CONFIDENTIAL

FOR USE BY HSBC ONLY

IIM-A INTERNSHIP WORKSHOP

WIMWI Plc
Disclaimer: The attached case study has been prepared from company disclosures and other publicly available
sources of information. However, some information contained herein may have been fabricated for the purposes of
teaching. The information should not be used as a basis for taking a lending or investment decision.

Contents
 Background
 HSBC Relationship
 Objectives and Assignment
 Information on WIMWI plc
o Company Profile
o Five Year Record
 Sector Information
o Industry Overview – Food Retailing
o Peer Analysis

Background
WIMWI Plc is one of the case studies which will be used during the workshop today. Although
essentially a supermarket, the group has a variety of businesses and other analytic challenges
which make it more complex to assess.

HSBC Relationship: Excerpts from June 2019 Global Annual Review

A long-standing client of Global Banking with significant facilities both in the UK and Asia, which result in
us being the largest lender to WIMWI Plc within their 20 strong lender group. Our relationship continues to
be underpinned by our house bank status in the UK and Global Transaction Banker (GTB) status in
overseas territories where we continue to be the banker of choice. We also retain a good layer of dialogue
across multiple layers with WIMWI and we continue to believe we are WIMWI’s “go-to” bank for any
urgent / confidential / strategic funding as demonstrated by our recent Escrow role on the Joka
transaction. The relationship is relatively diverse and split across a number of products (GLCM, Debt, DCM,
Advisory, GTRF etc.).

Note: Outside of the core WIMWI’s business, HSBC has a relationship with/provide services to
WIMWI Bank and WIMWI Mobile.

Objectives and Assignment

The aim of this workshop is to familiarize yourself with the analysis of the Company’s operations
and the sector in which it operates. During the workshop we expect you to look in more detail at
the Company’s operating performance and funding strategy in order to evaluate the overall
credit standing and future outlook for the company.

 Macro environment and Sector

o What do you perceive to be the 3 – 4 key opportunities and threats presented by the
operating environment? Consider both macro-economic, competitive and any
regulatory issues.
o Critical Success Factors - what characteristics do companies in the sector need
to have to be successful?

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  Company specific
o Business model: what are the key strengths and weaknesses of the Company’s
business model?
o Critical success factors: How well positioned is the Company in the sector – does it
have those factors which are critical for success?
o Sustainability: does the Company appear to respect key social, environmental and
economic factors? How does this evidence itself and are there any specific concerns
in this regard?

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 WIMWI PLC
Company Profile
Disclaimer: The attached case study has been prepared from company disclosures and other publicly available
sources of information. However, some information contained herein may have been fabricated for the purposes of
workshop. The information should not be used for any purpose other HSBC Workshop.

Introduction
WIMWI is a U.K-based international supermarket retailer that also engages in retail banking. As
at 24 February 2018 (the company’s FYE) WIMWI operated 6,966 stores (including owned and
franchise) and had c. 449,000 full and part-time employees in 8 markets worldwide. WIMWI is
the largest supermarket in the UK where approximately half of its stores are located and c. 80%
of revenues are generated; it had a 27.6% market share in the UK grocery market as of March
2018. WIMWI’s other segment is WIMWI Bank, which provides retail banking and insurance
services to customers in the UK.

For the year ended February 2018, WIMWI generated sales of £57.5 billion (2017: £55.9
billion) and a trading profit of £1,644 million (2017: £1,280 million); it had a market
capitalisation of £23.7 billion at the end of February 2018 (2017: £19.0 billion).

Financial statistics (GBP m) 2014 2015R 2016 2017 2018

Retail revenue 62,554 55,978 53,478 54,905 56,440
% change (2.0%) (10.5%) (4.5%) 2.7% 2.8%
Bank revenue 1,003 947 955 1,012 1,051
% change (1.8%) (5.6%) 0.8% 6.0% 3.9%
Total group revenue 63,557 56,925 54,433 55,917 57,491
% change (2.0%) (10.4%) (4.4%) 2.7% 2.8%
Retail trading profit 3,121 752 782 1,123 1,471
Retail trading profit margin 5.0% 1.3% 1.5% 2.0% 2.6%
Bank trading profit 194 188 162 157 173
Group trading profit 3,315 940 944 1,280 1,644
Group trading profit margin 5.2% 1.7% 1.7% 2.3% 2.9%
*Operating profit margin 4.1% (10.1%) 1.9% 1.8% 3.2%
* Operating profit includes restructuring costs and profit arising from sale of fixed assets.

Retail Statistics 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Number of stores 7,305 6,642 6,665 6,809 6,966
Total sales area 000 sq. ft. 109,572 95,587 94,406 88,737 87,552
Avg. FTE employees 391,868 362,370 357,835 342,770 327,916
Revenue per employee 159.63 154.48 149.45 160.18 172.12
Sales per sq foot £ 571 586 566 619 645

NB: 2015 figures are restated to reflect the sale of the company’s Korean operations; stores and sales area do not
include franchise stores; number of stores include franchise stores

Retail Operations
WIMWI has two primary operations - Retailing and associated activities and Retail banking
and insurance services. Retailing and associated activities is further broken down into three
segments: UK and ROI, Central Europe and Asia. Prior to FY18, WIMWI’s retail division was
divided into two segments: UK & ROI and International; however, FY17 has been restated to
reflect the new reporting structure

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A breakdown of revenues and trading profits by division for FYE 2016 – 2018 can be seen
below:
2016 2017 2018
Revenue Trading Profit Revenue Trading Profit Revenue Trading Profit
GBP m Margin GBP m Margin GBP m Margin
UK & ROI 43,256 1.2% 43,524 1.8% 44,908 2.3%
Europe 6,195 0.9% 6,585 1.8%
Asia* 10,222 2.7% 5,186 5.1% 4,947 6.0%
Total 53,478 1.7% 54,905 2.0% 56,440 2.6%
*2016 – Asia includes all International retail operations

The table below reflects the reporting structure prior to 2016 and is provided to show
some perspective on the company’s performance over time through 2015.

A break down like-for-like performance by division is shown below:

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Retail Operations: WIMWI UK & ROI

WIMWI UK & ROI 2017 2018

Revenue £ millions 43,524 44,908
Change in revenue (3.4%) 3.2%
Trading profit (£ millions) 803 1,053
Trading profit margin 1.8% 2.3%
Like for like sales performance 0.9% 2.3%
Number of stores 3,581 3,585
Total sales area 000 sq. ft. 43,398 43,352
Sales per sq. ft. (£000's) 997 998
Avg. number of full time employees 218,552 210,312
Sales per avg. full time employees 199 214
NB: Stores and sales area do not include franchise stores

WIMWI operates more than 3,500 stores in the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland across multiple retail formats including convenience stores and hypermarkets:
 WIMWI Superstores are large supermarkets, which primarily stock groceries alongside
a small range of home goods.
 WIMWI Extras are out-of-town hypermarkets that sell groceries, clothing, home ware
and electronics.
 WIMWI Metros are small supermarkets located in city centres.
 WIMWI Express locations are convenience stores that retail snacks and everyday
essentials such as milk. Many WIMWI Express locations exist alongside petrol stations.
 WIMWI Dotcom stores serve WIMWI’s online shopping business.
 One Stop shops are convenience stores that tend to be located in lower income areas
than WIMWI Express stores. One Stop stores frequently compete with other lower end
convenience stores, such as Costcutter.

In addition to selling third party products, WIMWI has three tiers of its Own Brand range: ‘good’
- including H.W. Nevill’s bread and Hearty Food Co., ‘better’ – including its WIMWI range of
products, and ‘best’ – including its WIMWI finest range of products. During FY18, the group
conducted a review of all three tiers embarked on a re-launch of over 10,000 products. WIMWI
also introduced its new Hearty Food Co., Go Cook and Fox & Ivy ranges during the year. The
group saw its own brand ranges increase on a like-for-like basis by 4.2% during FY18.

Retail Operations: WIMWI International

WIMWI International 2017 2018
Revenue £ millions 11,381 11,532
Change in revenue 4.3% 1.3%
Trading profit (£ millions) 320 418
Trading profit margin 2.8% 3.6%
Like-for-like sales - Asia 1.8% (10.0%)
Like-for-like sales - Central Europe 0.9% 0.3%
Number of stores 2,972 2,984
Total sales area 000 sq. ft. 48,831 44,200
Sales per sq. ft. (£000's) 209 231
NB: Stores and sales area do not include franchise stores

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WIMWI operates 2,984 stores outside the UK and the Republic of Ireland. In Asia, WIMWI has
operations in Malaysia (WIMWI Superstores, WIMWI Extras and a home delivery service) and
Thailand (WIMWI Lotus) and in Thailand via WIMWI Lotus. WIMWI Lotus is the market leader in
Thailand with a market share of c. 15% and operates hypermarkets, supermarkets and
convenience stores. In Europe, the company has WIMWI Superstores, WIMWI Express and a
handful of WIMWI Extra stores in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. It also
has a chain of convenience stores operating under the Zabka brand through a franchise
agreement in the Czech Republic.

WIMWI Bank
WIMWI Bank was initially a 50:50 joint venture with RBS until WIMWI bought RBS’s stake in
2008 for £950 million. The bank primarily provides mortgages, credit cards, personal loans,
insurance, current and savings accounts to customers in the United Kingdom and reported
revenues (interest income and commissions and fees) of £1,051 million and a trading profit of
£173 million for FYE 2018. WIMWI Bank’s operating performance is summarized below:

Strategy: 2000 to 2013

WIMWI launched WIMWI Dotcom as a separate online shopping business in 2000, and it was
the market pioneer for online grocery shopping, offering both store collection and delivery in an
hour time slot to customers before many of its competitors. While many of WIMWI’s competitors
have been known to lose money, WIMWI Dotcom has been able to make a consistent profit.

Between 2003 and 2011, WIMWI’s pursued a strategy of expansion and diversification, making
acquisitions / entering into joint ventures in Turkey and Thailand and expanded into China,
South Korea and Japan. In addition, the group expanded into the US market in 2007 via the
acquisition of Fresh and Easy. Much of WIMWI’s expansion, however, was not as successful
as the group anticipated. As a result, WIMWI disposed of its Japanese operations in 2012, and
its Chinese joint venture business was folded into a much larger state-owned retailer (WIMWI
received a 20% stake in the newly formed joint venture). In spite of heavy investment in the US
operations, Fresh & Easy generated substantial losses and in 2013 the group disposed of it
recording a loss of £2 billion. The group’s diversification strategy also included of the
acquisition of a controlling stake in Blinkbox, an Internet video and music streaming service in
2011 and the restaurant chain Giraffe for £48.6 million in 2013.

Pricing Scandal
During 2013, WIMWI was hit by a series of food and pricing scandals in the UK. This included
misrepresentations with regard to the type of meat being sold (e.g. horsemeat in lieu of minced
beef, imported pork chops sold as British pork chops) and misleading customers over
promotions. These incidents had a substantial impact on WIMWI’s reputation and a knock-on
effect on overall profitability.

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In line with its other UK competitors, WIMWI has also been facing increased competition from
new entrants into its home market. In particular, discount German supermarkets Aldi and Lidl
have been investing heavily in the UK over the past five years, building a combined market
share of approximately 10% as consumers have switched away from the more established UK
retailers. The increased presence of Aldi and Lidl has led some of the local incumbents to cut
prices in an effort to compete and maintain both market share and customer loyalty.

In response to the scandals and the pricing pressures, WIMWI announced a strategy in late
2013 involving the renovation of existing stores and the hiring of new staff.

Change in Management / Accounting Scandal

WIMWI’s management underwent an overhaul in 2014 and 2015. WIMWI brought in a new
CEO, Dave Lewis (from Unilever), in October 2014 to replace Philip Clarke, and a new CFO,
Alan Steward, who came from Marks & Spencer. This was the first time that WIMWI had
recruited a CEO externally. Shortly after the arrival of Dave Lewis, a whistle blower alerted
WIMWI’s general counsel that the group’s profits were overstated because payments made
by suppliers had been mistakenly stated as revenue. As a result, Deloitte and legal advisers
Freshfields were brought in to investigate. (PwC are WIMWI’s usual auditors).

The investigation uncovered that WIMWI’s profits were overstated by £263 million due to
incorrectly stated revenue going back two years in its UK business. Consequently, Dave Lewis
suspended eight senior executives from different parts of WIMWI’s UK operations. This also led
to the resignation of Chairman Richard Broadbrent who was replaced by John Allen, formerly
the Chairman of Dixons, in March 2015. The board also appointed three new non-executive
directors in 2015 and three new non-executive directors in April 2016. In March 2017, WIMWI
announced that its UK subsidiary has come to an agreement with the UK’s Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) resulting in the end of the SFO’s investigation. Under the terms of the agreement, WIMWI
paid a fines and other costs of c. £450 million.

At the end of 2014, WIMWI’s management announced a revamped strategy which had the aim
of reducing costs (restructure central overheads, simplify store management structures and
close 43 unprofitable stores), restoring WIMWI’s competitiveness in its core business (“building
a better WIMWI” by providing best shopping experience to the customer and enhancing quality,
service, range, price and store environment) and reducing total indebtedness which stood at
£21.7 billion (including lease commitments and pension deficit) at financial year-end. WIMWI
also announced initiatives aimed at improving its service and price competitiveness in a bid to
lure back customers and a revamped programme aimed at improving relations with its suppliers.
The group also divested non-core / underperforming businesses including WIMWI Broadband,
Blinkbox streaming business, its South Korean operations, which mainly consisted of the
Homeplus brand, for £4.2 billion, its Turkish operations, Dobbies (garden centres) and Giraffe (a
family friendly UK restaurant chain).

In an effort to reduce the company’s exposure to inflation (i.e. index-linked operating leases),
WIMWI decided to increase ownership of its property. This was done by way of an asset swap
with British Land (regaining sole ownership of 21 superstores) and transactions with two funds
allowing it to regain sole ownership of 49 large stores and two distribution centres.

Current Strategy
WIMWI’s current business model is based on three pillars: customer, product and channels.
WIMWI states that it exists to serve its customers – listening to them and acting on what is
most important is why they choose to shop at WIMWI. In addition, the group builds close and
mutually-beneficial relationships with its supplier partners to source the best possible products
that meet and anticipate customers’ needs. Finally, in order to bring the best products to

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customers, WIMWI works through a range of channels – from small shops to large shops, and
its online business. Joka, the group’s latest acquisition, gives it access to new channels,
including business centres and delivered wholesale.

The group believes that by focusing on its six strategic drivers, it will create long-term value or
all of its stakeholders. These are:
 a differentiated brand (i.e. focus on own-brand products and food quality)
 reduce operating costs by £1.5 billion by FY20 (2018: £594 million, to-date: £820
million)
 generate £9 billion cash from operations by FY20 (2018: £495 million, to-date: £2.8
billion)
 maximise the mix to achieve a 3.5% - 4.0% margin by FY20 (2018: 2.9%)
 maximise value of property portfolio via the sale of various properties while increasing
the proportion of freehold property (to-date: £1.4 billion in the sale of property,
percentage of freehold property in the UK and ROI from 41% to 52%)
 innovation - launch of new products and new technologies.

Little Helps Plan

In October 2017, WIMWI rolled out its Little Helps plan which addresses how the group works
in partnership with others including suppliers, NGOs, governments and other retailers in order
to make a positive contribution with regard to the most pressing social and environmental
challenges facing the business, its customers and its communities. The plan’s targets include
helping to make sustainable products accessible and affordable for all, to support all of its
colleagues to live healthier lives and help its customers make healthier food choices, to ensure
they never use more packaging than is needed and to opt for sustainable sources and to reuse
and recycle, and to help halve global food waste, farm to fork, by 2030.

Joka Acquisition
In March 2018, WIMWI completed its acquisition of Joka, the UK’s largest wholesale food
supplier (2016 revenues: £3.2 billion cash and carry, £1.8 billion food delivery) for a total
consideration of £3.893 billion - £766 million in cash and £3,127 million in shares. WIMWI
claims that the combined business will bring benefits including 1) better availability of quality
food at attractive prices across retail and eating out locations, 2) help for independent retailers,
caterers and small businesses by further improving choice, price and service, with enhanced
digital and deliver service options, and 3) a broader market opportunity for WIMWI’s suppliers
with strong growth prospects and an opportunity to develop better own brand and fresh ranges.
In addition, WIMWI expects cost synergies of at least £200 million per year by the end of the
third year following the close of the merger.

Ownership
WIMWI is publicly listed; In November 2017, WIMWI announced the reinstatement of its
dividend for the first time since 2014 and paid 1.0p per share

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 Five-year record
Figures below reflect the latest published information. For financial years prior to 2018, these figures represent the comparatives from the following years’ financial
statements. During 2017, the Group decided to sell its operations in Turkey. Accordingly, these operations were treated as discontinued in 2017. The 2016
statistics have been re-presented to be consistent with 2017. Prior years have not been re-presented. Korea was first classified as a discontinued operation in
2016. China was first classified as a discontinued operation in 2013/14.

The Group has determined new segments during the financial year. Refer to Note 2. The Group had also determined new segments and defined new APMs
during 2016. Historical data up to 2015 data for these new measures and segments has been presented, but prior historic data has not.

2014 2015(a) 2016 2017 2018

Financial statistics (£m)
Sales
UK & ROI 38,228 37,189 37,692 38,650
Central Europe 6,186 5,268 5,977 6,343
Asia 4,492 4,447 5,186 4,947
WIMWI Bank 1,003 947 955 1,012 1,051
Group sales(c) 49,853 47,859 49,867 50,991
Revenue
UK & ROI 45,062 43,080 43,524 44,908
Central Europe 6,424 5,451 6,195 6,585
Asia 4,492 4,447 5,186 4,947
WIMWI Bank 1,003 947 955 1,012 1,051
Group revenue 63,557 56,925 53,933 55,917 57,491
Operating profit/(loss) before exceptional items(c)
UK & ROI 498 503 803 1,053
Central Europe (4) 102 58 119
Asia 258 218 262 299
WIMWI Bank 188 162 157 173
Group operating profit/(loss) before exceptional items(c) 940 985 1,280 1,644
Operating profit margin before exceptional items 1.7% 1.8% 2.3% 2.9%
Operating profit/(loss)
UK & ROI (5,334) 597 519 1,199
Central Europe (666) 111 190 21 2
Asia 97 203 231 277
WIMWI Bank 153 161 77 149
Group operating profit/(loss) 2,631 (5,750) 1,072 1,017 1,837
Share of post-tax profits/(losses) of joint ventures and associates 60 (13) (21) (107) (6)
Net finance costs (432) (571) (849) (765) (533)
Profit/(loss) before tax 2,259 (6,334) 202 145 1,298
Taxation (347) 670 54 (87) (306)
Profit/(loss) for the year from continuing operations 1,912 (5,664) 256 58 992
Discontinued operations (942) (102) (127) (112) 216
Profit/(loss) for the year 970 (5,766) 129 (54) 1,208
Attributable to:
Owners of the parent 974 (5,741) 138 (40) 1,206
Non-controlling interests (4) (25) (9) (14) 2
Profit before tax before exceptional items, net pension finance costs and fair 516 509 781 1,282
value remeasurements on financial instruments(c)
Other financial statistics
Diluted earnings/(losses) per share – continuing operations (69.56)p 3.22p 0.81p 12.08p
Diluted earnings per share – continuing operations before exceptional items, net 5.70p 5.79p 7.30p 11.88p
pension finance costs and fair value remeasurements on financial instruments(c)
Dividend per share(b) 14.76p 1.16p – – 3.00p
Cash generated from Retail operating activities (£m) 4,607 1,860 2,581 2,278 2,773
Return on capital employed (ROCE)(c) 13.6% 4.0% 6.2% 8.1% 10.9%
Total shareholder return(c) 3.7% (9.5)% (11.8)% (7.5)% 8.7%
Net debt (£m)(c) 6,597 8,481 5,110 3,729 2,625
Discounted operating lease commitments – continuing operations (£m) 9,419 9,353 7,814 7,440 6,931
Pension deficit, net of deferred tax – Group (£m) 2,559 3,885 2,612 5,504 2,728
Total indebtedness (£m)(c) 18,575 21,719 15,536 16,673 12,284
Enterprise Value (£m)(c) 33,597 28,415 20,101 19,262 19,452
Group Retail statistics
Number of stores(d) 7,305 6,849 6,733 6,809 6,966
Total sales area (’000 sq. ft.)(d) 109,572 95,811 91,195 89,041 87 ,9 90
Average employees 510,444 480,607 475,399 464,520 448,988
Average full-time equivalent employees (FTE) 391,868 362,370 351,289 342,770 327,916
UK & ROI Retail statistics
Number of stores(d) 3,524 3,710 3,743 3,739 3,754
Total sales area (’000 sq. ft.)(d) 45,300 45,946 45,253 43,610 43,577
Average full-time equivalent employees (FTE) 225,192 225,378 218,522 210,312
Revenue (exc. fuel) (per FTE – £) 169,757 165,007 172,486 183,775
Weekly revenue (exc. fuel) (per sq. ft. – £) 15.81 15.68 16.31 17.05
(a) 53 weeks. (b) Dividend per share relating to the interim and proposed final dividend. (c) See glossary for definitions. (d) Including franchise stores.

154 WIMWI PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2018

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 Industry Overview – Food Retailing
Food retailing encompasses a variety of different formats including hypermarkets / superstores,
supermarkets, discount stores, local grocery stores, convenience stores, specialist food
retailers and food markets, all of which may also provide online services. Food retailing was
historically dominated by supermarkets and hypermarkets, and the industry was generally seen
as fairly mature. However, the more traditional food retailing model has been under pressure
from discount retailers and online food retailing, both of which have grown significantly over the
past decade. The pressure on established UK food retailers has been amplified by an increase
in food inflation, which saw four-year highs at the end of 2017, and which has further squeezed
consumers’ spending ability. During the fiscal quarter ended January 2018, overall UK grocery
sales increased by 3.4% year on year. Aldi and Lidl, the largest discount retailers, saw sales
increase by 16% during the period when compared to same quarter last year, online grocer
Ocado experienced an increase of c. 8% and the remaining retailers had an increase of 3% on
average.

Strong competition and political and economic uncertainly are expected to lead to lower overall
volumes and a continued commitment to lower prices in 2018, according to IGD, a UK-based
research and training charity. In spite of this, however, a number of growth areas are expected
including healthy products, food-to-go and premium private label products. Waitrose, for
example, has introduced a new Good Health label and Lidl has said that it has seen a 37%
increase in fruit and vegetable sales since 2014, in part due to its ‘Pick of the Week’
promotions. One of the ways food retailers have capitalised on the food-to-go trend is through
partnerships. In 2017, Marks and Spencer opened its first Wasabi sushi counter and Patisserie
Valerie began selling its pastries in Sainsbury’s stores.

Many food retailers have also attempted to expand through different formats, as well as
outside of their home markets. This has been done with varying degrees of success. This,
together with pressure from discounters in home markets, has led some food retailers to divest
non-core / non-performing operations to focus on improving performance in the companies’
home markets.

Food retailing is essentially a low margin business (i.e. EBITDA margins of less than 10%).
Although there are variations amongst formats and countries, key costs tend to be the cost of
buying products from suppliers, as well as staff costs. In an effort to increase profitability and
improve customer loyalty, many retailers continue to increase their focus on private label
products, or products which are branded but which are provided by the retailer itself. For
example, Asda’s revamped ‘Farm Stores’ range saw a 20% increase YoY through May-2016
and Morrisons has announced plans to introduce 1,000 new products in its ‘The Best’ range.
Most chains today aim to have between 25% - 50% of total revenues generated through their
own brands.

The industry is also characterised by a high level of capital expenditure, both through
refurbishment of old stores and building new stores. This used to be primarily done by the
traditional and high-end retailers; however, discounters such as Lidl have increased
refurbishment budgets in an effort to improve the overall shopping experience. In addition,
many retailers have increased expenditure on technology as programmes such as online
shopping and 1-hour delivery have become more popular.

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 Food Retailers (*exclusive of any financial services)
Y/end Currency 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 17/18 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 17/18
Sales Debt
WIMWI Feb GBP m 62,554 55,978 53,478 54,905 56,440 WIMWI 10,427 10,727 11,525 12,155 10,587 7,699
Sainsburys Mar GBP m 23,921 23,443 23,168 25,824 27,944 Sainsburys 2,478 2,089 2,337 2,053 2,211 2,240
Morrisons Feb GBP m 17,680 16,816 16,122 16,317 17,262 Morrisons 2,432 3,033 2,519 2,204 1,550 1,317
Waitrose Jan GBP m 6,100 6,500 6,086 6,245 6,355 Waitrose
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** Dec Euro m 32,615 32,774 38,203 49,695 62,890 Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz2,610 2,376 2,623 2,922 4,705 5,499
Carrefour* Dec Euro m 74,809 74,706 79,465 76,645 78,897 Carrefour* 11,156 16,783 16,901 16,121 16,558 15,788
Groupe Casino Dec Euro m 47,870 48,493 35,312 36,030 37,822 Groupe Casino 12,180 11,091 13,747 11,734 10,215 8,722
*Except for Carrefour which includes financial services
**Ahold and Delhaize are combined beginning in 2016/2017 (5 months of Delhaize)
Change in sales % Debt/Underlying EBITDA
WIMWI (2.0%) (10.5%) (4.7%) 2.6% 2.7% WIMWI 2.1 2.3 4.2 6.0 4.4 2.6
Sainsburys 2.7% (2.0%) (1.2%) 10.3% 7.6% Sainsburys 1.8 1.5 1.8 3.2 3.5 3.6
Morrisons (2.4%) (4.9%) (4.3%) 1.2% 5.5% Morrisons 1.6 2.1 2.3 7.3 3.6 3.8
Waitrose 5.9% 6.6% (6.8%) 2.5% 1.7% Waitrose
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** (0.7%) 0.5% 14.2% 23.1% 21.0% Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz1.1 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.8 2.5
Carrefour* (2.6%) (0.1%) 6.0% (3.7%) 2.9% Carrefour* 3.0 4.5 4.5 6.6 7.0 7.9
Groupe Casino 14.1% 1.3% (27.2%) 2.0% 4.7% Groupe Casino 3.9 3.6 4.5 11.8 9.9 7.0

Reported Operating Profit margin % Interest cover

WIMWI 3.9% (10.5%) 1.7% 1.6% 2.9% WIMWI 9 8 5 4 5 7
Sainsburys 4.2% 0.1% 2.8% 2.5% 2.4% Sainsburys 11 11 9 9 10 130
Morrisons (0.5%) (4.1%) 1.9% 2.9% 2.7% Morrisons 24 18 11 10 7 7
Waitrose 5.1% 3.7% 3.8% 3.3% 2.7% Waitrose
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** 3.8% 3.8% 3.4% 3.2% 3.5% Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz10 10 10 11 11 13
Carrefour* 3.2% 3.4% 2.8% 2.5% 0.9% Carrefour* 4 8 5 8 10 11
Groupe Casino 5.4% 3.6% 1.8% 1.1% 2.0% Groupe Casino 10 4 4 4 4 4

Underlying Operating Profit margin % CAPEX to Sales

WIMWI 5.0% 2.1% 1.5% 2.0% 2.9% WIMWI 4.1% 4.0% 3.6% 1.6% 2.2% 2.6%
Sainsburys 3.6% 3.1% 2.7% 2.4% 2.2% Sainsburys 4.7% 3.3% 4.1% 2.8% 2.9% 2.3%
Morrisons 4.5% 2.6% 1.9% 2.6% 2.0% Morrisons 5.4% 5.8% 3.1% 2.3% 2.6% 2.5%
Waitrose 5.1% 3.7% 3.8% 4.0% 2.7% Waitrose 3.4% 4.7% 6.0% 3.5% 2.7% 2.5%
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** 4.2% 3.9% 3.8% 3.4% 3.5% Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz2.8% 2.5% 2.2% 2.1% 2.6% 2.7%
Carrefour* 3.0% 3.2% 3.1% 3.1% 2.5% Carrefour* 2.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.0% 3.6% 3.0%
Groupe Casino 4.9% 4.6% 2.8% 2.9% 3.3% Groupe Casino 3.3% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.6%

Underlying EBITDA margin % CAPEX vs. Depreciation

WIMWI 7.5% 4.9% 3.8% 4.4% 5.2% WIMWI 165% 159% 128% 69% 92% 111%
Sainsburys 5.9% 5.4% 5.2% 4.8% 61.8% Sainsburys 211% 145% 175% 116% 121% 98%
Morrisons 8.1% 6.5% 6.0% 4.5% 4.0% Morrisons 266% 109% 134% 95% 137% 129%
Waitrose Waitrose 106% 70% 82%
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** 6.8% 6.4% 6.6% 6.1% 5.9% Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz96% 95% 87% 77% 96% 111%
Carrefour* 5.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.6% Carrefour* 96% 146% 175% 151% 179% 146%
Groupe Casino 6.5% 6.3% 4.4% 4.3% 4.9% Groupe Casino 125% 165% 168% 170% 168% 161%

Underlying EBITDAR margin % Inventory DOH

WIMWI 9.6% 7.4% 5.8% 6.3% 7.0% WIMWI 21 21 19 17 15 15
Sainsburys 8.0% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 7.4% Sainsburys 15 15 16 15 25 24
Morrisons 8.5% 7.0% 6.6% 5.1% 4.6% Morrisons 16 18 14 14 14 15
Waitrose Waitrose
Ahold / Ahold Delhaize** 8.7% 8.2% 8.4% 8.1% 7.4% Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz17 16 18 16 24 18
Carrefour* 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.4% 6.2% Carrefour* 27 28 30 29 34 32
Groupe Casino 9.0% 8.8% 6.9% 6.8% 7.5% Groupe Casino 41 34 38 48 38 37

Accounts Payable DOH

WIMWI 63 61 63 57 57 59
Sainsburys 43 41 46 48 53 56
Morrisons 43 47 48 57 63 63
Waitrose
Ahold / Ahold Delhaiz42 40 44 42 57 44
Carrefour* 63 64 67 65 76 70
Groupe Casino 78 66 76 100 85 77

INTERNAL