disbarred in 1957, was REINSTATED BY RESOLUTION, about
two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of
certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the
legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations
has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school
or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lawyer, first of all, because
in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be
a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against
defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact
that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and
unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was
reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof
no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.
CASE NO. 5 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTERAUL
ALMACEN, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY.
FACTS: An irate Atty. Almacen, Legal Counsel of the Defendant in a
legal Case entitled Antonio H. Calero,Vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, filed
a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," in protest against
what he asserted as "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." In the said case, Atty. Almacen filed an appeal at the
Court of Appeals (CA) after the lower court rendered judgment against
his client. The CA denied repeatedly Atty. Almacen’s motions and
dismissed the case. He later filed a Petition for certiorari at the Supreme
Court (SC) which refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. His further appeals for reconsideration were also
denied. At this, Atty. Almacen got disappointed and filed the
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," (with
reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain
our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession). He also caused the publication in
the Manila Times an article assailing the SC as “composed of men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.” Through the Petition and the publication,
Atty. Almacen expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title
by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court
"will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions”. In the exercise of its
inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, the SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Atty.
Almacen replied, but neither showed remorse nor any sign of apology.
ISSUE: Whether or not atty. Almacen deserves to be disciplined by the
Supreme Court on the ground of gross misconduct for assailing the
integrity of the court in a disrespectful manner; and showing no remorse
for his acts.
HELD: Atty. Almacen deserves to be disciplined. As such, the court
suspended him. A critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort.
And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness,
real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness
and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy.
“ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law
until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
CASE 6: IN RE: DE GUZMAN 55 SCRA 139
FACTS:
In a Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Jesus de Veyra rendered a decision. Upon receipt of copy of the
decision, the Court in its Resolution required Atty. Felizardo de Guzman
to answer and complied thereafter. The matter was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. At the
hearing conducted where only Atty. De Guzman appeared despite due
notice. LagrimasLapatha filed with the Court of First instance of Manila
a “Petition for Relief from Judgement, Orders, & other Proceedings in
the Inferior Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injuction.” In the Petition
it was alleged by petitioner that at the initial hearing, she appeared
without counsel; she approached Atty. de Guzman, and begged for a
five-day postponement to the trial to which he verbally agreed.
Atty. de Guzman then asked her to affix her signature on the court’s
“expediente” and after signing she left. She was surpiresed to receive a
copy of a decision from the City Court that states she confessed
judgement.
Vicente Floro filed his answer and alleged that the decision of
the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by
petitioner. Judge Veyra rendered his decision in favour of petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N the findings of Judge de Veyra were not only left
unsubstantiated at the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General's
Office for failure of said witnesses to appear notwithstanding due notice,
but that they were satisfactorily controverted by the evidence submitted
by respondent at said hearing.
HELD: the complaint is dismissed and respondent is exonerated of the
charge.
RULING:
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the
evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed any
deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of
Manila. It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis for suspension
or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established
by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case
which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The
dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof
must be clearly demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary
is proved, and as an officer of the court, that he has performed his duty
in accordance with his oath. Thus, the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against a respondent attorney.
CASE 7:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO vs. SEVERINO MARTINEZ
FACTS:
In 1953, Telesforo A. Diao successfully passed the bar examinations
and was admitted to the bar. After two years, Severino Martinez charged
him for false representation as he had not satisfied the academic
requirements, namely: High school training Required pre-legal
education – that he never attended Quisimbing College and never
obtained his A.A. diploma there from.
ARGUMENTS:
He admitted the first charge but said that he entered U.S. Army and
passed the General Qualifications Test there and it is equivalent to high
school diploma. Upon return to civilian life, authorities considered his
army service equivalent to 3rd and 4th year high school. He obtained his
A.A. diploma from Arellano University in April 1949 but due to
confusion, he was erroneously certified as graduate of Quisimbing
College.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diao can still practice law and continue as member of
bar for passing the required examination despite failure to satisfy
required pre-law requirements?
HELD: NO. The Clerk was ordered to strike his name from the roll of
attorneys.
 Explanation:
o First charge is doubtful but Supreme Court deal
more with the second charge. It said that, “Had
his application disclosed his having obtained
A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then
he would not have been permitted to take the bar
tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm
under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed
by the Department of Private Education,"
 Passing the examination is immaterial because it is not
the only qualification to be admitted in the bar, taking the
prescribed pre-legal education is equally essential.
#8 ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN JR. VS. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO
FACTS: Simbillo advertised himself as an “Annulment of Marriage
Specialist.” These advertisements appearedin the July 5, 2000 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar
advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and
6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000. In September 1,
2000, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of
legal services, filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan. Simbillo’s
advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and
violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. Simbillo professed
repentance and beg for the Court’s indulgence, this rings hollow as he
again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads
Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court
RULINGS: Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138,
section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the
practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely
HELD: Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one
year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely Ratio: The practice of law
is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money is the primary consideration Reasoning:Rule 2.03 - A lawyer
shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.— A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candour, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” and by
this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage —encouraging
people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation
of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession
CASE 17: PEOPLE VS DE LUNA 102 PHIL 986
FACTS:
A group of bar flunkers filed a petition for admission in the bar
which was eventually denied by the Supreme Court through a
resolution. Defendant-appellee Eustacio de Luna and other bar flunkers
of the 1946 to 1952 bar examinations took the lawyer’s oath in a notary
public when they failed in the bar examinations by relying on Republic
Act No. 972, also known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, while
knowing that it has already been declared unconstitutional. A case was
filed against the defendants for the crime of contempt of court.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
since according to Rule 64 section 4 of Rules of Court, “Where the
contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or
against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such
superior court.” The Court of First Instance granted the motion to
dismiss. The case has been brought to the Supreme Court upon Petition.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction
over the case.
2) Whether or not the facts alleged do not constitute the crime
of contempt of court.
RULING:
1) Yes. The defendants performed an act that impeded the
administration of justice of not just the Supreme Court but
also all courts. Hence, by applying the Rule 64 section 4, the
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the crime of
contempt of courts. Also, the resolution passed by the
Supreme Court shows no intention of exercising its
jurisdiction over the case.
2) Yes. The defendants were already notified when the
Supreme Court denied their petition for admission through
its resolution. Yet they still did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and contemptuously disobey the said Resolution
of the Supreme Court which already constitute a crime of
contempt of court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed.
CASE 18: UI V. BONIFACIO
Legal and Judicial Ethics
FACTS:
 Complainant filed an administrative case for disbarment against
respondent for having an illicit relationship with her husband.
 The said illicit relationship between respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio and Carlos Ui, complainant Leslie Ui’s husband, was
alleged to have produced two children. The two were wed in
Hawaii in 1985, two years after they met.
 Carlos Ui admitted to his wife Leslie the relationship, prompting
her to visit the respondent’s office where she confronted her and
introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos. She subsequently
told the respondent to end her relationship with Carlos.
 However, the affair continued, leading Leslie to file a complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio.
 The respondent, however, claimed that she was the victim in the
situation, saying that when she met Carlos Ui, he made himself
out to be a bachelor, but had children to an estranged Chinese
woman living in China. Moreover, she said that she and Carlos
never lived together and that their relationship was not illicit in
nature as they were married abroad.
 Respondent ended her relationship with Carlos Ui once she
found out his true civil status.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of
law
HELD:
 No. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred
for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding
more about Carlos Ui’s personal background prior to her
intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed
which should have at least aroused respondent’s suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
moved her to ask probing questions.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered as immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and to opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.
The respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from
Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention
of flaunting the law and the high moral standards of the legal
profession.
The SC dismissed the case.
CASE 23: IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
(Bar Matter No. 810, January 27, 1998)
FACTS:
In 1991, Arthur Cuevas, Jr. was one of the persons convicted with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide for the death of a neophyte
due to his participation in the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas,
a fraternity in the San Beda College of Law. He applied and was granted
probation to continue taking up law, and in 1995, he was discharged
from probation.
In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed him to take the Bar examinations
subject to the condition that should he pass, he shall not be allowed to
take the Lawyer’s Oath pending approval of the Court. Cuevas then
passed the 1996 bar exams and in May 5, 1997, he filed a petition before
the Supreme Court asking the Court to allow him to take the Lawyer’s
Oath
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath.
COURT DECISION: Yes. The practice of law is a privilege extended
only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of
undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been
admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. And Cuevas’
deliberate participation indicates absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar.
However, the Court was willing to give Cuevas a chance to take the
Lawyer’s Oath, considering that he was discharged from probation
without any infraction and with various certifications regarding his good
behavior. The Court was prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash.
The Court also stressed that the Lawyer’s Oath is not a mere formality
recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the
presence of select witnesses. Cuevas is expected to live strictly
according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a
lawyer he will be in a better position to render legal and other services
to the more unfortunate members of society.
CASE 24: MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
B.M. No. 553 June 17, 1993
EN BANC
FACTS:
The Legal Clinic, Inc. is engaged in the rendering of “legal
support services” through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines as contended by the former. It has claimed that
it is not engaged in the practice of law and that the latter be different
from that rendered by the corporation itself. Furthermore, in its
advertisements, as complained of by the petitioner, show that they are
unethical and demeaning of the law profession as they are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy by offering secret marriages and foreign divorce in the
Philippines.
The petitioner prays that Courts would restrain the respondent
from issuing advertisements similar to that raised at bar.
In considering the critical implications on the issue raised, the
Court has collected position papers to selected bar associations as
follows:
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
IBP wrote that “legal support services” vis-à-vis “legal services”
are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of the
name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives an impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal services. Furthermore, the advertisements in
question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy and that the Court
should perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice.
2. Philippine Bar Association (PBA)
PBA wrote that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court, but also includes out-of-court matters.
Furthermore, only natural persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation
employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association
The activities of the respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term as “the practice of law”
as it offers to the general public advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law and that it requires the application of
aforesaid laws.
4. Women Lawyers’ Circle
A lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then,
 is a lawyer qualified to practice of law. The general public
should also be protected from the dangers brought about by
advertising of legal services as in the case at bar, it was alleged
that the legal services are advertised not by lawyers but by
“paralegals”.
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines
The advertisement to solicit cases and cause the celebration of
secret marriages are illegal and immoral.
6. Federacion International de Abogadas
The respondent is not engaged in an “unlawful” practice of law
but an “unauthorized” one since services are rendered by non-
lawyers. It can be said that a person is engaged in a lawful calling
in the practice of law provided that the services performed are
not customarily reserved to members of the bar.
As for them, practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the services offered by respondent, as advertised
by it, constitutes practice of law.
2. Whether the same can be properly be the subject of
advertisement.
RULING:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, as advertised by it,
constitutes practice of law.
YES, the services offered constitute practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the practice of his
profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity:
a. Legal advice and instructions to client to inform them of their
rights and obligations
b. Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman
c. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law.
“Legal support services” basically consist of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that said function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real.
It should also be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals.
Whether the same can be properly be the subject of advertisement.
NO, the services offered cannot be subject of advertisement.
The cannons of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust which may be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct.
Although not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. There are those exceptions as follows:
a. Publication in reputable law lists
b. Use of an ordinary simple professional card and announcements
 Taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements of the respondent, it can be said that such do not fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The respondent is hereby warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding be dealt with more
severely.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who
can institute the corresponding quo warranto action. Accordingly, the
Court resolved to restrain and enjoin the respondent from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form.
CASE 32: MAGDALENA ARCIGA VS. SEGUNDINO
MANIWANG
FACTS: In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a
relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They
started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got
pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s
parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s parents believe
that they were already married but they would have to have the church
wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang
secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a
marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped
communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there
she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga
confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted
physical injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on
gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of
Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he
broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was
born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different
from the cases of MortelvsAspiras and Almirezvs Lopez, and other
cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much
discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme
Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been
defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community”.
CASE 34. IN RE: EDILLON (1978)
22 Oct 2017
Legal Ethics | IBP Dues| Delinquency| Disbarment| Practice of Law|
Privileges
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines. On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal
to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due
notices sent to him.
ISSUES:
 WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO
COMPEL HIM TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
 WHETHER THE PROVISION OF THE COURT RULE
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF A MEMBERSHIP FEE IS
VOID.
 WHETHER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PENALTY
PROVISIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO A DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AND HENCE
INFRINGES ON ONE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
 WHETHER THE POWER OF SC TO STRIKE THE NAME
OF A LAWYER FROM ITS ROLL OF ATTORNEYS IS
VALID.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion
is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the
respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys,
it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was
ordered to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
CASE 41: IN RE: SYCIP
[92 SCRA 1 July 30, 1979]
FACTS:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty.
HerminioOzaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through
this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued
use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is
no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies
the individual members of the firm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving partners may be allowed by the
court to retain the name of the partners who already passed away in the
name of the firm?
HELD:
No, the surviving partners may not be allowed to retain the
names. In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking
Corporation, the SC said: The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and
client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from
their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can
tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and
business corporations: A partnership for the practice of law is not a
legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying
on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, it has been stated
that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice
is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.